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THE
SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST

London

HENRY FROWDE

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THE
SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST

TRANSLATED

BY VARIOUS ORIENTAL SCHOLARS

AND EDITED BY

F. MAX MÜLLER

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G A I N A S Ū T R A S

TRANSLATED FROM PRAKR/IT

BY

HERMANN JACOBI

PART II

THE UTTARÂDHYAYANA SŪTRA

THE SŪTRAKR/TÂNGA SŪTRA



Oxford

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

1895

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CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION	PAGE xiii
------------------------	--------------

UTTARÂDHYAYANA.

LECTURE	1. On discipline (especially for pupils) . . .	1
„	2. On troubles. (About the twenty-two things that cause trouble to monks) . . .	8
„	3. The four requisites (for the attainment of beatitude)	15
„	4. Impurity. (Carefulness required for obtaining the end).	18
„	5. Death against (and with) one's will . . .	20
„	6. The false ascetic. (Wrong conduct leads to perdition, right conduct to salvation) . . .	24
„	7. The parable of the ram, &c. (illustrative of the folly of the sinner who misses his chance of reaching a more exalted state of existence)	27
„	8. Kapila's verses (in praise of good conduct) . . .	31
„	9. The Pravragyâ of king Nami. (A dialogue between him and Indra who advised him to retain the royalty)	35
„	10. The leaf of the tree. (A sermon by Mahāvira on the punishment of the sinner and the reward of the righteous)	41
„	11. The very learned (monk; his virtues and his superiority)	46
„	12. Harikêsa, (a Kândâla, turned monk; his victory over a Brahman, whom he converts) . . .	50
„	13. Kîtra and Sambhûta. (A dialogue on the vanity of worldly pleasures) . . .	56
„	14. Ishukâra. (A legend, illustrating the excellence of a monastic life)	61

	PAGE
LECTURE 15. The true monk; (how he should conduct himself)	69
„ 16. The ten conditions of perfect chastity . . .	73
„ 17. The bad <i>Sramana</i> ; (what a monk should avoid)	77
„ 18. <i>Saṅgaya</i> . (King S. turned monk; he preaches that the state of a monk is preferable to that of a king; illustrations from <i>Gaina</i> history) .	80
„ 19. The son of <i>Mrigā</i> . (On the punishment in the hells)	88
„ 20. The great duty of the <i>Nirgranthas</i> . (A dialogue between king <i>Srêṇika</i> and a monk on the happiness obtained by righteousness. The bad monk is lost)	100
„ 21. <i>Samudrapāla</i> , (turned monk. On the duties of a monk)	108
„ 22. <i>Rathanēmi</i> . (The renunciation of <i>Arishanēmi</i> ; his wife <i>Rāḡmatī</i> exhorts <i>Rathanēmi</i>) . .	112
„ 23. <i>Kēsi</i> and <i>Gautama</i> . (The followers of <i>Pārsva</i> are brought over to the church of <i>Mahāvīra</i>)	119
„ 24. The <i>Samitis</i> (and the <i>Guptis</i>)	129
„ 25. The true sacrifice. (<i>Gayaghōsha</i> , the monk, converts <i>Vigayaghōsha</i> , the Brahman) . .	136
„ 26. The correct behaviour (of monks during the several parts of day and night)	142
„ 27. The bad bullocks (compared to bad pupils by <i>Garga</i>)	149
„ 28. The road to final deliverance. (On the fundamental principles of <i>Gainism</i>) . .	152
„ 29. The exertion in righteousness. (On the seventy-three articles necessary for reaching perfection)	158
„ 30. The road of penance. (On external and internal austerities).	174
„ 31. Mode of life. (A list of articles of the <i>Gaina</i> faith according to the number of their subdivisions)	180
„ 32. The causes of carelessness; (what excites the passions and produces <i>Karman</i>)	184

	PAGE
LECTURE 33. The nature of Karman, (and the subdivisions of it)	192
„ 34. On Lēsyā	196
„ 35. The houseless monk. (The chief duties of a monk)	203
„ 36. On living beings and things without life. (The contents of this Lecture are detailed in note 2, pp. 206, 207)	206

SŪTRAKR/TAṄGA.

FIRST BOOK.

LECTURE 1. The doctrine. (On some heretical doctrines)	235-248
Chapter 1. (Materialists, v. 8; Vedāntins, v. 9; other materialists, vv. 11, 12; Akriyāvādins, v. 13; forerunners of the Vaisēshikas, v. 15; Bauddhas, v. 17; <i>Gāṇḍāyās</i> , v. 18)	235
Chapter 2. (Fatalists, vv. 1-3; Agnostics, v. 17; Kriyāvādins, v. 24; Buddhists, vv. 25-28, cf. p. 414)	239
Chapter 3. (Paurāṇikas, vv. 6-8; the followers of Gōśāla, vv. 11, 12; Vainayikas, v. 14)	243
Chapter 4. (Some popular beliefs, vv. 6, 7. Conclusion)	246
„ 2. The destruction of Karman; (how to lead a holy life)	249-261
Chapter 1	249
Chapter 2	253
Chapter 3	257
„ 3. The knowledge of troubles	261-271
Chapter 1. (A monk encounters many difficulties)	261
Chapter 2. (He is tempted back to domestic life)	263
Chapter 3. (He easily desponds. The opinion refuted that a monk should not provide a sick brother with food)	265

	PAGE
LECTURE 3. Chapter 4. (Several objections removed) .	268
„ 4. Knowledge of women	271-278
Chapter 1. (How women tempt a monk) .	271
Chapter 2. (How they treat him afterwards) .	275
„ 5. Description of the hells	279-286
Chapter 1	279
Chapter 2	283
„ 6. Praise of Mahāvīra	287
„ 7. Description of the wicked. (No living beings should be destroyed; no merit in ablutions and tending the sacrificial fire. A monk should not be selfish)	292
„ 8. On exertion. (Exertion not leading to works recommended)	297
„ 9. The Law. (What a monk should abstain from)	301
„ 10. Carefulness. (Some more injunctions and prohibitions)	306
„ 11. The Path. (The same subject continued and concluded)	310
„ 12. The creed. (On the four heresies: Agnos- ticism, v. 2; Vinayavāda, v. 3; Akriyāvāda, vv. 4-10; Kriyāvāda, v. 11 ff.)	315
„ 13. The real truth. (Some duties of a pious monk)	320
„ 14. The Nirgrantha. (The same subject con- tinued)	324
„ 15. The Yamakas. (Miscellaneous topics treated in artificial verses)	329
„ 16. The song. (On the virtues of a true monk) .	333

SECOND BOOK.

LECTURE 1. The Lotus. (The parable of the Lotus. The Materialists, § 14 ff. Another school of Materialists and the forerunners of the Vaisēshikas, § 20 ff. The Vēdāntins, § 25 ff. The fatalists, § 30 ff. Exhortation to follow the true Law, § 35 ff.)	335
--	-----

	PAGE
LECTURE 2. On activity. (The twelve kinds of committing sin, and sinless actions. Some wicked practices described, § 25 ff. Some more wicked practices, § 60 ff. Right conduct of monks, § 69 ff.; of laymen, § 75 ff. Refutation of the 363 heretical philosophical schools, § 79 ff. Conclusion)	355
„ 3. Knowledge of food. (On the generation of living beings).	388
„ 4. Renunciation of activity. (An action is sinful though it be done unconsciously)	398
„ 5. Freedom from error; (what should be maintained and what not)	405
„ 6. Âdraka; (his dispute with Gôrâla, a Buddhist, a Vêdic priest, a Vêdântin, and a Hastitâpasa)	409
„ 7. Nâlandâ. (Udaka, a follower of Pârsva, is converted by Gautama)	419
INDEX OF NAMES AND SUBJECTS	437
INDEX OF SANSKRIT AND PRÂKRIT WORDS	443

Transliteration of Oriental Alphabets adopted for the Translations of the Sacred Books of the East	453
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INTRODUCTION

TEN years have elapsed since the first part of my translation of *Gaina Sûtras* appeared. During that decennium many and very important additions to our knowledge of Gainism and its history have been made by a small number of excellent scholars. The text of the canonical books, together with good commentaries in Sanskrit and Guzeratî, has been made accessible in fair editions published by native scholars in India. Critical editions of two of them have been published by Professors Leumann¹ and Hoernle²; and the latter scholar has added a careful translation and ample illustrations to his edition of the text. A general survey of the whole *Gaina* literature has been given by Professor Weber in his catalogue of the Berlin Manuscripts³ and in his learned treatise⁴ on the sacred literature of the *Gainas*. The development of *Gaina* learning and science has been studied by Professor Leumann, and some *Gaina* legends and their relations to those of the Brahmins and Buddhists have been investigated by the same scholar⁵. An important document for our knowledge of the old history of the *Svêtâmbara* sect has been edited

¹ Das *Aupapâtika Sûtra*, in the *Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, vol. viii; and *Dasavaikâlîka Sûtra* und *Niryukti*, in the *Journal of the German Oriental Society*, vol. xlv.

² The *Uvâsaga Dasâo*: (in the *Bibliotheca Indica*), vol. i. Text and Commentary, Calcutta, 1890; vol. ii. Translation, 1888.

³ Berlin, 1888 and 1892.

⁴ In the *Indische Studien*, vol. xvi, p. 211 ff., and xvii, p. 1 ff.; translated in the *Indian Antiquary* and edited separately, Bombay, 1893.

⁵ In the *Actes du VI Congrès International des Orientalistes*, section Arienne, p. 469 ff., in the 5th and 6th vols. of the *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, and in the 48th vol. of the *Journal of the German Oriental Society*.

by myself¹, and the history of some of their *Gakkhas* has been made known from their lists of teachers by Hoernle and Klatt. The last-named scholar, whom we have all but lost by this time, has prepared a biographical dictionary of all Gaina writers and historical persons, and he has issued specimens of this great Onomasticon, while Hofrat Bühler has written a detailed biography of the famous encyclopaedist Hēmaṅdra². The same scholar has deciphered the ancient inscriptions, and discussed the sculptures excavated by Dr. Führer at Mathurā³, and the important inscriptions at *Sravana Belgola* have been edited by Mr. Lewis Rice⁴; M. A. Barth has reviewed our knowledge of Gainism⁵, and likewise Bühler in a short paper⁶. Lastly Bhandarkar has given a most valuable sketch of the whole of Gainism⁷. All these additions to our knowledge of Gainism (and I have but mentioned the most remarkable ones) have shed so much clear light on the whole subject that little room is left now for mere guesswork, and the true historical and philological method can be applied to all its parts. Still some of the principal problems require elucidation, while the proffered solution of others is not accepted by all scholars. I, therefore, gladly avail myself of this opportunity to discuss some of the disputed points, for the settling of which the works translated in this volume offer valuable materials.

It is now admitted by all that Nātaputta (*Gñātriputra*), who is commonly called Mahāvīra or Vardhamāna, was a contemporary of Buddha; and that the *Niganthas*⁸

¹ The *Parisishāparvan* by Hēmaṅdra, *Bibliotheca Indica*.

² *Denkschriften der philos.-histor. Classe der kaiserl. Akademie der Wissenschaften*, vol. xxxvii, p. 171 ff.

³ *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, vols. ii and iii. *Epigraphia Indica*, vols. i and ii.

⁴ Bangalore, 1889.

⁵ *The Religions of India*. *Bulletin des Religions de l'Inde*, 1889-94.

⁶ *Über die indische Secte der Jaina*. Wien, 1887.

⁷ Report for 1883-84.

⁸ *Nigantha* is apparently the original form of the word, since it is thus spelled in the *Asōka* inscription, in Pāli, and occasionally by the Gainas, though the phonetic laws of all three idioms would have given preference to the form *niggantha*, the more frequent spelling in Gaina works.

(Nirgranthas), now better known under the name of *Gainas* or *Ārhatas*, already existed as an important sect at the time when the Buddhist church was being founded. But it is still open to doubt whether the religion of the early Nirgranthas was essentially the same as that taught in the canonical and other books of the present *Gainas*, or underwent a great change up to the time of the composition of the *Siddhānta*. In order to come nearer the solution of this question, it may be desirable to collect from the published Buddhist works, as the oldest witnesses we can summon, all available information about the *Niganthas*, their doctrines and religious practices.

In the *Āṅguttara Nikāya*, III, 74, a learned prince of the *Likkhavis* of *Vaisālī*, *Abhaya*¹, gives the following account of some *Nigantha* doctrines: 'The *Nigantha* *Nātaputta*, sir, who knows and sees all things, who claims perfect knowledge and faith (in the following terms): "walking and standing, sleeping or waking, I am always possessed of perfect knowledge and faith;" teaches the annihilation by austerities of the old *Karman*, and the prevention by inactivity of new *Karman*. When *Karman* ceases, misery ceases; when misery ceases, perception ceases; when perception ceases, every misery will come to an end. In this way a man is saved by pure annihilation of sin (*niggarā*) which is really effective.'

The *Gaina* counterpart to these tenets can be collected from the *Uttarādhyayana* XXIX. 'By austerities he cuts off *Karman*,' § 27. 'By renouncing activity he obtains inactivity; by ceasing to act he acquires no new *Karman*, and destroys the *Karman* he had acquired before,' § 37. The last stages in this process are fully described in §§ 71,

¹ There are apparently two persons of this name. The other *Abhaya*, a son of king *Śrēṇika*, was a patron of the *Gainas*, and is frequently mentioned in their legends and in the canonical books. In the *Magghima Nikāya* 58 (*Abhayakumāra Sutta*) it is related that the *Nigantha* *Nātaputta* made him engage in a disputation with *Buddha*. The question was so adroitly framed that whether the answer was Yes or No, it involved *Buddha* in self-contradiction. But the plan did not succeed, and *Abhaya* was converted by *Buddha*. There is nothing in this account to elucidate the doctrines of *Nātaputta*.

72. And again, in XXXII, v. 7, we read : ' Karman is the root of birth and death, and birth and death they call misery.' The nearly identical verses 34, 47, 60, 73, 86, 99 may be thus condensed : ' But a man who is indifferent to the object of the senses, and to the feelings of the mind [this comes nearest to the Buddhist *vêdanâ* perception], is free from sorrows ; though still in the *Samsâra*, he is not afflicted by that long succession of pains. just as the leaf of the Lotus (is not moistened) by water.'

The above assertion that Nâtaputta claimed the possession of perfect knowledge and faith, requires no further proof ; for it is one of the fundamental dogmas of the Gainas.

Another piece of information about Nigantha doctrines may be gathered from the Mahāvagga VI, 31 (S. B. E., vol. xvii, p. 108 ff.) There a story is told of Sîha¹, the general of the *Likkhavis*, who was a lay disciple of Nâtaputta. He wanted to pay the Buddha a visit, but Nâtaputta tried to dissuade him from it, because the Niganthas held the Kriyâvâda, while the Buddha taught the Akriyâvâda. Sîha, however, setting his master's prohibition at naught, went to the Buddha on his own account, and was, of course, converted by him. Now the statement that the Niganthas embraced the Kriyâvâda is borne out by our texts ; for in the Sûtrakṛitāṅga I, 12, 21, below, p. 319, it is said that a perfect ascetic 'is entitled to expound the Kriyâvâda ;' and this doctrine is thus expressed in the Ākārāṅga Sûtra I, 1, 1, 4 (part i, p. 2) : 'He believes in soul, believes in the world, believes in reward, believes in action (believed to be our own doing in such judgments as these) : " I did it ;" " I shall cause another to do it ;" " I shall allow another to do it." '

Another lay disciple of Mahāvîra, converted by the Buddha, was Upâli. As narrated in the *Magghima Nikâya* 56, he ventured upon a dispute with him whether the sins of the mind are heaviest, as the Buddha teaches, or the

¹ The name Sîha occurs in the Bhagavatî (Calcutta edition, p. 1267, see Hoernle, *Uvâsaga Dasâo* Appendix, p. 10) as that of a disciple of Mahāvîra ; but as he was a monk, he cannot be identified with his namesake in the Mahāvagga.

sins of the body, as the *Nigantha* Nātaputta contends. In the beginning of the discourse Upāli states that his master uses the term *danda*, punishment, for what is commonly called *kamma*, deed, act. This is true, though not quite to the letter; for the word *kamma* occurs also in the *Gaina* Sūtras in that sense. The term *danda*, however, is at least as frequently used. Thus, in the *Sūtrakṛitāṅga* II, 2, p. 357 ff., the thirteen kinds of 'committing sins' are treated of, and in the first five cases the word which I have translated 'committing sins' is in the original *danda-samādāne*, and in the remaining cases *kiriyaṭhāne*, i.e. *kriyāsthāna*.

The *Nigantha* Upāli goes on to explain that there are three *dandas*, the *danda* of body, that of speech, and that of mind. This agrees with the *Gaina* doctrine expressed in nearly the same words in the *Sthānāṅga* Sūtra, 3rd uddēsaka (see *Indian Antiquary*, IX, p. 159).

The second statement of Upāli, that the *Niganthas* consider sins of the body more important than sins of the mind, is in perfect harmony with *Gaina* views. For in the *Sūtrakṛitāṅga* II, 4, p. 398 ff., the question is discussed whether sins may be committed unconsciously, and it is boldly answered in the affirmative (compare note 6, p. 399); and in the Sixth Lecture of the same book (p. 414) the Buddhists are severely ridiculed for maintaining that it depends on the intention of the man whether a deed of his be a sin or not.

In the *Āṅguttara Nikāya* III, 70, 3, some practices of *Nigantha* laymen are discussed. I translate the passage thus: 'O Visākhā, there is a class of *Samānas* who are called *Niganthas*. They exhort a *Sāvaka* thus: "Well, sir, you must desist from doing injury to beings in the East beyond a *yōgana* from here, or to those in the West, North, South, always beyond a *yōgana* from here." In this way they enjoin tenderness by making him spare some living beings; in this way they enjoin cruelty by making him not spare other living beings.' It is not difficult to recognise under these words the Digvirati vow of the *Gainas*, which

consists in laying down the limits beyond which one shall not travel nor do business in the different directions. A man who keeps this vow cannot, of course, do any harm to beings beyond the limits within which he is obliged to keep. This is so distorted by the hostile sect as to lay the rule under discussion open to blame. We cannot expect one sect to give a fair and honest exposition of the tenets of their opponents; it is but natural that they should put them in such a form as to make the objections to be raised against them all the better applicable. The Gainas were not a whit better in this respect than the Bauddhas, and they have retorted upon them in the same way; witness their misrepresentation of the Buddhist idea that a deed becomes a sin only through the sinful intention of the doer, in a passage in the present volume, p. 414, v. 26 ff., where the sound principle of the Buddhists is ridiculed by applying it to a fictitious and almost absurd case.

The passage in the *Āṅguttara Nikāya*, which we have just discussed, goes on as follows: 'On the Upôsatha day they exhort a Sāvaka thus: "Well, sir, take off all your clothes and declare: I belong to nobody, and nobody belongs to me." Now his parents know him to be their son, and he knows them to be his parents. His son or wife know him to be their father or husband, and he knows them to be his son or wife. His slaves and servants know him to be their master, and he knows them to be his slaves and servants. Therefore (the *Niganthas*) make him use lying speech at the time when he makes the above declarations. On this account I charge him with lying speech. After the lapse of that night he enjoys pleasures (by means of things) that were not freely given. On this account I charge him with taking of what is not freely given.'

According to this statement, the duties of a *Nigantha* layman became, during the Upôsatha days, equal to those of a monk; it was on common days only that the difference between layman and monk was realised. This description, however, does not quite agree with the Pôsaha rules of the Gainas. Bhandarkar gives the following definition of Pôsaha

according to the *Tattvārthasāradīpikā*, which agrees with what we know about it from other sources: 'Pôsaha, i.e. to observe a fast or eat once only or one dish only on the two holy days (the eighth and the fourteenth of each fortnight), after having given up bathing, unguents, ornaments, company of women, odours, incense, lights, &c., and assumed renunciation as an ornament.' Though the Pôsaha observances of the present Gainas are apparently more severe than those of the Buddhists, still they fall short of the above description of the *Nigantha* rules; for a Gaina layman does not, to my knowledge, take off his clothes during the Pôsaha days, though he discards all ornaments and every kind of luxury; nor must he pronounce any formula of renunciation similar to that which the monks utter on entering the order. Therefore, unless the Buddhist account contains some mistake or a gross misstatement, it would appear that the Gainas have abated somewhat in their rigidity with regard to the duties of laymen.

Buddhaghôsa, in his commentary on the *Brahmagāla Sutta*, *Dīgha Nikāya* I, 2, 38¹, mentions the *Niganthas* as holding the opinion, discussed in the text, that the soul has no colour, in contradistinction to the *Āgīvikas*, who divide mankind into six classes according to the colour of the *Ātman*; both *Niganthas* and *Āgīvikas*, however, agree in maintaining that the soul continues to exist after death and is free from ailments (*arôḡô*). Whatever may be the exact meaning of the last expression, it is clear that the above description squares with the opinions of the Gainas about the nature of the soul, as described below, p. 172 f.

In another passage (l.c. p. 168) Buddhaghôsa says that *Nigantha* Nātaputta considers cold water to be possessed of life (so kira *sītôdakê sattasaññi hôti*), for which reason he does not use it. This doctrine of the Gainas is so generally known that I need not bring forward any quotation from the *Sûtras* in support of its genuineness.

This is nearly all the information on the doctrines of the

¹ *Sumaṅgala Vilāsinī*, p. 119 of the Pali Text Society edition.

ancient *Niganthas* which I have been able to gather from the Pāli texts. Though it is less than we desire, its value is not to be underrated. For with one exception all the doctrines and usages of the ancient *Niganthas* mentioned agree with those of the present *Gainas*, and they comprise some of the fundamental ideas of *Gainism*. It is therefore not probable that the doctrines of the *Gainas* have undergone a great change in the interval between the quoted Buddhist records and the composition of the *Gaina* canon.

I have purposely deferred the discussion of the classical passage on the doctrines of *Nigantha* Nātaputta, because it leads us to a new line of inquiry. The passage in question occurs in the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya*¹. I translate it in accordance with Buddhaghōsa's comment in the *Sumaṅgala Vilāsinī*. 'Here, great king, a *Nigantha* is protected by restraint in four directions (*kāṭu-yāmasamvarasamvutō*). How, great king, is a *Nigantha* protected by restraint in four directions? Here, great king, a *Nigantha* abstains from all (cold) water, he abstains from all bad deeds, by abstinence from all bad deeds he is free from sins, he realises abstinence from all bad deeds. In this way, great king, a *Nigantha* is protected by restraint in four directions. And, great king, because he is thus protected, the *Nigantha* Nātaputta's soul is exalted, is restrained, is well settled².'—This is, certainly, not an accurate nor an exhaustive description of the *Gaina* creed, though it contains nothing alien from it, and successfully imitates the language of the *Gaina Sūtras*. As I have already explained elsewhere³, I think the term *kāṭu-yāmasamvarasamvutō* has been misunderstood not only by the commentator, but also by the author of the text. For

¹ Page 57 of the edition in the Pali Text Society.

² The translations of Gogerly and of Burnouf in Grimblot, *Sept Suttas Pālis*, were made without the help of a commentary, and may, therefore, be passed by. It is, however, open to doubt whether Buddhaghōsa has drawn his information from genuine tradition, or had to rely on conjectures of his own.

³ See my paper, 'On Mahāvīra and his Predecessors,' in the *Indian Antiquary*, IX, 158 ff., where some of the above problems have been treated.

the Pāli *kātuyāma* is equivalent to the Prākṛit *kātug-gāma*, a well-known Gaina term which denotes the four vows of Pārśva in contradistinction to the five vows (*pañcā mahāvaya*) of Mahāvīra. Here, then, the Buddhists, I suppose, have made a mistake in ascribing to Nātaputta Mahāvīra a doctrine which properly belonged to his predecessor Pārśva. This is a significant mistake; for the Buddhists could not have used the above term as descriptive of the Nigantha creed unless they had heard it from followers of Pārśva, and they would not have used it if the reforms of Mahāvīra had already been generally adopted by the Niganthas at the time of the Buddha. I, therefore, look on this blunder of the Buddhists as a proof for the correctness of the Gaina tradition, that followers of Pārśva actually existed at the time of Mahāvīra.

Before following up this line of inquiry, I have to call attention to another significant blunder of the Buddhists: they call Nātaputta an Aggivêśana, i.e. Agnivaśyâyana; according to the Gainas, however, he was a Kāśyapa, and we may credit them in such particulars about their own Tīrthakara. But Sudharman, his chief disciple, who in the Sûtras is made the expounder of his creed, was an Agnivaśyâyana, and as he played a prominent part in the propagation of the Gaina religion, the disciple may often have been confounded by outsiders with the master, so that the Gôtra of the former was erroneously assigned to the latter. Thus by a double blunder the Buddhists attest the existence of Mahāvīra's predecessor Pārśva and of his chief disciple Sudharman.

That Pārśva was a historical person, is now admitted by all as very probable; indeed, his followers, especially Kêsi¹, who seems to have been the leader of the sect at the time of Mahāvīra, are frequently mentioned in Gaina Sûtras in such a matter-of-fact way, as to give us no reason for doubting the authenticity of those records. The legend in

¹ In the Râguprasnî Pārśva has a discussion with king Paësi and converts him, see *Actes du VI Congrès International des Orientalistes*, vol. iii, p. 490 ff.

the Uttarādhyayana, Lecture XXIII, how the union of the old and the new church was effected, is of much interest in this respect. Kēsi and Gautama, the representatives and leaders of the two branches of the Gaina church, both at the head of their pupils, meet in a park near Srāvastī; the differences in their creed concerning the number of great vows, and the use or disuse of clothes are explained away without further discussion, and full harmony with regard to the fundamental ethical ideas is satisfactorily established by the readiness with which allegorical expressions of the one speaker are understood and explained by the other. There seems to have been some estrangement, but no hostility between the two branches of the church; and though the members of the older branch invariably are made to adopt the Law of Mahāvīra, 'which enjoins five vows,' it may be imagined that they continued in some of their old practices, especially with regard to the use of clothes, which Mahāvīra had abandoned. On this assumption we can account for the division of the church in Svêtāmbaras and Digambaras, about the origin of which both sects have contradictory legends¹. There was apparently no sudden rupture; but an original diversity (such as e.g. subsists now between the several *Gakkhas* of the Svêtāmbaras) ripened into division, and in the end brought about the great schism.

The records in the Buddhist Canon are not repugnant to our views about the existence of the *Niganthas* before Nātaputta; for the *Niganthas* must have been an important sect at the time when Buddhism took its rise. This may be inferred from the fact that they are so frequently mentioned in the *Pitakas* as opponents or converts of Buddha and his disciples; and as it is nowhere said or even merely implied that the *Niganthas* were a newly-founded sect, we may conclude that they had already existed a considerable time before the advent of the Buddha. This conclusion is supported by another fact. Makkhali Gôsāla, a contemporary

¹ See my paper on the origin of the Svêtāmbara and Digambara sects in the *Journal of the German Oriental Society*, vol. xxxviii, p. 1 ff.

of Buddha and Mahāvīra, divided mankind into six classes¹. Of these, according to Buddhaghōsa², the third class contains the *Niganthas*. Gōsāla probably would not have ranked them as a separate, i. e. fundamental subdivision of mankind, if they had only recently come into existence. He must have looked upon them as a very important, and at the same time, an old sect, in the same way in which, in my opinion, the early Buddhists looked upon them. As a last argument in favour of my theory I may mention that in the *Magghima Nikāya* 35, a disputation between the Buddha and *Sakkaka*, the son of a *Nigantha*, is narrated. *Sakkaka* is not a *Nigantha* himself, as he boasts of having vanquished Nātaputta in disputation³, and, moreover, the tenets he defends are not those of the *Gainas*. Now when a famous controversialist, whose father was a *Nigantha*, was a contemporary of the Buddha, the *Niganthas* can scarcely have been a sect founded during Buddha's life.

Let us now confront the records of the *Gainas* about the philosophical doctrines of heretics, which they had to combat, with such as the Buddhists describe. In the *Sūtrakrītāṅga* II, 1, 15 (p. 339 f.) and 21 f. (p. 343) two materialistic theories which have much in common are spoken of. The first passage treats of the opinion of those who contend that the body and the soul are one and the same thing; the second passage is concerned with the doctrine that the five elements are eternal and constitute everything. The adherents of either philosophy maintain that it is no sin to kill living beings. Similar opinions are, in the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta*, ascribed to Pūraṇa Kassapa and Agita Kēsakambalī. The former denies that there is such a thing as sin or merit. Agita Kēsakambalī holds that nothing real

¹ *Sāmaññaphala Sutta*, *Dīgha Nikāya* II, 20.

² *Sumaṅgala Vilāsinī*, p. 162. Buddhaghōsa expressly states that Gōsāla reckoned the *Niganthas* lower than his own lay disciples, who form the fourth class.—As Buddhaghōsa does not take umbrage at Gōsāla's reckoning the *Bhikkhus* still lower, it is clear that he did not identify the *Bhikkhus* with the Buddhist monks.

³ See p. 250 of the Pali Text Society edition.

corresponds to the current transcendental ideas. He moreover maintains: 'Man (purisô) consists of the four elements; when he dies, earth returns to earth, water to water, fire to fire, wind to wind, and the organs of sense merge into air (or space)¹. Four bearers with the hearse carry the corpse to the place of cremation (or, while it is burned) they make lamentations; the dove-coloured bones remain, the offerings are reduced to ashes.' The last passage recurs with few alterations in the *Sûtrakṛitāṅga*, p. 340: 'Other men carry the corpse away to burn it. When it has been consumed by fire, only dove-coloured bones remain, and the four bearers return with the hearse to their village².'

In connection with the second materialistic system (p. 343, § 22, and p. 237 f., vv. 15, 16) a variety of it is mentioned, which adds the permanent *Ātman* or soul as a sixth to the five permanent elements. This seems to have been a primitive or a popular form of the philosophy which we now know under the name of *Vaisêshika*. To this school of philosophy we must perhaps assign *Pakudha Kakâyana* of Buddhist record. He maintained³ that there are seven eternal, unchangeable, mutually independent things: the four elements, pleasure, pain, and the soul. As they have no influence upon one another, it is impossible to do any real harm to anybody. I confess that to maintain the eternal existence of pleasure and pain (*sukha* and *dukkha*) and to deny their influence on the soul, seems to me absurd; but the Buddhists have perhaps misstated the original tenets. At any rate, the views of *Pakudha Kakâyana*

¹ *Ākāra*; it is not reckoned as a fifth element in the Buddhist account, but it is so in that of the *Gainas*, see below, p. 343, and p. 237, verse 15. This is a verbal, rather than a material difference.

² I put here the original texts side by side so that their likeness may be more obvious:

âsandipañkamâ purisâ matam
âdâya gakkhanti yâva âlâhanâ
padâni paññâpentî, kâpôtakâni
attâhîni bhavanti, bhassantâ hutiyô.

âdahanâe parêhi niggai, aganig-
ghâmitê sarîre kavôtavannâim
attâhîni âsandipañkamâ purisâ
gâmam pakkâgakkhanti.

³ Loc. cit., p. 56.

come under the denomination of Akriyāvāda; and in this they differ from the Vaisēshika proper, which is a Kriyāvāda system. As these two terms are frequently used both by Buddhists and Gainas, it will not be amiss to define them more accurately. Kriyāvāda is the doctrine which teaches that the soul acts or is affected by acts. Under this head comes Gainism, and of Brahmanical philosophies Vaisēshika and Nyāya (which, however, are not expressly quoted in the canonical books of either Buddhists or Gainas), and apparently a great many systems of which the names have not been preserved, but the existence of which is implied in our texts. Akriyāvāda is the doctrine which teaches either that a soul does not exist, or that it does not act or is not affected by acts. Under this subdivision fall the different schools of materialists; of Brahmanical philosophies the Vēdānta, Sāṅkhya, and Yōga; and the Buddhists. Of the latter the doctrines of the Kṣhāṇikavādins and the Sūnyavādins are alluded to in Sūtrakṛitāṅga I, 14, verses 4 and 7. It may be mentioned here that the Vēdāntists or their opinions are frequently mentioned in the Siddhānta; in the Sūtrakṛitāṅga the Vēdānta is the third heresy described in the First Lecture of the Second Book, p. 344; it is also adverted to in the Sixth Lecture, p. 417. But as no professor of it was among the six heretical teachers (titthiya) of the Buddhists, we may pass them over here¹.

The fourth heresy discussed in the First Lecture of the Second Book of the Sūtrakṛitāṅga² is Fatalism. In the Sāmaññaphala Sutta this system is expounded by Makkhali Gōsāla in the following words³: 'Great king, there is no cause, nor any previously existing principle productive of the pollution of sentient beings; their defilement is uncaused and unproduced by anything previously existing. There is no cause nor any previously existing principle

¹ It is worthy of remark that the Vēdāntists play no conspicuous part, if any, among Buddha's opponents. As they were, however, the foremost of Brahmanical philosophers, we must conclude that Brahmins of learning held aloof from the classes of society to which the new religion appealed.

² Page 345 f., see also p. 239.

³ Grimblot, Sept Suttas Pālis, p. 170.

productive of the purity of sentient beings : their purity is uncaused and unproduced by anything previously existing. For their production there is nothing that results from the conduct of the individuals, nothing from the actions of others, nothing from human effort : they result neither from power nor effort, neither from manly fortitude nor manly energy. Every sentient being, every insect, every living thing, whether animal or vegetable¹, is destitute of intrinsic force, power, or energy, but, being held by the necessity of its nature, experiences happiness or misery in the six forms of existence, &c.' The explanation of these doctrines in the Sûtrakṛitāṅga (l.c.), though less wordy, comes to the same ; it does not, however, expressly ascribe them to Gôśāla, the son of Makkhali.

The Gainas enumerate four principal schools of philosophy² : Kriyāvāda, Akriyāvāda, Agñānavāda, and Vainayikavāda. The views of the Agñānikas, or Agnostics, are not clearly stated in the texts, and the explanation of the commentators of all these philosophies which I have given in note 2, p. 83, is vague and misleading. But from Buddhist writings we may form a pretty correct idea of what Agnosticism was like. It is, according to the Sāmaññaphala Sutta, the doctrine of Saṅgaya Bêlatthiputta, and is there stated in the following way³ : ' If you inquire of me whether there be a future state of being, I answer : If I experience a future state of existence, I will then explain the nature of that state. If they inquire, Is it after this manner ? that is

¹ In the original: sabbê sattâ, sabbê pâṇâ, sabbê bhûtâ, sabbê g'ivâ. The same enumeration frequently occurs in Gaina Sûtras, and has, in my translation, been abbreviated in 'all classes of living beings.' Buddhaghôsa's explanation has been thus rendered by Hoernle, Uvâsaga Dasâo, Appendix II, p. 16: 'In the term *all beings* (sabbê sattâ) he comprises camels, oxen, asses, and other animals without exception. The term *all sensitive beings* (sabbê pâṇâ) he uses to denote those with one sense, those with two senses, and so forth. The term *all generated beings* (sabbê bhûtâ) he uses with reference to those that are generated or produced from an egg or from the womb. The term *all living beings* (sabbê g'ivâ) he uses with reference to rice, barley, wheat, and so forth ; in these he conceives that there is life, because it is their nature to grow.'

² See pp. 83, 291, 316, 385.

³ Grimblot, l. c., p. 174.

not my concern. Is it after that fashion? that is not my concern. Is it different from these? that is not my concern. Is it not? that is not my concern. No, is it not? It is no concern of mine.' In the same way he e. g. refuses a definite answer to the questions whether the Tathâgata is after death, or is not; is and is not at the same time, is not nor is not at the same time. It is evident that the Agnostics examined all modes of expression of the existence or non-existence of a thing, and if it were anything transcendental or beyond human experience, they negatived all those modes of expression.

The records of the Buddhists and Gainas about the philosophical ideas current at the time of the Buddha and Mahāvîra, meagre though they be, are of the greatest importance to the historian of that epoch. For they show us the ground on which, and the materials with which, a religious reformer had to build his system. The similarity between some of those 'heretical' doctrines on the one side, and Gaina or Buddhist ideas on the other, is very suggestive, and favours the assumption that the Buddha, as well as Mahāvîra, owed some of his conceptions to these very heretics, and formulated others under the influence of the controversies which were continually going on with them. Thus, I think, that in opposition to the Agnosticism of Sañgaya, Mahāvîra has established the Syâdvâda. For as the *Agñānavâda* declares that of a thing beyond our experience the existence, or non-existence or simultaneous existence and non-existence, can neither be affirmed nor denied, so in a similar way, but one leading to contrary results, the Syâdvâda declares that 'you can affirm the existence of a thing from one point of view (*syâd asti*), deny it from another (*syâd nâsti*); and affirm both existence and non-existence with reference to it at different times (*syâd asti nâsti*). If you should think of affirming existence and non-existence at the same time from the same point of view, you must say that the thing cannot be spoken of (*syâd avaktavyaḥ*). Similarly, under certain circumstances, the affirmation of existence is not possible

(syād asti avaktavyaḥ); of non-existence (syān nāsti avaktavyaḥ); and also of both (syād asti nāsti avaktavyaḥ)¹.

This is the famous Saptabhaṅginaya of the Gainas. Would any philosopher have enunciated such truisms, unless they served to silence some dangerous opponents? The subtle discussions of the Agnostics had probably bewildered and misled many of their contemporaries. Consequently the Syādvāda must have appeared to them as a happy way leading out of the maze of the Agñānavāda. It was the weapon with which the Agnostics assailed the enemy, turned against themselves. Who knows how many of their followers went over to Mahāvīra's creed convinced by the truth of the Saptabhaṅginaya!

We can trace, I imagine, the influence of Agnosticism also in the doctrine of the Buddha about the Nirvāṇa, as it is stated in Pāli books. Professor Oldenberg was the first to draw attention to the decisive passages which prove beyond the possibility of doubt that the Buddha declined answering the question whether the Tathāgata (i.e. the liberated soul, or rather principle of individuality) is after death or not. If the public of his time had not been accustomed to be told that some things, and those of the greatest interest, were beyond the ken of the human mind, and had not acquiesced in such answers, it certainly would not have lent a willing ear to a religious reformer who declined to speak out on what in Brahmanical philosophy is considered the end and goal of all speculations. As it is, Agnosticism seems to have prepared the way for the Buddhist doctrine of the Nirvāṇa². It is worthy of note

¹ Bhandarkar, Report for 1883-4, p. 95 f.

² The reticence of Buddha on the nature of the Nirvāṇa may have been wise at his time; but it was fraught with very important results for the development of the church. For his followers, having to hold their own against such split-hair dialecticians as the Brahmanical philosophers, were almost driven to enunciate more explicit ideas about the great problem which the founder of the church had left unsolved. The tendency to supply the crowning stone to an edifice which appeared to have been left unfinished by the hand of the master, led to the division of the community into numerous

that in a dialogue between king Pasénadi and the nun Khêmâ, told in the *Samyutta Nikâya*, and translated by Oldenberg, the king puts his questions about the existence or non-existence of the Tathâgata after death in the same formulas which *Saṅgaya* is made to use in the passage translated above from the *Sâmaññaphala Sutta*.

In support of my assumption that the Buddha was influenced by contemporary Agnosticism, I may adduce a tradition incorporated in the *Mahāvagga* I, 23 and 24. There we are told that the most distinguished pair of his disciples, Sâriputta and Moggallâna, had, previously to their conversion, been adherents of *Saṅgaya*, and had brought over to Buddha 250 disciples of their former teacher. This happened not long after Buddha's reaching Bôdhi, i.e. at the very beginning of the new sect, when its founder must have been willing, in order to win pupils, to treat prevalent opinions with all due consideration.

The greatest influence on the development of Mahāvîra's doctrines must, I believe, be ascribed to Gôsâla, the son of Makkhali. A history of his life, contained in the *Bhagavatî* XV, 1, has been briefly translated by Hoernle in the Appendix to his translation of the *Uvâsaga Dasâo*. It is there recorded that Gôsâla lived six years together with Mahāvîra as his disciple, practising asceticism, but afterwards separated from him, started a Law of his own, and set up as a *Gina*, the leader of the *Āgīvikas*. The Buddhist records, however, speak of him as the successor of Nanda *Vakkha* and Kisa *Samkikka*, and of his sect, the *akêlaka paribbâgakas*, as a long-established order of monks. We have no reason to doubt the statement of the *Gainas*, that Mahāvîra and Gôsâla for some time practised austerities together; but the relation between them probably was different from what the *Gainas* would have us believe. I suppose, and shall now bring forward some arguments in favour of my opinion, that Mahāvîra and Gôsâla asso-

sects soon after the *Nirvâṇa* of Buddha. We need not wonder therefore that in Ceylon, which is at such a distance from the centre of Brahmanical learning, Buddhists could retain the doctrine of the *Nirvâṇa* in its original form.

ciated with the intention of combining their sects and fusing them into one. The fact that these two teachers lived together for a long period, presupposes, it would appear, some similarity between their opinions. I have already pointed out above, in the note on p. xxvi, that the expression *sabbê sattâ sabbê pâṇâ sabbê bhûtâ sabbê gīvâ* is common to both Gôśāla and the Gainas, and from the commentary we learn that the division of animals into *ékēndriyas*, *dvīndriyas*, &c., which is so common in Gaina texts, was also used by Gôśāla. The curious and almost paradoxical Gaina doctrine of the six *Lēśyās* closely resembles, as Professor Leumann was the first to perceive, Gôśāla's division of mankind into six classes; but in this particular I am inclined to believe that the Gainas borrowed the idea from the *Āgīvikas* and altered it so as to bring it into harmony with the rest of their own doctrines. With regard to the rules of conduct the collective evidence obtainable is such as to amount nearly to proof that Mahāvīra borrowed the more rigid rules from Gôśāla. For as stated in the *Uttarādhyayana* XXIII, 13, p. 121, the Law of Pārsva allowed monks to wear an under and upper garment, but the Law of Vardhamāna forbade clothes. A term¹ for naked friar, frequently met with in the *Gaina Sūtras*, is *akēlaka*, literally 'unclothed.' Now the Buddhists distinguish between *Akēlakas* and *Niganthas*; e.g. in Buddha-ghôsa's commentary on the *Dhammapadam*² it is said of some *Bhikkhus* that they gave the preference to the *Niganthas* before the *Akēlakas*, because the latter are stark naked (*sabbasô apatikkhannâ*), while the *Niganthas* use some sort of cover³ 'for the sake of decency,' as was wrongly assumed by those *Bhikkhus*. The Buddhists de-

¹ Another term is *Ginakalpika*, which may be rendered: adopting the standard of the Ginas. The *Svêtâmbaras* say that the *Ginakalpa* was early replaced by the *Sthavirakalpa*, which allows the use of clothes.

² Fausböll's edition, p. 398.

³ The words *sēsakam purimasamappitâ va patikkhādentī* are not quite clear, but the contrast leaves no doubt about what is meant. *Sēsaka* is, I believe, the Pāli for *sīsnaka*. If this is right, the above words may be translated: 'they cover the pudenda wearing (a cloth) about the forepart (of their body).'

note by *Akêlaka* the followers of *Makkhali Gôsâla* and his two predecessors *Kisa Samkikka* and *Nanda Vakkha*, and have preserved an account of their religious practices in the *Magghima Nikâya* 36. There *Sakkaka*, the son of a *Nigantha*, whom we are already acquainted with, explains the meaning of *kâyabhâvanâ*, bodily purity, by referring to the conduct of the *Akêlakas*. Some details of *Sakkaka's* account are unintelligible in the absence of a commentary, but many are quite clear, and bear a close resemblance to well-known *Gaina* usages. Thus the *Akêlakas*, like the *Gaina* monks, may not accept an invitation for dinner; they are forbidden food that is *abhihata* or *uddissakata*, which terms are, in all likelihood, identical with *adhyâhrîta* and *auddêsika* of the *Gainas* (see p. 132, note); they are not allowed to eat meat or to drink liquor. 'Some beg only in one house and accept but one morsel of food, some in more up to seven; some live upon one donation of food, some on more up to seven.' Similar to these are some practices of *Gaina* monks described in the *Kalpa Sûtra*, 'Rules for Yatis,' § 26, part i, p. 300, and below, p. 176 f., verses 15 and 19. The following practice of the *Akêlakas* is identically the same as that observed by the *Gainas*: 'some eat but one meal every day, or every second day¹, &c., up to every half month.' All the rules of the *Akêlakas* are either identical with those of the *Gainas* or extremely like them, and dictated, so to say, by the same spirit. And still *Sakkaka* does not quote the *Niganthas* as a standard of 'bodily purity,' though he was the son of a *Nigantha*, and therefore must have known their religious practices. This curious fact may most easily be accounted for by our assuming that the original *Niganthas*, of whom the Buddhist records usually speak, were not the section of the church, which submitted to the more rigid rules of *Mahāvira*, but those followers of *Pârsva*, who,

¹ These fasts are called by the *Gainas* *kautthabhatta*, *khattabhatta*, &c. (see e.g. *Aupapâtika Sûtra*, ed. Leumann, § 301A); and monks observing them, *kautthabhattiya*, *khattabhattiya*, &c. (see e.g. *Kalpa Sûtra*, 'Rules for Yatis,' § 21 ff.)

without forming a hostile party, yet continued, I imagine, to retain within the united church some particular usages of the old one¹. As those rigid rules formed no part of the ancient creed, and Mahāvīra, therefore, must have introduced them, it is probable that he borrowed them from the *Akēlakas* or *Āgīvikas*, the followers of Gōsāla, with whom he is said to have lived in close companionship for six years practising austerities. We may regard Mahāvīra's adoption of some religious ideas and practices of the *Āgīvikas* as concessions made to them in order to win over Gōsāla and his disciples. This plan seems to have succeeded for some time; but at last the allied teachers quarrelled, it may be supposed, on the question who was to be the leader of the united sects. Mahāvīra's position apparently was strengthened by his temporary association with Gōsāla, but the latter seems to have lost by it, if we are to believe the account of the *Gainas*, and his tragic end must have been a severe blow to the prospects of his sect.

Mahāvīra probably borrowed much more from other sects than we shall ever be able to prove. It must have been easy to add new doctrines to the *Gaina* creed, as it scarcely forms a system in the true sense of the word. Each sect, or fraction of a sect, which was united with the *Gaina* church by the successful policy of Mahāvīra², may have brought with it some of its favourite speculations, and most probably its favourite saints too, who were recognised as *Kakravartins* or *Tīrthakaras*. This is, of course, a mere conjecture of mine; but it would account for the strange hagiology of the *Gainas*, and in the absence of any trace of direct evidence we are driven to rely upon guesses, and those deserve the preference which are the most

¹ As I have said above and in note 2, p. 119, this difference has probably given rise to the division of the church into *Svêtāmbaras* and *Digambaras*. But these two branches have not directly grown out of the party of *Pârsva* and that of Mahāvīra; for both recognise Mahāvīra as a *Tīrthakara*.

² Mahāvīra must have been a great man in his way, and an eminent leader among his contemporaries; he owed the position of a *Tīrthakara* probably not so much to the sanctity of his life, as to his success in propagating his creed.

plausible. For the rest, however, of the hypotheses which I have tried to establish in the preceding pages, I claim a higher degree of probability. For on the one hand I do no violence to the tradition of the *Gainas*, which in the absence of documents deserves most careful attention, and on the other, I assume but what under the given circumstances would have been most likely to happen. The cardinal feature in my construction of the early history of the *Gaina* church consists in my turning to account the alleged existence of followers of *Pârsva* in the time of *Mahāvira*, a tradition which seems to be almost unanimously accepted by modern scholars.

If *Gainism* dates from an early period, and is older than *Buddha* and *Mahāvira*, we may expect to find marks of its antiquity in the character of *Gaina* philosophy. Such a mark is the animistic belief that nearly everything is possessed of a soul; not only have plants their own souls, but particles of earth, cold water, fire, and wind also. Now ethnology teaches us that the animistic theory forms the basis of many beliefs that have been called the philosophy of savages; that it is more and more relinquished or changed into purer anthropomorphism as civilisation advances. If, therefore, *Gaina* ethics are for their greater part based on primitive animism, it must have extensively existed in large classes of Indian society when *Gainism* was first originated. This must have happened at a very early time, when higher forms of religious beliefs and cults had not yet, more generally, taken hold of the Indian mind.

Another mark of antiquity *Gainism* has in common with the oldest Brahmanical philosophies, *Vêdânta* and *Sânkhya*. For at this early epoch in the development of metaphysics, the Category of Quality is not yet clearly and distinctly conceived, but it is just evolving, as it were, out of the Category of Substance: things which we recognise as qualities are constantly mistaken for and mixed up with substances. Thus in the *Vêdânta* the highest Brahman is not possessed of pure existence, intellect, and joy as qualities of his nature, but Brahman is existence, intellect, and

joy itself. In the Sāṅkhya the nature of purusha or soul is similarly defined as being intelligence or light; and the three guṇas are described as goodness, energy, and delusion, or light, colour, and darkness; yet these guṇas are not qualities in our sense of the word, but, as Professor Garbe adequately calls them, constituents of primitive matter. It is quite in accordance with this way of thinking that the ancient Gaina texts usually speak only of substances, dravyas, and their development or modifications, paryāyas; and when they mention guṇas, qualities, besides, which however is done but rarely in the Sûtras and regularly in comparatively modern books only, this seems to be a later innovation due to the influence which the philosophy and terminology of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika gradually gained over the scientific thoughts of the Hindus. For at the side of paryāya, development or modification, there seems to be no room for an independent category 'quality,' since paryāya is the state in which a thing, dravya, is at any moment of its existence, and this must, therefore, include qualities, as seems to be actually the view embodied in the oldest text. Another instance of the Gainas applying the category 'substance' to things which are beyond its sphere, and come rather under that of 'quality,' is seen in their treating merit and demerit, dharma and adharma, as kinds of substances with which the soul comes into contact¹; for they are regarded as co-extensive with the world, not unlike space, which even the Vaiśeṣikas count as a substance. If the categories of substance and quality had already been clearly distinguished from one another, and had been recognised as correlative terms, as they are in Vaiśeṣika philosophy (which defines substance as the substratum of qualities, and quality as that which is inherent in substance), Gainism would almost certainly not have adopted such confused ideas as those just expounded.

¹ That this was the primitive conception of the Vedic Hindus has been noted by Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, p. 317 f.

From the preceding remarks it will be evident that I do not agree with Bhandarkar¹, who claims a late origin for Gainism, because, on some points, it entertains the same views as the Vaisêshika. The Vaisêshika philosophy may be briefly described as a philosophical treatment and systematical arrangement of those general concepts and ideas which were incorporated in the language, and formed therefore the mental property common to all who spoke or knew Sanskrit. The first attempts to arrive at such a natural philosophy may have been made at an early epoch ; but the perfection of the system, as taught in the aphorisms of Kanâda, could not be reached till after many centuries of patient mental labour and continuous philosophical discussion. In the interval between the origin and the final establishment of the system those borrowings may have taken place of which, rightly or wrongly, the Gainas may be accused. I must, however, remark that Bhandarkar believes the Gainas to hold, on the points presently to be discussed, a view 'which is of the nature of a compromise between the Sâmkhyas and the Vêdântins on the one hand and the Vaisêshika on the other.' But for our discussion it makes no difference whether direct borrowing or a compromise between two conflicting views be assumed. The points in question are the following : (1) both Gainism and Vaisêshika embrace the Kriyâvâda, i.e. they maintain that the soul is directly affected by actions, passions, &c. ; (2) both advocate the doctrine of asatkârya, i.e. that the product is different from its material cause, while the Vêdânta and Sâmkhya hold that they are the same (satkârya) ; (3) that they distinguish qualities from their substratum (dravya). The latter item has been discussed above ; we have to deal, therefore, with the first two only. It will be seen that the opinions under (1) and (2) are the common-sense views ; for that we are directly affected by passions, and that the product is different from its cause, e.g. the tree from the seed, will always and everywhere be the primâ faciê con-

¹ See his Report for 1883-84, p. 101 f.

clusion of an unbiassed mind, or rather will appear as the simple statement of what common experience teaches. Such opinions cannot be regarded as characteristic marks of a certain philosophy, and their occurrence in another system need not be explained by the assumption of borrowing. The case would be different if a paradoxical opinion were found in two different schools; for a paradoxical opinion is most likely the product of but one school, and, when once established, it may be adopted by another. But such opinions of the Vaisêshika, as are the result of a peculiar train of reasoning, e.g. that space (*dis*) and air (*âkâsa*) are two separate substances, do not recur in Gainism. For in it, as well as in the older Brahmanical systems, Vêdânta and Sâṅkhya, space and air are not yet distinguished from one another, but *âkâsa* is made to serve for both.

Some other instances of difference in fundamental doctrines between Vaisêshikas and Gainas are, that according to the former the souls are infinite and all-pervading, while to the latter they are of limited dimensions, and that the Vaisêshikas make *dharma* and *adharma* qualities of the soul, while, as has been said above, the Gainas look on them as a sort of substances. In one point, however, there is some resemblance between a paradoxical Vaisêshika opinion and a distinct Gaina doctrine. According to the Vaisêshika there are four kinds of bodies: bodies of earth, as those of men, animals, &c.; bodies of water in the world of *Varuṇa*; bodies of fire in the world of *Agni*; and bodies of wind in the world of *Vâyu*. This curious opinion has its counterpart in Gainism; for the Gainas, too, assume Earth-bodies, Water-bodies, Fire-bodies, and Wind-bodies. However, these elementary bodies are the elements or the most minute particles of them, inhabited by particular souls. This hylozoistic doctrine is, as I have said above, the outcome of primitive animism, while the Vaisêshika opinion, though probably derived from the same current of thought, is an adaptation of it to popular mythology. I make no doubt that the Gaina opinion is much more primitive and

belongs to an older stage in the development of philosophical thought than the Vaisêshika assumption of four kinds of bodies.

Though I am of opinion that between Vaisêshika and Gainism no such connection existed as could be proved by borrowings of the one system from the other, still I am ready to admit that they are related to each other by a kind of affinity of ideas. For the fundamental ideas of the Vêdântins and Sâṅkhyas go directly counter to those of the Gainas, and the latter could not adopt them without breaking with their religion. But they could go a part of their way together with the Vaisêshika, and still retain their religious persuasion. We need, therefore, not wonder that among the writers on the Nyâya-Vaisêshika some names of Gainas occur. The Gainas themselves go still farther, and maintain that the Vaisêshika philosophy was established by a schismatical teacher of theirs, *Kāḷaluya Rôhagutta* of the *Kausika Gôtra*, with whom originated the sixth schism of the Gainas, the *Trairâsika-matam*, in 544 A.V.¹ (18 A.D.) The details of this system given in the *Âvâryaka*, vv. 77-83, are apparently reproduced from *Kaṇâda's Vaisêshika Darsana*; for they consist in the enumeration of the six (not seven) categories with their subdivisions, among which that of qualities contains but seventeen items (not twenty-four), and those identical with *Vaisêshika Darsana I*, 1, 6.

I believe that in this case, as in many others, the Gainas claim more honour than is their due in connecting every Indian celebrity with the history of their creed. My reason for doubting the correctness of the above Gaina legend is the following. The Vaisêshika philosophy is reckoned as one of the orthodox Brahmanical philosophies, and it has chiefly, though not exclusively, been cultivated by orthodox Hindus. We have, therefore, no reason for doubting that they have misstated the name and Gôtra of the author of the *Sûtras*, viz. *Kaṇâda* of the *Kâryapa Gôtra*. No trace

¹ See *Indische Studien*, vol. xvii, p. 116 ff.

has been found in Brahmanical literature that the name of the real author of the Vaisēshika was Rôhagupta, and his Gôtra the Kausika Gôtra ; nor can Rôhagupta and Kânâda be taken as different names of the same person, because their Gôtras also differ. Kânâda, follower of Kanâda, means etymologically crow-eater, owl ; hence his system has been nicknamed Aulûkya Darsana, owl-philosophy¹. In Rôhagupta's second name, *Kuluya*, which stands for *Shadulûka*², allusion is made to the 'owl,' probably to the Kânâdas ; but the Gainas refer *ulûka* to the Gôtra of the Rôhagupta, viz. Kausika³, which word also means owl. As the unanimous tradition of the Brahmans deserves the preference before that of the Gainas, we can most easily account for the latter by assuming that Rôhagupta did not invent, but only adopted the Vaisēshika philosophy to support his schismatical views.

About the two works translated in this volume, the Uttarādhyayana and Sûtrakṛitāṅga, I have little to add to the remarks of Professor Weber in the *Indische Studien*, vol. xvi, p. 259 ff., and vol. xvii, p. 43 ff. The Sûtrakṛitāṅga is probably the older of the two, as it is the second Āṅga, and the Āṅgas obtain the foremost rank among the canonical books of the Gainas, while the Uttarādhyayana, the first Mûlasûtra, belongs to the last section of the Siddhânta. According to the summary in the fourth Āṅga the object of the Sûtrakṛitāṅga is to fortify young monks against the heretical opinions of alien teachers, to confirm them in the right faith, and to lead them to the highest good. This description is correct on the whole, but not exhaustive, as will be seen by going over our table of contents. The work opens with the refutation of heretical doctrines, and the same object is again treated at greater length in the

¹ See my edition of the Kalpa Sûtra, p. 119.

² Literally Six-owl. The number six refers to the six categories of the Vaisēshika.

³ Part i, p. 290. But in the legend translated by Professor Leumann, l. c., p. 121, his Gôtra is called *K'âulû*.

First Lecture of the Second Book. It is followed in the First Book by Lectures on a holy life in general, on the difficulties a monk has to overcome, especially the temptations thrown in his way, the punishment of the unholy, and the praise of Mahāvīra as the standard of righteousness. Then come some Lectures on cognate subjects. The Second Book, which is almost entirely in prose, treats of similar subjects, but without any apparent connection of its parts. It may therefore be considered as supplementary, and as a later addition to the First Book. The latter was apparently intended as a guide for young monks¹. Its form, too, seems adapted to this purpose; for it lays some claim to poetical art in the variety of the metres employed, and in the artificial character of some verses. It may, therefore, be considered as the composition of one author, while the Second Book is a collection of tracts which treat on the subjects discussed in the first.

The Uttarādhyayana resembles the Sūtrakṛitāṅga with regard to its object and part of the subjects treated; but it is of greater extent than the original part of the Sūtrakṛitāṅga, and the plan of the work is carried out with more skill. Its intention is to instruct a young monk in his principal duties, to commend an ascetic life by precepts and examples, to warn him against the dangers in his spiritual career, and to give some theoretical information. The heretical doctrines are only occasionally alluded to, not fully discussed; apparently the dangers expected from that quarter grew less in the same measure as time advanced and the institutions of the sect were more firmly established. Of more importance to a young monk seems to have been an accurate knowledge of animate and inanimate things, as a rather long treatise on this subject has been added at the end of the book.—Though there is an apparent plan in the selection and arrangement of the single Lectures, still it is open to doubt whether they were all composed by one

¹ According to an old tradition (see *Indische Studien*, vol. xvi, p. 223) the Sūtrakṛitāṅga is studied in the fourth year after the ordination of a monk.

author, or only selected from the traditional literature, written or oral, which among the *Gainas*, as everywhere else, must have preceded the formation of a canon. I am inclined to adopt the latter alternative, because there is a greater variety of treatment and style in the different parts than seems compatible with the supposition of one author, and because a similar origin must be assumed for many works of the present canon.

At what time the works under discussion were composed or brought into their present shape is a problem which cannot be satisfactorily solved. As, however, the reader of the present volume will naturally expect the translator to give expression to his personal conviction on this point, I give my opinion with all reserve, viz. that most parts, tracts, or treatises of which the canonical books consist, are old; that the redaction of the *Aṅgas* took place at an early period (tradition places it under *Bhadrabâhu*); that the other works of the *Siddhânta* were collected in course of time, probably in the first centuries before our era, and that additions or alterations may have been made in the canonical works till the time of their first edition under *Devardhigaṇin* (980 A.V. = 454 A.D.)

I have based my translation of the *Uttarâdhyayana* and *Sûtrakṛitâṅga* on the text adopted by the oldest commentators I could consult. This text differs little from that of the MSS. and the printed editions. I had prepared a text of my own from some MSS. at my disposal, and this has served to check the printed text.

The Calcutta edition of the *Uttarâdhyayana* (*Samvat* 1936 = 1879 A.D.) contains, besides a Guzeratî gloss, the *Sûtra-dipikâ* of *Lakshmiṣvallabha*, pupil of *Lakshmîkîrtigaṇin* of the *Kharatara Gakkha*. Older than this commentary is the *Tîkā* of *Dêvendra*, which I have made my principal guide. It was composed in *Samvat* 1179 or 1123 A.D., and is confessedly an abstract from *Sântyâkârya's Vṛitti*, which I have not used. But I have had at my disposal an illuminated old MS. of the *Avakûri*, belonging to the

Strassburg University Library. This work is apparently an abstract from the *Vṛitti* of Sântyaġārya, as in a great many passages it almost verbally agrees with Dêvendra's work.

The Bombay edition of the *Sûtrakṛitāṅga* (*Samvat* 1936 or 1880 A. D.) contains three commentaries: (1) *Silāṅka's Tīkā*, in which is incorporated Bhadrabāhu's *Niryukti*. This is the oldest commentary extant; but it was not without predecessors, as *Silāṅka* occasionally alludes to old commentators. *Silāṅka* lived in the second half of the ninth century A. D., as he is said to have finished his commentary on the *Ākārāṅga Sûtra* in the Saka year 798 or 876 A. D. (2) The *Dîpika*, an abstract from the last by Harshakula, which was composed in *Samvat* 1583 or 1517 A. D. I have also used a MS. of the *Dîpika* in my possession. (3) *Pâsakaṇḍra's Bâlâvabôdha*, a Guzerati gloss.—My principal guide was, of course, *Silāṅka*; when he and Harshakula agree, I refer to them in my notes as the 'commentators;' I name *Silāṅka* when his remark in question has been omitted by Harshakula, and I quote the latter when he gives some original matter of interest. I may add that one of my MSS. is covered with marginal and interlinear glosses which have now and then given me some help in ascertaining the meaning of the text.

H. JACOBI.

Bonn :
November, 1894.

ADDITIONAL NOTE.

I may here add a remark on the Parable of the Three Merchants, see p. 29 f., which agrees with Matthew xxv. 14 and Luke xix. 11. It seems, however, to have had a still greater resemblance to the version of the parable in The Gospel according to the Hebrews, as will appear from the following passage from Eusebius' Theophania (ed. Migne's Patrologia Graeca, iv. 155), translated by Nicholson, The Gospel according to the Hebrews (London, 1879): 'The Gospel, which comes to us in Hebrew characters, has directed the threat not against the hider, but against the abandoned liver. For it has included three servants, one which devoured the substance with harlots and flute-women, one which multiplied, and one which hid the talent: one was accepted, one only blamed, and one shut up in prison.' I owe this quotation to my colleague Arnold Meyer.


Taking into consideration (1) that the *Gaina* version contains only the essential elements of the parable, which in the Gospels are developed into a full story; and (2) that it is expressly stated in the *Uttarādhyaṇa* VII, 15 that 'this parable is taken from common life,' I think it probable that the Parable of the Three Merchants was invented in India, and not in Palestine.

H. J.

UTTARÂDHYAYANA.

UTTARÂDHYAYANA.

FIRST LECTURE.



ON DISCIPLINE.

I shall explain in due order the discipline of a houseless monk, who has got rid of all worldly ties. Listen to me. (1)

A monk who, on receiving an order¹ from his superior², walks up to him, watching his nods and motions, is called well-behaved. (2)

But a monk who, on receiving an order from his superior, does not walk up to him, being insubordinate and inattentive, is called ill-behaved. (3)

As a bitch with sore ears is driven away every-

¹ Âṇā-niddēsa-karê. Âṇā is the order itself; niddēsa, the assent to it.

² The original has the plural instead of the singular. It takes great liberties in this respect, and the commentators constantly call to help a *vaṭanavyatyaya* or *līṅgavyatyaya*, exchange of number or gender, as the case may be. It is impossible in the translation to follow the original in this respect, and useless to note all such grammatical blunders. The conclusion we may draw from them is that in the spoken language many grammatical forms which in the literary language continued to be used, were on the point of dying out or had already actually become obsolete. I am almost sure that the vernacular of the time when the Sūtras were composed began to drop the distinction between the singular and plural in the verb. It was, however, artificially revived in the literary Māhārāṣhṭri of later days.

where, thus a bad, insubordinate, and talkative (pupil) is turned out. (4)

As a pig leaves a trough filled with grain to feed on faeces, so a brute (of a man) turns away from virtue, and takes to evil ways. (5)

Hearing a man thus compared to a dog and a pig, he who desires his own welfare, should adhere to good conduct. (6)

Therefore be eager for discipline, that you may acquire righteousness; a son of the wise¹, who desires liberation², will not be turned away from anywhere. (7)

One should always be meek, and not be talkative in the presence of the wise; one should acquire valuable knowledge, and avoid what is worthless. (8)

When reprimanded a wise man should not be angry, but he should be of a forbearing mood; he should not associate, laugh, and play with mean men. (9)

He should do nothing mean³, nor talk much; but after having learned his lesson, he should meditate by himself. (10)

¹ Buddhaputta. Buddha is here and in the sequel explained by âkârya, teacher. The word is in the crude form, not in the inflected form, as the nominative would not suit the metre. Liberties of this kind are frequently met with in our text.

² Niôga//î = niyôgarthin. It is always explained and usually means môkshârthin. But here and in verse 20 niyôga has perhaps its common meaning: appointment, order. In that case we must translate: he who waits for an order.

³ *Kandâliya*, literally, he should not demean himself like a *Kândâla*. The commentators, however, divide the word in *kanda*, violent, hot, and *alika*, untrue, false. This explanation is too artificial to be accepted, though the meaning comes to the same thing.

If he by chance does anything mean, he should never deny it, but if he has done it, he should say : 'I have done it;' if he has not done it, 'I have not done it.' (11)

He should not, in every case, wait for the express command (of the teacher) like an unbroken horse for the whip (of the rider), but like a broken horse which sees the whip (of the rider) he should commit no evil act. (12)

Disobedient, rough speaking, ill-behaved pupils will exasperate even a gentle teacher; but those will soon win even a hot-tempered teacher who humour him and are polite. (13)

He should not speak unasked, and asked he should not tell a lie; he should not give way to his anger, and bear with indifference pleasant and unpleasant occurrences. (14)

Subdue your Self, for the Self is difficult to subdue; if your Self is subdued, you will be happy in this world and in the next. (15)

Better it is that I should subdue my Self by self-control and penance, than be subdued by others with fetters and corporal punishment. (16)

He should never do anything disagreeable to the wise¹, neither in words nor deeds, neither openly nor secretly. (17)

He should not (sit) by the side of the teacher, nor before him, nor behind him; he should not touch (the teacher's) thigh with his own, nor answer his call from the couch. (18)

A well-behaved monk should not sit on his hams²,

¹ Buddhāṇam, i.e. the superiors.

² Palhatthiyā = paryastikā: so that his clothes cover his knees and shanks.

nor cross his arms¹, nor stretch out his legs, nor stand (too) close to his teacher. (19)

If spoken to by the superior, he should never remain silent, but should consider it as a favour; asking for his command², he should always politely approach his teacher. (20)

If the teacher speaks little or much, he should never grow impatient; but an intelligent pupil should rise from his seat and answer (the teacher's) call modestly and attentively. (21)

He should never ask a question when sitting on his stool or his bed, but rising from his seat³ and coming near, he should ask him with folded hands. (22)

When a pupil who observes the above rules of conduct, questions the teacher about the sacred text, its meaning, or both, he should deliver it according to tradition. (23)

A monk should avoid untruth, nor should he speak positively (about future things, his plans, &c.); he should avoid sinful speech, and always keep free from deceit. (24)

He should not tell anything sinful or meaningless⁴

¹ Pakshapinda.

² Niyâga//hî or niôga//hî. The commentator explains it, as in verse 7, by 'desiring liberation.'

³ Ukkudûô. The commentator explains it by muktâsanaḥ, kâranataḥ pâdapuṣṭhanâdigataḥ.

⁴ In illustration of this the commentator (Dêvendra) quotes the following verse: êsha bandhyâsutô yâti khapushpakṛitasêkharah | mṛigatrishnâmbhasi snâtaḥ sasarîṅgadhanurdharaḥ || There goes the son of a barren woman, bearing a chaplet of sky-flowers, having bathed in the water of a fata morgana, and carrying a bow made of a hare's horn.

or hurtful, neither for his own sake nor for anybody else's, nor without such a motive. (25).

In barbers' shops¹ or houses, on the ground separating two houses, or on the highway a single monk should not stand with a single woman, nor should he converse with her. (26)

Any instruction the wise ones² may give me in a kind or a rough way, I shall devotedly accept, thinking that it is for my benefit. (27)

(The teacher's) instruction, his manner of giving it, and his blaming evil acts are considered blissful by the intelligent, but hateful by the bad monk. (28)

Wise, fearless monks consider even a rough instruction as a benefit, but the fools hate it, though it produces patience and purity of mind. (29)

He should occupy a low, firm seat, which does not rock; seldom rising and never without a cause, he should sit motionless. (30)

At the right time a monk should sally forth, and he should return at the right time; avoiding to do anything out of time, he should do what is appropriate for each period of the day. (31)

A monk should not approach (dining people) sitting in a row, but should collect alms that are freely given; having begged according to the sanctioned rules, he should eat a moderate portion at the proper time. (32)

A monk should wait (for his alms) alone, not too far from other monks, nor too near them, but so that he is not seen by another party; another monk should not pass him to get the start of him. (33)

¹ Samara, explained by the commentator barbers' shop or smithy, with the addition that it includes all places of low people.

² Buddhāṇ.

Neither boldly erect nor humbly bowing down, standing neither too close by nor too far off, a monk should accept permitted¹ food that was prepared for somebody else². (34)

In a place that is covered above and sheltered on all sides, where there are no living beings nor seeds, a monk should eat in company, restrained and undressed. (35)

A monk should avoid as unallowed such food as is well dressed, or well cooked, or well cut, or such in which is much seasoning, or which is very rich, or very much flavoured, or much sweetened³. (36)

(The teacher) takes delight in instructing a clever (pupil), just as the rider (in managng) a well-broken horse; but he tires to instruct a foolish (pupil), just as the rider (tires to manage) an unbroken horse. (37)

(A bad pupil thinks :) 'I get but knocks and boxes on the ear, hard words and blows;' and he believes a teacher who instructs him well, to be a malevolent man. (38)

A good pupil has the best opinion (of his teacher), thinking that he treats him like his son or brother or a near relation⁴; but a malevolent pupil imagines himself treated like a slave. (39)

He should not provoke his teacher's anger, nor

¹ Phâsuya, translated prâsuka, and explained : free from living beings.

² Parakaḍa, prepared for the householder or some other person, but not for the monk himself.

³ The translation of the terms in this verse is rather conjectural, notwithstanding the explanations in the commentary.

⁴ I translate according to the interpretation of the commentator, which is probably right; but the text sets all rules of grammar at defiance.

should he himself grow angry; he should not offend the teacher nor irritate him by proclaiming his faults¹. (40)

Perceiving the teacher's anger one should pacify him by kindness, appease him with folded hands, and promise not to do wrong again. (41)

He who adopts the conduct which the wise ones² have attained by their virtues and always practised, will not incur blame. (42)

Guessing the teacher's thoughts and the purport of his words, one should express one's assent, and execute (what he desires to be done). (43)

An excellent pupil needs no express directions, or he is (at least) quickly directed; he always carries out his duties as he is told. (44)

An intelligent man who has learned (the sacred texts) takes his duties upon himself³, and he becomes renowned in the world; as the earth is the dwelling of all beings, so he will be a dwelling of all duties. (45)

When the worthy teachers, who are thoroughly enlightened and from early times well versed in conduct⁴, are satisfied (with a pupil), they will make over to him their extensive and weighty⁵ knowledge of the sacred texts. (46)

His knowledge will be honoured, his doubts will be removed, he will gladden the heart of his teacher

¹ Literally, search for the goad.

² Buddha.

³ Namati, literally, bows down.

⁴ *Puvvasamthuya* = *pûrvasamstuta*. Besides the meaning rendered in my translation the commentator proposes another: already famous.

⁵ *Atthiya* = *arthika*, having an object or purpose, viz. *môksha*; it is therefore frequently rendered: leading to liberation.

by his good acts ; kept in safety by the performance of austerities and by meditation, being as it were a great light, he will keep the five vows. (47)

Honoured by gods, Gandharvas, and men, he will, on leaving this body which consists of dirt and impurities, become either an eternal Siddha¹, or a god of great power and small imperfections. (48)

Thus I say².

SECOND LECTURE.

ON TROUBLES³.

O long-lived (*Gambûsvâmin*)! I (*Sudharman*) have heard the following Discourse⁴ from the Venerable (*Mahâvîra*) :

Here⁵, forsooth, the Venerable Ascetic *Mahâvîra* of the *Kâsyapa Gôtra* has declared twenty-two troubles which a monk must learn and know, bear and conquer, in order not to be vanquished by them when he lives the life of a wandering mendicant.

¹ I. e. a liberated or perfected soul.

² *Ti bēmi* = *iti bravîmi*. These words serve to mark the end of every chapter in all canonical books ; compare the Latin *dixi*.

³ *Parîsaha*, that which may cause trouble to an ascetic, and which must be cheerfully borne.

⁴ The commentator (*Dêvendra*) says that when *Mahâvîra* spoke, he was understood by all creatures, whatever was their language. He quotes the following verse : *dêvâ dêvîm narâ nârîm sabarâs kâpi sâbarîm | tiryakô pi ka tairasîm mênirê bhagavadgiram* || The gods, men, Sabaras, and animals took the language of the Lord for their own. Cf. Acts ii. 11.

⁵ I. e. in our creed or religion. This is generally the meaning of the word *iha*, here, opening a sentence.

These, then, are the twenty-two troubles declared by the Venerable Ascetic Mahāvīra, which a monk must learn and know, bear and conquer, in order not to be vanquished by them when he lives the life of a wandering mendicant :

1. *digaññā* (*gugupsā*)-*parisahā*, hunger ;
2. *pivāsā* (*pipāsā*)-p., thirst ;
3. *sīya* (*śīta*)-p., cold ;
4. *usina* (*ushna*)-p., heat ;
5. *daṃsamāsaya* (*daṃsamāsaka*)-p., gad-flies, and gnats¹ ;
6. *akēla*-p., nakedness² ;
7. *arati*-p., to be discontented with the objects of control.
8. *itthī* (*strī*)-p., women ;
9. *kariyā* (*kāryā*)-p., erratic life ;
10. *nisthiyā* (*naishēdhikī*)-p., place for study ;
11. *seggā* (*sayyā*)-p., lodging ;
12. *akkōsa* (*ākrōsa*)-p., abuse ;
13. *vaha* (*vadha*)-p., corporal punishment ;
14. *gāyanā* (*yājanā*)-p., to ask for something ;
15. *alābha*-p., to be refused ;
16. *rōga*-p., illness ;
17. *tana-phāsa* (*trīnaśpāsa*), pricking of grass ;
18. *galla*-p., dirt ;
19. *sakkārapurakkāra* (*satkārapurakkāra*)-p., kind and respectful treatment ;
20. *paññā* (*pragñā*)-p., understanding ;
21. *annāna* (*agñāna*)-p., ignorance ;
22. *sammatta* (*samyaktva*)-p., righteousness.

¹ This is to include all biting or stinging insects, as lice, &c.

² This is binding on the *Ginakālpikas* only, not on common monks.

¹The enumeration of the troubles has been delivered by the Kâsyapa², I shall explain them to you in due order. Listen to me. (1)

1. Though his body be weakened by hunger, a monk who is strong (in self-control) and does penance, should not cut or cause another to cut (anything to be eaten), nor cook it or cause another to cook it. (2)

Though emaciated like the joint of a crow's (leg) and covered with a network of veins, he should know the permitted measure of food and drink, and wander about with a cheerful mind. (3)

2. Though overcome by thirst, he should drink no cold water, restrained by shame and aversion (from forbidden things); he should try to get distilled³ water. (4)

Wandering about on deserted ways, in pain, thirsty, with dry throat, and distressed, he should bear this trouble (of thirst). (5)

3. If a restrained, austere ascetic occasionally suffers from cold on his wanderings, he should not walk beyond the (prescribed) time, remembering the teaching of the *Gina*. (6)

'I have no shelter and nothing to cover my skin, therefore I shall make a fire to warm myself;' such a thought should not be entertained by a monk. (7)

¹ The preceding part of this lecture is in prose, the rest is in *śloka*. The numbers placed before the verses refer to the above enumeration of the troubles. It will be seen that two stanzas are allotted to each of them.

² I.e. Mahāvīra, who belonged to the Gôtra of Kâsyapa.

³ *Vigada* = *vikṛīta*. It means water which by boiling or some other process has become so changed that it may be regarded as lifeless.

4. If he suffers from the heat of hot things, or from the heat of his body, or from the heat of summer, he should not lament the loss of comfort. (8)

A wise man, suffering from heat, should not long for a bath, or pour water over his body, or fan himself. (9)

5. Suffering from insects a great sage remains undisturbed. As an elephant at the head of the battle kills the enemy, so does a hero (in self-control conquer the internal foe). (10)

He should not scare away (insects), nor keep them off, nor be in the least provoked to passion by them. Tolerate living beings, do not kill them, though they eat your flesh and blood. (11)

6. 'My clothes being torn, I shall (soon) go naked,' or 'I shall get a new suit;' such thoughts should not be entertained by a monk. (12)

At one time he will have no clothes, at another he will have some; knowing this to be a salutary rule, a wise (monk) should not complain about it. (13)

7. A houseless and poor monk who wanders from village to village may become tired of ascetic life: he should bear this trouble. (14)

A sage should turn away from this discontent; he should wander about free from sins, guarded in himself, a tabernacle (as it were) of the Law, doing no actions, and perfectly passionless. (15)

8. In this world men have a natural liking for women; he who knows (and renounces) them, will easily perform his duties as a Sramana. (16)

A wise man who knows that women are a slough, as it were, will get no harm from them, but will wander about searching for the Self. (17)

9. Alone, living on allowed food¹, he should wander about, bearing all troubles, in a village or a town or a market-place or a capital. (18)

Different (from other men) a monk should wander about, he should acquire no property; but not being attached to householders, he should live without a fixed residence. (19)

10. In a burial-place, or a deserted house, or below a tree he should sit down, alone, without moving, and he should not drive away any one. (20)

Sitting there he should brave all dangers; when seized with fear, he should not rise and go to some other place. (21)

11. A monk who does penance and is strong (in self-control), will not be affected beyond measure by good or bad lodgings, but an evil-minded monk will. (22)

Having obtained a good or bad lodging in an empty house², he should stay there thinking: 'What does it matter for one night?' (23)

12. If a layman abuses a monk, he should not grow angry against him; because he would be like a child³, a monk should not grow angry. (24)

If a monk hears bad words, cruel and rankling ones, he should silently overlook them, and not take them to heart. (25)

13. A monk should not be angry if beaten, nor should he therefore entertain sinful thoughts; knowing patience to be the highest good, a monk should meditate on the Law. (26)

¹ *Lâdha*; see also note on XVII, 2.

² I. e. in which there are no women.

³ Or like an ignorant man, *bâla*.

If somebody strikes a restrained, resigned *Sramana* somewhere, he should think: 'I have not lost my life.' (27)

14. It will always cause difficulties to a houseless monk to get everything by begging, and nothing without begging. (28)

The hand (of the giver) is not always kindly stretched out to a monk when he is on his begging tour; but he should not think that it would be better to live as a householder. (29)

15. He should beg food from the householder when his dinner is ready; a wise man should not care whether he gets alms or not. (30)

'I get nothing to-day, perhaps I shall get something to-morrow;' a monk who thinks thus, will not be grieved by his want of success. (31)

16. If any misfortune¹ happens and he suffers pain, he should cheerfully steady his mind, and bear the ills that attack him. (32)

He should not long for medical treatment, but he should continue to search for the welfare of his soul; thus he will be a true *Sramana* by neither acting himself nor causing others to act. (33)

17. When a naked, rough, restrained ascetic lies on the grass, his body will be hurt. (34)

In the sun his pain will grow insupportable; still a monk, though hurt by the grass, will not use clothes². (35)

18. When by the heat of summer his body sweats and is covered with dirt and dust, a wise monk should not lament his loss of comfort. (36)

¹ Viz. if he falls sick.

² *Tantuga*, what is manufactured from threads.

He should bear (all this), waiting for the destruction of his Karman¹, (and practising) the noble, excellent Law; he should carry the filth on his body till he expires. (37)

19. It may be that a gentleman salutes a monk, or rises from his seat on his approach, or invites him (to accept alms in his house): a monk should evince no predilection for men of this sort, who show him such marks of respect. (38)

Not resentful, having few wants, begging from strangers, and not being dainty, a wise man should not long for pleasant things, nor be sorry afterwards (for not having got them). (39)

20. 'Forsooth, in bygone times I have done actions productive of ignorance, for I do not remember them when asked by anybody anywhere².' (40)

'Afterwards, however, actions productive of ignorance take effect.' Therefore comfort yourself, knowing the consequences of actions. (41)

21. 'It was of no use to turn away from the lust of the senses and to live restrainedly, for I do not properly recognise good and bad things.' (42)

'Though in practising austerities and religious observances I live according to strict rules, still the hindrances to knowledge will not go off.' (43)

22. A monk should not think: 'There is, indeed, no life to come, nor an exalted state to be acquired by penances; in short, I have been deceived.' (44)

A monk should not think: 'Those lied who said that there were, are, and will be *Ginas*.' (45)

¹ Nirgarâ.

² The commentators refer the word 'anywhere' to the place or object of the former actions.

All these troubles have been declared by the Kâsyapa. A monk should not be vanquished by them, when attacked by any anywhere.

Thus I say.

THIRD LECTURE.

THE FOUR REQUISITES.

Four things of paramount value are difficult to obtain here by a living being: human birth, instruction in the Law, belief in it, and energy in self-control. (1)

I. The universe is peopled by manifold creatures, who are, in this *Samsâra*, born in different families and castes for having done various actions. (2)

Sometimes they go to the world of the gods, sometimes to the hells, sometimes they become Asuras in accordance with their actions. (3)

Sometimes they become Kshattriyas, or *Kandâlas* and Bukkasas, or worms and moths, or (insects called) Kunthu¹ and ants. (4)

Thus living beings of sinful actions, who are born again and again in ever-recurring births, are not disgusted with the *Samsâra*, but they are like warriors (never tired of the battle of life). (5)

Living beings bewildered through the influence of their actions, distressed and suffering pains, undergo misery in non-human births. (6)

But by the cessation of Karman, perchance, living

¹ About the Kunthu see below, Thirty-sixth Lecture, v. 138 and note.

beings will reach in due time a pure state and be born as men. (7)

II. And though they be born with a human body, it will be difficult for them to hear the Law, having heard which they will do penances, combat their passions and abstain from killing living beings. (8)

III. And though, by chance, they may hear the Law, it will be difficult for them to believe in it; many who are shown the right way, stray from it. (9)

IV. And though they have heard the Law and believe in it, it is difficult for them to fulfill it strenuously; many who approve of the religion, do not adopt it. (10)

Having been born as a man, having heard the Law, believing in it, and fulfilling it strenuously, an ascetic should restrain himself and shake off sinfulness. (11)

The pious obtain purity, and the pure stand firmly in the Law: (the soul afterwards) reaches the highest Nirvâṇa, being like unto a fire fed with ghee. (12)

Leave off the causes of sin, acquire fame through patience! (A man who acts up to this) will rise to the upper regions after having left this body of clay. (13)

The Yakshas who are gifted with various virtues, (live in the heavenly regions, situated) one above the other, shining forth like the great luminaries, and hoping never to descend thence. (14)

Intent on enjoying divine pleasures and changing their form at will, they live in the upper Kalpa heavens many centuries of former¹ years. (15)

¹ One 'former' (pûrva) year consists of 7,560 millions of common years. The idea that years were longer when the world was still young, is apparently suggested by the experience which everybody will have made, that a year seemed to us an enormously long time when we were young, and the same space of time

The Yakshas, having remained there according to their merit, descend thence at the expiration of their life and are born as men.

Men are of ten kinds. (16)

Fields and houses, gold, cattle, slaves and servants: where these four goods, the causes of pleasure, are present, in such families he is born¹. (17)

He will have friends and relations, be of good family, of fine complexion, healthy, wise, noble, famous, and powerful. (18)

After having enjoyed, at their proper time, the unrivalled pleasures of human life, he will obtain true knowledge by his pure religious merit acquired in a former life. (19)

appears to us shorter and shorter as we advance in life. A similar analogy with our life has probably caused the belief in the four ages of the world, shared by the Hindus and the ancients. For does not childhood to most of us appear the happiest period of our life, and youth better still than the time of full-grown manhood? As in retrospect our life appears to us, so primitive man imagines the life of the world to have been: the first age was the best and the longest, and the following ages grew worse and worse, and became shorter at the same time. This primitive conceit was by the ancients combined with the conceit of the year, so that the four ages were compared with the four seasons of the year. Something similar seems to have happened in India, where, however, there are three or six seasons. For the Gainas seem to have originally divided one Eon into six minor periods. Now the year was frequently compared to a wheel, and this second metaphor was worked out by the Gainas. They named the six minor periods aras, literally spokes of a wheel, and divided the whole Eon into one descending part (of the wheel), avasarpinî, and one rising part, utsarpinî. These Avasarpinîs and Utsarpinîs are probably a later improvement, and the Eon originally contained but six Aras. But if there were indeed twelve Aras from the beginning, they must have been suggested by the twelve months of the year.

¹ This is the first of the ten kinds of men mentioned above; the remaining nine are enumerated in the following verse.

Perceiving that the four requisites are difficult to obtain, he will apply himself to self-control, and when by penances he has shaken off the remnant of Karman, he will become an eternal Siddha. (20)

Thus I say.

FOURTH LECTURE.

IMPURITY.

You cannot prolong your life¹, therefore be not careless; you are past help when old age approaches. Consider this: what (protection) will careless people get, who kill living beings and do not exert themselves? (1)

Men who adhering to wrong principles acquire wealth by evil deeds, will lose it, falling into the snares (of their passions) and being held captive by their hatred. (2)

As the burglar² caught in the breach of the wall perishes by the work the sinner himself had executed, thus people in this life and the next cannot escape the effect of their own actions. (3)

If a man living in the *Samsâra* does an action for the sake of somebody else, or one by which he him-

¹ A similar expression is used in *Sûtrakṛtiânga* I, 2, 2, 21.

² Dêvendra relates two stories of burglars, one of which is supposed to be hinted at in the text. It comes to this. A burglar is caught, in the breach he had excavated, by the owner of the house, who takes hold of his feet protruding from the breach. But the burglar's companion tries to drag him out from the other side of the wall. In this position he is smashed by the upper part of the wall coming down.

self also profits, then, at the time of reaping the fruit of his actions, his relations will not act as true relations (i.e. will not come to his help). (4)

Wealth will not protect a careless man in this world and the next. Though he had seen the right way, he does not see it, even as one in the dark whose lamp has suddenly been put out. (5)

Though others sleep, be thou awake! Like a wise man, trust nobody, but be always on the alert; for dangerous is the time and weak the body. Be always watchful like a *Bhârunda*¹ bird! (6)

A monk should step carefully in his walk (i.e. in his life), supposing everything to be a snare for him. First he must bestow care on his life till he wins the stake (viz. enlightenment), and afterwards he should despise it, annihilating his sins. (7)

By conquering his will, (a monk) reaches liberation, as a well-broken horse which is clad in harness (goes to battle). Be watchful in your young years; for thereby a monk quickly obtains liberation. (8)

‘If he does not get (victory over his will) early, he will get it afterwards;’ such reasoning² presupposes the eternity of human life. But such a man despairs when his life draws to its close, and the dissolution of his body approaches. (9)

One cannot quickly arrive at discernment; therefore one should exert one’s self, abstain from pleasures, understand the world, be impartial like

¹ Each of these birds has two necks and three legs.

² *Upamâ*. Literally translated: ‘this is the comparison of those who contend that life is eternal.’ The commentator gives a forced interpretation of the first part of the verse to bring about a comparison. But the meaning ‘comparison’ will not suit the context, the word must here mean: conclusion, reasoning.

a sage, and guard one's self : (thus) never be careless. (10)

A Sramana who again and again suppresses the effects of delusion, and controls himself, will be affected in a rough way by external things ; but a monk should not hate them in his mind. (11)

External things weaken the intellect and allure many ; therefore keep them out of your mind. Keep off delusion, remove pride, do not practise deceit, leave off greed. (12)

Heretics who are impure and vain, are always subject to love and hate, and are wholly under the influence (of their passions). Despising them as unholy men, desire virtues till the end of your life. (13)

Thus I say.

FIFTH LECTURE.

DEATH AGAINST ONE'S WILL.

In this ocean (of life) with its currents (viz. births) difficult to cross, one man has reached the opposite shore ; one wise man has given an answer to the following question. (1)

These two ways of life ending with death have been declared : death with one's will, and death against one's will. (2)

Death against one's will is that of ignorant men, and it happens (to the same individual) many times. Death with one's will is that of wise men, and at best ¹ it happens but once. (3)

¹ Viz. in the case of a Kêvalin. Other sages die this death seven or eight times before reaching mukti.

Mahāvira has (thus) described the first kind in which an ignorant man, being attached to pleasures, does very cruel actions. (4)

A man attached to pleasures and amusements will be caught in the trap (of deceit). (He thinks): 'I never saw the next world, but I have seen with my own eyes the pleasures of this life.' (5)

'The pleasures of this life are (as it were) in your hand, but the future ones are uncertain¹. Who knows whether there is a next world or not?' (6)

The fool boasts: 'I shall have the company of (most) men².' But by his love of pleasures and amusements he will come to grief. (7)

Then he begins to act cruelly against movable and immovable beings, and he kills living beings with a purpose or without. (8)

An ignorant man kills, lies, deceives, calumniates, dissembles, drinks liquor, and eats meat, thinking that this is the right thing to do. (9)

Overbearing in acts and words, desirous for wealth and women, he accumulates sins in two ways³, just as a young snake gathers dust (both on and in its body). (10)

Then he suffers ill and is attacked by disease; and he is in dread of the next world when he reflects on his deeds. (11)

I have heard of the places in hell, and of the destination of the sinner, where the fools who do cruel deeds will suffer violently. (12)

¹ Kālikā, doubtful as regards the time when they will be enjoyed.

² I. e. I shall do as people generally do, viz. enjoy pleasures.

³ Viz. By his acts and thoughts.

Then going to the place where he is to be born again according to his deeds, he feels remorse, as I have heard (from my teacher). (13)

As a charioteer, who against his better judgment leaves the smooth highway and gets on a rugged road, repents when the axle breaks; so the fool, who transgresses the Law and embraces unrighteousness, repents in the hour of death, like (the charioteer) over the broken axle. (14, 15)

Then when death comes at last, the fool trembles in fear; he dies the 'death against one's will,' (having lost his chance) like a gambler vanquished by Kali. (16)

Thus has been explained the fools' 'death against one's will;' now hear from me the wise men's 'death with one's will!' (17)

Full of peace and without injury to any one is, as I have heard (from my teachers), the death of the virtuous who control themselves and subdue their senses¹. (18)

(Such a death) does not fall to the lot of every monk, nor of every householder; for the morality of householders is of various character, and that of monks is not always good throughout. (19)

Some householders are superior to some monks in self-control; but the saints are superior to all householders in self-control. (20)

Bark and skin (of a goat), nakedness, twisted

¹ *Samgayânam* *vusîmao* = *samyatânâm* *vasyavatâm*. *Vusîmao* is gen. sing., it is here used in juxtaposition with a word in gen. plur. Such an irregularity would of course be impossible in classical *Prâkrîṭ*, but the authors of metrical *Gâna Sûtras* take such liberties with grammar that we must put up with any faulty expression, though it would be easy to correct it by a conjecture.

hair, baldness—these (outward tokens) will not save a sinful ascetic. (21)

A sinner, though he be a mendicant (friar), will not escape hell; but a pious man, whether monk or householder, ascends to heaven. (22)

A faithful man should practise¹ the rules of conduct for householders; he should never neglect the Pôsaḥa fast² in both fortnights, not even for a single night. (23)

When under such discipline he lives piously even as a householder, he will, on quitting flesh and bones³, share the world of the Yakshas. (24)

Now a restrained monk will become one of the two: either one free from all misery or a god of great power. (25)

To the highest regions, in due order, to those where there is no delusion, and to those which are full of light, where the glorious (gods dwell)—who have long life, great power, great lustre, who can change their shape at will, who are beautiful as on their first day, and have the brilliancy of many suns—to such places go those who are trained in self-control and penance, monks or householders, who have obtained liberation by absence of passion. (26–28)

Having heard (this) from the venerable men who control themselves and subdue their senses, the virtuous and the learned do not tremble in the hour of death. (29)

¹ Kâḥṇa phâsaê=kâyêṇa sprisêṭ, literally, touch with his body.

² The Pôsaḥa of the Gainas corresponds to the Upôsaṭha of the Buddhists. Hoernle in note 87 of his translation of the Uvâsaḡa Dasô (Bibliotheca Indica) says of the Pôsaḥa: it is distinguished by the four abstinences (uvavâsa) from food (âhâra), bodily attentions (sarîrasatkâra), sexual intercourse (abrahma) and daily work (vyâpâra).

³ Literally, skin and joints.

A wise man having weighed (both kinds of death) and chosen the better one (taught in) the Law of Compassion, will become calm through patience, with an undisturbed mind (at the time of death). (30)

When the right time (to prepare for death) has arrived, a faithful (monk) should in the presence (of his teacher) suppress all emotions (of fear or joy) and wait for the dissolution of his body. (31)

When the time for quitting the body has come, a sage dies the 'death with one's will,' according to one of the three methods¹. (32)

Thus I say.

SIXTH LECTURE.

THE FALSE ASCETIC².

All men who are ignorant of the Truth are subject to pain; in the endless *Samsâra* they suffer in many ways. (1)

Therefore a wise man, who considers well the ways that lead to bondage³ and birth, should

¹ These three methods are (1) *bhaktapratyâkhyâna*, (2) *îṅgi-tamarana*, (3) *pâdapôpagamana*. They are fully described in the *Âtârâṅga Sûtra* I, 7, 8, 7 ff., see part i, p. 75 f.

² *Khuddâganiyantiḥḡgam* = *Kshullakanirgranthîyam*. *Kshullaka* originally means 'small, young,' but I do not see that the contents of this lecture support this translation, though the commentators would seem to favour it.

³ *Dêvendra* here quotes the following Sanskrit verse : *Kalatrani-gadam dattvâ na samtushṭaḥ pragâpatiḥ bhûyô-py apatyarûpêna dadâti galasrîṅkhalam*. The creator was not satisfied when he had given (to man) the wife as a fetter, he added a chain round his neck in the form of children.

himself search for the truth, and be kind towards all creatures. (2)

‘Mother, father, daughter-in-law, brother, wife, and sons will not be able to help me, when I suffer for my own deeds¹.’ (3)

This truth should be taken to heart² by a man of pure faith; he should (therefore) cut off greed and love, and not hanker after his former connections. (4)

Cows and horses, jewels and earrings, cattle, slaves and servants: all these (possessions) you must give up in order to obtain the power of changing your form at will. (5)³

Everything that happens to somebody, affects him personally; therefore, knowing the creatures’ love of their own self, do not deprive them of their life, but cease from endangering and combating them. (6)

Seeing that to accept (presents) leads to hell, one should not accept even a blade of grass; only to preserve one’s life⁴ one should eat the food that is put in one’s own alms-bowl. (7)

Here some are of opinion that they will be delivered from all misery by merely attending the teacher⁵, without abstaining from sins. (8)

¹ This verse recurs in *Sûtrakṛitāṅga* I, 9, 5.

² *Sapêhâê pâsê* = *svaprêkshayâ pasyêt*, he should look at it with his mind or reflectively. However *sapêhâê* is usually the absolute participle *samprêkshya*. The meaning is the same in both cases.

³ Some MSS. insert here the following verse: ‘Movables and immovables, corn, and furniture can not deliver a man from pain, who is suffering for his deeds.’

⁴ This is according to the commentators the meaning of the word *dôguññî* = *gugupsin*.

⁵ *Âyariyam vidittânam*. The commentator makes this out

Acknowledging the truth about bondage and liberation, but talking only, not acting (in accordance with these tenets), they seek comfort for themselves in mighty words. (9)

Clever talking will not work salvation; how should philosophical instruction do it? Fools, though sinking lower and lower through their sins, believe themselves to be wise men. (10)

They are (going) a long way in the endless *Sam-sâra*; therefore looking out carefully one should wander about carefully¹. (11)

Choosing what is beyond and above (this world, viz. liberation), one should never desire (worldly objects), but sustain one's body only to be able to annihilate one's *Karman*. (12)

Those will reap pains who, in thoughts, words, or acts, are attached to their body, to colours, and to forms. (13)

Recognising the cause of *Karman*, one should wander about waiting for one's death; (knowing) the permitted quantity of food and drink, one should eat (such food as has been) prepared (by the householders for their own consumption). (14)

An ascetic should not lay by any store, not even so little as the grease (sticking to his alms-bowl); but as a bird with its plumage², so he with his alms-bowl should wander about without desires. (15)

to mean: by learning only what right conduct (*âkârikam*) is, without living up to it. But it is obvious that the author intends a censure upon the *Gñanamârگا*.

¹ As usual this phrase means: one should conduct one's self so as to commit no sin.

² There is a pun in the original on the word *patta*, which means *plumes* (*patra*) and *alms-bowl* (*pâtra*).

Receiving alms in a manner to avoid faults¹, and controlling one's self, one should wander about in a village (&c.) without a fixed residence; careful among the careless one should beg one's food. (16)

Thus has spoken the Arhat *Gñâtrîputra*, the venerable native of *Vaisâlî*², who possesses the highest knowledge and who possesses the highest faith, who possesses (at the same time) the highest knowledge and the highest faith. (17)

Thus I say.

SEVENTH LECTURE.

THE PARABLE OF THE RAM, ETC.

As somebody, to provide for (the arrival of) a guest, brings up a young ram, gives it rice and gram³, and brings it up in his yard; (1)

Then when it is grown up and big, fat and of a large belly, fattened and of a plump body, it is ready for the guest. (2)

As long as no guest comes, the poor (animal) lives; but as soon as a guest arrives, its head is cut off, and it is eaten. (3)

As this ram is well treated for the sake of

¹ This is the *êshanâsamiti*. On the *samitis* see below, Twelfth Lecture, 2.

² *Vêsaliê* = *Vaisâlîka*. See my remarks on this statement in part i, introduction, p. xi, and Hoernle's notes in his translation of the *Uvâsaga* Dasô, p. 3 ff.

³ *Yavasa*, explained by *mudgamâshâdi*. Mutton of gram-fed sheep is greatly appreciated in India.

a guest, even so an ignorant, great sinner longs (as it were) for life in hell. (4)

An ignorant man kills, tells lies, robs on the highway, steals foreign goods, deceives, (always thinking of some one) whom he could plunder, the villain. (5)

He is desirous of women and pleasures, he enters on undertakings and business, drinks liquor, eats meat, becomes strong, a subduer of foes. (6)

He eats crisp goats' meat, his belly grows, and his veins swell with blood—but he gains nothing but life in hell, just as the ram is only fed to be killed for the sake of a guest. (7)

After having enjoyed pleasant seats, beds, carriages, riches, and pleasures, after having squandered his wealth which he had so much trouble in gaining, and after having committed many sins, he will, under the burden of his Karman, and believing only in the visible world, be grieved in the hour of death like the ram¹ at the arrival of a guest. (8, 9)

Then the sinner who has been killing living beings, at the end of his life falls from his state², and against his will he goes to the world of the Asuras, to the dark place. (10)

As a man for the sake of one Kâkint³ (risks and) loses a thousand (Kârshâpanas), or as the king lost his kingdom (and life) by eating a mango-fruit which he was strictly forbidden (by his physician)⁴: (11)

¹ Aya = aga, literally goat.

² Kuya = kyuta is said of one who is born after his death in a lower sphere than that in which he lived before.

³ According to the commentators the eightieth part of a rupee.

⁴ The commentators relate 'old stories' to explain allusions in the text; they will, however, be intelligible without further comment, though I do not contend that those stories were not really old and known to the author of the Sûtra.

Even so are human pleasures compared with the pleasures of the gods: divine life and pleasures surpass (the former) a thousand times and more. (12)

Those endowed with excellent knowledge live many *nayutas*¹ of years; so great a loss suffer the fools in a life of less than a hundred years! (13)

Three merchants set out on their travels, each with his capital; one of them gained there much, the second returned with his capital, and the third merchant came home after having lost his capital. This parable² is taken from common life; learn (to apply it) to the Law. (14, 15)

The capital is human life, the gain is heaven; through the loss of that capital man must be born as a denizen of hell or a brute animal. (16)

These are the two courses open to the sinner; they consist in misery, as corporal punishment, &c.; for the slave to his lusts³ has forfeited human life and divine life. (17)

Having once forfeited them, he will have to endure these two states of misery; it will be

¹ A *nayuta* or *niyuta* is equal to

49,786,136,000,000,000,000,000,000,000.

It is derived in the following way:

1 *pûrvânga* = 8,400,000

1 *pûrva* = 8,400,000 *pûrvângas*.

1 *nayutânga* = 8,400,000 *pûrvas*.

1 *nayuta* = 8,400,000 *nayutângas*.

² This parable closely corresponds to Matth. xxv. 14, Luke xix. 11. I need not here discuss the problems raised by this coincidence since they will, as I hear, be fully treated by Herr Hüttemann, a pupil of Professor Leumann of Strassburg.

³ *Lôlayâsadhê* = *lôlatâsa/ha*. The commentator takes *lôlatâ* for *lôla* and makes the word a *karmadhâraya*. I think that the word *sa/ha* which originally means 'one who deceives others' is used here in the sense 'one who deceives himself.'

difficult for him to attain an upward course¹ for a long time to come. (18)

Considering what is at stake, one should weigh (the chances of) the sinner and of the virtuous man (in one's mind).

He who brings back his capital, is (to be compared to) one who is born again as a man. (19)

Those men who through the exercise of various virtues² become pious householders, will be born again as men; for all beings will reap the fruit of their actions. (20)

But he who increases his capital, is (to be compared to) one who practises eminent virtues; the virtuous, excellent man cheerfully attains the state of gods³. (21)

When one thus knows that a (virtuous) monk or householder will be gladdened (by his gain), how, then, should a man, whilst he is losing (his chance), not be conscious of his losing it? (22)

As a drop of water at the top of a blade of Kusa-grass dwindles down to naught when compared with the ocean, so do human pleasures when compared with divine pleasures. (23)

The pleasures in this very limited life of men are like (the water at) the top of a blade of Kusa-grass; for the sake of what will a man not care to gain and

¹ I. e. birth as a man or a god.

² *Sikshâ*. The commentator quotes the following passage in *Prâkrîti*: Souls gain human birth through four causes: (1) a kind disposition (*prakṛtibhadratâ*), (2) love of discipline (*prakṛtivistivînatâ*), (3) compassion (*sânu-krośanatâ*), and (4) want of envy (*amatsarîtatâ*).

³ For a higher rank than that of a god, e. g. that of a *Kêvalin*, cannot, in the present state of the world, be attained.

to keep (so precious a good which he risks to lose)? (24)

He who has not renounced pleasure, will miss his aim (i.e. the true end of his soul); for though he has been taught the right way, he will go astray again and again. (25)

But he who has renounced pleasure, will not miss his aim; (he will think): I have learned that, by getting rid of this vile body, I shall become a god. (26)

He will be born among men where there is wealth, beauty, glory, fame, long life, and eminent happiness. (27)

See the folly of the sinner who practises unrighteousness: turning away from the Law, the great sinner will be born in hell. (28)

See the wisdom of the wise man who follows the true Law: turning away from unrighteousness, the virtuous man will be born as a god. (29)

A wise man weighs in his mind the state of the sinner and that of the virtuous man; quitting the state of the sinner, a sage realises that of the virtuous. (30)

Thus I say.

EIGHTH LECTURE.

KAPILA'S VERSES¹.

By what acts can I escape a sorrowful lot in this unstable ineternal *Samsâra*, which is full of misery? (1)

¹ This lecture is ascribed to Kapila. According to an old story, told in the commentary, he was the son of Kâsyapa, a Brahman

Quitting your former connections place your affection on nothing ; a monk who loves not even those who love him, will be freed from sin and hatred. (2)

Then the best of sages, who is exempt from

of Kaurâmbî, and his wife Yará. When Kâsyapa died, his place was given to another man. His wife then sent her boy to Srâvastî to study under Indradatta, a friend of his father's. That man was willing to instruct the boy, and procured him board and lodging in a rich merchant's house. Kapila, however, soon fell in love with the servant-girl who was appointed to his service. Once, at a festival kept by her caste, the girl in tears told him that she could not take part in the festivity as she had no money to buy ornaments. To get some she asked him to go to Dhana, a merchant, who used to give two pieces of gold to the man who saluted him first in the morning. Accordingly Kapila set out in the night, but was taken up by the police and brought before the king, Prasênagit. The student made a clear breast before the king, who was so pleased with him that he promised to give him whatever he should ask. Kapila went in the garden to consider what he should ask ; and the more he thought about it, the more he raised the sum which he believed he wanted, till it came to be ten thousand millions. But then, all of a sudden, the light came upon him ; he began to repent of the sinful life he had led up to that time, and tearing out his hair he became a Svayamsambuddha. Returning to the king, he pronounced verse 17 : The more you get, &c., and giving him the Dharmalâbha, he went his way. He practised austerities and acquired superior knowledge, by dint of which he came to know that in a wood, eighteen leagues from Râgagrîha, lived a gang of five hundred robbers, under a chief Bala-bhadra. These men, he knew, would become converts to the right faith ; accordingly he went to the wood where they lived. He was made prisoner, and brought before the leader of the robbers. To have some fun out of him they ordered him to dance, and on his objecting that there was none to play up, they all clapped their hands to beat the time. He then sang the first stanza of this lecture, by which some robbers were converted, and he continued to sing, repeating this stanza after each following verse (as dhr uva), till at last all the robbers were converted.

delusion and possesses perfect knowledge and faith, speaks for the benefit and eternal welfare, and for the final liberation of all beings. (3)

All fetters (of the soul), and all hatred, everything of this kind, should a monk cast aside; he should not be attached to any pleasures, examining them well and taking care of himself. (4)

A stupid, ignorant sinner who never fixes his thoughts on the soul's benefit and eternal welfare, but sinks down through hatred and the temptation of lust, will be ensnared as a fly is caught on glue. (5)

It is difficult to cast aside the pleasures of life, weak men will not easily give them up; but there are pious ascetics (*sâdhu*) who get over the impassable (*Samsâra*) as merchants cross the sea. (6)

Some there are who call themselves *Sramanas*, though they are like the beasts ignorant of (the prohibition of) killing living beings; the stupid sinners go to hell through their superstitious beliefs¹. (7)

One should not permit (or consent to) the killing of living beings; then he will perhaps be delivered from all misery; thus have spoken the preceptors who have proclaimed the Law of ascetics. (8)

A careful man who does not injure living beings, is called 'circumspect' (*samita*). The sinful *Karman* will quit him as water quits raised ground. (9)

In thoughts, words, and acts he should do

¹ The commentator quotes the following words: *brahmanê brâhmanam âlabhêta, indrâya kshattram, marudbhyô vaisyam, tapasê sâdram*, and explains them: he who kills a *Brâhmana* will acquire *Brahma* knowledge.

nothing injurious to beings who people the world, whether they move or not. (10)

He should know what alms may be accepted, and should strictly keep these rules; a monk should beg food only for the sustenance of life, and should not be dainty. (11)

He should eat what tastes badly, cold food, old beans, Vakkasa Pulâga, and for the sustenance of his life he should eat Manghu (ground badara). (12)

Those who interpret the marks of the body, and dreams, and who know the foreboding changes in the body (aṅga vidyâ)¹, are not to be called Śramaṇas; thus the preceptors have declared. (13)

Those who do not take their life under discipline, who cease from meditation and ascetic practices², and who are desirous of pleasures, amusements, and good fare, will be born again as Asuras. (14)

And when they rise (in another birth) from the world of the Asuras, they err about, for a long time, in the Saṃsâra; those whose souls are sullied by many sins, will hardly ever attain Bôdhi. (15)

And if somebody should give the whole earth to one man, he would not have enough; so difficult is it to satisfy anybody. (16)

The more you get, the more you want; your desires increase with your means. Though two mâshas would do to supply your want, still you would scarcely think ten millions sufficient. (17)

¹ See the note on verse 17 of the Fifteenth Lecture.

² Samâdhiyôgâh. Samâdhi is concentration of the mind, and the yôgâs are, in this connection, the operations (vyâpâra) of mind, speech, and body conducive to it.

Do not desire (women), those female demons¹, on whose breasts grow two lumps of flesh, who continually change their mind, who entice men, and then make a sport of them as of slaves. (18)

A houseless (monk) should not desire women, he should turn away from females; learning thoroughly the Law, a monk should strictly keep its rules. (19)

This Law has been taught by Kapila of pure knowledge; those who follow it, will be saved and will gain both worlds. (20)

Thus I say.

NINTH LECTURE.

THE PRAVRAGYÂ OF KING NAMÎ².

After (Nami) had descended from the world of the gods, and had been born as a man, he put an end to the influence of delusion, and remembered his former birth. (1)

Remembering his former birth, king Nami

¹ Râkshasîs in the original.

² The Life of king Nami and his Bôdhi is told in the commentary. The *Prâkrî*t text of this romance is printed in my 'Ausgewählte Erzählungen in Mâhârâsh/ri,' Leipzig, 1886, p. 41 ff. Nami is one of the four simultaneous Pratyêkabuddhas, i.e. one of those saints who reach the highest stage of knowledge by an effort of their own, not through regular instruction and religious discipline. The Pratyêkabuddhas or Svayamsambuddhas (Sahasambuddha in *Prâkrî*t) do not, however, propagate the true Law, as the Tîrthakaras do. As the legend of Nami is not materially connected with our text, I need not give an abstract of it here.

became a Svayamsambuddha in the true Law, and placing his son on the throne he retired from the world. (2)

After having enjoyed, in the company of the beautiful ladies of his seraglio, excellent pleasures which match those of the heavens, king Nami became enlightened and gave up his pleasures. (3)

Having given up the town and country of Mithilâ, his army, seraglio, and all his retinue, the venerable man retired from the world and resorted to a lonely place. (4)

When the royal Seer Nami retired from the world, at the occasion of his Pravragyâ there was an uproar in Mithilâ. (5)

To the royal Seer who had reached the excellent stage of Pravragyâ, Sakra in the guise of a Brâhmana addressed the following words: (6)

‘Why is now Mithilâ¹ full of uproar? Dreadful noises are heard from palaces and houses.’ (7)

On hearing this, the royal Seer Nami, pursuing his reasons and arguments, answered the king of the gods thus: (8)

‘In Mithilâ is the sacred² tree Manôrama, full of leaves, flowers, and fruits, which sheds a cool shadow; this tree is always a favourite resort of many (birds). (9)

¹ The text has Mahilâê, which is against the metre. The locative makes the construction needlessly involved.

² Kêiê, kaitya. The commentator interprets it as meaning udyâna, park; but to make good his interpretation he takes va~~kk~~ê for an instrumental plural instead of a nominative singular. The context itself seems to militate against this interpretation; for it is natural to say of a tree that it has many leaves, but it is rather strained to say the same of a park.

‘ Now, as this sacred tree Manôrama is shaken by the storm, the birds, suffering, destitute of refuge, and miserable, scream aloud.’ (10)

On hearing this, the king of gods, pursuing his reasons and arguments, answered the royal Seer Nami thus : (11)

“ This is fire and storm, your palace is on fire ! Reverend sir, why do you not look after your seraglio ? ” (12)

Nami answered (see verse 8) : (13)

‘ Happy are we, happy live we who call nothing our own ; when Mithilâ is on fire, nothing is burned that belongs to me. (14)

‘ To a monk who has left his sons and wives, and who has ceased to act, nothing pleasant can occur, nor anything unpleasant. (15)

‘ There is much happiness for the sage, for the houseless monk, who is free from all ties, and knows himself to be single and unconnected (with the rest of the world).’ (16)

Indra answered (see verse 11) : (17)

“ Erect a wall, gates, and battlements ; dig a moat ; construct sataghnts¹ : then you will be ² a Kshattriya.” (18)

Nami answered (see verse 8) : (19)

‘ Making Faith his fortress, Penance and Self-control the bolt (of its gate), Patience its strong wall, so that guarded in three ways³ it is impregnable ; making Zeal his bow, its string Carefulness in walking (iriyâ), and its top (where the string is

¹ An instrument for defending a town.

² *Gakkhasi*. The commentator explains this as an imperative, but there is no necessity for it.

³ *Tigutta*, this is a pun on the three *guptis*.

fastened) Content, he should bend (this bow) with Truth, piercing with the arrow, Penance, (the foe's) mail, Karman—(in this way) a sage will be the victor in battle and get rid of the *Samsâra*.' (20-22)

Indra answered (see verse 11): (23)

"Build palaces, excellent houses¹, and turrets; thus you will be a Kshattriya." (24)

Nami answered (see verse 8): (25)

'He who builds his house on the road, will certainly get into trouble; wherever he wants to go, there he may take up his lodgings.' (26)

Indra answered (see verse 11): (27)

"Punishing thieves and robbers, cut-purses and burglars, you should establish public safety; thus you will be a Kshattriya." (28)

Nami answered (see verse 8): (29)

'Men frequently apply punishment wrongly: the innocent are put in prison, and the perpetrator of the crime is set at liberty.' (30)

Indra answered (see verse 11): (31)

"O king, bring into subjection all princes who do not acknowledge you; thus you will be a true Kshattriya." (32)

Nami answered (see verse 8): (33)

'Though a man should conquer thousands and thousands of valiant (foes), greater will be his victory if he conquers nobody but himself. (34)

'Fight with your Self; why fight with external foes? He who conquers himself through himself, will obtain happiness. (35)

'The five senses, anger, pride, delusion, and greed

¹ Vardhamânagṛiḥa; the houses which are so called, belong to the best kind, see Varâha Mihira, *Bṛihat Samhitâ* 53, 36.

—difficult to conquer is one's self; but when that is conquered, everything is conquered!¹ (36)

Indra answered (see verse 11): (37)

"Offer great sacrifices, feed *Sramanas* and *Brâhmanas*, give alms, enjoy yourself, and offer sacrifices: thus you will be a true *Kshattriya*." (38)

Nami answered: (39)

'Though a man should give, every month, thousands and thousands of cows, better will be he who controls himself, though he give no alms.' (40)

Indra answered: (41)

"You have left the dreadful *âsrama* (that of the householder)² and are wanting to enter another; (remain what you were), O king, and be content with observing the *Pôsaha*-days." (42)

Nami answered: (43)

'If an ignorant man should eat but a blade of *Kusa*-grass every month, (the merit of his penance) will not equal the sixteenth part of his who possesses the Law as it has been taught.' (44)

Indra answered: (45)

"Multiply your gold and silver, your jewels and

¹ The first line of this verse is in the *Âryâ*-metre, the second in *Anushûbh*; the whole will not construe, but the meaning is clear. There are numerous instances in which the metre changes in the same stanza from *Âryâ* to *Anushûbh*, and vice versa, so frequent they are that we are forced to admit the fact that the authors of these metrical texts did not shrink from taking such liberties.

² *Ghôrâsama*. A *Gaina* author cannot forbear to name things from his religious point of looking at them. Thus only can it be explained that here Indra is made to apply to the *âsrama* of the householder an attribute which not he but his opponent could have used. Our verse is, however, probably only a later addition, as it has not the burden of the verses put into the mouth of Indra.

pearls, your copper, fine robes, and carriages, and your treasury; then you will be a true Kshatriya." (46)

Nami answered: (47)

'If there were numberless mountains of gold and silver, as big as Kailâsa, they would not satisfy a greedy man; for his avidity is boundless like space. (48)

'Knowing that the earth with its crops of rice and barley, with its gold and cattle, that all this put together will not satisfy one single man, one should practise austerities.' (49)

Indra answered: (50)

"A miracle! O king, you give up those wonderful pleasures, in search of imaginary objects; your very hope will cause your ruin." (51)

Nami answered: (52)

'Pleasures are the thorn that rankles, pleasures are poison, pleasures are like a venomous snake; he who is desirous of pleasures will not get them, and will come to a bad end at last. (53)

'He will sink through anger; he will go down through pride; delusion will block up his path; through greed he will incur dangers in both worlds.' (54)

Throwing off the guise of a Brâhmaṇa, and making visible his true form, Sakra saluted him respectfully and praised him with these sweet words: (55)

"Bravo! you have conquered anger; bravo! you have vanquished pride; bravo! you have banished delusion; bravo! you have subdued greed. (56)

"Bravo for your simplicity, O saint! bravo for your humility, O saint! bravo for your perfect patience! bravo for your perfect liberation! (57)

“Here (on earth) you are the highest man, Reverend sir, and hereafter you will be the highest; exempt from all blemishes you will reach Perfection, a higher state than which there is none in this world.” (58)

Thus praising the royal Seer, Sakra in perfect faith kept his right side towards him and paid reverence to him, again and again. (59)

After having adored the best sage's feet marked by the *Kakra* and the *Aṅkusa*¹, he flew up through the air, with his crown and his earrings prettily trembling. (60)

Nami humbled himself; enjoined by Sakra in person, the king of Vidēha left the house, and took upon him *Sramanahood*. (61)

Thus act the enlightened, the wise, the clever ones; they turn away from pleasures, as did Nami, the royal Seer. (62)

Thus I say.

TENTH LECTURE².

THE LEAF OF THE TREE.

As the fallow leaf of the tree falls to the ground, when its days are gone, even so the life of men (will

¹ The wheel and the hook.

² This is a sermon delivered by Mahāvīra to his disciple Indrabhūti, who belonged to the Gôtama Gôtra. In the commentary a lengthy legend is given how Gautama came to want this instruction. As it is not necessary for understanding the contents of this lecture, I may pass it over.

come to its close); Gautama, be careful all the while! (1)

As a dew-drop dangling on the top of a blade of Kusa-grass lasts but a short time, even so the life of men; Gautama, be careful all the while! (2)

As life is so fleet and existence so precarious, wipe off the sins you ever committed; Gautama, &c. (3)

A rare chance, in the long course of time, is human birth for a living being; hard are the consequences of actions; Gautama, &c. (4)

When the soul has once got into an earth-body¹, it may remain in the same state as long as an Asamkhya²; Gautama, &c. (5)

When the soul has once got into a water-body, &c. (all as in verse 5). (6)

When a soul has once got into a fire-body, &c. (all as in verse 5). (7)

When the soul has once got into a wind-body, &c. (all as in verse 5). (8)

When the soul has once got into a vegetable-body, it remains long in that state, for an endless time, after which its lot is not much bettered³; Gautama, &c. (9)

When the soul has once got into a body of a Dvîndriya (i.e. a being possessing two organs of

¹ Verses 5-9 treat of the êkêndriyas or beings which possess but one organ of sense, that of touch. A full description of them as well as of the dvîndriyas, &c. is given in the last lecture.

² The periods called asamkhya are measured by utsarpinîs and avasarpinîs which correspond to the kalpas of the Hindus, but greatly exaggerated. An asamkhya is the longest time (ukhôsam = utkarsham) which a soul may be doomed to live in earth-bodies; see below, XXXVI, 81 ff.

³ This is, according to the commentary, the meaning of duranta.

sense), it may remain in the same state as long as a period called *samkhyêya*¹; Gautama, &c. (10)

When the soul has once got into a body of a *Trîndriya* (i.e. a being possessing three organs of sense), it, &c. (all as in verse 10). (11)

When the soul has once got into a body of a *Katurindriya* (i.e. a being possessing four organs of sense), it, &c. (all as in verse 10). (12)

When the soul has once got into a body of a *Pañcêndriya* (i.e. a being possessing five organs of sense), it may remain in the same state as long as seven or eight births; Gautama, &c. (13)

When the soul has once got into the body of a god or of a denizen of hell, it may remain in that state one whole life; Gautama, &c. (14)

Thus the soul which suffers for its carelessness, is driven about in the *Samsâra* by its good and bad *Karman*; Gautama, &c. (15)

Though one be born as a man, it is a rare chance to become an *Ârya*; for many are the *Dasyus* and *Mlêkhas*; Gautama, &c. (16)

Though one be born as an *Ârya*, it is a rare chance to possess all five organs of sense; for we see many who lack one organ or other; Gautama, &c. (17)

Though he may possess all five organs of sense, still it is a rare chance to be instructed in the best Law; for people follow heretical teachers; Gautama, &c. (18)

Though he may have been instructed in the right Law, still it is a rare chance to believe in it; for many people are heretics; Gautama, &c. (19)

¹ A *samkhigga*, i.e. *samkhyêya*, is a period which can be measured by thousands of years.

Though one believe in the Law, he will rarely practise it; for people are engrossed by pleasures; Gautama, &c. (20)

When your body grows old, and your hair turns white, the power of your ears decreases; Gautama, &c. (21)

When your body grows old, and your hair turns white, the power of your eyes decreases; Gautama, &c. (22)

When your body grows old, and your hair turns white, the power of your nose decreases. (23)

When your body grows old, and your hair turns white, the power of your tongue decreases. (24)

When your body grows old, and your hair turns white, the power of your touch decreases. (25)

When your body grows old, and your hair turns white, all your powers decrease. (26)

Despondency, the king's evil, cholera, mortal diseases of many kinds befall you; your body wastes and decays; Gautama, &c. (27)

Cast aside from you all attachments, as the (leaves of) a lotus let drop off the autumnal¹ water, exempt from every attachment, Gautama, be careful all the while! (28)

Give up your wealth and your wife; you have entered the state of the houseless; do not, as it were, return to your vomit; Gautama, &c. (29)

Leave your friends and relations, the large fortune you have amassed; do not desire them a second time; Gautama, &c. (30)

¹ This attribute is here given to 'water,' because in autumn the water becomes pure, and even the purest water has no hold upon the leaves of a lotus; thus a saint should give up even the best and dearest attachment.

There is now no Gina¹, but there is a highly esteemed guide to show the way; now being on the right path, Gautama, be careful all the while! (31)

Now you have entered on the path from which the thorns have been cleared, the great path; walk in the right path; Gautama, &c. (32)

Do not get into an uneven road like a weak burden-bearer; for you will repent of it afterwards; Gautama, &c. (33)

You have crossed the great ocean; why do you halt so near the shore? make haste to get on the other side; Gautama, &c. (34)

Going through the same religious practices as perfected saints², you will reach the world of perfection, Gautama, where there is safety and perfect happiness; Gautama, &c. (35)

The enlightened³ and liberated monk should control himself, whether he be in a village or a town, and he should preach to all⁴ the road of peace; Gautama, &c. (36)

Having heard the Buddha's⁵ well-delivered

¹ As this assertion cannot be put in the mouth of Mahāvīra, this verse must be set down as a later addition—or perhaps as a blunder of the poet similar to that noted before, in IX, 42.

² This seems, according to the commentary, to be the meaning of the phrase *akalêvarasênim ūsiyâ*. *Akalêvarasrêṇī* is said to mean as much as *kshapakasrêṇī*.

³ Buddha.

⁴ *Bûhaê = vrimhayêt*; literally, propagate.

⁵ Here the word *buddha* is used as a title; but its use is very restricted, scarcely going beyond that of a common epithet. This is just what we otherwise should have to assume in order to explain the use by the Bauddhas of that word to denote the founder of their sect. In the *Sûtrakṛitāṅga* II, 6, 28 *Buddha*, in the plural, actually denotes the prophets of the Buddhists.

sermon, adorned by illustrations, Gautama cut off love and hatred and reached perfection. (37)

Thus I say.

ELEVENTH LECTURE.

THE VERY LEARNED.

I shall explain, in due order, the right discipline of a houseless monk who has got rid of all worldly ties. Listen to me. (1)

He who is ignorant of the truth, egoistical, greedy, without self-discipline, and who talks loosely, is called ill-behaved and void of learning. (2)

There are five causes which render wholesome discipline impossible : egoism, delusion, carelessness, illness, and idleness : (3)

For eight causes discipline is called virtue, viz. : not to be fond of mirth, to control one's self, not to speak evil of others, not to be without discipline, not to be of wrong discipline, not to be covetous, not to be choleric, to love the truth ; for their influence discipline is called virtue. (4, 5)

A monk who is liable to the following fourteen charges, is called ill-behaved, and does not reach Nirvâna : (6)

If he is frequently angry ; if he perseveres in his wrath ; if he spurns friendly advice ; if he is proud of his learning ; if he finds fault with others ; if he is angry even with friends ; if he speaks evil even of a good friend behind his back ; if he is positive in his assertions ; if he is malicious, egoistical, greedy,

without self-discipline; if he does not share with others; if he is always unkind: then he is called ill-behaved. (7-9)

But for the following fifteen good qualities he is called well-behaved: if he is always humble, steady, free from deceit and curiosity; if he abuses nobody; if he does not persevere in his wrath; if he listens to friendly advice; if he is not proud of his learning; if he does not find fault with others; if he is not angry with friends; if he speaks well even of a bad friend behind his back; if he abstains from quarrels and rows; if he is enlightened, polite, decent, and quiet: then he is called well-behaved. (10-13)

He who always acknowledges his allegiance to his teacher¹, who has religious zeal and ardour for study, who is kind in words and actions, deserves to be instructed. (14)

As water put into a shell shines with a doubled brilliancy, so do the piety, fame, and knowledge of a very learned monk. (15)

As a trained Kambôga-steed, whom no noise frightens², exceeds all other horses in speed, so a very learned monk is superior to all others³. (16)

As a valiant hero bestriding a trained horse, with heralds singing out to his right and left, (has no equal)⁴, neither has a very learned monk. (17)

¹ Literally, who always remains in his teacher's kula.

² Kanthaka. The horse of Buddha is called Kanthaka; our passage shows that the word is not a proper noun, but an appellative.

³ This is the burden of all verses down to verse 30.

⁴ I have supplied these words here and in the following verses. The commentators try to do without them, and labour to point out qualities of the monk, which correspond to the attributes of the subject of the comparison.

As a strong and irresistible elephant of sixty years, surrounded by his females, (has no equal), neither has a very learned monk. (18)

As a sharp-horned, strong-necked bullock, the leader of the herd, is a fine sight, so is a very learned monk. (19)

As a proud lion with sharp fangs, who brooks no assault, is superior to all animals, so is a very learned monk (superior to all men). (20)

As Vâsudêva, the god with the conch, discus, and club, who fights with an irresistible strength, (has no equal), neither has a very learned monk. (21)

As a universal monarch with his fourfold army and great power, the possessor of the fourteen attributes of a king, (has no equal), neither has a very learned monk. (22)

As Sakra the thousand-eyed, the wielder of the thunderbolt, the fortress-destroyer, the king of gods, (has no equal), neither has a very learned monk. (23)

As the rising sun, the dispeller of darkness, who burns as it were with light, (has no equal), neither has a very learned monk. (24)

As the moon, the queen of the stars, surrounded by the asterisms, when she is full at full-moon, (has no equal), neither has a very learned monk. (25)

As a well-guarded storehouse of merchants, which is filled with grain of many kinds, (has no equal), neither has a very learned monk. (26)

As the best of *Gambû*¹ trees, called *Sudarsanâ*,

¹ *Eugenia Jambu*. According to the commentators the very tree is meant from which *Gambûdvîpa* took its name. They make of the presiding (*ânâdhiya*) deity, the god *Anâdrita*. I am not prepared to say that there is such a god as *Anâdrita*. The name looks suspicious. I think *ânâdhiya* is equal to *âgñâsthita*.

which is the abode of the presiding deity, (has no equal), neither has a very learned monk. (27)

As the best of rivers, the ocean-flowing stream Sitâ¹ with its dark waters, (has no equal), neither has a very learned monk. (28)

As the best of hills, high mount Mandara, on which various plants shed a bright lustre, (has no equal), neither has a very learned monk. (29)

As the ocean of inexhaustible water, the delight of Svayambhû², which is full of precious things of many kinds, (has no equal), neither has a very learned monk. (30)

Monks who equal the ocean in depth, who are difficult to overcome, are frightened by nobody (or nothing), and are not easily assailed, who are full of extensive learning and take care of themselves, will go to the highest place, after their Karman has been annihilated. (31)

Therefore, seeker after the highest truth, study the sacred lore, in order to cause yourself and others to attain perfection. (32)

Thus I say.

¹ According to the cosmography of the *Gainas* the Sitâ is a river which takes its rise in the Nîla range and falls into the Eastern ocean. The Nîla is the fourth of the six parallel mountain-barriers, the southernmost of which is the Himâlaya. (*Trailôkya Dîpikâ*, *Umâsvâtis' Tattvârthâdhigama Sûtra*, &c.)

² This epithet apparently refers to Vishnu's sleeping on the ocean.

TWELFTH LECTURE ¹.

HARIKÊSA.

Harikêsa-Bala was born in a family of Svapâkas (*Kândâlas*); he became a monk and a sage, possessed of the highest virtues, who had subdued his senses. (1)

He observed the rules with regard to walking, begging, speaking, easing nature, and receiving and keeping (of things necessary for a monk)², controlled himself, and was always attentive (to his duty). (2)

He protected from sin his thoughts, speech, and body³, and subdued his senses.

¹ The commentators relate a legend of the principal figure in the following lecture. We may skip his former births and begin with his last. Near the Ganges lived Balakôsh/ha, chief of a *Kândâla* tribe, called Harikêsa (the yellow-haired). With his wife Gaurî he had a son Bala, who in the course of time became a *Gaina* monk and a great *Rîshi*. On his wanderings he once stayed in the Tinduga-grove near Benares, the presiding deity of which, a Yaksha, became his most fervent follower. One day Bhadrâ, king Kausalika's daughter, came to the Yaksha's shrine and paid homage to the idol. But seeing the dirty monk, she did not conceal her aversion. The Yaksha, however, to punish her for her want of respect for the holy man, possessed her. As no physician or conjurer could cure her madness, the Yaksha, by whom she was possessed, said she would recover only if she were offered as bride to Bala, the monk. The king agreeing, Bhadrâ became sound as before and went to the monk to choose him for her husband. Bala of course refused her. She was then married by the king to his Purôhita, Rudradêva, whose sacrifice-enclosure is the scene of the occurrences related in the Twelfth Lecture.

² These are the five Samitis. Compare Bhandarkar, Report on the Search for Sanskrit Manuscripts for 1883-84, p. 98, note †.

³ These are the three Guptis. Compare Bhandarkar, loc. cit. p. 100, note *.

Once on his begging tour, he approached the enclosure of a Brahmanical sacrifice. (3)

When (the priests) saw him coming up, emaciated by austerities, in a miserable condition, and with the poorest outfit, they laughed at him, the ruffians. (4)

Stuck up by pride of birth, those killers of animals, who did not subdue their senses, the unchaste sinners, made the following speech : (5)

‘Who is that dandy coming there? he is swarthy, dreadful, with a turned-up nose, miserably clad, a very devil¹ of a dirty man, with a filthy cloth put on his neck? (6)

‘Who are you, you monster? or for what purpose have you come here? you miserably clad devil of a dirty man! go, get away! why stand you there?’ (7)

At this turn the Yaksha, who lived in the Tinduka-tree, had compassion on the great sage, and making his own body invisible spoke the following words: (8)

“I am a chaste Sramana, controlling myself; I have no property, nothing belonging to me, and do not cook my food; I have come for food which is dressed for somebody else at the time when I call. (9)

“You give away, eat, and consume plenty of food; know that I subsist by begging; let the mendicant get what is left of the rest.” (10)

‘The dinner has been prepared for Brâhmanas, it has been got ready especially for ourselves and for

¹ Pisâka. A full description of a Pisâka is given in the Uvâsaga Dasâo, § 94 of Hoernle's edition.

us exclusively; we shall not give you such food and drink; why stand you there?' (11)

"The husbandmen throw the corn on high ground and on low ground¹, hoping (for a return). For the like motive give unto me; I may be the field which may produce merit (as the return for your benevolence)." (12)

'All the world knows that we are (as it were) the field on which gifts sown grow up as merit; Brâhmaṇas of pure birth and knowledge are the blessed fields.' (13)

"Those who are full of anger and pride, who kill, lie, steal, and own property, are Brâhmaṇas without pure birth and knowledge; they are very bad fields. (14)

"You are only the bearer of words as it were, you do not understand their meaning, though you have learned the Vêdas. The saints call at high and lowly (houses); they are the blessed fields." (15)

'Detractor of the learned doctors, how dare you speak thus in our presence! This food and drink should rather rot, than we should give it you, Nirgrantha².' (16)

"If you do not give me what I ask for, I who observe the Samitis, who am protected by the Guptis³, who subdue my senses, what benefit, then, will you gain by your sacrifices?" (17)

'Are here no Kshattriyas, no priests who tend the fire, no teachers with their disciples, who will

¹ This reminds one of the biblical parable of the sower.

² The word Nirgrantha has here, besides its common meaning, Gaiṇa monk, another derived from its etymological meaning, 'without any tie, without restraint,' i.e. shameless.

³ For Samiti and Gupti see notes 2 and 3 on p. 50.

beat him with a stick, or pelt him with a nut, take him by the neck, and drive him off?' (18)

On these words of the teachers, many young fellows rushed forward, and they all beat the sage with sticks, canes, and whips. (19)

At that turn king Kausalika's daughter, Bhadrâ, of faultless body, saw that the monk was beaten, and appeased the angry youngsters. (20)

'He is the very man to whom the king, impelled by the devil (who possessed me), had given me, but who would not think of me; he is the sage whom princes and gods adore, who has refused me. (21)

'He is that austere ascetic, of noble nature, who subdues his senses and controls himself; the chaste man, who would not accept me when my own father, king Kausalika, gave me to him. (22)

'He is the man of great fame and might, of awful piety and power; do not injure him who cannot be injured, lest he consume you all by the fire (of his virtue).' (23)

When the Yakshas heard these well-spoken words of (the Purôhita's) wife Bhadrâ, they came to the assistance of the sage, and kept the young men off. (24)

Appearing in the air with hideous shapes, the Asuras beat the people. When Bhadrâ saw them with rent bodies spitting blood, she spoke again thus: (25)

'You may as well dig rocks with your nails, or eat iron with your teeth, or kick fire with your feet, as treat contemptuously a monk. (26)

'Like a poisonous snake is a great sage of severe austerities, of tremendous piety and power; like

a swarm of moths you will rush into a fire, if you beat a monk on his begging tour. (27)

‘Prostrate yourself before him for protection, you together with all of them, if you want to save your life and your property; for in his wrath he might reduce the world to ashes.’ (28)

When the Brâhmana saw the disciples bowing their back and head, and holding out their hands, not minding their occupation; with streaming eyes, spitting blood, looking upwards, their eyes and tongues protruding, like as many logs of wood, he became heartbroken and dejected, and together with his wife he appeased the sage: ‘Forgive us our injury and abuse, sir! (29, 30)

‘Forgive, sir, these ignorant, stupid boys, that they injured you; sages are exceedingly gracious, nor are the saints inclined to wrath.’ (31)

“There is not the least hatred in me, neither now, nor before, nor in future. The Yakshas attend upon me, therefore they have beaten the boys.” (32)

‘You know the truth and the Law; you are not angry, compassionate sage; we take refuge at your feet, we together with all of them. (33)

‘We worship you, mighty sir; there is nothing in you that we do not worship; eat this dish of boiled rice seasoned with many condiments. (34)

‘I have got plenty of food; eat it to do us a favour!’ The noble (monk) said ‘yes,’ and took food and drink after having fasted a whole month. (35)

At that moment the gods caused a rain of perfumed water and flowers, and showered down heavenly treasures; they struck the drums, and in the air they praised the gift. (36)

‘The value of penance has become visible, birth

appears of no value! Look at the holy Harikêsa, the son of a Svapâka, whose power is so great.' (37)

"O Brâhmanas, why do you tend the fire, and seek external purity by water? The clever ones say that external purity which you seek for, is not the right thing. (38)

"You (use) Kusa-grass, sacrificial poles, straw and wood, you touch water in the evening and in the morning; thereby you injure living beings, and in your ignorance you commit sins again and again." (39)

'How should we sacrifice, O monk, and how avoid sinful actions? Tell us, ascetic, whom the Yakshas hold in honour, what do the clever ones declare to be the right method of sacrificing?' (40)

"Doing no injury to living beings of the six orders, abstaining from lying and from taking what is not freely given, renouncing property, women, pride, and deceit, men should live under self-restraint. (41)

"He who is well protected by the five *Samvaras*¹ and is not attached to this life, who abandons his body², who is pure and does not care for his body, wins the great victory, the best of offerings." (42)

'Where is your fire, your fireplace, your sacrificial ladle? where the dried cowdung (used as fuel)? Without these things, what kind of priests can the monks be? What oblations do you offer to the fire?' (43)

¹ *Samvara* is preventing, by means of the *Samitis* and *Guptis*, the *âsrava*, or flowing in of the *Karman* upon the soul. Bhandarkar, loc. cit. p. 106.

² This is the *Kâyôtsarga*, the posture of a man standing with all his limbs immovable, by which he fortifies himself against sins, &c.

“Penance is my fire; life my fireplace; right exertion is my sacrificial ladle; the body the dried cowdung; Karman is my fuel; self-control, right exertion, and tranquillity are the oblations, praised by the sages, which I offer.” (44)

‘Where is your pond, and where the holy bathing-place? how do you make your ablutions or get rid of impurity? Tell us, O restrained monk whom the Yakshas hold in honour; we desire to learn it from you.’ (45)

“The Law is my pond, celibacy my holy bathing-place, which is not turbid, and throughout clear for the soul¹; there I make ablutions; pure, clean, and thoroughly cooled I get rid of hatred² (or impurity). (46)

“The clever ones have discovered such bathing, it is the great bath praised by the seers, in which the great seers bathe, and, pure and clean, they obtain the highest place.” (47)

Thus I say.

THIRTEENTH LECTURE.

KĪTRA AND SAMBHŪTA³.

Being contemptuously treated for the sake of his birth (as a *Kāṇḍāla*) Sambhūta took, in Hastināpura,

¹ Attapasannalēsa = ātmaprasannalēśya, ‘in which the Lēśyā is favourable for the soul.’ The Lēśyā is comparable to the subtle body of the orthodox philosophy. The theory of the Lēśyā forms the subject of the Thirty-fourth Lecture.

² Dōsa, which means hatred (dvēsha) and impurity (dōsha).

³ The stories about Kītra and Sambhūta and the fate they

the sinful resolution (to become a universal monarch in some later birth); descending from the heavenly region Padmagulma, he was born of *Kulant* in *Kâmpilya* as *Brahmadatta*; *Kitra*, however, was born in the town *Purimatâla* in the great family of a merchant; when he had heard the Law, he entered the order. (1, 2)

In the town *Kâmpilya*, both *Sambhûta* and *Kitra* (as they were called in a former birth) met again and told each other the reward they had realised for their good and bad actions. (3)

The universal monarch *Brahmadatta*, the powerful and glorious king, respectfully addressed the following words to him (who had been) his brother (in a former birth): (4)

‘We were brothers once, kind to each other, loving each other, wishing well to each other. (5)

‘We were slaves in the country of the *Dasârnas*, then antelopes on mount *Kâlaṅgara*, then geese on the shore of *Mṛitagangâ*, and *Svapâkas* in the land of *Kâsi*. (6)

‘And we were gods having great power, in the regions of the gods. This is our sixth birth, in which we are separated from each other.’ (7)

“*Karman* is produced by sinful thoughts, and you have entertained them, O king; it is by the influence of this *Karman* that we were separated.” (8)

underwent in many births are common to Brahmins, Gainas, and Buddhists. The whole subject has been exhaustively dealt with by Prof. Leumann in two learned papers in the *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, vol. v, pp. 1 ff., 111 ff., where an analysis of the various documents which relate this legend is given, and the *Prâkrit* text of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Lectures together with a German translation is published. For all details, therefore, the reader is referred to Prof. Leumann's papers.

‘I had done actions derived from truth and purity, and now I enjoy their effect; is this also true in your case, *Kiṭra*?’ (9)

“Every good deed will bear its fruit to men; there is no escape from the effect of one’s actions. Through riches and the highest pleasures my soul has got the reward for its virtues. (10)

“Know, *Sambhūta*, that you have got the reward of your virtues in the shape of great wealth and prosperity; but know, O king, that is just so with *Kiṭra*; he also obtained prosperity and splendour. (11)

“A song of deep meaning condensed in words has been repeated in the midst of a crowd of men, (having heard) which monks of piety and virtues exert themselves in this (religion): I have become a *Sramaṇa*.” (12)

‘Renowned are my beautiful palaces *Ukka*, *Udaya*, *Madhu*, *Karka*, and *Brahman*: this house, full of treasures and containing the finest products of the *Pañcāśālas*, O *Kiṭra*¹, regard it as your own! (13)

‘Surround yourself with women who dance, and sing, and make music; enjoy these pleasures, O monk; I deem renunciation a hard thing.’ (14)

As the virtuous *Kiṭra*, for old friendship’s sake, loved the king who was attached to sensual pleasures, and as he had at heart his welfare, he spoke to him the following words: (15)

“All singing is but prattle, all dancing is but

¹ The commentator constructs *Kiṭra* with *dhanappabhūya*: full of manifold treasures; but Prof. Leumann is probably right in taking it as a vocative.

mocking, all ornaments are but a burden, all pleasures produce but pains. (16)

“O king, pleasures which the ignorant like, but which produce pains, do not delight pious monks who care not for pleasure, but are intent on the virtues of right conduct. (17)

“Excellent king, the lowest caste of men is that of the Svapâkas, to which we twice belonged; as such we were loathed by all people, and we lived in the hamlets of Svapâkas. (18)

“In that miserable birth we lived in the hamlets of Svapâkas, detested by all people; then we acquired the Karman (the fruit of which we now enjoy). (19)

“You are now a king of great power and prosperity, enjoying the reward of your good actions; put from you the transitory pleasures, and enter the order for the sake of the highest good¹! (20)

“He who in this life has done no good actions and has not practised the Law, repents of it in the next world when he has become a prey to Death. (21)

“As a lion takes hold of an antelope, so Death leads off a man in his last hour; neither mother, nor father, nor brother will, at that time, save a particle (of his life). (22)

“Neither his kinsmen, nor his friends, nor his sons, nor his relations will share his suffering, he alone has to bear it; for the Karman follows the doer. (23)

“Leaving behind bipeds and quadrupeds, his fields, his house, his wealth, his corn, and everything;

¹ Âdâna, explained *kāritradharma*.

against his will, and accompanied only by his Karman¹, he enters a new existence, either a good or a bad one. (24)

“When they have burned with fire on the funeral pile his forlorn, helpless corpse, his wife and sons and kinsfolk will choose another man to provide for them. (25)

“Life drags on (towards death) continuously²; old age carries off the vigour of man. King of the Pañchâlas, mark my words: do no fearful actions.” (26)

‘I, too, know just as well as you, O saint, what you have told me in your speech: pleasures will get a hold on men and are not easily abandoned by such as we are, sir. (27)

‘O Kîtra, in Hastinâpura³ I saw the powerful king (Sanatkumâra), and I took that sinful resolution in my desire for sensual pleasures. (28)

‘And since I did not repent of it, this has come of it, that I still long for sensual pleasures, though I know the Law. (29)

‘As an elephant, sinking down in a quagmire,

¹ This might be translated, as Professor Leumann suggests: possessing Karman as the germ (of his future destiny); still I prefer the meaning vouched for by the commentators, because karmabîga generally means the germ, i.e. cause of Karman, see below, Thirty-second Lecture, verse 7.

² See Professor Leumann's remarks on this verse, l. c., p. 137 f.

³ When Sunandâ, wife of Sanatkumâra, paid homage to Sambhûta, then a Gaina monk, and touched his feet with the curls of her soft hair, he was possessed by the desire to become a universal monarch in reward for his penances. This is the nidâna of which the text speaks, and what I render in this connection by ‘taking a resolution.’ For the story itself, see my *Ausgewählte Erzählungen in Mâhârâshtrî*, p. 5 f.

sees the raised ground but does not get to the shore, so do we who long for sensual pleasures, not follow the path of monks. (30)

‘Time elapses and quickly pass the days; the pleasures of men are not permanent; they come to a man and leave him just as a bird leaves a tree void of fruit.’ (31)

“If you are unable to abandon pleasure, then do noble actions, O king; following the Law, have compassion on all creatures: then you will become a god on entering a new existence. (32)

“If you have no intention of abandoning pleasure, and still long for undertakings and property, my long talk has been to no purpose. I go, king, farewell.” (33)

And Brahmadata, king of the Pañkâlas, did not act on the counsel of the saint; he enjoyed the highest pleasure, and (afterwards) sank into the deepest hell. (34)

But Kîtra the great sage, of excellent conduct and penance, was indifferent to pleasure; after he had practised the highest self-control, he reached the highest place of perfection. (35)

Thus I say.

FOURTEENTH LECTURE.

ISHUKÂRA.

Having been gods in a former existence and lived in the same heavenly region, some were born (here below) in the ancient, wealthy, and famous

town called Ishukâra¹, which is beautiful like heaven. (1)

By a remnant of the merit they had acquired in their former life, they were born in noble families. Disgusted with the world and afraid of the *Samsâra*, they abandoned (pleasures, &c.) and took refuge in the path of the *Ginas*. (2)

Two males remained bachelors, (the third became) the Purôhita (*Bhrigu*), (the fourth) his wife *Yasâ*, (the fifth) the widely-famed king Ishukâra, and (the sixth) his wife *Kamalâvatî*. (3)

Overcome by fear of birth, old age, and death, their mind intent on pilgrimage, and hoping to escape the Wheel of Births, they examined pleasures and abandoned them. (4)

Both dear sons of the Brahmanical Purôhita, who was intent on works, remembered their former birth, and the penance and self-control they had then practised. (5)

Averse to human and heavenly pleasures, desiring liberation, and full of faith, they went to their father and spoke thus: (6)

‘Seeing that the lot of man is transitory and precarious, and that his life lasts not long, we take no delight in domestic life; we bid you farewell: we shall turn monks!’ (7)

In order to dissuade them from a life of austerities, the father replied to those (would-be) monks: ‘Those versed in the *Vêdas* say that there will be no better world for men without sons. (8)

‘My sons, after you have studied the *Vêdas*, and fed the priests, after you have placed your own sons

¹ In *Prâkrîṭ Usuyâra* (or *Isuyâra*). According to the *Prâkrîṭ* legend given in the commentary it was in the Kuru country.

at the head of your house, and after you have enjoyed life together with your wives, then you may depart to the woods as praiseworthy sages.' (9)

The young men perceiving that the Purôhita was wholly consumed, as it were, by the fire of grief, which was fed by his individual inclinations and blown into a huge flame by the wind of delusion; that he suffered much and talked a great deal in many ways; that he tried to persuade them by degrees, and that he would even bribe them with money and with objects of desire, (spoke) these words : (10, 11)

"The study of the Vêdas will not save you; the feeding of Brâhmanas will lead you from darkness to darkness, and the birth of sons will not save you. Who will assent to what you said? (12)

"Pleasures bring only a moment's happiness, but suffering for a very long time, intense suffering, but slight happiness; they are an obstacle to the liberation from existence, and are a very mine of evils. (13)

"While a man walks about without abandoning pleasures, and grieves day and night, while he is anxious about other people, and seeks for wealth, he comes to old age and death. (14)

"I have this, and I have not that; I must do this, and I should not do that! While he talks in this strain, the robbers (viz. time) drag him away. What foolishness is this!" (15)

'Great wealth and women, a family and exquisite pleasures: for such things people practise austerities. All this you may have for your asking.' (16)

"What avail riches for the practice of religion, what a family, what pleasures? We shall become

Sramanas, possessed of many virtues, and wander about collecting alms." (17)

'As fire is produced in the *Arazi*-wood, as butter in milk, and oil in sesamum seed, so, my sons, is the soul¹ produced in the body; (all these things) did not exist before, they came into existence, and then they perish; but they are not permanent.' (18)

"(The soul) cannot be apprehended by the senses, because it possesses no corporeal form², and since it possesses no corporeal form it is eternal. The fetter of the soul has been ascertained to be caused by its bad qualities, and this fetter is called the cause of worldly existence. (19)

"Thus being ignorant of the Law, we formerly did sinful actions, and through our wrong-mindedness we were kept back and retained (from entering the order). We shall not again act in the same way. (20)

"As mankind is harassed (by the one), and taken hold of (by the other), and as the unfailing ones go by, we take no delight in the life of a householder." (21)

'Who harasses the world? who takes hold of it?

¹ Sattâ in the original; it is rendered *sattva* by the commentators. Perhaps *sattâ* is the *Prâkrî* for *svâtâmâ*; at any rate, the context of the next verse proves that soul is intended.

² *Amûrta*. In later philosophy *mûrtatva* is defined as the possessing of definite and limited form (*parikkhinnaparimânavattvam*) or the possessing of action (*kriyâvattvam* or *vegavattvam*). *Amûrta* *dravya* are with the *Vaiseshikas*: the air (*âkâsa*), time, space, and *Âtman*. These are also called *nityadravya*. *Amûrta* is here apparently synonymous with *arûpin*, formless, compare XXXVI, 4, where *dharma*, *adharma*, *akâsa*, and *kâla* are enumerated as the 'formless things without life.'

whom do you call unfailing? My sons, I am anxious to learn this.' (22)

"Mankind is harassed by Death; it is taken hold of by Old Age; the days¹ are called unfailing: know this, Father! (23)

"The day that goes by will never return; the days elapse without profit to him who acts contrary to the Law. (24)

"The day that goes by will never return; the days elapse with much profit to him who acts up to the Law." (25)

'Having lived together in one place, and both parties² having acquired righteousness, we shall, O my sons, afterwards go forth (as monks) and beg alms from house to house.' (26)

"He who can call Death his friend, or who can escape him, or who knows that he will not die, might perhaps decide: this shall be done to-morrow. (27)

"We will even now adopt the Law, after the adoption of which we shall not be born again. The future has nothing in store for us (which we have not experienced already). Faith will enable us to put aside attachment." (28)

(Bhrigu speaks to his wife Vâsishthî.) 'Domestic

¹ Literally, the nights. It seems to have been the custom at the time when the Sûtras were composed, to reckon the time by nights, though the reckoning by days is not quite uninstanced in the Sûtras.

² This is the explanation of *duhaô* by the commentators, who apparently think that the parents and the sons are meant. The word in question is originally an adverb, but it is also (cf. Thirteenth Lecture, verse 18) taken by the commentator as a numeral, and rendered *dvayôh*. A genitive of the dual occurs in XIX, 90.

life ceases (to have attraction) for one who has lost his sons ; Vâsishṭhi, the time has arrived for me to turn mendicant friar. As long as a tree retains its branches, it is really a tree ; when they are lopped off, it is called a trunk. (29)

‘As a bird without its wings, as a king in battle without his followers, as a merchant on a boat without his goods, even so am I without my sons.’ (30)

“You have brought together all these objects of desire, and have collected many exquisitely pleasant things. Let us, therefore, fully enjoy the pleasures ; afterwards we shall go forth on the road of salvation.” (31)

‘We have finished enjoying pleasures, my dear ; our life is drawing to its close. I do not abandon pleasures for the sake of an unholy life ; but looking with indifference on gain and loss, on happiness and suffering, I shall lead the life of a monk.’ (32)

“May you not remember your brothers (when it is too late) like an old goose swimming against the current. Enjoy the pleasures together with me. A mendicant’s life is misery.” (33)

‘My dear, as a snake casts off the slough of its body and goes along free and easy, even so have my sons abandoned pleasure. Why should I, being left alone, not follow them ? (34)

‘As the fish Rôhita¹ breaks through a weak net, even so wise men of exemplary character and famous for their austerities abandon pleasure and live as mendicants. (35)

“As the herons fly through the air and the geese too, who had rent the net, even so my sons and

¹ Cyprinus Rohita.

my husband depart. Why should I, being left alone, not follow them?" (36)

When the queen had heard that the Purôhita with his wife and sons had entered the order, abandoning pleasures and all his large property, she spoke to the king: (37)

'A man who returns, as it were, to the vomit, is not praised; but you want to confiscate¹ the property left by the Brâhmana. (38)

'If the whole world and all treasures were yours, you would still not be satisfied, nor would all this be able to save you. (39)

'Whenever you die, O king, and leave all pleasant things behind, the Law alone, and nothing else in this world, will save you, O monarch. (40)

'As a bird dislikes the cage, so do I (dislike the world). I shall live as a nun, without offspring, poor, upright, without desire, without love of gain, and without hatred. (41)

'As when by a conflagration of a forest animals are burned, other beasts greatly rejoice, being under the influence of love and hate; even so we, fools that we are, being attached to pleasure, do not perceive that the world is consumed by the fire of love and hatred. (42, 43)

'Those who have enjoyed pleasures, and have renounced them, move about like the wind, and go wherever they please, like the birds unchecked in their flight. (44)

'When they² are caught, and held by my hand,

¹ It was considered a privilege of the king to confiscate the property of a man who had no heir; compare Gautama XXVIII, 42, Vasishtha XVII, 83-86, &c.

² This apparently refers to the birds mentioned in the last verse.

sir, they struggle; we shall be like them, if we are attached to pleasures. (45)

‘As an unbaited (bird)¹ sees a baited one caught in the snare, even so shall we avoid every bait and walk about, not baited by anything. (46)

‘Being aware that pleasures are causes for the continuance of worldly existence, as illustrated in (the above) similes of the greedy man, one should be cautious and stir as little as possible, like a snake in the presence of Suparna. (47)

‘Like an elephant who has broken his fetters, go to your proper destination. O great king Ishukâri; this is the wholesome truth I have learned. (48)

‘Leave your large kingdom and the pleasures which are so dear to all; abandon what pleases the senses, and what attracts; be without attachment and property; learn thoroughly the Law and give up all amusements; then practise famous and severe penance, being of firm energy².’ (49, 50)

The commentators labour to interpret them as ‘pleasures,’ but that will not make good sense.

¹ Kulala in the original. Kulâla in Sanskrit denotes the wild cock, Phasianus Gallus. The word seems to be derived from kulâya by assimilation of the y to the preceding consonant, compare salilâ for saliyâ = saritâ = sarit. In the sense of bird the word kulâla seems to be used in the well-known stanza of Bhartṛhari: brahmâ yena kulâlavan niyamito brahmândabhândô-dare, unless here kulâla is an early corruption for kulâyin.

² The commentators assign these verses to the two sons of Bhrigu; but then the verses do not construe. Besides the mention of the ‘large kingdom’ in the first line seems to prove that the king, and not the Brahmins, is to be understood as the person addressed. In the last line I separate pagiggḥaha kkhâyam (scil. tavam), instead of pagiggḥa ahakkhâyam. It is, however, just possible that the next verse is to be connected with the preceding ones; in that case, we must read pagiggḥa and interpret it in conformity with the scholiast as a gerund.

In this way all (these) professors of the Law gradually obtained enlightenment, being frightened by birth and death, and seeking for the end of misery. (51)

Their doubts about the true doctrine were dispersed, and they realised the Bhâvanâs¹; in a short time they reached the end of misery. (52)

The king and the queen, the Brahmanical Purôhita, his wife, and his sons, they all reached perfection. (53)

Thus I say.

FIFTEENTH LECTURE.

THE TRUE MONK².

He who adopts the Law in the intention to live as a monk, should live in company (with other monks), upright, and free from desire; he should abandon his former connections, and not longing for pleasures, he should wander about as an unknown beggar: then he is a true monk. (1)

Free from love he should live, a model of

¹ The bhâvanâs are certain meditations which are conducive to the purity of the soul. They are treated at length in a work by Hêmaçandra, called Bhavabhâvanâ, which seems to be rather popular with the Svêtâmbaras. The Digambaras seem to call them Anuprêkshâs. A work in Prâkrîṭ by Subhaçandra, called Kârttikêyanuprêkshâ, is epitomised in Bhandarkar's Report for 1883-84, p. 113 ff.

² The name of this lecture, sa bhikkhû, is derived from the burden which runs through the whole of it and winds up every verse.

righteousness¹, abstaining from sins, versed in the sacred lore, protecting his soul (from every wrong), wise, hardy, observing everything; he who is attached to nothing, is a true monk. (2)

Ignorant of abuse and injury, a steadfast monk should be a model of righteousness, always protecting his soul (from sins), neither rash nor passionate; when he endures everything, then he is a true monk. (3)

He who is content with lowly beds and lodgings, bears heat and cold, flies and gnats, is neither rash nor passionate, and endures everything, he is a true monk. (4)

He does not expect respectful treatment, nor hospitality, nor reverence, nor, indeed, praises; he controls himself, keeps the vows, practises austerities, lives together with other monks, meditates on his soul; this is a true monk. (5)

If he does not care for his life, or abandons every delusion, if he avoids men and women, always practises austerities, and does not betray any curiosity, then he is a true monk. (6)

He who does not profess and live on divination from cuts and shreds², from sounds on the earth or in the air, from dreams, from diagrams, sticks, and

¹ *Lâdhê*, explained *sadanush/hânatayâ pradhânaḥ*. *Lâdha* is also the name of a country in western Bengal, inhabited, at Mahāvîra's time, by uncivilised tribes, see part i, p. 84, note 1. The etymology of both words is doubtful.

² Compare the note on p. 161 of part i. The 71st chapter of Varāha Mihira's *Bṛihat Saṃhitā* treats of *vastrakḥêda*, rents, &c. of clothes; the 51st, of *aṅgavidyâ*, forebodings from the body; and the 53rd, of *vâstuvidyâ*, property of buildings; chapters 88, 90, and 95 are devoted to the forebodings from the cries of birds, female jackals, and crows.

properties of buildings, from changes in the body, from the meaning¹ of the cries (of animals)—he is a true monk. (7)

Spells, roots, every kind of medical treatment, emetics, purgatives, fumigation, anointing of the eye, and bathing, the patient's lamentation, and his consolation—he who abstains from all these things, is a true monk. (8)

He who does not praise, or pay attention to, the warriors, Ugras², princes, Brâhmanas, Bhôgas, and artists of all sorts, who abstains from this, he is a true monk. (9)

He who does not, for earthly gain, improve his acquaintance with householders, with whom he fell in as a monk, or was in friendly relation before that time, he is a true monk. (10)

A Nirgrantha is forbidden to take from householders, if they do not give it themselves, bed, lodging,

¹ A conjectural rendering of *vigaya*, which cannot be taken in its ordinary meaning 'victory.' The commentary explains it *ru-bhâsubhanirûpañâbhyâsah*.—Notice the absence of astrology from the above list of prophetic arts practised by strolling friars apparently to insinuate themselves into the good graces of laymen and women. If Greek nativity had already risen to importance, it certainly would have been mentioned. For it has ever since held a firm hold on the Hindu mind.—This remark also applies to XX, 45. But in *Sûtrakṛitāṅga* I, 12, 9, astrology (*saṃvakkhara*) is mentioned; it is, however, the ancient astrology of the Hindus, not the Greek one.

² The Ugras and Bhôgas were Kshatriyas. The former were, according to the *Gainas*, descendants of those whom *Rishabha*, the first Tîrthakara, appointed to the office of *kôtwals* or prefects of towns, while the Bhôgas were descendants from those whom *Rishabha* acknowledged as persons deserving of honour. Comp. Hoernle, *Uvâsaga Dasâo*, Appendix, p. 58, and my edition of the *Kalpa Sûtra*, p. 103, note on § 18.

drink, food, or any dainties and spices; he who is not angry at such occasions, he is a true monk. (11)

If a monk gets any food and drink, or dainties and spices, and does not feel compassion (on a sick fellow-monk) in thoughts, words, and deeds, (then he is not a true monk)¹; but if he has his thoughts, words, and acts under strict discipline, then he is a true monk. (12)

Dish-water², barley-pap, cold sour gruel³, water in which barley has been washed: such loathsome food and drink he should not despise, but call at the lowliest houses (for alms); then he is a true monk. (13)

There are many voices on the earth, of gods, of men, and of beasts, dreadful, frightful, and awful noises; if he hears them without trembling, then he is a true monk. (14)

He who understands all religious disputations, [who lives together with fellow-monks]⁴, who practises self-discipline⁵, who meditates on his soul, who is wise, hardy, and observes everything, who

¹ The commentators supply these words; something to that purport is wanted to make out a consistent meaning, but there is not so much as a hint of it in the text itself. As it stands now, the meaning would be just the opposite of that given in the translation, which is in better accordance with the established custom.

² Âyâмага, it is rendered âkâmakâ in Sanskrit, and explained avasrâvana, i.e. avasrâvana. See also Leumann, Aupapâtika Sûtra, Glossar s.v.

³ Sauvîra, explained kâṅgika, the water of boiled rice in a state of spontaneous fermentation.

⁴ This is a later addition, proved to be such by the metre, though the commentators comment upon it.

⁵ Khêyânugaê. The commentators explain khêda by samyama.

is calm, and does not hurt anybody, he is a true monk. (15)

He who, not living by any art, without house, without friends, subduing his senses, free from all ties, sinless, and eating but little, leaves the house and lives single, he is a true monk. (16)

Thus I say.

SIXTEENTH LECTURE.

THE TEN CONDITIONS OF PERFECT CHASTITY.

O long-lived (*Gambûsvâmin*)! I (*Sudharman*) have heard the following Discourse from the Venerable (*Mahâvîra*) :

Here¹, indeed, the venerable *Sthaviras* have declared ten conditions for the realisation of celibacy, by hearing and understanding which the monks will reach a high degree of self-discipline, of *Samvara*², and of contemplation, will be well protected (by the three *Guptis*), will guard their senses, guard their chastity, and will thus never be remiss (in the attendance on their religious duties).

What, then, are those ten conditions for the realisation of celibacy as declared by the venerable *Sthaviras*, by hearing and understanding which the monks will reach a high degree of self-discipline, of

¹ The word 'here' is explained as meaning 'in this religion of the *Gainas*.' See p. 8, note 5.

² *Samvara* is the stopping of the *âsravas* by means of the *Samitis* and *Guptis*, see above, p. 55, note 1.

Samvara, and of contemplation, will be well protected (by the three *Guptis*), will guard their senses, guard their chastity, and will thus never be remiss (in the attendance on their religious duties)?

These, then, are the ten conditions for the realisation of celibacy, &c. (all down to) duties.

1. A *Nirgrantha* may occupy various places for sleep or rest¹; but a *Nirgrantha* should not occupy places, for sleep or rest, frequented by women, cattle, or eunuchs. The preceptor has explained the reason for this. If a *Nirgrantha* occupies places for sleep or rest, frequented by women, cattle, or eunuchs, then, though he be chaste, there may arise a doubt with regard to his chastity, or a sensual desire, or a feeling of remorse, or he will break the rules, or he will become a slave to passion, or he will acquire a dangerous illness of long duration, or he will desert the faith which the *Kêvalin* has proclaimed. Therefore a *Nirgrantha* should not occupy places, for sleep or rest, frequented by women, cattle, or eunuchs.

2. A *Nirgrantha* should not converse with women². The preceptor has explained the reason for this. If a *Nirgrantha* converses with women, &c. (all as above).

3. A *Nirgrantha* should not sit together with women on the same seat. The preceptor has explained the reason for this. If a *Nirgrantha* sits on the same seat with women, &c. (all as above).

¹ Literally, beds and seats.

² This might also be rendered: he should not talk about women.

4. A Nirgrantha should not look at, or contemplate, the charms and beauties of women. (The rest similar as above.)

5. A Nirgrantha should not, behind a screen, or curtain, or wall, listen to the screeching or screaming or singing or laughing or giggling or crying of women. (The rest similar as above.)

6. A Nirgrantha should not recall to his memory the pleasure and amusements which in the past he enjoyed together with women. (The rest similar as above.)

7. A Nirgrantha should not eat well-dressed food. (The rest similar as above.)

8. A Nirgrantha should not eat or drink to excess. (The rest similar as above.)

9. A Nirgrantha should not wear ornaments. The preceptor has explained the reason for this. If he wears ornaments, or adorns his body, he might become an object of desire to women. When he is an object of desire to women, then, &c. (the rest as in 1).

10. A Nirgrantha should not care for sounds, colours, tastes, smells, and feelings. (The rest similar as above.)

Here are some verses (to the same effect)¹:

A monk should take up a detached lodging, free from, and not frequented by women, to preserve his chastity. (1)

A chaste monk should avoid talking with women, which delights the mind and foment love and passion. (2)

¹ The preceding part of this lecture is in prose.

A chaste monk should always avoid the company of, and frequent conversation with women. (3)

A chaste monk should avoid observing the body, limbs, and figure of women, their pleasant prattle and oglings. (4)

A chaste monk should avoid listening to the screeching, screaming, singing, laughing, giggling, and crying of women. (5)

A chaste monk should never recall to his mind how he had laughed and played with women, and had enjoyed them, how they became jealous, and what tricks he played to frighten them. (6)

A chaste monk should always avoid well-dressed food and drink which will soon raise his sensuality. (7)

A chaste monk should always eat his food, collected according to the rules, for the sustenance of life, in the prescribed quantity, and at the right time; concentrated in his thoughts he should not eat to excess. (8)

A chaste monk should abstain from ornaments, he should not adorn his body after the fashion of amorous people. (9)

He should always abstain from the five orders of pleasant things: sounds, colours, smells, tastes, and feelings of touch. (10)

A lodging frequented by women, their pleasant talk, their company, and looking at their charms; (11)

Their screeching, screaming, singing, and laughing, eating and sleeping together with them; well-dressed food and drink, or partaking of them to excess; (12)

And ornaments and finery¹: these pleasant things,

¹ *Iṭṭham ka*, i.e. *ishṭam ka*. The commentators connect the

which are hard to leave, are like the poison Tâlapuṭa¹, for a man who seeks after the true Self. (13)

He should, once for all, abandon pleasant things which are hard to leave; and concentrated in his thoughts he should avoid whatever casts a doubt on his chastity. (14)

A monk should be the steadfast charioteer, as it were, of the Law in the park of the Law², a vessel of righteousness, content, restrained, attentive to the duties of a chaste monk. (15)

The gods, Dânavas, Gandharvas, Yakshas, Râkshasas, and Kinnaras pay homage to a chaste monk who performs his difficult duties. (16)

This unchangeable, permanent, and eternal Law has been proclaimed by the *Ginas*; through it the *Siddhas* have reached perfection, and others will reach it. (17)

Thus I say.

SEVENTEENTH LECTURE.

THE BAD SRAMANA.

A Nirgrantha who has entered the order, who has learned the Law, who has received religious

words with the second part of the sentence. By giving to *ka* the meaning of *api* they interpret the two words in question as meaning 'though very pleasant.'

¹ Tâlauḍa. According to the *Dîpikâ* it is a poison which kills by merely touching the palate (*tâlukasparsanamâtrâd êva*); but this is a mere guess prompted by a wrong etymology. Tâlauḍa stands perhaps for tâlakûṭa, which may have been a variant of kâlakûṭa, the deadly poison swallowed by *Siva*.

² Here we have twice the same word *dhammârâmê*, which

discipline, and who has obtained the benefit of Bôdhi which is difficult to obtain, may perhaps afterwards begin to live as he likes. (1)

(He will say :) I have a good bed and wherewithal to cover me; I obtain food and drink; I know everything that comes to pass, friend; why then should I study, sir? (2)

He who, after entering the order, always sleeps, eats, and drinks as much as he likes, and lives comfortably, is called a bad *Sramana*. (3)

The sinner who despises the learning and discipline which his preceptor and teachers have taught him, is called a bad *Sramana*. (4)

He who does not, as he should, strive to please his preceptor and teachers, and does not, in his arrogance, treat them with respect, is called a bad *Sramana*. (5)

He who hurts living beings, seeds, and sprouts, who does not control himself, though he believes himself well-controlled, is called a bad *Sramana*. (6)

He who uses a bed, a plank, a chair, a seat, or his duster¹, without having well wiped these things, is called a bad *Sramana*. (7)

He who walks with great haste and without care, being overbearing and fierce, is called a bad *Sramana*. (8)

I have once translated 'park of the Law,' and then 'vessel of righteousness.' It is obvious that a play on this word is intended, though I may have failed to hit the meaning of the author.

¹ *Pâdakambala*, usually called *ragôharana*. One commentator suggests, as a possible rendering, *pâtrakambala* 'a cloth to cover his almsbowl.'

He who carelessly inspects things¹, throwing down his duster at random, not being attentive to the inspection of things, is called a bad *Sramana*. (9)

He who carelessly inspects things, his attention being absorbed by what he hears, who always slights his teachers, is called a bad *Sramana*. (10)

He who is deceitful, talkative, arrogant, greedy, who does not control himself, nor share (his food, &c. with those who are in want), and is not of an amiable disposition, is called a bad *Sramana*. (11)

He who is a controversialist, and ill-behaved, who perverts the truth, and delights in quarrels and contentions, is called a bad *Sramana*. (12)

He who sits down on a weak, shaking seat wherever he lists, and is not careful in sitting down, is called a bad *Sramana*. (13)

He who sleeps with dusty feet and does not inspect his couch, being careless about his bed, is called a bad *Sramana*. (14)

He who eats milk, curds, and other things produced from milk, and does not practise austerities, is called a bad *Sramana*. (15)

He who eats after sunset, and when admonished, makes an angry reply, is called a bad *Sramana*. (16)

He who leaves his own teacher, and follows heretical ones, who continuously changes his school², being of a bad disposition, is called a bad *Sramana*. (17)

¹ It is a monk's duty closely to inspect everything that he uses or comes in contact with, in order to avoid hurting inadvertently anything considered to possess life. This is called *paḍilêhâ*.

² *Gāṇaṅganika*, according to the commentators one who attaches himself to another *gana* every half-year.

He who has left his own house, and busies himself in another's house, who lives by fortune-telling, is called a bad *Sramana*. (18)

He who eats the food of his relations, and does not like living by alms¹, who reposes on the seat of the householder, is called a bad *Sramana*. (19)

Such a monk, who, like the heretics², does not protect himself from sins, who though having the appearance (of a monk) is the lowest among his worthy brethren, is despised in this world like poison; he is nobody in this world and in that beyond. (20)

But he who always avoids these sins, and is pious amongst his brethren, is welcomed in this world like nectar; he conquers this world and the next³. (21)

Thus I say.

EIGHTEENTH LECTURE.

SAÑGAYA⁴.

In the town of Kâmpilya there was a king, named *Sañgaya*, who possessed numerous troops and war-chariots; once he went a-hunting. (1)

¹ *Sâ mudâniya*, explained *bhaiksham*.

² *Pañkakusîla*, literally, those who practise the five wrong *sîlas*, whereby probably those are denoted who do not keep the five great vows of the *Gainas*. Note that the Buddhists too have their *pañkasîla*. They could therefore have been called *pañkakusîla* by the *Gainas*.

³ The text is not settled in the last line; but there can be no doubt about the meaning.

⁴ The commentators Sanskritise this name in *Samyata*. But however appropriate it may be to a *Gaina*, it certainly does not

He was surrounded on all sides by a large host of horses, elephants, chariots, and footmen. (2)

He chased the deer on horseback in the Kêsarapark of Kâmpilya ; and intent on his sport he killed there the frightened deer. (3)

Now in the Kêsarapark there was a houseless ascetic intent on sacred study and meditating on the Law. (4)

Annihilating sinful inclinations¹, he meditated in the Âsphôta-bower². But the king killed the deer that fled to him. (5)

Now the king on horseback came quickly there ; he saw the killed deer and saw the monk there. (6)

The king in his consternation (thought) 'I had nearly hurt the monk ; ill-fated and cruel me that is mad for the sport.' (7)

Having dismissed his horse, the king bowed respectfully to the monk's feet (saying), 'Forgive me this, Reverend sir.' (8)

But the venerable monk, being plunged in silent meditation, made no reply to the king, who, therefore, was seized with fear. (9)

'I am Sañgaya ; answer me, Reverend sir ; a monk might by the fire of his wrath reduce millions of men to ashes.' (10)

'Be without fear, O king ; but grant safety to others also ; in this transient world of living beings, why are you addicted to cruelty ? (11)

look like a king's name. The Sanskrit form of the name was probably Sañgaya or Sringaya, both of which frequently occur in Sanskrit literature.

¹ To render âsrava.

² Apphōva in the original ; there are several plants which are called âsphôta.

‘As you must, of necessity, one day part with everything, in this transient world of living beings, why do you cling to kingly power ? (12)

‘Transient like a stroke of lightning are life and beauty, which you love so much ; you do not comprehend what will benefit you in the next life. (13)

‘Wives and children, friends and relations, all are dependent on a man during his life ; but they will not follow him in death. (14)

‘The sons, in great sorrow, will remove the corpse of their father (to the cemetery) ; and so will parents do with their sons and relations ; O king, do penance ! (15)

‘O king, other men, glad, and pleased, and well attired, will enjoy the riches (the deceased) had amassed, and will dally with the wives he had so well guarded. (16)

‘And whatever actions he has done, good or wicked ones, with their Karman he will depart to his next existence.’ (17)

Then the king was taught the Law by this monk, and was filled with a great desire for purity, and disregard of worldly objects. (18)

Saṅgaya gave up his kingly power and adopted the faith of the Gīnas in the presence of the venerable monk Gardabhāli. (19)

A Kshattriya, who had abandoned his kingdom and had turned monk, said to him : ‘As you look so happy in outward appearance, you must have peace of mind. (20)

‘What is your name, to which Gôtra do you belong, and why have you become an ascetic¹ ?

¹ Literally, a Brahman.

How do you venerate the enlightened ones¹, and how did you come to be called a well-behaved (monk)?' (21)

"My name is Sañgaya ; I belong to the Gôtra of Gôtama ; my teacher is Gardabhâli, who is conversant with the sacred lore and good conduct. (22)

"O great sage, the man of limited knowledge talks foolishly on these four heads², viz. the existence of the soul, its non-existence, idolatry, and the inefficiency of knowledge. (23)

"This has been declared by him who is enlightened, wise, liberated, conversant with the sacred lore and good conduct, who is truthful and of right energy. (24)

"Men who commit sins will go to hell ; but those who have walked the road of righteousness, will obtain a place in heaven. (25)

"All this delusive talk (of the heretics) is untrue and without any meaning ; I live and walk about according to the rules of self-control. (26)

¹ Buddhê, explained âkâryân, preceptors.

² These are the four great heresies: (1) that of the *kriyâvâdinas*, who maintain that the soul exists; (2) that of the *akriyâvâdinas*, who hold the reverse of the preceding doctrine; (3) that of the *vainayikas*, which seems to be identical with salvation by *bhakti*; (4) that of the *agñânavâdinas*, who contend that knowledge is not necessary for salvation, but *tapas*; this seems identical with the *karmapatha*. The commentators explain *kriyâvâdina* 'those who believe the soul or *âtman* to be characterised by the verb to be (i.e. by a permanent and unchangeable existence), and ascribe to it such qualities as ubiquity or non-ubiquity, activity or non-activity.' This they treat as heresy, but from *Mahāvagga* VI, 31, 2 (vol. xvii, p. 109) it is evident that the *Gainas* were considered *kriyâvâdins*. The *akriyâvâda* is also identified with the *kṣhanikavâda* or doctrine, usually ascribed to Buddhists, that everything has but a momentary existence and is in the next moment replaced by a facsimile of itself. About these heresies compare the *Sûtrakṛitāṅga* I, 12 ; II, 2, 77.

“ I know all these heresies to be contemptible ; I know that there will be a life hereafter, and I know my Self. (27)

“ I was an illustrious god in the Mahâprâva heaven, and reached old age as we here would say of a man who is a hundred years old ; but in heaven, hundred years consist of as many Mahâpâlîs of Pâlîs¹. (28)

“ Descending from the Brahmalôka, I was born as a man. I know exactly the length of my life as well as that of other men. (29)

“ A monk should abandon the manifold doctrines (of heretics), and his own fancies, and such deeds as are productive of evil everywhere. One should live up to this wisdom². (30)

“ I keep clear of the (superstitious) questions and the spells of laymen, exerting myself day and night (in the true religion). Thinking thus, one should practise austerities. (31)

“ And what you of a pure mind asked me just now, that has been revealed by the enlightened one³ ; such knowledge makes part of the creed of the Gînas. (32)

“ A wise man believes in the existence of the soul⁴,

¹ According to the commentary a pâlî seems to be what is commonly called palyôpamâ, and mahâpâlî a sâgarôpamâ. However the longest life of a god in Brahmalôka is but ten Sâgarôpamâs, see below, XXXVI, 225. The construction of the verse is very involved, but the drift of it cannot be mistaken.

² ii viggâm anusamkharê. I believe that viggâm here stands for vidvân, as in the following verse. The meaning would then be, ‘knowing this one should live as a monk.’

³ Buddha.

⁴ The Gînas do not deny the existence of the soul, but the unalterable character of the soul. Hence they object to the kriyâvâda.

he avoids the heresy of the non-existence of the soul; possessing true faith one should practise the very difficult Law according to the faith. (33)

"Having learned this pure creed, which is adorned by truth and righteousness, Bharata¹ gave up Bharatavarsha and all pleasures, and entered the order. (34)

"King Sagara² also gave up the ocean-girt Bharatavarsha and his unrivalled kingly power, and reached perfection through his compassion. (35)

"After having given up Bharatavarsha, the famous universal monarch of great power, called Maghavan³, entered the order. (36)

"King Sanatkumâra⁴, a universal monarch of great power, placed his son on the throne, and then practised austerities. (37)

"Sânti⁵, a universal monarch of great power, the

¹ Bharata was the eldest son of Rîshabha, the first Tîrthakara. He became the first Kakravartin, or universal monarch, and resided in Ayôdhyâ. At his renunciation he was ordered by Indra himself to pluck out five handfuls of his hair as is the custom of Gaina monks on entering the order.

² Sagara, king of Ayôdhyâ, was, according to the legend contained in the commentary (see R. Fick, *Eine jainistische Bearbeitung der Sagara-Sage*, Kiel, 1889), the younger brother of Agita, the second Tîrthakara. He became the second Kakravartin, and, in the end, he was ordained by Agita. The Gaina legend seems to be but a strangely distorted version of the story of Sagara told in the first book of the Râmâyana.

³ Maghavan, son of king Samudravigaya of Srâvastî, and his wife Bhadrâ, became the third Kakravartin.

⁴ Sanatkumâra, son of king Asvasêna of Hastinâpura, and his wife Sahadêvî, became the fourth Kakravartin. The adventures of Sanatkumâra are told in a Prâkrit legend, which I have published in my *Ausgewählte Erzählungen in Mâhârâsh'rif*, Leipzig, 1886, p. 20 ff.

⁵ Sânti was the sixteenth Tîrthakara, Kunthu the seventeenth, and

bringer of peace to the world, gave up Bharatavarsha and reached perfection. (38)

“King Kunthu, the bull of the Aikshvâka race, the widely famed lord, reached perfection. (39)

“King Ara, after he had given up the sea-girt Bharatavarsha, reached perfection on becoming exempt from defilement. (40)

“After having given up his large kingdom, his army and war-chariots, his exquisite pleasures, Mahâpadma¹ practised austerities. (41)

“Having brought the (whole) earth under his sceptre, king Harishêna², who humbled the pride (of other kings), reached perfection. (42)

“Gaya³, together with thousands of kings, renouncing the world, practised self-restraint. He

Ara the eighteenth Tīrthakara. Kunthu sounds strange for a proper name. I think it just possible that it is a popular or Prākṛit corruption of Kakutstha, who was an Aikshvâka. As is well known, Râma is frequently called after him Kâkutsstha, and so are other kings of the same line, in which he stands as the twenty-fifth according to the list in the Râmâyana I, 70.

¹ Mahâpadma was the ninth Kakravartin. His elder brother was Vishṇukumâra, who was ordained by Suvrata, a disciple of Munisuvrata, the twentieth Tīrthakara. He wrenched the sovereignty of the world from Namuḁi, minister of his father Padmôttara, who had ascended the throne, by making him promise as much of his territory as he could cover with three strides. This is the Brahmanical story of Vishṇu and Bali, for whom the Gainas have substituted Namuḁi. According to them the minister Namuḁi was, in a disputation, defeated by the Gaina monks, and to revenge himself on them, he ordered them to quit his kingdom as soon as he got it.—Mahâpadma's residence was Hastinâpura.

² Harishêna, son of king Mahâhari of Kâmpilya, became the tenth Kakravartin.

³ Gaya, son of king Samudravigaya of Râgagriha, became the eleventh Kakravartin.

reached perfection which has been taught by the Ginas. (43)

"Dasârṇabhadra¹, giving up his flourishing kingdom of Dasârṇa, turned monk; he renounced the world, being directed to do so by Sakra himself. (44)

"Karakandu was king of Kalinga; Dvimukha, of Pañkâla; Nami, of Vidêha; Naggati (or rather Nagnagit), of Gândhâra². (45)

"Nami humbled himself, being directed to do so by Sakra himself; the king of Vidêha left the house and became a Sramana. (46)

"These bulls of kings have adopted the faith of the Ginas; after having placed their sons on the throne, they exerted themselves as Sramanas. (47)

"Udâyana³, the bull of the kings of Sauvîra, renounced the world and turned monk; he entered the order and reached perfection. (48)

"And thus the king of Kâsi⁴, exerting himself for the best truth, abandoned all pleasures, and hewed down, as it were, his Karman like a forest. (49)

"And thus king Vigaya⁵, whose sins were not quite annihilated⁶, turned monk after he, the famous man, had quitted his excellent kingdom. (50)

¹ King Dasârṇabhadra was a contemporary of Mahāvîra.

² These are the four Pratyêkabuddhas; see p. 35, note 2.

³ The story of Udâyana (or perhaps Uddâyana) will be found in my *Ausgewählte Erzählungen in Mâhârâsh/rî*, p. 28 ff. He was contemporary with Mahāvîra.

⁴ He was Nandana, the seventh Baladêva, son of king Agnisikha of Benares.

⁵ He was the son of king Brahmarâga of Dvârakâvatî, and eldest brother of the Vâsudêva Dviprîshṭa or Dvipushṭi.

⁶ To render ana//hâkitti, of which the commentators offer several explanations, rendering it anârttâkîrti and anash/akîrti. A various reading âna//hâkitti is mentioned, and explained âgñâ-artha-âkîrti.

“And thus the royal seer Mahâbala¹ practised severe penance with an undistracted mind, and took upon himself the glory (of self-control). (51)

“Why should a wise man, for bad reasons, live on earth like a madman, since those persons (mentioned above) who reached eminence, exerted themselves strongly? (52)

“I have spoken true words able to promote virtue; some have been saved, some are being saved, and some will be saved. (53)

“Why should a wise man, for bad reasons, bring affliction upon himself? He who has become free from all ties and sins, will reach perfection.” (54)

Thus I say.

NINETEENTH LECTURE.

THE SON OF MRIGÂ.

In the pleasant town of Sugrîva, which is adorned with parks and gardens, there was the king Balabhadra and Mrigâ, the principal queen. (1)

Their son Balasri, also known as Mrigâputra (i. e. son of Mrigâ), the darling of his father and mother, was crown-prince, a (future) lord of ascetics. (2)

In his palace Nandana he dallied with his wives, like the god Dôgundaga², always happy in his mind. (3)

¹ Mahâbala was the son of king Bala of Hastinâpura. He lived at the time of Vimala, the thirteenth Tîrthakara.

² According to the commentators the Dôgundaka gods are the trâyastriṃsa gods. The Sanskrit of dôgundaga would be dvikundaka.

Standing at a window of his palace¹, the floor of which was inlaid with precious stones and jewels, he looked down on the squares, places, and roads of the town. (4)

Once he saw pass there a restrained *Sramana*, who practised penance, self-restraint, and self-control, who was full of virtues, and a very mine of good qualities. (5)

Mrigâputra regarded him with fixed eyes, trying to remember where he had seen the same man before. (6)

While he looked at the saint, and his mind became pure, the remembrance of his former birth came upon him as he was plunged in doubt. (7)

When the remembrance of his former birth came upon the illustrious *Mrigâputra*, he remembered his previous birth and his having been then a *Sramana*. (8)

Being not delighted with pleasures, but devoted to self-control, he went to his father and mother, and spoke as follows : (9)

‘I have learned the five great vows ; (I know) the suffering (that awaits the sinner) in hell or in an existence as a brute ; I have ceased to take delight in the large ocean (of the *Samsâra*) ; therefore, O mother, allow me to enter the order. (10)

‘O mother, O father, I have enjoyed pleasures which are like poisonous fruit : their consequences are painful, as they entail continuous suffering. (11)

‘This body is not permanent, it is impure and of

¹ I separate the words *pâsây-âlôyana//hiô*. The commentators take them for a compound ; but then the preceding part of the sentence would not construe. It is an irregular sandhi, instances of which, however, are not unfrequent.

impure origin ; it is but a transitory residence (of the soul) and a miserable vessel of suffering. (12)

‘I take no delight in this transitory body which one must leave sooner or later, and which is like foam or a bubble. (13)

‘And this vain human life, an abode of illness and disease, which is swallowed up by old age and death, does not please me even for a moment. (14)

‘Birth is misery, old age is misery, and so are disease and death, and ah, nothing but misery is the *Samsâra*, in which men suffer distress. (15)

‘Leaving behind my fields, house, and gold, my son and wife, and my relations, leaving my body I needs must, one day, depart. (16)

‘As the effect of Kimpâka-fruit¹ is anything but good, so the effect of pleasures enjoyed is anything but good. (17)

‘He who starts on a long journey with no provisions, will come to grief on his way there, suffering from hunger and thirst. (18)

‘Thus he who without having followed the Law, starts for the next world, will come to grief on his way there, suffering from illness and disease. (19)

‘He who starts on a long journey with provisions, will be happy on his way there, not suffering from hunger and thirst. (20)

‘Thus he who after having followed the Law, starts for the next world, will be happy on his journey there, being exempt from *Karman* and suffering. (21)

‘As when a house is on fire, the landlord carries away valuable things and leaves behind those of

¹ *Cucumis Colocynthus*.

no value ; so when the whole world is on fire, as it were, by old age and death, I shall save my Self, if you will permit me.' (22, 23)

To him his parents said : "Son, difficult to perform are the duties of a *Sramana* ; a monk must possess thousands of virtues. (24)

"Impartiality towards all beings in the world, whether friends or enemies, and abstention from injury to living beings throughout the whole life : this is a difficult duty. (25)

"To be never careless in abstaining from falsehood, and to be always careful to speak wholesome truth : this is a difficult duty. (26)

"To abstain from taking of what is not given, even of a toothpick, &c. ; and to accept only alms free from faults : this is a difficult duty. (27)

"To abstain from unchastity after one has tasted sensual pleasures, and to keep the severe vow of chastity : this is a very difficult duty. (28)

"To give up all claims on wealth, corn, and servants, to abstain from all undertakings, and not to own anything : this is a very difficult duty. (29)

"Not to eat at night any food of the four kinds¹, not to put away for later use or to keep a store (of things one wants) : this is a very difficult duty. (30)

"Hunger and thirst, heat and cold, molestation by flies and gnats, insults, miserable lodgings, pricking grass, and uncleanness, blows and threats, corporal punishment and imprisonment, the mendicant's life and fruitless begging : all this is misery. (31, 32)

"Such a life is like that of pigeons (always afraid of

¹ I.e. food, drink, dainties, and spices.

dangers); painful is the plucking out of one's hair; difficult is the vow of chastity and hard to keep (even) for a noble man. (33)

"My son, you are accustomed to comfort, you are tender and cleanly¹; you are not able, my son, to live as a Sramana. (34)

"No repose as long as life lasts; the great burden of duty is heavy like a load of iron, which is difficult to be carried, O son. (35)

"As it is difficult to cross the heavenly Ganges, or to swim against the current, or to swim with one's arms over the sea, so it is difficult to get over the ocean of duties. (36)

"Self-control is untasteful like a mouthful of sand, and to practise penance is as difficult as to walk on the edge of a sword. (37)

"It is difficult (always to observe the rules of) right conduct with one's eyes for ever open like (those of) a snake², O son; it is difficult to eat iron grains, as it were. (38)

"As it is very difficult to swallow burning fire, so is it difficult for a young man to live as a Sramana. (39)

"As it is difficult to fill a bag³ with wind,

¹ Literally, well washed or bathed.

² This appears to be the meaning of the words *ahîv-êganta-di//hîê*. We might perhaps take *ahîv** for *ahivam* = *ahivat*, in which case the construction of the sentence would be grammatically correct. An alternative rendering would be: '(A monk) like a snake must have his eyes always open on the difficult conduct, O son.' It is a well-known fact that snakes cannot shut their eyes as other animals.

³ *Kotthala*, a *Dêśi*-word for *kuśûla*, granary, see *Hêmañdra*, *Dêśi Kôsha* 2, 48. The commentators render it by 'cloth.'

so is it difficult for a weak man to live as a *Sramaṇa*. (40)

“As it is difficult to weigh Mount Mandara in a balance, so it is difficult to live as a *Sramaṇa* with a steady and fearless mind. (41)

“As it is difficult to swim over the sea with one’s arms, so it is difficult for one whose mind is not pacified, (to cross) the ocean of restraint. (42)

“Enjoy the fivefold¹ human pleasures. After you have done enjoying pleasures, O son, you may adopt the Law.” (43)

He answered: ‘O father and mother, it is even thus as you have plainly told; but in this world nothing is difficult for one who is free from desire. (44)

‘An infinite number of times have I suffered dreadful pains of body and mind, repeatedly misery and dangers. (45)

‘In the *Samsāra*, which is a mine of dangers and a wilderness of old age and death, I have undergone dreadful births and deaths. (46)

‘Though fire be hot here, it is infinitely more so there (viz. in hell)²; in hell I have undergone suffering from heat. (47)

‘Though there may be cold here, it is of infinitely greater intensity there; in hell I have undergone suffering from cold. (48)

¹ Viz. those of the five senses.

² The description of hell is a favourite theme with the monks of all ages and all religions; and the *Gaiṇa* monks are not behind others in the treatment of this gruesome subject. A detailed description of the different hells will be found in the fifth lecture of the first book of the *Sūtrakṛitāṅga*. I remember a *yati* showing me, with much complacency, a manuscript of the latter work adorned with lively illustrations of the most exquisite tortures.

‘An infinite number of times have I been roasted over a blazing fire in an oven, screaming loud, head down and feet aloft. (49)

‘In the desert which is like a forest on fire, on the Vagravâlukâ and the Kadambavâlukâ¹ rivers, I have been roasted an infinite number of times. (50)

‘Being suspended upside down over a boiler, shrieking, with no relation to help me, I was cut to pieces with various saws², an infinite number of times. (51)

‘I have suffered agonies when I was fastened with fetters on the huge Sâlmâlî tree, bristling with very sharp thorns, and then pushed up and down. (52)

‘An infinite number of times have I been crushed like sugar-cane in presses, shrieking horribly, to atone for my sins, great sinner that I was. (53)

‘By black and spotted wild dogs³ I have, ever so many times, been thrown down, torn to pieces, and lacerated, screaming and writhing. (54)

‘When I was born in hell for my sins, I was cut, pierced, and hacked to pieces with swords and daggers, with darts and javelins. (55)

‘I have been forcibly yoked to a car of red-hot iron full of fuel⁴, I have been driven on with a goad

¹ These are two rivers in hell; the sand of the one consists of *vagra* (either steel-filings or diamonds), and that of the other, of turmeric.

² *Karavattakarakayâîhim* = *karapattrakrakaâdibhih*.

³ *Kôlasunaya*, explained by *sûkarasvan*, hog-dog, which may be a kind of hog or dog, probably the latter.

⁴ *Samilâ gue*. The commentators render *gue* by *yuga* and *yuta*, and do not explain *samilâ*, which they treat as a Sanskrit word. I think it is the *Prâkrî* of *samidh*, compare *viggulâ* = *vidyut*, *salilâ* = *sarit*.

and thongs, and have been knocked down like an antelope¹. (56)

‘On piles, in a blazing fire, I have forcibly been burnt and roasted like a buffalo, in atonement for my sins. (57)

‘An infinite number of times have I violently been lacerated by birds whose bills were of iron and shaped like tongs, by devilish vultures². (58)

‘Suffering from thirst I ran towards the river Vaitaraṇī to drink its water, but in it I was killed (as it were) by blades of razors³. (59)

‘When suffering from the heat, I went into the forest in which the trees have a foliage of daggers; I have, ever so many times, been cut to pieces by the dropping dagger-leaves. (60)

‘An infinite number of times have I suffered hopelessly from mallets and knives, forks and maces, which broke my limbs. (61)

‘Ever so many times have I been slit, cut, mangled, and skinned with keen-edged razors, knives, and shears. (62)

‘As⁴ an antelope I have, against my will, been

¹ *Roggho* = *riśya*, see *Hēmakandra*, *Dēś Kōsha* 7, 12.

² *Dhaṅka grīdhra*. The commentators offer no explanation of *dhaṅka*, but only say that they are not real vultures as there are no animals in hell. Therefore they must be *vaikriya*, i.e., in our case, demons who have adopted the shape of vultures.

³ The water of the river Vaitaraṇī consists of a very caustic acid.

⁴ Here and in the following verses the suffering of *Mrigāputra* as an animal and a plant seems to be described. But in verse 68 the scene is again laid in hell. The first word in verse 63, &c., ‘as,’ would literally be ‘like’ (*viva* in the original text), but in rendering it by ‘like,’ we have to assume that as a denizen of hell he is treated in the manner described, which seems rather strained.

caught, bound, and fastened in snares and traps, and frequently I have been killed. (63)

‘As a fish I have, against my will, been caught with hooks and in bow-nets; I have therein been scraped, slit, and killed, an infinite number of times. (64)

‘As a bird I have been caught by hawks, trapped in nets, and bound with bird-lime, and I have been killed, an infinite number of times. (65)

‘As a tree I have been felled, slit, sawn into planks, and stripped of the bark by carpenters with axes¹, hatchets, &c., an infinite number of times. (66)

‘As iron I have been malleated, cut, torn, and filed by blacksmiths², an infinite number of times. (67)

‘I have been made to drink hissing molten copper, iron, tin, and lead under horrid shrieks, an infinite number of times. (68)

‘You like meat minced or roasted; I have been made to eat, ever so many times, poisoned meat, and red-hot to boot. (69)

‘You like wine, liquor, spirits, and honey³; I have been made to drink burning fat and blood. (70)

‘Always frightened, trembling, distressed, and suffering, I have experienced the most exquisite pain and misery. (71)

‘I have experienced in hell sharp, acute and

¹ Kuhâdâ = kuṭhâra; comp. pihâda = piḥara. The form kuhâra occurs in Guzeratî, Sindhî, and Panjâbî.

² Kumâra; this is obviously the modern kamâr ‘blacksmith’ (derived from karmakâra); and it is of interest to find this form in an old text like the Uttarâdhyayana.

³ To render surâ, sîdhu, mairêya, and madhu.

severe, horrible, intolerable, dreadful, and formidable pain. (72)

‘O father, infinitely more painful is the suffering in hell than any suffering in the world of men. (73)

‘In every kind of existence I have undergone suffering which was not interrupted by a moment’s reprieve.’ (74)

To him his parents said : “Son, a man is free to enter the order, but it causes misery to a *Sramana* that he may not remedy any ailments.” (75)

He answered : ‘O father and mother, it is even thus as you have plainly told ; but who takes care of beasts and birds in the woods ? (76)

‘As a wild animal¹ by itself roams about in the woods, thus I shall practise the Law by controlling myself and doing penance. (77)

‘When in a large forest a wild animal falls very sick at the foot of a tree, who is there to cure it ? (78)

‘Or who will give it medicine ? or who will inquire after its health ? or who will get food and drink for it, and feed it ? (79)

‘When it is in perfect health, it will roam about in woods and on (the shores of) lakes in search of food and drink. (80)

‘When it has eaten and drunk in woods and lakes, it will walk about and go to rest according to the habits of wild animals. (81)

‘In the same way a pious monk goes to many places and walks about just as the animals, but afterwards he goes to the upper regions. (82)

¹ Miga = *mṛiga*, literally ‘antelope ;’ but here as frequently the word has apparently the more general meaning ‘wild animal.’

‘As a wild animal goes by itself to many places, lives in many places, and always gets its food; thus a monk on his begging-tour should not despise nor blame (the food he gets). (83)

‘I shall imitate this life of animals.’ “Well, my son, as you please.” With his parents’ permission he gave up all his property. (84)

‘I shall imitate this life of animals, which makes one free from all misery, if you will permit me.’ “Go, my son, as you please.” (85)

When he had thus made his parents repeat their permission, he gave up for ever his claims in any property, just as the snake casts off its slough. (86)

His power and wealth, his friends, wives, sons, and relations he gave up as if he shook off the dust from his feet, and then he went forth. (87)

He observed the five great vows, practised the five Samitis, and was protected by the three Guptis¹; he exerted himself to do mental as well as bodily penance. (88)

He was without property, without egoism, without attachment, without conceit², impartial towards all beings, whether they move or not. (89)

He was indifferent to success or failure (in begging), to happiness and misery, to life and death, to blame and praise, to honour and insult. (90)

He turned away from conceit and passions, from injurious, hurtful, and dangerous actions³, from gaiety and sadness; he was free from sins and fetters. (91)

¹ See notes 2 and 3 on p. 50.

² Gârava = gaurava or garva. Dîpikâ : *riddhigârava-rasagârava-sâtâgârava iti garvatrayarahitaḥ.*

³ To render *danḍasallabhaḥ*su.

He had no interest in this world and no interest in the next world; he was indifferent to unpleasant and pleasant things ¹, to eating and fasting. (92)

He prevented the influx of Karman (âsrava) through all bad channels ²; by meditating upon himself he obtained praiseworthy self-purification and sacred knowledge. (93)

Thus he thoroughly purified himself by knowledge, right conduct, faith, penance, and pure meditations, and after having lived many years as a *Sramana*, he reached perfection after breaking his fast once only every month. (94, 95)

Thus act the enlightened ones, the learned, the clever; like *Mṛigâputra* they turn away from pleasures. (96)

When you have heard the words of the illustrious and famous son of *Mṛigâ*, his perfect practise of austerities, and his liberation, famous in the three worlds, you will despise wealth, the cause of misery, and the fetter of egoism, the cause of many dangers, and you will bear the excellent and pleasant yoke of the Law that leads to the great happiness of *Nirvâna*. (97, 98)

Thus I say.

¹ *Vâsîkandanakappô*. The author of the *Avaâturi* explains this phrase thus: he did not like more a man who anoints himself with sandal than a mason. Apparently he gives to *vâsa* the meaning 'dwelling;' but I think that the juxtaposition of *kandana* calls for a word denoting a bad-smelling substance, perhaps 'ordure.'

² Literally 'door.' The meaning of the line will be fully rendered and the simile at least partially be preserved by the following less literal translation: he shut the door, as it were, to evil influences. For the âsrava, see above, p. 55, note 1.

TWENTIETH LECTURE.

THE GREAT DUTY OF THE NIRGRANTHAS.

Piously adoring the perfected and the restrained saints, listen to my true instruction which (teaches the real) profit (of men), religion, and liberation¹. (1)

King *Srênika*², the ruler of Magadha, who possessed many precious things, once made a pleasure-excursion to the *Mandîkukshi Kaitya*³. (2)

It was a park like Nandana⁴, with trees and creepers of many kinds, peopled by various birds, and full of various flowers. (3)

There he saw a restrained and concentrated saint sitting below a tree, who looked delicate and accustomed to comfort. (4)

When the king saw his figure, his astonishment at that ascetic's figure was very great and unequalled. (5)

'O his colour, O his figure, O the loveliness of the noble man, O his tranquillity, O his perfection, O his disregard for pleasures!' (6)

¹ *Atthadhammagaim* = *arthadharmagati*. I think this equal to *artha dharma mōksha*, though the commentators offer a different explanation by making *gati* mean *gñāna*. The phrase is derived from the typical expression *kāmārthadharmamōksha* by leaving out *kāma*, which of course could not be admitted by ascetics.

² He is identical with Bimbisāra of the Buddhists; see my edition of the *Kalpa Sūtra*, introduction, p. 2.

³ The following verses prove that *kaitya* denotes park here as the word is explained by the scholiast in IX, 9.

⁴ Nandana is Indra's park.

Adoring his feet and keeping him on his right side (he sat down), neither too far off nor too close by, and asked him with his hands clasped : (7)

‘ Though a young nobleman, you have entered the order ; in an age fit for pleasure you exert yourself as a *Sramana*, O ascetic ; I want to hear you explain this.’ (8)

“ I am without a protector, O great king ; there is nobody to protect me, I know no friend nor any one to have sympathy with me.” (9)

Then king *Srênika*, the ruler of Magadha, laughed : ‘ How should there be nobody to protect one so accomplished as you ?’ (10)

‘ I am the protector of religious men ¹ ; O monk ; enjoy pleasures together with your friends and relations ; for it is a rare chance to be born as a human being.’ (11)

“ You yourself are without a protector, *Srênika*, ruler of Magadha ; and as you are without a protector, how can you protect anybody else ?” (12)

When the saint had addressed this unprecedented speech to the king, who was greatly moved and astonished, and struck with astonishment, (he answered) ² : (13)

‘ I have horses, elephants, and subjects, a town and a seraglio, power and command : enjoy human pleasures. (14)

‘ In possession of so great means, which permit the owner to enjoy all pleasures, how could he be

¹ *Bhadantânām*.

² The verb is wanting in this verse, and there is an apparent tautology in the words as they now stand. This is an obvious mark of a corruption in the text, which, however, I do not know how to remove by a plausible conjecture.

without protection? Reverend sir, you speak untruth.' (15)

"O king, you do not know the meaning and origin¹ of (the word) 'without protection,' nor how one comes to be without protection or with protection, O ruler of men. (16)

"Hear, O great king, with an undistracted mind in what way a man can be said to be 'without protection,' and with what purpose I have said all this. (17)

"There is a town Kausâmbî by name, which is among towns what Indra² is (among the gods); there lived my father, who possessed great wealth. (18)

"In my childhood, O great king, I caught a very bad eye-disease and a severe burning fever in all my limbs, O ruler of men. (19)

"My eyes ached as if a cruel enemy thrust a sharp tool in the hollow of my body. (20)

"In the back, the heart³, and the head, I suffered

¹ Pottham or pokkham. The commentators are at a loss to give an etymology of this word, or rather have a choice of them to offer, which comes to the same thing, and proves that nothing certain was known. If potthâ is the correct form, it may be derived from pra + ut + sthâ, and mean 'origin;' if pokkâ or pukâ is the right spelling it is prikkâ, and may mean 'etymology.'

² Purâna purabhêdanî. As usual the commentators give a purely etymological explanation. But it is obvious that purabhêdana must have a similar meaning as purandara = Indra, or purabhid Siva. The latter word occurs in later literature only, and, besides, Siva does not yet seem to have been generally acknowledged as the supreme god, when and where the Gâna Sûtras were composed. The Vedic word pûrbhid, 'destroyer of castles,' also presents itself as an analogy; though it is not yet the exclusive epithet of a god, it is frequently applied to Indra.

³ To render antarikâ or antarittha. The Guzeraï translation renders it hrîdaya.

dreadful and very keen pains equal to a stroke of lightning. (21)

“Then the best physicians came to my help, who cure by their medical art and by spells, who were versed in their science, and well knew spells and roots. (22)

“They tried to cure me according to the fourfold science¹ which they had been taught; but they could not rid me of my pains: hence I say that I am without protection. (23)

“My father would have spent all he possessed, for my sake; but he could not rid me of my pains, hence I say that I am without protection. (24)

“My mother, O great king, was agonized with grief about her son; but she could not, &c. (25)

“O great king, my own brothers, the elder and younger ones, could not rid me of my pains, &c. (26)

“O great king, my own sisters, the elder and younger ones, could not, &c. (27)

“O great king, my loving and faithful wife moistened my breast with the tears of her eyes. (28)

“The poor lady did not eat, nor drink, nor bathe, nor use perfumes, wreaths, and anointment, with my knowledge or without it. (29)

“O great king, she did not leave² my side even for a moment; but she could not rid me of my pains, hence I say that I am without protection. (30)

“Then I said: It is very hard to bear pains again and again in the endless Circle of Births. (31)

¹ *Kâuppâya*=*Katuhpâda*. Four branches of medical science are intended.

² *Phi//ai*=*bhrasyati*, *Hemakandra's Prākṛit Grammar*, iv, 177.

“If I, for once, shall get rid of these great pains, I shall become a houseless monk, calm, restrained, and ceasing to act. (32)

“While I thought so, I fell asleep, O ruler of men; and after that night my pains had vanished. (33)

“Then in the morning of the next day I took leave of my relations and became a houseless monk, calm, restrained, and ceasing to act. (34)

“Thus I became the protector of myself and of others besides, of all living beings, whether they move or not. (35)

“My own Self is the river Vaitarant¹, my own Self the Sâlmali tree¹; my own Self is the miraculous cow Kâmaduh, my own Self the park Nandana. (36)

“My own Self is the doer and undoer of misery and happiness; my own Self, friend and foe, according as I act well or badly. (37)

“But there is still another want of protection, O king; hear, therefore, O king, attentively with concentrated thoughts, how some easily discouraged men go astray after having adopted the Law of the Nirgranthas². (38)

“If an ordained monk, through carelessness, does not strictly keep the great vows, if he does not restrain himself, but desires pleasure, then his fetters will not be completely cut off. (39)

“One who does not pay constant attention to his walking, his speaking, his begging, his receiving and keeping (of things necessary for a monk), and his

¹ See above, p. 94.

² The verses 38–53 are apparently a later addition because (1) the subject treated in them is not connected with that of the foregoing part, and (2) they are composed in a different metre.

easing nature ¹, does not follow the road trod by the Lord. (40)

“ One who for a long time wears a shaven crown and mortifies himself, but who is careless with regard to the vows, and neglects penance and self-control, will not be a winner in the battle (of life). (41)

“ He is empty like a clenched ² fist, (of no value) like an uncoined ³ false Kârshâpana or like a piece of glass resembling turquoise, he is held lightly by men of discernment. (42)

“ He who has the character of a sinner, though he lays great stress on the outward signs of his calling ⁴ as a means of living ; he who does not control himself, though he pretends to do so ; will come to grief for a long time. (43)

“ As the poison Kâlakûta kills him who drinks it ; as a weapon cuts him who awkwardly handles it ; as a Vêtâla kills him who does not lay him ; so the Law harms him who mixes it up with sensuality. (44)

“ He who practises divination from bodily marks and dreams, who is well versed in augury and superstitious rites, who gains a sinful living by practising magic tricks ⁵, will have no refuge at the time (of retribution). (45)

“ The sinner, always wretched, goes from darkness

¹ These are the five Samitis, see above, p. 50.

² Pollâ or pullâ, explained antaḥ-sushira ‘hollow in the middle.’

³ Ayantita = ayantrita. My translation is but conjectural. Perhaps the regular coins are not meant, but stamped lumps of metal, which were current long before coins were introduced.

⁴ Literally, ‘the flag of the seers ;’ the broom &c. are meant.

⁵ Kuhêdaviggâ.

to darkness, to utter misery; the unholy man who breaks the rules of monks, rushes, as it were, to hell, and to be born again as a brute. (46)

"He who accepts forbidden alms, viz. such food as he himself asks for, as has been bought for his sake, or as he gets regularly (as by right and custom), who like fire devours everything, will go to hell from here, after having sinned. (47)

"A cut-throat enemy will not do him such harm as his own perversity will do him; the man without pity will feel repentance in the hour of death. (48)

"In vain he adopts nakedness, who errs about matters of paramount interest; neither this world nor the next will be his; he is a loser in both respects in the world. (49)

"Thus the self-willed sinner who leaves the road of the highest *Ginas*, who with the appetite of an osprey is desirous of pleasure, will grieve in useless sorrow. (50)

"A wise man who hears this discourse, an instruction full of precious wisdom, and who deserts every path of the wicked, should walk the road of the great *Nirgranthas*. (51)

"He who possesses virtuous conduct and life, who has practised the best self-control, who keeps from sinful influences¹, and who has destroyed his *Karman*, will reach (in the end) the greatest, best, and permanent place (viz. *mukti*). (52)

Thus the austere and calm, great ascetic and great sage who kept great vows and possessed great fame, preached at great length this great sermon: the great duty of the *Nirgranthas*. (53)

¹ *Nirâsava* = *nirâsrava*. For the *âsravas*, see p. 55, note 1.

And king *Srêṇika*, pleased, spoke thus: 'You have truly shown what it is to be without protection. (54)

'You have made the best use of human birth, you have made a true gain, O great sage, you are a protector (of mankind at large) and of your relations, for you have entered the path of the best *Gīnas*. (55)

'You are the protector of all unprotected beings, O ascetic; I ask you to forgive me: I desire you to put me right. (56)

'That by asking you I have disturbed your meditation, and that I invited you to enjoy pleasures, all this you must forgive me.' (57)

When the lion of kings had thus, with the greatest devotion, praised the lion of houseless monks, he, together with his wives, servants, and relations, became a staunch believer in the Law, with a pure mind. (58)

The ruler of men, with the hair on his body joyfully erected, bowed his head (to the monk), keeping him on his right side, and departed. (59)

And the other, rich in virtues, protected by the three *Guptis*, and abstaining from injuring (living beings) in the three ways (viz. by thought, words, and acts), travelled about on the earth, free like a bird, and exempt from delusion. (60)

Thus I say.

TWENTY-FIRST LECTURE.

SAMUDRAPÂLA.

In *Kampâ* there lived a *Srâvaka*, the merchant *Pâlita*, who was a disciple of the noble and venerable *Mahâvîra*. (1)

As a *Srâvaka* he was well versed in the doctrines of the *Nirgranthas*. Once he went by boat to the town of *Pihunda* on business. (2)

A merchant gave him his daughter while he was doing business in *Pihunda*. When she was big with child, he took her with him on his returning home. (3)

Now the wife of *Pâlita* was delivered of a child at sea; as the boy was born at sea (*samudra*), he was named *Samudrapâla*. (4)

Our merchant, the *Srâvaka*, went leisurely to *Kampâ*, to his house; in his house the boy grew up surrounded by comfort. (5)

He studied the seventy-two arts, and acquired knowledge of the world¹; he was in the bloom of youth, and had a fine figure and good looks. (6)

His father procured him a beautiful wife, *Rûpint*, with whom he amused himself in his pleasant palace, like a *Dôgundaga* god². (7)

Once upon a time he saw from the window of his palace a man sentenced to death, dressed for execution, on his way to the place of execution. (8)

¹ To render *nîtikôvida*.

² For *Dôgundaga*, see above, p. 88, note 2.

Agitated by what he saw, Samudrapâla spoke thus: 'Of wicked actions this is the bad result.' (9)

He became enlightened at once, the venerable man, and he was immensely agitated; he took leave of his parents, and entered the state of houselessness. (10)

Abandoning the great distress to which the worldly¹ are liable, the great delusion, and whatever causes fear, one should adopt the Law of monks², the vows, the virtues, and the (endurance of) calamities. (11)

One should keep the five great vows, viz. not to kill, to speak the truth, not to steal, to be chaste, to have no property whatever; a wise man should follow the Law taught by the *Ginas*. (12)

A monk should have compassion on all beings, should be of a forbearing character, should be restrained and chaste, and abstaining from everything sinful; he should live with his senses under control. (13)

Now and then³ he should travel in one country,

¹ *Saggantha* = *sagrantha*, which is obviously the opposite of *nirgrantha*. The commentators correct *samgamtha* in *samgam ka*. The original reading is in MS. B. A. has *samgamtha*, and so had C. originally, but it corrects the *tha* into *ka*. According to the commentators we should translate: abandoning worldly attachment which causes great distress, great delusion, black (*Lêryâ*), and dangers, one should, &c.

² *Paryâya-dharma*. *Paryâya* means a state under which a substance presents itself. Here is meant the state of the soul in *pravragyâ*, i.e. *srâmanya-paryâya*; compare the expressions *khadmastha-paryâya* and *kêvali-paryâya*. *Paryâya-dharma* is here equal to *pravragyâ-dharma*, Law of the monks.

³ *Kâlêna kâlam*, the commentators supply *kurvan*, and explain the passage as follows: *kâlêna*, i.e. in a *paurushî* (four

taking into consideration its resources and his own ability; like a lion he should not be frightened by any noise; and whatever words he hears, he should not make an improper reply. (14)

In utter indifference he should walk about, and bear everything, be it pleasant or unpleasant; he should not approve of everything everywhere, nor care for¹ respectful treatment or blame. (15)

There are many opinions here among men, which a monk places in their true light; there will rise many dangerous and dreadful calamities, caused by gods, men, or animals, which are difficult to be borne and cause easily-discouraged men to sink under them; but a monk who comes in contact with them will not be afraid, like a stately elephant at the head of the battle. (16, 17)

Cold and heat, flies and gnats, unpleasant feelings, and many diseases attack the body; without flinching² he should bear them, and should

hours) less one quarter of it, *kâlam*, i.e. what is proper for the time. The meaning would be 'doing at every time what is proper or prescribed to do at it.' But this explanation looks very artificial; I think that the expression *kalêna kâlam* is an adverb of the same type as *maggham magghêna* and many others.

¹ *Samgae*. This word may be *samyata* in this place; but in verse 20, where the same line occurs again, it cannot be so interpreted, because there the word *samgae* occurs twice; once it has the meaning of *samgata*, but in the passage under discussion it must be a verb, and it is rendered there *saṅgayet* = *saṅgam kuryât* by the commentators.

² *Akukkuô*, translated *akukûga*, derived from the root *kûg* 'to warble, to groan;' it would therefore mean 'without complaint.' But in I, 30 we have *appakukkuê*, derived from the root *kuḥ* 'to bend, to be crooked,' and it is rendered *alpaspadana*. The same meaning applies in the present case.

not recall to his memory the pleasures he once enjoyed. (18)

Giving up love, hatred, and delusion, a monk who is always careful and who is steadfast even as Mount Mêru cannot be shaken by the storm, should bear calamities, guarding himself. (19)

A great sage should be neither too elevated by pride nor too humble, he should not care for respectful treatment nor blame; an ascetic who has ceased (to act), will by means of his simplicity enter the path of Nirvâṇa. (20)

He is neither grieved nor pleased (by anything)¹, he abandons his relations with men, he ceases (to act), is intent on the benefit of his soul, he strives for the highest good (viz. mukti), and uses the means to reach it, free from sorrow, egoism, and any kind of property. (21)

A merciful (monk) should use beds distant from others, which are not got ready for his sake² nor strewn (with leaves or things considered to be possessed of life); he should sustain such hardships as the sages are accustomed to. (22)

The great sage (Samudrapâla), understanding the sacred lore and practising completely the best Law, shone forth like the sun in the sky, being possessed of the highest knowledge and glory. (23)

Having annihilated his Karman both meritorious

¹ This is the meaning commonly given to the frequently occurring phrase *arairaisahe*. Another interpretation is: *saṃyamâ-saṃyamavishayê, tâbhyâm na bâdhatê*.

² *Nirôvalêvâi* = *nirupalipta*. By *upalêpa* may be meant 'dirt,' but the author of the *Avatâri* explains *upalêpa* as consisting in *abhishvaṅga* 'affection.' It is almost impossible to render satisfactorily so vague an expression.

and sinful, being steadfast ¹, and free from all fetters, Samudrapâla crossed the ocean-like Flood of worldly existence and obtained exemption from transmigration. (24)

Thus I say.

TWENTY-SECOND LECTURE.

RATHANÊMI.

In the town of Sauryapura ² there was a powerful king, Vasudêva by name, who possessed the characteristic marks of a king. (1)

He had two wives, Rôhini and Dêvaki; each of them had a beloved son, Râma and Kêśava. (2)

In the town of Sauryapura there was (another) powerful king, Samudravigaya by name, who possessed the characteristic marks of a king. (3)

His wife was Sivâ by name; and her famous son was the venerable Arishṭanêmi, the saviour of the world and the lord of ascetics. (4)

This Arishṭanêmi, who was gifted with an excellent voice and possessed the thousand and eight lucky marks of the body, was a Gautama, and his skin was black. (5)

His body was strong like that of a bull, and hard

¹ Nirangana = samyamê niskala, immovable with regard to self-control.

² According to the Brahmanical account Vasudêva lived in Mathurâ. The name given to the town by the Gainas is apparently derived from Sauri, an epithet of Krishna, whose grandfather was Sûra. Soriyapura may be Saurikapura or Sauryapura. The latter rendering adopted by our commentators is based on a wrong etymology.

like steel; he was well proportioned, and had a belly like that of a fish.

Kêśava asked the girl Râgimati¹ in marriage for him. (6)

Now this daughter of an excellent king² was virtuous and well looking; she possessed all lucky marks of the body, and shone forth like the lightning Saudâmant. (7)

Her father said to the powerful Vâsudêva: 'Let the prince come here that I may give him my daughter.' (8)

He had taken a bath containing all (lucky) herbs, and had performed the customary ceremonies; he wore a suit of heavenly clothes and was decked out with ornaments. (9)

Riding on the best mast elephant³ of Vâsudêva he looked beautiful, like a jewel worn on the head. (10)

He sat under a raised umbrella, fanned by two chowries, and he was surrounded on all sides by a host of Dasârhas⁴ and by a complete army drawn

¹ Râimaî, Râimaî, and Râyamati are the forms of her name in *Prâkrîṭ*; the spellings Râgimati and Râgamati are also met with in Sanskrit.

² Viz. Ugrasêna. He was placed on the throne by *Kṛishṇa* on the death of *Kamsa*, cf. *Vishṇu Purâṇa* V, 21. He and *Dêvaka* were the sons of *Âhuka*, *Kamsa* was a son of Ugrasêna, and *Dêvaki* a daughter of *Dêvaka*, loc. cit. IV, 14. According to the legend of *Kṛishṇa*, as told by the Brahmans and *Gainas*, *Garâsandha* afterwards repeatedly attacked Mathurâ. *Kṛishṇa* therefore built *Dvâarakâ* on the shore of the western ocean, and sent thither the *Yâdava* tribe, loc. cit. V, 22 and 23. The events narrated in the text must be understood to have occurred in *Dvâarakâ*, as is evident from verse 21.

³ *Gandhahastin*, an elephant of the best class, whose very smell is sufficient, as is believed, to frighten common elephants, see verse 15.

⁴ *Dasâra* in *Prâkrîṭ*. They are a clan descended from *Yadu*.

up in rank and file, while the heavenly sound of musical instruments reached the sky. (11, 12)

With such pomp and splendour the hero of the *Vrishni*s started from his own palace. (13)

On his way he saw animals, kept in cages and enclosures, overcome by fear and looking miserable. (14)

Seeing them on the point of being killed for the sake of their flesh, and to be eaten afterwards, the great sage spoke to his charioteer¹ thus: (15)

‘Why are² all these animals, which desire to be happy, kept in cages and enclosures?’ (16)

Then the charioteer answered: ‘Lucky are these animals because at thy wedding they will furnish food for many people.’ (17)

Having heard these words, which announced the slaughter of many animals, the great sage, full of compassion and kindness to living beings, meditated thus: (18)

‘If for my sake many living beings are killed, I shall not obtain happiness in the next world.’ (19)

Then the famous man presented the charioteer with his pair of earrings, his neck-chain, and all his ornaments. (20)

When he had formed his resolution, the gods

¹ In verse 10 Arish/anêmi rides on an elephant, but in the sequel he is supposed to travel in a car. Unless the poet can be charged with having made this blunder, which I think just possible, verse 10 must be considered a later addition.

² The form of the verb *akkkahim* for *akkkhanti* is worthy of note, because *him* as ending of the third person plural belongs to Apabhramsa. It is interesting to find a true Apabhramsa form in a text so old as ours, for it seems to prove that at all times Apabhramsa went along with the common Prakrit, a vulgar or low with a high middle-Indian language.

descended (from heaven), according to the established custom, to celebrate, with great pomp together with their retinue, the event of his renunciation. (21)

Surrounded by gods and men, and sitting on an excellent palankin, the Venerable One left Dvârakâ and ascended mount Raivataka ¹. (22)

On arriving at the park he descended from his excellent palankin, surrounded by a crowd of thousands, and then his renunciation took place, while the moon was in conjunction with *Kîtrâ* ². (23)

Then he himself plucked out his delightfully-perfumed, soft, and curled hair in five handfuls. (24)

And Vâsudêva said to that subduer of the senses, who had plucked out his hair: 'O lord of ascetics, may you soon obtain what you wish and desire. (25)

'Increase in knowledge, faith, and right conduct, in forbearance and perfection !' (26)

In this manner Râma and Kêśava, the Dasârhas, and many people paid homage to Arish/anêmi and then returned to the town of Dvârakâ. (27)

When the daughter of the king heard of the ordination of the *Gina*, laughter and gaiety forsook her, and she was overwhelmed with affliction ³. (28)

¹ Raivataka is mount Gîrnâr in *Kaśhiawâd*. The hill is one of the most sacred places of the *Gainas*, and is covered with temples of the *Ginas*. It is also sacred to the Hindus on account of its connection with the history of *Krîṣṇa*. The poetical description of mount Raivataka forms the subject of the fourth sarga of the *Sirupâlavadhâ* by Mâgha.

² The lunar mansion, the chief star of which is Spica or α Virginis.

³ The lamentation of Râgîmatî on her husband's becoming an ascetic forms the subject of a curious Sanskrit poem called *Nêmi-dûtakâvya*, by Vikrama, son of Saṅghana, which has been edited in

Râgīmatī thought: 'Shame upon my life, that I have been forsaken by him! it is better I should turn nun.' (29)

Firm and decided she cut off her tresses which were black like bees and dressed with a brush and comb¹. (30)

And Vāsudēva said to her who had cut off her hair, and subdued her senses: 'Lady, cross the dreadful ocean of the *Samsāra* without difficulty!' (31)

When she had entered the order, the virtuous and very learned lady induced there many people, her relations and servants, to enter the order too. (32)

On her way to mount Raivataka it began to rain; her clothes being wet, she entered a cave and waited there in the darkness while it was raining. (33)

She took off her clothes and was naked as she was born, thus she was seen by Rathanēmi², whose

the *Kāvya-mâlâ* of 1886. It is what is technically called a *sama-syâpûraṇa* or gloss. The last line of each stanza is taken from the *Mêghadûta* of Kâlidâsa, and the first three lines are added by the poet to make the whole fit the circumstances of his tale.

¹ *Kukkaphanaga*, in Sanskrit *kûrṅaphanaka*. According to the scholiasts *phanaka* is a comb made of bamboo.—I have translated, 'cut off her tresses,' but literally it is: 'plucked out her hair.' However, I do not think that women also are to pluck out their hair.

² Rathanēmi was her husband's elder brother. According to a legend told in Haribhadra's *Tīkā* of the *Daravai-kâlīka Sûtra* (see Leumann in the *Journal of the German Oriental Society*, vol. 46, p. 597), Rathanēmi fell in love with Râgīmatī. But that lady in order to make him see his wrong, vomited a sweet beverage she had drunk, in a cup and offered it him. On his turning away with disgust she explained to him her meaning: she too had been vomited, as it were, by Arishanēmi, notwithstanding which he wanted to have her. She then taught him the *Gaina* creed, and he became a monk.

(peace of) mind became (thereby) disturbed; and afterwards she saw him. (34)

She was frightened when she discovered herself alone with the monk; folding her arms over her breast she sank down trembling. (35)

When the prince, Samudravigaya's son, saw her frightened and trembling, he spoke the following words: (36)

'I am Rathanêmi, O dear, beautiful, sweetly-speaking lady! Do accept me for your lover, O slender one¹, you shall have no cause to complain. (37)

'Come, let us enjoy pleasures, for it is a rare chance to be born a human being; after we have enjoyed pleasures, we shall enter on the path of the Ginas.' (38)

When Râgîmatî perceived that Rathanêmi's strength of will was broken, and temptation had got the better of him, she did not lose her presence of mind and defended her Self on that occasion. (39)

The daughter of the best king, true to self-control and her vows, maintained the honour of her clan and family, and her virtue, and spoke to him: (40)

'If you owned the beauty of Vaisramana², the pleasing manners of Nalakûbara³, if you were like Purandara⁴ himself, I should have no desire for you. (41)

Suyanu = sutanu. This may, however, be a proper name, a synonym of Râgîmatî, for according to the Harivamśa 209 and the Vishṇu Purāṇa IV, 14, Sutanu was a daughter of Ugrasêna.

² Vaisramana is a Prâkrîṭ spelling for Vaisravana = Kubêra.

³ Nalakûbara is Vaisramana's son.

⁴ Indra.

‘Fie upon you, famous knight, who want to quaff the vomited drink for the sake of this life ; it would be better for you to die¹. (42)

‘I am the daughter of the Bhôga-king², and you are an Andhakav^rishni ; being born in a noble family let us not become like Gandhana-snakes³; firmly practise self-control ! (43)

‘If you fall in love with every woman you see, you will be without hold like the Hat^ha-plant⁴, driven before the wind. (44)

‘As a herdsman or a keeper of goods does not own the things (he has the care of), so you will not truly own Sramanahood.’ (45)

Having heard these well-spoken words of the virtuous lady, he returned to the Law like an elephant driven by the hook⁵. (46)

Protected in thoughts, words, and acts, subduing his senses and keeping the vows, he practised true Sramanahood throughout life. (47)

¹ The verses 42, 43, 44, 46 have been received in the *Dasavai-kâlîka Sûtra* II, 7-10, see Leumann’s edition of that *Sûtra* quoted in the note, p. 116. A metrical German translation will be found in the same place.

² On the Bhôgas see p. 71, note 2. It is perhaps here misspelt for Bhôga. In the *Vishnu Purâna*, Kamsa, Ugrasêna’s son, is twice called Bhôgarâga (see Wilson’s translation, ed. Hall, vol. iv, pp. 260, 271), in contradiction to the common tradition which makes him an Andhaka, compare *Patañjali* on *Pânini* IV, 1, 114.

³ There are said to be two kinds of snakes, the gandhana and the agandhana. The former can be made to suck the poison from the wound they have inflicted ; the other will rather die than do so. Cf. Leumann, loc. cit., p. 597, note *.

⁴ *Pistia Stratiotes*, an aquatic plant.

⁵ Dêvendra here refers to the story of the *Nûpurapandita*, of which he gives a small portion in *Prâkrit*. The whole story is related in the *Parishishaparvan* of *Hêmatandra*, see the introduction to my edition of that work in the *Bibliotheca Indica*.

After practising severe austerities both of them became Kêvalins, and having completely annihilated their Karman, they reached the highest perfection. (48)

Thus act the enlightened, the wise, the clever ones; they turn from pleasures as did this best of men¹. (49)

Thus I say.

TWENTY-THIRD LECTURE ².

KÊSI AND GAUTAMA.

There was a Gina, Pârsva³ by name, an Arhat, worshipped by the people, who was thoroughly enlightened and omniscient, a prophet of the Law, and a Gina. (1)

And there was a famous disciple of this Light of

¹ Compare the last verse of the Ninth Lecture.

² In this lecture we have a very interesting legend about the way in which the union of the old church of Pârsva and the new church of Mahâvîra was brought about. A revival of this ancient difference seems to have caused the united church afterwards to divide again into the present Svêtâmbara and Digambara sects. They do not continue the two primitive churches, but seem to have grown out of the united church.

³ Pârsva is the last but one Tîrthakara, his Nirvâna took place 250 years before that of Mahâvîra. This statement, which has been generally accepted, is, however, in seeming contradiction to the account of our text, according to which a disciple of Pârsva, who is called a young monk kumâra-sramana, met Gautama, i.e. Sudharman, the disciple of Mahâvîra. We therefore must take the word disciple, sîse, as paramparâsishya, that is not in its literal sense. See note 3, p. 122.

the World, the young *Sramana* Kêsi, who had completely mastered the sciences and right conduct. (2)

He possessed the light of *Sruta* and *Avadhi* knowledge¹, and was surrounded by a crowd of disciples; wandering from village to village he arrived in the town of *Srâvastî*. (3)

In the district of that town there is a park, called *Tinduka*; there he took up his abode in a pure place to live and sleep in. (4)

Now at that time there lived the Prophet of the Law, the *Gina*, who in the whole world is known as the venerable *Vardhamâna*. (5)

And there was a famous disciple of this Light of the World, the venerable *Gautama* by name, who had completely mastered the sciences and right conduct. (6)

He knew the twelve *Ângas*, was enlightened, and was surrounded by a crowd of disciples; wandering from village to village he too arrived in *Srâvastî*. (7)

In the district of that town there is a park *Kôshthaka*; there he took up his abode in a pure place to live and sleep in. (8)

The young *Sramana* Kêsi and the famous *Gautama*, both lived there, protecting themselves (by the *Guptis*) and being careful. (9)

The pupils of both, who controlled themselves, who practised austerities, who possessed virtues, and who protected their Self, made the following reflection: (10)

¹ These are the second and third kinds of knowledge according to the *Gaina* classification. *Sruta* is the knowledge derived from the sacred books, and *avadhi* is limited or conditioned knowledge. See Bhandarkar, Report, p. 106.

‘Is our Law the right one, or is the other Law¹ the right one? are our conduct and doctrines right, or the other? (11)

‘The Law as taught by the great sage Pârsva, which recognises but four vows², or the Law taught by Vardhamâna, which enjoins five vows? (12)

‘The Law which forbids clothes (for a monk), or that which (allows) an under and upper garment? Both pursuing the same end, what has caused their difference?’ (13)

Knowing the thoughts of their pupils, both Kêsi and Gautama made up their minds to meet each other. (14)

Gautama, knowing what is proper and what is due to the older section (of the church), went to the Tinduka park, accompanied by the crowd, his pupils. (15)

When Kêsi, the young monk, saw Gautama approach, he received him with all becoming attention. (16)

He at once offered Gautama the four pure kinds of straw and hay³ to sit upon. (17)

Kêsi, the young Sramana, and the famous Gautama, sitting together, shone forth with a lustre like that of sun and moon. (18)

There assembled many heretics out of curiosity, and many thousands of laymen; (19)

Gods, Dânavas, Gandharvas, Yakshas, Râkshasas,

¹ Viz. the Law of Pârsva or the Law of Mahāvîra.

² Hence it is called *kâuggâma kâturyâma*. Chastity (*maithunaviramana*) was not explicitly enumerated, but it was understood to be contained in the fourth commandment: to have no property (*aparigraha*).

³ The four kinds of straw are: *sâlî vîhî koddava râлага*, to which is added hay: *ranne tanâni*.

and Kinnaras (assembled there), and there came together invisible ghosts¹ too. (20)

Kêsi said to Gautama, 'I want to ask you something, holy man.' Then to these words of Kêsi Gautama made the following reply: "Sir, ask whatever you like." Then with his permission Kêsi spoke to Gautama: (21, 22)

'The Law taught by the great sage Pârsva, recognises but four vows, whilst that of Vardhamâna enjoins five. (23)

'Both Laws pursuing the same end, what has caused this difference? Have you no misgivings about this twofold Law, O wise man?' (24)

Then to these words of Kêsi Gautama made the following reply: "Wisdom recognises the truth of the Law and the ascertainment of true things. (25)

"The first² saints were simple but slow of understanding, the last saints prevaricating and slow of understanding, those between the two simple and wise; hence there are two forms of the Law³. (26)

¹ Bhûya = bhûta, explained Vyantara. The vantara or vânamantara are a class of ghosts. The second part of the word apparently is tara 'crossing,' and the first seems to contain an accusative *vam* or *vânamam* which may be connected with viha or vyôman 'air.'

² Those under the first Tîrthakaras.

³ The meaning of this explanation is as follows. As the vow of chastity is not explicitly mentioned among Pârsva's four vows, but was understood to be implicitly enjoined by them, it follows that only such men as were of an upright disposition and quick understanding would not go astray by observing the four vows literally, i. e. by not abstaining from sexual intercourse, as it was not expressly forbidden.—The argumentation in the text presupposes a decay of the morals of the monastic order to have occurred between Pârsva and Mahâvîra, and this is possible only on the assumption of a sufficient interval of time having

“The first could but with difficulty understand the precepts of the Law, and the last could only with difficulty observe them, but those between them easily understood and observed them.” (27)

‘Well, Gautama, you possess wisdom, you have destroyed my doubt; but I have another doubt which you must explain to me, Gautama. (28)

‘The Law taught by Vardhamāna forbids clothes, but that of the great sage Pārśva allows an under and upper garment. (29)

‘Both Laws pursuing the same end, what has caused this difference? Have you no misgivings about this twofold Law, O wise man?’ (30)

To these words of Kêśi Gautama made the following reply: “Deciding the matter by their superior knowledge, (the Tîrthakaras) have fixed what is necessary for carrying out the Law. (31)

“The various outward marks (of religious men) have been introduced in order that people might recognise them as such; the reason for the characteristic marks is their usefulness for religious life and their distinguishing character. (32)

“Now the opinion (of the Tîrthakaras) is that knowledge, faith, and right conduct are the true causes of final liberation, (and not the outward marks).” (33)

‘Well, Gautama, you possess wisdom, you have destroyed my doubt; but I have another doubt, which you must explain to me, Gautama. (34)

‘Gautama, you stand in the midst of many

elapsed between the last two Tîrthakaras. And this perfectly agrees with the common tradition that Mahāvîra came 250 years after Pārśva.

thousand (foes) who make an attack on you ; how have you vanquished them ¹ ?' (35)

"By vanquishing one, five are vanquished ; by vanquishing five, ten are vanquished ; by this tenfold victory, I vanquish all foes." (36)

Kêsi said to Gautama : 'Whom do you call a foe ?' To these words of Kêsi Gautama made the following reply : (37)

"Self is the one invincible foe, (together with the four) cardinal passions ², (viz. anger, pride, deceit, and greed, they are five) and the (five) senses (make ten). These (foes), O great sage, I have regularly vanquished." (38)

'Well, Gautama, &c. (as in verse 28). (39)

'We see many beings in this world who are bound by fetters ; how have you got rid of your fetters and are set free, O sage ?' (40)

"Having cut off all fetters, and having destroyed them by the right means, I have got rid of my fetters and am set free, O sage." (41)

Kêsi said to Gautama : 'What do you call fetters ?'

¹ This question does not refer to the difference in doctrines between Pârsva and Mahâvîra, but is discussed here, as the commentator states, for the benefit of the pupils of both sages who are engaged in conversation. I think, however, that this and the following questions are asked and answered here by the disciples of the two Tîrthakaras for a better reason than that given by the scholiast. For in them the leading topics of Gainism are treated in a symbolical way. Gautama at once understands the true meaning of the similes and interprets them to the satisfaction of Kêsi. In this way the unity in doctrine subsisting between the Law of Pârsva and that of Mahâvîra is demonstrated to the hearers of the dispute, after the differences had been explained away.

² Kashâya.

To these words of Kêsi Gautama made the following reply : (42)

“Love, hatred, &c., are heavy fetters, attachment is a dangerous one; having regularly destroyed them, I live up to the rules of conduct.” (43)

‘Well, Gautama, &c. (as in verse 28). (44)

‘O Gautama, in the innermost heart there grows a plant which brings forth poisonous fruit; how have you torn it out?’ (45)

“I have thoroughly clipped that plant, and torn it out altogether with its roots; thus I have got rid of the poisonous fruit.” (46)

Kêsi said to Gautama, ‘What do you call that plant?’ To these words of Kêsi Gautama made the following reply : (47)

“Love of existence is that dreadful plant which brings forth dreadful fruit; having regularly torn it out, I live pleasantly.” (48)

‘Well, Gautama, &c. (as in verse 28). (49)

‘Gautama, there is blazing up a frightful fire which burns¹ the embodied beings; how have you put it out?’ (50)

“Taking water, excellent water, from (the river) produced by the great cloud, I always pour it over my body; thus sprinkled the fire does not burn me.” (51)

Kêsi said to Gautama, ‘What do you call the fire?’ To these words of Kêsi Gautama made the following reply : (52)

“The passions are the fire; knowledge, a virtuous life, and penances are the water; sprinkled

¹ In the original ‘fire’ is put in the plural because the four kashâyas or cardinal passions are denoted by it.

with the drops of knowledge the fire of the passions is extinguished and does not burn me." (53)

'Well, Gautama, &c. (as in verse 28). (54)

'The unruly, dreadful, bad horse, on which you sit, runs about, Gautama ! how comes it to pass that it does not run off with you ?' (55)

"I govern it well in its course by the bridle of knowledge ; it does not go astray with me, it keeps to the right path." (56)

Kêsi said to Gautama, 'What do you call this horse ?' To these words of Kêsi Gautama made the following reply : (57)

"The mind is that unruly, dreadful, bad horse ; I govern it by the discipline of the Law (so that it becomes a well-) trained Kambôga-¹steed". (58)

'Well, Gautama, &c. (as in verse 28). (59)

'There are many bad roads in this world, which lead men astray ; how do you avoid, Gautama, going astray as you are on the road ?' (60)

"They all are known to me, those who are in the right path and those who have chosen a wrong path ; therefore I do not go astray, O sage !" (61)

Kêsi said to Gautama, 'What do you call the path ?' To these words of Kêsi Gautama made the following reply : (62)

"The heterodox and the heretics have all chosen a wrong path ; the right path is that taught by the Gînas ; it is the most excellent path." (63)

'Well, Gautama, &c. (as in verse 28). (64)

'Is there a shelter, a refuge, a firm ground for the beings carried away by the great flood of water ? do you know the island, O Gautama ?' (65)

¹ Kanthaka, see above, p. 47, note 2.

“There is a large, great island in the midst of water, which is not inundated by the great flood of water.” (66)

Kêsi said to Gautama, ‘What do you call this island?’ To these words of Kêsi Gautama made the following reply: (67)

“The flood is old age and death, which carry away living beings; Law is the island, the firm ground, the refuge, the most excellent shelter.” (68)

‘Well, Gautama, &c. (as in verse 28). (69)

‘On the ocean with its many currents there drifts a boat; how will you, Gautama, on board of it reach the opposite shore?’ (70)

“A boat that leaks will not reach the opposite shore; but a boat that does not leak, will reach it.” (71)

Kêsi said to Gautama, ‘What do you call this boat?’ To these words of Kêsi Gautama made the following reply: (72)

“The body is the boat, life is the sailor, and the Circle of Births is the ocean which is crossed by the great sages.” (73)

‘Well, Gautama, &c. (as in verse 28). (74)

‘In this dreadfully dark gloom there live many beings; who will bring light into the whole world of living beings?’ (75)

“The spotless sun has risen which illuminates the whole world; he will bring light into the whole world of living beings.” (76)

Kêsi said to Gautama, ‘What do you call this sun?’ To these words of Kêsi Gautama made the following reply: (77)

“Risen has he who put an end to the Circle of

Births, the omniscient Gina, the luminary, who brings light into the whole world of living beings." (78)

'Well, Gautama, &c. (as in verse 28). (79)

'Do you, O sage, know a safe, happy, and quiet place for living beings which suffer from pains¹ of body and mind?' (80)

"There is a safe place in view of all, but difficult of approach, where there is no old age nor death, no pain nor disease." (81)

Kêsi said to Gautama, 'What is this place called?' To these words of Kêsi Gautama made the following reply: (82)

"It is what is called *Nirvâṇa*, or freedom from pain, or perfection, which is in view of all; it is the safe, happy, and quiet place which the great sages reach. (83)

"That is the eternal place, in view of all, but difficult of approach. Those sages who reach it are free from sorrows, they have put an end to the stream of existence." (84)

'Well, Gautama, you possess wisdom, you have destroyed my doubt; obeisance to you, who are not troubled by doubts, who are the ocean, as it were, of all Sûtras.' (85)

After his doubt had been solved, Kêsi, of enormous sanctity, bowed his head to the famous Gautama. (86)

And in the pleasant (Tinduka park) he sincerely adopted the Law of the five vows, which was proclaimed by the first Tirthakara, according to the teaching of the last Tirthakara. (87)

¹ *Mânasê dukkhê* stands for *mânasêhim dukkhêhim*. It is an interesting instance of the dropping of case affixes, which probably was more frequent in the vernacular.

In that meeting of Kêsi and Gautama, knowledge and virtuous conduct were for ever brought to eminence, and subjects of the greatest importance were settled. (88)

The whole assembly was greatly pleased and fixed their thoughts on the right way. They praised Kêsi and Gautama: 'May the venerable ones show us favour!' (89)

Thus I say.

TWENTY-FOURTH LECTURE.

THE SAMITIS.

The eight articles¹ of the creed are the Samitis and the Guptis; there are five Samitis and three Guptis. (1)

The Samitis² are: 1. *īryâ-samiti* (going by paths trodden by men, beasts, carts, &c., and looking carefully so as not to occasion the death of any living creature); 2. *bhâshâ-samiti* (gentle, salutary, sweet, righteous speech); 3. *êshanâ-samiti* (receiving alms in a manner to avoid the forty-two faults that are laid down); 4. *âdâna-samiti* (receiving and keeping of the things necessary for

¹ The word I have rendered 'article' is *mâyâ*, the Sanskrit form of which may be *mâtâ* or *mâtrâ*. The word is derived from the root *mâ* 'to find room in,' and denotes that which includes in itself other things, see verse 3. The word may also mean *mâtri* 'mother,' as Weber understands it. But this is an obviously intentional double meaning.

² The definitions placed in parentheses in the text are taken from Bhandarkar's Report for 1883-1884, p. 98, note †, p. 100, note *.

religious exercises, after having carefully examined them); 5. *uḥkâra-samiti* (performing the operations of nature in an unfrequented place). The three *Guptis* (which are here included in the term *Samiti* in its wider application) are: 1. *mano-gupti* (preventing the mind from wandering in the forest of sensual pleasures by employing it in contemplation, study, &c.); 2. *vâg-gupti* (preventing the tongue from saying bad things by a vow of silence, &c.); 3. *kâya-gupti* (putting the body in an immovable posture as in the case of *Kâyôtsarga*). (2)

The eight *Samitis* are thus briefly enumerated, in which the whole creed taught by the *Ginas* and set forth in the twelve *Ângas*, is comprehended. (3)

1. The walking of a well-disciplined monk should be pure in four respects: in respect to 1. the cause¹; 2. the time; 3. the road; 4. the effort². (4)

The cause is: knowledge, faith, and right conduct; the time is day-time; the road excludes bad ways. (5)

The effort is fourfold, viz. as regards: 1. substance, 2. place, 3. time, and 4. condition of mind. Hear me explain them. (6)

With regard to substance: the (walking monk) should look with his eyes; with regard to place: the space of a *yuga* (i.e. four *hastas* or cubits); with regard to time: as long as he walks; and with regard to condition of mind: carefully³. (7)

He walks carefully who pays attention only to

¹ *Âlambana*, literally support; explained: supported by which the mind becomes pure.

² *Gâyanâ* = *yatna*; it consists chiefly in compassion with living creatures (*gîvadayâ*).

³ *Upayukta*.

his walk and his body (executing it), whilst he avoids attending to the objects of sense, but (minds) his study, the latter in all five ways¹. (8)

2. To give way to : anger, pride, deceit and greed, laughter, fear, loquacity and slander²; these eight faults should a well-disciplined monk avoid; he should use blameless and concise speech at the proper time. (9, 10)

3. As regards begging³, a monk should avoid the faults in the search⁴, in the receiving⁵, and in the use⁶ of the three kinds of objects, viz. food, articles of use, and lodging. (11)

A zealous monk should avoid in the first (i.e. in the search for alms) the faults occasioned either by the giver (udgama) or by the receiver (utpâdana); in the second (i.e. in the receiving of alms) the faults inherent in the receiving; and in the use of the articles received, the four faults⁷. (12)

¹ The 'five ways' are *vâkanâ*, &c., as explained in the Twenty-ninth Lecture, §§ 19-23, below, p. 165 f. The commentators supply *kuryât* 'he should carry on his study.'

² *Vikahâ* = *vikathâ*, which does not occur in common Sanskrit. Perhaps it stands for *vikatthâ* 'boasting.'

³ *Ēshanâ*.

⁴ *Gavêshanâ*.

⁵ *Grahanâishanâ*.

⁶ *Paribhōgaishanâ*.

⁷ There are altogether forty-six faults to be avoided. As they are frequently alluded to in the sacred texts, a systematical enumeration and description of them according to the *Dīpikā* will be useful.

There are sixteen *udgama-dōshas* by which food, &c. becomes unfit for a *Gaṇa* monk :

1. *Ādhākarmika*, the fault inherent in food, &c., which a layman has prepared especially for religious mendicants of whatever sect.

2. *Auddêrika*, is food, &c., which a layman has prepared for a particular monk.

4. If a monk takes up or lays down the two kinds of things belonging to his general and supple-

3. Pûtika, is food, &c., which is pure on the whole, but contains particles impure on account of the first fault.

4. Unmisra, is food, &c., of which a part only had been especially prepared for the monk in question.

5. Sthâpanâkarmika, is food, &c., which has been reserved for the monk.

6. Prâbhrîtika, is food, &c., which has been prepared for some festivity.

7. Prâduḥkarana, when the layman has to light a lamp in order to fetch the alms for the monk.

8. Krîta, when he has to buy the things.

9. Prâmitya, when he has to fetch a ladle (ṛuddhâraka) in order to draw out the food, &c.

10. Parâvrîtî, when he replaces bad particles of the food by good ones, and vice versa.

11. Adhyâhrîta, when he has to fetch the food, &c., from some distance.

12. Udbhinna, when he has to open locks before he gets at the food, &c.

13. Mâlâhrîta, when he has to take the food, &c., from some raised or underground place.

14. Âkṣhidya, when the food, &c., was taken by force from somebody.

15. Anisrîṣṭa, when a man gives from a store he possesses in common with other men, without asking their permission.

16. Adhyavapûra, when the mendicant calls while the dinner is being cooked, and for his sake more food is put in the pot on the fire.

(Some of these faults are enumerated in the Aupapâtika Sûtra, § 96, III.)

There are sixteen utpâdana-dôshas; or such faults as are occasioned by the monk's using some means to make the layman give him alms:

1. Dhâtrîkarman, when the monk plays with the layman's children.

2. Dûtakarman, when he gives him information about what his people are doing.

3. Nimitta, when he speaks in praise of almsgiving.

4. Âgîvikâ, when he makes his birth and family known to him.

mentary¹ outfit, he should proceed in the following way. (13)

5. *Vapaṅka*, when he expatiates upon his misery.
6. *Kikitsā*, when he cures sick people.
7. *Krôdhapinda*, when he extorts alms by threats.
8. *Mānapinda*, when he tells the layman that he has laid a wager with other monks that he would get alms from him.
9. *Mâyâpinda*, when he employs tricks or buffoonery in order to procure alms.
10. *Lôbhapinda*, when he goes begging from a desire of good fare.
11. *Samstava-pinda*, when he flatters the layman.
12. *Vidyâpinda*, when he makes a show of his learning; or when he conjures a god from whom to get alms.
13. *Mantradôsha*, when he obliges the layman in some way or other.
14. *Kûrnayôga*, when he makes himself invisible and then takes away the food, &c.
15. *Yôgapinda*, when he teaches people spells, tricks, &c.
16. *Mûlakarman*, when he teaches them how to obviate evils by roots, charms, &c.

There are ten faults of *grahanaishanâ*:

1. *Saṅkita*, when a monk accepts alms from a frightened layman.
2. *Mrakshita*, when the food is soiled (*kharanṣita*) by animate or inanimate matter.
3. *Nikshipta*, when the food is placed among animate things.
4. *Pihita*, when animate food is covered with inanimate matter, and vice versa.
5. *Samhrîta*, when the layman has to take out the thing to be given from one vessel and puts it into another.
6. *Dâyaka*, when the condition or occupation of the giver forbids accepting alms from him.
7. *Unmisrita*, when the layman mixes up pure with impure food.
8. *Aparita* (?), when one joint possessor gives away from the store against the other's will.
9. *Lipta*, when the layman gives food, &c., with a ladle or his hand, soiled with milk, butter, &c.
10. *Kḥardita*, when in giving alms he spills milk, &c.

¹ See next page.

A zealous monk should wipe the thing after having inspected it with his eyes, and then he should take it up or put it down, having the Samiti in both respects². (14)

5. Excrements, urine, saliva, mucus, uncleanness of the body, offals of food, waste things, his own body (when he is about to die), and everything of this description (is to be disposed of in the way to be described). (15)

[A place may be not frequented and not seen (by people), or not frequented but seen, or frequented and not seen, or frequented and seen. (16)]³

In a place neither frequented nor seen by other people, which offers no obstacles to self-control, which is even, not covered with grass or leaves⁴, and has

There are four faults of paribhōgaishanâ :

1. *Samyôganâ*, when the monk puts together the ingredients for a good meal.

2. *Apramâna*, when he accepts a greater than the prescribed quantity of food.

3. *Îngâla*, when he praises a rich man for his good fare, or *dhûma*, when he blames a poor man for his bad fare.

4. *Akâraṇa*, when he eats choice food on other occasions than those laid down in the sacred texts.

¹ *Aughika* and *aupagrahika*. The former is explained *sâ mudâyika*, the other denotes such things as are wanted occasionally only, as a stick. I cannot make out with certainty from the commentaries whether the broom is reckoned among the former or the latter.

² This means, according to the commentator, either in taking up or putting down, or with respect to the *ôgha* and *aupagrahika* outfit, or with respect to substance and condition of mind.

³ This verse, which is in a different metre (*Âryâ*), is apparently a later addition, and has probably been taken from an old commentary, the *Kûrvi* or the *Bhâshya*.

⁴ *Agghusirê* = *asushirê*, not perforated, not having holes. I translate according to the author of the *Avaṭṭuri*. The literal

been brought into its present condition¹ not long ago, which is spacious, has an inanimate surface-layer², not too near (the village, &c.), not perforated by holes, and is exempt from insects and seeds—in such a place he should leave his excrements, &c. (17, 18)

The five Samitis are thus briefly enumerated, I shall now explain in due order the three Guptis³. (19)

1. There is, 1. truth ; 2. untruth ; 3. a mixture of truth and untruth ; 4. a mixture of what is not true, and what is not untrue. The Gupti of mind refers to all four⁴. (20)

A zealous monk should prevent his mind from desires for the misfortune of somebody else⁵, from thoughts on acts which cause misery to living beings⁶, and from thoughts on acts which cause their destruction⁷. (21)

2. The Gupti of speech is also of four kinds (referring to the four divisions as in verse 20). (22)

A zealous monk should prevent his speech from (expressing) desires, &c. (as in verse 21). (23)

3. In standing, sitting, lying down, jumping, going, and in the use of his organs, a zealous monk should prevent his body from intimating obnoxious desires,

translation would give a wrong idea, as it would come to the same as the word *bilavargita* in the next verse.

¹ I. e. where the ground has been cleared not long ago by burning the grass, &c.

² *Ôgâdâhê*, where the animate ground is covered by at least five digits of inanimate matter.

³ Viz. of mind (20, 21), of speech (22, 23), and of the body (24, 25).

⁴ See part i, p. 150, note 2.

⁵ *Samrambha*.

⁶ *Samârambha*.

⁷ *Ârambha*.

from doing acts which cause misery to living beings, or which cause their destruction. (24, 25)

These are the five Samitis for the practice of the religious life, and the Guptis for the prevention of everything sinful. (26)

This is the essence of the creed, which a sage should thoroughly put into practice; such a wise man will soon get beyond the Circle of Births. (27)

Thus I say.

TWENTY-FIFTH LECTURE.

THE TRUE SACRIFICE.

There was a famous Brâhmana, Gayaghôsha by name, who was born in a Brâhmanical family, but who was pledged to the performing of the yamas¹. (1)

This great sage, who subdued all his senses, and who walked on the right road, came, on his wandering from village to village, to the town of Benares. (2)

There outside of Benares he took up his lodgings in a pleasant park; there he took up his abode in a pure place to live and sleep in. (3)

At the same time a Brâhmana, versed in the Vêdas, Vigayaghôsha by name, offered a sacrifice in that town. (4)

Now this houseless (monk) at the end of a fast of a month's duration, went to the sacrifice of Vigayaghôsha to beg alms. (5)

¹ Yama etymologically means 'restraint'; here it denotes the great vows of the Gainas; cf. XXIII, 12, p. 121 and note 2.

The priest wanted to turn the approaching monk off: 'I shall not give you alms, mendicant, beg somewhere else. (6)

'Priests who are versed in the Vêdas and are chaste as behoves offerers, who are versed in the *Gyôti-shânga*¹ and are well grounded in the sacrificial science, who are able to save themselves and others, such priests ought to be presented with food and all they desire.' (7, 8)

When the great sage was thus refused by the priest, he was neither angry nor pleased, as he always strove for the highest good. (9)

Not to obtain food, or drink, or whatever else he wanted, but to save these people he spoke the following words: (10)

"You do not know what is most essential² in the Vêdas, nor in sacrifices, nor in the heavenly bodies³, nor in duties⁴. (11)

"Nor do you know those who are able to save themselves and others; but if you do, then speak out!" (12)

The priest did not make a reply to defend himself against his insinuation; but he and all there assembled joined their hands and questioned the great sage: (13)

'Tell us the most essential subject in the Vêdas, and tell us what is most essential in the sacrifice;

¹ It is worthy of note that, according to the opinion of our author, the knowledge of astronomy, as taught in the *Gyôtisha*, was one of the principal accomplishments of a priest. This quality of a priest must therefore have been more conspicuous to an outsider than Brâhmanical books would make us believe.

² To render *muha* = *mukha*.

³ *Nakshatra*.

⁴ *Dharma*.

tell us the first of the heavenly bodies, and tell us the best of dharmas. (14)

‘Who are able to save themselves and others (viz. tell me). I ask you to solve this my doubt, O saint.’ (15)

“The most essential subject in the Vêdas is the agnihôtra, and that of the sacrifice is the purpose of the sacrifice¹; the first of the heavenly bodies is the moon, and the best of dharmas is that of Kâsyapa (i. e. Rîshabha). (16)

“The beautiful (gods) with joined hands praise and worship the highest Lord (i. e. the Tîrthakara) as the planets, &c., (praise) the moon. (17)

“The ignorant (priests) pretend to know the sacrifice, those whose Brâhmanical excellence consists in (false) science; they shroud themselves in study and penance, being like fire covered by ashes. (18)

“He who is called by people a Brâhmana and is worshipped like fire (is no true Brâhmana). But him we call a true Brâhmana, whom the wise point out as such. (19)

“He who has no worldly attachment after entering the order, who does not repent of having become a monk², and who takes delight in the noble words, him we call a Brâhmana. (20)

“He who is exempt from love, hatred, and fear,

¹ *Gannatîhî vêyasâ muham = yagñârthî vedasâm mukham.* According to the *Dîpikâ* sacrifice here means the ten virtues: truth, penance, content, patience, right conduct, simplicity, faith, constancy, not injuring anything, and *Samvara*.

² According to the commentators we should translate: He who does not embrace (his people) on meeting them, and is not sorry on leaving them.

(and who shines forth) like burnished gold, purified in fire¹, him we call a Brâhmana. (21)

"A lean, self-subduing ascetic, who reduces his flesh and blood, who is pious and has reached Nirvâna, him we call a Brâhmana. (22)

"He who thoroughly knows living beings, whether they move or not, and does not injure them in any of the three ways², him we call a Brâhmana. (23)

"He who does not speak untruth from anger or for fun, from greed or from fear, him we call a Brâhmana. (24)

"He who does not take anything that is not given him, be it sentient or not sentient, small or large, him we call a Brâhmana. (25)

"He who does not carnally love divine, human, or animal beings, in thoughts, words, or acts, him we call a Brâhmana. (26)

"He who is not defiled by pleasures as a lotus growing in the water is not wetted by it, him we call a Brâhmana. (27)

"He who is not greedy, who lives unknown, who has no house and no property, and who has no friendship with householders, him we call a Brâhmana. (28)

"He who has given up his former connections (with his parents, &c.), with his kinsmen and relations, and who is not given to pleasure, him we call a Brâhmana. (29)

¹ Niddhantamalapâvagam. The commentator assumes a transposition of the members in this compound. Such irregular compounds are not unfrequent in our Prâkrîṭ. If, however, pâvaga stands for pâpaka, the compound would be regular, and would refer not to 'gold,' but to the person described. In that case we must translate: whose impurities and sins had been annihilated.

² I. e. by thoughts, words, and acts.

“The binding of animals (to the sacrificial pole), all the Vêdas, and sacrifices, being causes of sin, cannot save the sinner; for his works (or Karman) are very powerful. (30)

“One does not become a Sramana by the tonsure, nor a Brâhmana by the sacred syllable *ôm*, nor a Muni by living in the woods, nor a Tâpasa by wearing (clothes of) Kusa-grass and bark. (31)

“One becomes a Sramana by equanimity, a Brâhmana by chastity, a Muni by knowledge, and a Tâpasa by penance. (32)

“By one's actions one becomes a Brâhmana, or a Kshattriya, or a Vaisya, or a Sûdra. (33)

“The Enlightened One has declared these (good qualities) through which one becomes a (true) Snâtaka¹; him who is exempt from all Karman, we call a Brâhmana. (34)

“The most excellent twice-born men² who possess these good qualities, are able to save themselves and others.” (35)

When thus his doubt had been solved, Vigaya-ghôsha, the Brâhmana, assented³ to the great sage Gayaghôsha and to his (speech). (36)

Vigaya-ghôsha, pleased, folded his hands and spoke

¹ Snâtaka denotes a Brahman who has finished his studies; it here means as much as ‘a perfect sage.’

² A various reading in one MS. adds, ‘Ginas and Brâhmanas’ before *dvigas*.

³ *Samudâya tayam tam tu*. The text is evidently corrupted. *Samudâya* stands, according to the commentators, for *samâdâya*, but there is no finite verb with which to construe the absolute participle, either expressed or easily supplied. Perhaps we must read *samuvâya vayam* = *samuvâka vaḥas*; for the perfect is retained in some cases. However, if this conjecture be right, the next line would be superfluous.

as follows: 'You have well declared to me what true Brâhmanahood consists in. (37)

'You are a sacrificer of sacrifices, you are the most learned of those who know the Vêdas, you know the Gyôtishânga, you know perfectly the Law. (38)

'You are able to save yourself and others; therefore do us the honour to accept our alms, O best of monks.' (39)

"I do not want any alms; but, O Brâhmana, enter the order at once, lest you should be drifted about on the dreadful ocean of the Samsâra, whose eddies are dangers. (40)

"There is glue (as it were) in pleasure: those who are not given to pleasure, are not soiled by it; those who love pleasures, must wander about in the Samsâra; those who do not, will be liberated. (41)

"If you take two clods of clay, one wet, the other dry, and fling them against the wall, the wet one will stick to it. (42)

"Thus foolish men, who love pleasure, will be fastened (to Karman), but the passionless will not, even as the dry clod of clay (does not stick to the wall)." (43)

When Vigayaghôsha had learned the excellent Law from the houseless Gayaghôsha, he entered the order. (44)

Gayaghôsha and Vigayaghôsha both annihilated their Karman by self-control and penance, and reached the highest perfection. (45)

Thus I say.

TWENTY-SIXTH LECTURE.

THE CORRECT BEHAVIOUR.

I shall declare the correct behaviour (*sâmâkâri*) which causes freedom from all misery; by practising it the Nirgranthas have crossed the ocean of *Samsâra*. (1)

The correct behaviour of monks consists of (the following) ten parts: 1. *âvasyikâ*; 2. *naishêdhikî*; 3. *âprikkhanâ*; 4. *pratiprikkhanâ*; 5. *khandanâ*; 6. *ikkhâkâra*; 7. *mithyâkâra*; 8. *tathâkâra*; 9. *abhyutthâna*; 10. *upasampad*. (2-4)

The *âvasyikâ* is required when he leaves a room (or the presence of other monks on some necessary business); the *naishêdhikî*, on entering a place; *âprikkhanâ*, (or asking the superior's permission) for what he is to do himself; *pratiprikkhanâ*, for what somebody else is to do; *khandanâ*, (or placing at the disposal of other monks) the things one has got; *ikkhâkâra*, in the execution (of one's intention by oneself or somebody else); *mithyâkâra*, in the blaming oneself (for sins committed); *tathâkâra*, (assent) in making a promise; *abhyutthâna*, in serving those who deserve respect; and *upasampad*, in placing oneself under another teacher. Thus the twice fivefold behaviour has been declared. (5-7)

After sunrise during the first quarter (of the first *Paurushî*)¹ he should inspect (and clean) his things and pay his respects to the superior. (8)

Then, with his hands joined, he should ask him :

¹ The southern half of the sky or horizon, between east and west, is divided into four quarters, each of which corresponds in time to a *paurushî*, the fourth part of a day or a night.

‘What shall I do now? I want to be employed, sir, in doing some work or in studying.’ (9)

If he is ordered to do some work, he should do it without tiring; if he is ordered to study, he should do it without allowing himself to be affected by any pains. (10)

A clever monk should divide the day into four (equal) parts (called *paurushî*), and fulfil his duties (*uttaraguna*) in all four parts. (11)

In the first *Paurushî* he should study, in the second he should meditate, in the third he should go on his begging-tour, and in the fourth he should study again. (12)

In the month *Âshâdha* the *Paurushî* (of the night) contains two feet (*pada*)¹; in the month *Pausha*, four; in the months *Kaitra* and *Âsvayuga*, three. (13)

(The *Paurushî*) increases or decreases a digit² (*aṅgula*) every week, two digits every fortnight, four digits every month. (14)

The dark fortnight of *Âshâdha*, *Bhâdrapada*, *Kârttika*, *Pausha*, *Phâlguna*, and *Vaisâkha* are known as *avamarâtrâs*³. (15)

¹ A *paurushî* is the fourth part of a day or a night; about the time of the equinoxes, when the day as well as the night contains twelve hours, the *paurushî* contains three hours. At the same time, in the months *Kaitra* and *Âsvina*, as we learn from our verse, the *paurushî* has three feet, *padas*. The *pada* therefore is equal to one hour exactly. The duration of the night at the summer solstice was therefore estimated at eight hours and at the winter solstice at sixteen, just as in the Vedic *Gyôtisha*.

² A digit, *aṅgula*, is apparently the twelfth part of a foot, *pada* = one hour. The digit is therefore equal to five minutes.

³ The fortnights, mentioned in the text, consist of fourteen days only, the remaining ones of fifteen days. In this way the lunar year is made to consist of 354 days.

In the quarter of the year comprising the three months *Gyêsthâmûla*, *Âshâdha*, and *Srâvana*, the (morning-) inspection is to last six digits (beyond $\frac{1}{4}$ Paurushî); in the second quarter, eight; in the third, ten; in the fourth, eight¹. (16)

A clever monk should divide the night too into four parts, and fulfil his duties (*uttaraguna*) in all four parts. (17)

In the first Paurushî he should study, in the second he should meditate, in the third he should leave off sleep, and in the fourth he should study again. (18)

When the nakshatra which leads the night² has reached the first quarter of the heaven, at dawn he should cease to study. (19)

When a small part of the quarter is left³, in which the (leading) nakshatra stands, during that space of time, being considered intermediate⁴ (between two) days, a monk should watch. (20)

In the first quarter (of the first Paurushî) he should inspect (and clean) his things, pay his respects to his superior, and then begin to study, not allowing himself to be affected by any pains⁵. (21)

¹ Or thirty, forty, fifty, forty minutes respectively.

² I.e. the nakshatra which is in opposition to the sun, and accordingly rises at the same time with the setting sun, and sets with the rising sun, compare *Râmâyana* III, 16, 12.

³ I.e. is about to set.

⁴ *Vêrattiya*, translated *vairâtrika*; but there is no such word in Sanskrit. It apparently stands for *dvairâtrika*, belonging to two days. As the Hindus reckon the day from sunrise, the time immediately preceding it may be considered to belong to two days.

⁵ Compare verse 8.

In the (last) quarter of the first Pauruṣṭī, after paying his respect to the Guru, a monk should inspect his almsbowl, without, however, performing the Kāla-pratikramaṇa¹. (22)

He should first inspect his mouth-cloth², then his broom³, and taking the broom in his hand he should inspect his cloth. (23)

Standing upright he holds his cloth firmly and inspects it first leisurely, then he spreads it, and at last he wipes it. (24)

(He should spread the cloth) without shaking or crushing it, in such a way as to make the folds disappear, and to avoid friction of its parts against each other; he should fold it up six times in length, and nine times in breadth, and then he should remove living beings with his hand (spreading the cloth on the palm of his hand)⁴. (25)

He must avoid want of attention: 1. in beginning his work; 2. in taking up the corners of the cloth; 3. in folding it up; 4. in shaking out the dust; 5. in putting it down (on some other piece of cloth); 6. in sitting upon the haunches⁵. (26)

¹ I.e. expiation of sins concerning time, cf. Bhandarkar's Report, p. 98, note †. It seems to consist in Kāyōtsarga.

² This is a piece of muslin which the Gaiṇa monks place before their mouth in speaking, in order to prevent insects being drawn in the mouth by the breath.

³ It is here called *gôkṣhaga* = *gukṣhaka*, originally a bunch of peacocks' feathers, it is so still, if I am not mistaken, with the Digambaras, whilst the Svêtâmbaras use other materials, especially cotton threads.

⁴ Much in my translation is conjectural. There are some technicalities in these verses which I fail to understand clearly, notwithstanding the explanations of the scholiasts.

⁵ Vêdikâ.

(One must further avoid) to hold the cloth loosely, or at one corner, or so as to let it flap, or so as to subject it to friction, or so as to shake it in different ways, or if one has made a mistake in the number of foldings (see verse 25) to count (aloud or with the help of the fingers, &c.)¹ (27)

There should be neither too little nor too much of inspection, nor an exchange (of the things to be inspected); this is the right way to do (the inspection), all other methods are wrong:— (28)

(This is) if one engaged in inspecting his things converses or gossips (with anybody), renounces something², teaches another his lesson, or receives his own lesson from another, (he neglects his inspection). (29)

He who is careful in the inspection, protects the six kinds of living beings, viz. the earth-bodies, water-bodies, fire-bodies, wind-bodies, plants, and animals. (30)

He who is careless in the inspection, injures the six kinds of living beings (just enumerated)³. (31)

In the third Pauruṣh he should beg food and drink, (he may do so) for any of the following six reasons: (32)

¹ I am not sure of having hit the true meaning. The commentators reckon this counting as a fault, while the text itself seems to enjoin it.

² *Dēi paṭṭakkhānam*. The meaning is, I believe, that during the time of inspection one should not make up one's mind to abstain from this or that because one is to devote one's whole attention to the inspection of one's things.

³ The *Dīpikā* places this verse before the last and construes it with verse 29, making out the following meaning: if one, engaged in inspecting his things, converses or gossips, &c., then, being careless in the inspection, he injures, &c.

1. To prevent an illness; 2. to serve the Guru; 3. to be able to comply with the rules about walking¹; 4. to be able to comply with the rules of self-control²; 5. to save one's life; 6. to be able to meditate on the Law. (33)

A zealous Nirgrantha or Nirgranthi may omit to beg food for the following six reasons, when it will not be considered a transgression of his duties: (34)

1. In case of illness; 2. in case of a disaster; 3. to preserve one's chastity and the Guptis; 4. out of compassion for living beings; 5. in the interest of penance; 6. to make an end of one's life³. (35)

Taking his whole outfit a monk should inspect it with his eye; he then may walk about, but not beyond half a Yôgana. (36)

In the fourth Paurushî he should put away his almsbowl (after having eaten his meal), and then begins his study which reveals all existent things. (37)

In the last quarter of the fourth Paurushî he should pay his reverence to the Guru, and after having performed Kâla-pratikramana⁴, he should inspect his lodging. (38)

A zealous monk should also inspect the place where to discharge his excrements and urine, and then (till the sun sets) he should go through Kâyôt-sarga without allowing himself to be affected by any pains. (39)

¹ Iriya//hâê; for one will not be careful about walking (îryâ-samitî) if too hungry or thirsty.

² For one might eat forbidden food if too hungry.

³ It may be remarked here that the verses 15, 16, 19, 20, 24, 26, 27, 29, 33, 34, 35 are in the Âryâ-metre while the rest of the lecture is in Ślôka.

⁴ Compare note 1, p. 145.

Then he should, in due order, reflect on all transgressions he has committed during the day, with regard to knowledge, faith, and conduct. (40)

Having finished Kâyôtsarga, and paid his reverence to the Guru, he should, in due order, confess his transgressions committed during the day. (41)

Then having recited the Pratikramana Sûtra¹, and having annihilated his sins, he should pay his reverence to the Guru (asking absolution)², and go through Kâyôtsarga without allowing himself to be affected by any pains. (42)

Having finished Kâyôtsarga, and paid his reverence to the Guru, he should pronounce the customary (three) praises, and then wait for the proper time. (43)

In the first Paurushî (of the night) he should study; in the second he should meditate; in the third he should leave off sleep; and in the fourth he should study again³. (44)

In the fourth Paurushî he should wait for the proper time and then begin to study without waking the householders. (45)

In the last quarter of the fourth Paurushî he should pay his reverence to the Guru, and performing Kâla-pratikramana⁴ he should wait for the proper time. (46)

When the (time for) Kâyôtsarga has arrived, he

¹ Padîkamittu = pratikramya, explained pratikramana-sûtram uktvâ.

² According to the Dîpikâ: having repeated the three Gâthâs beginning âriyauvagghâya.

³ This verse is the same as verse 18, except a verbal difference in the last line.

⁴ Padîkamittu kâlassa, see p. 145, note 1. The Dîpikâ here explains this phrase by: doing acts proper for that time.

should go through it, without allowing himself to be affected by any pains. (47)

Then he should, in due order, reflect on all transgressions he has committed during the night with regard to knowledge, faith, and conduct. (48)

Having finished Kâyôtsarga and paid his reverence to the Guru, he should, in due order, confess his transgressions committed during the night. (49)

Then having recited the Pratikramana Sûtra &c. (see verse 41). (50)

He should consider what kind of austerities he will undertake. Having finished his Kâyôtsarga, he pays his reverence to the Guru. (51)

Having finished Kâyôtsarga and paid his reverence to the Guru, he should practise those austerities which he has decided upon, and praise the perfected saints. (52)

Thus has been summarily declared the correct behaviour, by practising which many souls have crossed the ocean of *Samsâra*. (53)

Thus I say.

TWENTY-SEVENTH LECTURE.

THE BAD BULLOCKS.

There was a Sthavira and Ganadhara¹, the learned sage Garga. This leader of the Gana once made the following reflections : (1)

‘ He who rides in a car, crosses a wilderness ; he

¹ Gana seems to correspond to the modern *Gakkha* ; see part i, p. 288, note 2. Ganadhara, therefore, does not denote here, as usual, a disciple of Tîrthakara.

who rides, as it were, in (the car of) religious exercise, crosses the *Samsâra*. (2)

‘But he who puts bad bullocks¹ before his car, will be tired out with beating them; he will feel vexation, and his goad will be broken (at last). (3)

‘(A bad bullock) will bite its mate in the tail; it will wound the other²; it will break the pin of the yoke³, or it will leave the road. (4)

‘It will fall down on its side, or sit down, or lie down; it will jump up or caper, or it will obstinately make for a young cow. (5)

‘It will furiously advance with its head lowered for an attack, or angrily go backward; it will stand still as if dead, or run at full speed. (6)

‘The cursed beast⁴ will rend asunder the rope, or in its unruliness break the yoke; and roaring it will break loose and run off. (7)

‘Just as bad bullocks are when put before a car, so are bad pupils when yoked, as it were, to the car of the Law; they break down through want of zeal. (8)

‘Some attach great importance⁵ to their success;

¹ *Khalumka* = *galivrishabha*. *Gali* is explained in the dictionaries: a strong but lazy bull. In verse 16 we meet with *galigaddaha* = *galigardabha*, as synonymous with *khalumka*.

² The commentator understands the first line of this verse as having reference to the angry driver. But though an angry driver will perhaps, for all I know, put his bullock's tail to his teeth, still it is harder to supply another subject in the first line than in the second, and in the following verses.

³ *Samilâ* = *yugarandhrakîlaka*, *Avatûri*.

⁴ *Kîmâla* = *gâra*, see *Hemakandra*, *Dêśi Kôsha* 3, 27. It is a coarse term, which I replace by another, though probably the language of our coach-drivers might supply us with a more idiomatic rendering.

⁵ *Gârava*, cf. p. 98, note 2.

some to their good fare; some to their comfort; some nurse their anger. (9)

‘Some are averse to begging; some are afraid of insults and are stuck up; (how can) I convince them by reasons and arguments’¹(?) (10)

‘(A bad pupil) makes objections, and points out (imagined) difficulties; he frequently acts in opposition to the words of the superiors. (11)

‘(He will say if sent to a lady): “She does not know me, she will give me nothing; I suppose she will be gone out; send some other monk there.” (12)

‘If sent on an errand, they do not do what they were bidden², but stroll about wherever they like; or deporting themselves like servants of the king³, they knit their brows (when speaking to other people). (13)

‘After they have been instructed, admitted into the order, and nourished with food and drink, they disperse in all directions like geese whose wings have grown.’ (14)

Now this driver (viz. Garga), who had to deal with bad bullocks, thought: ‘What have I to do with bad pupils? I am disheartened. (15)

‘As are bad pupils, so are bad bullocks; I shall leave these lazy donkeys, and shall practise severe austerities.’ (16)

¹ The metre of this verse seems to have originally been *Âryâ*, but an attempt has been made to change it into *Anush/ubh*. We meet here with the interesting form *anusâsammî* (read *anusasammi*) = *anusâsmi*.

² This seems to be the meaning of the word *paliumkanti*. The commentators say, after other explanations, that they pretend not to have met the person to whom they were sent.

³ *Râgavet/him va mannantâ; vet/hi*=*vish/i*, hire.

That noble man, who was full of kindness, grave, and always meditating, wandered about on the earth, leading a virtuous life. (17)

Thus I say.

TWENTY-EIGHTH LECTURE.

THE ROAD TO FINAL DELIVERANCE.

Learn the true road leading to final deliverance, which the Ginas have taught; it depends on four causes and is characterised by right knowledge and faith. (1)

I. Right knowledge; II. Faith; III. Conduct; and IV. Austerities; this is the road taught by the Ginas who possess the best knowledge. (2)

Right knowledge, faith, conduct, and austerities; beings who follow this road, will obtain beatitude. (3)

I. Knowledge is fivefold: 1. *Sruta*, knowledge derived from the sacred books; 2. *Âbhinibôdhika*, perception¹; 3. *Avadhi*, supernatural knowledge; 4. *Manahparyâya*², knowledge of the thoughts of other people; 5. *Kêvala*, the highest, unlimited knowledge. (4)

¹ This is usually called *mati*, and is placed before *sruta*. The same enumeration recurs in XXXIII, 4, p. 193. *Umâsvâti* in *Môksha Sûtra* I, 14, gives the following synonyms of *mati*: *smṛiti*, *kintâ*, *abhinibôdhika*.

² *Mananânâma*.

This is the fivefold knowledge. The wise ones have taught the knowledge of substances, qualities, and all developments¹. (5)

Substance is the substrate of qualities ; the qualities are inherent in one substance ; but the characteristic of developments is that they inhere in either (viz. substances or qualities). (6)

Dharma, Adharma, space, time, matter, and souls (are the six kinds of substances²) ; they make up this world, as has been taught by the *Ginas* who possess the best knowledge. (7)

Dharma, Adharma, and space are each one substance only ; but time, matter, and souls are an infinite number of substances. (8)

The characteristic of Dharma is motion, that of Adharma immobility, and that of space³, which contains all other substances, is to make room (for everything)⁴. (9)

The characteristic of time is duration⁵, that of soul the realisation⁶ of knowledge, faith, happiness, and misery. (10)

The characteristic of Soul is knowledge, faith, conduct, austerities, energy, and realisation (of its developments). (11)

The characteristic of matter is sound, darkness,

¹ *Dravya, guṇa, paryāya* (*paggava* in *Gaina Prākṛit*). *Guṇa*, quality, is generally not admitted by the *Gainas* as a separate category, see *Śīlāṅka's* refutation of the *Vaiśeṣika* doctrines at the end of his comments on *Sūtrakṛitāṅga* I, 12 (Bombay edition, p. 482).

² They are frequently called *astikāyas*, or realities.

³ It is here called *nabhas* instead of *ākāśa*.

⁴ *Avagāha*.

⁵ *Vartanā*.

⁶ *Upayōga*.

lustre (of jewels, &c.), light, shade, sunshine ; colour, taste, smell, and touch. (12)

The characteristic of development is singleness, separateness¹, number, form, conjunction, and disjunction. (13)

1. *gīva*, Soul; 2. *agīva*, the inanimate things; 3. *bandha*, the binding of the soul by Karman; 4. *punya*, merit; 5. *pāpa*, demerit; 6. *âsrava*, that which causes the soul to be affected by sins; 7. *saṃvara*, the prevention of *âsrava* by watchfulness; 8. the annihilation of Karman; 9. final deliverance: these are the nine truths (or categories). (14)

He who verily believes the true teaching of the (above nine) fundamental truths, possesses righteousness. (15)

II. Faith is produced by 1. *nisarga*, nature; 2. *upadêsa*, instruction; 3. *âgñâ*, command; 4. *sûtra*, study of the *sûtras*; 5. *bīga*, suggestion; 6. *abhiḡama*, comprehension of the meaning of the sacred lore; 7. *viśtâra*, complete course of study; 8. *kriyâ*, religious exercise; 9. *saṃkshêpa*, brief exposition; 10. *dharma*, the Law. (16)

1. He who truly comprehends, by a spontaneous effort of his mind², (the nature of) soul, inanimate things, merit, and demerit, and who puts an end to sinful influences³, (believes by) nature. (17)

He who spontaneously believes the four truths (explicitly mentioned in the last verse), which the

¹ Singleness (*êkatva*) makes a thing appear as one thing, separateness (*prithaktva*) as different from others.

² *Sahasamuiya* = *svayamsamudita*. It is usually rendered *sahasammati*.

³ *Âsravasaṃvara*, see above, verse 14, 6 and 7.

Ginas have taught, (thinking) they are of this and not of a different nature, believes by nature. (18)

2. But he who believes these truths, having learned them from somebody else, either a *Kḥadmastha*¹ or a *Gina*, believes by instruction. (19)

3. He who has got rid of love, hate, delusion, and ignorance, and believes because he is told to do so, believes by command. (20)

4. He who obtains righteousness by (the study of) the *Sūtras*, either *Aṅgas* or other works², believes by the study of *Sūtras*. (21)

5. He who by correctly comprehending one truth arrives at the comprehension of more—just as a drop of oil expands on the surface of water—believes by suggestion. (22)

6. He who truly knows the sacred lore, viz. the eleven *Aṅgas*, the *Prakīrṇas*³, and the *Dṛśhtivāda*, believes by the comprehension of the sacred lore. (23)

7. He who understands the true nature of all substances by means of all proofs (*pramāṇa*) and *nayas*⁴, believes by a complete course of study. (24)

8. He who sincerely performs (all duties implied)

¹ A *kḥadmastha* is one who has not yet obtained *Kēvala*, or the highest knowledge; he is in the two *gunasthānas* (the fourteen stages in the development of the soul from the lowest to the highest) characterised as 1. *upasāntamōha*, and 2. *kshīnamōha*; viz. 1. that in which delusion is only temporarily separated from the soul, and 2. that in which delusion is finally destroyed.

² *Bāhira*; apparently the same works are intended which are elsewhere called *anāṅgapravishṭa*.

³ The original has the singular.

⁴ The seven *nayas* are 'points of view or principles with reference to which certain judgments are arrived at or arrangements made.' Bhandarkar, Report, p. 112.

by right knowledge, faith, and conduct, by asceticism and discipline, and by all Samitis and Guptis, believes by religious exercise. (25)

9. He who though not versed in the sacred doctrines¹ nor acquainted with other systems², holds no wrong doctrines, believes by brief exposition. (26)

10. He who believes in the truth³ of the realities⁴, the Sûtras, and conduct, as it has been explained by the Ginas, believes by the Law. (27)

Right belief depends on the acquaintance with truth⁵, on the devotion to those who know the truth, and on the avoiding of schismatical and heretical tenets. (28)

There is no (right) conduct without right belief⁶, and it must be cultivated (for obtaining) right faith; righteousness and conduct originate together, or righteousness precedes (conduct). (29)

Without (right) faith there is no (right) knowledge, without (right) knowledge there is no virtuous conduct⁷, without virtues there is no deliverance⁸, and without deliverance there is no perfection. (30)

(The excellence of faith depends on the following) eight points: 1. that one has no doubts (about the truth of the tenets); 2. that one has no preference (for heterodox tenets); 3. that one does not doubt

¹ Pravaṇana.

² E. g. that of Kapila, &c., Comm.

³ Dharma.

⁴ Astikâya; see note on verse 7.

⁵ I. e. true things as soul, &c.

⁶ Samyaktva 'righteousness.'

⁷ Karanaguna. The commentators make this a dvandva compound, and interpret *karana* as *vratâdi*, and *guna* as *pindavisuddhi*, &c.

⁸ By deliverance I have rendered *môksha*, and by final perfection *nirvâna*. *Môksha* denotes freedom from *Karman*, a condition which in Brâhmanical philosophy is called *gîvanmukti*.

its saving qualities¹; 4. that one is not shaken in the right belief (because heretical sects are more prosperous); 5. that one praises (the pious); 6. that one encourages (weak brethren); 7. that one supports or loves the confessors of the Law; 8. that one endeavours to exalt it. (31)

III. Conduct, which produces the destruction of all Karman, is 1. *sâmâyika*², the avoidance of everything sinful; 2. *kêdôpasthâpana*, the initiation of a novice; 3. *parihâravisuddhika*, purity produced by peculiar austerities³; 4. *sûkshma samparâya*, reduction of desire; 5. *akashâya yathâkhyâta*, annihilation of sinfulness according to the precepts of the Arhats, as well in the case of a *Khadmastha* as of a *Gina*. (32, 33)

IV. Austerities are twofold: external and internal; both external and internal austerities are sixfold. (34)

By knowledge one knows things, by faith one believes in them, by conduct one gets (freedom from Karman), and by austerities one reaches purity. (35)

Having by control and austerities destroyed their Karman, great sages, whose purpose is to get rid of all misery, proceed to (perfection).

Thus I say.

¹ *Nivvitigikêkâ*=*nirvikikitsa*. According to the commentary it may stand for *nir-vid-gugupsâ* 'without loathing the saints.'

² See Bhandarkar, Report, p. 98, note †.

³ The *Dîpikâ* contains the following details. Nine monks resolve to live together for eighteen months. They make one of their number their superior, *kalpasthita*, four become *parihârikas*, and the remaining four serve them (*anuparihârikas*). After six months the *parihârikas* become *anuparihârikas* and vice versa. After another six months the *kalpasthita* does penance and all the other monks serve him as *anuparihârikas*.

TWENTY-NINTH LECTURE.

THE EXERTION IN RIGHTEOUSNESS.

O long-lived (*Gambûsvâmin*)! I (*Sudharman*) have heard the following discourse from the venerable (*Mahâvira*).

Here, forsooth, the Venerable Ascetic *Mahâvira*, of the *Kasyapa Gôtra*, has delivered this lecture called the exertion in righteousness. Many creatures, who truly believe in the subject (taught in this lecture), put their faith in it, give credence to it, accept it, practise it, comply with it, study it, understand it, learn it, and act up to it according to the precept (of the *Ginas*)¹—have obtained perfection, enlightenment, deliverance, final beatitude, and have put an end to all misery.

This lecture treats of the following subjects :

1. *samvêga*, longing for liberation ;
2. *nirvêda*, disregard of worldly objects ;
3. *dharmaśraddhâ*, desire of the Law ;
4. *gurusâdharmikasusrûshanâ*, obedience to co-religionists and to the Guru.
5. *âlôkanâ*, confession of sins before the Guru ;
6. *nindâ*, repenting of one's sins to oneself ;
7. *garhâ*, repenting of one's sins before the Guru ;

¹ Here we have no less than ten verbs, many of which are synonyms, with probably no well-defined difference in their meaning. This heaping of synonymous words is a peculiarity of the archaic style. The commentators always labour hard to assign to each word an appropriate meaning, but by sometimes offering different sets of explanations they show that their ingenuity of interpretation was not backed by tradition.

8. sāmâyika, moral and intellectual purity of the soul ;
9. *ṣaturvimsatistava*, adoration of the twenty-four Ginas ;
10. vandana, paying reverence to the Guru ;
11. pratikramana, expiation of sins ;
12. kâyôtsarga, a particular position of the body ;
13. pratyâkhyâna, self-denial ;
14. stavastutimaṅgala, praises and hymns ;
15. kâlasya pratyupêkshanâ, keeping the right time ;
16. prâyasṣittakarana, practising penance ;
17. kshamâpana, begging forgiveness ;
18. svâdhyâya, study ;
19. vâkanâ, recital of the sacred texts ;
20. pariprikkhanâ, questioning (the teacher) ;
21. parâvartanâ, repetition ;
22. anuprêkshâ, pondering ;
23. dharmakathâ, religious discourse ;
24. srutasyârâdhanâ, acquisition of sacred knowledge ;
25. êkâgramanaṣsannivêsanâ, concentration of thoughts ;
26. samyama, control ;
27. tapas, austerities ;
28. vyavadâna, cutting off the Karman ;
29. sukhâsâta, renouncing pleasure ;
30. apratibaddhatâ, mental independence ;
31. viṣitrasayanâsanasêvanâ, using unfrequented lodgings and beds ;
32. vinivartanâ, turning from the world ;
33. sambhôgapratyâkhyâna, renouncing collection of alms in one district only ;

34. upadhipratyâkhyâna, renouncing articles of use ;
35. âhârapratyâkhyâna, renouncing food ;
36. kashâyapratyâkhyâna, conquering the passions ;
37. yôgapratyâkhyâna, renouncing activity ;
38. sarîrapratyâkhyâna, renouncing the body ;
39. sahâyapratyâkhyâna, renouncing company ;
40. bhaktapratyâkhyâna, renouncing all food ;
41. sadbhâvapratyâkhyâna, perfect renunciation ;
42. pratirûpatâ, conforming to the standard ;
43. vaiyâvṛitya, doing service ;
44. sarvagunasampûrnatâ, fulfilling all virtues ;
45. vitarâgatâ, freedom from passion ;
46. kshânti, patience ;
47. mukti, freedom from greed ;
48. ârgava, simplicity ;
49. mârdava, humility ;
50. bhâvasatya, sincerity of mind ;
51. karanasatya, sincerity of religious practice ;
52. yôgasatya, sincerity of acting ;
53. manôguptatâ, watchfulness of the mind ;
54. vâg-guptatâ, watchfulness of the speech ;
55. kâyaguptatâ, watchfulness of the body ;
56. manasamâdhâranâ, discipline of the mind ;
57. vâksamâdhâranâ, discipline of the speech ;
58. kâyasamâdhâranâ, discipline of the body ;
59. gñânasampannatâ, possession of knowledge ;
60. darsanasampannatâ, possession of faith ;
61. kâritrasampannatâ, possession of conduct ;

62. *srôtrêndriyanigraha*, subduing the ear ;
63. *ākshurindriyanigraha*, subduing the eye ;
64. *ghrânêndriyanigraha*, subduing the organ of smell ;
65. *gihvêndriyanigraha*, subduing the tongue ;
66. *sparsanêndriyanigraha*, subduing the organ of touch ;
67. *krôdhavigaya*, conquering anger ;
68. *mānavigaya*, conquering pride ;
69. *mâyâvigaya*, conquering deceit ;
70. *lôbhavigaya*, conquering greed ;
71. *prêmadvêshamithyâdarsanavigaya*, conquering love, hate, and wrong belief ;
72. *sailêst*, stability ;
73. *akarmatâ*, freedom from Karman.

1. Sir, what does the soul obtain by the longing for liberation ? By the longing for liberation the soul obtains an intense desire of the Law ; by an intense desire of the Law he quickly arrives at an (increased) longing for liberation ; he destroys anger, pride, deceit, and greed, which reproduce themselves infinitely ; he acquires no (bad) Karman, and ridding himself of wrong belief which is the consequence of the latter, he becomes possessed of right faith ; by the purity of faith some will reach perfection after one birth ; nobody, however, who has got this purity, will be born more than thrice before he reaches perfection. (1)

2. Sir, what does the soul obtain by disregard of worldly objects¹ ? By disregard of worldly objects the soul quickly feels disgust for pleasures enjoyed by gods, men, and animals ; he becomes indifferent to

¹ Or aversion to the Circle of Births.

all objects ; thereby he ceases to engage in any undertakings, in consequence of which he leaves the road of *Samsâra* and enters the road to perfection. (2)

3. Sir¹, what does the soul obtain by the desire of the Law? By the desire of the Law the soul becomes indifferent to pleasures and happiness to which he was attached ; he abandons the life of householders, and as a houseless monk he puts an end to all pains of body and mind, which consist in (the suffering of) cutting, piercing, union (with unpleasant things), &c. ; and he obtains unchecked happiness. (3)

4. By obedience to co-religionists and to the Guru the soul obtains discipline (*vinaya*). By discipline and avoidance of misconduct (towards the teacher²) he avoids being reborn as a denizen of hell, an animal, a (low) man, or a (bad) god ; by zealous praise of, devotion to, and respect for (the Guru) he obtains birth as a (good) man or god, gains perfection and beatitude, does all praiseworthy actions prescribed by discipline, and prevails upon others to adopt discipline. (4)

5. By confession of sins (before the Guru) the soul gets rid of the thorns, as it were, of deceit, misapplied austerities³, and wrong belief, which obstruct the way to final liberation and cause an endless migration of the soul ; he obtains simplicity, whereby the soul which is free from deceit does not acquire that *Karman* which results in his having a carnal desire for a woman or eunuch⁴, and annihilates such *Karman* as he had acquired before. (5)

¹ In this way all paragraphs up to § 72 open with a question of always the same form. I drop the question in the sequel.

² *Atyâsâtana*.

³ *Nidâna*, cf. p. 60, n. 2.

⁴ This is the meaning of the words *itthîvêya napumsaga-*

6. By repenting of one's sins to oneself the soul obtains repentance, and becoming indifferent by repentance he prepares for himself an (ascending) scale of virtues ¹, by which he destroys the Karman resulting from delusion. (6)

7. By repenting of one's sins before the Guru the soul obtains humiliation; feeling humiliated, he will leave off all blameable occupations ², and apply himself to praiseworthy occupations, whereby a houseless monk will stop infinite disabling ³ developments. (7)

8. By moral and intellectual purity (literally, equilibrium) the soul ceases from sinful occupations. (8)

9. By the adoration of the twenty-four Ginas the soul arrives at purity of faith. (9)

10. By paying reverence (to the Guru) the soul destroys such Karman as leads to birth in low families, and acquires such Karman as leads to birth in noble families; he wins the affection of people, which results in his being looked upon as an authority, and he brings about general goodwill. (10)

11. By expiation of sins he obviates transgressions of the vows; thereby he stops the Âsravas, preserves a pure conduct, practises the eight articles ⁴, does not neglect (the practice of control), and pays great attention to it. (11)

vêyam = strîvêda, napumsakavêda, as explained by the commentators on XXXII, 102.

¹ Karanagunasrêdhîm pratipadyatê. It is difficult to render this phrase adequately; the meaning is that by successively destroying moral impurities one arrives at higher and higher virtues.

² Yôga, i.e. the cause of the production of Karman.

³ Ghâti, compare Bhandarkar, Report, p. 93, note *.

⁴ See Twenty-fourth Lecture, p. 129 ff.

12. By Kâyôtsarga he gets rid of past and present (transgressions which require) Prâyasçitta¹; thereby his mind is set at ease like a porter who is eased of his burden; and engaging in praiseworthy contemplation he enjoys happiness. (12)

13. By self-denial he shuts, as it were, the doors of the Âsravas; by self-denial he prevents desires rising in him; by prevention of desires he becomes, as it were, indifferent and cool towards all objects. (13)

14. By praises and hymns he obtains the wisdom consisting in knowledge, faith, and conduct; thereby he gains such improvement, that he will put an end to his worldly existence², (or) be born afterwards in one of the Kalpas and Vimânas³. (14)

15. By keeping the right time he destroys the Karman which obstructs right knowledge. (15)

16. By practising Prâyasçitta¹ he gets rid of sins, and commits no transgressions; he who correctly practises Prâyasçitta, gains the road and the reward of the road⁴, he wins the reward of good conduct. (16)

17. By begging forgiveness he obtains happiness of mind; thereby he acquires a kind disposition towards all kinds of living beings⁵; by this

¹ Expiatory rites, âlôkanâ, &c.

² Antakriyâ, explained by mukti.

³ The Kalpas and the Vimânas are the heavens of the Vaimânika gods, see below, p. 226.

⁴ By road is meant the means of acquiring right knowledge, and by the reward of the road, right knowledge. The reward of good conduct is mukti.

⁵ Savvapânabhûyagîvasattâ. The prânas possess from two to four organs of sense, the gîvas five, the bhûtas are plants, and the sattvas are all remaining beings.

kind disposition he obtains purity of character and freedom from fear. (17)

18. By study he destroys the Karman which obstructs right knowledge. (18)

19. By the recital of the sacred texts he obtains destruction of Karman, and contributes to preserve the sacred lore, whereby he acquires the Law of the Tīrtha¹, which again leads him to the complete destruction of Karman, and to the final annihilation of worldly existence. (19)

20. By questioning (the teacher) he arrives at a correct comprehension of the Sūtra and its meaning, and he puts an end to the Karman which produces doubts and delusion. (20)

21. By repetition he reproduces the sounds (i. e. syllables) and commits them to memory. (21)

22. By pondering (on what he has learned) he loosens the firm hold which the seven kinds of Karman, except the Âyushka² (have upon the soul); he shortens their duration when it was to be a long one; he mitigates their power when it was intense; (he reduces their sphere of action when it was a wide one)³; he may either acquire Âyushka-karman or not, but he no more accumulates Karman which

¹ According to the commentaries, by Tīrtha are meant the *Ġaṇadharas*.

² Concerning the eight kinds of Karman, see XXXIII, 2 and 3, p. 192. Âyushka is that Karman which determines the length of time which one is to live. A somewhat different explanation of this Karman is given by Bhandarkar, loc. cit., p. 97, note.

³ The passage in question is an addition in some MSS., as the commentators tell us. The meaning seems to be that the Karman which was attached to many parts of the soul is restricted to fewer places by the influence of the purity superinduced on the soul by pondering.

produces unpleasant feelings, and he quickly crosses the very large forest of the fourfold *Samsâra*, which is without beginning and end. (22)

23. By religious discourses he obtains destruction of the *Karman*; by religious discourses he exalts the creed, and by exalting the creed he acquires *Karman*, which secures, for the future, permanent bliss. (23)

24. By acquisition of sacred knowledge he destroys ignorance, and will not be corrupted by worldliness. (24)

25. By concentration of his thoughts he obtains stability of the mind. (25)

26. By control he obtains freedom from sins. (26)

27. By austerities he cuts off the *Karman*¹. (27)

28. By cutting off the *Karman* he obtains (the fourth stage of pure meditation characterised by) freedom from actions, by doing no actions he will obtain perfection, enlightenment, deliverance, and final beatitude, and will put an end to all misery. (28)

29. By renouncing pleasures he obtains freedom from false longing, whereby he becomes compassionate, humble, free from sorrow, and destroys the *Karman* produced by delusion regarding conduct. (29)

30. By mental independence he gets rid of attachment, whereby he will concentrate his thoughts (on the Law), and will for ever be without attachment and fondness (for worldly things). (30)

31. By using unfrequented lodgings and beds he obtains the *Gupti* of conduct, whereby he will use

¹ *Vyavadâna* is the cutting off of the *Karman* and the subsequent purity of the soul.

allowed food, be steady in his conduct, be exclusively delighted with (control), obtain a yearning for deliverance, and cut off the tie of the eightfold Karman. (31)

32. By turning from the world he will strive to do no bad actions, and will eliminate his already acquired Karman by its destruction; then he will cross the forest of the fourfold *Samsāra*. (32)

33. By renouncing collection of alms in one district only¹ he overcomes obstacles²; unchecked by them he exerts himself to attain liberation; he is content with the alms he gets, and does not hope for, care for, wish, desire, or covet those of a fellow-monk; not envying other monks he takes up a separate, agreeable lodging³. (33)

34. By renouncing articles of use⁴ he obtains successful study; without articles of use he becomes exempt from desires, and does not suffer misery. (34)

35. By renouncing (forbidden) food he ceases to act for the sustenance of his life; ceasing to act for the sustenance of his life he does not suffer misery when without food. (35)

36. By conquering his passions he becomes free from passions; thereby he becomes indifferent to happiness and pains. (36)

37. By renouncing activity he obtains inactivity, by ceasing to act he acquires no new Karman, and destroys the Karman he had acquired before. (37)

38. By renouncing his body he acquires the pre-eminent virtues of the Siddhas, by the possession

¹ *Sambhōga* = *ĕkamandalyām āhāraḥ*.

² *Ālambanā, glānatādi*.

³ *Dukkaṃ suhaseggaṃ uvasampaggittānaṃ viharai*.

⁴ Except such as are obligatory, e.g. his broom, the *mukha-vastrikā*, &c.

of which he goes to the highest region of the universe, and becomes absolutely happy. (38)

39. By renouncing company he obtains singleness; being single and concentrating his mind, he avoids disputes, quarrels, passions, and censoriousness, and he acquires a high degree of control, of *Samvara*, and of carefulness¹. (39)

40. By renouncing all food he prevents his being born again many hundreds of times. (40)

41. By perfect renunciation² he enters the final (fourth stage of pure meditation), whence there is no return; a monk who is in that state, destroys the four remnants of *Karman* which even a *Kêvalin* possesses, viz. *vêdantya*, *âyushka*, *nâman*, and *gôtra*³; and then he will put an end to all misery. (41)

42. By conforming to the standard of monks⁴ he obtains ease, thereby he will be careful, wear openly the excellent badges of the order, be of perfect righteousness, possess firmness and the *Samitis*, inspire all beings with confidence, mind but few things⁵, subdue his senses, and practise, in a high degree, the *Samitis* and austerities. (42)

43. By doing service he acquires the *Karman*

¹ *Samâhiê* = *samâhita* or *samâdhimân*.

² *Sadbhâva pratyâkhyâna*. The *Dîpikâ* gives the following explanation: he makes the renunciation in such a way that he need not make it a second time.

³ *Vêdanîya* is that *Karman* which produces effects that must be experienced, as pleasure or pain; *âyushka* is the *Karman* that determines the length of life; *nâman* and *gôtra* cause him to be born as such or such an individual in this or that family; see Thirty-third Lecture, verses 2 and 3, p. 192 f.

⁴ Explained: *sthavirakalpasâdhuvêshadhâritvam*.

⁵ *Appaḍilêha* = *alpapratiyupêksha*; he has to inspect few things, because he uses only few.

which brings about for him the nâman and gôtra of a Tîrthakara. (43)

44. By fulfilling all virtues he secures that he will not be born again; thereby he will become exempt from pains of the body and mind. (44)

45. By freedom from passion he cuts off the ties of attachment and desire; thereby he becomes indifferent to all agreeable and disagreeable sounds, touches, colours, and smells. (45)

46. By patience he overcomes troubles. (46)

47. By freedom from greed he obtains voluntary poverty, whereby he will become inaccessible to desire for property. (47)

48. By simplicity he will become upright in actions, thoughts, and speech, and he will become veracious; thereby he will truly practise the Law. (48)

49. By humility he will acquire freedom from self-conceit; thereby he will become of a kind and meek disposition, and avoid the eight kinds of pride. (49)

50. By sincerity of mind he obtains purity of mind, which will cause him to exert himself for the fulfilment of the Law which the *Ginas* have proclaimed; and he will practise the Law in the next world too. (50)

51. By sincerity in religious practice he obtains proficiency in it; being proficient in it he will act up to his words. (51)

52. By sincerity of acting he will become pure in his actions. (52)

53. By watchfulness¹ of the mind he concentrates his thoughts; thereby he truly practises control. (53)

¹ Gupti.

54. By watchfulness of speech he keeps free from prevarication; thereby he enables his mind to act properly. (54)

55. By watchfulness of the body he obtains *Samvara*¹; thereby he prevents sinful *Âsravas*. (55)

56. By discipline of the mind he obtains concentration of his thoughts; thereby he obtains development of knowledge, which produces righteousness and annihilates wrong belief. (56)

57. By discipline of the speech he obtains development of faith, whereby he acquires facility of becoming enlightened, and destroys preventing causes. (57)

58. By discipline of the body he obtains development of conduct, which causes him to conduct himself according to the regulation; thereby he destroys the four remnants of *Karman* which even a *Kêvalin* possesses²; after that he obtains perfection, enlightenment, deliverance, and final beatitude, and he puts an end to all misery. (58)

59. By possession of knowledge he acquires an understanding of words and their meaning; thereby he will not perish in the forest of the fourfold *Samsâra*; as a needle with its thread will not be lost, thus the soul possessing the sacred lore³ will not be lost in the *Samsâra*; he performs all prescribed actions relating to knowledge, discipline, austerities, and conduct, and well versed in his

¹ For *Samvara* and *Âsrava*, see above, p. 55, note 1, and p. 73, note 2.

² See above, § 41.

³ Here is a pun on the word *sutta*=*sûtra*, which means thread and *Sûtra*, sacred lore, or knowledge acquired by the study of the *Sûtras*.

own and in heterodox creeds he will become invincible. (59)

60. By possession of faith he annihilates wrong belief which is the cause of worldly existence, and he will not lose his inner light; but he endues his Self with the highest knowledge and faith, and purifies it¹. (60)

61. By possession of conduct he obtains a stability like that of the king of mountains² (viz. Mêru), whereby a houseless monk destroys the four remnants of Karman which even a Kêvalin possesses; after that he obtains perfection, enlightenment, deliverance, and final beatitude, and puts an end to all misery. (61)

62. By subduing the organ of hearing he overcomes his delight with or aversion to all pleasant or unpleasant sounds, he acquires no Karman produced thereby, and destroys the Karman he had acquired before. (62)

63-66. (All this applies also to his) subduing the organs of sight, of smelling, of tasting, and of touch (with regard to) pleasant colours, smells, tastes, and touches. (63-66)

67. By conquering anger he obtains patience; he acquires no Karman productive of anger³, and destroys the Karman he had acquired before. (67)

68. By conquering pride he obtains simplicity, &c. (as in 67, substituting pride for anger). (68)

69. By conquering deceit he obtains humility, &c. (as in 67, substituting deceit for anger). (69)

¹ I.e. makes it contain nothing foreign to its own nature.

² Sêlêsi = sailêsi; sailêsa is Mêru, and its avasthâ, or condition, is sailêsi.

³ Or, perhaps, which results in experiencing anger.

70. By conquering greed he obtains content, &c. (as in 67, substituting greed for anger). (70)

71. By conquering love, hate, and wrong belief he exerts himself for right knowledge, faith, and conduct, then he will cut off the fetters of the eightfold Karman ; he will first destroy the twenty-eight kinds¹ of Karman, which are productive of delusion; (then) the five kinds of obstruction to right knowledge², the nine kinds of obstruction to right faith³, and the five kinds of obstacles (called Antarâya): the last three remnants of Karman he destroys simultaneously; afterwards he obtains absolute knowledge and faith, which is supreme, full, complete, unchecked, clear, faultless, and giving light (or penetrating) the whole universe; and while he still acts⁴, he acquires but such Karman as is inseparable from religious acts⁵; the pleasant feelings (produced by it) last but two moments: in the first moment it is acquired, in the second it is experienced, and in the third it is destroyed; this Karman is produced, comes into contact (with the soul), takes rise, is experienced, and is destroyed; for all time to come he is exempt from Karman. (71)

72. Then⁶ when his life is spent up to less than

¹ There are sixteen kashâyas, nine nô-kashâyas, and three môhanfiyas.

² These are the obstacles to the five kinds of knowledge: mati, sruta, avadhi, manahparyâya, kêvala.

³ They are: the obstacles to âakshurdarsana, to âakshurdarsana, to avadhidarsana, and to kêvaladarsana, and five kinds of sleep (nidrâ). Concerning Antarâya, see p. 193.

⁴ Sayôgin, i.e. while he has not yet reached the fourteenth gunasthâna, the state of a Kêvalin.

⁵ Airyapathika.

⁶ I.e. when he has become a Kêvalin, as described in the preceding paragraph.

half a muhūrta, he discontinues to act, and enters upon the (third degree of) pure meditation¹, from which there is no relapse (to lower degrees), and which requires most subtile functions only (of his organs); he first stops the functions of his mind, then the functions of speech, then those of the body, at last he ceases to breathe. During the time required for pronouncing five short syllables, he is engaged in the final pure meditation, in which all functions (of his organs) have ceased, and he simultaneously annihilates the four remnants of Karman, viz. vêdaniya, âyushka, nâman, and gôtra². (72)

73. Then having, by all methods, got rid of his audârîka, kârmaṇa (and taigasa) bodies, the soul takes the form of a straight line, goes in one moment, without touching anything and taking up no space, (upwards to the highest Âkâsa), and there develops into its natural form, obtains perfection, enlightenment, deliverance, and final beatitude, and puts an end to all misery. (73)

This indeed is the subject of the lecture called exertion in righteousness, which the Venerable Ascetic Mahāvîra has told, declared, explained, demonstrated. (74)

Thus I say.

¹ Sukladhyâna.

² See note on § 41.

THIRTIETH LECTURE.

THE ROAD OF PENANCE.

Now hear with concentrated mind, how a monk destroys by austerities the bad Karman which he had acquired by love and hatred. (1)

By abstaining 1. from destroying life; 2. from lying; 3. from taking anything which is not given; 4. from all sexual indulgence; 5. from having any property; and 6. from eating at night, the soul becomes free from Âsravas¹. (2)

By possessing the five Samitis and the three Guptis, by freedom from passions, by subduing the senses, by vanquishing conceit², and by avoiding delusions, the soul becomes free from Âsravas. (3)

Hear attentively how a monk destroys (the Karman) acquired by love and hatred in the absence of the above-mentioned (virtues). (4)

As a large tank, when its supply of water has been stopped, gradually dries up by the consumption of the water and by evaporation, so the Karman of a monk, which he acquired in millions³ of births, is annihilated by austerities, if there is no influx of bad Karman. (5, 6)

Austerities are of two kinds: external and internal;

¹ Karmôpâdânahêtavas, that through which the soul becomes affected by Karman.

² Agârava = agaurava; but it is here explained, free from garva, cf. p. 98, note 2.

³ Literally krores, i.e. ten millions.

external austerities are of six kinds, and internal are of six kinds¹. (7)

External austerities are :

1. *anasana*, fasting; 2. *avamôdarikâ*, abstinence²; 3. *bhikshâkaryâ*, collecting alms; 4. *rasa-parityâga*, abstention from dainty food; 5. *kâya-klêsa*, mortification of the flesh; 6. *samlinatâ*, taking care of one's limbs³. (8)

1. Fasting is of two kinds: *a. itvara*, temporary, and *b. maranâkâla*, fasting which precedes, and ends with death. Temporary fasting is either such in which a desire (for food) is present, or such in which no such desire exists. (9)

a. The temporary fasting is briefly of six kinds: 1. in the form of a line⁴; 2. in the form of a square; 3. in the form of a cube; 4. of a sixth power; 5. of a twelfth power; 6. of any arrangement. Temporary fasting (can be practised) for different objects which one has in mind. (10, 11)

¹ Comp. *Aupapâtika Sûtra*, ed. Leumann, p. 38 ff. The general division is the same, but the subdivision differs in many details.

² Gradual reduction of food, from a full meal of thirty-two morsels to one of one morsel.

³ *Âṅgôpâṅgâdikam samvṛitya pravartanam, T'ikâ.*

⁴ The meaning of this singular statement is as follows. If four fasts of two, three, four, and five days are performed in this order, they form a line. If this set of fasts is four times repeated, each time beginning with a different number, we get sixteen fasts; they form a square, viz. :

1 . 2 . 3 . 4

2 . 3 . 4 . 1

3 . 4 . 1 . 2

4 . 1 . 2 . 3

The next class contains 64 fasts, the fourth 4,096, the fifth 16,777,216 fasts. Fasts of the last class require 700,000 years at least, and must be assumed to be restricted to former Tîrthakaras, whose lives lasted enormous periods of time.

b. Fasting which is to precede death, is of two kinds with regard to the motions of the body : with change (of position) and without change. (12)

And again it is twofold : admitting of relief¹, or not ; one may either leave the place (which one has chosen to die in), or not leave it ; in both cases one may not take any food. (13)

2. Abstinence is briefly of five kinds : with regard to *a.* substance ; *b.* place ; *c.* time ; *d.* state of mind ; *e.* development. (14)

a. He who takes less food than he usually does², in the extreme case but one mouthful, performs abstinence with regard to substance. (15)

b. (Place means) a village, a scotfree town³, a capital, a camp of merchants⁴, a mine, a settlement of a wild tribe⁵, a place with an earth wall⁶, a poor town⁷, a town with a harbour⁸, a large town⁹, an isolated town¹⁰, and an open town¹¹. (16)

¹ Saparikarma = vaiyâvṛtyasahita. This leads to iṅginī-marana and bhaktapratyakhyāna; the aparikarma to pādapôpagamana (i.e. prâypôpagamana); comp. part i, p. 72.

² Thirty-two mouthfuls is the usual quantity of food of men, twenty-eight that of women. A mouthful is of the size of an egg.

³ Nagara, where no taxes (na kara) are levied, while villages pay eighteen taxes.

⁴ Nigama, or a place where many merchants dwell.

⁵ Pallī.

⁶ Khêṣa.

⁷ Karvaṣa. According to the dictionary, it means 'market-town;' but the commentators render it by kunagara, or say that it is karvaṣaganâvâsa, the dwelling-place of the Karvaṣa people.

⁸ Drôṇamukha, a town to which there is access by water and land, like Bhrīgukakṣha or Tāmralipti.

⁹ Paṭṭana.

¹⁰ Maṭamba, a town which is more than three and a half yôganas distant from the next village.

¹¹ Sambâdha, prabhûtaḥâturvarṇyanivâsa.

In a hermitage, a vihâra¹, a halting-place for procession², a resting-place for travellers³, a station of herdsmen, a camp on high ground, a caravan's camp, a fortified place of refuge. (17)

In gardens, on roads, in houses—all this is meant by place. In these and similar places he may (wander about). In this way he performs abstinence with regard to place. (18)

1. pêlâ, 2. ardhapêlâ, 3. gômûtrikâ, 4. pataṅga-vîthikâ, 5. sambûkâvartta, 6. âyatam-gatvâ-pratyâgata⁴. (19)

c. Abstinence with reference to time (is observed by him) who goes about in that time of the four Paurushîs of the day (which he selects for that purpose). (20)

Or if he collects alms in a part of the third Paurushî, or in its last quarter, then he observes abstinence with reference to time. (21)

d. Abstinence with reference to state of mind (is observed by him) who accepts alms from a woman or man, from an adorned or unadorned person, from one of any age or dress, of any temper or colour: if that person does not change his disposition or condition⁵. (22, 23)

¹ A dwelling-place of Bhikshus, or a dêvagrîha.

² Sannivêsa.

³ Samâga.

⁴ These are terms for different kinds of collecting alms; it is called pêlâ (box), when one begs successively at four houses forming the corners of an imaginary square; gômûtrikâ, when he takes the houses in a zigzag line; pataṅgavîthikâ (cricket's walk), when he goes to houses at a great distance from one another; sambûkâvartta (the windings of a conch), when he goes in a spiral line, either toward the centre (abhyantara) or from the centre outward (bahis); âyatam-gatvâ-pratyâgata, when he first goes straight on and then returns.

⁵ I give the traditional explanation of the verses, as handed

e. A monk who observes abstinence according to the particulars which have been enumerated with regard to substance, place, time, and state of mind, observes abstinence with regard to development¹ too. (24)

3. With regard to collecting alms there are the eight principal ways² how to collect them; the seven êshanâs (or modes of begging) and other self-imposed restrictions. (25)

4. Abstention from dainty food means abstention from such highly nourishing³ food and drink as milk, curds, ghee, &c. (26)

5. Mortification of the flesh consists in the different postures as Virâsana, &c., which benefit the soul, and which are difficult to perform. (27)

6. Using unfrequented lodgings and beds consists in living and sleeping in separate and

down in the commentaries. If we might set it aside, I should translate: abstinence with reference to disposition is observed by him who in collecting alms preserves the same disposition, whether he has to do with a woman or man, &c.

¹ For development (*paggava* = *paryâya*) denotes any form or phase of existence which anything can assume. Therefore all particulars of place, e.g. are developments of Place. As all restrictions of place, &c., indirectly diminish the food obtainable by a monk, they also come under the head Abstinence.

² According to the commentator, these are the six kinds enumerated in verse 19. *Sambûkâvartta* is of two kinds, as explained in the note; the eighth kind is *rigvî*, or the common way of begging. These eight ways have reference to the houses in which they collect alms. The seven êshanâs refer to the quality or quantity of the food; their names are given in the *Tikâ*, partly in *Prâkrî*, partly in Sanskrit: 1. *samsaithâ*; 2. *asamsaithâ*; 3. *uddhadâ*; 4. *alpalêpikâ*; 5. *udgrîhîâ*; 6. *pragrîhîâ*; 7. *uggîhî-tadharmâ*. According to another passage: 1. is *samsprîshâ*, 3. *uddhrîta*, 5. *avagrîhîta*.

³ *Pranîta*, explained *pushîkara*.

unfrequented places where there are neither women nor cattle. (28)

Thus external austerities have been briefly explained ; I shall now explain internal austerities in due order. (29)

Internal austerities are :

1. *prâyasâkitta*, expiation of sins ;
2. *vinaya*, politeness ;
3. *vaiyâvrîtya*, serving the Guru ;
4. *svâdhyâya*, study ;
5. *dhyâna*, meditation ;
6. *vyutsarga*¹, abandoning of the body. (30)

1. Expiation of sins is tenfold, what must be confessed², &c. ; this is to be strictly observed by a monk ; this is called expiation of sins. (31)

2. Politeness consists in rising (from one's seat), folding of the hands, offering of a seat, loving the Guru, and cordial obedience. (32)

3. There are ten³ kinds of service, as serving the *Âkârya*, &c.⁴ ; doing service consists in giving one's assistance as well as one is able. (33)

4. Study is fivefold : 1. saying or learning one's lesson ; 2. (questioning the teacher about it) ; 3. repetition ; 4. pondering ; 5. religious discourse. (34)

¹ *Viôsagga*, *viussaga*, *viusagga*. It is usually rendered *vyutsarga*, but the Sanskrit prototype is *vyavasarga*, as Leumann has pointed out, l.c., p. 152.

² Compare *Aupapâtika Sûtra*, ed. Leumann, p. 40.

³ *Ibidem*, p. 42.

⁴ They are enumerated in the following *Gâthâ* : *âyariya-uvaggâhê thêra-tavassî-gilâna-sêhâna | sâhammiya-kula-gana-saṅgha-saṃgayam tam iha kâyavvam*. The ten persons or body of persons entitled to 'service' are : 1. *âkârya* ; 2. *upâdhyâya* ; 3. *sthavira* ; 4. *tapasvin* ; 5. *glâna* ; 6. *saiksha* ; 7. *sâdharmika* ; 8. *kula* ; 9. *gana* ; 10. *saṅgha*.

5. Abstaining to meditate on painful and sinful things¹, one should, with a collected mind, engage in pure meditations on the Law; this the wise call meditation. (35)

6. If a monk remains motionless when lying down, sitting, or standing upright, this is called abandoning of the body, which is the sixth kind (of internal austerities). (36)

If a sage truly performs these two kinds of austerities, he will soon be thoroughly released from the Circle of Births. (37)

Thus I say.

THIRTY-FIRST LECTURE.

MODE OF LIFE².

I shall declare the mode of life that benefits the soul; by practising it many souls have crossed the ocean of *Samsâra*. (1)

One should desist from one thing, and practise another: desist from neglect of self-control, and practise self-control. (2)

Love and hatred are two evils which produce bad

¹ This is the *ârtaraudradhyâna*.

² This lecture offers many difficulties to the translator, as it contains scarcely more than a dry list of articles of the *Gâina* faith. To fully understand or interpret it would require an accurate knowledge of the complete religious system of the *Gâinas*, to which we can lay no claim at present. The order in which the articles are given follows the number of their subdivisions. In some cases the number is not given in the *Sûtra*, but is supplied by the commentary.

Karman ; if a monk always avoids them, he will not stand within the circle (of transmigration). (3)

A monk who always avoids the thrice threefold hurtful, conceited, and delusive acts¹, will not stand in the circle (of transmigration). (4)

A monk who well bears calamities produced by gods, animals, or men, will not stand, &c. (5)

A monk who always avoids the (four) different kinds of praises², passions, expressions (of the emotions)³, and (of the four) meditations the two sinful ones, will not stand, &c. (6)

A monk who always exerts himself⁴ with regard to the (five) vows, the (five) objects of sense, the (five) Samitis, and (five) actions⁵, will not stand, &c. (7)

A monk who always exerts himself with regard to the six lēsyās⁶, the six kinds of bodies, and the six (regular functions as) eating⁷, will not stand, &c. (8)

A monk who always exerts himself with regard to the (seven) rules of accepting alms⁸, and the seven causes of danger (to other men) will not stand, &c. (9)

¹ Compare XIX, 91, and XXX, 3. Hurtful acts (*danda*) are threefold, as referring to thoughts, words, and acts ; conceited acts (*gāraṇa*), as pride of riches, of taste (*rasa*), and of pleasure or fashion (*sātā*) ; delusive acts (*śalya*), as *mâyā*, *nidāna*, and *mithyādarsana*.

² *Vikatthā*.

³ *Samgñā*.

⁴ *Yatatē* 'exerts himself ;' supply 'to avoid, to know, or to do,' as the case may require.

⁵ *Kriyā* ; they are : 1. *kāyikī* ; 2. *adhikaraṇikī* ; 3. *prādvēṣhikī* ; 4. *paritāpanikī*, and 5. *prāṇātipātikī*.

⁶ On the *lēsyās* see Thirty-fourth Lecture, p. 196 ff.

⁷ From the commentaries I learn two more of these six *kāraṇas* : *vēdana* and *vaiyāvṛitya*. I cannot say which are the remaining three.

⁸ They are enumerated in note 2 on XXX, 25, p. 178.

A monk who always exerts himself with regard to the (eight) objects of pride¹, to that which protects his chastity², and to the tenfold Law of the monks³. (10)

A monk who always exerts himself with regard to the (eleven) duties of the upâsakas, and the (twelve) duties of the bhikshus⁴, will not stand, &c. (11)

A monk who always exerts himself with regard to the (thirteen) actions (productive of Karman), to the various (fourteen) kinds of living beings, and the (fifteen) places of punishment of the wicked⁵, will not stand, &c. (12)

A monk who always exerts himself with regard to the sixteen Gâthâs⁶, and to the (seventeen kinds of) neglect of self-control, will not stand, &c. (13)

A monk who always exerts himself with regard to the (eighteen kinds of) continence, to the (nineteen) *gñâtâdhyayanas*⁷, and the (twenty) cases for not concentrating one's thoughts, will not, &c. (14)

¹ Viz. caste, family, beauty, &c. ; see *Sûtrakṛit.* II, 2, 17.

² *Brahmagupti*. This is of nine kinds.

³ *Bhikshudharma*. It consists of Nos. 46-49, 26, 27, of Lecture XXIX, truth, purity, poverty, and chastity.

⁴ The details given in the commentary (*Dêvendra*) partly differ from the description of the twelve duties of *Srâvakas*, and the ten duties of *Bhikshus* given by *Bhandarkar* from the *Kârttikâyânu-prêkshâ*, see his Report, p. 114 ff.

⁵ *Paramâdhârmika*. My translation is based on the enumeration of fifteen words, among which the names of some well-known hells occur.

⁶ The sixteen lectures of the first part of the *Sûtrakṛitânga*, the last of which is called *Gâthâ*, are meant by the sixteen *Gâthâs*. The whole book contains twenty-three lectures as stated in verse 16.

⁷ The first *śrutaskandha* of the *Gñâtâdharmakathâ*, which contains nineteen *adhyayanas*, is intended by *gñâtâdhyayana*.

A monk who always exerts himself with regard to the twenty-one forbidden ¹ actions, and the twenty-two troubles ², will not stand, &c. (15)

A monk who always exerts himself with regard to the twenty-three (lectures of the) *Sûtrakṛitāṅga*, and to the gods whose number exceeds by an unit ³ (the number of the lectures of the *Sûtrakṛitāṅga*), will not stand, &c. (16)

A monk who always exerts himself with regard to the twenty-five clauses ⁴, and (to the recitation of the twenty-six) chapters of the *Daśās*, &c. ⁵, will not stand, &c. (17)

A monk who always exerts himself with regard to the (twenty-seven) virtues of the laity, and the (twenty-eight lectures of the) *Prakalpa* ⁶, will not stand, &c. (18)

A monk who always exerts himself with regard to the (twenty-nine) causes of wrong knowledge, and the (thirty) causes of delusion, will not stand, &c. (19)

A monk who always exerts himself with regard to the (thirty-one) qualities of Siddhas, &c., the (thirty-

¹ *Sabala*, because they 'variegate' the conduct. The actions meant are sitting on an unwiped seat, &c.

² *Paṛisaha*, see above, p. 9 ff.

³ *Rûpa*. The twenty-four gods are: ten *Bhavanapatis*, eight *Vyantaras*, five *Gyôṭishkas*, one *Vaimânika*; or the 24 prophets.

⁴ *Bhâvanâ*, the subdivisions of the five great vows, see part i, p. 189 ff.

⁵ The *Daśâsrutaskandha*, *Bṛhat Kalpa*, and *Vyavahâra Sûtras* are meant, which together contain twenty-six *uddêśas*.

⁶ I.e. the *Âtârâṅga Sûtra*; it now contains but twenty-four lectures, but is said to have originally contained four more, see part i, introduction, p. xlix f. These four lectures were: *Mahâparinnâ*, *Ugghâya*, *Anugghâya*, *Ârôḍhanâ*.

two) Yôgas¹, and thirty-three Âsâtanâs², will not stand, &c. (20)

A clever monk who always exerts himself with regard to the above-mentioned points, will soon be thoroughly released from the Circle of Births (21)

Thus I say.

THIRTY-SECOND LECTURE.

THE CAUSES OF CARELESSNESS.

With attentive mind hear me explain for your benefit the deliverance from the beginningless time, together with its causes³, and from all misery : a truly wholesome subject. (1)

By the teaching of true⁴ knowledge, by the avoidance of ignorance and delusion, and by the destruction of love and hatred, one arrives at final deliverance which is nothing but bliss. (2)

This is the road to it : to serve the Gurus and the old (teachers), to avoid throughout foolish people, to

¹ The pure operations of mind, speech, and body.

² As far as I can make out from the enumeration in the commentary, they are articles regulating the intercourse between monks, especially pupils and teacher.

³ By beginningless time the Samsâra is meant ; its causes are the kashâyas or cardinal passions, and avirati.

⁴ Sakkaṣsa=satyasya. This is a various reading ; the received text has savvassa. The commentators give the following explanation : by the property of knowledge to make everything known—this indicates that knowledge is the cause of mōksha.

apply oneself earnestly to study, and to ponder zealously on the meaning of the Sûtras. (3)

A Sramana engaged in austerities, who longs for righteousness¹, should eat the proper quantity of allowed food, should select a companion of right understanding, and should live in a place suited to seclusion. (4)

If he does not meet with a clever companion who surpasses or equals him in virtue, he should live by himself, abstaining from sins and not devoted to pleasures. (5)

As the crane² is produced from an egg, and the egg is produced from a crane, so they call desire³ the origin of delusion, and delusion the origin of desire. (6)

Love and hatred are caused by Karman, and they say that Karman has its origin in delusion; Karman is the root of birth and death, and birth and death they call misery. (7)

Misery ceases on the absence of delusion, delusion ceases on the absence of desire, desire ceases on the absence of greed, greed ceases on the absence of property. (8)

I shall explain in due order the means which must be adopted by him who wants to thoroughly uproot love, hatred, and delusion. (9)

Pleasant food⁴ should not be enjoyed with preference, for it generally makes men over-strong⁵; and desires rush upon the strong, like birds upon a tree with sweet fruits. (10)

¹ Samâdhi; the Dîpikâ explains it by *gñânadarsana-kâri-tralâbha*.

² Balâka.

³ Trishnâ.

⁴ Rasâ.

⁵ Driptikara.

As in a forest, full of fuel, a fire fanned by the wind cannot be extinguished, so the fire (as it were) of the senses of him who eats as he lists; it does not benefit any chaste man. (11)

The mind of those who always live in unfrequented lodgings, who eat low food, and who subdue their senses, will not be attacked by the foe, Love, who is vanquished as disease is by medicine. (12)

As it is not safe for mice to live near the dwelling of a cat, so a chaste (monk) cannot stay in a house inhabited by women. (13)

A *Sramana*, engaged in penance, should not allow himself to watch the shape, beauty, coquetry, laughter, prattle, gestures, and glances of women, nor retain a recollection of them in his mind. (14)

Not to look at, nor to long for, not to think of, nor to praise, womankind: this is becoming the meditation of the noble ones, and it is always wholesome to those who delight in chastity. (15)

Though those who possess the three *Guptis*, cannot be disturbed even by well-adorned goddesses, still it is recommended to monks to live by themselves, as this is wholesome in every way. (16)

To a man who longs for liberation, who is afraid of the *Samsâra*, and lives according to the Law, nothing in the world offers so many difficulties¹ as women who delight the mind of the ignorant. (17)

To those who have overcome the attachment (to women), all others will offer no difficulties²; even as to those who have crossed the great ocean, no river, though big like the Ganges, (will offer any difficulty). (18)

¹ Duttara.

² Suuttara.

From desire of pleasure arises the misery of the whole world, the gods included ; whatever misery of body and mind there is, the dispassionate will put an end to it. (19)

As the fruit of the Kimpâka¹ is beautiful in taste and colour, when eaten ; but destroys the life when digested, (being) poison ; similar in their effect are pleasures. (20)

A Sramana, engaged in austerities, who longs for righteousness², should not fix his thoughts on the pleasant objects of the senses, nor turn his mind from them, if they be unpleasant. (21)

‘Colour’ attracts the eye ; it is the pleasant cause of Love, but the unpleasant cause of Hatred³ ; he who is indifferent to them (viz. colours), is called dispassionate. (22)

The eye perceives ‘colour,’ and ‘colour’ attracts the eye ; the cause of Love is pleasant, and the cause of Hatred is unpleasant. (23)

He who is passionately fond of ‘colours,’ will come to untimely ruin ; just as an impassioned moth which is attracted by the light rushes into death. (24)

He who passionately hates (a colour), will at the same moment suffer pain. It is the fault of an undisciplined man that he is annoyed (by a colour) ; it is not the ‘colour’ itself that annoys him. (25)

¹ Trichosanthes Palmata, or Cucumis Colocynthus.

² Compare verse 4.

³ Love and Hatred must of course be understood in their widest meaning. The same remark applies to the term ‘colour,’ which according to Hindu terminology denotes everything that is perceived by the eye. The first three sentences are, in the original, dependent on verbs as vadanti, âhus. I have, here and elsewhere, dropped them in the translation.

He who is very fond of a lovely 'colour,' hates all others; hence a fool will suffer misery, but a dispassionate sage is not affected by it. (26)

He who has a passion for 'colours¹,' will kill many movable and immovable beings; a passionate fool, intent on his personal interest, pains and torments those beings in many ways. (27)

How can a man who passionately desires 'colours²,' be happy while he gets, keeps, uses, loses, and misses (those things). Even when he enjoys them, he is never satisfied. (28)

When he is not satisfied with those 'colours,' and his craving for them grows stronger and stronger, he will become discontented, and unhappy by dint of his discontent; misled by greed he will take another's property. (29)

When he is overcome by violent desire, takes another's property, and is not satisfied with those 'colours' and their possession, then his deceit and falsehood increase on account of his greed; yet he will not get rid of his misery. (30)

After and before he has lied³, and when he is on the point of lying, he feels infinitely unhappy. Thus when he takes another's property, and is (after all) not satisfied by the 'colours' (he has

¹ Rûvânugâsânuga = rûpa-anuga-âsâ-anuga. This division of the compound looks artificial; I should prefer to divide rûva-anugâsa-anuga = rûpa-anukarsha-anuga; literally, possessed of attraction by colours.

² Rûvanuvâêna pariggahêna. Parigraha is explained as the desire to possess them.

³ Instead of 'lying,' we can also adopt the rendering 'stealing,' as the word in the original mûsa may stand either for mri'shâ, or for mûsha.

obtained), he becomes unhappy, and nobody will protect him¹. (31)

How, then, can a man who is devoted to 'colours,' ever derive any happiness from anything? He suffers pain at the time of their enjoyment to procure which he had suffered misery. (32)

In the same way he who hates 'colours,' incurs a long succession of pains; when his mind is filled with hatred, he accumulates Karman which in the end again produces misery. (33)

But a man who is indifferent to 'colours,' is free from sorrows; though still in the *Samsâra*, he is not affected by that long succession of pains, just as the leaf of the Lotus (is not moistened) by water. (34)

[The whole set of verses 22-34 is, with few alterations, five times repeated in the original in order to apply to the other organs of sense.

Verses 35-47 treat of sounds; 'sound' is to be substituted for 'colour,' 'ear' for 'eye.'

The last line of verse 37, which corresponds to verse 24, runs thus:

As an impassioned deer allured (by a song) rushes into death, without being satisfied with the sound.

In the same way verses 48-60 apply to 'smells'; substitute 'smell' and 'organ of smell.'

Verses 61-73 apply to tastes; substitute 'tastes' and 'tongue.'

Verses 74-86 apply to touches; substitute 'touches' and 'body.'

Verses 87-99 apply to feelings; substitute 'feelings' and 'mind.'

¹ *Anissa* = *anisra*. *Nisrâ* does not occur in common Sanskrit; it is rendered *avash/ambha* by the commentators.

The lines corresponding to the comparison in verse 24, run as follows :

Just as an impassioned snake which is allured by the smell of a drug, when it comes out of its hole. (50)

Just as an impassioned fish which is eager to swallow the bait, has its body transfixed by a hook. (63)

Just as an impassioned buffalo who dives in cold water, is taken hold of by a crocodile and dies. (76)

Just as an impassioned elephant who is inflamed by carnal desires, is turned from his way by a female elephant (and is captured and at last killed in battle). (89)]

Thus the objects of the senses and of the mind cause pain to passionate men, but they never in the least cause any pain to the dispassionate. (100)

Pleasant things (by themselves) do not cause indifference nor emotions (as anger, &c.); but by either hating or loving them, a man undergoes such a change through delusion. (101)

Anger, pride, deceit, greed ; disgust, aversion to self-control and delight in sensual things¹; mirth, fear, sorrow, carnal desire for women, men, or both ; all these manifold passions arise in him who is attached to pleasures ; and so do other emotions produced by those (before mentioned) arise in him who is to be pitied, who (ought to be) ashamed of himself, and who is hateful. (102, 103)

¹ Arati and rati. Compare note on XXI, 21, where I have adopted another translation suited to the context. The first four numbers contain the cardinal passions ; the rest the emotions which are called *nô-kashâya*.

A monk should not desire a companion, not (even) one who is able to perform his religious duties; nor, if he regrets having taken the vows, (should he desire for) a worldly reward of his austerities¹. Such emotions of an infinite variety arise in one who is the slave of his senses. (104)

Desiring happiness and being submerged in the ocean of delusion, he forms many plans for warding off misery; and for their sake an impassioned man exerts himself. (105)

But all kinds of objects of the senses, sounds, &c., will cause to the indifferent neither a pleasant nor an unpleasant feeling. (106)

He who endeavours to recognise the vanity of all desires², will arrive at perfect indifference. When he ceases to desire the objects (of the senses), his desire for pleasures will become extinct. (107)

The dispassionate man who has performed all duties will quickly remove the obstructions to right knowledge and to right faith, and whatever Karman produces obstruction (to righteousness). (108)

Then he knows and sees all things, he is free from delusion and hindrances, his Āsravas have gone,

¹ My translation follows the interpretation of the commentators. The original runs thus: *Kappam na ikkhiḅḅa saḥāyaliḅḅū paḅḅhānutāvēṇa tavappabhāvaṃ*. The meaning they have made out is very unsatisfactory. There is a remarkable various reading in MS. C not noticed by the scholiasts: *saḥāyalakḅḅim* = *svabhāvalakṣhmīm*. If this was the original reading, the meaning of the line, in which however I must leave the word *kappam* untranslated, would come to this: a monk who regrets having taken the vows should not desire personal power as the reward for his penance. *Kalpa*, according to the commentators, is one who is able to perform his religious duties; a *kalpa* is contrasted with a *śishya*, novice.

² *Samkalpavikalpanāsu upasthitasya*.

and he is proficient in meditation and concentration of thoughts, and being pure he will arrive at beatitude when his life is spent. (109)

He will get rid of all misery which always afflicts mankind; recovered from the long illness, as it were, and glorious, he becomes infinitely happy, and obtains the (final) aim. (110)

We have taught the way how to become exempt from all misery which arises since time without beginning; those beings who follow it will in their time become infinitely happy. (111)

Thus I say.

THIRTY-THIRD LECTURE.

THE NATURE OF KARMAN.

I shall now in due order explain the eight kinds of Karman, bound by which the soul turns round and round in the Circle of Births. (1)

The eight kinds of Karman are briefly the following:

1. *Gñânâvaranīya* (which acts as an obstruction to right knowledge);
2. *Darsanâvaranīya* (which acts as an obstruction to right faith);
3. *Vêdanīya* (which leads to experiencing pain or pleasure);
4. *Môhanīya* (which leads to delusion);
5. *Âyukkarman* (which determines the length of life);

6. Nâman (which determines the name or individuality of the embodied soul);

7. Gôtra (which determines his Gôtra);

8. Antarâya (which prevents one's entrance on the path that leads to eternal bliss¹). (2, 3)

1. Obstruction of knowledge is fivefold (viz. obstruction to):

a. Sruta, knowledge derived from the sacred books;

b. Âbhinibôdhika, perception;

c. Avadhigñâna, supernatural knowledge;

d. Manaḥparyâya, knowledge of the thoughts of other people;

e. Kêvala, the highest, unlimited knowledge. (4)

2. The nine kinds of obstruction to right faith are :

1. sleep; 2. activity; 3. very deep sleep; 4. a high degree of activity²; 5. a state of deep-rooted greed; 6-9 refer to faith in the objects of the first three and the last kinds of knowledge. (5, 6)

3. Vêdântya is twofold, pleasure and pain; there are many subdivisions of pleasure and so there are of pain also. (7)

4. Môhanîya is twofold as referring to faith and to conduct; the first is threefold, the second twofold. (8)

The three kinds of Môhanîya referring to faith are : 1. right faith; 2. wrong faith; 3. faith partly right and partly wrong. (9)

¹ Compare Bhandarkar, Report, p. 93, note *.

² Nos. 1-4 are nidrâ, praḥalâ, nidrânidrâ, praḥalâpraḥalâ; I render the etymological meaning of these words. According to the Dîpikâ, however, they have a different meaning: nidrâ means the state of agreeable waking; praḥalâ, the slumber of a standing or sitting person; nidrânidrâ, deep sleep; praḥalâpraḥalâ, sleep of a person in motion. Nos. 6 and 7 are here called kakkhu and aḥakkhu, instead of âbhinibôdhika and sruta.

The two kinds of Môhaniya referring to conduct are : 1. what is experienced in the form of the four cardinal passions ; 2. what is experienced in the form of feelings different from them. (10)

The first kind of this Karman is sixteenfold, the second sevenfold or ninefold ¹. (11)

5. Âyushka is fourfold as referring to 1. denizens of hell ; 2. brute creation ; 3. men ; 4. gods. (12)

6. Nâman is twofold, good and bad ; there are many subdivisions of the good variety, and so there are of the bad one also ². (13)

7. Gôtra is twofold, high and low ; the first is eightfold, and so is the second also. (14)

8. Antarâya is fivefold as preventing : 1. gifts ; 2. profit ; 3. momentary enjoyment ; 4. continuous enjoyment ³ ; and 5. power. (15)

Thus the division of Karman and the subdivisions have been told.

Now hear their number of atoms ⁴, place, time, and development. (16)

¹ The divisions of the second Karman are the feelings or emotions enumerated in the 102nd verse of the last lecture, from disgust onward. There are seven of them, if desire for women, men, or both, is reckoned as one item, but nine, if it is reckoned as three. The sixteen divisions of the Karman produced by the cardinal passions are arrived at by subdividing each of the four passions with reference to 1. anantânubandha ; 2. pratyâkhyâna ; 3. apratyâkhyâna ; 4. samgvalana.

² In the Dipikâ 103 subdivisions are enumerated ; they correspond to our genera.

³ 3. Bhôga, 4. upabhôga ; bhôga is enjoyment of flowers, food, &c. ; upabhôga, that of one's house, wife, &c. The Karman in question brings about an obstruction to the enjoyment, &c., though all other circumstances be favourable.

⁴ The Karman is considered to consist, like other substances, of atoms, here called pradêsa point. The word I have translated

The number of atoms of every Karman is infinite; it is (infinitely) greater than (the number) of fettered¹ souls, but less than that of the perfected ones. (17)

The Karman in the six directions of space² binds all souls, and it binds the whole soul in all its parts in every possible way. (18)

The longest duration (of Karman) is thirty Krores of Krores of Sâgarôpamâs³, and the shortest a part of a muhûrta. (19)

This holds good with both Âvaran̄tyas, with Vêdantiya and Antarâya. (20)

The longest duration of Môhantiya is seventy Krores of Krores of Sâgarôpamâs, and the shortest a part of a muhûrta. (21)

The longest duration of Âyushka is thirty-three Krores of Krores of Sâgarôpamâs, and the shortest a part of a muhûrta. (22)

The longest duration of Nâman and Gôtra is twenty Krores of Krores of Sâgarôpamâs, and the shortest eight muhûrtas. (23)

The number of perfected souls is infinite, and that

number of atoms is paêśaggam = pradêśâgram, which is rendered paramânuparimâna.

¹ Gan̄hiyasatta = granthigasattva.

² The six directions of space are the four cardinal points, zenith and nadir. The commentators quote scripture that êkêndriyas, or beings with one organ of sense, are bound by Karman in three and more directions. The true meaning of this statement is beyond my grasp.—The Dîpikâ explains how Karman acts on the soul. The soul absorbs all material particles of a suitable nature (especially the karmapudgalas) with which it comes into contact, i.e. all that are in the same space with the soul, and assimilates them in the form of g̃hânâvaran̄tiya, &c., just as fire consumes everything within its reach, but nothing beyond it.

³ I.e. 3,000,000,000,000,000 Sâgarôpamâs.

of the subdivisions of Karman¹ is also (infinite); the number of atoms in all these (subdivisions) exceeds (the number) of all souls. (24)

Therefore a wise man should know the different subdivisions of these Karmans, and should exert himself to prevent and to destroy them. (25)

Thus I say.

THIRTY-FOURTH LECTURE.

ON LÊSYÂ².

I shall deliver in due order the Lecture on Lêsyâ; hear the nature of the six Lêsyâs (produced by) Karman. (1)

¹ Anubhâga, explained karmarasavisêsha.

² The lêsyâs (adhyavasâya visêshâh) are different conditions produced in the soul by the influence of different Karman; they are therefore not dependent on the nature of the soul, but on the Karman which accompanies the soul, and are, as it were, the reflection of the Karman on the soul, as stated in the following verse from the *Avatûri*: *krishnâdidravayasâkivyât parinâmô ya âtmanaḥ, spaṣikasyêva tatrâyam lêsyâsabdaḥ pravartate* || 'The alteration produced on the soul, just as on a crystal by the presence of black things, &c., is denoted by the word lêsyâ.' The Lêsyâ, or, according to the above explanation, what produces Lêsyâ, is a subtile substance accompanying the soul; to it are attributed the qualities described in this lecture.—The word lêśā is derived from klêsa; this etymology appears rather fanciful, but I think it may be right. For the Lêsyâs seem to be the Klêsas, which affect the soul, conceived as a kind of substance. The Sanskrit term Lêsyâ is of course a hybrid word. It must, however, be stated that lêśā occurs also in the meaning 'colour,' e.g. *Sûtrakṛt.* I, 6, 13, and that the *Prâkrît* of klêsa is kilêsa.

Hear 1. the names, 2. colours, 3. tastes, 4. smells, 5. touches, 6. degrees, 7. character, 8. variety, 9. duration, 10. result, and 11. life of the Lêsya's. (2)

1. They are named in the following order : black, blue, grey, red, yellow, and white. (3)

2. The black Lêsya has the colour of a rain-cloud, a buffalo's horn, (the fruit of) Rishîaka¹, or the eye of the wagtail. (4)

The blue Lêsya has the colour of the blue Asôka², the tail of the Kâsha³, or of lapis lazuli. (5)

The grey Lêsya has the colour of the flower of Atasi⁴, the feathers of the Kôkila, or the collar of pigeons. (6)

The red Lêsya has the colour of vermillion, the rising sun, or the bill of a parrot. (7)

The yellow Lêsya has the colour of orpiment, turmeric, or the flowers of Sana⁵ and Asana⁶. (8)

The white Lêsya has the colour of a conch-shell, the anka-stone⁷, Kunda-flowers⁸, flowing milk, silver, or a necklace of pearls. (9)

3. The taste of the black Lêsya is infinitely more bitter than that of Tumbaka⁹, (the fruit of the) Nimb-tree¹⁰, or of Rôhini. (10)

¹ Sapindus Detergens.

² It is not the common Asôka, Jonesia Asoka, which has red flowers.

³ Corarias Indica, blue jay; according to some, a kingfisher.

⁴ Linum Usitatissimum, whose flowers are blue.—The word for grey is kâû = kâpôta; in the comm., however, it is described as kimkit krishnâ, kimkil lôhitâ, which would be rather brown. But the description given in our verse leaves no doubt that grey colour is intended.

⁵ Crotonaria Juncea.

⁶ Terminalia Tomentosa.

⁷ Anka, manivirêsha.

⁸ Jasminum Multiflorum.

⁹ The gourd Lagenaria Vulgaris.

¹⁰ Azadirachta Indica.

The taste of the blue Lêsya is infinitely more pungent than Trikaṭuka¹ and Hastipippali. (11)

The taste of grey Lêsya is infinitely sourer than that of unripe Mango and Kapittha². (12)

The taste of red Lêsya is infinitely more pleasant than that of ripe Mango and Kapittha. (13)

The taste of yellow Lêsya is infinitely better than that of excellent wine and various liquors, honey and Mairêyaka³. (14)

The taste of white Lêsya is infinitely better than that of dates, grapes, milk, candied and pounded sugar. (15)

The smell of the bad Lêsya's (viz. the three first) is infinitely worse than that of the corpse of a cow, dog, or snake. (16)

The smell of the three good Lêsya's is infinitely more pleasant than that of fragrant flowers and of perfumes when they are pounded. (17)

5. The touch of the bad Lêsya's is infinitely worse than that of a saw, the tongue of a cow, or leaf of the Teak tree. (18)

The touch of the three good Lêsya's is infinitely more pleasant than that of cotton, butter, or Śiṛisha-flowers⁴. (19)

6. The degrees⁵ of the Lêsya's are three, or nine,

¹ The aggregate of three spices, &c., black and long pepper and dry ginger.

² *Feronia Elephantum*.

³ A kind of intoxicating drink, extracted from the blossoms of *Lythrum Fruticosum*, with sugar, &c.

⁴ *Acacia Sirisa*.

⁵ The Lêsya's may possess their qualities in a low, middle, or high degree; each of these degrees is again threefold, viz. low, middle, and high. In this way the subdivision is carried on up to 243.

or twenty-seven, or eighty-one, or two hundred and forty-three. (20)

7. A man who acts on the impulse of the five Āsravas¹, does not possess the three Guptis, has not ceased to injure the six (kinds of living beings), commits cruel acts, is wicked and violent, is afraid of no consequences², is mischievous and does not subdue his senses—a man of such habits develops the black Lēsyā. (21, 22)

A man of the following qualities: envy, anger, want of self-control, ignorance, deceit, want of modesty, greed, hatred, wickedness, carelessness, love of enjoyment; a man who pursues pleasures and does not abstain from sinful undertakings, who is wicked and violent—a man of such habits develops the blue Lēsyā. (23, 24)

A man who is dishonest in words and acts, who is base, not upright, a dissembler and deceiver³, a heretic, a vile man, a talker of hurtful and sinful things, a thief, and full of jealousy—a man of such habits develops the grey Lēsyā. (25, 26)

A man who is humble, steadfast, free from deceit and inquisitiveness, well disciplined, restrained, attentive to his study and duties⁴, who loves the Law and keeps it, who is afraid of forbidden things and strives after the highest good—a man of such habits develops the red Lēsyā. (27, 28)

A man who has but little anger, pride, deceit, and greed, whose mind is at ease, who controls himself,

¹ I.e. commits the five great sins.—The following verses give the character—*lakṣhaṇa*—of the Lēsyās.

² This is, according to the comm., the meaning of the word *niddhamdhasaparīṇāṃ*.

³ *Paliuñṇakaga-uvāhiya* = *pratikuñṇakaka-upadhika*.

⁴ *Yôgavān upadāṇavān*.

who is attentive to his study and duties, who speaks but little, is calm, and subdues his senses—a man of such habits develops the yellow Lêsya. (29, 30)

A man who abstains from constant thinking about his misery and about sinful deeds, but engages in meditation on the Law and truth only¹, whose mind is at ease, who controls himself, who practises the Samitis and Guptis, whether he be still subject to passion or free from passion, is calm, and subdues his senses—a man of such habits develops the white Lêsya. (31, 32)

8. There are as many varieties² of Lêsya³s as there are Samayas³ in the innumerable Avasarpinis and Utsarpinis, and as there are countless worlds. (33)

9. Half a muhūrta is the shortest, and thirty-three Sâgarôpamâs plus one muhūrta is the longest duration of the black Lêsya. (34)

Half a muhūrta is the shortest, and ten Sâgarôpamâs plus one Palyôpamâ and a part of an Asamkhyêya is the longest duration of the blue Lêsya. (35)

Half a muhūrta is the shortest, and three Sâgarôpamâs plus one Palyôpamâ and a part of an Asamkhyêya is the longest duration of the grey Lêsya. (36)

Half a muhūrta is the shortest, and two Sâgarôpamâs plus one Palyôpamâ and a part of an Asamkhyêya is the longest duration of the red Lêsya. (37)

Half a muhūrta is the shortest, and ten Sâgarôpamâs plus one muhūrta is the longest duration of the yellow Lêsya. (38)

¹ Literally: who avoids the ârta and raudra dhyânas, and practises the dharma and sukla dhyânas. These terms cannot be adequately translated; the reader may therefore be referred for details to Bhandarkar's Report, p. 110 ff.

² *Thânâim* sthânâni.

³ Samaya is the smallest division of time=instant, moment.

Half a muhūrta is the shortest, and thirty-three Sâgarôpamâs plus one muhūrta is the longest duration of the white Lêsya. (39)

I have described above the duration of the Lêsya generally; I shall now detail their duration in the four walks of mundane existence¹. (40)

The shortest duration of the grey Lêsya (of a denizen of hell) is ten thousand years, the longest three Sâgarôpamâs plus one Palyôpamâ and part of an Asamkhyêya. (41)

The shortest duration of the blue Lêsya (of a denizen of hell) is three Sâgarôpamâs plus one Palyôpamâ and a part of an Asamkhyêya, the longest ten Sâgarôpamâs plus one Palyôpamâ and a part of an Asamkhyêya. (42)

The shortest duration of the black Lêsya (of a denizen of hell) is ten Sâgarôpamâs plus one Palyôpamâ and a part of an Asamkhyêya, the longest thirty-three Sâgarôpamâs. (43)

I have described the duration of the Lêsya of denizens of hell; I shall now describe that of animals, men, and gods. (44)

The duration of any of the Lêsya except the best (viz. white one) is less than a muhūrta for (the lowest organisms), animals, and men². (45)

Half a muhūrta is the shortest duration of the white Lêsya (of animals and men), and the longest a Krore of former years³ less nine years. (46)

¹ Viz. as denizens of hell, brutes, men, and gods. Only the three first Lêsya lead to being born in hell.

² The consequence of this statement appears to be that at the expiration of the Lêsya a new one is produced. The commentators, however, are not explicit on this head.

³ About the former years, see above, p. 16, note 1.

I have described the duration of the Lêsýâs of animals and men, I shall now describe that of the gods. (47)

The shortest duration of the black Lêsýâ is ten thousand years, the longest a Palyôpamâ and (a part of) an Asamkhyêya. (48)

The shortest duration of the blue Lêsýâ is equal to the longest of the black one plus one Samaya; the longest is one Palyôpamâ plus a (greater part of) an Asamkhyêya. (49)

The shortest duration of the grey Lêsýâ is equal to the longest of the blue one plus one Samaya; the longest is one Palyôpamâ plus (a still greater part of) an Asamkhyêya. (50)

I shall now describe the red Lêsýâ as it is with gods, Bhavanapatis, Vyantaras, Gyôtishkas, and Vaimânikas. (51)

The shortest duration of the red Lêsýâ is one Palyôpamâ, the longest two Sâgarôpamâs plus one Palyôpamâ and a part of an Asamkhyêya¹. (52)

The shortest duration of the red Lêsýâ is ten thousand years, the longest two Sâgarôpamâs plus one Palyôpamâ and a part of an Asamkhyêya. (53)

The longest duration of the red Lêsýâ plus one Samaya is equal to the shortest of the yellow Lêsýâ; its longest, however, is ten muhûrtas longer. (54)

The longest duration of the yellow Lêsýâ plus one Samaya is equal to the shortest of the white Lêsýâ; the longest, however, is thirty-three muhûrtas longer. (55)

10. The black, blue, and grey Lêsýâs are the

¹ This verse seems to lay down the duration of the Lêsýâ in the case of common gods, while the next one applies to Bhavanapatis, &c.

lowest Lâsyâs; through them the soul is brought into miserable courses of life. (56)

The red, yellow, and white Lâsyâs are the good Lâsyâs; through them the soul is brought into happy courses of life. (57)

11. In the first moment of these Lâsyâs when they are joined (with the soul), the latter is not born into a new existence¹. (58)

In the last moment of all these Lâsyâs when they are joined (with the soul), the latter is not born into a new existence. (59)

While the last muhûrta is running and a part of it is still to come, the souls with their Lâsyâs developed, go to a new birth. (60)

A wise man should, therefore, know the nature of these Lâsyâs; he should avoid the bad ones and obtain the good ones. (61)

Thus I say.

THIRTY-FIFTH LECTURE.

THE HOUSELESS MONK.

Learn from me, with attentive minds, the road shown by the wise ones², which leads a monk who follows it, to the end of all misery. (1)

¹ The question treated rather darkly in the next three verses is, according to the comm., the following:—Every individual dies in the same Lâsyâ in which he is born. When his Lâsyâ ends with his life, then the soul must get a new Lâsyâ. Our verses state at which time the new Lâsyâ comes into existence or is joined with the soul.

² Buddhêhi.

Giving up the life in a house, and taking Pravrâgyâ, a sage should know and renounce those attachments which take hold of men. (2)

A restrained monk should abstain from killing, lying, stealing, carnal intercourse, from desire, love, and greed. (3)

Even in his thoughts a monk should not long for a pleasant painted house filled with the fragrance of garlands and frankincense, secured by doors, and decorated with a white ceiling-cloth¹. (4)

For in such a dwelling a monk will find it difficult to prevent his senses from increased desire and passion. (5)

He should be content to live on a burial-place, in a deserted house, below a tree, in solitude, or in a place which had been prepared for the sake of somebody else². (6)

A well-controlled monk should live in a pure place, which is not too much crowded, and where no women live. (7)

He should not build a house, nor cause others to erect one; for many living beings both movable and immovable, both subtle and gross, are seen to be killed when a house is being built; therefore a monk should abstain from building a house. (8, 9)

The same holds good with the cooking of food and drink, or with one's causing them to be cooked. Out of compassion for living beings one should not cook nor cause another to cook. (10)

Beings which live in water, corn, or in earth and

¹ Ullôva = ullôka.

² Parakada = parakṛita, explained parair âtmârtham kṛita.

wood, are destroyed in food and drink; therefore a monk should cause nobody to cook. (11)

There is nothing so dangerous as fire, for it spreads in all directions and is able to destroy many beings; one should therefore not light a fire. (12)

Even in his thoughts a monk should not long for gold and silver; indifferent alike to dirt and gold he abstains from buying and selling. (13)

If he buys, he becomes a buyer; if he sells, he becomes a merchant; a monk is not to engage in buying and selling. (14)

A monk who is to live on alms, should beg and not buy; buying and selling is a great sin; but to live on alms is benefitting. (15)

He should collect his alms in small parts according to the Sûtras and so as to avoid faults; a monk should contentedly go on his begging-tour, whether he get alms or not. (16)

A great sage should not eat for the sake of the pleasant taste (of the food) but for the sustenance of life, being not dainty nor eager for good fare, restraining his tongue, and being without cupidity. (17)

Even in his thoughts he should not desire to be presented with flowers, to be offered a seat, to be eloquently greeted, or to be offered presents, or to get a magnificent welcome and treatment. (18)

He should meditate on true things only¹, committing no sins and having no property; he should walk about careless of his body till his end arrives. (19)

Rejecting food when the time of his death arrives,

¹ Sukla dhyâna, see note 1, p. 200.

and leaving the human body, he becomes his own master¹, and is liberated from misery. (20)

Without property, without egoism, free from passions and the Âsravas, he obtains absolute knowledge, and reaches eternal beatitude. (21)

Thus I say.

THIRTY-SIXTH LECTURE.

ON LIVING BEINGS AND THINGS WITHOUT LIFE².

Now learn from me with attentive minds the division of Living Beings and Things without life³, which a monk must know who is to exert himself in self-control. (1)

¹ By the destruction of the vîryântarâya.

² It will perhaps not be amiss to give a systematic list of the subjects treated in this lecture. The numbers refer to the verses.

A. Things without life, 3-48.

(1) Without form, 5-9.

(2) With form, 10-48.

B. Living Beings, 48-246.

(1) Perfected souls, 50-68.

(2) Mundane Beings, 69-246.

a. Immovable Beings, 71-106.

a. Earth Lives, 71-84.

β. Water Lives, 85-92.

γ. Plants, 93-106.

δ. Movable Beings, 108-246.

a. Fire Lives, 109-117.

β. Wind Lives, 118-126.

γ. Beings with an organic body, 127-246.

³ See next page.

The Living Beings and the Things without life make up this world (Lôka); but the space where only Things without life are found is called the Non-world (Alôka). (2)

The Living Beings and the Things without life will be described with reference to 1. substance, 2. place, 3. time, and 4. development. (3)

A. Things without life.

Things without life are 1. possessing form, 2. formless; the formless things are of ten kinds, those possessing form are of four kinds. (4)

(1) The ten kinds of formless things: 1. Dharma, 2. its divisions, 3. its indivisible parts; 4. Adharma, 5. its divisions, 6. its indivisible parts; 7. space,

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- i. With two organs of sense, 128-136.
 - ii. With three organs of sense, 137-145.
 - iii. With four organs of sense, 146-155.
 - iv. With five organs of sense, 156-246.
 - a. Denizens of hell, 157-170.
 - ð. Animals (vertebratae), 171-193.
 - 1. Aquatic, 171-178.
 - 2. Terrestrial, 179-186.
 - 3. Aerial, 187-193.
 - c. Men, 194-202.
 - d. Gods, 203-246.
 - 1. Bhavanavâsin, 205, 218.
 - 2. Vyantara, 206, 219.
 - 3. Gyôtishka, 207, 220.
 - 4. Vaimânika, 208, 221-246.
 - a'. Living in Kalpas, 209, 210, 221-232.
 - ð'. Living above the Kalpas, 211.
 - a'. Graivêyakas, 212, 213, 233-241.
 - ð'. Anuttaras, 214-217, 242, 243.

Appendix, 247-267.

³ *Gîva* and *agîva*. The former is defined in the *Dîpikâ* as *upayôgavân* in accordance with our text, XXVIII, 10; the latter is also called *pudgala*.

8. its divisions, 9. its indivisible parts, and 10. time¹. (5, 6)

Dharma and Adharma are co-extensive with the World (Lôka); space fills the World and the Non-world (Alôka); time exists in what is called the place of time². (7)

Dharma, Adharma, and Space are ever without beginning and end. (8)

And time also, if regarded as a continuous flow³, is called so (i. e. without beginning and end); but with regard to an individual thing it has a beginning and an end. (9)

(2) The four kinds of things possessing form are 1. compound things, 2. their divisions, 3. their indivisible parts, and 4. atoms⁴. (10)

Compound things and atoms occur as individual things and apart (or different from others)⁵, in the whole world and in parts of the world; this is their distribution with regard to place. (11)

Subtile things occur all over the world, gross things only in a part of it.

¹ It is here called *addhâ-samaya*, which may be translated real-time. It has no divisions or parts as the other things, because of time only the present moment is existent. And a moment cannot be divided.

² Time is only present in the two and a half continents inhabited by men, and the oceans belonging to them; beyond this sphere there is no time or, as the *Dîpikâ* correctly remarks, no divisions of time.

³ *Samtatim* *pappa* = *samtatim* *prâpya*.

⁴ According to the *Dîpikâ*, we should have but two divisions, viz.: 1. compound things (*skandha*, aggregates of atoms), and 2. not aggregated atoms; for Nos. 2 and 3 of our text are but subdivisions of No. 1.

⁵ *Ēgattêna* *puhuttêna* = *êkatvêna* *prîthaktvêna*.

I shall now give their fourfold division with regard to time. (12)

With regard to the continuous flow (or development of a thing) it is without beginning and without end; but with regard to its existence (as an individual thing) it has both a beginning and an end¹. (13)

The longest duration of Things without life possessing form is an immeasurable² period; the shortest one Samaya. (14)

The longest interruption³ in the existence of Things without life possessing form is an endless time; the shortest one Samaya. (15)

Their development is fivefold: with regard to 1. colour, 2. smell, 3. taste, 4. touch, and 5. figure. (16)

Those which develop with regard to colour are of five kinds: 1. black, 2. blue, 3. red, 4. yellow, 5. white. (17)

Those which develop with regard to smell are of two kinds: 1. sweet-smelling substances, and 2. of bad smell. (18)

Those which develop with regard to taste are of five kinds: 1. bitter, 2. pungent, 3. astringent, 4. sour, and 5. sweet. (19)

Those which develop with regard to touch are of eight kinds: 1. hard, 2. soft, 3. heavy, 4. light, 5. cold, 6. hot, 7. smooth, and 8. rough.

¹ The meaning of this verse is that a thing, as far as its material cause is concerned, has always existed, and will ever exist under one form or other, but that the individual thing in its present form has but a limited existence.

² *Asamkhakâlam*. See above, p. 42, note 2.

³ *Antaram*; the interval between the thing being removed from its proper scene and reaching it again (*Avakâuri* and *Dîpikâ*).

In this way the substances have been declared, which develop with regard to touch. (20, 21)

Those which develop with regard to figure are of five kinds : 1. globular, 2. circular, 3. triangular, 4. square, and 5. long. (22)

Things of black colour are subdivided with regard to smell, taste, touch, and figure. (23)

The same subdivision holds good with blue, red, yellow, and white things. (24-27¹)

Things of sweet smell are subdivided with regard to colour, taste, touch, and figure ; things of bad smell are similarly subdivided. (28, 29)

Things of bitter taste are subdivided with regard to colour, smell, touch, and figure. (30)

The same subdivision holds good with pungent, astringent, sour, and sweet things. (31-34)

Things of hard touch are subdivided with regard to colour, smell, taste, and figure. (35).

The same subdivision holds good with soft, heavy, light, cold, hot, smooth, and rough things. (36-42)

Things of globular figure are subdivided with regard to colour, smell, taste, and touch. (43)

The same subdivision holds good with circular, triangular, square, and long things. (44-47)

Thus the division of Things without life has briefly been told.

B. Living Beings.

I shall now, in due order, deliver the division of living beings. (48)

Living beings are of two kinds : 1. those still

¹ Each verse has the same form as 23, only that another colour is substituted for black. In the same way the subdivisions of smells, &c., are given. I give the first verse of each class and abbreviate the rest.

belonging to the *Samsâra*, and 2. the perfected souls (*siddhas*). The latter are of many kinds; hear me explain them. (49)

(1) The perfected souls are those of women, men, hermaphrodites, of orthodox, heterodox, and householders. (50)

Perfection is reached by people of the greatest, smallest, and middle size¹, on high places, underground, on the surface of the earth, in the ocean, and in water (of rivers, &c.). (51)

Ten hermaphrodites reach, at the same time, perfection, twenty women, one hundred and eight men; four householders, ten heterodox, and one hundred and eight orthodox monks. (52, 53)

Two individuals of the greatest size reach perfection (simultaneously), four of the smallest size, and one hundred and eight of the middle size. (54)

Four individuals reach perfection (simultaneously) on high places, two in the ocean, three in water, twenty underground, and one hundred and eight on the surface of the earth. (55)

From where are the perfected souls debarred? Where do the perfected souls reside? Where do they leave their bodies, and where do they go, on reaching perfection? (56)

Perfected souls are debarred from the non-world (*Alôka*); they reside on the top of the world; they leave their bodies here (below), and go there, on reaching perfection. (57)

Twelve *Yôganas* above the (*Vimâna*) *Sarvârtha* is

¹ The greatest size (*ôgâhanâ*) of men is 500 dhanus, or 2,000 cubits, the smallest one cubit.

the place called Īshatprāgbhāra¹, which has the form of an umbrella; (there the perfected souls go). (58)

It is forty-five hundred thousand Yôḡanas long, and as many broad, and it is somewhat more than three times as many in circumference. (59)

Its thickness is eight Yôḡanas, it is greatest in the middle, and decreases² toward the margin, till it is thinner than the wing of a fly. (60)

This place, by nature pure, consisting of white gold, resembles in form an open umbrella, as has been said by the best of Gīnas. (61)

(Above it) is a pure blessed place (called Sītā), which is white like a conch-shell, the añka-stone³, and Kunda-flowers; a Yôḡana thence is the end of the world. (62)

The perfected souls penetrate the sixth part⁴ of the uppermost Krôṣa of the (above-mentioned) Yôḡana. (63)

There at the top of the world reside the blessed perfected souls, rid of all transmigration, and arrived at the excellent state of perfection. (64)

The dimension of a perfected soul is two-thirds of the height which the individual had in his last existence. (65)

The perfected souls, considered singly, (as individuals) have a beginning but no end; considered

¹ Similar details are given in the Aupapâtika Sûtra (ed. Leumann, § 163 f.).

² According to the commentator, who quotes scripture, it decreases an aṅgula every Yôḡana.

³ Compare XXXIV, 9 and note. The commentators here treat añka as a separate substance without offering any explanation. The Dīpikā writes sītā instead of sītā.

⁴ Or $333\frac{1}{3}$ dhanus.

collectively¹ (as a class) they have neither a beginning nor an end. (66)

They have no (visible) form, they consist of Life throughout, they are developed into knowledge and faith, and they possess paramount happiness which admits of no comparison. (67)

They all dwell in one part of the world, and have developed into knowledge and faith, they have crossed the boundary of the *Samsâra*, and reached the excellent state of perfection. (68)

(2) Living beings which still belong to the *Sam-sâra*, are of two kinds : *a.* movable, and *b.* immovable ones : the immovable ones are of three kinds : (69)

a. Earth Lives, *β.* Water Lives, and *γ.* plants ; these are the three kinds of immovable living beings ; now learn from me their subdivision. (70)

a. The Earth Lives are of two kinds : subtile and gross ; and both of them are either fully developed or undeveloped. (71)

The gross and fully developed are of two kinds : viz. smooth or rough. The smooth ones are of seven kinds : (72)

Black, blue, red, yellow, white, pale dust, and clay.

The rough ones are of thirty-six kinds : (73)

Earth, gravel, sand, stones, rocks, rock-salt², iron, copper, tin, lead, silver, gold, and diamond ; (74)

Orpiment, vermilion, realgar, *Sâsaka*³, antimony,

¹ The words translated, 'considered singly' and 'considered collectively,' are *êgattêna* and *puhuttêna* = *êkatvêna* and *pri-thaktvêna*. Their usual meaning has been given in verse 11.

² *Lavanâsê?*

³ Not in our dictionaries ; the commentators only say that it is a kind of mineral, *dhâtuvisêsha*. I give the Sanskrit names of

coral, *Abhrapaṭala*, *Abhravāluka*; these are varieties of gross (Earth-) bodies and kinds of precious stones. (75)

Hyacinth, natron, *Aṅka*, crystal, *Lôhitāksha*, emerald, *Masâragalla*, *Bhugamôḥaka*, and sapphire; (76)

Kandana, red chalk, *Hamsagarbha*, *Pulaka*¹, and sulphur; *Kandraprabha*, lapis lazuli, *Galakânta*, and *Sûryakânta*². (77)

These thirty-six kinds of 'rough earth' have been enumerated. The 'subtile earth' is but of one kind, as there is no variety. (78)

The subtile species is distributed all over the world, but the gross one (is found) in a part of the world only.

I shall now give their fourfold division with regard to time. (79)

With regard to the continuous flow (or development of an earth-body) it is without a beginning and end; but with regard to its existence in its present form it has both a beginning and end. (80)

Twenty-two thousand years is the longest duration of the Earth Lives; its shortest is less than a *muhūrta*. (81)

The longest duration of the body of Earth Lives, if they do not leave that (kind of) body³, is an

the stones, which cannot be identified with certainty, or are not contained in the index of R. Garbe's work on the Indian minerals, Leipzig, 1882.

¹ A medicinal earth, commonly called *Kaṅkush/ḥa*.

² The enumeration contains thirty-nine, instead of thirty-six items, as stated in verses 73 and 76.

³ The meaning seems to be that souls of earth-bodies live in

immeasurable time; the shortest is less than one muhūrta. (82)

The longest interval between an Earth Life's leaving its body (till its return to it), is an endless time; the shortest less than one Muhūrta. (83)

Their varieties, caused by (difference of) colour, smell, taste, touch, figure, and place, are (counted) by thousands. (84)

β. The Water Lives are of two kinds: subtile and gross ones; and both of them are either fully developed or undeveloped. (85)

The gross and fully developed ones are of five kinds: pure water, dew, exudations, fog, and ice. (86)

The 'subtile water' is of one kind, as there is no variety. The subtile species is distributed all over the world, but the gross one (is found) in a part of the world only. (87)

With regard to the continuous flow, &c. (as in verse 80).

Seven thousand years is the longest duration of the life of Water Lives, &c. (as in verse 81). (All that has been said of Earth Lives in verses 82-84 is verbally repeated here of 'Water Lives.') (88-92)

γ. Plants are of two kinds: subtile and gross ones; and both of them are either fully developed or undeveloped. (93)

The gross and fully developed plants are of two kinds: either many have one body in common, or each has its own body. (94)

Those who severally have their own body are of

earth-bodies, the time stated in verse 82, while the length of each separate existence is determined in verse 81.

many kinds: trees, shrubby plants¹, shrubs², big plants³, creeping plants⁴, grass⁵; (95)

Palms⁶, plants of knotty stems or stalks⁷, mushrooms⁸, water-plants, annual plants⁹, and herbs¹⁰. These are called plants possessing severally their own body. (96)

Those plants of which many have one body in common are of many kinds¹¹: Âluya¹², Mûlaya¹³, ginger; (97)

Harilî, Sirilî, Sassirilî, Gâvaî, Kêyakandalî¹⁴, onion, garlic, plantain-tree, Kuḍuvvaya¹⁵; (98)

¹ *Gukkha*; it is explained to denote such plants from the single root or bulb of which come forth many stalks, e.g. *Vrintâka*, *Solanum Melongena*.

² *Gulma*, similar to the preceding class, but bringing forth twigs or stems, instead of stalks, e.g. *Navamâlikâ*, *Jasminum Sambac*, *Kanavîra*, &c.

³ *Latâ*, as *Lotus*, *Pandanus*, &c.

⁴ *Vallî*, as gourds, *Piper Betel*, &c.

⁵ *Trina*, grass. But of the two examples given in the commentary, *guṅḡuka* is not in our dictionaries, and *Arguna* denotes usually a tree, *Terminalia Arjuna*.

⁶ *Valaya*; so called from their foliation.

⁷ *Parvaga*, as sugar-cane.

⁸ *Kuhana*, plants which cause the earth to burst, as *sarpa-khatra*, mushroom (toad-stool).

⁹ *Ôshadhi*, such plants as die after having brought forth seed, as rice, &c.

¹⁰ *Haritakâya*, as *tandulêya*, &c.

¹¹ The plants in the following list are, according to the commentary, mostly bulbs, 'well known in the countries where they grow.' Many of them are not in our dictionaries. I give the *Prâkrî*t form of their names, and note the Sanskrit equivalent when it can be identified.

¹² *Âluka*, *Amorphophallus Campanulatus*. ¹³ *Mûlaka*, radish.

¹⁴ A various reading has for the last two words (which might be differently divided), *âpaikkêikandalî*. The *Kandalî*, the plantain-tree, occurs in the next line again.

¹⁵ A various reading is *Kuḍambaya*.

Lôhinhûya, Thihûya, Tuhaga, Kanha¹, Vaggakanda², Sûranaya³; (99)

Assakanni⁴, Sihakanni, Musundhi, turmeric, and many others besides. (100)

The subtile plants are of one kind, as there is no variety. Subtile plants are distributed all over the world, gross plants (are found) in a part of the world only. (101)

With regard to the continuous flow, &c. (as in verse 80). (102)

Ten thousand years is the longest duration of the life of plants, &c. (All as in verses 81-84. Substitute plants, which are here called vanaspati and panaka, for Earth-bodies.) (103-106)

Thus the three kinds of immovable living beings have briefly been told. I shall now explain in due order the three kinds of movable living beings. (107)

6. The movable beings are *a.* the Fire Lives, *β.* the Wind Lives, and *γ.* those with an organic body; these are the three kinds of movable beings. Learn from me their subdivision. (108)

a. The Fire Lives are of two kinds: subtile and gross ones; and both of them are either fully developed or undeveloped. (109)

The gross and fully developed ones are of many kinds: coal, burning chaff, fire, and flame of fire; (110)

Meteors, and lightning, and many other kinds besides.

¹ *Krishnakanda*, *Nymphaea Rubra*.

² *Vagrakanda* of the Sanskrit Koshas.

³ *Sûrana*, *Arum Campanulatum*.

⁴ *Asvakarnâ*. *Asvakarna* is a tree, *Vatika Robusta*.

The subtile Fire Lives are but of one kind, as there is no variety. (111)

The subtile species, &c. (see verses 79-84. Substitute Fire Lives for Earth Lives. In verses 114 f., corresponding to verses 81, 89, and 103, read: 'the longest duration of the life of Fire Lives is three days,' &c.; the rest as above). (112-117)

β. The Wind Lives are of two kinds, &c. (as in verse 109). (118)

The gross and fully developed ones are of five kinds: squalls¹, whirlwinds², thick winds³, high winds, low winds; (119)

And the *Samvartaka*⁴ wind, &c.; thus they are of many kinds⁵.

The subtile Wind Lives are but of one kind, as there is no variety. (120)

The subtile species, &c. (as above 79-84. Substitute Wind Lives for Earth Lives. In verse 123, corresponding to 114, read: 'the longest duration of the life of Wind Lives is three thousand years;' the rest as above). (121-126)

¹ Utkalikâ, intermittent winds. ² *Maṇḍalikâ* = vâṭôlî.

³ According to the comm. these winds blow on the oceans which are situated below the Ratnaprabhâ-hell, or which support the heavenly Vimânas, and have the density of snow. Perhaps the notion is similar to that of the Hindu astronomers, who fancied that the heavenly bodies were set in motion by cords of wind called pravaha. See *Sûrya Siddhânta* II, 3.

⁴ This seems to be the hurricane which causes the periodical destruction of the world. But *Dêvendra* says: '*Samvartaka* is a wind which carries grass, &c., from the outside into a particular place.'

⁵ Though in the preceding verse it was said that there are five kinds of wind, six are enumerated, and more are implied by the '&c.'

γ. Movable beings with organic bodies (i.e. animals) are of four kinds: i. those possessing two organs of sense, ii. those with three organs, iii. those with four organs, iv. those with five organs. (127)

i. Beings with two organs of sense are of two kinds: subtile and gross ones. Both are either fully developed or undeveloped. Learn from me their subdivision ¹. (128)

Worms, Sômaṅgala, Alasa ², Mâivâhaya ³, Vâsîmuha ⁴, shells, conches, Saṅkhâṇaga ⁵; (129)

Pallôya, Anullaya, cowries, leeches, Gâlaga, and Kandana ⁶. (130)

These and others are the many kinds of beings with two organs of sense. All of them live in a part of the world only, they do not live everywhere. (131)

With regard to the continuous flow, &c. (as in verse 80). (132)

¹ As many of these lower animals are not known to us, I give the Prâkrîṭ names of those which I cannot identify. Dêvendra says: 'Some of them are well known, the remaining ones are to be explained according to tradition.' The explanation of this passage in the Avaṭṭuri is fuller.

² A small poisonous animal. Petersburg Dictionary, s. v. According to the Gîvaviṭâra Vṛitti V, 16, they are earth-snakes (bhûnâga), which originate in the rainy season when the sun is in Aśleshâ, i.e. about the beginning of July.

³ Mâtrivâhaka. According to the description of the Avaṭṭuri, the larvae of Phryganeae seem intended. According to the Gîvaviṭâra Vṛitti, they are called kûḍêlî in Guzeratî.

⁴ Vâsîmukha, explained: Whose mouth is like a chisel or adze. There are many insects, e.g. the Curculionidae, which suit this description.

⁵ Saṅkhâṇaka, 'very small, conch-like animals.'

⁶ Kandana = Akâvṛiksha (?). According to the Gîvaviṭâra Vṛitti V, 16, they are animals living in water and on land, and are called Aksha in the vernacular (samayabhâshâ).

The duration of the life of beings with two organs of sense is twelve years at the utmost; the shortest is less than a muhūrta. (133)

The longest duration of the body of beings with two organs of sense is a *Samkhyêya* (or measurable time) if they do not leave that (kind of) body; the shortest is less than one muhūrta. (134)

135, 136 = 83, 84. Substitute 'beings with two organs of sense' for Earth Lives.

ii. Beings with three organs of sense are of two kinds: subtile and gross ones. Both are either fully developed or undeveloped. Learn from me their subdivision. (137)

Kunthu¹, ants, bugs, Ukkala, white ants, *Tana-hâra*, *Kattahâra*, *Mâlûga*², *Pattahâra*; (138)

Duga shining like lead, which originate in the kernel of the cotton-seed, *Sadâvarî*, centipedes, *Indagâiya*; (139)

Cochineal, &c. Thus they are of many kinds.

All of them live in a part of the world only, they do not live everywhere. (140)

141-145 = 132-136. (Substitute 'beings with three organs of sense.' The longest duration, &c., is forty-nine days, verse 142 = 133.)

iii. Beings with four organs of sense are of two kinds: subtile and gross ones. Both are either

¹ Kunthu or animalcules are also called *Amuddharî*, see concerning them, *Kalpa Sûtra*, Rules for Yatis, § 44, part i, p. 304.—I give in the text the *Prâkrit* form of the words I cannot identify.

² *Mâlûka* is the name of a plant, *Ocimum Sanctum*. It must, of course, here denote some animal.—The *Gîvavikâra* enumerates many other animals, lice, bugs, different kinds of larvae living in dung, corn, &c.—The *trinahâra*, *kâsh/hahâra*, and *patrahâra* seem to denote different kinds of ants.

developed or undeveloped. Learn from me their subdivision. (146)

Andhiya, Pottiyâ, flies, mosquitoes, bees, moths, Dhiṅkana and Kaṅkana; (147)

Kukkudâ¹, Singirîḍḍi, Nandâvatta², scorpions, Dôla, crickets, Virali, Akkhivêhaya; (148)

Akkhila, Sâhaya Akkhirôdaya, Vikitta, Vikittapattaya³, Uhm̐galiyâ, Galakârî, Niyâ, and Tantavagâiyâ. (149)

These and others are the beings with four organs of sense. All of them, &c. (the rest as in verses 131-136. Substitute 'beings with four organs of sense.' The longest duration, &c., is six months, verse 152 = 133). (150-155)

iv. Beings with five organs of sense are of four kinds: denizens of hell, animals⁴, men, and gods. (156).

a. Denizens of hell are of seven kinds according to the seven hells; they are called Ratnâbha, Sarkarâbha, Vâlukâbha; (157)

Paṅkâbha, Dhûmâbha, Tamâ, and Tamatamâ. Thus the seven kinds of denizens of hell have been enumerated. (158)

All the (denizens of hell) live in a part of the

¹ Kukkuḍa is given in the dictionaries as the name of a small lizard.

² Nandâvatta occurs elsewhere as the name of a particular fish, and of a shell. It can be neither of these in our passage, as both animals belong to other classes than the *Katurindriyas*.

³ Etymologically: with many-coloured wings. Probably butterflies are intended.

⁴ Tirikkha = tiryak. Apparently only the higher animals are intended by this term, the lower animals, from the insects downwards, being enumerated in the preceding classes of beings.

world only; they do not live everywhere, &c. (as in verses 79 and 80). (159, 160)

In the first hell the longest duration of their life is one Sâgarôpamâ; the shortest is ten thousand years. (161)

In the second hell the longest duration of their life is three Sâgarôpamâs; the shortest is one Sâgarôpamâ¹. (162)

In the third hell the longest duration of their life is seven Sâgarôpamâs; the shortest is three Sâgarôpamâs. (163)

In the fourth hell the longest duration of their life is ten Sâgarôpamâs; the shortest is seven Sâgarôpamâs. (164)

In the fifth hell the longest duration of their life is seventeen Sâgarôpamâs; the shortest is ten Sâgarôpamâs. (165)

In the sixth hell the longest duration of their life is twenty-two Sâgarôpamâs; the shortest is seventeen Sâgarôpamâs. (166)

In the seventh hell the longest duration of their life is thirty-three Sâgarôpamâs; the shortest is twenty-two Sâgarôpamâs. (167)

The length of the life of denizens of hell is also that of their continuance in the same kind of body, with regard both to the longest and shortest duration of it. (168)

Verses 169, 170 = 83, 84. (Substitute, denizens of hell.)

b. The animals which possess five organs of sense are of two kinds, those which originate by gene-

¹ It will be seen that the longest duration of life in each hell is always equal to the shortest in the preceding one.

ratio *aequivoca*¹, and those which are born from the womb. (171)

Either of them are again of three kinds: 1. aquatic, 2. terrestrial, and 3. aerial animals. Learn from me their subdivision. (172)

1. Fishes, tortoises, crocodiles, Makaras, and Gangetic porpoises are the five kinds of aquatic animals. (173)

174, 175 = 159, 160.

The longest duration of the life of aquatic animals is one Kṛoṇe of former years²; the shortest is less than one muhūrta. (176)

The longest duration of the aquatic animals' continuance in the (same kind of body) is from two to nine³ Kṛoṇes of former years. (177)

178 = 83.

2. Quadrupeds and reptiles are the two kinds of terrestrial animals. The quadrupeds are of four kinds; listen to my description of them: (179)

(1) Solidungular animals, as horses, &c.;

(2) Biungular animals, as cows, &c.;

(3) Multiungular animals, as elephants, &c.;

(4) Animals having toes with nails, as lions, &c. (180)

The reptiles are of two kinds: 1. those which walk on their arms, as lizards, &c., and 2. those which move on their breast, as snakes, &c. Both are again of many kinds. (181)

¹ *Sammûrkkhima*. They grow by assimilating the materials in their surrounding. According to a second explanation, their internal organ does not fully develop.

² See page 16, note 1.

³ This is, according to the *Avakūṛi*, the meaning of *pūhuttam prithaktvam*.

182, 183 = 159, 160.

The longest duration of the life of terrestrial animals is three Palyôpamâs; the shortest is less than one muhûrta. (184)

The longest duration of the terrestrial animals' continuance in the (same kind of) body is three Palyôpamâs plus from two to nine Krores of former years; the shortest is less than one muhûrta. (185)

186 = 83.

3. Winged animals are of four kinds: those with membranous wings¹, those with feathered wings, those with wings in the shape of a box², and those (which sit on) outspread wings³. (187)

188, 189 = 159, 160.

The longest duration of the life of aerial animals is an Asamkhyêya-part of a Palyôpamâ⁴; the shortest is less than one muhûrta. (190)

The longest duration (of the aerial animals' continuance in the same kind of body) is an Asamkhyêya-part of a Palyôpamâ plus from two to nine Krores of former years; the shortest is less than one muhûrta. (191)

192, 193 = 159, 160.

c. Men are of two kinds; listen to my description of them: men originating by generatio aequivoca⁵, and men born from the womb. (194)

Those who are born from the womb are of three

¹ E.g. the *karmaka/akas* or bats.

² Samudga. These interesting birds are said to live outside the Mânushôttara, or world inhabited by men.

³ The comm. do not tell us what kind of birds is intended.

⁴ The comm. do not explain this expression; the meaning, therefore, is doubtful. I give a literal translation of it in this and the next verse.

⁵ See page 223, note 1, on verse 171.

kinds: those living in the Karmabhûmi¹, those living in the Akarmabhûmi, and those living on the minor continents². (195)

They have, in the same order, fifteen³, thirty⁴, and twenty-eight subdivisions. These are the numbers handed down. (196)

Men originating by *generatio aequivoca* are of as many kinds. They all live but in a part of the world. (197)

Verses 198–202 = 183–186. (Substitute, 'men' for 'terrestrial animals'.)

d. Gods are of four kinds; listen to my description of them: 1. Bhaumêyikas; 2. Vyantaras; 3. Gyôtishkas; 4. Vaimânikas. (203)

There are ten kinds of Bhavanavâsins (= Bhaumêyikas), eight of those who live in woods (= Vyantaras), five of Gyôtishkas, and two of Vaimânikas. (204)

1. The Bhavanavâsins are: the Asura-, Nâga-, Suvarṇa-, Vidyut-, Agni-, Dvîpa-, Udadhi-, Vâta-, and Ghaṇika-(Kumâras⁵). (205)

2. The eight kinds of Vyantaras are: Pisâkas,

¹ Concerning Karmabhûmi, see part i, p. 195, note 1. The *Avaṭṭuri* places the Akarmabhûmi first, but the next verse proves that it originally stood in the second place.

² These are seven groups of islands situated off the eastern and western ends of the Himâlaya, which are inhabited by fabulous races.

³ According to the *Avaṭṭuri*, there are five kinds in Bharata, five in Airāvata, and five in Vidêha.

⁴ Viz. five in each of the six Akarmabhûmis: Haimavata, Hari-varsha, Hairanyavata, Dêvakuru, and Uttarakuru.

⁵ According to the commentaries the word *kumâra* is to be supplied after each of the ten names.

Bhûtas, Yakshas, Râkshasas, Kinnaras, Kimpurushas, Mahôragas, and Gandharvas. (206)

3. The moons, the suns, the Nakshatras, the planets, and the hosts of stars are the fivefold dwellings of the *Gyôdishkas*. (207)

4. The *Vaimânika* gods are of two kinds :
α'. those who are born in the heavenly Kalpas, and
β'. those who are born in the regions above them¹. (208)

α'. The former are of twelve kinds : those who live in (the following Kalpas, after which they are named) : Saudharma, *Îsâna*, Sanatkumâra, Mâhendra, Brahmâlôka, and Lantaka ; (209)

Mahâsukla, Sahasrâra, Ânata, Prânata², Âraṇa, and Akyuta. These are the gods who are born in Kalpas. (210)

β'. The gods who are born in the regions above the Kalpas are of two kinds : *α'*. the Graivêyakas³, and *β'*. the Anuttaras⁴. The Graivêyakas are of nine kinds. (211)

α'. The lowest of the lowest, the middle of the lowest, the highest of the lowest, the lowest of the middle ; (212)

The middle of the middle, the highest of the middle, the lowest of the highest, the middle of the highest ; (213)

The highest of the highest. These are the Graivêyaka gods.

¹ They are termed Kalpôpaga and Kalpâtîta.

² I am not sure that these are the correct Sanskrit forms of the two last Kalpas ; the original has *Âṇaya* and *Pânaya*.

³ I.e. those who live on the neck (*grîva*), i.e. on the upper part of the universe.

⁴ I.e. those above whom there dwell no other gods.

β'. The Vigayas, the Vaigayantas, the Gayantas, the Aparâgitas (214)

And the Sarvârthasiddhas: these are the five kinds of Anuttara gods.

These and others besides are the many kinds of Vaimânika gods. (215-217 = 159-160)

The longest duration of the life of the Bhau-mêyika gods is somewhat more than a Sâgarôpamâ, the smallest ten thousand years. (218)

The longest duration of the life of the Vyantaras is one Palyôpamâ, the shortest is ten thousand years. (219)

The longest duration of the life of the Gyôtishkas is one Palyôpamâ plus one hundred thousand years, the shortest is the eighth part of a Palyôpamâ. (220)

The longest duration of life in the Saudharma-kalpa is two Sâgarôpamâs, the shortest is one Palyôpamâ. (221)

(In the same way (a) the longest, and (b) the shortest duration of life in the remaining Kalpas and heavenly regions is given in the original. I give in the sequel the substance only of each verse.)

In Îsâna Kalpa (a) is somewhat more than a Sâgarôpamâ, (b) somewhat more than a Palyôpamâ. (222)

In Sanatkumâra Kalpa (a) is seven, (b) two Sâgarôpamâs. (223)

In Mâhendra Kalpa (a) is somewhat more than seven Sâgarôpamâs, (b) somewhat more than two. (224)

In Brahmalôka Kalpa (a) is ten Sâgarôpamâs, (b) seven. (225)

In Lantaka Kalpa (a) is fourteen Sâgarôpamâs, (b) ten. (226)

In Mahâsukla Kalpa (*a*) is seventeen Sâgarôpamâs,
(*b*) fourteen¹. (227)

In Sahasrâra Kalpa (*a*) is eighteen Sâgarôpamâs,
(*b*) seventeen. (228)

In Ânata Kalpa (*a*) is nineteen Sâgarôpamâs,
(*b*) eighteen. (229)

In Prânata Kalpa (*a*) is twenty Sâgarôpamâs,
(*b*) nineteen. (230)

In Ârana Kalpa (*a*) is twenty-one Sâgarôpamâs,
(*b*) twenty. (231)

In Akÿuta Kalpa (*a*) is twenty-two Sâgarôpamâs,
(*b*) twenty-one. (232)

In the first (Graivâyika region) (*a*) is twenty-three
Sâgarôpamâs, (*b*) twenty-two. (233)

In the second (Graivâyika region) (*a*) is twenty-
four Sâgarôpamâs, (*b*) twenty-three. (234)

In the third (Graivâyika region) (*a*) is twenty-five
Sâgarôpamâs, (*b*) twenty-four. (235)

In the fourth (Graivâyika region) (*a*) is twenty-six
Sâgarôpamâs, (*b*) twenty-five. (236)

In the fifth (Graivâyika region) (*a*) is twenty-seven
Sâgarôpamâs, (*b*) twenty-six. (237)

In the sixth (Graivâyika region) (*a*) is twenty-
eight Sâgarôpamâs, (*b*) twenty-seven. (238)

In the seventh (Graivâyika region) (*a*) is twenty-
nine Sâgarôpamâs, (*b*) twenty-eight. (239)

In the eighth (Graivâyika region) (*a*) is thirty
Sâgarôpamâs, (*b*) twenty-nine. (240)

In the ninth (Graivâyika region) (*a*) is thirty-one
Sâgarôpamâs, (*b*) thirty. (241)

In the four heavens (of the Anuttara gods), be-

¹ From this verse to verse 241 the length of life increases by
one Sâgarôpamâ in each following class of gods.

ginning with Vigaya¹, (a) is thirty-three Sâgarô-pamâs, (b) thirty-one. (242)

In the great Vimâna Sarvârtha(siddha) there is no difference between the longest and shortest duration of life, but it is always thirty-three Sâgarô-pamâs. (243)

The longest and shortest duration of the gods' (continuance in the same kind of) body is equal to that which has been given for their life. (244, 245², 246 = 159, 160)

We have described the Living Beings, the worldly and the perfected ones, and we have described the Lifeless Things, those possessing form and those without form. (247)

Having thus learned (the nature of) living beings and lifeless things which is in accordance with the principles of reasoning³, and believing in it, a sage should delight in self-control. (248)

After having lived as a Sramana many years, a sage should mortify himself⁴ by the following religious exercises. (249)

The longest duration of the mortification is twelve years; the middle, one year; and the shortest, six months. (250)

¹ Viz. Vigaya, Vaigayanta, Gayanta, and Aparâgita.

² Two MSS. (A and D) insert after verses 245 the following two verses: The longest interval between a Graivâyika's leaving his rank in Ânata, &c., and being again born to it, is an endless time, the shortest is from two to nine years. In the case of Anuttara gods the longest interval is a Sâgarôpamâ plus one Samkhyêya, the shortest is from two to nine years.

³ Naya.

⁴ The last self-mortification, samlekhanâ, which is to end with death, is intended here. Some details about it will be found in part i, p. 74 ^α.

In the first four years he should abstain from dressed food¹, in the second four years he should keep various fasts. (251)

During two years he should eat Âkâmla² at the end of every second fast; in the following half year he should keep not too long fasts. (252)

In the second half of the year he should keep long fasts. During the whole year he should eat but small portions of Âkâmla². (253)

During the (last) year a sage should make the ends of two consecutive fasts meet³, and should break his fast after half a month or a whole month, (till he dies). (254)

The following (Bhâvanâs), Kandarpa-, Âbhiyôgika-, Kilvisha-, Môha-, and Asuratva-(Bhâvanâs⁴), will lead to evil ways (i. e. bad births); they are obnoxious at the time of death. (255)

Those souls who cherish heretical opinions, commit sins, and kill living beings, will not reach Bôdhi at the time of death. (256)

Those souls who cherish orthodox opinions, do not commit sins, and are enveloped in white Lêsya, will reach Bôdhi at the time of death. (257)

¹ *Vigat-niggôhana*. The meaning is that at the end of his fasts a monk should eat âkâmla, nirvikritika, &c. In the *Avatûri* a verse from the *Nisithakûrni* is quoted, which gives the same rule for the second four years.

² *Âyâma* = *âkâmla*. Is this the same thing as the *âyâмага* = *âkâmakâ* mentioned XV, 13? See above, p. 72, note 2.

³ *Kôdisahiyam âyamam* = *kôdisahitam âkâmlam*. The commentators give two explanations of this phrase: (1) Having fasted one day, one should take âkâmla on the next day; (2) one should on the second day continue to abstain from âkâmla.

⁴ The definition of these technical terms is given below, verses 262 ff.

Those souls who cherish heretical opinions, commit sins, and are enveloped in black *Lêsyâ*, will not reach *Bôdhi* at the time of death. (258)

Those who love the creed of the *Ginas* and piously practise it, will be pure and free from the soil (of passions), and will (in due time) get out of the Circle of Births. (259)

The miserable men who do not know the creed of the *Ginas*, will many times commit unholy suicide and die against their will. (260)

Those who are well versed in the sacred lore and possess much knowledge, who awaken piety (in others) and appreciate their good qualities, are for this very reason worthy to hear the doctrine of salvation¹. (261)

He who by ribaldry and buffoonery, by his comical habits and appearance, by jests and words amuses other people, realises the *Kandarpa-Bhâvanâ*. (262)

Those who practise spells and besmear their body with ashes for the sake of pleasure, amusement, or power, realise the *Âbhiyôgika-Bhâvanâ*². (263)

The deceitful man who reviles the sacred lore, the *Kêvalins*, the teacher of the Law, the *Saṅgha*, and the monks, realises the *Kilvishika-Bhâvanâ*. (264)

He who is continuously angry, and who puts his faith in prognostics, realises the *Asuratva-Bhâvanâ*. (265)

Those who use weapons, eat poison, throw them-

¹ *Âlôkanâ* = *sramanaphalam*. The *Avatûri* renders the last phrase: 'They are able to bring about the salvation of others.' The original, however, has *sôum*, 'to hear.'

² The *Abhiyôgidêvas* are genii who serve the gods. This *Bhâvanâ* leads to being born as an *Abhiyôgidêva*; the next two *Bhâvanâs*, as a *Kilvishadêva* and an *Asura*.

selves into fire or water, and use things not prescribed by the rules of good conduct, are liable to be born and to die again and again. (Such persons realise the Môha-Bhâvanâ.) (266)

The enlightened and liberated *Gñâtri*(putra) has thus delivered Thirty-six Lectures of the Uttarâdhyayana¹, which the pious² approve of. (267)

¹ Uttaragghâê in the original. The commentators give *uttara* here the meaning *pradhâna*, 'best, prominent.' The same explanation is given by the scholiast on the *Nandî* (Weber, Sacred Literature of the Jains, p. 124). Perhaps the name refers to the tradition that Mahāvîra recited at the time of his death the thirty-six *aputtiha-vâgaranâim*, which are identified by one commentator of the *Kalpa Sûtra* (Lives of the *Ginas*, § 147) with the *Uttarâdhyayana*; for *uttara* also means 'last.'

² *Bhavasiddhîya*=*bhavasiddhika*, explained by *bhavya*.

SŪTRAKRITÂṄGA.

SÛTRAKRITÂNGA.

FIRST BOOK¹.

FIRST LECTURE,

CALLED

THE DOCTRINE ².

FIRST CHAPTER.

One should know what causes the bondage of Soul, and knowing (it) one should remove³ it.

(Gambûsvâmin asked Sudharman):

What causes the bondage (of Soul) according to Mahâvîra? and what must one know in order to remove it? (1)

(Sudharman answered):

He who owns even a small property in living or lifeless things⁴, or consents to others holding it, will not be delivered from misery. (2)

¹ *Srutaskandha*. Its Sanskrit title mentioned by *Śilânka* is *Gâthâshôḍaśaka*, i.e. the book whose Sixteenth Lecture is called *Gâthâ*. It is mentioned in the *Uttarâdhyayana* XXXI, 13 by the name of the sixteen *Gâthas*; see above, p. 182.

² *Samaya*. This title is not found in MSS. at the end of the lecture, but it is given by the author of the *Niryukti* (verse 29). The subject of this lecture is more fully treated in §§ 15-33 of the First Lecture of the Second Book.

³ *Tiu//iggâ*. The commentators translate this word *trô/ayêt*, but the true Sanskrit original is *ativartêta*, as is evident from the form *atiu//anti* in I, 2, 22.

⁴ Living and lifeless things as we understand these words, not

If a man kills living beings, or causes other men to kill them, or consents to their killing them, his iniquity will go on increasing. (3)

A sinner who makes the interests of his kinsmen¹ and companions his own, will suffer much; for the number of those whose interest he takes to heart constantly increases. (4)

All this, his wealth and his nearest relations, cannot protect him (from future misery); knowing (this) and (the value of) life, he will get rid of Karman. (5)

Some men², Sramanas and Brâhmanas, who ignore and deny these true words³, adhere (to their own tenets), and are given to pleasures. (6)

Some⁴ profess (the exclusive belief in) the five gross elements: earth, water, fire, wind, and air. (7)

‘These five gross elements (are the original causes of things), from them arises another (thing, viz. âtman)⁵; for on the dissolution of the (five elements) living beings cease to exist. (8)

as the Gainas do. The original has: *kittamantam akittam vâ*, beings possessed of intellect, and things without intellect. The latter are, according to Gaina notions, living beings *gîva* as well as inanimate matter.

¹ Literally, those in whose family he is born. Silânka, the author of the oldest *Tikâ* on the *Sûtrakritāṅga*, names the Râsh/rakûtas or Râthors in order to illustrate what is meant by ‘family.’

² According to Silânka the Bauddhas, Bârhaspatyas, and others are intended.

³ Grantha, passage in a book. The verses 2-5 are intended.

⁴ They are the Nâstikas or Kârvâkas.

⁵ In other words the Âtman is produced by the elements. But there is, it would seem, but one Âtman, for in verses 11, 12, we have another heretical philosophy which acknowledged a plurality of transient âtmans.

‘And as the Earth, though it is but one pile, presents many forms, so the intelligent (principle, viz. the *âtman*) appears under various forms as the universe¹.’ (9)

Thus say some fools. (But how can they explain on their theory that) the man engaging in undertakings, who has committed a sin, will himself suffer severe pain²? (10)

‘Everybody, fool or sage, has an individual soul. These souls exist (as long as the body), but after death they are no more; there are no souls which are born again. (11)

‘There is neither virtue nor vice, there is no world beyond; on the dissolution of the body the individual ceases to be.’ (12)

‘When a man acts or causes another to act, it is not his soul (*âtman*) which acts or causes to act³.’ Thus they (viz. the adherents of the *Sânkhya* philosophy) boldly proclaim. (13)

How can those who hold such opinions explain (the variety of existence in) the world? They go from darkness to utter darkness, being fools and engaged in works. (14)

Some⁴ say that there are five elements and that

¹ This is the doctrine of the *Vêdântins*.

² If there were but one *âtman* common to all men, the fruit of works done by one man might accrue to another. For the *âtman* is the substratum of merit and demerit.

³ Though there is no doubt about the meaning of this passage, still the construction is so elliptic that I may have failed to understand the connection of the parts of the sentence.

⁴ This is the opinion expressed by *Karaka* and in the early law-books, see Professor Jolly’s paper in the *Transactions of the Ninth International Congress of Orientalists*, vol. i, p. 456. *Silânka* ascribes it to the *Sânkhya*s and *Saivâdhikârin*s.

the soul is a sixth (substance), but they contend that the soul and the world (i.e. the five elements) are eternal. (15)

‘These (six substances) do not perish neither (without nor with a cause); the non-existent does not come into existence, but all things are eternal by their very nature¹.’ (16)

Some fools² say that there are five skandhas of momentary existence. They do not admit that (the soul) is different from, nor identical³ with (the elements), that it is produced from a cause (i.e. the elements), nor that it is without a cause (i.e. that it is eternal). (17)

The *Gāṇayas*⁴ say that there are four elements : earth, water, fire, and wind, which combined form the body (or soul?). (18)

(All these heretics say): ‘Those who dwell in houses, in woods, or on hills, will be delivered from all misery if they adopt our creed.’ (19)

¹ Niyatībhāvam āgayā. Niyatī is explained by nityabhāva.

² Viz. the Bauddhas. The five skandhas are explained in the commentary as follows: 1. rūpaskandha, or substances and their qualities; 2. vêdanâskandha, feelings, as pleasure and pain; 3. vigñânaskandha, perceptions of the qualities of things; 4. saṃgñâskandha, perception and knowledge of things; 5. saṃskâraskandha, merit and demerit.

³ Identical, i.e. a product of the elements as the *Kârvâkas* maintain.

⁴ *Gāṇaya*, which is explained in the *Dīpikā* by *gñânaka* = *panditammanya*, denotes the Bauddhas. I think that the word may be derived from *yâna* ‘vehicle,’ which the Buddhist used to designate the two sections of the church, viz. the *Hīnayâna* and *Mahâyâna* schools. The commentator quotes a various reading: *âvarê* for *gāṇayâ*, and explains it as referring to another sect of Bauddhas than those spoken of in the preceding verse. *Silânka* comments on the reading *avvarê* first, and then on *gāṇaya*.

But they do not cross the Flood of Life, who, ignoring the true relation of things, and not versed in the true Law, hold the above heretical opinions. (20)

They do not reach the end of the *Samsâra*, who, ignoring, &c. (21)

They do not reach the end of transmigration, who, &c. (22)

They do not put an end to birth, who, &c. (23)

They do not put an end to misery, who, &c. (24)

They do not put an end to death, who, &c. (25)

They will again and again experience manifold pains in this ring¹ of the earth, which is full of death, disease, and old age. (26)

The highest *Gina*, Mahâvîra the *Gñâtriputra*, has said that they will undergo births without number, being placed in all sorts of existences. (27)

Thus I say.

SECOND CHAPTER.

Again some² say: 'It is proved that there are individual souls; they experience pleasure and pain; and (on dying) they lose their state of life. (1)

'But misery (and pleasure) is not caused by (the souls) themselves; how could it be caused by other (agents, as time, &c.)? Pleasure and misery, final beatitude³ and temporal (pleasure and pain) are not

¹ *Kakravâla*.

² They are the fatalists whose peculiar opinions are stated in verses 2 and 3.

³ *Sêhiyam* = *saiddhikam*, i.e. *môkshê bhavam sukham*. Another explanation of the commentator makes *saiddhika* those pleasures which depend on external causes, as wreaths, sandal, &c., and *asaiddhika* the pleasures of the mind.

caused by (the souls) themselves, nor by others ; but the individual souls experience them ; it is the lot assigned them by destiny.' This is what they (i.e. the fatalists) say. (2, 3)

Those who proclaim these opinions, are fools who fancy themselves learned ; they have no knowledge, and do not understand that things depend partly on fate, and partly on human exertion ¹. (4)

Thus (say) some heretics² ; they are very bold men ; if they act up to their principles, they will never be delivered from misery. (5)

As the swift deer who are destitute of protection, are frightened where there is no danger, and not frightened where there is danger ; (6)

(As) they dread safe places, but do not dread traps ; they are bewildered by ignorance and fear, and run hither and thither ; (7)

If they did jump over the noose or pass under it, they would escape from the snare ; but the stupid animal does not notice ³ it ; (8)

The unhappy animal, being of a weak intellect, runs into the dangerous (place), is caught in the snare, &c., and is killed there ; (9)

So some unworthy Sramanas who hold wrong doctrines are afraid of what is free from danger, and are not afraid of real dangers. (10)

The fools dread the preaching of the Law, but

¹ To render *niyatâniyatam*.

² *Pâsattha*, usually translated *pâṣvastha* 'outsider,' those who do not acknowledge true arguments; another rendering is *pâṣastha* 'held in bondage.'

³ *Dêhati* = *pasyati*. The form *dekkhati* occurs in the *Prâkrit* of plays.

they do not dread works, being without discernment and knowledge. (11)

Shaking off greed¹, pride², deceit³, and wrath⁴, one becomes free from Karman. This is a subject (which an ignorant man, like) a brute animal, does not attend to. (12)

The unworthy heretics who do not acknowledge this, will incur death an endless number of times, like deer caught in a snare. (13)

All Brâhmanas and Sramanas contend that they possess the knowledge (of the truth), but the creatures in the whole world do not know anything. (14)

As a Mlêkkha⁵ repeats what an Ârya has said, but does not understand the meaning, merely repeating his words, so the ignorant, though pretending to possess knowledge, do not know the truth, just as an uninstructed Mlêkkha. (15, 16)

The speculations of the Agnostics cannot lead to knowledge; they cannot reach the truth by themselves, still less teach it to other men. (17)

As when a man in a wood who does not know it, follows a guide who also does not know it, both being unacquainted (with the place), come to great trouble; (18)

As when one blind man is the guide of another, the man walks a great distance, loses his way, or follows a wrong way; (19)

Thus some who search after salvation and pretend

¹ Savvappaga = sarvâtmaka, lôbha.

² Viukkassa = vyutkarsha, mâna.

³ Nâma = mâyâ.

⁴ Appattiya = krôdha.

⁵ It is worthy of note that the Mlêkkhas here are represented as not understanding the language of the Âryas.

to practise the (true) Law, follow the false Law and do not arrive at the thoroughly right (thing, viz. self-control). (20)

Thus some (wrong philosophers) do not apply to others for arguments, but they continue to err because they believe their own arguments to be right¹. (21)

Thus arguing according to their light, and ignorant about what is right and wrong, they do not get out of misery as birds do not get out of their cage. (22)

They praise their own creed and blame that of their opponents, but those who act in this respect the part of philosophers, will be kept confined in the Circle of Births². (23)

There is the doctrine of the Kriyāvādins³, which has been previously explained; it augments the misery of worldly existence of those who do not well consider the nature of acts. (24)

‘He who intends (to kill) a living being but does not do it by (an act of) his body, and he who unknowingly kills one, both are affected by that act through a slight contact (with it) only, but the demerit (in their case) is not fully developed⁴.’ (25)

¹ The last part of the verse might also be translated: ‘because these fools believe the subject to be cleared up (maṅgū) by their own arguments.’

² There is a play on the words viussanti and viussiyā, in the last line of this verse viussanti is a denominative verb from viusa=vidvān, and is translated vidvān ivā karati. Viussiya =vi+ut+srita.

³ See above, p. 83. Śīlāṅka defines the Kriyāvādins here as men who contend that the principal means of reaching Mōksha is kaitiyakarma, the construction of sanctuaries.

⁴ An intentional killing of a living being must actually take place in order to induce the Karman on the soul. If one of the essential conditions which constitute the guilt of slaughter (hiṁsā),

‘There are three ways of committing sins: by one’s own activity, by commission, by approval (of the deed). (26)

‘These are the three ways of committing sins. Thus by purity of the heart one reaches Nirvâṇa. (27)

‘A layman may kill his son (during a famine) and eat him; a wise (monk) who partakes of the meat, will not be defiled by the sin¹.’ (28)

The mind of those who sin in thoughts is not pure; they are wrong, they do not conduct themselves carefully². (29)

Men attached to pleasure, who think that the above-mentioned doctrines will save them, commit sins. (30)

As a blind-born man getting into a leaky boat, wants to reach the shore, but is drowned during the passage³, so some unworthy, heretical Sramanas wish to get beyond the Circle of Births, but they are whirled round in it. (31, 32)

Thus I say.

THIRD CHAPTER.

If a monk should eat forbidden food which a pious (layman) has prepared for some guest, and which food has been mixed up with even thousand (times more

is wanting the Karman is still produced; however, it does not take a firm hold of the soul, but merely ‘touches’ it. This is of course the opinion of the Kriyāvādins.

¹ According to Śilāṅka the father too would not be guilty; but this interpretation is against good sense and grammar.

² This is the answer of the Siddhāntin to the foregoing propositions.

³ The same verse recurs below, I, 11, 30.

pure food)¹, he would be neither monk nor layman. (1)

Sramanas who do not comprehend this and do not know what is dangerous, who care for the pleasures of the moment only, will suffer death an endless number of times, like big² fishes who when the water rises are by the water (deposited) on dry land and are killed (there), poor things, by hungry *dhaṅkas* and herons. (2-4)

We hear also of another error of some (philosophers) : some say that the world has been created (or is governed)³ by the gods, others, by Brahman. (5)

Some⁴ say that it has been created by the *Īsvara*, others that it was produced from chaos, &c., this world with living beings and lifeless things, with its variety of pleasure and pain. (6)

The great *Rishi*⁵ said, that the world has been created by Svayambhū; Māra originated Māyā, therefore the world (appears to be) uneternal. (7)

Some Brāhmanas and Sramanas say that the

¹ This might also be translated: 'though the food passes through the hands of a thousand men before he accepts it.'

² *Vēsāliya* = *vaisālika*. The commentators offer three explanations of this word, (1) marine, *visālaḥ samudras tatra-bhavāḥ*; (2) belonging to the genus called *visāla*; (3) big, *visāla*.

³ *Dēvauttē*. This is either *dēvair upaḥ*, sown, i.e. produced by the gods, or *dēvair guptaḥ*, governed by the gods.

⁴ The adherents of the *Yōga* and *Sāṅkhya* philosophy, or the theistical and atheistical followers of the latter, are apparently meant by 'some' and 'others.'

⁵ The commentators unfortunately have not preserved the name of the great *Rishi*; they identify Svayambhū with Vishṇu 'or some one else.' This Svayambhū, afraid that the earth should become overcrowded, called to help Yama, alias Māra, who with the help of Māyā makes the creatures appear to die.

universe was produced from the (primeval) egg, and He (Brahman) created the things. These ignorant men speak untruth. (8)

Those who on arguments of their own maintain that the world has been created, do not know the truth. Nor will (the world) ever perish. (9)

Know that misery arises from wicked deeds¹. How can those who do not know the origin (of misery) know its prevention? (10)

Some say that the soul (of him who is) pure will become free from bad Karman (on reaching beatitude), but that in that state it will again become defiled through pleasant excitement or hate. (11)

(According to them²) he who has lived on earth as a restrained monk, will afterwards become free from Karman. As clear water which was free from defilement becomes again defiled, so (will be the soul). (12)

A wise man should consider that these (heretics) do not lead a life of chastity, and that all these disputants proclaim their own creed in opposition (to the others). (13)

(Others³ maintain that) perfection can only be reached by their method of religious life, not otherwise; and that even before (that time) they have

¹ It is not given us by any of the above-mentioned agents whom the opponents believe to have created the world.

² According to *Sīlāṅka* the followers of *Gōśāla* and the *Trairāśikas* are meant. The latter are the *Gaiṇa* followers of the *Vairēshika* philosophy. The *Trairāśika Sākhā* was founded by *Khaluka Rôhagupta*, see part i, p. 290. The name *Trairāśika* is said to have been given to these philosophers because they admit a third state besides those of the bound and of the liberated.

³ According to *Sīlāṅka* the *Saivas* and *Ekadāṇḍins* are meant.

their senses under control and possess everything to be wished for¹. (14)

Some say that they will be perfected and sound. On the head of Perfection some men are infatuated with their own doctrines. (15)

But these uncontrolled (men) will whirl round in the beginningless (Circle of Births); after a Kalpa they will rise from their sphere to become the lowest of Asuras². (16)

Thus I say.

FOURTH CHAPTER.

These (philosophers) who are vanquished (by their passions) cannot help you in cases where a sinner perishes³; though having given up their former occupations they will give advice in worldly matters. (1)

A wise monk who fully appreciates this, should not mix with those (heretics); without conceit and not attached to them a sage should lead a life equally removed (from love and hate). (2)

Some say that those who own possessions and engage in undertakings (may reach perfection); but a monk should take his refuge to those who neither own possessions nor engage in undertakings. (3)

A wise man should beg food which has been

¹ They acquire the eight siddhis or magical powers.

² I translate the words *ihânâ âsurakivvisiyâ* according to the explanation of the commentary. But they may also mean: from the sphere of Asuras and sinners.

³ A various reading first commented upon by *Silânka* is: *bâlâ panditamâninô*, being ignorant men who fancy themselves learned.

prepared (for somebody else), and he should accept what is freely given him, without greed and passions; he should abstain from overbearing behaviour¹. (4)

He should know the talk of people: some say things which are the outcome of a wrong understanding and are but opinions of others repeated. (5)

'The world is boundless and eternal, it exists from eternity and does not perish²; (another) bold philosopher³ says that the world is limited, but eternal. (6)

'Some say that the knowledge (of the highest authority) is unlimited; but the same bold philosopher says that it is limited in every way⁴.' (7)

Some beings have motion, others not; it depends on certain conditions whether they are in the one state or in the other. (8)

(E.g. big creatures) have one form of bodily existence and then another⁵. But all are subject to pain; hence they should not be killed. (9)

This is the quintessence of wisdom: not to kill anything. Know this to be the legitimate conclusion

¹ Omâna = apamâna.

² According to Sîlânka the eternity of things means, with these philosophers, that one thing always retains the same genus or *gâti*, e. g. that he who was a man in this life will again be a man in the next.

³ According to the commentators Vyâsa is intended. The doctrine referred to in the text is that of the *Purânas*.

⁴ The commentators interpret this verse as if not two philosophical opinions but only one was spoken of. Unlimited knowledge is according to them different from omniscience; in the second part of the sentence 'limited' refers to the sleep of Brahman during which he is unconscious.

⁵ Men are some time embryos, then young men, then old men.

from the principle of the reciprocity with regard to non-killing¹. (10)

Living (according to the rules of conduct), and without greed, one should take care of the highest good².

In walking, in sitting and lying down, and in food and drink : with regard to these three points a monk should always control himself.

And he should leave off pride³, wrath⁴, deceit⁵, and greed⁶. (11, 12)

Possessing the Samitis and being protected by the five *Samvaras*, a pious monk should live, till he reaches perfection, as a man free from fetters among those bound in fetters (viz. the householders). (13)

Thus I say.

¹ *Ahimsâsamayam* = *ahimsâsamatâm*, viz. as you do not wish to be killed, so others do not wish to be killed. The last part of the sentence might also be translated : know this to be the real meaning of the Law (*samaya*) of *ahimsâ*. The same verse recurs I, 11, 10.

² *Âdâna*, right knowledge, right faith, and right conduct.

³ *Ukkasa* = *utkarsha*, *mâna*.

⁴ *Galana* = *gvalana*, *krôdha*.

⁵ *Nûma* = *mâyâ*.

⁶ *Maggâattha* = *madhyastha*, *lôbha*. Compare the similar expressions in I, 1, 2, 12, above, p. 241, notes 1-4, and I, 2, 2, 29, below, p. 257.

SECOND LECTURE¹,

CALLED

THE DESTRUCTION OF KARMAN.

FIRST CHAPTER.

(Rishabha said to his sons):

Acquire perfect knowledge of the Law! why do you not study it? It is difficult to obtain instruction in it after this life. The days (that are gone by) will never return, nor is it easy a second time to obtain human birth. (1)

See, young and old men, even children in the mother's womb die. As a hawk catches a quail, so (life) will end when its time is spent². (2)

¹ The name of this lecture, which occurs in its last line, is *vêyâlîya*, because, as the author of the *Niryukti* remarks, it treats on *vidârika*, destruction (of Karman), and because it is composed in the *Vaitâlîya* metre. For either word, *vaidârika* (or rather *vaidâlîka*, cf. *karmavidalana*) and *vaitâlîya* may, in *Gaina Prâkrîṭ*, become *vêyâlîya* or *vêtâlîya*. A play of words was apparently intended; it would have been impossible, if both words had not become identical in sound. We may, therefore, conclude that the language of the author obeyed the same phonetic laws as the *Gaina Prâkrîṭ* exhibited in our MSS., or in other words, that the text has been written down in about the same language in which it was originally composed. The name of the Fifteenth Lecture leads to the same inference; for it is called *gamaṭîya* (*yamakîya*) because each of its verses contains the verbal ornament called *yamaka*, and because it opens with the words *gam aṭîyam* (*yad atîtam*).

² One MS. here inserts *gîvâṇa gîviyam*, the life of living beings.

(A man) may suffer for the sake of his parents ; he will not easily obtain happiness after this life. A pious man should consider these causes of danger and cease to act. (3)

For in this world living beings suffer individually for their deeds ; for the deed they have done themselves, they obtain (punishment), and will not get over it before they have felt it. (4)

Even gods, Gandharvas, Râkshasas, and Asuras ; animals who live on earth, and snakes ; kings, common people, merchants, and Brâhmaṇas : they all must leave their rank and suffer. (5)

Notwithstanding their pleasures and relations, all men must suffer in due time the fruit of their works ; as a cocoa-nut detaching itself from its stalk (falls down), so (life) will end when its time is spent. (6)

Even a very learned or virtuous man, or a Brâhmaṇa or an ascetic, will be severely punished for his deed when he is given to actions of deceit¹. (7)

See, those (heretics) who search for the knowledge of truth, but who do not cross the Samsâra, talk only about the highest good (without reaching it).

How will you understand what is near you and what is beyond²? In the meanwhile you suffer for your deeds. (8)

He who walks about naked and lean, he who eats only once after a month, if he is filled with deceit, will be born an endless number of times. (9)

¹ Abhinâma.

² According to Sîlânka, this world and the next, or domestic life and monachism, or the Samsâra and Môksha are meant by the expression 'what is near you and what is beyond.'

Man, cease from sins! For the life of men will come to an end¹. Men who are drowned (in lust, as it were), and addicted to pleasure will, for want of control, be deluded². (10)

Exert and control yourself! For it is not easy to walk on ways where there are minutely small animals. Follow the commandments which the Arhats have well proclaimed³. (11)

Heroes (of faith) who desist (from sins) and exert themselves aright, who subdue wrath, fear, &c., will never kill living beings; they desist from sins and are entirely happy. (12)

It is not myself alone who suffers, all creatures in the world suffer; this a wise man⁴ should consider, and he should patiently bear (such calamities) as befall him, without giving way to his passions. (13)

As a wall covered with a plastering (of dried cow-dung)⁵ is by a shock made thin, so (a monk) should make his body lean by fasting, &c. He should

¹ Paliyantam. Another explanation of this word, preferred by the commentators, is palyôpamasya antar: within, i.e. something shorter than a Palyôpamâ.

² Or, acquire Karman which is to result in delusion.

³ According to the commentators: practise (control) according to the sâsana (i.e. sûtras); this has been well declared by the Arhats.

⁴ Sahie. This word is explained sometimes by svahita, intent on his spiritual welfare, sometimes by hitena gñânâdinâ sahitaḥ, possessed of knowledge, &c. I translate it 'wise,' and derive the word from Sanskrit sahrîdaya, the correct Prâkrîṭ for which would be sahiyae.

⁵ Cow-dung is stuck, in the form of flat round cakes, against a wall to dry there. When the cakes are dried a little shake is sufficient to make them come down, whereby the wall will be restored to its original shape and dimensions.

abstain from slaughter of living beings. This is the Law proclaimed by the Sage. (14)

As a bird covered with dust removes the grey powder by shaking itself, so a worthy and austere Brāhmaṇa¹, who does penance, annihilates his Karman. (15)

Young and old people claim a houseless Sramana as their own, though he begs according to the Law, observes the rules of conduct, and performs austerities. People will even cry themselves hoarse, but they will not captivate him. (16)

Whatever they will do to move his pity, however they will cry about their son, they will not captivate a worthy and virtuous monk or make him return to domestic life. (17)

Though they tempt him with pleasures, and though they should bind him and carry him home, if he does not care for a (worldly) life, they will not captivate him or make him return to domestic life. (18)

His father and mother, his children and wife who claim him, will admonish him : 'See, you are our supporter ; care not for the next world in order to support us.' (19)

Some people are (foolishly) attached to others, and are thereby deluded ; the unrighteous make them adopt unrighteousness, and they exult in their wickedness. (20)

Therefore a worthy and wise man should be

¹ Māhana = brāhmaṇa. The commentator derives the word from mā and root han! The word is a synonym of muni, with which it frequently occurs in the same verse and has then been left out in the translation.

careful, ceasing from sin and being entirely happy. The virtuous heroes of faith (have chosen) the great road, the right and certain path to perfection. (21)

He who has entered the road leading to the destruction (of Karman)¹, who controls his mind, speech, and body, who has given up his possessions and relations and all undertakings, should walk about subduing his senses. (22)

SECOND CHAPTER.

A sage thinks that he should leave off sins just as (a snake) leaves its slough; and he is not proud of his Gôtra and other advantages; or is there any use in blaming others? (1)

A man who insults another will long whirl in the Circle of Births; to blame others is not good. Considering this a sage is not conceited. (2)

He who is independent, and he who is the servant of a servant, if they but observe the Vow of Silence², they have no reason to be ashamed; (therefore a monk) should behave equally towards all. (3)

Indifferent and pure with regard to every kind of control, a *Sramana* should walk about; he who entertains pure thoughts during his whole life, dies as a worthy and wise man. (4)

The sage who sees the far-off (goal, viz. liberation), past and future things, will practise indifference, though he suffer corporal punishment and be beaten. (5)

Possessing perfect wisdom, a sage always vanquishes (his passions); he correctly expounds the

¹ Vêyâliya-maggam.

² Maunapada.

Law; he never neglects even the smallest (duty); he is neither angry nor proud. (6)

A man who controls himself according to (the Law), which is praised by many people, and is not bound by any worldly ties, who is always pure like a lake, proclaims the Law of Kâsyapa. (7)

Seeing that numerous living beings lead an individual life, and that every one feels (pleasure and pain) just as the others, a wise man who observes the Vow of Silence, leaves off (injuring them). (8)

A sage has completely mastered the Law, and has ceased to do actions; but the selfish grieve, they will not (thereby) recover their (lost) property¹. (9)

Know that it (viz. property) entails pains in this world, and very great pains² in the next. Who will lead a domestic life when he knows that everything must perish? (10)

One should know (and renounce) the great attachment (to the world), and respect and honours on earth; (for conceit) is a very thin thorn difficult to pull out. A wise man, therefore, should abandon worldliness³. (11)

A monk should perform postures (as Kâyôtsarga, &c.) alone on his seat, and alone on his couch he should meditate; excelling in the performance of austerities, guarded in words, and restrained in thoughts. (12)

¹ Sîlânka quotes a verse which the Nâgârguṇīyas insert here; compare part i, p. 32, note 2.

² I take duhaṃduha for a kind of intensive form of duha.

³ This is a rather dark verse. Sîlânka, after explaining it, quotes the verse as it was read by the Nâgârguṇīyas, which may be rendered thus: Respect and honours are a great obstacle, this he should know; be the thorn small (or) difficult to pull out, a wise man should remove it by the (means we are about to describe).

An ascetic does not shut the door of a deserted house (where he puts up), nor does he open it; when asked he returns no (rude) answer; he cuts no grass, nor does he strew it (on the ground for a couch). (13)

Where (he is) at sunset, there he calmly (performs his duties); a sage bears pleasant and unpleasant things, be there insects, or wild beasts, or snakes. (14)

He bears the three kinds of calamities arising from beasts, men, and gods. A great sage will not be seized with a shivering, &c.¹, when he stays in a deserted house. (15)

He should not fear for his life, nor should he desire to be praised (for his courage). Fearful things will frighten the mind of a monk who stays in a deserted house. (16)

They say that he who is very well disciplined, who protects others, who lives in a place removed from other people, who is not frightened by dangers, possesses right conduct, &c. (17)

A monk who uses warm or hot water², who follows the Law, and loathes (wrong conduct), will by intercourse with bad kings become deficient in his devotion though he be ever so virtuous. (18)

When a monk quarrels and uses very bad language, he will suffer great spiritual loss; therefore a wise man should not quarrel. (19)

He who abstains from cold water², who plans (or undertakes) nothing, and has ceased from even the smallest actions, who does not eat food out of the dish of a householder, possesses right conduct, &c. (20)

¹ Literally, horripilation. By the ' &c.' the other outward signs of horror are indicated.

² It should be kept in mind that Gaina monks are forbidden to use cold water, because it is considered to possess life.

Though life cannot be prolonged, as the saying is¹, still foolish people sin recklessly; a foolish man is filled to the brim (as it were) with sins. Considering this a sage is not conceited. (21)

By self-invented rites common people seek holiness², they are full of deceit and shrouded (as it were) in delusion. But a monk is holy² through his innocence, he allows no troubles³ to influence his words, (thoughts, and acts). (22)

As a clever gambler, playing at dice, is not vanquished, since he casts the *Kṛita*, but not *Kali*, nor *Trêta*, nor *Dvâpara*; (23)

So adopt for your welfare the best and highest Law which has been proclaimed in this world by the Saviour, as the clever (gambler casts) the *Kṛita*, and avoids the other casts. (24)

I have heard that sensual pleasures are said to have the strongest hold on men; but those who abstain from them follow the Law of *Kâsyapa*. (25)

Those who follow the Law that has been proclaimed by *Gñâtrika*, the great seer⁴, are virtuous and righteous; they confirm each other in the Law. (26)

Take no heed of the seductive (pleasures), endeavour to shake off delusion. Those who are not subdued by the wicked (pleasures), know meditation to be their duty⁵. (27)

¹ Compare Uttarâdhyayana IV, 1, above p. 18. The same words recur below, I, 2, 3, 10, p. 259.

² *Palêti* = *praliyatê*.

³ Literally, cold and heat.

⁴ *Mahâvîra*.

⁵ *Âhitam*, literally, has been declared. The commentators explain the word as *â-hitam*, thoroughly good, or *âtmani vyavasthitam*, placed in the soul.

A monk should not tell stories, nor ask idle questions, nor gossip¹. But, knowing the highest Law, he should perform his religious duties, and regard nothing his own. (28)

A monk should not indulge deceit², greed³, pride⁴, and wrath⁵. Those are virtuous who have arrived at the right understanding of these passions, and who have well practised control⁶. (29)

(A monk) should be free from attachment, wise, controlling himself, seeking the Law, earnest in the performance of austerities, and subduing his senses. It is difficult to obtain the soul's benefit. (30)

Right conduct, &c., which has been taught by the *Gñātrika*, the sage who knew everything in the whole world, has either not been learned or not been truly practised (by creatures now in distress). (31)

Many men who thought this Law to be the highest good and conducive to their spiritual welfare, obeyed their preceptors, ceased from works, and have crossed the great flood (of worldly existence). (32)

Thus I say.

THIRD CHAPTER.

If a monk who abstains from actions, suffers pain (for acts done) through ignorance, that Karman will

¹ Samprasāraṇa?

² *Khanna* = māyā.

³ *Pasamsa* = *prasamsā*, lōbha.

⁴ *Ukkāsa* = *utkarsha*, māna.

⁵ *Pagāsa* = *prakāsa*, krōdha.

⁶ *Dhuya* = *dhūta*. The word preceding this is *sugōsiyam* = *gushṭam*, *sēvitam*. A various reading is *sugḥōsiyam*, which means 'who have well annihilated their Karman (*dhūta*).'

be annihilated through control. The wise reach (perfection) getting rid of death. (1)

Those who resist the seductions¹ are placed on a line with those who have crossed the *Samsāra*. Therefore look up (at beatitude as the end in view). Those (virtuous men) regard pleasures as equal to diseases. (2)

Men of princely rank wear precious things imported by merchants; likened (to these precious things) are the excellent great vows together with (the prohibition of) eating at night. (3)

Pleasure-seeking men who are greedy and are absorbed by amusements, are reckless and like the wretched; they do not know that meditation (has been enjoined as) a duty. (4)

As a bullock which is hurt and urged on by the driver² becomes weak, and at last, when its strength is exhausted and it is unable to move, sinks down; (5)

So he who knows the pursuit of pleasures, must sooner or later give up their enjoyment (lest they drag him down³). He who is still surrounded by pleasant things⁴, should not love pleasures, whether he obtains them, or for some reason or other does not obtain them. (6)

Lest the lot of the wicked should fall to you, escape (the influence of the senses), and discipline yourself! The wicked will much and strongly grieve, groan, and wail. (7)

¹ *Vinnavanā* = *viṅṇāpanā*, explained *striyaḥ*.

² Instead of 'driver' and 'bullock' we might translate 'hunter' and 'deer.'

³ He should not be engrossed by them as the bullock sinks down beneath its burden.

⁴ To render *kāmī*.

See, life in this world (is transient); though your life lasts a hundred years, you die as a short-lived man; mind that (your) years swiftly pass. Nevertheless greedy men are attached to pleasures. (8)

Those who engage in undertakings, who work the perdition of their souls, and who kill (living beings), will go to the world of the wicked, to the abode of the Asuras for a long time (to dwell there). (9)

Though life cannot be prolonged, as the saying is¹, still foolish people sin recklessly (thinking): 'We are only concerned with the present time; who has seen the next world and returned thence?' (10)

Believe in the words of him who sees (everything), you who are blind, as it were, you whose sight is blinded, ah, whose sight is obstructed by your works which result in delusion! (11)

The unhappy again and again suffer from delusion; therefore have done with praise and honours! A wise ascetic should consider that living beings are like himself (as regards love of life, aversion to pain, &c.). (12)

The man also who still lives in the house, should, in accordance with his creed², be merciful to living beings; we are bidden to be fair and equal with all; (thereby even a householder) goes to the world of the gods. (13)

Being instructed in the creed of the Lord, exert yourself in the truth (i.e. in control)! A monk who has thoroughly subdued his selfishness should collect pure alms. (14)

Knowing the truth, one should live up to it,

¹ Compare p. 256, note 1.

² Ânupûrvyâ.

seeking the Law, earnest in the performance of austerities, possessing the Guptis, being accomplished, one should always exert oneself, intent on the soul's benefit, and desiring the highest good (viz. liberation). (15)

The fool thinks that his wealth, cattle, and relations will save him ; they him, or he them. But they are no help, no protection. (16)

When calamity befalls him, or the end of his life draws near, he must go and come alone ; the wise believe that there is nothing to protect him. (17)

All living beings owe their present form of existence to their own Karman ; timid, wicked, suffering latent misery, they err about (in the Circle of Births), subject to birth, old age, and death. (18)

He should know that the present time is the best opportunity to mend, and that an awakening is difficult to obtain. A wise man should be aware of this¹. The (first) *Gina*² has said this, and so the remaining ones (will) say it. (19)

O ye monks, the virtuous (*Ginas*) that have been and will be, the followers of the Law of Kâsyapa³, they all have commended these virtues. (20)

Do not kill living beings in the threefold way⁴, being intent on your spiritual welfare and abstaining from sins. In this way numberless men have reached

¹ A various reading mentioned in the commentary is *ahiyâsaê*, 'he should bear (all troubles).'

² The whole lecture is put by the commentators in the mouth of *Rîshabha*.

³ The first and last Tîrthakaras belonged to the Kâsyapa Gôtra.

⁴ I.e. by your own acts, by order, and by assent ; or by thoughts, words, and acts.

perfection, and others, who live now, and who are to come, (will reach it). (21)

Thus spoke the Arhat *Gñâtriputra*, the reverend, famous native of *Vaisâli*¹, who possessed the highest knowledge and the highest faith, who possessed (simultaneously) the highest knowledge and faith.

Thus I say.

THIRD LECTURE,

CALLED

THE KNOWLEDGE OF TROUBLES ².

FIRST CHAPTER.

A man believes himself a hero as long as he does not behold the foe, as did *Sisupâla* (before he beheld) the valorously-fighting, great warrior ³. (1)

They go forward to the head of the battle; but when the fight has begun the mother will not recognise her son, and he will be mangled by his foe. (2)

So a novice, who as yet has not suffered pains and is not yet used to a mendicant's life, believes himself a hero till he practises austerities ⁴. (3)

¹ See my remarks in part i, Introduction, p. xi. This passage in prose appended to the metrical text seems to contradict the supposition of the commentators that the whole lecture was pronounced by *Rishabha*.

² Compare *Uttarâdhyayana* II, above, p. 9 ff.

³ Viz. *Krishna*. *Krishna*'s victory over *Sisupâla* is told in the *Mahâbhârata*, *Sabhâparvan*, *Sisupâlavadha* (eighth parvan). It forms the subject of *Mâgha*'s famous poem *Sisupâlavadha*.

⁴ *Lûham* = *rûksham*, i.e. *samyamam*, control.

When during the winter they suffer from cold and draughts, the weak become disheartened like Kshatriyas who have lost their kingdom. (4)

When they suffer from the heat of summer, sad and thirsty, the weak become disheartened like fish in shallow water. (5)

It is painful never to take anything but what is freely given, and begging is a hard task. Common people say that (men become monks) because they will not work and are wretched. (6)

Weak men who are unable (to bear) these insults in villages or towns, become disheartened like cowards in the battle. (7)

Perchance a snarling dog will bite a hungry monk ; in that case the weak will become disheartened like animals burnt by fire. (8)

Some who hate (the monks), revile them : ' Those who lead such a (miserable) life (as monks do), atone but (for their sins in a former life).' (9)

Some call them names, as ' naked, lowest of beggars, baldhead, scabby, filthy, nasty.' (10)

Those who behave in this way and do not know better, go from darkness to utter darkness, being fools and shrouded in delusion¹. (11)

When bitten by flies and gnats, and unable (to bear) the pricking of grass, (they will begin to doubt), ' I have not seen the next world, all may end with death² ! ' (12)

Some weak men who suffer from the plucking out of the hair, and who are unable to preserve their chastity, will become disheartened like fish transfixed by a spear³. (13)

¹ Compare I, 1, 1, 14.

² Compare I, 3, 3, 6.

³ Kêṭana, perhaps ' caught with the hook.'

Some low people who lead a life of iniquity, and entertain heretical opinions, being subject to love and hatred, injure a monk. (14)

Some fools in outlying countries take a pious monk for a spy or a thief, bind him, and insult him with angry words. (15)

A weak monk being hurt with a stick or a fist or a fruit, remembers his (kind) relations, just as a woman who in a passion has left (her husband and house). (16)

All these hardships are difficult to bear; the weak return to their house (when they cannot bear them), like elephants covered with arrows (break down). (17)

Thus I say.

SECOND CHAPTER.

There are some tender affections which monks cannot easily overcome. On their account some become disheartened, and are unable to practise control. (1)

His relations on seeing him will surround him and cry: 'Child, we have brought you up, (now) support us! O dear! why will you leave us? (2)

'Child, your father is an old man; your sister is still very young; (and here), O dear, are your own brothers from the same mother; why will you leave us? (3)

'Support your mother and father, thus you will win this world; it is a duty in this world to protect one's mother. (4)

'The old people are kind-spoken; your sons, child, are very young; you have married your wife; (take care) that she will not go to another man. (5)

‘Come, child, let us go home; we can do all the work, you need not (do it); the next time we shall take care (that you will not be overburdened with work); child, let us meanwhile go to our house. (6)

‘Afterwards you may go again; by this (visit of yours) you will not cease to be a Sramana; who will hinder you to practise control when you have done with worldly desires¹? (7)

‘All your outstanding debts we have divided between us, and we shall give you the money (required for) business.’ (8)

In this way (his relations) come to him, lamenting, and try to persuade him. Held fast by his attachment for his relations, he quickly returns to his house. (9)

As a creeper encircles a tree growing in the forest, so his relations press him hard that he should leave off control. (10)

He is held fast by his attachment for his relations. So the keepers always follow a newly-caught elephant, and a cow which has just calved never goes far (from the calf). (11)

Men do not (easily) get over this attachment, as (they do not get over) the ocean². For its sake the weak suffer pains, being engrossed by their attachment for their relations. (12)

But a monk should renounce it; for every attachment is but a cause of sin. He should not desire life, having been instructed in the best Law. (13)

There are these whirlpools which have been

¹ Akâmagam. Another explanation is, if you are not willing (to do domestic work).

² Pâtâla, explained by samudra.

pointed out by Kâsyapa : the wise keep clear of them, but the ignorant go down in them. (14)

Kings and ministers of kings, Brâhmanas and Kshattriyas try with pleasant things to seduce a monk who leads a holy life. (15)

(They try to seduce him) with elephants, horses, chariots, and cars, with pleasure-trips (saying to him) : ' Enjoy these excellent pleasures, great sage, we worship you ! (16)

' Clothes, perfumes, ornaments, women, and beds : enjoy these pleasures, friend, we worship you ! (17)

' All the vows which you, holy man, have kept while a monk, are compatible with your living in a house. (18)

' It will be no sin, for you have wandered about long (enough).' In this way they try to tempt him, as men decoy a pig with wild rice. (19)

Weak men who are exhorted to live as monks, but who are unable to practise control, break down like weak (bullocks carrying a heavy burden) uphill. (20)

Unable to practise the rough (i.e. control), and harassed by the austerities, weak men break down, like old oxen in going uphill. (21)

When men who are greedy, attached to women, and who love pleasures, are tempted in the way described above, they return to their houses. (22)

Thus I say.

THIRD CHAPTER.

As at the time of the battle the coward looks behind him for a ditch, thicket, or other hiding-place¹, (thinking that) nobody knows who will win ; (1)

¹ Nâma = prakṣhannam, giriguhâdikam.

‘A moment’s moment will bring the decision¹; when we lose, we shall fly.’ Thus thinks the coward. (2)

So some *Sramanas*, knowing themselves to be weak, have recourse to worldly sciences² when they see that they will suffer want. (3)

(They say): ‘Who knows what will cause my loss of sanctity, women or water? When we are questioned, we shall speak out (i.e. show our knowledge). We have no (other) resource (in case of need)!’ (4)

They are cautious, like those who look out for a ditch, &c. Those who doubt (their ability for control) are like men ignorant of the way. (5)

But famous warriors, leaders of heroes at the time of the battle, do not look behind them; (they think) what if all end with death? (6)

A monk who exerts himself in a similar way, should slip off the ties that bind him to his house. Putting aside all undertakings, he should wander about for the welfare of his soul. (7)

Some revile a monk who leads a holy life. But these revilers are far off from perfection³. (8)

(The revilers say), ‘You live just as the laymen do, being attached to one another, for (e.g.) you beg alms for a sick man and give it him. (9)

‘Therefore you still have an attachment, being obedient to the will of one another; you have not the purity produced by the right path, and have not got beyond the Circle of Births.’ (10)

Now a monk who knows (the truth about) *Môksha*

¹ Literally, a moment of a moment of moments will be such.

² As grammar, astrology, medicine, &c.

³ *Samâhi*, explained *môksha*, compare first note in the Tenth Lecture.

should answer them¹: 'You speak thus, wavering between two ways of life (viz. that of householders and monks). (11)

'You eat out of the vessels² (of householders, and make them) bring food for a sick brother; you eat seeds and drink cold water³, and what has been especially prepared (for you when sick). (12)

'You are infected by great faults, you are void of discrimination, and your resolutions are bad. It is not good to scratch a wound too much, for it will grow worse⁴.' (13)

They should be instructed in the truth by one who knows it and is free from passions⁵: 'Yours is not the right way, you speak and act without consideration. (14)

'This your talk is weak, like the top of a bamboo, (when you say: a sick brother) may eat the food brought by a householder, but not that brought by a monk! (15)

'(And when you say that) our religious precepts are wholesome only for householders (not for monks, we reply that our prophet had) no such (inconsistent) ideas when he taught (his Law).' (16)

When (these heretics) cannot prove (their assertion) by any arguments they give up the discussion, and fall back on their bold (assertion). (17)

¹ According to *Sīlāṅka* the *Āgīvikas* or the *Digambaras* are intended.

² For these heretics carry the principle of absolute poverty so far as to reject even the use of almsbowls.

³ *Bīgôḍaka*.

⁴ The meaning is that the overdoing of the principle of poverty is just as harmful as the scratching of a wound.

⁵ *Apaḍinna* = *apratigṇa*, explained by *rāgadvêsharahita*.

Overcome by their passions and infected by untruth, (these men) have recourse to bad language, as the (savage) *Tañkana*¹ (when beaten) have recourse to their hills. (18)

The argumentation of a monk whose mind is at rest² should possess many good qualities. He should proceed in such a way as not to exasperate his opponent. (19)

Following this Law which has been proclaimed by the *Kâsyapa*, a sound monk should carefully attend a sick brother. (20)

Knowing the beautiful Law, a wise and thoroughly restrained monk should bear all hardships and wander about till he reaches final liberation. (21)

Thus I say.

FOURTH CHAPTER.

Some say that in old times great men, rich in religious penance, have reached perfection though they drank (cold) water (and ate fruits and roots). Ignorant men (who hear such assertions) are led astray (by them). (1)

‘Nami, the king of *Vidêha*, ate nothing, *Râmagupta* did eat, *Bâhuka* drank (cold) water, and so did *Târâgana*³, the seer. (2)

‘*Âsila*, *Dêvala*, the great sage *Dvîpâyana*, and

¹ This hill tribe lived somewhere in the north-east of *Madhyadêsa*, see *Petersburg Dictionary*, s. v.

² *Attasamâhiê* = *âtmasamâdhika*.

³ Concerning *Nami*, see above, p. 35, note 2. *Râmagupta* may be another name of *Râma*. Instead of *Târâgana* *Śilânka* writes *Nârâyana*.

Pârâsara did drink (cold) water, and did eat seeds and sprouts¹. (3)

‘I have heard that in old times these renowned and well-known great men ate seeds and drank water, and have reached perfection.’ (4)

When weak (monks hear such assertions) they become disheartened, as donkeys break down under their burden; in case of danger they retreat (and perish) like men who walk on crutches². (5)

Some³ say: Pleasant things are produced from pleasant things⁴. (They are those who disdain) the noble path and the renowned highest good. (6)

Do not, by disdaining it, lose much for the sake of little. If you do not give up this (wrong law), you will repent of it as the man did who carried iron (a long way) believing it to be silver. (7)

(And so will) those who kill living beings, who do not abstain from untrue speech, who take what is not freely given them, who enjoy sexual pleasures, and who own property. (8)

¹ Âsila is not known from other sources; perhaps Asita is meant, and Âsila Dêvila stands for Asita Dêvala. Concerning Dvîpâyana, the Pârâsara, compare Journal of the German Oriental Society, vol. 42, p. 495. But in the Aupapâtika Sûtra (ed. Leumann, § 76) Pârâsara and Dvîpâyana are two distinct persons.

² *Pîdhasappî* = *pîḥasarpin*. *Sîlânka* comments on the reading *pîḥasappî*, i.e. *prîṣṭhasarpin*; but he makes out no good meaning.

³ According to the commentators the Buddhists are intended. They quote some verses in illustration of the *pushîmârğa* of the Buddhists, one of which is not yet known I believe. It runs thus: *manunnam bhôyanam bhukkâ manunnam sayanâsanam | manunnamsi agâramsî manunnam ghâyae munî* || ‘Having enjoyed a pleasant dinner, and a pleasant seat and bed, a *munî* in a pleasant house meditates on pleasant things.’

⁴ Viz. *Môksha*, a pleasant thing, is arrived at through a comfortable life, another pleasant thing.

Some unworthy heretics¹, slaves of women, ignorant men who are averse to the Law of the Gīnas, speak thus: (9)

‘As the squeezing of a blister or boil (causes relief) for some time, (and has no dangerous consequences), so it is with (the enjoyment of) charming women. How could there be any sin in it? (10)

‘As a ram drinks the quiet water², so, &c. (the rest as in verse 10). (11)

‘As the bird Piṅga³ drinks the quiet water (flying), &c. (the rest as in verse 10).’ (12)

So say some unworthy heretics who entertain false doctrines, and who long for pleasures, as the ewe⁴ for her kid. (13)

Those who do not think of the future, but only enjoy the present, will repent of it afterwards when their life or their youth is gone. (14)

But those who exert themselves at the proper time, feel no remorse afterwards; these heroes who have got rid of their fetters, do not long for life. (15)

As Vaitaraṇī, the river (of hell), is difficult to pass, so in this world women are to the unwise (a temptation) difficult to overcome. (16)

Those who have given up intercourse with women

¹ Pāsāttha = pārsvastha.

² The meaning seems to be that by the ram’s drinking the water is not disturbed.

³ Explained by kapiṅgala, the francoline partridge.

⁴ Pūyaṇā (pūtana, who is ever desirous of young), explained either by sākinī ‘hog’ or gaddarikā ‘ewe.’ The commentators relate the following anecdote. In order to find out which animal loved its young ones best, their young ones were placed at the bottom of a well. Their mothers assembled round the brink and howled, but the ewe threw herself recklessly into the well. Therefore the ewe excels the other animals in maternal love.

and have left off adorning themselves, are well established in control, because they have renounced everything. (17)

As merchants go over the sea, so they will cross the flood (of *Samsâra*), where living beings despond and suffer pains because of their own deeds. (18)

A monk who knows this, will live as a virtuous man guarded by the Samitis; he will abstain from untrue speech, and not take what is not freely given him. (19)

He should cease to injure living beings whether they move or not, on high, below, and on earth. For this has been called the *Nirvâna*, which consists in peace¹. (20)

21, 22 = I, 3, 3, 20 and 21.

Thus I say.

FOURTH. LECTURE²,

CALLED

KNOWLEDGE OF WOMEN.

FIRST CHAPTER.

A monk who has left his mother and father and all worldly ties, (determines) to walk about alone and wise, to abstain from sexual pleasures, and to ask for a secluded place (where to lodge). (1)

¹ See below, I, 11, 11.

² This whole *adhyayana* is composed in the archaic form of *Âryâ*, of which I have treated at length in the thirty-eighth volume of the *Journal of the German Oriental Society*, p. 594. The same metre occurs also in the *Suttanipâta* of the Buddhists (ed. Fausböll, 26 f., 170 ff.), a fact which I was not aware of when I wrote the paper just referred to.

With clever pretences women make up to him, however foolish they be ; they know how to contrive that some monks will become intimate with them. (2)

They will often sit down at his side ; they always put on fine clothes ; they will show him the lower part of their body, and the armpit, when lifting up their arms, so that he will follow them about. (3)

And occasionally a woman¹ will tempt him to a comfortable couch or bed. But he should know these things to be as many traps under various disguises. (4)

He should not look at them, nor should he consent to anything inconsiderate, nor walk together with them ; thus he will well guard himself. (5)

Inviting a monk and winning his confidence, they offer themselves to him. But he should know, and fly from these temptations² in their various forms. (6)

Meekly and politely they approach him with their manifold arts to win his heart ; and talking sweetly in confidential conversation they make him do (what they like). (7)

As (men by baiting) with a piece of flesh a fearless single lion get him into a trap, so women may capture an ascetic though he be careful. (8)

And then they make him do what they like, even as a wheelwright gradually turns the felly of a wheel. As an antelope caught in a snare, so he does not get out of it, however he struggles. (9)

Afterwards he will feel remorse like one who has drunk milk mixed with poison ; considering the

¹ The original has the plural itthîḥ, but the metre requires itthî in the singular.

² Literally 'sounds,' which stands for objects of the senses in general.

consequences, a worthy monk should have no intercourse with women. (10)

Therefore he should avoid women, knowing them to be like a poisoned thorn. He is no Nirgrantha who without companion (goes into) houses, being a slave (to passion) and preaches (his religion). (11)

Those who are attached to this sinful (intercourse) must be reckoned among the wicked. Even a monk who practises severe austerities should avoid the company of women. (12)

A monk should have no intercourse with his daughters and daughters-in-law, with nurses or female slaves, or with grown-up girls. (13)

When the relations and friends see (the intimacy of a monk with a girl), they become angry (saying) : 'All creatures love pleasures ; you are a man, protect and support her.' (14)

But some become angry even when they see an innocent *Sramana*, and suspect the fidelity of their wives because of the dishes they serve up¹. (15)

Those who have intercourse with (women) have already ceased to practise meditation ; *Sramanas*, therefore, for the benefit of their souls, do not go to the apartments (of women). (16)

Though many leave the house, some (of them) arrive but at a middling position (between householder and monk) ; they merely talk of the path to perfection. The force of sinners is talking. (17)

In the assembly he pronounces holy (words), yet secretly he commits sins ; but the wise know him to be a deceiver and great rogue. (18)

¹ There is a saying in German : Eine verliebte Köchin versalzt den Brei, 'a cook in love spoils the soup.' The commentators put different constructions on the last part of the sentence.

The sinner does not confess his wrong, but rather boasts of it when reprimanded. Though he is admonished not to act as most men do, he becomes weak again and again. (19)

Some men of great intelligence who perform their duties as supporters of women, get into their power, though they be well acquainted with the *Strīvêda*¹. (20)

(The adulterers') hands and feet are cut off, their skin and flesh are torn off, they are roasted alive, and acid is poured into their wounds. (21)

Their ears and nose are cut off, and their throats cut ; (all this) they will suffer, but though suffering here for their sins they will not promise not to do² the same again. (22)

All this some have learned, and it has been well demonstrated in the *Strīvêda*. Though (people) know it, they do wrong (impelled) by *Karman*. (23)

One man (women) have in their heart, another in their words, and another still in their actions. Therefore a monk should not trust women, knowing that they are full of deceit. (24)

A young woman, putting on fine ornaments and clothes, will say to a *Sramana* : ' I shall give up (my former way of life) and practise the rough (viz. control). Reverend sir, teach me the Law ! ' (25)

Or by professing herself a lay-disciple and co-religionist of the *Sramanas*, (she will try to make a friend of him). As a pot filled with lac (will melt)

¹ I. e. *Kâmasâstra*, or rather the part of it treating on courtezans, *Vaisika*, that had been composed by *Dattaka*. He is mentioned by the commentators in an anecdote they relate ad v. 24.

² The original has *kâhinti* ' they will do ; ' it must be *kâham* ti ' I shall do.'

near the fire, so even a wise (monk) will fall through intercourse with women. (26)

A pot filled with lac thrown into the fire melts quickly and is destroyed; so monks are lost through intercourse with women. (27)

Some commit sins (with a girl), but when questioned about it, they say: 'I have done no sin; she only slept in my lap (like my daughter).' (28)

This is a second folly of the sinner that he obstinately denies what he has done. He commits a twofold sin, since, for the sake of his reputation, he falls again¹. (29)

(Some women) will say, by way of invitation, to a good-looking, self-knowing monk: 'Holy man, accept a robe, an almsbowl, food or drink (at our house)!' (30)

He should regard their words like wild rice², and should not desire to call at (their) house; for a fool who is bound in the fetters of sensuality will be subject to delusion again and again. (31)

Thus I say.

SECOND CHAPTER.

A monk, living single³, should not fall in love; if he loves pleasures, he should again become indifferent. Now hear the pleasures of *Sramanas*, which some monks enjoy. (1)

When a monk breaks the law, dotes (on a woman), and is absorbed by that passion, she afterwards

¹ *Visannêsi*. *Vishanna* is explained as *amyama*.

² Wherewith pigs are decoyed, see above, p. 265, verse 19.

³ *Ôê* = *êkaḥ*, explained: free from love and hate.

scolds him¹, lifts her foot, and tramples on his head. (2)

‘O monk, if you will not live with me as a woman who has still her hair, I shall tear it out; but do not live separated from me.’ (3)

But when they have captured him, they send him on all sorts of errands²: ‘Look (for the bodkin to) carve the bottle-gourd³, fetch some nice fruit. (4)

‘(Bring) wood to cook the vegetables, or that we may light a fire at night; paint my feet⁴, come and meanwhile rub my back! (5)

‘Look after my clothes, bring food and drink, get me some perfume, a broom, a barber⁵ (to shave my head)! (6)

‘Give me the collyrium-box, my ornaments, the lute, Lōdhra-powder⁶, a Lōdhra-flower, the Vēṇu-palāsika-lute⁷, a pill! (7)

‘A Utpalakushṭa⁸, Tagara⁹-powder, and aloe pounded together with Uśtra¹⁰, oil for anointing the

¹ Paribhindiyaṇa = paribhidya.

² The following verses are interesting as they afford us a glimpse of a Hindu household some 2,000 years ago. We find here a curious list of domestic furniture and other things of common use.

³ Alābukkkhegga = alābukkkhēdam pippalakādi sastram.

⁴ Or, scour my pots.

⁵ Kāsavaga = kāsyaṇa, explained nāpita. The word is probably derived from the root kash ‘to scrape.’ According to Sīlāṅka verses 5–6 refer to things used by monks and nuns.

⁶ Symplocos Racemosa, the bark of which is used in dyeing.

⁷ This is a thin piece of bamboo or bark held between the teeth and with the left hand, and played by the right hand just like a Vīṇā. (Sīlāṅka.)

⁸ Probably Costus Speciosus. ⁹ Tabernaemontana Coronaria.

¹⁰ Andropogon Muricatus.

face, baskets of bamboo wickerwork to put my things in! (8)

‘Reach me the lip-salve, fetch the umbrella and slippers, the knife to cut the string, have my robe dyed bluish! (9)

‘Give me the pot to cook the vegetables in, Myrobalans¹, the jar to fetch water in, the stick to paint the mark upon the forehead, the pin to apply collyrium (to the eyelids), or the fan when it is hot! (10)

‘Fetch me the pincers², the comb, the ribbon to bind up the hair, reach me the looking-glass, put the tooth-brush near me! (11)

‘Fetch me areca-nut and betel, needle and thread, the chamber-pot, the winnowing basket, the mortar, the pot for liquefying natron³! (12)

‘Give me the vessel (used in worshipping the gods⁴), the water-pot. Friend, dig a privy. Fetch the bow for our son, the bullock for the *Srâmanêra*! (13)

‘The small pot, the drum, and the ball of cloth for the boy (to play with). *Sramana*, the rainy season is at hand, look after the house and the stores! (14)

‘(Fetch) the chair with woven twine seat⁵, the wooden shoes⁶ to walk on!’ Pregnant women order

¹ They are used in bathing.

² To tear out the hair growing in the nose.

³ Used in India instead of soap for cleaning linen.

⁴ *Kandâlaka*, a copper vessel used in worship. The name was current in Mathurâ at the time when *Silânka* wrote or the author from whose work he copied this remark.

⁵ See Grierson, *Bihar Peasant Life*, § 632.

⁶ *Pâulla*; either the wooden sandals or slippers made of *Muṅga* grass.

their husbands about like slaves to fulfil their craving. (15)

When a son, the reward (of their wedded life), is born, (the mother bids the father) to hold the baby, or to give it her. Thus some supporters of their sons have to carry burdens like camels. (16)

Getting up in the night they lull the baby asleep¹ like nurses; and though they are ashamed of themselves, they wash the clothes like washermen². (17)

This has been done by many men who for the sake of pleasures have stooped so low; they become the equals of slaves, animals, servants, beasts of burden—mere nobodies. (18)

One should not mind the entreaties of women, but abstain from their friendship and company. These pleasures which are derived therefrom are called causes of blamable actions. (19)

Restraining himself by the thought that these dangerous (pleasures) will not be to his benefit, a monk should abstain from women, and commit no unnatural crime³. (20)

A wise and learned monk whose soul is in a pure condition (Lāsyā), will abstain from doing work for others; in thoughts, words, and actions he will bear all troubles. (21)

The hero (of faith) who has vanquished sin and delusion, has said all this. A monk, therefore, whose soul is pure (and free from sins) should wander about till he reaches final liberation. (22)

Thus I say.

¹ Sīlāṅka gives a specimen of a lullaby without meaning and metre.

² Hamsa, explained ragaka.

³ No itthim no pasum bhikkhū no sayapāninā niliggeggā.

FIFTH LECTURE,

CALLED

DESCRIPTION OF THE HELLS.

FIRST CHAPTER.

I once asked the Kêvalin, the great sage¹: What is the punishment in the hells? Knowing it, O sage, tell it me who do not know it! How do sinners go to hell? (1)

When I thus questioned the illustrious Kâsyapa, the omniscient one² spoke as follows: I shall describe the truly insupportable pains where there is distress and (the punishment of) evil deeds. (2)

Those cruel sinners who, from a desire of (worldly) life, commit bad deeds, will sink into the dreadful hell which is full of dense darkness and great suffering. (3)

He who always kills movable and immovable beings for the sake of his own comfort, who injures them, who takes what is not freely given, who does not learn what is to be practised (viz. control); (4)

The impudent sinner, who injures many beings without relenting³, will go to hell; at the end of his life he will sink to the (place of) darkness; head downwards he comes to the place of torture. (5)

They hear the cries of the punishers: Beat, cut,

¹ I. e. Mahâvîra. Sudharman speaks to Gambûsvâmin.

² Âsupanna = âsupragña 'quickly comprehending.' I usually render this word 'intelligent,' when it is used of common monks.

³ Anivvû = anirvritaḥ.

split, burn him! The prisoners in hell lose their senses from fright, and do not know in what direction to run. (6)

Going to a place like a burning heap of coals on fire, and being burnt they cry horribly; they remain there long, shrieking aloud. (7)

Have you heard of the horrible (river) Vaitaraṇī, whose cutting waves are like sharp razors¹? They cross the horrible Vaitaraṇī, being urged on by arrows, and wounded with spears. (8)

The punishers pierce them with darts; they go in the boat, losing their memory; others pierce them with long pikes and tridents, and throw them on the ground. (9)

Some, round whose neck big stones are tied, are drowned in deep water. Others again roll about in the Kadambavālukā (river)² or in burning chaff, and are roasted in it. (10)

And they come to the great impassable hell, full of agony, called Asūrya (i.e. where the sun does not shine), where there is great darkness, where fires, placed above, below, and all around, are blazing. (11)

There, as in a cave, being roasted on the fire, he is burned, having lost the reminiscence (of his sins) and consciousness of everything else; always suffering (he comes) to that miserable hot place that is ever ready (for the punishment of evildoers)³. (12)

¹ Silāṅka says that the water of this river is alkali and hot blood; compare Uttarādhyayana XIX, 59, above p. 95.

² See the note on Uttarādhyayana XIX, 50, above p. 94, note 1.

³ The last two lines recur in verse 21 with the only difference that there *kaśinam* stands for *kaluṇam* in this place; yet the commentators offer a different explanation in the second place. In my translation I follow their interpretation both times.

There the cruel punishers have lighted four fires, and roast the sinners; they are roasted there like fishes put on the fire alive. (13)

The prisoners in hell come to the dreadful place called Santakshana¹ (i.e. cutting), where the cruel punishers tie their hands and feet, and with axes in their hands cut them like wooden planks. (14)

And they turn the writhing victims round, and stew them, like living fishes, in an iron caldron filled with their own blood, their limbs covered with ordure, their heads smashed. (15)

They are not reduced to ashes there, and they do not die of their enormous pains; undergoing this punishment², the miserable men suffer for their misdeeds. (16)

And there in the place, where there is constant shivering, they resort to a large burning fire; but they find no relief in that place of torture; the tormentors torture them still³. (17)

There is heard everywhere the noise of painfully uttered cries even as in the street of a town. Those whose bad Karman takes effect (viz. the punishers), violently torment again and again those whose bad Karman takes effect also (viz. the punished). (18)

They deprive the sinner of his life; I shall truly tell you how this is done. The wicked (punishers) remind by (similar) punishment (their victims) of all sins they had committed in a former life⁴. (19)

Being killed they are thrown into a hell which is

¹ Here and in similar places the commentators do not take the word as a proper name, but as an epithet.

² Anubhâga.

³ Or, with burning fire they roast them.

⁴ See Uttarâdhyayana XIX, 69 ff., above p. 96.

full of boiling filth. There they stay eating filth, and they are eaten by vermin. (20)

And there is an always crowded, hot place, which men deserve for their great sins, and which is full of misery¹. (The punishers) put them in shackles, beat their bodies, and torment them (by perforating) their skulls with drills. (21)

They cut off the sinner's nose with a razor, they cut off both his ears and lips; they pull out his tongue a span's length and torment (him by piercing it) with sharp pikes. (22)

There the sinners dripping (with blood) whine day and night even as the dry leaves of a palm-tree (agitated by the wind). Their blood, matter, and flesh are dropping off while they are roasted, their bodies being besmeared with natron. (23)

Have you heard of the large, erected caldron of more than man's size, full of blood and matter, which is extremely heated by a fresh fire, in which blood and matter are boiling? (24)

The sinners are thrown into it and boiled there, while they utter horrid cries of agony; they are made to drink molten lead and copper when they are thirsty, and they shriek still more horribly. (25)

Those evildoers who have here forfeited their souls' (happiness) for the sake of small (pleasures), and have been born in the lowest births during hundred thousands of 'former years,' will stay in this (hell). Their punishment will be adequate to their deeds. (26)

The wicked who have committed crimes will

¹ Compare note on verse 12. The same lines recur in the next chapter, verse 13. The commentator gives the same explanation there as here.

atone for them, deprived of all pleasant and lovely objects, by dwelling in the stinking crowded hell, a scene of pain, which is full of flesh (&c.). (27)

Thus I say.

SECOND CHAPTER.

I shall now truly tell you another kind of perpetual suffering, how the sinners who have committed crimes suffer for the deeds they have done in their former lives. (1)

Tying their hands and feet the (punishers) cut open their belly with razors and knives; taking hold of the mangled body of the sinner, they forcibly tear the skin off his back. (2)

They cut off his arms at the armpits; they force his mouth wide open and scald it; they yoke the sinner to a car and drive him, and growing angry¹ they pierce his back with a goad. (3)

The (sinners) walk over ground burning and glowing like red-hot iron; scorched they shriek horribly, being urged on with arrows² and put to a red-hot yoke. (4)

The sinners are driven over slippery ground which is like a road of red-hot iron; in this dreadful place (the ministers of hell) make them go forward like slaves (beating them) with sticks. (5)

Proceeding in this intolerable (hell) they are crushed by rocks tumbling down. There is the

¹ Ârussa = ârushya, here and in a similar passage (verse 15) the commentators explain it, 'making him angry, exasperating him.' They have misunderstood rahaṃsi in the second line, rendering it rahasi; it is of course = rathê.

² Usu = ishu, explained by âravisêsha 'a kind of awl.'

(caldron) Santāpanī¹, where evildoers suffer for a long time. (6)

They throw the sinners into caldrons and boil them; scalded they rise thence again; devilish crows² feed on them and (so do) other beasts having claws devour them. (7)

There is a place of smokeless fire in the form of a pile³ where (the sinners) greatly distressed shriek horribly; head downwards they are lacerated and cut into pieces with iron knives. (8)

Tied up and skinned they are devoured by steel-nibbed birds; it is the hell called Samgṭvant, where life is long, and where men of an evil mind are tortured. (9)

The (punishers) pierce them with sharp pikes as people do with a captured pig. Transfixed by a pike the (sinners) shriek horribly; suffering both (bodily and mentally) they feel nothing but pains. (10)

There is a great place always on fire, where fires burn without fuel; there for a long time stay the evildoers shrieking aloud. (11)

Setting on fire large piles, they thrust into them (a sinner) who will cry horribly; as butter thrown in the fire melts, so does the evildoer there. (12)

And there is an always crowded, hot place which one deserves for one's great sins, and which is full of misery. There (the punishers) tie (the sinner's)

¹ Or, it is (the hell) called Santāpanī. My translation in the text agrees with Śīlāṅka's interpretation.

² Compare Uttarādhyayana XIX, 58, p. 95.

³ Samūsiyam nāma. This might also be rendered, 'called Samukkkhrita.' But the commentators do not take samūsiya for a proper name.

hands and feet, and belabour him with sticks like an enemy. (13)

They break the sinner's back with a weapon, and smash his skull with iron clubs; their bodies are split and sawn like a plank; and tortured with red-hot awls (the sinners) are subjected (to cruelties). (14)

Cruel evildoers¹, urged on with arrows, and put to work (by the punishers), carry burdens in the way of elephants; two or three (punishers) get on one (victim) and growing angry² hurt his vital parts. (15)

The sinners are driven over the large, slippery, and thorny ground; tightly bound with straps³ they lose their senses; the revenging (punishers) cut them into pieces⁴, and throw them about like a bali-sacrifice. (16)

There is a dreadful mountain towering high up in the air, called Vaitālika⁵, where the evildoers are tortured for more than a thousand hours. (17)

Tortured, the sinners shriek, suffering day and night; in this horrid, great hell, which is full of implements of torture, they are put to a cruel death. (18)

Full of wrath, like their enemies in a former life,

¹ Ruddaasāhukammī = raudra-asādhū-karmāṇaḥ. Sīlāṅka thinks that the ministers of hell are meant; but then the verse will not construe.

² See note on verse 3.

³ Vivaddhatappēhiṃ, in a marginal gloss, explained: baddhvā karmabandhanaiḥ. But it might also be vivṛiddhatāpaiḥ 'under increased tortures.'

⁴ Koṭṭa = kuṭayitvā.

⁵ Vêtāliya. The commentators render it vaikriya 'produced by magic,' and moreover explain the word as an epithet, not as a proper name.

(the punishers) crush them with hammers and clubs. With mangled bodies, and vomiting blood, they fall to the ground, head foremost. (19)

There are the ever hungry¹, savage, always wrathful, great jackals by whom the evildoers bound with shackles are devoured. (20)

There is the dreadful, slimy river, which is always flowing and full of molten iron; in this very dreadful river (the sinners) must descend one by one². (21)

These pains are suffered without interruption by the sinner who stays there for a long time. There is no escape from the torture; he must, himself and alone, suffer the pains. (22)

Whatever cruelty he has done in a former birth, the same will be inflicted on him in the Circle of Births. Having been born in an extremely miserable state of life, the sufferer experiences infinite pain. (23)

A wise man hearing of these hells should not kill any living being in the whole world; believing in true doctrines and renouncing all property he should know the world, but not become a slave to it. (24)

Knowing the endless Circle of Births³ with regard to animals, men, and gods, and the reward they will get; knowing all this, (a wise man) should wait for his decease, practising meanwhile self-control. (25)

Thus I say.

¹ *Anâsiyâ, anasitâh*. This might also be taken as the name of the jackals.

² *Êgâyatâ*, explained *êkakinah*.

³ *Kauranta*.

SIXTH LECTURE,

CALLED

PRAISE OF MAHĀVĪRA.

Sramanas and Brāhmanas, householders and heretics, have asked (me): Who is he that proclaimed this unrivalled truly wholesome Law, which was (put forward) with true knowledge¹? (1)

What was the knowledge, what the faith, and what the conduct of the *Gñātriputra*? If you know it truly, O monk, tell us as you have heard it, as it was told you! (2)

This wise and clever great sage possessed infinite knowledge and infinite faith. Learn and think about the Law and the piety of the glorious man who lived before our eyes²! (3)

This wise man had explored all beings, whether they move or not, on high, below, and on earth, as well as the eternal and transient things. Like a lamp he put the Law in a true light. (4)

He sees everything; his knowledge has got beyond (the four lower stages)³; he has no impurity; he is virtuous, of a fixed mind, the highest, the

¹ The question is supposed to be addressed by Gambûsvâmin to Sudharman.

² *Kakkhupahê tñiyassa = kakkshuḥpathê sthitasya*, literally, 'who stood (or stands) in the path of the eyes.' We are scarcely entitled to infer from this phrase that the author had actually seen Mahāvīra as tradition would make us believe.

³ *Abhibhūya-nānī*. Concerning the five stages or kinds of knowledge, see above, p. 152. The Kēvala knowledge is intended.

wisest in the whole world ; he has broken from all ties ; he is above danger and the necessity to continue life¹. (5)

Omniscient, wandering about without a home, crossing the flood (of the *Samsâra*), wise, and of an unlimited perception, without an equal, he shines forth (or he does penance) like the sun, and he illumines the darkness like a brilliant fire. (6)

The omniscient² sage, Kâsyapa, has proclaimed this highest Law of the *Ginas* ; he, the illustrious one, is prominent (among men) like the thousand-eyed Indra among the gods of heaven. (7)

His knowledge is inexhaustible like the (water of the) sea ; he has no limits and is pure like the great ocean ; he is free from passion, unfettered, and brilliant like *Sakra*, the lord of the gods. (8)

By his vigour he is the most vigorous ; as *Sudarsana* (*Mêru*), the best of all mountains, or as heaven, a very mine of delight, he shines forth endowed with many virtues. (9)

(*Mêru*) a hundred thousand *yôḡanas* high, with three tiers³, with the *Pandaga* (-wood) as its flag, rising ninety-nine thousand *yôḡanas* above the ground, and reaching one thousand below it ; (10)

It touches the sky and is immersed in the earth ; round it revolve the suns⁴ ; it has the colour of gold, and contains many *Nandana* (parks)⁵ ; on it the *Mahêndras* enjoy themselves. (11)

¹ To render *anâyuh*.

² *Âsupanna* = *âsupragṇa*, literally, 'quickly witted ;' the word is usually explained by *kêvalin*.

³ *Kandaka*, one of stone, one of gold, and one of turquoise.

⁴ As is well known the *Gainas* assume a plurality of suns.

⁵ The names of these four parks are, according to the com-

This mountain is distinguished by (many) names ; it has the colour of burnished gold ; it is the greatest of all mountains, difficult to ascend on account of its rocks ; this excellent mountain is like a part of the earth on fire. (12)

The king of mountains, standing in the centre of the earth, is seen in a pure light¹ like that of the sun. With such beauty shines forth this many-coloured, lovely (mountain), which is crowned with radiance. (13)

Thus is described the glory of mount Sudarsana, the great mountain ; similar to it is the *Sramana Gñâtriputra*, who is noble, glorious, full of faith, knowledge, and virtue. (14)

As *Nishadha*² is the best of long-stretched mountains, and *Ruḥaka* of circular ones, so is he (*Mahāvira*) among sages the wisest in the world, according to the declaration of the wise ones. (15)

After having taught the highest Law he practised the highest contemplation³, which is the purest of pure, pure without a flaw, thoroughly white (as it were) like mother-of-pearl and the moon. (16)

Having annihilated all his *Karman*, the great sage by his knowledge, virtue, and faith reached

mentary, *Sâlavana*, *Nandanavana*, *Saumanasavana*, and *Pandaka* (or *Pânduka*) vana. The first is at the foot of *Mêru*, the second 500 *yôgan*s above it, the third 62,000 above the second, and the fourth 36,000 above the last, i. e. at the very top.

¹ *Suddha-lessê* = *suddhalêsyâ*. Here *lêsyâ* is equal to *têgas*.

² *Nishadha* and *Ruḥaka* are two fabulous chains of mountains situated beyond *Gambûdvîpa*.

³ This is the *sukla dhyâna*. As *sukla*, which I translate 'pure,' originally means 'white,' the comparison with the moon is natural in the original.

the insurpassable, highest perfection, a state which has a beginning but no end. (17)

As the *Sālmālī*, in which the *Suparna*¹ gods take their delight, is most famous among trees, as *Nandana* is among parks, so is the Omniscient most famous through his knowledge and virtue. (18)

As thunder is the loudest of sounds, as the moon is the most glorious of heavenly bodies, as sandal is the best of perfumes, so of monks is he who had renounced all wishes or plans. (19)

As (the ocean on which sleeps) *Svayambhū* is the best of seas, as *Dharaṇendra* is the best of *Nāgas*, as the juice of sugarcane is, as it were, the flag of juices, so is he (*Mahāvīra*) the flag of monks by his austerities. (20)

As *Airāvata* is the best of elephants, the lion of beasts, *Gaṅgā* of rivers, as *Garuda*, *Vēnudēva*², is the best of birds, so is *Gñātriputra* the best of those who have taught the *Nirvāna*. (21)

As *Vishvaksēna*³ is the most famous of warriors, as the lotus is the best of flowers, as *Dantavakra* is the best of *Kshatriyas*, so *Vardhamāna* is the best of sages. (22)

As giving safety is the best of gifts, as the best of true speeches is that which causes no dis-

¹ They belong to the *Bhavanapatis*, see above, p. 225.

² The commentator says that *Vēnudēva* is another name of *Garuda*. *Vēnu* stands perhaps for *venhu* = *vishnu*; but I do not know that *Garuda* ever was directly identified with *Vishnu*.

³ *Visasēna*. *Vishvaksēna* is a name of *Krishna*. The commentators make *Virvasēna* of *Visasēna*, and seem to take it as a synonym of *lakravartin* or universal monarch. *Dantavakra* is mentioned in my 'Ausgewählte Erzählungen,' p. 35, line 36.

tress, as chastity is the highest of austerities, so is the Sramana *Gñâtriputra* the highest of men. (23)

As the Lavasaptamas¹ are the highest of those gods who live very long, as the palace Saudharman is the best of heavenly abodes, as Nirvâna is the chief object of the Law, so there is no wiser man than *Gñâtriputra*. (24)

He (bears everything) like the earth; he annihilates (his Karman); he is free from greed; he, the Omniscient, does not keep store (of anything); he has crossed the ocean of life like the sea: he, the Hero, who grants protection to all, and whose perception is infinite. (25)

Having conquered the passions which defile the soul: wrath, pride, deceit, and greed, the Arhat, the great sage, does not commit any wrong, nor does he cause it to be committed. (26)

He understood the doctrines of the Kriyâvâdins, of the Akriyâvâdins, of the Vainayikas, and of the *Agñânavâdins*²; he had mastered all philosophical systems, and he practised control as long as he lived. (27)

He abstained³ from women, and from eating at night, he practised austerities for the removal of pain, he knew this world and that beyond; the lord renounced³ everything at every time. (28)

Having heard and believing in the Law, which

¹ The commentator identifies them with the fifth class of Anuttara gods (see Uttarâdhyayana XXXVI, 215, above p. 227), and explains the name by saying 'if they lived seven lavas longer, they would reach perfection.'

² Concerning these four principal heresies see note on Uttarâdhyayana XVIII, 23, above p. 83.

³ Vâriya, literally 'forbade.'

has been proclaimed and taught by the Arhat, and has been demonstrated with arguments, people will either make an end of their mundane existence, or they will become like Indra, the king of gods. (29)

Thus I say.

SEVENTH LECTURE,

CALLED

DESCRIPTION OF THE WICKED.

Earth, water, fire, wind; grass, trees, and corn; and the movable beings, (viz.) the oviparous, viviparous, those generated from dirt, and those generated in fluids¹; (1)

These classes (of living beings) have been declared (by the *Ginas*); know and understand that they (all desire) happiness; by (hurting) these beings (men) do harm to their own souls, and will again and again be born as one of them. (2)

Every being born high or low in the scale of the living creation, among movable and immovable beings, will meet with its death. Whatever sins the evildoer commits in every birth, for them he must die². (3)

¹ The last two classes are, according to the commentators, (1) lice, bugs, &c.; (2) beings like cotton threads in thick milk, sour barley gruel, &c. Apparently vibrios are meant.

² *Miggati* = *mîyatê*. Another rendering offered by *Sîlânka* is 'he will be filled (by Karman).'

In this world or in the next (the sinners suffer themselves what they have inflicted on other beings), a hundred times, or (suffer) other punishment. Living in the *Samsâra* they ever acquire new Karman, and suffer for their misdeeds. (4)

Some leave their mother and father to live as *Sramanas*, but they use fire; (the prophet) says: 'People are wicked who kill beings for the sake of their own pleasure.' (5)

He who lights a fire, kills living beings; he who extinguishes it, kills the fire. Therefore a wise man who well considers the Law, should light no fire. (6)

Earth contains life, and water contains life; jumping (or flying) insects fall in (the fire); dirt-born vermin¹ (and beings) living in wood: all these beings are burned by lighting a fire. (7)

Sprouts are beings possessed of natural development², their bodies (require) nourishment, and all have their individual life. Reckless men who cut them down out of regard for their own pleasure, destroy many living beings. (8)

By destroying seeds, when young or grown up, a careless man does harm to his own soul. (The prophet) says: 'People are wicked who destroy seeds for the sake of their own pleasure.' (9)

¹ Viz. insects originated in dung, &c. used as fuel.

² *Vilambaga*; the commentators in explanation of this word say that plants, like men, go through all states of development, youth, ripe age, old age, &c. I think *vilambaga* is derived from *viḍambaka*, they imitate (the development of animals). For if I understand *Sīlânka* aright, a plant contains a great many *bhûtas* or beings, each localised in a certain part of the plant, as roots, &c. This is, according to him, the meaning of *pudhōsiyāni*, rendered in the text 'have their individual life.'

Men die as embryos, or as babies who do not yet talk, or who do so already; other men, as boys wearing five tufts of hair¹, or as youths, or in middle age: at the expiration of their life all leave the body and die. (10)

Wake up, men! If we look at the dangers (to which he is exposed) a fool has not much chance to obtain human birth; always suffering like men in fever, people will go to utter misery. (11)

Some say that perfection is reached by abstaining from the seasoner of food (viz. salt)², others by the use of cold water (i.e. by ablutions)³, others again by (tending) a fire⁴. (12)

Perfection is not reached by bathing in the morning, nor by abstention from acids and salt; but by drinking liquor or eating meat or garlic men obtain another state of existence (than perfection). (13)

Those who, touching water in the morning and evening, contend that perfection is obtained through water (are easily refuted). For if perfection could be obtained by contact with water, many beings living in water must have reached perfection: (14)

Fishes, tortoises, aquatic snakes, cormorants,

¹ *Pañkasikha*. It usually denotes certain ascetics: but *Śilāṅka* here renders it *kumāra* 'boy.'

² *Śilāṅka* notices two different readings: (1) *āhārasappañka-gavagganenaṃ*, by abstaining from food seasoned with one of the five kinds of salt (viz. *saindhava*, *sauvarkāla*, *viḍa*, *rauma*, *sāmudra*); (2) *āhāraḥ pañkagaḥ*, by abstaining from five kinds of food: garlic, onion, young camels' milk, beef, liquor.

³ *Śilāṅka* mentions the *Vāribhadrakas*, a subdivision of the *Bhāgavatas*, as belonging to this category. He states elsewhere that they eat *saivala* (*Vallisneria Octandra*) and frequently bathe, wash themselves, and drink water.

⁴ Viz. *Tāpasas* and *Brāhmanas*.

otters¹, and demons living in water. The clever ones declare those to be wrong who maintain that perfection may be obtained through water. (15)

If water did wash off the impure Karman, it must take off merit too. But this (assertion of the heretics) has no foundation but their wish. As a blind man follows a guide (and misses his goal), so a fool (who makes ablutions, &c. as a means of reaching Mōksha) kills living beings. (16)

If water did wash off the sins of him who committed them, some would have obtained perfection who killed water-beings. Therefore he is wrong who maintains the attainment of perfection through water. (17)

Those who, lighting fire in the morning and evening, contend that perfection is obtained through fire (are easily refuted). For if thereby perfection could be obtained, mechanics also, who use fire, would be liberated. (18)

Perfection cannot be established by such gratuitous assertions; those who have not learned the truth will come to harm. A wise man, who knows the truth, should know and understand that all beings desire happiness. (19)

All creatures who have committed sins wail, suffer, and tremble. Considering this a wise monk who has ceased to sin, and guards his own self, should abstain from violence with regard to movable and (immovable) beings. (20)

He who keeps a store of rightly-obtained food and eats it; he who makes ablutions with pure water,

¹ U//a or u//ha, explained as 'a kind of aquatic animal;' the Sanskrit prototype is apparently udra, but the commentators render it ush/ra!

contracting his limbs; he who washes and adorns his clothes, is far from being a naked monk. (21)

A wise man, seeing that it is sinful (to use) water, should live of pure water, till he is liberated from the *Samsâra*¹; not eating seeds and bulbs, he abstains from bathing, &c., and from women. (22)

He who, after having left father, mother, house, sons, cattle, and wealth, visits houses where he gets nice food, is far from being a *Sramana*. (23)

He who visits houses where he gets nice food, who professes the Law, desirous only of filling his belly, and brags (of himself) for the sake of food, is not equal to the hundredth part of an *Ārya*. (24)

A miserable man, who becomes a monk in order to get food from others, and a flatterer by the desire of filling his belly, will, in no remote future, come to harm, even as a boar greedy of wild rice². (25)

The servile man says pleasing things for the sake of food, drink, and other things: but wrong belief and bad conduct are worthless like chaff. (26)

He should beg where he is unknown, and maintain himself by it; he should not seek fame and respect by his austerities; he should not desire (pleasant) sounds and colours, but conquer his longing for all kinds of pleasures. (27)

A monk should avoid every attachment and bear every pain, be full (of wisdom), not greedy, wander about homeless, give assurance of safety (to all beings), and be free from passions. (28)

(In order to be able) to practise control³ a monk should eat; he should desire to get rid of sin; if he

¹ *Āi* = *âdi*.

² Cf. p. 265, verse 19.

³ *Bhârassa gâyâ* = *bhârasya* (= *śamyamasya*) *yâtâ*.

suffers pain, he should have recourse to control, and subdue the foe at the head of the battle, as it were. (29)

Though beaten he should be like a plank¹; he should wait for the advent of death; having annihilated his Karman he should not again mix with the world, but be rather like a car whose axle is broken. (30)

Thus I say.

EIGHTH LECTURE,

CALLED

ON EXERTION².

It is said that two definitions of exertion are given; but in what does the exertion of the virtuous consist, and how is it defined? (1)

Some say that it consists in works, and the pious (say that it consists) in abstention from works. Men appear divided into two classes from this point of view. (2)

Carelessness is called (the cause of) Karman, carefulness that of the contrary (viz. absence of Karman); when the one or the other is predicated

¹ Phalagâvata//hi = phalagavad avatash/aḥ. Śīlāṅka gives the following explanation: As a plank planed on both sides becomes thin, so a sādhu, by reducing his body by exterior and interior tapas, grows thin, of weak body.

² Vīrya; it is the power or virtue of a thing.

(of a man, he is called) either a fool or a wise man. (3)

Some learn sciences¹ which teach the destruction of living beings, others study spells for killing all sorts of creatures. (4)

Deceivers practise deceit in order to procure themselves pleasures and amusement ; they kill, cut, and dismember (beings) for the sake of their own comfort. (5)

The careless (commit sins) by thoughts, words, and acts, with regard to this and the next world, both (by doing the act themselves and by making others do it). (6)

A cruel² man does cruel acts and is thereby involved in other cruelties ; but sinful undertakings will in the end bring about misery. (7)

Sinners, subject to love and hate and doing wrong, acquire Karman arising from passions³ and commit many sins. (8)

Thus the 'exertion leading to works' of the sinners has been described ; now learn from me the wise men's 'exertion not leading to works.' (9)

A pious monk, who is free from bonds and has severed all fetters, annihilates his bad Karman, and removes definitely the thorn (of sin). (10)

Following the right doctrine he exerts himself ; as one becomes more and more the receptacle

¹ Sattha = sâstra or sastra. On the latter alternative we must translate '(practice of) arms.'

² Vêri = vairin, gîvôpamardakârin.

³ Karma is of two kinds, airyapathika, arising from 'walking,' i.e. from those actions which are indispensable to a virtuous life or the conduct of monks, and sâmparâyika, arising from the passions.

of misery, so his bad thoughts (or sinfulness) increase. (11)

Those who have good places (in heaven, &c.) must surely leave them (some time). We live together with relations and friends but a limited time. (12)

Considering this, a wise man should conquer his greed, and enter upon the noble (path), which contains all virtues and is not blamed¹. (13)

Whether he know the pith of the Law by intuition or through instruction, a houseless (monk) should exert himself and abstain from sins. (14)

When a wise man, in whatever way, comes to know that the apportioned space of his life draws towards its end, he should in the meantime quickly learn the method (of dying a religious death)². (15)

As a tortoise draws its limbs into its own body, so a wise man should cover, as it were, his sins with his own meditation. (16)

He should draw in, as it were, his hands and feet, his mind and five organs of sense, the effect of his bad Karman, and every bad use of language. (17)

The virtuous exert themselves with regard to the distant end (viz. Liberation³). One should live

¹ *Savvadhammagôvīyam*. According to the commentator the meaning of this phrase is: which is not blamed or shown to be wrong by all (heretical) Laws.

² See *Uttarādhyāyana*, Fifth Lecture.

³ *Śīlāṅka* quotes and comments upon four different readings of the first line of this verse, the last of which is rendered above as it is the *textus receptus* of the *Dīpikā*. (1) Abstaining from even small pride and from deceit, one, &c. (2) 'Great' for 'even small.' (3) I have heard from some men: This is the valour of the virtuous man, that, &c. After this verse *Śīlāṅka* quotes another which, he says, is not found in MSS. of the text, but

indifferent to one's own happiness, calm, and without any attachment. (18)

Do not kill living beings, do not take what is not freely given, do not talk false, treacherous speech! This is the Law of him who is rich in control. (19)

Do not desire by words or thoughts what is a transgression (of the Law); guarding yourself in all ways, and subduing (the senses), practise control. (20)

A man who guards his self and subdues his senses, abhors all sins, past, present, and future ones. (21)

Benighted men of wrong faith, (though) they be renowned as heroes, exert themselves in a bad way, which will have, in all respects, evil consequences for them. (22)

Wise men of right faith, who are renowned heroes, exert themselves in a good way which will have no (evil) consequences whatever for them. (23)

Penance is of no good if performed by noble men who have turned monks (for the sake of fame); but that penance of which nobody else knows anything (is meritorious). Do not spread your own fame¹! (24)

A pious man should eat little, drink little, talk little; he should always exert himself, being calm, indifferent, a subduer (of his senses), and free from greed. (25)

Meditating and performing religious practices,

is found in the *Tīkā*. It is, however, the identical verse I, 3, 4, 20, see above, p. 271, which occurs again I, 11, 11.

¹ Compare Matthew vi. 1-6.

abandoning his body, regarding forbearance as the paramount duty, a monk should wander about till he obtains liberation. (26)

Thus I say.

NINTH LECTURE,

CALLED

THE LAW.

What is the Law that has been preached by the wise Brâhmana ¹ (i.e. Mahâvîra)? Learn from me the noble Law of the Gînas as it is. (1)

Brâhmanas, Kshattriyas, Vaisyas, Kândâlas, Vukkasas, hunters ², merchants ³, Sûdras, and others who are accustomed to do acts ; (2)

The iniquity ⁴ of all these men who cling to property goes on increasing ; for those who procure themselves pleasures by sinful acts will not get rid of misery. (3)

After a man has done acts which cause the death of living beings, his pleasure-seeking relations take possession of his wealth, whilst the doer of the acts must suffer for them. (4)

'Mother, father, daughter-in-law, brother, wife, and sons will not be able to help me, when I suffer for my own deeds ⁵.' (5)

¹ The word brâhmana (mâhara) is here, as in many other passages, a mere honorific title which could be rendered by 'ascetic.'

² Êsiya.

³ Vêsiya.

⁴ Vêra = vaira.

⁵ This verse recurs in Uttarâdhyayana VI, 3 ; above, p. 25.

Taking to heart this truth from which flow the most important truths, a monk, without property and without egoism, should follow the teaching of the Ginas. (6)

Leaving his wealth, sons, relations, and property, leaving sorrow that never ceases, (a monk) should wander about without any worldly interests. (7)

Earth, water, fire, and wind; grass, trees, and corn; oviparous animals, the two kinds of viviparous¹ animals; beings engendered in fluids and in dirt, and plants; (8)

These six classes of living beings a wise man should know and treat tenderly, in thoughts, words, and acts; he should neither do actions nor desire property whereby he might do them any harm. (9)

Untrue speech, sexual intercourse, personal property, taking things that are not freely given: all these causes of injury to living beings a wise man should abstain from. (10)

Deceit², greed³, anger⁴, and pride⁵: combat these causes of sin; a wise man should abstain from them. (11)

Washing, dyeing, making urine, evacuation of the bowels, vomiting, anointing of the eyes, and whatever is contrary to the rules of conduct⁶: from all this a wise man should abstain. (12)

¹ Pôyagarâû = pôtagarâyû, i.e. born alive (as elephants, &c.) and born together with the chorion (as cows, &c.)

² Paliuṣṣana = parikuṣṣana, i.e. mâyâ.

³ Bhayana = bhagana, i.e. lôbha.

⁴ Thandillâ, i.e. krôdha.

⁵ Ussayana = ukkṣraya, i.e. mâna. These four passions are named here from the way in which they are supposed to act upon the soul. Similar names occurred above, p. 248, notes 3-6.

⁶ Palimantha.

Perfumes, wreaths, bathing, cleansing of the teeth, property, actions referring to women : from all this a wise man should abstain. (13)

Alms that have been prepared, or bought, or stolen, or brought for the sake of a monk, or alms that contain particles of the above mentioned, or such alms as are unacceptable (for one cause or other), from all these a wise man should abstain. (14)

Invigorating food, anointing of the eyes, greed, damaging others, washing (one's limbs), (rubbing them with) Lôdhra-powder, &c. : from all this a wise man should abstain. (15)

Deliberating with laymen, praising their work, answering their questions, eating the householder's meals : from all this a wise man should abstain. (16)

He should not learn to play chess¹, he should not speak anything forbidden by the Law ; a wise man should abstain from fights and quarrels. (17)

Shoes, an umbrella, dice, chowries, working for another, helping each other : from all this a wise man should abstain. (18)

A monk should not void his excrements or urine among plants ; he should never rinse his mouth (even) with distilled water after having removed (everything endowed with life). (19)

He should never eat or drink out of a householder's vessel ; nor wear his clothes, especially if he

¹ Ash/âpada. This does not necessarily, in this place, mean chess-board, but any game played on a similar chequered board may be intended. The earliest unmistakable mention of chess, that I have met with, occurs in Ratnâkara's Haravigaya XII, 9, a mahâkâvya written in the first half of the ninth century A.D. in Kashmir.—Another explanation of *ashâvayam* is *arthapadam* = *arthasâstram* 'means of acquiring property.'

is a naked monk : from all this a wise man should abstain. (20)

A stool or bed or a seat in a house, asking of news and recollection (of past sports) : from all this a wise man should abstain. (21)

Fame, glory, and renown ; honours and respectful treatment ; all pleasures in the whole world : from all this a wise man should abstain. (22)

A monk (should be content) with such food and drink as will sustain his life ; he should give a portion of it to others : [from all this a wise man should abstain¹.] (23)

Thus spoke the Nirgrantha, the great sage Mahāvira ; he who possesses infinite knowledge and faith has taught the Law and the sacred texts². (24)

In speaking (a monk) should use as few words as possible ; he should not delight in another's foibles ; he should avoid deceiving speech³, and should answer after ripe reflection. (25)

One will repent of having used the third kind of speech⁴ ; a secret should not be made known. This is the Nirgrantha's commandment. (26)

¹ The last part of this verse is here repeated from the preceding ones ; but it is quite out of place here.

² Here apparently ended the original treatise ; the following verses are not directly connected with it.

³ *Mâi/hânam*, always rendered *mâtristhânam*. I think it is a regular corruption for *mâyâsthânam*. The second syllable of the word becomes short before two consonants, and then the *ya* was changed into *i* with which it is almost interchangeable.

⁴ The four kinds of speech are (1) true speech, (2) untrue speech, (3) speech partly true and partly untrue, (4) speech which is neither true nor untrue, see part i, p. 150.—Inaccurate statements are intended here.

(A monk) should not call one names¹, nor 'friend,' nor by his Gôtra; 'thou, thou' is vulgar; never address one by 'thou!' (27)

A virtuous monk should never keep company (with the wicked); for thereby he incurs dangers (for his conduct) disguised as pleasures. A wise man should be aware of them. (28)

(A monk) should not stay in the house of a householder except by constraint; nor should he amuse himself too long (by looking) at the sports of the children of the village². (29)

Not desirous of fine things, he should wander about, exerting himself; not careless in his conduct, he should bear whatever pains he has to suffer. (30)

If beaten, he should not be angry; if abused, he should not fly into a passion; with a placid mind he should bear everything and not make a great noise. (31)

He should not enjoy pleasures though they offer themselves; for thus he is said (to reach) discernment. He should always practise what is right to do in the presence of the enlightened ones. (32)

He should obey and serve a wise and pious teacher, (such teachers) as are heroes (of faith), who search for the benefit of their souls, are firm in control, and subdue their senses. (33)

These men, who do not see the light (as it were) in domestic life, are the beloved of the people; these heroes, free from bondage, do not desire life. (34)

¹ Hôlâ, which is said to be a Dêsi word of abuse. The same word occurs also in the Âkârânga Sûtra, see part i, p. 151, where I translated it by 'loon.'

² According to *Silânka*: (he should not join) the sports of the children of a village, nor amuse himself too long.

They do not long for sensual pleasures, they do not engage in works. All that (the heretics) always talk about, is opposed to the right faith. (35)

Excessive pride and deceit, all worldly vanities : all this a wise man knows and renounces, and thus brings about his final Liberation. (36)

Thus I say.

TENTH LECTURE,

CALLED

CAREFULNESS¹.

The wise (Arhat) having pondered on the Law proclaimed it ; learn from me correctly what is carefulness. A monk who forms no resolutions and is possessed of carefulness, should wander about, giving no offence to any creature ; (1)

To no living beings, whether they move or not, whether above or below or on earth, by putting a strain upon them by his hands or feet². Nor should he take from householders anything that is not freely given. (2)

Having mastered the Law and got rid of carelessness, he should live on allowed food³, and treat

¹ Samâhi = samâdhi. This word has not only the meaning 'meditation,' but also a much wider one. Here it is explained as 'the means of obtaining Mōksha.' I have chosen 'carefulness,' because it is less technical than 'control,' which I have used in other places.

² The first part of verse 2 to be construed with the last part of the preceding verse.

³ Lâdhe.

all beings as he himself would be treated ; he should not expose himself to guilt by his desire for life ; a monk who performs austerities should not keep any store. (3)

Restraining his senses from women, a sage should wander about free from all worldly ties. See, every creature and every being suffers pain and is afflicted. (4)

Doing harm to these beings, an ignorant man becomes involved in sins. Sin is committed by injuring (beings), and one sins also by employing others (in such acts). (5)

He too who leads a miserable life, commits sin. Therefore (the *Ginas*) have enjoined thorough carefulness. One should know the truth, delight in control and sound judgment, cease from injuring beings, and be of a settled mind. (6)

Looking at all people with an impartial mind, one should not do anything to please or to harm them. After a virtuous beginning some become miserable and lose heart, (since) they desire honour and fame. (7)

Desiring unallowed¹ food and accepting such, the sinner, careless in his conduct, is attached to women, and tries to acquire property. (8)

Given to violent deeds he accumulates (*Karman*) ; on his decease he (meets with) really distressing misery. Therefore a wise man considers well the Law ; a sage wanders about free from all worldly ties. (9)

He should not expose himself to guilt by his desire for life, but he should wander about without any attachment. Speaking after due consideration,

¹ *Ahâgada*=*yathâkrîta*; cf. p. 131, note 7, 1.

and combating his worldly desires, he should say nothing that involves slaughter of living beings. (10)

He should not desire unallowed food, and he should not mix with people who desire such ; he should mortify his flesh, thinking (of his duty), and giving up his sorrows without regard (to worldly interests). (11)

Try to realise that you are single and alone ; thereby you will obtain Liberation ; mind, this is no false assertion ! This Liberation is not anything unreal, but the best thing. An ascetic is free from anger, and delights in the truth. (12)

Abstain from sexual intercourse with women, do not acquire property ; a man possessed of carefulness will, beyond doubt, be a saviour (to others) in all circumstances. (13)

A monk having conquered aversion to control and delight in sensual objects¹, should bear all troubles caused by (pricking) grass, cold, heat, and insects ; he should endure pleasant and unpleasant smells. (14)

Guarding his speech and possessed of carefulness, acquiring (pure) Lēsyā², he should wander about ; he should not thatch a house for himself or for others, nor behave towards other people like a householder. (15)

Questioned by somebody who maintains the unchangeable character of the soul³, he should expound the true (doctrine) ; those who engage in works and

¹ This is, according to Śyāṅka, the meaning of the words *araim raim vā*, see, however, above, p. 111, note 1.

² See Uttarādhyayana, Lecture XXXIV.

³ A *kiriyaâyā* = *akriyâtman*.

are held in worldly bondage, do not know the Law which leads to Liberation. (16)

Men here have various opinions ; (they adhere) to the doctrine of the Kriyâvâdins and Akriyâvâdins. The iniquity of an unrestrained sinner, who after having been born injures the body (of beings to procure his own happiness), goes on increasing. (17)

Forgetting that his life will have an end, a rash and foolish man is full of selfishness ; he toils day and night, greedy of wealth, as if he never should grow old or die. (18)

Leave wealth and cattle, all relations and dear friends ! (A man) always talks (about these things), and he is infatuated with them ; but other people will take away his wealth. (19)

As smaller beasts keep at a distance from a lion, being afraid of him, so a wise man keeps aloof from sin, well considering the Law. (20)

A wise man who has become awakened should turn away from sin, when he considers the evils arising from slaughter and the great dangers entailed by his cruel disposition. (21)

A sage setting out for the real good¹ (viz. Liberation), should not speak untruth ; this (rule, they say,) comprises Nirvâṇa and the whole of carefulness. He should not do works, nor cause others to do them, nor assent to others doing them. (22)

When he gets pure (food), he should not be affected (by love or hate), and he should not be too

¹ Attagâmi = âptagâmin. Âpta is either Môksha as assumed in my translation, or it denotes the 'highest authority ;' in the latter case we can translate : who proceeds on the right path.

fond (of such food) nor long for it. A pious monk, free from bonds, should wander about desiring neither honours nor fame. (23)

A monk who has left the house and is free from desires should abandon his body, annihilating his sins; he should not desire life nor death, and walk about, having got beyond the Circle (of Births)¹. (24)

Thus I say.

ELEVENTH LECTURE,

CALLED

THE PATH.

What is the Path that has been preached by the wise Brāhmaṇa² (i. e. Mahāvītra), having correctly entered upon which path a man crosses the flood (of Samsāra) which is difficult to pass? (1)

O monk and great sage, tell us this best path which leads to liberation from all misery, as you know it! (2)

Tell us how we should describe that path, if somebody, a god or a man, should ask us about it! (3)

If somebody, a god or a man, ask you about it, tell them the truth about the path. Listen to me! (4)

The very difficult (path) explained by the Kāśyapa, following which some men from this earth

¹ Or, the fetter of sin.

² See note on IX, 1.

have formerly passed over (the *Samsāra*) like traders over the ocean¹, pass over it (even now), and will pass over it in future; (this path which) I have learned, I shall explain in due order; men, listen to me! (5, 6)

Earth-lives are individual beings, so are water-lives, fire-lives, and wind-lives; grass, trees, corn; (7)

And the remaining, (*viz.*) the movable beings; thus are enumerated the six classes of living beings; these are all the living beings, there are no more besides. (8)

A wise man should study them with all means of philosophical research. All beings hate pains; therefore one should not kill them. (9)

This is the quintessence of wisdom: not to kill anything. Know this to be the legitimate conclusion from the principle of the reciprocity with regard to non-killing². (10)

He should cease to injure living beings whether they move or not, on high, below, and on earth. For this has been called the *Nirvāṇa*, which consists in peace³. (11)

Master (of his senses) and avoiding wrong, he should do no harm to anybody, neither by thoughts, nor words, nor acts. (12)

A wise man who restrains his senses and possesses great knowledge, should accept such things as are freely given him, being always circumspect with regard to the accepting of alms, and abstaining from what he is forbidden to accept. (13)

¹ The same simile occurs also in I, 3, 4, 18, above p. 271.

² The same verse occurred above, I, 1, 4, 10, p. 247.

³ We have had the same verse above, I, 3, 4, 20, p. 271.

A true monk should not accept such food and drink as has been especially prepared for him along with slaughter of living beings. (14)

He should not partake of a meal which contains but a particle of forbidden food¹: this is the Law of him who is rich in control. Whatever (food a monk) suspects (to be impure), he may not eat. (15)

A man who guards his soul and subdues his senses, should never assent to anybody killing beings.—In towns and villages cases (will occur, which place) the faithful (in a dilemma)². (16)

Hearing the talk of people, one should not say, 'this is a good action,' nor 'this is a bad action.' For there is an objection (to either answer). (17)

He should not say that it is meritorious, because he ought to save those beings, whether they move or not, which are killed there for the sake of making a gift. (18)

Nor should he say that it is not meritorious, because he would then prevent those for whose sake the food and drink in question is prepared, to get their due. (19)

Those who praise the gift, are accessory³ to the killing of beings; those who forbid it, deprive (others) of the means of subsistence. (20)

Those, however, who give neither answer, viz.

¹ This is the meaning of the phrase *pâtikarma na sêvêta*.

² When well-meaning people sink a well, offer a sacrifice, or feed persons, &c.

³ Literally, wish.

that it is meritorious, or is not so, do not expose themselves to guilt, and will reach Beatitude¹. (21)

Knowing that Beatitude is the best thing as the moon is among the stars, a sage always restrained and subduing his senses brings about Beatitude. (22)

A pious man² shows an island to the beings which are carried away (by the flood of the *Samsâra*) and suffer for their deeds. This place of safety has been proclaimed (by the Tirthakaras). (23)

He who guards his soul, subdues his senses, puts a stop to the current (of the *Samsâra*), and is free from Âsravas³, is (entitled to) expound the pure, complete, unparalleled Law. (24)

Those who do not know this (Law), are not awakened, though they fancy themselves awakened; believing themselves awakened, they are beyond the boundary of right faith⁴. (25)

Eating seeds and drinking cold water⁵ and what

¹ Sîlânka quotes the following Sanskrit verse to show the application of the maxim to the digging of a well: *satyam vaprêshu sîtam sasikaradhavalam vâri pîtvâ prakâmam vyukhhinnârêshatrîshnâh pramuditamanasaḥ prânisârthâ bhavanti | sôsham nîtê galaughê dinakarakiranair yânti anantâ vinâram tēnô-dâsīnabhâvam vragati muniganaḥ kûpavaprâdikâryê ||* 'Forsooth, when living beings drink to their hearts' content the cool water of ditches, which is white like the moon, their thirst is completely allayed and their heart is gladdened; but when all the water is dried up by the rays of the sun, numberless creatures must die; therefore the sages decline every interest in the construction of wells and ditches.'

² The commentators connect *sâhu* as adjective with *dîvam*, and supply Tirthakara, &c. as subject.

³ See above, p. 55, note 1.

⁴ *Samâdhi*.

⁵ *Vîôdaga* = *bîgôdaka*.

has been especially prepared for them, they enter upon meditation ¹, but are ignorant of the truth, and do not possess carefulness. (26)

As *dhaṅkas*, herons, ospreys, cormorants, and pheasants meditate upon capturing fish, (which is) a sinful and very low meditation, so some heretical, unworthy *Sramanas* contemplate the pursuit of pleasures; (they are) sinful and very low like herons. (27, 28)

Here some weak-minded persons, abusing the pure path, enter upon a wrong path. They thereby will go to misery and destruction. (29)

As a blind-born man getting into a leaky boat wants to reach the shore, but is drowned during the passage ²; so some unworthy, heretical *Sramanas*, having got into the full current (of the *Samsâra*), will incur great danger. (30, 31)

But knowing this Law which has been proclaimed by the *Kâsyapa*, (a monk) crosses the dreadful current (of the *Samsâra*), and wanders about intent on the benefit of his soul. (32)

Indifferent to worldly objects, a man should wander about treating all creatures in the world so as he himself would be treated. (33)

A wise man knowing (and renouncing) excessive pride and deceit, (in short) giving up all (causes of worldly existence), brings about his Liberation ³. (34)

He acquires good qualities, and leaves off bad qualities; a monk, who vigorously practises austerities, avoids anger and pride. (35)

The Buddhas ⁴ that were, and the Buddhas that

¹ Comp. I, 3, 3, 12.

² Verses 30, 31 *a*=I, 1, 2, 31, 32 *a*.

³ The first line of this verse occurred in I, 9, 36.

⁴ Here Buddha is a synonym for Tîrthakara.

will be, they (as it were) have Peace as their foundation, even as all things have the earth for their foundation. (36)

And if any accidents whatever befall him who has gained that (foundation), he will not be overpowered by them as a mountain by the storm¹. (37)

A restrained, very learned, and wise (monk) should accept such alms as are freely given him, being free from passions and waiting for his end. This is the doctrine of the Kêvalin. (38)

Thus I say.

TWELFTH LECTURE,

CALLED

THE CREED ².

There are four (heretical) creeds³ which the disputants severally uphold: 1. the Kriyâvâda, 2. the Akriyâvâda, 3. the Vinayavâda, and 4. the Agñânavâda. (1)

The agnostics⁴, though they (pretend to) be

¹ Śilânka says that by exercise the power of resistance will be increased, and in confirmation of this he relates the well-known story of the herdsman who daily carried a calf from its birth till it was two years old.

² Samôsarana = samavasarana. This word and the verb samôsarai are commonly used when Mahâvîra preaches to a meeting (mêlâpaka) gathered round him.

³ Compare Uttarâdhyayana XVIII, 23, above p. 83, note 2.

⁴ Annâniyâ = agñânikâs, the followers of the fourth sect.

clever, reason incoherently, and do not get beyond the confusion of their ideas. Ignorant (teachers) speak to ignorant (pupils), and without reflection they speak untruth. (2)

Believing truth to be untruth, and calling a bad man good, the various upholders of Vinaya, asked about it, explain their tenet ¹. (3)

Without perceiving the truth they speak thus: this object (viz. Mōksha) is realised by us thus (viz. by Vinaya). The Akriyāvādins who deny Karman ², do not admit that the action (of the soul is transmitted to) the future moments ³. (4)

They become involved in contradiction in their own assertions; they falter in their speech and are unable to repeat what is said to them ⁴. This (their opinion) has a valiant counter-opinion, this (our opinion) has no valiant counter-opinion; and Karman has six sources ⁵. (5)

The Akriyāvādins who do not understand the truth, bring forward various opinions; many men

¹ Viz. that Mōksha is arrived at through Vinaya, discipline.

² Lavāvasaṅkī. Lava is explained by karman, and avasaṅkī by apasartum sīlam yêshām tē.

³ The meaning is that as everything has but a momentary existence, there is no connection between the thing as it is now, and as it will be in the next moment. This is a doctrine of the Bauddhas. But the Sāṅkhyas are also reckoned among the Akriyāvādins, because, according to them, the ātman does not act.

⁴ Sīlāṅka in commenting upon this passage has to say a good deal about the Bauddhas. It is perhaps of interest that he mentions their 500 Gātakas, and not thirty-four which is the recognised number of Gātakas according to the Northern Buddhist. How Sīlāṅka came to a knowledge of the numbers of Gātakas accepted by the Southern Buddhists, I cannot tell.

⁵ Viz. the six Āsravas.

believing in them will whirl round in the endless Circle of Births. (6)

‘There rises no sun, nor does it set; there waxes no moon, nor does it wane; there are no rivers running, nor any winds blowing; the whole world is ascertained to be unreal¹.’ (7)

As a blind man, though he have a light, does not see colours, &c., because he is deprived of his eye(sight), so the Akriyâvâdin, having a perverted intellect, does not recognise the action (of the soul) though it does exist. (8)

Many men in this world who have studied astrology, the art of interpreting dreams, divination from diagrams, augury, divination from bodily marks, and from portents, and the eight branches (of divination from omens), know the future². (9)

(The opponents say that) some forecasts are true, and the prophecies of others prove wrong; therefore they do not study those sciences, but they profess to know the world, fools though they be³. (10)

The (Kriyâvâdins) Sramanas and Brâhmanas understanding the world (according to their lights), speak thus: misery is produced by one’s own works, not by those of somebody else (viz. fate, creator, &c.)⁴. But right knowledge and conduct lead to liberation. (11)

¹ This is the opinion of the Sûnyavâdins, who are considered to belong to the Akriyâvâdins, because they deny all actions, even such as are perceived by everybody (Sîlânka).

² This would be impossible if the whole world was unreal.

³ A various reading, commented upon by the scholiasts, runs thus: âham su viggâpalimokkham êva, ‘they say that one must give up science.’

⁴ The Kriyâvâdins contend, according to Sîlânka, that works alone, by themselves, without knowledge, lead to Môksha.

The (Tirthakaras), being (as it were) the eyes of the world and its leaders, teach the path which is salutary to men; they have declared that the world is eternal inasmuch as creatures are (for ever) living in it, O ye men! (12)

The Rākshasas and the dwellers in Yama's world, the troops¹ of Asuras and Gandharvas, and the spirits that walk the air, and individual beings²: they will all be born again and again. (13)

(The *Samsāra*) which is compared to the boundless flood of water, know it to be impassable and of very long duration on account of repeated births³. Men therein, seduced by their senses and by women, are born again and again both (as movable and immovable beings). (14)

The sinners cannot annihilate their works by new works; the pious annihilate their works by abstention from works; the wise and happy men who got rid of the effects of greed, do not commit sins. (15)

They know the past, present, and future ways of the world; they are leaders of other men, but follow no leader; they are awakened, and put an end to mundane existence. (16)

Averse to injury of living beings, they do not act, nor cause others to act. Always restraining them-

¹ Kāya. The commentators explain this word as denoting the earth-bodies, &c., but from the context it will be seen that it refers to Asuras and Gandharvas, and must be translated by 'troops.'

² *Pudhō siyâ = prīthak sritâḥ*; according to *Śīlāṅka*, *prīthivyâsritâḥ*. This expression is generally used to denote the lower order of beings.

³ To render *bhavagahana*.

selves, those pious men practise control, and some become heroes through their knowledge. (17)

He regards small beings and large beings, the whole world as equal to himself; he comprehends the immense world, and being awakened he controls himself among the careless. (18)

Those who have learned (the truth) by themselves or from others, are able (to save) themselves and others. One should always honour a man, who is like a light and makes manifest the Law after having well considered it. (19)

He who knows himself and the world; who knows where (the creatures) go, and whence they will not return; who knows what is eternal, and what is transient; birth and death, and the future existences of men; (20)

He who knows the tortures of beings below (i. e. in hell); who knows the influx of sin and its stoppage¹; who knows misery and its annihilation,—he is entitled to expound the Kriyâvâda², (21)

Being not attached to sounds and colours, indifferent to tastes and smells, not desiring life nor death, guarded by control, and exempt from the Circle (of Births). (22)

Thus I say.

¹ Âsrava and samvara.

² It is evident that the Gainas considered themselves Kriyâvâdins. I had overlooked this passage when penning the note on p. 83.

THIRTEENTH LECTURE,

CALLED

THE REAL TRUTH.

I shall now expound, in accordance with truth, the various qualities of men ; I shall explain the virtue and peace of the good, the vices and the unrest of the wicked. (1)

Having learned the Law from men who exert themselves day and night, from the Tathâgatas¹, they neglect the conduct in which they had been instructed, and speak rudely to their teacher. (2)

Those who explain the pure doctrine according to their individual opinion, falsify it in repeating (it after their teachers) ; those who speak untruth from pride of knowledge, are not capable of many virtues. (3)

Those who on being questioned conceal the truth, defraud themselves of the real good. These bad men who believe themselves good and are full of deceit, will go to endless punishment. (4)

He who is of a wrathful disposition and calls everything by its true name², who renews a composed quarrel, will, like a blind man groping his way with

¹ According to the commentators, Gaiṇa teachers, inclusive of the schismatical ones, are intended. Tathâgata is a synonym of Tîrthakara and Buddha ; but it is less frequently used by the Gaiṇas than by the Bauddhas with whom it is of very common occurrence.

² *Gagāṇhabhâsî* = *gagadarthabhâshin*. Sîlânka proposes also *gayâarthabhâshin*, who speaks dogmatically.

a stick, do harm to himself, being still subject to passion and possessing evil Karman. (5)

He who is quarrelsome and talks improperly, is not impartial nor beyond the reach of deceit¹; but he who executes the commands (of his teacher) and controls himself, sees nothing but the truth and is exempt from deceit. (6)

He who conforms to admonitions however many he receives, is kindly spoken, subtile, manly, noble, and a well-doer; (such a man) is impartial and beyond the reach of deceit. (7)

He who believes himself rich in control, or inconsiderately vaunts his knowledge, or fancies himself purified by austerities, will look upon other men as shadows. (8)

He is always turned round by delusion, and has no place in the Gôtra where the Vow of Silence is practised (viz. in the Gaina church), who not being awakened puts himself forward in order to gain honours through something different from control. (9)

A Brâhmaṇa or Kshattriya by birth, a scion of the Ugra² race or a Liṅṅhavi³, who enters the order eating alms given him by others, is not stuck up on account of his renowned Gôtra. (10)

His pedigree on his mother's and on his father's

¹ *Aghaṅghapatta*. *Ghaṅghâ* (tempest) = *mâyâ*.

² Concerning the Ugras, see above, p. 71, note 2.

³ *Liṅṅhai*. According to the Gainas the *Liṅṅhavi* and *Mallakis* were the chiefs of Kâsi and Kôśala. They seem to have succeeded the Aikshvâkas, who ruled there in the times of the *Râmâyana*. The *Liṅṅhavis* became a powerful race, who held the supreme power in Eastern India during many centuries after the beginning of our era.

side will be of no use to him, nothing will but right knowledge and conduct: when after becoming a monk he acts like a householder, he will not succeed in obtaining final Liberation. (11)

If a poor monk subsisting on the meanest food is attached to vanities, desires fame, and not being awakened, (makes his monkhood) a means of subsistence, he will suffer again and again (in the Circle of Births). (12)

A monk, who is eloquent, speaks very well, has bright ideas, is clever, possesses a fine intellect, and has purified his soul, may (perhaps) despise other men on account of his intellect. (13)

Thus an intelligent monk who puts himself forward, has not yet realised carefulness; or rather he is a weak-minded man who elated by his success blames other men. (14)

A monk should combat pride of genius, pride of sanctity, pride of birth, and (pride of good) living, which is enumerated as the fourth; such a man is wise and of the right stuff. (15)

The wise leave off these kinds of pride, the pious do not cultivate them; the great sages are above all such things as Gôtra (&c.), and they ascend to the place where there is no Gôtra at all (viz. to Môksha). (16)

A monk who looks upon his body as on a corpse and fully understands the Law, will on entering a village or a town distinguish between what may be accepted and what may not, and will not be greedy of food or drink. (17)

A monk having conquered aversion to control and delight in sensual objects, living in company with many brethren or leading a single life, should

silently repeat to himself: 'A man must come and go (according to his Karman) alone' (i. e. without deriving any help from others). (18)

Knowing it by intuition or having learned it from others, one should teach the Law which is a benefit to men; the pious are not given to blameable sinful practices. (19)

If (a monk preaches the Law to some one) whose disposition he has not ascertained, that man, not believing (what he is taught), will become angry, and may wound him in a way that will shorten or end his life. When he knows their disposition, he (may teach) others the truth. (20)

A wise man by suppressing his Karman and his will should renounce his interest in everything else. (For) through the objects of sight (i.e. senses) which are causes of danger, men come to harm. Knowing the truth with regard to movable and immovable beings (a monk should exert himself)¹. (21)

Not desiring honour or fame, he should say nothing to anybody either to please or to irritate him. Avoiding all evils, a monk should without embarrassment and passion (preach the Law). (22)

Well considering (his duties) in accordance with truth, abstaining from doing injury to living beings, not desiring life nor death, he should wander about released from the Circle (of Births). (23)

Thus I say.

¹ The commentators make out the following meaning: A wise (preacher) should ascertain (his hearers') occupations and inclinations, and then (try to) better their evil disposition. Through the objects of sight which are causes of danger, men are led astray. A wise man knowing (the disposition of his hearers should preach the Law which is wholesome) to all living beings whether they move or not.

FOURTEENTH LECTURE,

. CALLED

THE NIRGRANTHA.

He who has given up all worldly ties and is instructed in our creed, should practise chastity, exerting himself; obeying the commands (of his teacher) he should make himself well acquainted with the conduct; a clever (monk) should avoid carelessness. (1)

As (birds of prey), e. g. *Dhāṅkas*, carry off a fluttering young bird whose wings are not yet grown, when it attempts to fly from the nest, but is not able to do so, because it is too young and its wings are not yet grown; (2)

Just as they carry off a young bird whose wings are not yet grown, so many unprincipled men will seduce a novice who has not yet mastered the Law, thinking that they can get him in their power, when they have made him leave (the *Gakkha*)¹. (3)

A good man should long to live with his teacher in order to perform his duties², knowing that he who does not live with his teacher will not put an end to his mundane existence. Making manifest

¹ *Nissāriyam* = *niśāritam*. I follow in the text the interpretation of the commentators. But I think that instead of *mannamānā* we must read, as in the preceding verse, *mannamānam*; and translate: believing himself rich in control (*vāsimam*) though he be still wanting in strength (*nissāriyam*).

² *Samāhim*.

the conduct of the virtuous, an intelligent (monk) should not leave the (company of his teacher). (4)

(A monk) who complies with the rules for Yatis¹ as regards postures, lying down, sitting, and exertion, who is thoroughly acquainted with the Samitis and Guptis, should in teaching others explain each single (point of conduct). (5)

Whether he hears (pleasant) sounds or dreadful ones, he should not allow himself to be influenced by them, and persevere in control; nor should a monk be sleepy or careless, but by every means he should get rid of doubts. (6)

If admonished by a young or an old monk, by one above him or one of equal age, he should not retort against him², being perfectly free from passion; for one who is (as it were) carried away (by the stream of the Samsâra), will not get to its opposite shore. (7)

(He should not become angry) if (doing anything wrong) his own creed is quoted against him by a heretic, or if he is corrected by (somebody else) be he young or old, or by a female slave engaged in low work or carrying a jar, or by some householder. (8)

He should not be angry with them nor do them any harm, nor say a single hard word to them, but he should promise not to commit the same sin again; for this is better than to do wrong. (9)

As to one who has lost his way in the wood, others who have not, (show it, thus some) teach the

¹ Susâdhuyukta.

² Sammam tayam thiratô nâ-bhigakkhê. I translate according to the commentators, as I am unable to understand the words in the text.

path which is salutary to men. Therefore (he should think): this is for my good that those who know put me right. (10)

Now he who has lost his way should treat with all honour him who has not. This simile has been explained by the Prophet. Having learned what is right one should practise it. (11)

As a guide in a dark night does not find the way since he cannot see it, but recognises the way when it has become light by the rising of the sun; (12)

So a novice who has not mastered the Law, does not know the Law, not being awakened; but afterwards he knows it well through the words of the Ginas, as with his eye (the wanderer sees the way) after sunrise. (13)

Always restrained with regard to movable and immovable beings which are on high, below, and on earth, (a monk) should wander about entertaining no hostile thoughts (towards them) and being steadfast (in control). (14)

At the right time he may put a question about living beings to a well-conducted (monk), who will explain the conduct of the virtuous; and what he hears he should follow and treasure up in his heart, thinking that it is the doctrine of the Kêvalins. (15)

Living in this (company of the teacher) and protecting (himself or other beings) in the three ways (viz. in thoughts, words, and acts), he (gets) peace and the annihilation (of sins) as they say. Thus speak those who know the three worlds, and they do not again commit faults! (16)

A monk by hearing the desired Truth gets bright ideas and becomes a clever (teacher); desiring the highest good and practising austerities and silence,

he will obtain final Liberation (living on) pure (food). (17)

Those who having investigated the Law expound it, are awakened and put an end to mundane existence; able to liberate both (themselves and others), they answer the well-deliberated questions. (18)

He does not conceal (the truth) nor falsify it; he should not indulge his pride and (desire for) fame; being wise he should not joke, nor pronounce benedictions. (19)

Averse to injury of living beings, he does not disgrace his calling¹ by the use of spells; a good man does not desire anything from other people, and he does not give utterance to heretical doctrines. (20)

A monk living single should not ridicule heretical doctrines, and should avoid hard words though they be true; he should not be vain, nor brag, but he should without embarrassment and passion (preach the Law). (21)

A monk should be modest² though he be of a fearless mind; he should expound the Syâdvâda³; he should use the two (permitted) kinds of speech⁴, living among virtuous men, impartial and wise. (22)

He who follows (the instruction) may believe something untrue; (one should) kindly (tell him) 'It is thus or thus.' One should never hurt him by

¹ Gôtra, explained by mauna.

² Saṅkiggiyâ = saṅkyêta.

³ Vibhagyavâda. The saptabhaṅgīnaya or seven modes of assertion are intended by the expression in the text. See Bhandarkar, Report, 1883-84, p. 95.

⁴ See above, p. 304, note 4. The first and fourth kinds of speech are here intended.

outrageous language, nor give long-winded explanations of difficult passages. (23)

(If the pupil does not understand his short explanation), he should explain at greater length. When the pupil has heard it, he will correctly understand the Truth. A monk should utter pure speech, which is in accordance with the creed (of the *Ginas*), and should declare the distinction of sin. (24)

He should well learn the (sacred texts) as they have been revealed; he should endeavour (to teach the creed), but he should not speak unduly long. A faithful man who is able to explain the entire creed¹ will not corrupt the faith. (25)

He should not pervert nor render obscure (the truth); he should fabricate neither text nor meaning, being a saviour; being devoted to the Teacher and considering well his words, he delivers faithfully what he has learned. (26)

He who correctly knows the sacred texts, who practises austerities, who understands all details of the Law, who is an authentic interpreter, clever, and learned—such a man is competent to explain the entire creed. (27)

Thus I say.

¹ Samâhi = samâdhi.

FIFTEENTH LECTURE,

CALLED

THE YAMAKAS¹.

What is past, present, and to come, all this is known to the Leader, the Saviour, who annihilates the hindrances to right faith. (1)

The annihilator of doubt knows the incomparable (Law); he, the expounder of the incomparable (Law), is not inclined towards this or that (heretical doctrine). (2).

On this or that (article of the creed he has) the correct opinion; hence he is rightly called a true (man); he who always possesses the truth, is kind towards his fellow-creatures. (3)

Towards your fellow-creatures be not hostile: that is the Law of him who is rich in control; he who is rich in control renounces everything, and in this (world meditates on the) reflections on life². (4)

¹ This lecture has been named from its opening words *gamañyam*, which also means, consisting of *yamakas* (compare *Journal of the German Oriental Society*, vol. xl, p. 101). For in this lecture each verse or line opens with a word repeated from the end of the preceding one. This artifice is technically called *srīṅkhala-yamaka*, or chain-yamaka, a term which seems to be contained in another name of our lecture, mentioned by the author of the *Niryukti* (verse 28), viz. *ādāniya-saṅkalīyā*. For *saṅkalīyā* is the *Prākṛit* for *srīṅkhala* (e.g. in our text I, 5, 2, 20), though *Śīlāṅka* here renders it wrongly *saṅkalita*; and *ādāniya* by itself is used as a name of our lecture.

² These are the twelve *bhāvanās* or meditations on the vanity of life and the world in general, and on the excellence of the Law, &c.

He whose soul is purified by meditating on those reflections is compared to a ship in water ; like a ship reaching the shore he gets beyond misery. (5)

A wise man gets beyond it who knows the sins of this world ; sinful acts are got rid of by him who does not undertake any new acts. (6)

He who does not undertake new acts does not acquire Karman, and he verily understands (Karman); understanding it he becomes a Great Hero ¹, who is not born (again) and does not die. (7)

A Great Hero, who has no Karman, does not die.—As the wind extinguishes a light, (so he puts down) the lovely women in this world. (8)

Those men whom women do not seduce, value Mōksha most ; those men are free from bondage and do not desire life. (9)

Turning from worldly life, they reach the goal by pious acts ; by their pious acts they are directed (towards Liberation), and they show the way to others. (10)

The preaching of the Law (has different effect) on different creatures ; he who is rich in control, is treated with honour ², but does not care for it ; he exerts himself, subdues his senses, is firm, and abstains from sexual intercourse. (11)

(He should not yield to temptations as a pig which) is decoyed by wild rice, being proof against sins, and free from faults. Being free from faults he always

¹ Mahāvīra.

² Pūyanāsaē, explained by pūganā-āsvādaka. I should prefer pūgā-nāśaka, who abolished the worship of gods, in which case the following word anāsaē = an-āśaya might be rendered : he makes no plans.

subdues his senses, and has reached the incomparable cession of Karman¹. (12)

Knowing the incomparable (control), he should not be hostile towards anybody, in thoughts, words, or deeds, having eyes (to see everything). (13)

He truly is the eye of men who (dwells so to speak) on the end² of desire; on its end (i. e. edge) glides the razor, on its end (i. e. rim) rolls the wheel. (14)

Because the wise use the ends (of things, i. e. bad food, &c.), they are called 'makers of an end' here. Here in the world of men we are men to fulfil the Law. (15)

In this creed which surpasses the world, (men) become perfected saints or gods, as I have heard; and I have heard that outside the rank of men this is not so³. (16)

Some (heretics) have said that they (viz. the gods) put an end to misery⁴; but others (Gainas) have repeatedly said that this (human) body is not easily obtained. (17)

To one whose soul has left (human life), it is not easy again to obtain instruction (in the Law), nor is such a mental disposition which they declare appropriate for adopting the Law⁵. (18)

How can it even be imagined that he should

¹ Sandhipattê. Sandhi is explained Karmavivaralakṣaṇam bhâvasandhim.

² There is a play on the word 'end' in this and the next verse which to a modern mind savours more of the absurd than the profound.

³ Perfection cannot be obtained by other creatures than men.

⁴ I. e. reach final beatitude.

⁵ The words as they are preserved do not construe; the meaning, however, must have been about what I have given in the translation.

be born again, who professes the pure, complete, unparalleled Law, and is a receptacle of the unparalleled Law? (19)

How could the wise Tathāgatas be born again, the Tathāgatas who engage in no undertakings, the supreme, the eyes of the world? (20)

And there has been declared by the Kāśyapa the supreme condition¹, by realising which some happy and wise men reach excellence. (21)

A wise man who has gained strength (in control) which leads to the expiation of sins, annihilates his former works, and does not do new ones. (22)

The Great Hero does no actions which are the effects of former sins. By his actions he is directed (towards Mōksha), abstaining from works which are entailed by birth². (23)

That which all saints value highly (viz. control), destroys the thorn (viz. Karman); practising it some have been liberated, and others have become gods. (24)

There have been wise men, and there will be pious men, who having come to the end and made manifest the end of the incomprehensible path, have been liberated. (25)

Thus I say.

¹ Viz. control.

² *Gammayam*. The commentators explain it *yan matam*; but I think it is = *ganmagam*.

SIXTEENTH LECTURE,

CALLED

THE SONG ¹.

Now the Venerable One said : He who thus subdues his senses, who is well qualified (for his task) ² and abandons his body, is to be called a Brâhmana, a Sramana, a Bhikshu, a Nirgrantha. (The pupil) replied : Why is he who thus subdues his senses, who is well qualified (for his task) and abandons his body, to be called a Brâhmana, a Sramana, a Bhikshu, a Nirgrantha? Tell this, O great sage! (1)

He is a Brâhmana for this reason that he has ceased from all sinful actions, viz. love, hate, quarrel, calumny, backbiting, reviling of others, aversion to control, and love of pleasures, deceit, untruth, and the sin of wrong belief; that he possesses the Samitis, always exerts himself, is not angry, nor proud. (2)

He is a Sramana for this reason that he is not hampered by any obstacles, that he is free from desires, (abstaining from) property, killing, telling lies, and sexual intercourse; (and from) wrath, pride, deceit, greed, love, and hate: thus giving up every passion that involves him in sin, (such as) killing of beings. (Such a man) deserves the name of a Sramana, who subdues (moreover) his senses, is well qualified (for his task), and abandons his body. (3)

¹ Gâhâ = gâthâ. In this lecture, which is in prose as regards form and contents, there is nothing that could justify the title given it.

² Daviê = dravya.

He is a Bhikshu for this reason that he is not conceited, but modest, and obedient (to his Guru), that he subdues his senses, is well qualified (for his task), and abandons his body, that he sustains all troubles and calamities, that he practises with a pure mind the (prescribed) conduct, exerts himself well, is steadfast, and eats but a moderate quantity¹ of food which is given him by others. (Such a man) deserves the name of a Bhikshu. (4)

He is a Nirgrantha for this reason that he is single², knowing the absolute (âtman), awakened, proof against sins, well disciplined; that he possesses the Samitis and equanimity, knows the true nature of the Self, is wise, has renounced the causes of sin both (objectively and subjectively³), does not desire honour, respect, and hospitality, but searches and knows the Law, endeavours to gain Liberation, and lives restrained. (Such a man) deserves the name of a Nirgrantha, who subdues his senses, is well qualified (for his task), and abandons his body. (5)

Know this to be thus as I have told you, because I am the Saviour. (6)

Thus I say.

¹ *Samkhâya*. The commentator takes this word as a gerund and explains it : knowing (the vanity of the world).

² *Êka*, i.e. free from love and hate.

³ *Dravyatô bhâvatas ka*.

SECOND BOOK¹.

FIRST LECTURE²,

CALLED

THE LOTUS.

O long-lived (*Gambûsvâmin*)! I (*Sudharman*) have heard the following Discourse from the Venerable (*Mahāvīra*). We now come to the Lecture called 'the Lotus.' The contents of it are as follows: (1)

There is a lotus-pool containing much water and mud, very full and complete, answering to the idea (one has of a lotus-pool), full of white lotuses, delightful, conspicuous, magnificent, and splendid. (2)

And everywhere all over the lotus-pool there grew many white lotuses, the best of *Nymphaeas*, as we are told, in beautiful array, tall, brilliant, of fine colour, smell, taste, and touch, (&c., all down to) splendid. (3)

And in the very middle of this lotus-pool there grew one big white lotus, the best of *Nymphaeas*,

¹ With the exception of the fifth and sixth lectures, the whole Book (*śrutaskandha*) is in prose. I have adhered to the subdivision of the lectures exhibited in the Bombay edition, which, on the whole, agrees with that of most MSS.

² The lectures of this Book are called, according to the *Nir-yukti*, Great (*mahā*) Lectures.

as we are told, in an excellent position, tall, (&c., all down to) splendid. (4)

[§§ 3 and 4 are to be repeated with the word 'all' or 'whole' added to 'lotus-pool' ¹.] (5)

Now there came a man from the Eastern quarter to the lotus-pool, and standing on the bank of it he saw that one big white lotus, (&c., as above). Now this man spoke thus: 'I am a knowing, clever, well-informed, discerning, wise, not foolish man, who keeps the way, knows the way, and is acquainted with the direction and bent of the way. I shall fetch that white lotus, the best of all Nymphaeas.' Having said this the man entered the lotus-pool. And the more he proceeded, the more the water and the mud (seemed to) extend. He had left the shore, and he did not come up to the white lotus, the best of Nymphaeas, he could not get back to this bank, nor to the opposite one, but in the middle of the lotus-pool he stuck in the mud. (6)

This was the first man. Now (we shall describe) the second man. There came a man from the Southern quarter to the lotus-pool, and standing on the bank of it he saw that one big white lotus (&c., all as above). There he saw one man who had left the shore, but had not come up to the white lotus, the best of Nymphaeas, who could not get back to his bank, nor to the opposite one, but stuck in the mud in the middle of the lotus-pool. Now the second man spoke of the first man thus: 'This man is not knowing, not clever, (&c., see above, all down to) not acquainted with the direction and bent

¹ In the text the words *savvāvanti ka nam* are prefixed to the text of §§ 3 and 4. I give the explanation of *Silāṅka*.

of the way.' For that man said : ' I am a knowing, (&c., all down to) I shall fetch that white lotus, the best of Nymphaeas.' But this white lotus, the best of Nymphaeas, cannot be got in the way this man tried. (7)

' However, I am a knowing, clever, (&c., all down to the end of the paragraph) he stuck in the mud.' This was the second man. (The same thing happened to a third and a fourth man, who came from the Western and Northern quarters respectively, and saw two and three men respectively sticking in the mud. Some MSS. give the story at length, others abbreviate it.) (8, 9)

Now a monk living on low food and desiring to get to the shore (of the *Samsâra*), knowing, clever, (&c., all down to) acquainted with the direction and bent of the way, came to that lotus-pool from some one of the four quarters or from one of the intermediate points (of the compass). Standing on the bank of the lotus-pool he saw the one big white lotus, (&c., as above). And he saw there those four men who having left the shore, (&c., all as above) stuck in the mud. Then the monk said : ' These men are not knowing, (&c., all down to) not acquainted with the direction and bent of the way ; for these men thought : We shall fetch that white lotus, the best of Nymphaeas. But this white lotus, the best of Nymphaeas, cannot be got in the way these men tried. I am a monk living on low food, (&c., all down to) acquainted with the direction and bent of the way. I shall fetch that white lotus, the best of Nymphaeas.' Having said this the monk did not enter the lotus-pool ; but standing on the bank of it he raised his voice : ' Fly up,

O white lotus, best of Nymphaeas!' . And the white lotus, the best of Nymphaeas, flew up. (10)

I have told you, O long-lived Sramanas, a simile¹; you must comprehend the meaning of it². The Nirgrantha monks and nuns worshipped and praised the Venerable Ascetic Mahāvīra, and then spoke thus: 'You have told, O long-lived Sramana, the simile, but we do not comprehend its meaning, O long-lived Sramana!' The Venerable Ascetic Mahāvīra addressed the crowd of Nirgrantha monks and nuns, and spoke thus: Ah, you long-lived Sramanas! I shall tell, declare, explain, expound, and demonstrate it with its meaning, reasons, and arguments. Thus I say: (11)

O long-lived Sramanas³, meaning⁴ the world I spoke of the lotus-pool. Meaning Karman I spoke of the water. Meaning pleasures and amusements I spoke of the mud. Meaning people in general I spoke of those many white lotuses, the best of Nymphaeas. Meaning the king I spoke of the one big white lotus, the best of Nymphaeas. Meaning heretical teachers I spoke of those four men. Meaning the Law I spoke of the monk. Meaning the church⁵ I spoke of the bank. Meaning the preaching of the Law I spoke of (the monk's) voice. Meaning Nirvāṇa I spoke of (the lotus') flying up. Meaning these things, O long-lived Sramanas, I told this (simile). (12)

¹ Nâê = gñâtam, literally, that which is known.

² In the text the sentence closes with bhante, a word frequently used in addressing members of the order.

³ These words are in the original repeated in each of the following sentences. I drop them in the translation.

⁴ Appâhātu = âtmany âhrītya, literally, having in my mind.

⁵ Dharmatīrtha.

Here in the East, West, North, and South many men have been born according to their merit, as inhabitants of this our world, viz. some as Âryas, some as non-Âryas, some in noble families, some in low families, some as big men, some as small men, some of good complexion, some of bad complexion, some as handsome men, some as ugly men. And of these men one man is king, who is strong like the great Himavat, Malaya, Mandara, and Mahêndra mountains, (&c., all down to) who governs his kingdom in which all riots and mutinies have been suppressed¹.

And this king had an assembly of Ugras² and sons of Ugras, Bhôgas² and sons of Bhôgas, Aikshvâkas and sons of Aikshvâkas, *Gñâtris* and sons of *Gñâtris*, Kauravas and sons of Kauravas, warriors and sons of warriors, Brâhmanas and sons of Brâhmanas, *Likkhavis* and sons of *Likkhavis*, commanders and sons of commanders, generals and sons of generals. (13)

And of these men some one³ is full of faith. Forsooth, the Sramanas or Brâhmanas made up their mind to go to him. Being professors of some religion (they thought) 'We shall teach him our religion.' (And they said): 'Know this, dear sir, that we explain and teach this religion well. (14)

'Upwards from the soles of the feet, downwards

¹ This is one of the *varṇaka* or typical descriptions which are so frequent in the canonical books. The full text is given in the *Aupapâtika Sûtra*, ed. Leumann, § 11, p. 26 f. Of the many meanings the word *varṇaka* may have, 'masterpiece' seems the one in which it must be taken here. Many *varṇakas* are, partly at least, composed in a curious metre which I have named Hypermetron, see *Indische Studien*, vol. xvii, pp. 389 ff.

² Concerning the Ugras and Bhôgas compare note 2 on p. 71.

³ Apparently the king is meant.

from the tips of the hair on the head, within the skin's surface is (what is called) Soul¹, or what is the same, the Ātman. The whole soul lives; when this (body) is dead, it does not live. It lasts as long as the body lasts, it does not outlast the destruction (of the body). With it (viz. the body) ends life. Other men carry it (viz. the corpse) away to burn it. When it has been consumed by fire, only dove-coloured bones remain, and the four bearers return with the hearse to their village. Therefore there is and exists no (soul different from the body). Those who believe that there is and exists no (such soul), speak the truth. Those who maintain that the soul is something different from the body, cannot tell whether the soul (as separated from the body) is long or small, whether globular or circular or triangular or square or sexagonal or octagonal or long, whether black or blue or red or yellow or white, whether of sweet smell or of bad smell, whether bitter or pungent or astringent or sour or sweet, whether hard or soft or heavy or light or cold or hot or smooth or rough. Those, therefore, who believe that there is and exists no soul, speak the truth. Those who maintain that the soul is something different from the body, do not see the following (objections): (15)

‘As a man draws a sword from the scabbard and shows it (you, saying): “Friend, this is the sword, and that is the scabbard,” so nobody can draw (the soul from the body) and show it (you, saying): “Friend, this is the soul, and that is the body.” As a man draws a fibre from a stalk of Muñga grass and shows it (you, saying): “Friend, this is the stalk, and that is the fibre;” or takes a bone out of the flesh, or the

¹ Gīva.

seed of *Âmalaka*¹ from the palm of his hand, or a particle of fresh butter out of coagulated milk, and shows you both things separately²; or as he presses oil from the seed of *Atasi*³, and shows the oil and oil-cake separately, or as he presses the juice from the sugar-cane, and shows the juice and the molasses⁴ separately, so nobody can show you the soul and the body separately. The same applies also when fire is churned from *Arañi*-wood. Those who believe that there is and exists no soul, speak the truth. Those who say that the soul is different from the body, are wrong.' (16)

This murderer says: 'Kill, dig, slay, burn, cook, cut or break to pieces, destroy! Life ends here; there is no world beyond.'

These (*Nâstikas*) cannot inform⁵ you on the following points: whether an action is good or bad, meritorious or not, well done or not well done, whether one reaches perfection or not, whether one goes to hell or not. Thus undertaking various works they engage in various pleasures and amusements for their own enjoyment. (17)

Thus some shameless men becoming monks propagate a Law of their own. And others believe it, put their faith in it, adopt it, (saying :) 'Well, you speak the truth, O *Brâhmaṇa*, (or) O *Sramaṇa*! We shall present you with food, drink, spices, and sweetmeats, with a robe, a bowl, or a broom.'

¹ *Emblica Myrobalanos*.

² I have somewhat condensed this passage.

³ *Ayau//asī* in *Prâkr̥t*; it is *Linum Usitatissimum*.

⁴ *Kṣhōya*. See Grierson, *Peasant Life of Bihar*, p. 236. The word is apparently derived from root *kshud*.

⁵ *Paḍivēdenti* = *prativēdayanti*. The commentators, however, explain it as 'understand.'

Some have been induced to honour them, some have made (their proselytes) to honour them. (18)

Before (entering an order) they were determined to become *Sramanas*, houseless, poor monks who would have neither sons nor cattle, to eat only what should be given them by others, and to commit no sins. After having entered their order they do not cease (from sins), they themselves commit sins, they cause others to commit sins, and they assent to another's committing sins. Thus they are given to pleasures, amusements, and sensual lust; they are greedy, fettered, passionate, covetous, the slaves of love and hate; therefore they cannot free themselves (from the Circle of Births), nor free anybody else from it, nor free any other of the four kinds of living beings from it. They have left their former occupations, but have not entered the noble path. They cannot return (to worldly life), nor get beyond it; they stick (as it were) in pleasures and amusements. Thus I have treated of the first man (as one who believes that) soul and body are one and the same thing. (19)

Now I shall treat of the second man¹ (as one who believes that) everything consists of the five elements.

Here in the East, (&c., see §§ 13, 14, all down to) teach this religion well. (20)

‘There are five elements² through which we explain

¹ According to the commentators the *Lôkâyatikas* or the *Sânkhya*s are intended. The latter explain the whole world as developed from the *Prâkrîti* or chaos, and contend that the *âtman* does not act. The *Lôkâyatikas* deny the separate existence of the *âtman*, and maintain that the elements are called *âtman* when they manifest intellect (*kaitanya*).

² *Mahabbhûta*=*mahâbhûta*.

whether an action is good or bad, (&c., see § 18, all down to) hell or not. Everything down to a blade of grass (consists of them). (21)

‘And one should know the intermixture¹ of the elements by an enumeration of them. Earth is the first element, water the second, fire the third, wind the fourth, and air the fifth. These five elements are not created, directly or indirectly, nor made; they are not effects nor products; they are without beginning and end; they always produce effects, are independent of a directing cause or everything else; they are eternal. Some, however, say that there is a Self besides the five elements. What is, does not perish; from nothing nothing comes. (22)

‘All living beings, all things, the whole world consists of nothing but these (five elements). They are the primary cause of the world, even down to a blade of grass. (23)

‘A man buys and causes to buy, kills and causes to kill, cooks and causes to cook, he may even sell and kill a man. Know, that even in this case he does not do wrong.’

These (Nāstikas) cannot inform you, (&c., see §§ 15–18, all down to) they stick (as it were) in pleasures and amusements.

Thus I have treated of the second man (who believes that) everything consists of the five elements. (24)

Now I shall treat of the third man (who believes that) the Self² is the cause of everything.

¹ Samavâya.

² The word used in the text is *îsara*=*îsvara*, but afterwards *purisa*=*purusha* is used in its place. Both words are synonymous

Here in the East, (&c., see §§ 12, 13, all down to) teach this religion well. (25)

‘Here all things have the Self for their cause and their object, they are produced by the Self, they are manifested by the Self, they are intimately connected with the Self, they are bound up in the Self.

‘As, for instance, a tumour is generated in the body, grows with the body, is not separate from the body, but is bound up in the body : so all things have the Self for their cause, (&c., all as above).

‘As, for instance, a feeling of indisposition is generated in the body, grows with the body, is never separate from the body, but is bound up in the body : so all things have the Self for their cause, (&c., all as above).

‘As, for instance, an anthill is made of earth, grows through earth, is not separate from earth, but is bound up in earth : so all things, (&c., all as above).

‘As, for instance, a tree springs up on earth, grows on earth, is not separate from earth, but is bound up in earth : so all things, (&c., all as above).

‘As, for instance, a lotus springs up in earth, grows on earth, is not separate from earth, but is bound up in earth : so all things, (&c., all as above).

‘As, for instance, a mass of water is produced by water, grows through water, is not separate from water, but is bound up in water : so all things, (&c., all as above).

‘As, for instance, a water-bubble is produced in water, grows in water, is not separate from water,

with âtman, the first may denote the highest âtman as in the Yôga philosophy, or the paramâtman as in the Vêdânta.

but is bound up in water : so all things, (&c., all as above). (26)

‘ And the twelve *Āṅgas*, the Canon of the *Gauṇins*¹, which has been taught, produced, and declared by the *Sramanas*, the *Nirgranthas*, viz. the *Ātārāṅga* (all down to) the *Drishṭivāda*, is wrong, not true, not a representation of the truth ; but this (our doctrine) is correct, is true, is a representation of the truth.’

The (heretics in question) make this assertion, they uphold this assertion, they (try to) establish this assertion.

Therefore they cannot get out of the misery produced by this (error), even as a bird cannot get out of its cage. (27)

These (heretics) cannot inform you, (&c., see §§ 16–19, all down to) they stick, as it were, in pleasures and amusements.

Thus I have treated of the third man (who believes that) the Self is the cause of everything. (28)

Now I shall treat of the fourth man who believes that Fate is the cause of everything.

Here in the East, (&c., see §§ 12, 13, all down to) teach this religion well. (29)

‘ There are two (kinds of) men. One man admits action, another man does not admit action. Both men, he who admits action, and he who does not admit action, are alike, their case is the same, because they are actuated by the same force². (30)

¹ *Gaṇipidaga*.

² Viz. Fate. For it is their destiny to entertain one belief or the other, and they are not amenable to it. This is the interpretation of the commentators. But to the phrase *kāraṇam āpanna* they give here a meaning different from that in the following paragraphs. I therefore propose the following translation of the end of the

‘An ignorant man thinks about the cause as follows : “When I suffer, grieve, blame myself, grow feeble¹, am afflicted, or undergo great pain, I have caused it ; or when another man suffers, &c., he has caused it.” Thus an ignorant man thinks himself or another man to be the cause of what he or the other man experiences. (31)

‘A wise man thinks about the cause as follows : “When I suffer, &c., I did not cause it ; and when another man suffers, &c., he did not cause it².”

‘A wise man thinks thus³ about the cause of what he himself or another man experiences. I say this : “Movable or immovable beings in all the four quarters thus (i.e. by the will of Fate) come to have a body, to undergo the vicissitudes of life, to lose their body, to arrive at some state of existence, to experience pleasure and pain⁴.”’

Entertaining such opinions these (heretics) cannot inform you, (&c., as in § 17, down to the end). (32)

These worthless men entertain such opinions, and believe in them till they cannot return, (&c., as in § 19 down to) amusements.

paragraph : ‘are equally (wrong), (err) alike as regards the cause (of actions).’

¹ Tippāmi, explained ‘lose strength of body.’ The word cannot be *trīpyāmi*, because it means ‘I am satisfied.’ The word is probably derived from the root *tik* ‘to kill.’ Tippāmi would be an irregular passive, just as *sippāmi* from *sik*, see *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung*, vol. xxvii, p. 250. Leumann, *Aupapātika Sūtra*, glossary s.v. *tippaṇayā*, explains this word by ‘crying’ on the authority of Abhayadēva. Either meaning suits the passages where it occurs in our text.

² But Fate is the cause.

³ That is to say, that Fate distributes pleasure and pain.

⁴ I render the rather ambiguous expressions in the original according to the interpretation of the commentators.

I have treated of the fourth man who believes that Fate is the cause of everything. (33)

These four men, differing in intellect, will, character, opinions, taste, undertakings, and plans, have left their former occupations, but have not entered the noble path. They cannot return (to worldly life) nor get beyond it; they stick (as it were) in pleasures and amusements. (34)

I say : here in the East, West, North, and South there are some men, viz. Âryas, non-Âryas, (&c., as in § 13, all down to) ugly men. They own small or large houses and fields, they own few or many servants and peasants. Being born in such-like families, they renounce (their possessions) and lead a mendicant's life. Some leave their kinsmen and their property to lead a mendicant's life; others, who have no kinsmen nor property, lead a mendicant's life. Whether they have kinsmen and property or not, they renounce them and lead a mendicant's life. (35)

Previously, however, they thought thus : ' Here, indeed, a man, who is on the point of turning monk, makes the following reflections with regard to different things : I possess fields, houses, silver, gold, riches, corn, copper, clothes, real valuable property, as riches, gold, precious stones, jewels, pearls, conches, stones, corals, rubies¹. I enjoy sounds, colours, smells, tastes, and feelings of touch. These pleasures and amusements belong to me, and I belong to them.' (36)

A wise man, previously, should thus think to

¹ The same enumeration of valuable things occurs elsewhere, e. g. Kalpa Sûtra, Lives of the Gînas, § 90.

himself: 'Here, indeed, some painful illness or disease might befall me, unwished for, unpleasant, disagreeable, nasty¹, painful and not at all pleasant. O ye dear pleasures, take upon you this painful illness or disease, unwished for, unpleasant, disagreeable, nasty, painful and not at all pleasant, that I may not suffer, grieve, blame myself, grow feeble, be afflicted, and undergo great pain². Deliver me from this painful illness or disease, (&c., all as above).' But this desire of his has never yet been fulfilled. (37)

Here, in this life, pleasures and amusements are not able to help or to save one. Sometimes a man first forsakes pleasures and amusements, sometimes they first forsake him. Pleasures and amusements are one thing, and I am another. Why then should we be infatuated with pleasures and amusements which are alien (to our being)? Taking this into consideration, we shall give up pleasures and amusements. A wise man thinks them alien to himself. (38)

There are things more intimately connected with me, viz. my mother, father, brother, sister, wife, children, grandchildren, daughters-in-law, servants, friends, kinsmen, companions, and acquaintances. These my relations belong to me, and I belong to them. A wise man, previously, should think thus to himself: 'Here, indeed, some painful illness or disease might befall me, (&c., all as in § 37 down to the end, but substitute "relations" for "pleasures"). (39)

¹ The original has six synonyms for disagreeable, which it is impossible to render adequately in English.

² The same words occurred in § 31.

‘Or some painful illness or disease, unwished for, (&c., all down to) not at all pleasant might befall my dear relations. I will take upon me this painful illness or disease, &c., that they may not suffer, (all down to) undergo great pain. I will deliver them from this painful illness or disease.’ But this desire of his has never yet been fulfilled. For one man cannot take upon himself the pains of another; one man cannot experience what another has done¹. (40)

Individually a man is born, individually he dies, individually he falls (from this state of existence), individually he rises (to another)². His passions³, consciousness, intellect, perceptions, and impressions belong to the individual exclusively. Here, indeed, the bonds of relationship are not able to help nor save one. (All as in § 38 down to the end; substitute ‘bonds of relationship’ for ‘pleasures and amusements.’) (41)

There are things more intimately connected with me, viz. my hands, feet, arms, legs, head, belly, character, life, strength, colour, skin, complexion, ear, eye, nose, tongue, and touch; they are part and parcel of me. But I grow old with regard to life, strength, (all down to) touch. The strong joints become loose, the body is furrowed with wrinkles, the black hair turns white, even this dear body which has grown with food, must be relinquished in due time.

¹ I.e. his Karman.

² According to the commentators the last two passages should be translated: ‘individually he leaves (his possessions, &c.), individually he is joined (to them).’

³ *Ghaṅghā* = kalaha.

Making such reflections, a monk should lead a mendicant's life and know that all things are divided into living beings and things without life, (and living beings again into) movable and immovable ones. (42)

Here, indeed, householders are killers (of beings) and acquirers of property, and so are even some *Sramanas* and *Brāhmanas*. They themselves kill movable and immovable living beings, have them killed by another person, or consent to another's killing them. (43)

Here, indeed, householders are killers (of beings) and acquirers of property, and so are even some *Sramanas* and *Brāhmanas*. They themselves acquire sentient or senseless objects of pleasure, have them acquired by another person, or consent to another's acquiring them. (44)

Here, indeed, householders are killers (of beings) and acquirers of property, and so are even some *Sramanas* and *Brāhmanas*. But I am no killer (of beings) nor an acquirer of property. Relying upon¹ householders and such *Sramanas* and *Brāhmanas* as are killers (of beings) and acquirers of property, we shall lead a life of chastity. (He should, however, part company with them.) (The pupil asks): What is the reason thereof? (The teacher answers): As before (their ordination they were killers of beings), so (they will be) afterwards, and vice versâ. It is evident that (householders) do not abstain (from sins) nor exert themselves (in control); and (as monks) they will relapse into the same (bad habits). (45)

¹ Nissâe=*nirayâ*, explained *âsrayêna*.

The householders and those *Sramanas* and *Brāhmanas*, who are killers (of beings) and acquirers of property, commit sins both (from love and hatred). But a monk who takes this into consideration, should lead a life subject to neither (love nor hatred). (46)

I say: in the East, West, North, and South (a true monk) will have renounced works, be exempt from works, will have put an end to them. This has been taught (by the prophets, &c.). (47)

The Venerable One has declared that the cause (of sins) are the six classes of living beings, earth-lives, &c. As is my pain when I am knocked or struck with a stick, bone, fist, clod, or potsherd; or menaced, beaten, burned, tormented, or deprived of life; and as I feel every pain and agony from death down to the pulling out of a hair: in the same way, be sure of this, all kinds of living beings feel the same pain and agony, &c., as I, when they are ill-treated in the same way¹. For this reason all sorts of living beings should not be beaten, nor treated with violence, nor abused, nor tormented, nor deprived of life². (48)

I say: the *Arhats* and *Bhagavats* of the past, present, and future, all say thus, speak thus, declare thus, explain thus: all sorts of living beings should not be slain, nor treated with violence, nor abused, nor tormented, nor driven away. This constant, permanent, eternal, true Law has been taught by wise men who comprehend all things. Thus a monk abstains from (the five cardinal sins:) slaughter of living beings, &c. He does not clean his teeth with

¹ The text repeats the phrases just translated.

² The same words form the text of the homily in *Âṣṭāṅga* I, 4.

a tooth-brush ¹, he does not accept collyrium, emetics, and perfumes. (49)

A monk who does not act, nor kill, who is free from wrath, pride, deceit, and greed, who is calm and happy, should not entertain the following wish : May I, after my departure from this world, by dint of my intellect, knowledge, memory, learning, or of the performance of austerities, religious duties, chastity, or of this habit to eat no more than is necessary to sustain life, become a god at whose command are all objects of pleasure, or a perfected saint who is exempt from pain and misery. (Through his austerities) he may obtain his object, or he may not obtain it. (50)

A monk should not be infatuated with sounds, colours, smells, tastes, and feelings of touch ; he should abstain from wrath, pride, deceit, and greed, from love, hate, quarrel, calumny, reviling of others, aversion to control and delight in sensual things, deceit and untruth, and the sin of wrong belief. In this way a monk ceases to acquire gross Karman, controls himself, and abstains from sins. (51)

He does not kill movable or immovable beings, nor has them killed by another person, nor does he consent to another's killing them. In this way a monk ceases to acquire gross Karman, controls himself, and abstains from sins. (52)

He does not acquire sentient or senseless objects of pleasure, nor has them acquired by another person, nor does he consent to another's acquiring them. In this way, (&c., all as above). (53)

¹ Or rather a piece of wood with which the Hindus rub their teeth.

He does no actions arising from sinful causes¹, nor has them done by another person, nor does he consent to another's doing them. In this way (&c., all as above). (54)

A monk should not take food, drink, dainties, and spices when he knows that (the householder) to satisfy him, or for the sake of a co-religionist, has bought or stolen or taken it, though it was not given nor to be taken, but was taken by force, by acting sinfully towards all sorts of living beings²; nor does he cause another person to eat it, nor does he consent to another's eating it. In this way (&c., all as above). (55)

A monk may think as follows : The (householders) have the means (to procure food for those) for whose sake it is prepared; viz. for himself³, his sons, daughters, daughters-in-law, nurses, relations, chiefs, male and female slaves, male and female servants; for a treat of sweetmeats, for a supper, for a breakfast the collation has been prepared. This food is to be eaten by some people, it is prepared by some one else, it is destined for some one else, it is free from the faults occasioned either by the giver or by the receiver or by the act of receiving it⁴, rendered pure⁵, rendered free from living matter⁶, wholly free from living things⁷, it has been begged, has been given to the monk on account of his profession⁸,

¹ Sâmparâyika. The commentators say: *ta k ka pradvêshaninnavamâtsaryântarâyâsâtanôpaghâtair badhyatê*.

² Compare Âkârânga Sûtra II, 1, 1, 11.

³ Apparently the householder is intended.

⁴ Udgama, utpâdanâ, êshanâ. See above, p. 131, note 7.

⁵ Sastrâtîtam.

⁶ Sastraparinâmitam.

⁷ Avihimsitam.

⁸ Vaishikam.

it has been collected in small bits¹, it is food fit for a learned monk, it is lawful to eat it at the present occasion, it is of the prescribed quantity, it greases, as it were, the axle of the carriage and anoints the sore, being just sufficient to enable one to practise control and to carry the burden of it; he should consume that food (without delay) even as the snake returning to its hole; that is to say: one should eat when it is time for eating, drink when it is time for drinking, dress when it is time for dressing, seek cover when it is time for seeking cover, and sleep when it is time for sleeping. (56)

A monk who knows the proper measure (in all things) travelling in one direction or other, should teach, explain, and praise (the Law), preach it unto those who exert themselves well, and to those who do not, to all who come to listen. (He should preach to them): indifference for the peace of mind, cessation of passion, Nirvāṇa, purity, simplicity, humility, freedom from bonds². He should preach the Law which prohibits to kill any living being, after having well considered it. (57)

When a monk preaches the Law, he should preach it not for the sake of food, drink, clothes, resting-place, or lodging, nor for any objects of pleasure; but he should preach the Law indefatigably, for no other motive than the annihilation of Karman. (58)

Those heroes of faith who are instructed in the Law by such a monk and exert themselves well, are

¹ Samudānikam, i.e. as bees collect honey from many flowers. Cf. p. 80, note 1.

² Compare Âkārāṅga Sūtra I, 7, 4, 1, part i, p. 68, note 3.

possessed of all (virtues), abstain from all (sins), cease from all (passions), conduct themselves well in every way, and reach final beatitude. (59)

Such a monk searches the Law, knows the Law, and endeavours to gain Liberation; as it has been said: 'He may get the white lotus, the best of Nymphaeus, or he may not get it.' Such a monk knows and renounces actions, worldly occupations, and the life of a householder; he is free from passions, possesses the Samitis, is wise, always exerts himself; he is to be called: a *Sramana*, a *Brâhmaṇa*, calm, a subduer of his senses, guarding himself, liberated, a seer, a sage, virtuous, wise, a monk, living on low food, desiring to get to the shore (of the *Samsâra*), fulfilling the general and particular virtues¹. (60)

Thus I say.

SECOND LECTURE,

CALLED

ON ACTIVITY².

O long-lived (*Gambûsvâmin*)! I (*Sudharman*) have heard the following Discourse from the Venerable (*Mahâvîra*). We now come to the Lecture called 'on Activity.' The contents of it are as follows:

¹ *Karṇakaraṇapâravid*. *Karṇa* is explained by *mûlaguṇa*, *karṇa* by *uttaraguṇa*. The *mûlaguṇas* consist in the observance of the five vows, the *uttaraguṇas* are the five Samitis, the three Guptis, &c., in short, the duties of a monk.

² *Kiriyâ/hânê* = *kriyâsthânam*, literally, the subject of activity.

It treats, briefly, of two subjects : merit and demerit. (The former is when the Self is) at rest, (the latter, when it is) in disturbance¹. (1)

Now the explanation² of the first subject, viz. demerit, is as follows. Here in the East, West, North, and South, (&c., all as in II, 1, 12, down to) ugly men. (2)

And as regards committing of sin³, among denizens of hell, brute animals, gods, men, and whatever other suchlike beings there be, the sentient beings feel⁴ the pain. (3)

And these beings practise the following thirteen kinds of activity—

1. sinning for one's interest ;
2. sinning without a personal interest ;
3. sinning by slaying ;
4. sinning through accident ;
5. sinning by an error of sight ;
6. sinning by lying ;
7. sinning by taking what is not freely given ;
8. sinning by a mere conceit ;
9. sinning through pride ;
10. sinning through bad treatment of one's friends ;
11. sinning through deceit ;
12. sinning through greed ;
13. actions referring to a religious life. (4)

¹ Upasānta and anupasānta.

² Vibhaṅga, more literally, case.

³ Dandasamādāna, explained pāpôpādāna.

⁴ A difference is made between feeling (anubhavanti) and knowing (vidanti): (1) the saṅgḥins or rational beings feel and know impressions; (2) the Siddhas only know them; (3) the reasonless beings only feel them; (4) things without life neither know nor feel them. Sentient beings are those in Nos. 1 and 3.

1. The first kind of committing sins is that prompted by a motive. This is the case when a man for his own sake, for the sake of his relations, his house, his family, his friends, for the sake of Nāgas, Bhûtas, or Yakshas does injury to movable or immovable beings, or has it done by another person, or consents to another's doing it. Thereby the bad Karman accrues to him. This is the first kind of committing sins, that prompted by a motive. (5)

2. We now treat of the second kind of committing sins, viz. that which is not prompted by personal interest. This is the case when a man slays, kills, cuts, pierces, hacks, mangles, or puts to death movable living beings, not because he wants their body, skin, flesh, blood, heart, bile, feathers of their tail, tail, big or small horns, teeth, tusks, nails, sinews, bones, or marrow; nor because he has been wounded by them, or is wounded, or will be wounded; nor in order to support his children, or to feed his cattle, or to enlarge his houses, nor for the maintenance of Sramanas and Brâhmanas, nor for the benefit of his body; setting aside reason a fool acquires the habit of cruelty, being a wanton killer. (6)

This is the case when a man slays, &c. (see above) immovable living beings as Ikkata-reed, Kathina, Gantuka-grass, Para-grass¹, Mòksha-trees², grass, Kusa-grass, Kuḥḥaka³, Pappaka⁴, or straw, not

¹ Compare Âtârânga Sûtra II, 2, 3, 18, note 1. One MS. reads êraga for para-grass. Êraka is the name of a reed.

² Mòksha is the name of a tree = mushkaka. The Âtârânga and one of our MSS. have mōraga, peacocks' feathers. But that is out of place here.

³ Kuḥḥaka is a white water-lily. The Âtârânga Sûtra has kuḥḥaka = kûrḥaka, brush.

⁴ Paktaka in the Âtârânga Sûtra.

in order to support his children, (&c., all down to) wanton killer. (7)

Or when a man on a marsh, a lake, a sheet of water, a pasture-ground, a place surrounded by a ditch, a moat, a thicket, stronghold¹ in a thicket, forest, stronghold in a forest, [mountain, stronghold on a mountain²], piles up grass and lights a fire, or has it lighted by another person, or consents to another's lighting it. Thereby the bad Karman accrues to him. This is the second kind of committing sins, that prompted by no personal interest. (8)

3. We now treat of the third kind of committing sins, called slaying. This is the case when a man thinking that some one has hurt, hurts, or will hurt him, or one of his people, or somebody else, or one of that person's people, kills movable and immovable beings, has them killed by another person, or consents to another's killing them. Thereby the bad Karman accrues to him. This is the third kind of committing sins, called slaying. (9)

4. We now treat of the fourth kind of committing sins, called accidental³. This is the case when in marshes (&c., all as above, down to) strongholds in

¹ Or a group of trees.

² A nearly identical enumeration of places occurs in Âtârânga Sūtra II, 3, 3, 2. The words in brackets seem to be added later; for Sîlânka does not comment upon them, and expressly mentions ten places. They are generally omitted in the sequel when the same passage occurs again.

³ Akasmâddandê. The commentators remark that the word akasmât is in Magadha pronounced by the people as in Sanskrit. The fact is that we meet here and in the end of the next paragraph with the spelling akasmât, while in the middle of the paragraphs it is spelled akamhâ, which is the true Prâkrit form.

a forest, a man who lives on deer, who likes deer, who dotes on deer, goes a hunting deer. Fancying to see deer, he takes aim with his arrow to kill the deer. Thinking that he will kill the deer, he kills a partridge, or a duck, or a quail, or a pigeon, or a monkey, or a francoline partridge. Here instead of one (being) he hurts another, (therefore he is called) an accidental killer. (10)

This is the case when a man weeding rice, Kôdrava¹, panic seed, Paraka, or Râlaka, uses his knife to cut some weeds. Fancying that he is cutting some weed-grasses², he cuts rice (&c., down to) Râlaka. Here instead of one (plant) he hurts another; (therefore he is called) an accidental killer. Thereby the bad Karman accrues to him. This is the fourth kind of committing sins, called accidental. (11)

5. We now treat of the fifth kind of committing sins, viz. by an error of sight. This is the case when a man living together with his mother, father, brothers, sisters, wives, sons, daughters, or daughters-in-law, and mistaking a friend for an enemy, kills the friend by mistake. (12)

This is the case when during a riot in a village³,

¹ Paspalum Sobriculatum.

² They are specialised in the text as *Syâmakam trinam*, *mukundaka vrîhiûsita*, and *kâlêsuka*. Only the two first are mentioned in our dictionaries.

³ In the *Dîpikâ* the following versus memorialis is quoted, in which the names of places mentioned in the text are defined: *grâmô vrîtyâ vrîtaḥ syân nagaram uruṭaturgôpurôdbhâsisôbham khêṣam nadyadrivêṣham parivritam abhitaḥ kharvaṣam parvatênaḥ grâmaḥ yuktam maṭambam dalitadasarataiḥ (?) pattanam ratnayônir drônâkhyam sindhuvêlâvalayitam atha sambâdhanam vâ-drîrînge* || It will be seen that the meaning of these terms given in this verse differs from that given in notes 3-11, p. 176.

or a scot-free town, or a town with an earth wall, or a poor town, or an isolated town, or a large town, or a sea-town, or a mine, or a hermitage, or a halting-place of processions or caravans, or a capital, a man mistaking for a robber one who is not, kills him by mistake. Thereby the bad Karman accrues to him. This is the fifth kind of committing sins, viz. by an error of sight. (13)

6. We now treat of the sixth kind of committing sins, viz. by lying. This is the case when a man for his own sake, or for the sake of his relations, his house, or his servants tells lies, causes another person to tell lies, or consents to another's telling lies. Thereby the bad Karman accrues to him. This is the sixth kind of committing sins, viz. by lying. (14)

7. Now we treat of the seventh kind of committing sins, viz. by taking what is not freely given. This is the case when a man for his own sake (&c., as above) takes himself what is not freely given, has it taken by another person, or consents to another's taking it. Thereby the bad Karman accrues to him. This is the seventh kind of committing sins, viz. by taking what is not freely given. (15)

8. Now we treat of the eighth kind of committing sins, viz. by a mere conceit. This is the case when a man, without being disappointed by anybody in any way, meditates, melancholy, sorry, angry, downcast, anxious in thoughts and ideas, plunged in a sea of sorrow and misery, reposing his head on the palm of his hand, overcome by painful reflections, and casting his eyes on the ground¹. There are four

¹ The same passage occurs Kalpa Sūtra, Lives of the Ġinas, § 92, part i, p. 249.

mental, but real, conditions (of this kind), viz. wrath, pride, deceit, and greed; for wrath, pride, deceit, and greed are mental conditions. Thereby the bad Karman accrues to him. This is the eighth kind of committing sins, viz. by a mere conceit. (16)

9. Now we treat of the ninth kind of committing sins, viz. through pride. This is the case when a man drunk (as it were) with pride of caste, family, beauty, piety, knowledge, success, power, intelligence¹, or any other kind of pride, slights, blames, abuses, reviles, despises somebody else and extols himself, (thinking :) 'he is my inferior, I am of better caste or family, and possess greater power and other advantages.' When he leaves this body and is only accompanied by his Karman, he, without a will of his own, goes forth from womb to womb, from birth to birth, from death to death, from hell to hell. He is cruel, stubborn, fickle, and proud. Thereby the bad Karman accrues to him. This is the ninth kind of committing sins, viz. through pride. (17)

10. We now treat of the tenth kind of committing sins, consisting in bad treatment of one's friends. This is the case when a man living together with his mother, father, brothers, sisters, wives, sons, daughters, or daughters-in-law, severely punishes even the smallest offence of theirs; e. g. he ducks the offender² in cold water, or pours hot water over him, or scalds him with fire, or lashes his sides sore with a halter, reed, rope³, strap of leather, whip, or

¹ These are the eight kinds of pride, madasthânâni.

² The original has *kâyam*, the body.

³ *Nettêna* = *nêtrêna*. The commentator says that it is a particular tree; but I think the usual meaning of *nêtra*, viz. rope, suits better.

thong of a whip, or he beats the offender with a stick, bone, fist, clod, or potsherd. When such a man is at home, (his people) are miserable; but when he is abroad, they rejoice. Such a man, who is for ever punishing, severely punishing, is hateful in this world and the next, irritable, passionate, an extortioner¹. Thereby the bad Karman accrues to him. This is the tenth kind of committing sins, consisting in bad treatment of one's friends. (18)

11. We now treat of the eleventh kind of committing sins, viz. through deceit. Those who conceal their thoughts, who are shrouded in darkness, who are light as the feather of an owl or heavy like a mountain, use unworthy² speech though they be Āryas. They believe themselves different from what they really are; asked one thing, they answer another, they speak different from what is to be spoken. (19)

As a man in whose body sticks an arrow³, does not extricate it (fearing the pain), nor has it extricated by somebody else, nor destroys it, but hides it; and the arrow, being not removed, goes deeper and deeper (in the flesh); so a deceitful man, having practised deception, does not confess it, expiate it, blame the deed to himself or others, does not remove it, annihilate it, and endeavour not to do it again, does not practise the prescribed austerities and penance. A deceitful man is generally not trusted⁴ in this world, a deceitful man is not trusted in the next world. He blames and reviles (the person

¹ *Pitṭhimamsī*, literally, who eats the flesh of the back.

² *Anārya*.

³ *Salya*.

⁴ *Paṭṭhāyāti, pratyāyāti. Dīpikā: avisvāsyatayā pratyāyāti prakhyātim yāti.*

whom he has deceived), he praises himself, and rejoices, and does not desist (from his vile practices); he conceals the wrong he has done to others, and does not acquire a pure *Lêsyâ*. Thereby the bad *Karman* accrues to him. This is the eleventh kind of committing sins, viz. through deceit. (20)

12. We now treat of the twelfth kind of committing sins, viz. through greed. Those (heretical monks) who live in woods, in huts, about villages, or practise some secret rites, are not well controlled, nor do they well abstain (from slaying) all sorts of living beings. They employ speech that is true and untrue at the same time¹: 'do not beat me, beat others; do not abuse me, abuse others; do not capture me, capture others; do not torment me, torment others; do not deprive me of life, deprive others of life².' And thus they are given to sensual pleasures, desire them, are held captive by them, passionately love them for four or five years, for six or ten years—(the period) may be shorter or longer. After having enjoyed these pleasures, and having died at their allotted time, they will be born in some places inhabited by *Asuras* and evildoers. And when they are released therefrom, they will be born deaf and dumb, or blind³, or dumb by birth. Thereby the bad *Karman* accrues to him. This is the twelfth kind of committing sins, viz. through greed. (21)

¹ Concerning the fourfold division of speech see above, p. 135, and part i, p. 150, note 2.

² The meaning is that Brahmins declare it a capital crime to kill a Brahmin, but a venial one to kill a *Sûdra*.

³ *Tammûyattâe* = *tamômûkatvêna*, explained either, blind by birth, or absolutely stupid or ignorant.

These twelve kinds of committing sins should bewell understood by a pious *Sramana* or *Brāhmaṇa*¹. (22)

13. We now treat of the thirteenth kind of acquiring *Karman*, that having reference to religious life². A monk³ who controls himself for the benefit of his soul, who in walking carefully avoids to cause the death of any living creature⁴, who uses gentle and righteous speech⁵, who receives alms in a manner to avoid the forty-two faults⁶, who is careful in receiving and keeping of things necessary for religious exercises⁷, who performs the operations of nature (excrements, urine, saliva, corporal impurities and mucus) in an unfrequented place⁸, who is careful with regard to mind, speech, and body⁹, who guards his mind, speech, and body so as to protect his soul from passions¹⁰, who guards his senses, who leads a chaste life regulated by the three *Guptis*, who carefully walks, stands, sits down, lies down, and speaks, who carefully takes up and lays

¹ The *Karman* of the preceding twelve kinds of sins is called *sāmparāyika* (see p. 298, n. 3). It takes hold of the *Ātman* till it is annihilated; it is a lasting *Karman*, while that described in the next paragraph is of a momentary existence.

² *Iriyāvahiya* = *īryapathika* or *airyapathika*. The term *īryapatha* literally means, way of walking, but technically it denotes the actions of which the life of a correct ascetic consists, and *airyapathika*, therefore, is the *Karman* inseparable from it.

³ The text consists of a string of technical terms, many of which have been explained already. I here incorporate the explanation in the translation. For more particulars see Bhandarkar's Report, p. 98.

⁴ *Īryāsamita*. ⁵ *Bhāshāsamita*. ⁶ *Ēshanāsamita*.

⁷ *Bhāṇḍamātrādānanikshēpanasamita*.

⁸ *Ukkāra-prasravana-slēshma-galla-sringhāna-parish-thāpanikā-samita*. ⁹ *Manah-, vāk-, kāya-samita*.

¹⁰ *Manah-, vāk-, kāya-gupta*.

down his cloth, alms-bowl, blanket, broom,—(even) such a monk performs various subtle actions called *tryapathika* (if it did but consist in moving an eyelash). This Karman is acquired and comes in contact (with the soul) in the first moment, in the second moment it is experienced, in the third it is destroyed; thus it is acquired, comes in contact (with the soul), takes rise, and is destroyed. For all time to come (the person in question) is exempt from Karman¹. Thereby the bad Karman accrues to him². This is the thirteenth kind of acquiring Karman, that inseparable from a religious life. (23)

All the Arhats and Bhagavats of the past, present, and future have told, tell, and will tell, have declared, declare, and will declare the above thirteen kinds of acquiring Karman. They have practised, practise, and will practise the thirteenth kind of acquiring Karman. (24)

As a supplement³ to the above (discussion) will

¹ An almost identical passage occurs in the *Uttarādhyāyana* XXIX, § 71, above p. 172.

² This typical passage is repeated here though it is apparently out of place.

³ Not only this paragraph but also all that follows up to the last paragraph seems to be a later addition. For in the last paragraph the subject treated of in §§ 1-27 is taken up again and brought to its conclusion. After the supplement §§ 25-27 a separate treatise on the main subject is inserted §§ 28-60 (28-57 on demerit, 58-59 on merit, § 60 on a mixed state); after this follows a similar treatise in §§ 61-77 (61-68 on demerit, 69-74 on merit, 75-77 on a mixed state). In § 78 we have again a supplement, and §§ 79-82 contain another supplement (or perhaps two). §§ 83-85 give the conclusion of the first treatise (§§ 1-24) and must originally have followed immediately after § 24. So we have, here, besides some appendices, three distinct original treatises on the same subject, very awkwardly pieced together to form one continuous lecture.

now be told the subject of men's success by occult sciences. Some men differing in intellect, will, character, opinions, taste, undertakings, and plans, study various evil sciences; (25) viz. (the divination) from terrestrial accidents, from strange phenomena¹, from dreams, from phenomena in the air, from changes in the body, from sounds, from mystical signs², from seeds³; (the interpretation of the) marks of women, men, elephants, cows, partridges, cocks, ducks, quails, of wheels, parasols, shields, sticks, swords, precious stones, jewels⁴; (26) the art to make one happy or miserable, to make a woman pregnant, to deprive one of his wits; incantations⁵, conjuring⁶; oblations of substances; the martial arts; the course of the moon, sun, Venus, and Jupiter; the falling of meteors; great conflagration; divination from wild animals⁷, the flight of crows, showers of dust, rain of blood, the Vaitālī and Ardhavaitālī arts⁸, the art of casting people asleep, of opening doors, the art of *Kāṇḍālas*, of *Sabaras*, of *Dravidas*, of *Kaliṅgas*, of *Gaudas*, of *Gāndhāras*; the spells for making somebody fall down, rise, yawn; for making him immovable, or cling to something; for making him sick, or sound;

¹ E. g. the laughing of monkeys.

² *Lakṣhaṇa*. The mystical signs meant are the svastika, &c.

³ *Vyañjana*. The seeds are sesamum, beans, &c.

⁴ *Kākinī*, rendered *ratna* in the commentary.

⁵ *Ātharvaṇī*.

⁶ *Pākasāsanī* = *indragāla*.

⁷ *Mrigakakra*.

⁸ According to the commentary the Vaitālī art teaches to raise a stick (? *dandam* *utthāpayati*, perhaps to lay a punishment on somebody) by spells; and the Ardhavaitālīka, to remove it. In Pāli *vēṭalam* means the magic art of bringing dead bodies to life by spells, see Childers' Dictionary of the Pāli Language, sub voce.

for making somebody go forth, disappear, (or come)¹. These and similar sciences are practised (by some men) for the sake of food, drink, clothes, a lodging, a bed, and various objects of pleasure. They practise a wrong science, the unworthy, the mistaken² men. After having died at their allotted time, they will be born in some places inhabited by Asuras and evildoers. And when they are released therefrom, they will again be born deaf and dumb, or night-blind. (27)

Some man for his own sake or for the sake of his relations, family, or servants, or entering the service of an acquaintance or neighbour of his, becomes his companion or his helpmate, or he goes to meet him, or he becomes a burglar, or a cut-purse, or he tends sheep, or he becomes a hunter³, or he catches birds, or he uses nets (for catching deer), or he becomes a fisherman or a cowherd or a slayer of cows or a dog-keeper or he hunts with dogs. (28)

A man, becoming the companion of another man, will follow him everywhere, (and having inspired him with confidence) beats, cuts, pierces, tears, thrashes, or puts him to death, and thereby gets his food. By these very evil deeds he degrades himself⁴. (29)

A man, becoming the helpmate of another man, always attends on him, (and having inspired him with confidence) beats, &c. (all down to) degrades himself. (30)

¹ *Âyamanim*, it is omitted in some MSS. and in the commentaries.

² *Vipratipanna*.

³ *Sôvariya*, translated *saukarika*.

⁴ I.e. he will be born in one of the low courses of existence.

A man, going to meet somebody, on the road, beats, &c. (all down to) degrades himself. (31)

A man, becoming a burglar, breaks into a house and beats, &c. (all down to) degrades himself. (32)

A man, becoming a cut-purse, cuts the purse and beats, &c. (all down to) degrades himself. (33)

A man, becoming a tender of sheep, beats, cuts, pierces, tears, thrashes, or puts to death a ram or some other animal. (The rest as above.) (34)

A man, becoming a hunter, beats, &c. (all down to) puts to death a buffalo or some other animal. (The rest as above.) (35)

A man, using nets (for catching deer), beats, &c., an antelope or some other animal. (The rest as above.) (36)

A man, catching birds, beats, &c., a bird or some other animal. (The rest as above.) (37)

A man, becoming a fisherman, beats, &c., a fish or some other animal. (The rest as above.) (38)

A man, becoming a cowherd, beats, &c., a cow or some other animal. (The rest as above.) (39)

A man, slaying cows, beats, &c., a cow or some other animal. (The rest as above.) (40)

A man, becoming a dog-keeper, beats, &c., a dog or some other animal. (The rest as above.) (41)

A man, becoming the helpmate of a dog-keeper, beats, &c., a dog or some other animal. (The rest as above.) (42)

A man, rising in an assembly, may promise to kill some (animal) and he will beat, &c., a partridge, duck, quail, pigeon, monkey, a francoline partridge, or some other animal. (The rest as above.) (43)

A man, being angry for some reason, e.g. because

his granary or his liquor-cask runs short¹, sets fire to the cornfields of the householders or their sons, has the fire set by another person, or consents to another's setting fire to them. (The rest as above.) (44)

A man, being angry for some reason, e.g. because his granary or liquor-cask runs short, makes a deep cut in the strong limbs of the camels, cows, horses, or donkeys of the householders or their sons, has it made by another person, or consents to another's making the cut. (The rest as above.) (45)

A man, being angry for some reason, e.g. because his granary or his liquor-cask runs short, covers with brambles or twigs the householders', or their sons', stable for the camels, cows, horses, or donkeys, and burns them, or has them burnt by another person, or consents to another's burning them. (The rest as above.) (46)

A man, being angry for some reason, &c. (as above), steals a householder's or his sons' earrings (or girdle)², or jewels, or pearls, has them stolen by another person, or consents to another's stealing them. (The rest as above.) (47)

A man, being angry, &c. (as before), robs Śra-manas or Brāhmanas of their umbrella, stick, staff, small property, pot, chair, clothes, blanket, leather boots, knife, or scabbard, has it done by another person, or consents to another's robbing them. (The rest as above.) (48)

A man, without consideration (and without any

¹ Khaladânêna vâ surâthâlaêna vâ. My translation is conjectural.

² Guṇa; omitted in the printed text.

provocation), sets fire to the cornfields of the householders, &c. (All as in § 44.) (49).

A man, without consideration, makes a deep cut in the strong limbs of the camels, &c. (All as in § 45.) (50)

A man, without consideration, covers with brambles and twigs the stables for the camels, &c., and burns them, &c. (All as in § 46.) (51)

A man, without consideration, steals the earrings, &c. (All as in § 47.) (52)

A man, without consideration, robs Sramanas or Brâhmanas of their umbrella, &c. (All as in § 48.) (53)

A man, on seeing Sramanas or Brâhmanas (whom he detests), degrades himself by various evil deeds. Either he gives them a slap with the open hand to turn them away¹, or he abuses them. And when the monk at the proper time calls (at his house on the begging-tour), he does not give him alms (but says): those who become Sramanas are the meanest workmen, men unable to support (their family), low-caste men, wretches, idlers! (54)

Such men praise this life, this miserable life; they do nothing on behalf of the next world; they suffer, grieve, blame themselves, grow feeble, are afflicted, and undergo great pain; they do not cease to cause others to suffer, grieve, &c., to slay and to put men in fetters; and while they make suffer or kill, or make suffer and kill (beings), and do various evil

¹ *Akkharâê apphâlettâ bhavai* = *apsarâyâr kaputikâyâr âsphâlayitâ bhavati*. I am not sure that I have hit the meaning; *apsarâ* is perhaps derived from *apasârayati*, the word is wanting in our dictionaries.

deeds, they enjoy the excellent pleasures of human life; viz. such a man eats at dinner-time, he drinks at drinking-time, he dresses himself at dressing-time, he goes to bed at the proper time, and sleeps at sleeping-time. Doing everything in its turn, he bathes, makes the offering (to the house-gods)¹, performs auspicious rites and expiatory acts, washes his head, hangs a wreath round his neck, adorns himself with precious stones and golden (trinkets), puts on (his head) a chaplet of flowers; with his body strengthened, with a wreath hanging down to the girdle of his loins, dressed in new clothes, his limbs and body anointed with sandal, (sitting) on a large throne in a lofty upper room (of his house), surrounded by women and a troop of followers, in the light (of torches) burning the whole night, under the great din of uninterrupted story-telling, dramatical plays, singing, and music, as beating of time, performing on the *Vīṇā*, *Tūryā*, the great drum, and *Paṭupātāha*², he enjoys the excellent pleasures of human life. (55)

When he gives an order to one man, even four or five men will, without being asked, go up to him (and say): 'Speak, beloved of the gods, what shall we do? what shall we fetch? what shall we give you? what (trinket) shall we put on you? what is your heart's desire? what relishes your mouth?'

Unworthy men who see him will say: 'Forsooth, this man is a god; this man is the anointed of the gods, this man will support (us), as he supports

¹ Compare *Kalpa Sūtra*, *Lives of the Ginas*, § 66, notes. Our commentator explains the *prāyaścitta* (expiatory acts) as ceremonies counteracting bad dreams.

² Compare *Kalpa Sūtra*, *Lives of the Ginas*, § 14, part i, p. 223.

others.' But noble men who see him will say: 'This man does cruel actions, and maintains himself by them. His is the southern region, the hell, the dark fortnight¹. In the future he will not easily obtain enlightenment.' (56)

(The conduct described in the preceding) part² is agreeable to some (heretical) monks, to some householders, to men governed by love of life. This conduct is unworthy, impure, void (of virtues), not holy, not right, not eradicating sins; it is not the road to perfection, liberation, Nirvâṇa, final delivery, not the road of those who are freed from all misery; it is thoroughly untrue, and bad.

This is the explanation of the first subject, viz. demerit. (57)

Now the explanation of the second subject, viz. merit, is as follows:

Here in the East, West, North, and South there are some men, viz. Âryas, non-Âryas, (all down to) ugly men. They own fields and houses, (&c., all as in II, 1, §§ 34-59, down to) reach final beatitude. (58)

(The conduct described in this) part is holy, right, (all just the reverse of what was said in § 58, down to) thoroughly true, and good. This is the explanation of the second subject, viz. merit. (59)

Now the explanation of the third subject, viz. the mixed state, is as follows:

Those who live in woods, in huts, near villages, (&c., all as above, § 21, down to) or blind. (The

¹ For according to the commentaries the worst of all regions is the south, the worst state of being that of denizens of hell, and the dark fortnight is the worse half of the month.

² *Tâṇê* = *sthânam*.

conduct described in this) part is not holy, (&c., all as in § 57, down to) thoroughly untrue, and bad.

This is the explanation of the third subject, viz. the mixed state. (60)

Now the explanation of the first subject, viz. demerit, is as follows :

Here in the East, West, North, and South live some men ; they are householders, men of great desires, great undertakings, great possessions, unrighteous men, men practising unrighteousness, very unrighteous men, men speaking unrighteously, living unrighteously, thinking unrighteously, given to unrighteousness, men of unrighteous character and conduct, men gaining an unrighteous livelihood. (61)

They beat, cut¹, pierce, skin, are bloody-handed, violent, cruel, wicked, rash ; they habitually practise bribery², fraud, deceit, imposture, dishonesty, and trickery ; they are of bad character and morals, they are difficult to please, they do not abstain from killing living beings ; as long as they live they do not abstain from wrath, (&c., all as in II, 1, 51, down to) the sin of wrong belief ; nor from bathing, rubbing, painting, anointing themselves ; from sounds, touches, tastes, colours, smells ; from wreaths and ornaments ; from cars, carriages, vehicles, litters, swings³, coach and pair⁴, palankins⁵, beds, seats ;

¹ These words are in the 2nd person sing. of the imperative, which, according to Pāṇini III, 4, 2, may be used to express a repeated or habitual action.

² *Utkuṣṭhāna*.

³ *Gilli*, *purushadvayōtkshiptā ghṛllikā*.

⁴ *Thilli*, explained : a vehicle drawn by a pair of mules ; but, according to Leumann s.v., saddle.

⁵ *Sṭyasandimāniyā*, explained *sibikāvisēsha*.

from enjoying a ride or drive; from having many followers; from buying, selling, doing business with Māshas¹, half Māshas, and Rupees; from silver, gold, riches, corn, precious stones, pearls, conches, stones, and corals; from using wrong weights and measures; from undertakings and slaughter; from working and making others work; from cooking and making others cook; from cutting, pounding, threatening, beating, binding, killing, and causing pain; and whatever other suchlike wicked and sinful actions of worthless men there be, that cause pains to other beings: these men do not abstain from them as long as they live. (62)

As some idle, cruel men wantonly injure Kalama², Masûra³, sesamum, Mudga⁴, beans, Nishpāva⁵, Kulattha⁶, Âlisanda⁷, Êlamikkha⁸, so an idle, cruel man wantonly hurts partridges, ducks, quails, pigeons, francoline partridges, deer, buffaloes, boars, iguanas, tortoises, and snakes.

A man will (occasionally) severely punish even the smallest offence of his domestics, viz. a slave or messenger or hired servant or vassal⁹ or parasite; e.g. punish him, pull out his hair, beat him, put him in irons, in fetters, in stocks, into prison, screw up in a pair of shackles (his hands and feet)

¹ Māsha is a weight of gold.

² A sort of rice.

³ A sort of pulse or lentil.

⁴ A sort of kidney-bean.

⁵ Probably Dolichos Sinensis.

⁶ A sort of pulse, Dolichos Uniflorus.

⁷ I cannot identify this plant, our dictionaries do not contain this or a similar word.

⁸ This word ought perhaps to be divided in two; êlâ are cardamoms, but what mikkha is I cannot say.

⁹ Bhâgilla = bhâgika, one who gets the sixth part of the products (e.g. of agriculture) of the work for which he is hired.

and break them, cut off his hands or feet or ears or nose or lips or head or face (?)¹, pierce his feet, tear out his eyes, teeth, tongue, hang him, brush him, whirl him round, impale him, lacerate him, pour acids (in his wounds), belabour him with cutting-grass, bind him to a lion's tail (!), or a bull's tail, burn him in a wood on fire, let him be devoured by crows and vultures, stop his food and drink, keep him a prisoner for life, let him die any of these horrid deaths. (63)

A man will (occasionally) severely punish even the smallest offence of his next of kin, viz. his mother or father or brother or sister or wife or sons or daughters or daughters-in-law; e.g. he ducks the offender in cold water, (&c., all as in § 18, down to) hateful in this world and the next. They suffer, grieve, blame themselves, grow feeble, are afflicted, and undergo great pain; they do not cease to cause others to suffer, grieve, &c., to slay and to put men in fetters². (64)

And thus they are given to sensual pleasures, desire them, are held captive by them, passionately love them for four or five years, for six or ten years—the period may be shorter or longer³. Having enjoyed pleasures, having produced the effects of iniquity, having acquired the Karma of many sinful actions which generally bear him downwards, (he goes to the bottom of the hell)⁴. As a ball of

¹ The following two words, *vêgaḥḥahiya* and *aṅgaḥḥahiya*, I cannot translate.

² Compare § 55.

³ Compare § 21.

⁴ These words from the end of the paragraph are to be supplied here, or rather the following passage has been inserted in the

iron or stone, when thrown in the water, sinks below the surface of the water till it stops at the bottom, so a man of the sort we are treating of, who is full of Karman, full of sin, full of demerit, full of disgrace¹, full of iniquity, full of wicked thoughts, deceit, imposture, and fraud, and, as a rule, kills animals, having died at the allotted time, will sink below this earth, and go to the bottom of the hell. (65)

These hells are round inside, square outside, on their floor razorlike arrows are thick-set (and covered with flowers), they are filled with perpetual darkness, never lighted up by the planets, moon, sun, Na-kshatras, and stars; their floor is slippery with a coating of marrow, fat, flesh, blood, and matter, and besmeared with grease; these hells are impure, smelling detestably, black, of the colour of fire, very rugged, difficult to pass, horrid. And horrid are the pains in these hells. (66)

And those who are condemned to live in these hells, do not sleep nor slumber, nor do they get any consolation² or comfort or recreation or encouragement; but the denizens of hell there suffer exquisite, great, deep, hard, rough, violent, painful, sharp, intolerable agonies. (67)

As a tree growing on a hill falls by its weight when its roots are cut, on a low, rugged, inaccessible place, so a man of the sort we are treating of

middle of the sentence so that it is apparently cut in two, of which the first lacks the verb.

¹ There is, apparently, a pun in the three words *vagga*, *pañka*, *ayasa*, for they mean also steel, mud, iron.

² *Muim* or *sāyam* or *suim*. The *Dīpikā* has *sruti*. The following words are *rati*, *dhr̥iti*, *mati*.

wanders from womb to womb, from birth to birth, from death to death, from hell to hell, from pain to pain. His is the southern region, the hell, the dark fortnight¹. In the future he will not easily obtain enlightenment. (The conduct described in the preceding) part is unworthy, impure, (&c., see § 57, all down to) it is thoroughly untrue, and bad. This is the explanation of the first subject, viz. demerit. (68)

Now the explanation of the second subject, viz. merit, is as follows :

Here in the East, West, North, and South there are some such men as abstain from undertakings and possessions, righteous men, men practising righteousness, (&c., all as in § 58, but substitute 'righteous' for 'unrighteous,' down to) men gaining a righteous livelihood. They are of good character and morals, they are easy to please and good. They abstain from killing living beings as long as they live, (&c., all just the reverse of what was said in § 62, down to) whatever other suchlike wicked actions there be, that cause pains to other beings: these men abstain from them as long as they live. (69)

There are such monks as in walking carefully avoid to occasion the death of any living creature, (&c., all as in § 23, down to) as lead chaste lives regulated by the three Guptis, as are free from anger, pride, deceit, and greed, as are calm, tranquil, passionless, happy, free from the Āsravas, and bondage, without sorrow; as water does not adhere to a copper vessel, or collyrium to mother-of-pearl

¹ Compare § 56 and note 1 on p. 372.

(so sins find no place in them); their course is unobstructed like that of Life; like the firmament they want nothing to support them; like the wind they know no obstacles; their heart is pure like the water (of rivers or tanks) in autumn; like the leaves of a lotus they cannot be soiled by anything; their senses are well protected like the limbs of a tortoise; they are single and alone like the horn of a rhinoceros; they are free like birds; they are always waking like the fabulous bird *Bhârunda*; they are valorous like elephants, strong like bulls, difficult to attack like lions, steady and firm like Mount Mandara, deep like the ocean, mild like the moon, refulgent like the sun, pure like excellent gold; like the earth they patiently bear everything; like a well-kindled fire they shine in their splendour¹. (70)

There are no obstacles anywhere for these reverend men. The obstacles have been declared to be of four kinds, viz. animals born from eggs, viviparous animals, things belonging to somebody, articles necessary for religious exercises². In whichever direction they want to go, there they meet with no obstacle; but being pure and free, full of learning, control, and austerities, they purify themselves. (71)

These reverend men practise the following mode

¹ The same passage occurs, *mutatis mutandis*, in the Kalpa Sūtra, *Lives of the Ginas*, § 118; see part i, p. 261, and notes 1 and 2.

² The author of the *Dīpikā* offers diverse interpretations of this division of obstacles, which are apparently guesses and not based on a solid tradition. In the parallel passage of the Kalpa Sūtra, § 119, the division is according to: matter, space, time, and affects.

of living which just suffices for carrying on existence ; they eat but one meal in two, three, four, five, six, seven days, in half a month, in one, two, three, four, five, six months ; they (have vowed to) live on such food only as has been taken out of the cooking-vessel, or as is still in it, or the first kind of food in one place and the second in another, or on low food, or bad food, or food collected in small bits, or food given with a dirty hand, or the reverse, or food given with a hand, &c. soiled by it ; they (have vowed to) accept such alms only as are within sight (when they beg), or are out of sight, as they are asked whether they would accept, or as they are not asked about, as are given with contempt, or the reverse ; they beg (in houses where they are) unknown, or when food is scarce¹ ; they accept only such things as are at hand, or only a limited number of gifts, or only a fixed quantity of food ; they beg according to the rules (laid down for begging) ; they eat low food or bad food or tasteless food or badly tasting food or rough food or disagreeable food ; they lead a low or mean life ; they drink sour gruel, they eat nothing seasoned with ghee or similar materials ; they do not drink liquors or eat meat, they do not eat highly-flavoured food ; they eat standing, or supported by something, or sitting on a stool or an armchair ; they lie down stretched out like a stick, or curved like a bent piece of wood² ; they sit in the sun,

¹ The author of the *Dîpikâ* states that such monks beg in the morning.

² *Lagandasâinô*. They lie in such a position that only their heels and head, or the back touch the ground.

they go naked¹; they do not scratch themselves; they do not spit; they do not cut their beard, hair, and nails, they do not take any care of their person. (72)

Living in this way they practise many years Sramāṇahood, and if then they fall sick, or even if they do not, they refuse food and omit many meals by abstaining from food. When they have attained that for whose sake they went about naked and bald-headed, did not bathe, nor clean their teeth, nor protect their head from the sun, nor wear shoes; they slept on the bare ground or a plank or a piece of wood, plucked out their hair, led a life of chastity, entered the houses of strangers, and bore, with indifference, success, failure, honour, disgrace, slights, blame, reviling, threatening, beating, all sorts of hardships², and the twenty-two calamities and troubles; (when they have attained their end), they reach, while they are breathing their last, the highest knowledge and faith, called Kêvala, which is infinite, supreme, unobstructed, unimpeded, complete and full; and then they obtain absolute perfection, enlightenment, deliverance, final beatitude, and put an end to all misery. (73)

Some become liberated³ without assuming another body (after quitting the last). But others, having died at the allotted time, are, on account of a residue

¹ I leave out agattayâ or agamayâ, which is not explained in the Dîpikâ.

² Grâmakāṇṭaka, either the abuse met with in villages, or the objects of the senses (indriyagrâma).

³ Bhayantârô bhavanti. Bhayantârô is explained: who go (gantâraḥ) from bhava to Môksha.

of (good) Karman, born in one of the regions of the gods. Among very beautiful, very splendid, very excellent, very glorious, very strong, very powerful, very happy (gods), they become very beautiful, very splendid, &c., gods¹; their breasts shining with necklaces; their arms encumbered with bracelets and armrings; wearing ear-ornaments² which play on their cheeks, and earrings which hang down to the bracelets on their upper arms; wearing various ornaments on their hands; their crowns adorned with gay wreaths; putting on highly perfumed, excellent clothes; using beautiful, excellent garlands and ointments; their splendid body ornamented with a long down-reaching garland; having divine colours, touches, constitution (of the body), and rank; lighting up and illumining all ten quarters (of the universe) with their divine beauty, splendour, lustre, brightness, brilliancy, and light; beautiful when they go, beautiful when they rest, and happy also in the time to come.

(The conduct described in the preceding) part is worthy, pure, (&c., see § 57, all down to) it is thoroughly true, and good.

This is the explanation of the second subject, viz. merit. (74)

Now the explanation of the third subject, viz. the mixed state, is as follows:

Here in the East, West, North, and South there are some such men as have few desires, few undertakings, few possessions, righteous men, men

¹ The following description contains passages recurring in the Kalpa Sûtra, §§ 14, 15.

² *Karnapîḥa*.

practising righteousness, (&c., all as in § 69, down to) men gaining a righteous livelihood. They are of good character and morals, easy to please, and good. They abstain, as long as they live, from one kind of killing living beings, but they do not abstain from another, (&c., similar as in § 62, all down to) whatever suchlike wicked actions there be, that cause pains to other beings, from some of them these men abstain as long as they live, from others they do not abstain. (75)

There¹ are, for instance, followers of the *Sramanas*, who comprehend (the doctrine about) living beings and things without life, who understand (the difference between) virtues and sins, who are well grounded in (the knowledge of) the *Āsravas*, *Samvara*, the realisation and annihilation (of *Karman*), the subject of actions², bondage, and final liberation; who, without anybody to back them³, cannot be seduced from the creed of the *Nirgranthas* by hosts of gods, *Asuras*, *Nāgas*, *Suvarṇas*, *Yakshas*, *Rākshasas*, *Kinnaras*, *Kimpurushas*, *Garuḍas*, and snake-gods; who have no doubts, scruples, or misgivings about this creed of the *Nirgranthas*, but have grasped its meaning, got hold of its meaning, got information about its meaning, ascertained its

¹ *Śilāṅka* says with regard to § 76: 'The MSS. of the text generally differ from one another in this passage; the text commented upon in the *Tīkā* does not agree with that of any MS. I therefore comment upon the text exhibited in one MS. If, therefore, my text does not agree with that (of the reader) he should not be alarmed.' All the MSS. I use have the same text, that of the commentator. It is characteristic of the way in which *Harshakula*, the author of the *Dīpikā*, worked, that he copies *Śilāṅka*'s above remark with some verbal alterations.

² *Kriyādhikaraṇa*.

³ *Asahāyā*.

meaning, and understood its meaning; whose very marrow¹ of the bones has been penetrated by their love (for the Nirgrantha creed), avowing that it alone is true, and all others futile. They keep the bar² (of their gates) raised and their door open, having no desire to enter a stranger's house or his seraglio. They strictly keep the Pôsaḥa-fast on the fourteenth and eighth days of the month, on certain festivals³, and on full-moon days. They provide the Nirgrantha Sramanas with pure acceptable food, drink, dainties and spices, with clothes, alms-bowls, blankets and brooms, with drugs and medicines, with stools, planks, beds, and couches. They purify themselves by practising the Śilavratas and Guṇavratas⁴, the Viramaṇa, the Pratyākhyāna,

the Pôsaḥa-fasts, and austerities which they have vowed to perform¹. (76)

Living in this way they are for many years followers of the Sramanas, and if then they fall sick, or even if they do not, they refuse food and omit many meals by abstaining from food. Having confessed their sins and expiated them, and having attained perfection², they die at their allotted time, to be born again as gods in one of the regions of the gods, (&c., all as in § 74, down to) it is thoroughly true, and good.

This is the explanation of the third subject, viz. the mixed state. (77)

He who does not practise cessation³ (from sin), is called a foolish man; he who practises cessation (from sin), is called a wise man; he who in one regard practises cessation (from sin) and in another does not, is said to be in a state partaking of that of a wise man and that of a foolish man.

The conduct of him who does not practise cessation from all (sins), is that of a man who kills living creatures; it is unworthy, (&c., all down to) thoroughly untrue, and bad.

The conduct of him who practises cessation from all (sins), is that of a man who does not kill living creatures; it is worthy, pure, (&c., all down to) thoroughly true, and good.

The conduct of a man who in one regard practises cessation from all (sins) and in another does not, is

¹ The same passage occurs below, 7, 4, and Aupapâtika Sûtra, § 124. Upâsakadarâ, § 66.

² Samâdhi, which is elsewhere explained by môksha, but in our case it cannot be final liberation, but a state of purity of the soul.

³ Virati.

that of a man who kills some living creatures and does not kill others ; it is worthy, pure, (&c., all down to) thoroughly true, and good. (78)

Those whom we have been treating of, fall under the two heads: merit and demerit ; (the former is when the Self is) at rest, (the latter, when it is) in disturbance.

Now the explanation of the first subject is as follows :

There are enumerated three hundred and sixty-three philosophical schools¹: those of the Kriyâ-vâda, those of the Akriyâvâda, those of the *Agñânikavâda*, and those of the *Vainayikavâda*. These (philosophers) teach final beatitude, they teach final deliverance, they speak as *Srâvakas*, they speak as teachers of *Srâvakas*². (79)

All these philosophers, founders of systems of their own, differing in intellect, will, character, opinions, taste, undertakings, and plans, formed one large circle, and every one of them stood in his place.

One man took hold of a vessel quite full of

¹ According to the commentators there are 180 schools of Kriyâvâdins, 84 of Akriyâvâdins, 67 of *Agñânikavâdins*, and 32 of *Vainayikavâdins*. These numbers are arrived at by calculation, not by actual observation. E.g. the 180 possible schools of the Kriyâvâdins are calculated in the following way. The nine categories of the *Gâinas* are: *gîva*, *agîva*, *âsrava*, *samvara*, *nirgarâ*, *punya*, *pâpa*, *bandha*, and *môksha*. Each of them may be regarded as *svatah* and *paratah*, as *nitya* and *anitya* with regard to *kâla*, *îsvara*, *âtma*, *niyati*, and *svabhâva*. By multiplying 9 successively in 2, 2, 5, we find 180 to be the number of possible schools of Kriyâvâdins.

² I.e. they learn these heresies from their teachers, and teach them to their pupils.

burning coals by an iron pair of tongs, and addressed those philosophers, founders of systems of their own, differing in intellect, (&c., all down to) undertakings and plans, in the following way : 'Heighho ! ye philosophers, (&c., all down to) undertakings and plans ! take this vessel full of burning coals and hold it for a minute in your hands ! But do not take hold of it by a pair of tongs, nor put out the fire, nor come to the help of one of your own creed or of an alien creed (by putting out the fire, &c.) ; but fair and honest ¹, without using any trick, stretch out your hands.' Having thus spoken, the man took hold of the vessel quite full of burning coals by an iron pair of tongs, and (offered to) put it in the hands of those philosophers. But the philosophers, (&c., all down to) undertakings and plans, held back their hands. On this the man addressed all the philosophers, (&c., all down to) undertakings and plans, in the following way : 'Heighho, ye philosophers, (&c., all down to) undertakings and plans ! why do you hold back your hands ?' 'Our hand will be burned.' 'What then, if it is burned ?' '(We shall suffer) pain.' 'Because you are afraid of pain, you hold back your hands !' (So are all creatures averse to pain). This is a maxim of general application ², it is a true principle, a religious reflection ³; this maxim, this principle, this religious reflection holds good with regard to every (living being). Therefore those Sramanas and Brâhmanas who say that all sorts of living beings may be beaten or treated with violence or abused or tor-

¹ Niyâgapaḍivanna.

² Tulâ.

³ Samôsarana = samavasârana, explained: dharmaviââra, viz. of the true adage: âtmavat sarvabhûtâni yah paryati sa paryati.

mented or deprived of life, will in the time to come¹ suffer cutting or piercing, will experience birth, old age, death, conception in the womb, the Circle of Births, regeneration, existence as a foetus, the whole scale of mundane existences, and suffer a variety of pains². (80)

They will many times undergo punishment, pulling out of the hair, threatening, putting in irons, (&c., similar as in § 63, all down to) whirling round; (they will witness) the death of their mothers, fathers, brothers, sisters, sons, daughters, and daughters-in-law; (they will experience) poverty, bad luck, company of hated people, separation from those whom they love, misery, and despair; they will again and again wander about in the beginningless and endless, immense wilderness of the fourfold *Samsâra*. They will not reach perfection, (&c., all down to) not put an end to all misery.—This is a maxim of general application, (&c., all down to) holds good with regard to every (living being). (81)

But those *Sramanas* and *Brâhmanas* who say that all sorts of living beings should not be beaten, &c., will in the time to come not suffer cutting, &c. They will not undergo many punishments, (&c., all just the reverse of what has been said in §§ 80, 81, down to) put an end to all misery. (82)

Thus those beings who practise the first twelve kinds of actions³, have not attained perfection, (&c., all down to) have not, nor do, nor will put an end to all misery. (83)

¹ Âgantu.

² Kalañkalibhâva.

³ Described in §§ 5-21. See p. 365, note 3.

But those beings who practise the thirteenth kind of action, have attained perfection, (&c., all down to) have put, or put, or will put an end to all misery. (84)

Thus a monk who obtains his soul's good and benefit, who guards himself, who (well directs the functions) of his soul, who well exerts himself, who protects himself (from evil), who is careful of himself, who saves himself (from the *Samsâra*), should withhold his soul (from the twelve kinds of committing sins). (85)

Thus I say.

THIRD LECTURE,

CALLED

KNOWLEDGE OF FOOD.

O long-lived (*Gambûsvâmin*)! I (*Sudharman*) have heard the following discourse from the Venerable (*Mahâvîra*). We now come to the Lecture called 'Knowledge of Food.' The contents of it are as follows :

Here in the East, West, North, and South there are, all in all, in the world four kinds of seed : seeds generated at the top (of the plant), at its root, at its knots, at its stem ¹. According to the seed and place

¹ The commentators here give the reading of the *Nâgârjunîyas* : 'the growth of seeds of the plants is fivefold, viz. they grow from the top (of the plant), its root, its knots, its stem, and its beads ;

(of growth) of these plants some beings—born in earth, originated in earth, and grown in earth, having in it their birth, origin, and growth, being impelled by their Karman, and coming forth in it on account of their Karman, growing there in particles of earth, the origin of various things—come forth as trees¹. (1)

These living beings feed on the liquid substance² of these particles of earth, the origin of various things; these beings consume earth-bodies, water-bodies, fire-bodies, wind-bodies, bodies of plants; they deprive of life the bodies of manifold movable and immovable beings; the destroyed bodies which have been consumed before, or absorbed by the rind, (are) digested and assimilated (by them). And the bodies of these (trees) which bring forth their different parts, are of manifold colours, smells, tastes, touches, forms, and arrangement of corporeal particles³.

and some are of a sixth kind called *sammûrkkhima*' (i.e. those plants which are believed to be originated by the coalescing particles of the substance in which they grow, e.g. grass springing up on ground lately cleared by fire).—The various readings of the *Nâgârguṇīyas* are occasionally quoted in commentaries (see e.g. part i, p. 32, note 2). But I do not think that it has been satisfactorily made out who these *Nâgârguṇīyas* were.

¹ The meaning is, that souls who on account of their Karman are to be born as trees, previously are embodied in earth, and thence they are transferred by their Karman to the seed which brings forth the tree.

² *Sinêha*, explained: *snigdhabhâva*. In the sequel where plants are spoken of, I shall render this word by 'sap' or 'humours,' as the context may require.

³ I.e. the food assimilated by the tree is the material of which its different parts, as root, stem, leaves, &c., are formed, and these parts are of manifold form, colours, &c.

These beings (animating trees) come into existence because of their Karman ; so we are taught (by the Tīrthakaras, &c.) (2)

And again it has been said of old : some beings born in trees, originated by trees, sprung from trees, (&c., as in § 1, down to) springing from trees that originated in earth, come forth as trees originated by trees¹. These beings feed on the sap of the trees originated in earth, (&c., all as in § 2, down to the end). (3)

(In the same way, and in nearly the same words, the offshoots of the trees mentioned in the preceding paragraph are treated of.) (4)

And again it has been said of old : some beings born in trees, (&c., all as above, down to) growing in trees, that are originated by trees, come forth as their roots, bulb, stem, branches, twigs, leaves, flowers, fruits, and seeds². These beings feed on the sap of those trees originated by trees, (&c., all as in § 2, down to) and the bodies of the roots, bulb, stem, &c. are of manifold colours, (&c., all as in § 2, down to the end). (5)

(The four paragraphs that come next, 6–9, are identical with the preceding ones, except that ‘creeper’³ is substituted for ‘tree.’) (6–9)

(In the same way ‘grass’⁴ is treated in four paragraphs, but the whole is much abridged ; then

¹ Apparently trees sprung from shoots, sprouts, aerial-roots, &c. are meant. They are considered as a class different from those whose offshoots they are.

² One soul, *gīva*, pervades the whole tree ; it is the soul of the tree. Separate *gīvas*, however, reside in the roots, &c.

³ *Aggāḍruha* = *adhyârôha*, explained in the *Dīpikā* : *vallī-vriksha*.

⁴ *Trina*.

it is said that 'herbs¹' and 'plants²' are to be treated in four paragraphs each.) (10-15)

And again it has been said of old : some beings born in earth, (&c., all as in § 1, down to) growing there in particles of earth that are the origin of various things, come forth as *Āya*, *Kāya*, *Kuhana*, *Kandu*, *Uvvêhaliya*, *Nivvêhaliya*, *Êsava*, *Sakêkha*, *Khattaga*, *Vâsâniya* ³. (The rest as in § 2, but substitute the words *Āya*, &c. for 'trees.')

Here there is only one paragraph, the remaining three do not apply here ⁴. (16)

And again it has been said of old : some beings born in water, (&c., all as in §§ 1-11, substitute only 'water' for 'earth.')

Thus we have four paragraphs for trees, four for creepers, four for grass, four for herbs, four for plants). (17)

Now it has been said of old : some beings born in water, (&c., all as above, down to) growing in particles of water that are the origin of various things, come forth as *Udaga*, *Avaga* ⁵, *Paṇaga*, *Sêvâla* ⁶, *Kalambuya* ⁷, *Kasêrûya* ⁸, *Kakêkhabhâniya*, *Uppala*,

¹ *Ôsahi* = *Ôshadhi*.

² *Hariya* = *harita*.

³ All the commentators say about the words *Āya*, &c. (which offer some various readings in the MSS.), is that they denote particular plants (*vanaspativîśha*) which must be learned from people (who know them). I give the words in their *Prākṛit* form, and do not attempt to transpose them into Sanskrit.

⁴ For there are no *Āyas* originated by *Āyas* except through their seed.

⁵ *Avakâ*, a grassy plant growing in marshy land, *Blyxa Octandra*.

⁶ *Saivâla*, the aquatic plant *Vallisneria*.

⁷ *Kadamba*, *Nauclea Kadamba*.

⁸ *Kasêru*, *Scirpus Kysoor*.

Pauma, Kumuya, Nalina¹, Subhagasômiya, Pondariya, Mahâpondariya, Sayavatta, Sahassavatta, Kalhâra, Kôkanada, Tâmarasa², as stalks and fibres of lotus, as Pukkhalâ³, and Pukkhalatthibhaga. (The rest similar as in § 2.) (18)

And again it has been said of old : some beings come forth as movable beings from trees born in earth, from trees originated by trees, from the roots, (&c., down to) seeds produced by trees, originated by creepers born on trees, from creepers born on creepers, from the roots, &c. of creepers born on creepers, from grass⁴, from herbs⁴, from plants⁴, from Âya, (&c., all down to) Kûra born in earth ; from trees born in water (the rest similar as with trees born in earth), from Udaga, (&c., all down to) Pukkhalatthibhaga born in water. (19)

These creatures feed on the sap of the trees, creepers, grass, herbs, plants, be they born in earth or water, on trees or creepers or grass or herbs or plants ; (the sap) of their roots, (&c., all down to) seeds, of Âyas, &c., of Udakas, &c. And these creatures consume earth-bodies, (&c., all as in § 2, down to) assimilated by them. And the bodies of these beings born of trees, creepers, grass, herbs, plants, their roots, &c., of Âyas, &c., of Udagas, &c., are of manifold colours, (&c., the rest as in § 2, down to the end). (20)

¹ The last four are well-known varieties of lotus, called in Sanskrit: utpala, padma, kumuda, nalina.

² The Sanskrit of the last seven items is : pundarîka, mahâpundarîka, satapattrâ, sahasrapattrâ, kahlâra, kôkanada, and tâmarasa ; they are all varieties of lotus.

³ Pushkara.

⁴ This is to be detailed in the same way as with trees and creepers.

And again it has been said of old : a man and a woman combine in cohabitation in a cunnus, which was produced by their Karman, and there they deposit their humours. Therein are born the souls of different men, viz. of those born in Karmabhûmi¹, or in Akarmabhûmi, or in the minor continents, of Âryas and barbarians, as women or men or eunuchs, according to the semen and blood of the mother² and the other circumstances³ (contingent on their coming into existence). These beings at first feed on the menses of the mother and the semen of the father, or both combined into an unclean, foul (substance). And afterwards they absorb with a part (of their bodies) the essence⁴ of whatever food the mothers take. Gradually increasing and attaining to the proper dimensions of a foetus⁵ they come forth from the womb, some as males, some as females, some as neuters. As long as they are babies, they suck the mother's milk; but when they grow older, they eat boiled rice, or gruel, or both movable and immovable beings. These beings consume earth-bodies, (&c., all as before, down to) assimilated by them. And the bodies of these men, viz. those born in Karmabhûmi, or Akarmabhûmi, or in the minor continents, of Âryas and barbarians, are of mani-

¹ Compare note 1, p. 225.

² Both are indicated in the text by *bîga*. According to *Silânka*, a male will be produced if the semen is in excess; a female, if the blood; a neuter, if they are equally balanced.

³ *Avakâsa*. According to *Silânka*, a male is produced from the right side of the womb, a female from the left, a neuter from both together.

⁴ *Ôyam* = *ôgas*.

⁵ *Paliyâgam*, explained *garbhaparipâka*.

fold colours, (&c., all as in § 2, down to the end). (21)

(This paragraph is nearly identical with the preceding one, but substitute 'aquatic animals of five organs of sense, viz. fishes, (all down to)¹ porpoises,' for 'different men' in the beginning and the end. The following sentence in the middle is slightly different; it runs thus: 'as long as they are young, they feed on the mothers' humours, but when they grow older they eat plants, or both movable and immovable beings.')(22)

(This paragraph treats of) quadrupeds², terrestrial animals with five organs of sense, viz. solidungular animals, biungular animals, multiungular animals, and animals having toes with nails. (All as in the last paragraph, only 'as long as they are young, they feed on their mothers' milk.')(23)

(This paragraph treats of) reptiles moving on the breast, (being) terrestrial animals with five organs of sense, viz. snakes, huge snakes³, Āsālika, and dragons⁴. (All as before, but the following passage is different.) Some bring forth eggs, some bring forth living young ones; some come out of the egg as males, some as females, some as neuters. As long as they are young, they live on wind. (The rest as above.) (24)

(This paragraph treats of) terrestrial animals with five organs of sense, walking on their arms, viz. iguanas, ichneumons, porcupines, frogs, chameleons,

¹ See Uttarādhyaṇa XXXVI, 173; above, p. 223.

² Compare Uttarādhyaṇa XXXVI, 180, *ibidem*.

³ Agagara, literally serpents which devour goats.

⁴ Mahōraḡa. According to the Guzeratī gloss these snakes are a thousand yōḡanas long.

Khôras, Gharakôillas¹, Vissambharas², rats, mangooses, Paîlâiyas, cats, Gôhas, Kâuppâiyas³. (The rest as in the last paragraph.) (25)

(This paragraph treats of) aerial animals with five organs of sense: birds with membranous wings, birds with feathered wings, birds with wings in the shape of a box, and birds (which sit on) outspread wings⁴. (All as before; only the following passage is different): 'As long as they are young, they are hatched by their mothers' warmth.' (The rest as above.) (26)

And again it has been said of old: there are beings of manifold birth and origin, (&c., all as in § 1, down to) growing there on the animate or inanimate bodies of manifold movable or immovable creatures, come forth as parasites⁵. These beings feed on the humours of various movable and immovable creatures, &c. And the bodies of these movable and immovable parasites are of manifold colours, (&c., as above). (27)

In the same way vermin generated in filthy substances⁶ and in the skin of living animals⁷ are to be treated of. (28, 29)

And again it has been said of old: there are some beings of manifold birth and origin, (&c., all as in § 1,

¹ *Grihakoila*, probably identical with *grihagôlika*, a lizard.

² *Visvambhara* is given in the smaller Petersburg Dictionary as the name of a scorpion or some similar animal. However, it must denote here some other animal.

³ This may be *katushpâdika*, quadruped; but then the word must be taken in a restricted sense, perhaps, small quadrupeds.

⁴ See *Uttarâdhyayana* XXXVI, 187; above, p. 224. Perhaps beetles and butterflies are intended by the two last kinds of *pakshins*?

⁵ *Anusûya* = *anusûta* or *anusyûta*.

⁶ *Durûvasambhava*.

⁷ *Khuruduga*.

down to) growing thereon (or in) the animate or inanimate bodies of manifold movable or immovable creatures as that (water)-body¹, which is produced by wind, condensed by wind, and carried along by wind; it goes upwards, when there is an upward wind; it goes downwards, when there is a downward wind; it goes in a horizontal direction, when there is a horizontal wind; (its varieties are) hoar-frost, snow, mist, hailstones, dew, and rain. These beings feed on the humours of these manifold movable and immovable creatures, &c. And the bodies of these (water-lives, viz.) hoar-frost, &c., produced by manifold movable or immovable creatures, are of manifold colours, (&c., as above)². (30)

And again it has been said of old: some beings, born in water, (&c., all similar as in § 1, down to) come forth in water(-bodies) in the water produced by manifold movable or immovable beings. These beings feed on the humours of the water(-bodies) produced by manifold movable and immovable creatures. (The rest similar as above.) (31)

And again it has been said of old: some beings, born in water, (&c., all similar as in § 1, down to) come forth in water-bodies produced by other water-bodies. These beings feed on the humours of those other water-bodies produced by water-bodies. (The rest similar as above.) (32)

And again it has been said of old: some beings, born in water, (&c., all similar as in § 1, down to) come forth as movable creatures in the water

¹ There is apparently no predicate in this sentence.

² This paragraph gives the 'scientific' explanation of the way by which water-bodies or the bodies of water-lives are produced by wind.

produced by water-bodies. These beings feed on the humours of the water(-bodies) produced by water. (The rest similar as before.) (33)

And again it has been said of old: some beings, of various birth and origin, (&c., all as in § 1, down to) come forth as fire-bodies in the manifold animate or inanimate bodies of movable or immovable creatures¹. These beings feed on the manifold movable or immovable creatures. (The rest similar as before.)

The remaining three paragraphs are similar (to those treating of) water-bodies. (34)

(This paragraph treats of wind-bodies in the same way as the preceding ones treated of fire-bodies; like it, it consists of four paragraphs). (35)

And again it has been said of old: some beings, of various birth and origin, (&c., all as in § 1, down to) come forth, in the manifold animate and inanimate bodies of movable and immovable creatures², as earth, gravel, &c. Here the following verses (from the Uttarâdhyayana XXXVI, 74-77) are to be made use of:

1. Earth, gravel, sand, stones, rocks, rock-salt, iron, copper, tin, lead, silver, gold, and diamond;
2. Orpiment, vermilion, realgar, Sâsaka, antimony, coral, Abhrapâṭala, Abhravâluka; these are varieties of gross (earth-)bodies, and precious stones.

¹ E.g. when two bulls or elephants rush upon one another, sparks of fire are seen issuing from their horns or teeth. Fire is produced when two pieces of wood or stone are rubbed one against the other.

² According to the commentators, earth-bodies are produced in the shape of precious stones, in the head of snakes, of pearls in the teeth (sic) of elephants, and so in reeds, &c.

3. Hyacinth, natron, Añka, crystal, Lôhitāksha, emerald, Masâragalla, Bhugamôḥaka, and sapphire ;

4. *Kandana*, red chalk, *Hamsagarbha*, *Pulaka*, and sulphur ; *Kandraprabha*, lapis lazuli, *Galakânta*, and *Sûryakânta*.

These beings feed on the humours of these manifold movable and immovable beings. (The rest as above.)

The remaining three paragraphs are similar (to those treating of) water-bodies. (36)

And again it has been said of old : all sorts of living beings, of manifold birth, origin, and growth, born in bodies, originated in bodies, grown in bodies, feeding on bodies, experience their *Karman*, are actuated by it, have their form and duration of life determined by *Karman*, and undergo changes through the influence of *Karman*. This you should know, and knowing it you will be careful and circumspect with regard to your food, and always exert yourself. (37)

Thus I say.

FOURTH LECTURE,

CALLED

RENUNCIATION OF ACTIVITY.

O long-lived (*Gambûsvâmin*) ! I (*Sudharman*) have heard the following Discourse from the Venerable (*Mahāvīra*). We now come to the Lecture called 'Renunciation of Activity.' The contents of it are as follows:

It is the Self that may¹ not renounce (activity), that may be accustomed to act, that may adhere to errors, that may be prone to sin, that may be thoroughly ignorant, that may be thoroughly stolid², that may not consider the operations³ of mind, speech, and body, that may not avoid and renounce sins.

The Venerable One has said, 'He (i. e. the Self) is uncontrolled, unresigned, does not avoid and renounce sins, is active, careless, prone to sin, thoroughly ignorant, thoroughly stolid. Though a fool does not consider⁴ the operations of his mind, speech, and body, nor does see even a dream⁵; still he commits sins⁶. (1)

The opponent says to the teacher: 'There can be no sin, if (the perpetrator of an action) does not possess sinful thoughts, speech, and functions of the body, if he does not kill, if he has no internal organ, if he does not consider the operations of mind, speech, and body, if he does not see even a dream.'

¹ 'May' is to render *yâvi = kâpi*. This word is used here to indicate that the reverse is true in other cases. This paragraph emphasises the *Gaina* doctrine that the Self or *âtman* is the direct cause of all actions of an individual being, in opposition to the *Sânkhya* philosophers who maintain the absolute inactivity of the *purusha*, and to the *Bauddhas* who deny the existence of a separate *âtman* altogether.

² Literally, sleeping (*sutta = supta*).

³ Literally, speeches (*vakka = vâkya*).

⁴ We ought, perhaps, to translate: if he is not conscious of, &c.

⁵ I.e. when consciousness is fainter than in a dream.

⁶ The doctrine of the *Gainas* is that *Karman* is the result of the action of every being, even of those whose intellect or consciousness is not developed, as with the *êkêndriyas* or beings who possess but one organ of sense. The opponent, however, maintains that only conscious actions of intelligent beings bring about *Karman*. This question is discussed in the following paragraphs.

What is the meaning of the opponent in making this statement? 'When there is a sinful mind, there is sin of the mind; when there is sinful speech, there is sin of the speech; when there is a sinful body, there is sin of the body. When one kills, possesses an internal organ, and considers the operations of mind, speech, and body, when one sees even a dream, then there is sin. Only he who has these qualities can commit sin.' The opponent goes on to say, 'Those who say: There is sin, though (the perpetrator of an action) does not possess sinful thoughts, speeches, and functions of the body, though he does not kill, though he does not possess an internal organ, though he does not consider the operations of mind, speech, and body, and though he does not see even a dream,—those who say this, are wrong.' (2)

Here the teacher says to the opponent: 'It is true what I have just said: there is sin, though (the perpetrator of the action) do not possess sinful thoughts, (&c., all as above, down to) though he do not see even a dream.' 'What is the reason thereof?' (The Ākārya says)¹: 'The Venerable One has assigned the six classes of living beings as the reason: the earth-lives, (&c., all down to) movable beings. With regard to these six classes of living beings, the Self does not avoid and renounce sins, he is wicked and does harm through cruelty: (this holds good with regard to the five cardinal sins:) killing of living beings, &c. (and the passions): anger, &c. (down to) the sin of wrong belief.' (3)

(The Ākārya says): 'The Venerable One has illustrated this by the example of a murderer:

¹ These words here and in the sequel are in Sanskrit; they probably are a gloss.

a murderer (who hates) a householder or his son or the king or his servant, resolves, on an occasion offering, to enter (the victim's house) and to kill him when he finds an opportunity¹. Is not this murderer who has formed this resolution², (a man) who, day and night, whether sleeping or waking, is full of hostility and wrong; who is wicked and does harm through cruelty? An unbiassed opponent before whom this is laid, will answer: Indeed, he is!' (4)

(The Ātārya says): 'As this murderer who has formed the above resolution is a man who (&c., all as in § 4, down to) does harm through cruelty—(and this holds good with regard to the five cardinal sins :) killing of living beings, &c. (and the passions :) anger, &c., (down to) the sin of wrong belief—so it has been said of him by the Venerable One: he³ is uncontrolled, unresigned, he does not avoid and renounce sins, he is active, careless, prone to sin, thoroughly ignorant, thoroughly stolid. Though a fool does not consider the operations of his mind, speech, and body, nor does see even a dream, still he commits sins. (5)

As a murderer who entertains (murderous) intentions towards a householder, &c., is a man who (&c., all as in § 4, down to) does harm through cruelty; so an ignorant man who entertains (cruel) intentions towards all sorts of living beings, is a man

¹ The Nāgārguṇīyas have another reading (where, is not stated by Sīlāṅka): If he sees no opportunity, or his proposed victim is always on his guard, he does not kill him, but he resolves in his mind: If I get an opportunity, or I find that man off his guard, I shall certainly kill him.

² The original repeats the preceding passage in full. I abridge it here and in the sequel.

³ I.e. every soul, even that of a being with but one organ of sense.

who (&c., all as in § 4, down to) does harm through cruelty. (6)

(An opponent might object): This is no good reasoning. (For) there are many living beings which one, during one's whole life, never saw, nor heard of, nor cared for, nor took notice of. Towards these beings, therefore, one cannot (be said to) entertain (murderous) intentions, nor to be one who, day and night, whether sleeping or waking, is full of hostility and wrong, (&c., the rest as in § 4). (7)¹

(The Ākārya says): The Venerable One has refuted this by two illustrations, one of a sentient being, the other of a senseless being. The first is as follows: A sentient being, possessing five organs of sense and a developed internal organ, may with regard to the six classes of living beings, viz. earth-bodies, (all down to) movable beings, impose some restriction upon himself; (e. g.) that he will meet his wants, or have them met by others, by means of earth-bodies only. His intention is: I shall meet my wants, or have them met by others, by means of earth-bodies only. His intention is not (to make use of) this or that (particular earth-body): he meets his wants, or has them met by others, by means of earth-bodies in general. With regard to them,

¹ Silāṅka here makes it clear that the discussion, in the preceding paragraphs, is carried on in the form of a syllogism of five parts established in Hindu logics. § 1 contains the proposition, *pratigñā*, § 3 the cause, *hētu*, § 4 the exemplification, *udāharaṇa* or *drishānta*, § 5 the *upanaya* or that part which shows that the *hētu* is in the subject of the syllogism, and § 6 the conclusion, *nigamana*. We thus see how deeply rooted in, and how genial to, the mind of the Hindus was the *pañcāvayavam anumānam* or syllogism of five parts; for the author conforms to it, I dare say, unintentionally.

therefore, he is uncontrolled, unrestrained, does not avoid and renounce sins. The same applies to the remaining five classes of living beings.—Some one may meet his wants, or have them met by others, by means of the six classes of living beings. His intention is: I shall meet my wants, or have them met by others, by means of the six classes of living beings; it is not: by means of some particular beings. He meets his wants, (&c.) by means of living beings in general. With regard to them, therefore, he is uncontrolled, &c. (This holds good with the five cardinal sins): killing of living beings, &c., (and with the passions): anger, (&c., all down to) the sin of wrong belief. The Venerable One has said that such a creature, (&c., all as in § 1, down to) commits sins. (8)

The illustration of senseless beings is as follows: Senseless beings, viz. earth-bodies, (&c., all down to) plants, to which must be added, as a sixth item, some movable beings, which have no reason nor consciousness, nor intellect, nor mind, nor speech, in order to do something, or to have it done by others, or to consent to others' doing it; these benighted creatures (are to be considered as murderers), are full of hostility and wrong (all as in § 4)¹ against all

¹ If the passage were printed in full, the most glaring contradictions would stare the reader in the face. The cause hereof is not that the passage cannot correctly be rendered, but that the authors of the Sûtras always make use of set phrases whether all parts of them suit the case in hand or not. Sometimes we can avoid downright nonsense by selecting a somewhat different rendering from what was given in another part of the book; and so I do in the last sentence of this paragraph. But this is only a makeshift.

sorts of living beings. (This holds good with the five cardinal sins :) killing of living beings, &c., (and with the passions, all down to) the sin of wrong belief. Know this: though these beings have neither mind nor speech, yet as they cause pain, grief, damages, harm, and injury, they must be regarded as not abstaining from causing pain, &c. (9)

Thus even senseless beings are reckoned instrumental in bringing about slaughter of living beings, (&c., all down to) the sin of wrong belief. Beings, whatever their origin, who were sentient (in one existence) will become senseless ones (in another) and vice versâ. Not getting rid of, nor shaking off, nor annihilating, nor destroying their Karman, the thoroughly wicked and ignorant wander from the body of a senseless being into that of sentient ones, or from the body of a sentient being into that of senseless ones, or from the body of a sentient being into that of another, or from the body of a senseless being into that of another. The sentient beings and the senseless ones, both are wrong in their conduct and commit sins through cruelty. The Venerable One has said that such a (creature) is uncontrolled, (&c., all as in § 1, down to) commits sins. (10)

(The opponent asks): 'What must one do or cause to be done, in order to become controlled and restrained, to avoid and renounce sins?' (The Âkârya answers): The Venerable One has declared that the cause (of sins) are the six classes of living beings, earth-lives, &c. As I feel pain, so they do. Therefore they should not be injured or killed¹.

¹ I here abridge the text which is identical with II, 1, 48 ff., p. 351.

This constant, permanent, eternal, true Law has been taught by wise men who comprehend all things. Thus a monk abstains from (the five cardinal sins) : slaughter of living beings, &c., (and of vices, all down to) the sin of wrong belief. He does not clean his teeth with a tooth-brush, he does not accept collyrium, emetics, and perfumes. Such a monk does not act nor kill, he is free from wrath, pride, deceit, and greed, he is calm and happy. The Venerable One says that such a (monk) is well controlled and restrained, does avoid and renounce sins, is not active, but careful and thoroughly wise. (11)

Thus I say.

FIFTH LECTURE,

CALLED

FREEDOM FROM ERROR.

A very clever (monk) who practises the vow of chastity, should not adopt the following (heretical) doctrines, nor behave badly in this religion. (1)

He should not believe that (this world) is without beginning or without end, eternal or not eternal, according to the argumentation (of heretics)¹. (2)

From these alternatives you cannot arrive at

¹ The Gainas decide all such questions with the help of the syâdvâda, which in an admirable way removes all difficulties; e.g. the world is eternal as far as that part is concerned which is

truth; from these alternatives you are, certainly, led to error. (3)

One should not say : that there will be an end of beings who (know and) teach the truth¹; nor that all beings are not alike, nor that they shall be in (perpetual) bondage, or (that the prophets are) eternal. (4)

From these alternatives you cannot arrive at the truth, &c. (see verse 3). (5)

One should not say : the guilt of killing small and great animals is the same, or not the same. (6)

From these alternatives, &c. (7)

One should know that those who accept things especially prepared for them², will be affected by demerit (in some cases), or will not be affected (where it is allowed by scripture). (8)

From these alternatives, &c. (9)

One should not maintain the identity of the audârîka³, âhârîka, and kârmaṇa bodies, nor

the substratum of the idea (sâmānya) 'world'; it is not eternal as far as its ever-changing state is meant.

¹ *Sâstâraḥ*, teachers, here those who reach perfection. The meaning is that the world would become empty if all beings should reach perfection. This should not be maintained, nor the opposite opinion, that some beings are qualified for Nirvâṇa and others not.

² *Ahâkammâni*, see p. 131, note 7.

³ The Gainas assume that each individual possesses five bodies : (1) audârîka, or the body that is seen; (2) kârmaṇa, receptacle of Karman, it is composed of Karman particles; (3) taigasa, a body composed of particles of fire, it causes digestion; (4) âhârîka, a subtile body of the soul, with which he goes to distant places (e.g. when a *ġaturdasapûrvin* goes to the Kêvalin to clear up some doubt); (5) vaikriya, a subtile body which can be changed at will. All these 'bodies,' except the first, are what in common language are called spirits or souls. We have here a Hindu counterpart of the belief in the plurality of souls shared

that everything cannot everywhere come into existence¹, nor that it can. (10)

From these alternatives, &c. (11)

Do not maintain that the world does not exist, maintain that it exists. (12)

Do not maintain that *Gīva* and *Agīva* do not exist, but that they exist. (13)

Do not maintain that *Dharma* and *Adharma* do not exist, but that they exist. (14)

Do not maintain that bondage and liberation do not exist, but that they exist. (15)

Do not maintain that virtue and vice² do not exist, but that they exist. (16)

Do not maintain that *Āsrava* and the stoppage of *Āsrava* do not exist, but that they exist. (17)

Do not maintain that the experiencing of the effect, and the annihilation of *Karman* do not exist, but that they exist. (18)

Do not maintain that activity and non-activity do not exist, but that they exist. (19)

by many ancient and modern nations. Compare the following verses quoted in Tylor, *Origin of Culture*, Chapter XI:

‘Bis duo sunt homini, manes, caro, spiritus, umbra:

Quattuor haec loci bis duo suscipiunt.

Terra tegit carnem, tumulum circumvolat umbra

Manes Orcus habet, spiritus astra petit.’

I am inclined to believe that the idea of the *âhâraka* and *vaikriya sarîras* is developed from the popular belief that the soul in sleep leaves the body and travels far away. Compare also the Sâṅkhya terms *vaikṛita* and *taigasa*, Garbe, *Die Sâṅkhya-Philosophie*, pp. 236, 249.

¹ According to the commentator this is said against the Sâṅkhya philosophy, for as everything is an effect of *Prakṛiti*, and *Prakṛiti* is present everywhere, everything may come into existence everywhere.

² *Puṇyam* and *pāpam*. The one is the good *Karman* (*subham karmapudgalam*); the other, the bad.

Do not maintain that anger and pride do not exist, but that they exist. (20)

Do not maintain that deceit and greed do not exist, but that they exist. (21)

Do not maintain that love and hate do not exist, but that they exist. (22)

Do not maintain that the fourfold Circle of Births does not exist, but that it exists. (23)

Do not maintain that there are no gods and goddesses, but that there are. (24)

Do not maintain that there is no such thing as perfection and non-perfection, but that there is such a thing. (25)

Do not maintain that there is no place exclusively reserved for those who attain to perfection, but that there is such¹. (26)

Do not maintain that there are no pious and wicked men, but that there are. (27)

Do not maintain that there is no such thing as good and bad, but that there is good and bad. (28)

The theory will not work that (a man is always) good, or (always) bad. The wrongly instructed Sramanas do not comprehend the (soul's) bondage² (through Karman). (29)

(Do not assert) that everything is imperishable, or full of pains, nor that criminals should be put to death or not be put to death; one should not speak in this way. (30)

Do not assert that those men are well-behaved monks who lead a pure life, and that those others lead an impure life. (31)

¹ See Uttarādhyaṇa XXXVI, 62, 63, p. 212.

² Vêra = vaira, explained karmabandha.

A wise monk should not say: v
this householder) or we do not
improve his chances for final libera

A monk should conform himself to
taught by the *Ginas*, and wander about
final liberation. (33)

Thus I say.

SIXTH LECTURE,

CALLED

ÂRDRAKA².

Gôśāla.

‘Listen, Ârdra³, to what (Mahāvīra) has done.
At first he wandered about as a single monk; but
now he has surrounded himself by many monks, and
teaches every one of them the Law at length. (1)

¹ *Santimaggam ka vûhaê = sântimârgam ka vrimhayêt.*

² The commentators relate a romantic story about prince Ârdra³, which need not be repeated here. Suffice it to say that he became monk, and after many adventures held the disputation which forms the subject of our lecture. After having vanquished his opponents, he was about to join Mahāvīra, when a newly-tamed elephant broke his chain, rushed on him, but just in front of him went down on his knees and paid him reverence. King *Srê-nika* witnessed this scene, and wondered how the elephant could have broken his chains. Ârdra³ replied that it was still more strange that a man could break the fetters which worldliness had fastened upon him. The whole story must be very old, for it is epitomised in ten gâthâs by the author of the *Niryukti*.—The names of the opponents not stated in the text of the verses are supplied from the commentaries.

³ This name is spelt either Ârdra or Ârdra³, Adda in *Prâkrî*.

‘The inconstant man has decided upon this mode of life¹: to stand up in a crowd of men, surrounded by monks, and to teach his doctrines for the benefit of many people. Therefore his former and his present life are not of a piece. (2)

‘Either to live as a single mendicant (was right conduct) or his present life; therefore both do not agree with each other.’

Ârdraka.

“His past, present, and future lives agree with each other; for he is really always single and alone (though he be now surrounded by many followers). (3)

“For if a *Sramana* or *Brâhmaṇa* who causes peace and security, comprehends the nature of movable and immovable living beings and explains it in a crowd numbering thousands, he realises singleness, remaining in the same mental condition as before². (4)

“It is no sin to teach the Law, if (he who teaches it) is patient and resigned, subdues his senses, avoids bad speech, and uses virtuous speech. (5)

“He who (teaches) the great vows (of monks) and the five small vows (of the laity³), the five *Âsraṇas* and the stoppage of the *Âsraṇas*, and control, who avoids *Karman* in this blessed life of *Sramanas*, him I call a *Sramana*.” (6)

¹ According to the commentators, *Gôśāla* intimates that *Mahāvīra* had found it very inconvenient to live alone, because he was then exposed to many injuries; so he set up as a *Tīrthakara*.

² *Tahaṭṭhe* = *tathârṭha*. *Ârṭhâ* is here explained as equal to *lêsyâ*.

³ *Anuvrata*. They are a modification of the great vows, intended for the laity. See *Bhandarkar's Report*, p. 114.

Gôśāla.

(‘As your Law makes it no sin for Mahāvīra to surround himself by a crowd of disciples), so according to our Law an ascetic, who lives alone and single, commits no sin if he uses cold water, eats seeds, accepts things prepared for him, and has intercourse with women.’ (7)

Ārdraka.

“Know this : those who use cold water, eat seeds, accept things especially prepared for them, and have intercourse with women, are (no better than) householders, but they are no *Sramanas*. (8)

“If those who eat seeds, use (cold) water, and have intercourse with women, are admitted to be *Sramanas*, then householders too are *Sramanas*; for they do the same things¹. (9)

“Monks who eat seeds and use cold water, who beg alms as a means of living, will, though they leave their relations, be born again and again, and will not put an end to mundane existence.” (10)

Gôśāla.

‘In making this statement you blame all philosophers alike!’

Ārdraka.

“Every philosopher praises his own doctrines and makes them known. (11)

“*Sramanas* and *Brāhmanas* blame one another when they teach (their doctrines). (The truth, they

¹ I.e. if the characteristic mark of a *Sramana* is to wander about without a companion, and to bear all sorts of hardship, then householders are included in this definition; for some of them also wander about without a companion and bear the same hardships.

say,) is all on their side; there is none on that of the opponents. But we blame only the (wrong) doctrines and not at all (those who entertain them). (12)

“We do not detract from anybody because of his personal qualities; but we make known the path pointed out in our creed. I have been taught the supreme, right path by worthy, good men. (13)

“If a well-controlled man, afraid of injuring any movable or immovable living beings, above, below, or on earth, condemns (evil deeds), he does not at all blame (anybody) in this world.” (14)

Gôṣāla.

‘Out of fear your Śramaṇa will not stay in houses for travellers or in public garden-houses; for in such places he would meet with many clever people, with lower or nobler men, with talkative or silent ones. (15)

‘He will not stay there because he fears lest some monks, wise, well instructed, learned men, who are well versed in the sacred texts and their meaning, should put questions to him.’ (16)

Ārdraka.

“Doing nothing without a purpose, nor without consideration, neither on the behest of the king nor from fear of anybody, he answers questions or not (according to the circumstances); but he (answers) worthy people with a definite purpose (in his mind)¹. (17)

¹ As the commentators explain: he is actuated by the Karman, by virtue of which he has become a prophet (tīrthakaraṇāma-karman); and this Karman must take effect and so be annihilated.

“ He, the wise man, impartially teaches (the Law) whether he goes (to his pupils) or not ; because unworthy men have fallen from the true faith, he does not go to places (frequented by them).” (18)

Gôśāla.

‘As a merchant desirous of gain (shows) his wares and attracts a crowd to do business, in a similar way (acts) the *Sramana Gñātriputra*. This is what I think and calculate about it.’ (19)

Ādraka.

“(Mahāvīra) acquires no new (Karman), he annihilates the old, avoiding wrong opinions ; and thus the saviour said to others : Herein is contained the vow (leading to) Brahman (i. e. Mōksha) ; this is the gain which a *Sramana* is desirous of. Thus I say. (20)

“A merchant kills living beings and desires property ; not leaving his kinsmen, he attracts a crowd in order to do business. (21)

“Desiring riches and addicted to sensuality, merchants wander about to earn their living. But we (say) that they are passionately fond of pleasures, unworthy, and desiring the enjoyment of love. (22)

“They do not abstain from slaughter and the acquirement of property, they are in bondage and full of wickedness ; and their gain of which you spoke, will be the endless Circle of Births and pains manifold¹. (23)

“They do not always make profit, nor does it last

¹ *Nêhâ* or *nêdhâ*. According to *Śīlāṅka* it is = *na iha* : ‘not even here (do they find the profit they seek).’ I think it may be the *Prākṛit* of *anêkadhâ*. It may, however, stand for *snêhâḥ*, in which case the meaning would be : love’s (reward will be) pain.

for ever; they meet with both results (success and failure) in their quest of gain¹. The profit (of the teacher), however, has a beginning, but no end; the saviour and sage shares his profit (with others). (24)

“Him who kills no (living beings), who has compassion on all creatures, who is well grounded in the Law, and causes the truth of the Law to be known, him you would equal to those wicked men! This is the outcome of your folly.” (25)

A Buddhist².

‘If (a savage) thrusts a spit through the side of a granary³, mistaking it for a man; or through a gourd, mistaking it for a baby, and roasts it, he will be guilty of murder according to our views. (26)

‘If a savage⁴ puts a man on a spit and roasts him, mistaking him for a fragment of the granary; or a

¹ Vayanti te dō vi guṇê-dayammi = vraganti tē dvā vapi guṇāv udayê. The usual reading adopted by the commentators is guṇō for guṇê. They translate: vadanti tē dvau vigata-guṇō dayau bhavata iti: (the experts) say that both (kinds of profit) are without value and duration. It is obvious that this interpretation is wrong.

² Ādraka after having put down Gôśāla is met, on his way to Mahāvīra, by Buddhists who engage him in the following discussion.

³ Pinnāgapindī. The commentators explain pinnāga (= pin-yāka) by khala, and pindī by bhinnaka (?) or sakala. Sīlāṅka gives the following explanation. During a struggle with savage men (mlêkḥḥa) some one runs away and throws his cloak off on a granary. An enemy in pursuit of that man mistakes it for him and takes hold of it, together with the part of the granary.—This interpretation looks absurd; but it will appear not so if we remember that granaries are beehive-shaped reservoirs made of sun-baked mud or wattle and mud; compare Grierson, Bihār Peasant Life, p. 17.

⁴ Milakkhu = mlêkḥḥa.

baby, mistaking him for a gourd, he will not be guilty of murder according to our views. (27)

‘If anybody thrusts a spit through a man or a baby, mistaking him for a fragment of the granary, puts him on the fire, and roasts him, that will be a meal fit for Buddhas to break fast upon. (28)

‘Those who always feed two thousand worthy monks, acquire great merit¹ and become powerful gods in Arûpa (dhātu)².’ (29)

Âdraka.

“Well-controlled men cannot accept (your denial of) guilt incurred by (unintentionally) doing harm to living beings. It will cause error and no good to both who teach such doctrines and who believe them. (30)

“A man who knows the nature of movable and immovable living beings, above, below, and on earth, who is afraid of injuring them and abstains from wicked deeds, may speak and act (in accordance with our Law); he will not be guilty of any (sin). (31)

“It is impossible to mistake (a fragment of the granary) for a man; only an unworthy man can say it. How can (the idea of a man) be produced by a fragment of the granary? Even to utter this is an untruth. (32)

“Do not use such speech by means of which you do evil; for such speech is incompatible with virtues. No ordained (monk) should speak empty words³. (33)

¹ *Punnakhandha* = *punyaskandha*.

² *Âroppa*. This is apparently derived from *Arûpa* as rendered in the text. *Arûpadhātu* is the highest heaven of the Buddhists; compare Burnouf, *Le Lotus de la Bonne Loi*, p. 807.

³ *Urâla* = *udâra*, here explained *nissâra*, void of sense.

“Oh ! you have explored this subject ; you have thoroughly examined the consequences of acts¹ of living beings ; your (fame) reaches the Eastern and Western oceans ; you view (the universe as if) it stood on the palm of your hands ! (34)

“Thoroughly examining the consequences of acts of living beings, (our monks) have found out a pure way of sustaining life. It is a maxim² of the monks of our creed³, that nobody who lives by secret sins⁴, should lay down the Law. (35)

“A man who always feeds two thousand worthy monks, does not control himself, and will be blamed in this world like a man with bloody hands. (36)

“They kill a fattened sheep, and prepare food for the sake of a particular person ; they season the meat with salt and oil, and dress it with pepper. (37)

“You are irreligious, unworthy men, devoted to foolish pleasures, who say that partaking heartily of this meat you are not soiled by sin. (38)

“All who partake of such food, commit sins in their ignorance ; but the wise do nothing of the kind. Even to utter it is an untruth. (39)

“In compassion to all beings, the seers, the *Gñātriputras*⁵, avoid what is sinful ; afraid of it, they abstain from food especially prepared for them. (40)

“They abstain from wicked deeds, afraid of injuring living beings, and do no harm to any creature ; therefore they do not partake of such food. This is a maxim of the monks of our creed. (41)

¹ *Anubhāe* = *anubhāga*, explained *karmavipāka*.

² *Anudharma*.

³ *Iha samyatânām*, who control themselves in this (creed of the *Gainas*).

⁴ *Khannapadôpagîvin*.

⁵ I.e. the *Gainas*.

“(Having reached) this perfection¹ in the Law of the Nirgranthas and standing firm in it, one should live without deceit². The awakened sage who is endowed with all virtues thereby obtained very great fame.” (42)

A Vêdic Priest.

‘Those who always feed two thousand holy³ mendicants, acquire great merit and become gods. This is the teaching of the Vêda.’ (43)

Âdraka.

“He who always feeds two thousand holy cats⁴ (i.e. Brâhmanas), will have to endure great pains in hell, being surrounded by hungry (beasts). (44)

“He who despises the Law that enjoins compassion, and praises the Law that permits slaughter, and who feeds but a single unprincipled man, even if he be a king, will go to darkness⁵, and not to the gods.” (45)

A Vêdântin⁶.

‘Both of us follow (very much the same) Law; we stood firm in it, and shall do so in the time to come; (we believe that) virtue consists in good conduct, and that knowledge (is necessary for liberation); and with regard to the Circle of Births there is no difference between us. (46)

¹ Samâdhi.

² Anihê.

³ Snâtaka, cf. Manu XI, 1.

⁴ Kulâlâya = kulâta, explained mârgâra. Another explanation is: who live (âlâya) in houses.

⁵ Nisam, literally, night.

⁶ Silânka calls this opponent an Êkadantîn, and ascribes to him the views of the Sâṅkhya philosophy. But it is evident from the sequel that he is a Vêdântin, as the commentators admit in their comment on the next verse.

‘(But we assume) an invisible, great, eternal, imperishable, and indestructible Soul, who excels all other beings in every respect, as the moon excels the stars.’ (47)

Âdraka.

“(If there were but one Soul common to all beings) they could not be known (from one another), nor could they experience different lots; there would not be Brâhmanas, Kshattriyas, Vaisyas, and Sûdras¹, insects, birds, and snakes; all would be men and gods. (48)

“Those who do not know all things by Kêvala (knowledge), but who being ignorant teach a Law (of their own), are lost themselves, and work the ruin of others in this dreadful, boundless Circle of Births. (49)

“Those who know all things by the full Kêvala knowledge, and who practising meditation teach the whole Law, are themselves saved and save others. (50)

“You have, in your mind, made equal both those who lead a blameable life, and those who in this world practise right conduct. Friend, you are deluded.” (51)

A Hastitâpasa².

‘Every year we kill one big elephant with an arrow, and live upon it in order to spare the life of other animals.’ (52)

¹ Pessâ = prêshya, literally, servants or slaves.

² The Hastitâpasas are thus named from the fact that they kill an elephant and live upon its flesh for a whole year or for six months, as Sîlânka adds, explaining thus the words *avi ya* (*api ka*) after *samvakkharêna*. The Hastitâpasas are mentioned in a list of the different Tâpasas in the Aupapâtika Sûtra, ed. Leumann, § 74.

Ârdraka.

“If every year you kill but one animal without abstaining from sin, though you are not guilty of the slaughter of other creatures, there is little difference between you and a householder. (53)

“If a man kills every year but one animal, and lives (in other respects) as a *Sramana*, he is unworthy, and works his perdition. Such men will not become *Kêvalins*.” (54)

A (monk) who has achieved his religious perfection through the instruction of the Awakened One¹, and stands firm in it, who guards himself in the threefold way (i. e. with regard to thoughts, words, and acts), and who possesses the things requisite for crossing the immense ocean of existence, may preach the Law. (55)

Thus I say.

SEVENTH LECTURE,

CALLED

NÂLANDÂ.

At that time, at that period, there was a town of the name *Râgagriha*: it was rich, happy, thriving, &c.² Outside of *Râgagriha*, in a north-eastern

¹ *Buddhassa ânâi*.

² This ‘&c.’ refers to the typical description of towns. Our text contains only the first words of the description, but the *Aupapâtika Sûtra*, § 1, gives it at length.

direction, there was the suburb Nālandā ; it contained many hundreds of buildings, &c.¹ (1)

In that suburb Nālandā there was a householder called Lēpa ; he was prosperous, famous ; rich in high and large houses, beds, seats, vehicles, and chariots ; abounding in riches, gold, and silver ; possessed of useful and necessary things ; wasting plenty of food and drink ; owning many male and female slaves, cows, buffaloes, and sheep ; and inferior to nobody. (2)

This householder Lēpa, a follower of the *Sramanas*, comprehended (the doctrine of) living beings and things without life, (&c., all as in II, 2, 76, p. 382, down to the end of the paragraph). (3)

This householder Lēpa possessed, in a north-eastern direction from the suburb Nālandā, a bathing-hall, called *Sēshadravyā*² ; it contained many hundreds of pillars, was beautiful, &c. In a north-eastern direction from this bathing-hall *Sēshadravyā*, there was a park called *Hastiyāma*. (Description of the park³.) (4)

And there in some house the Venerable Gautama was staying. The venerable (man) was in the garden, and so was Udaka, the son of *Pêdhâla*, a *Nirgrantha* and follower of *Pârsva*⁴, of the *Mêdârya Gôtra*. He went there where the Venerable Gautama was, and said : ‘ O long-lived Gautama, I want to ask you about a point (of faith) ; O long-lived one,

¹ I cannot tell where the full description occurs.

² The name denotes: the rest of materials, i.e. the hall which was built with the materials not used (in building the house), the well-known ‘few remaining bricks.’

³ The text is given in the *Aupapâtika Sûtra*, § 3.

⁴ Compare the Twenty-second Lecture of the *Uttarâdhyayana*.

please explain it to me so as it has been taught (by the Tīrthakara).’ And the Venerable Gautama spoke thus to Udaka, the son of Pêdhâla : “Well, long-lived one, I shall see about it, when I have heard and understood (your question).” And Udaka, the son of Pêdhâla, spoke thus to the Venerable Gautama : (5)

‘O long-lived Gautama, there are Nirgrantha Sramanas, called Kumâraputras, who profess your creed ; they make a zealous ¹ householder, a follower of the Sramanas, renounce injury to movable beings except on the order (from an established authority), as the householder caused one of the captured thieves to be set free ². Those who make this renunciation, make a bad renunciation ; those who cause this renunciation to be made, cause a bad renunciation to be made ; in causing another to make this renunciation, they annul their own allegation ³. Why do I say this ? Beings belong to the Circle of Births ; though they be (now) immovable beings, they will (some time) become movable ones, or though they be (now) movable beings, they will become immovable ones ; when they leave the bodies

¹ Uvasampanna.

² These words seem to refer to an apologue told by the commentator : King Ratnasêkhara of Ratnapura, once making a pleasure trip, issued an order that nobody should remain in the town. Six brothers disobeyed, were brought before the king, and sentenced to death. Their father in vain implored the king to spare them, or to spare five, four, three, two of his sons. At last the king consented to pardon the eldest son, at which the old father rejoiced.—The six sons are likened to the six classes of living beings. As a householder cannot altogether abstain from injuring them, as monks do, he is content to abstain from injuring movable beings or animals.

³ Viz. that by abstaining from slaughter of living beings they kill no living beings.

of immovable beings, they will be born in bodies of movable ones, and when they leave the bodies of movable beings, they will be born in bodies of immovable ones. When they are born in bodies of immovable beings, it is no sin to kill them. (6)

‘(But if they make him renounce) injury to creatures which are, for the time being, movable beings, except on the order (from an established authority)—as the householder caused one of the captured thieves to be set free—if they take this vow, those who make this renunciation, make a good renunciation; those who cause this renunciation to be made, cause a good renunciation to be made; in causing another to make this renunciation, they do not annul their own allegation. Though in this way¹ a correct expression is found, some (monks) from anger or greed cause the householder to make the renunciation (without the necessary restriction). Is not this our interpretation right? O long-lived Gautama, do you approve of it?’ (7)

And Gautama spoke thus to Udaka, the son of Pêdhâla: “O long-lived Udaka, we certainly do not approve of it. The Sramanas or Brâhmanas who say thus, speak thus, declare thus, and explain thus, do not speak as Sramanas or Nirgranthas, they speak noxious speech. They mislead laymen. They make void all vows undertaken for sparing particular living beings². Why do I say this? Beings belong

¹ I.e. by specifying the movable beings as beings which are movable ones for the time being.

² E.g. if a man vows to kill no Brâhmana (and does not add the restriction ‘for the time being’), he may kill no man or animal whatever; for the soul of that man or animal may, in the past, have been embodied in a Brâhmana.

to the Circle of Births; though they be (now) immovable beings, they will (some time) become movable ones, (&c., all as in § 6, down to) when they leave the bodies of movable beings, they will be born in the bodies of immovable ones. When they are born in the bodies of movable beings, it is a sin to kill them." (8)

And Udaka, the son of Pêdhâla, spoke thus: 'Which beings do you call movable beings? movable ones or others?'

And Gautama spoke thus to Udaka, the son of Pêdhâla: "O long-lived Udaka, what you call beings which are, for the time being, movable ones, we call movable beings; and what we call movable beings, you call beings which are, for the time being, movable ones. Both expressions are equal, and mean the same thing. O long-lived one, why do you think it more correct to say: beings which are, for the time being, movable ones; and why do you think it incorrect to say: movable beings, that you censure the one expression, and applaud the other? This your interpretation is not right. (9)

"And the Venerable One has spoken thus: Some men there are who say: we cannot, submitting to the tonsure, renounce the life of a householder and enter the monastic state, but we shall gradually conform to the Gôtra (i. e. community of the monks). Accordingly they make known the limits¹, fix the limits, determine the limits (beyond which they will not go in the enjoyment of worldly goods); and

¹ Literally, the number. A sample of such vows is given in the beginning of the Uvâsaga Dasâo, see Hoernle's edition, § 16 ff.

renounce injury to movable beings, except on the order¹ (of an established authority)—as the householder caused one of the captured thieves to be set free. And this turns out to their benefit. (10)

“Movable beings are called so, when they get this character² through the taking effect of the Karman relating to movable beings. But when their duration of life as movable beings comes to its close, the (soul), embodied in a movable being, leaves its life as such and becomes embodied in an immovable being. Immovable beings are called so, when they get this character through the taking effect of the Karman relating to immovable beings. But when their duration of life as an immovable being comes to its close, the (soul), embodied in an immovable being, leaves its life as such and takes again a new form of existence; they are (then) called³ animated beings, (animals) of large bodies, or of long life.” (11)

And Udaka, the son of Pêḍhāla, spoke thus to the Venerable Gautama: ‘Is there not a chance, that a follower of the Sramanas, though he has renounced slaughter of but one class of living beings, ceases altogether to injure any⁴? Why do

¹ Abhiyôga. Sîlāṅka enumerates four kinds of abhiyôga: gāṇa-, bala-, devatā-abhiyôga, and gurunigraha.

² Nāma, literally, name.

³ They are called (*vuḥkanti* = *uḥyantê*) is apparently equivalent with: they get the name (*nāma*); ‘name,’ however, means in Gāina and Bauddha terminology as much as ‘the nature of the thing.’ The words of the text, therefore, come to mean: ‘they become or are animated beings,’ &c.

⁴ The question discussed in the following paragraphs is whether, at some future time, all movable beings in the Samsāra might not die out, and none but immovable beings be left. This idea is combated at great length by Gautama.

I say this? Beings belong to the Circle of Births, though they be (now) immovable beings, they will (some time) become movable ones, and though they be movable beings, they will become immovable ones. When they leave the bodies of immovable beings, all are born in bodies of movable ones, and when they leave the bodies of movable beings, all will be born in bodies of immovable ones. When they are born in bodies of immovable beings, they may be killed ¹. (12)

And the Venerable Gautama spoke thus to Udaka, the son of Pêdhâla : “ O long-lived one, we ² do not admit what you say ; viz. that there is a chance that a follower of the *Sramanas* should cease to do injury to any kind of living beings. Why do we say this ? Beings belong to the Circle of Births, (&c., all as above, down to) when they are born in bodies of movable beings, it is a sin to kill them. They are called animated beings, (animals) of large bodies, or of long life. There are always a great many animate beings, (the slaughter of) which a follower of the *Sramanas* must renounce, there are none, (the slaughter of) which he need not renounce. If he ceases, or has done with, or has given up (injuring) the large class of movable beings, his renunciation is

¹ The meaning is, that at some future time movable beings may have ceased to exist, since they are all born as immovable beings, and vice versâ. If the latter is the case, a layman, who abstains from killing animals, practically does injury to no being whatever ; if the former is the case, he cannot transgress his vow even if he would.

² The text has the Sanskrit word *asmâkam*, of which the commentator alleges that it was thus pronounced by all people in Magadha, compare note 2, p. 358.

good. What you or somebody else says, that there is a chance of a layman's ceasing to do an injury altogether, by renouncing slaughter of one kind of beings; this interpretation of yours is not right." (13)

The Venerable One¹ gave an illustration: "I put a question to the Nirgranthas: O long-lived ones, (suppose) there be some men who have made the following declaration: 'I shall not inflict punishment on those who, submitting to the tonsure, renounce the life of a householder and enter the monastic state; but I shall inflict punishment on those who lead a domestic life.' Some Sramana, who for four or five years, or for six or ten years—the period may be shorter or longer—has wandered about in the land, returns to domestic life. Now answer me: does the man break his word when he puts to death this (renegade) householder?" 'Certainly not!' "It is just the same with a follower of the Sramanas, who has renounced injury to movable beings, but not to immovable ones. If he kills immovable beings, he does not transgress his vow. This you acknowledge, O Nirgranthas, this you must acknowledge!" (14)

The Venerable One gave another illustration: "I put a question to the Nirgranthas. O long-lived Nirgranthas, (suppose) there be householders or sons of householders, born in respectable families, who come to you for instruction in the Law. Ought they to be instructed in the Law?" 'Yes, they should.' "When they have learned and understood this Law, will they say: this creed of the

¹ Gautama.

Nirgranthas is true, supreme, excellent, full of virtues, right, pure, it removes doubts, it is the road to perfection, liberation, Nirvāṇa; it is free from error and doubts, it is the road of those who are free from all misery; those who adopt it will reach perfection, (&c., all down to) put an end to all misery; exerting ourselves we shall control ourselves with regard to all kinds of living beings.—Will they speak thus?" 'Yes.' "Should such men be admitted to the order?" 'Yes, they should.' "Should such men be instructed in the discipline and kept to attend to religious instruction?" 'Yes, they should.' "Do they renounce injury to every living being?" 'Yes, they do.' "Now (suppose) one of these men who lead such a life, after wandering about in the land for four or five years, or for six or ten years—the period may be shorter or longer—returns to domestic life. Will this man (still) abstain from doing injury to every living being?" 'No.' "The same man¹ who at first (as a householder) had not renounced injury to every living being, who afterwards has renounced, and who now does not renounce injury to every living being, did at first not control himself, did so afterwards, and does not so now. As long as he does not control himself, he does not renounce injury to every living being². This you acknowledge, O Nirgranthas, this you must acknowledge!" (15)

The Venerable One gave (another) illustration: "I put a question to the Nirgranthas. O long-lived

¹ *Sê gê sê gîvê*, literally, his soul.

² Here the last sentence but one of the preceding paragraph ought to be repeated. But there is no trace of it in my MSS. or the commentary.

Nirgranthas, (suppose) there be monks or nuns of other sects, who come to you for instruction in the Law, (all as before, down to) attend to religious instruction." 'Yes, they should.' "Is it lawful to eat with such men?" 'Yes, it is.' "Now (suppose) some of these people who lead such a life, (&c., all as before, down to) return to domestic life. Is it lawful to eat with them then?" 'No, it is not¹.' "The same man with whom to eat was not lawful at first, was lawful afterwards, and is not lawful now, was no Sramana at first, was a Sramana afterwards, and is no Sramana now. It is not lawful for Nirgrantha Sramanas to eat together with him. This you acknowledge, O Nirgranthas; this you must acknowledge!" (16)

And the Venerable One spoke thus: "There are some followers of the Sramanas, who have made this declaration: we cannot, submitting to the tonsure, renounce the life of a householder and enter the monastic state, but we shall strictly observe the Pôsaḥa on the fourteenth and the eighth days of each fortnight, (on the new-moon, and) full-moon days, we renounce gross ill-usage of living beings, grossly lying speech, gross taking of things not given, (unlawful) sexual intercourse, (unlimited) appropriation of property; we shall set limits to our desires in the two forms and in the three ways². They will also make the following renunciation: 'neither do nor cause anything (sinful) to be done for my sake.'

¹ Nô in=a//hê sama//hê; I think the Sanskrit of this phrase, which is not explained by the commentator, is nô ayam arthaḥ samarthaḥ.

² Viz. 'I will not do it, nor cause it to be done, either in thought or in word or in deed.' Compare Uvâsaga Dasão, Hoernle's edition, § 13 ff.

Having (on Pôsa-ha-days) abstained from eating, drinking, bathing, and using beds or chairs, may they, on their decease, be said to make a (righteous) end of their life?" 'Certainly, they do make such an end of their life.' "They are called animated beings, (&c., all as in § 13, down to) this interpretation of yours is not right." (17)

The Venerable One spoke thus: "There are some followers of the Sramanas, who have made this declaration: we cannot, submitting to the tonsure, renounce the life of a householder and enter the monastic state; we also cannot strictly observe the Pôsa-ha on the fourteenth and the eighth days of each fortnight, (on the days of new-moon) and full-moon; but while we are preparing ourselves for death by fasting¹, we shall abstain from food and drink without longing for the end; we shall renounce all ill-usage of living beings, all lying speech, all taking of things not given, all sexual intercourse, all property, (saying): 'neither do nor cause anything (sinful) to be done for my sake.' (All the rest as in the preceding paragraph.)" (18)

And the Venerable One spoke thus: "There are some men of great desires, great undertakings, &c.², who do not abstain from all ill-usage of living beings, (&c., down to) from all property. During the whole time, from their taking the vows of a follower of the Sramanas till their death, they abstain from injury to living beings. Then they die; in their next existence they experience their Karman, and receive an evil lot. (The rest as before.)" (19)

And the Venerable One spoke thus: "There are

¹ Samlêhanaghûsanâghûsiyâ.

² See II, 2, 61.

some men of no desires, no undertakings, who abstain from all ill-usage of living beings, (&c., down to) from all property. During the whole time, from their taking the vows of a follower of the *Sramanas* till their death, they abstain from injury to living beings. Then they die; in their next existence they experience their *Karman*, and receive a happy lot. (The rest as before.)" (20)

And the Venerable One spoke thus: "There are some men of few desires, few undertakings, who abstain from ill-usage of one sort of living beings, (&c., down to) from one sort of property. During the whole time, (&c., the rest as in the last paragraph)." (21)

And the Venerable One spoke thus: "There are some men who live in woods, in huts, near villages, or practise some secret rites, who are not well controlled, do not well abstain (from slaying) all sorts of living beings. They employ speech that is true and untrue at the same time: do not beat me, beat others, (&c., all as in II, 2, 21, down to) having died at their allotted time, they are born in some places inhabited by *Asuras*¹ and evil-doers. And when they are released therefrom, they will be born deaf and dumb or blind. They are called animated beings, (&c., the rest as in § 13)." (22)

And the Venerable One spoke thus: "There are some beings of a long life, which a follower of the *Sramanas* abstains from injuring through life. They die after him. They are called animated beings, (&c., the rest as in § 13)." (23)

¹ *Âsuriya*. *Sīlāṅka* here offers a second explanation of this word, viz. *asūrya*, where no sun ever shines.

(The two next paragraphs treat in exactly the same way of beings of an equally long life, which die simultaneously with him, and of beings of a short life, which die before him.) (24, 25)

And the Venerable One spoke thus: "There are some followers of the *Sramanas*, who have made this declaration: we are not able to strictly observe the *Pôsa*-days, but we are able, when preparing ourselves for death by fasting, to abstain from food and drink without longing for the end. The vow of such a man is the *Sâmâyika Dêśâvakâsika*¹: (he declares) in the morning: (I shall travel) only thus or thus far in an eastern, western, southern, northern direction. He renounces injury to all beings: I shall cause peace and security to all sorts of living beings.

"Within those (limits) the movable living beings, which the follower of the *Sramanas* abstains from injuring till his death, will leave their life, and will then be born, within the same limits, as movable living beings, which the follower of the *Sramanas* abstains from injuring till his death. With regard to them the follower of the *Sramanas* has made a good renunciation. They are called animated beings, (&c., the rest as before). (26)

"The movable beings within those limits, &c.², will,

¹ The *Dêśâvakâsika* 'consists in drawing closer or contracting every day the limits already laid down (in accordance with the *Gunavratas*) to the range of one's travels,' &c. The *Gunavrata* referred to is the *Digvirati*, i.e. 'to lay down a limit beyond which one shall not travel in the different directions, or a limit as to the countries one shall visit for the acquisition of wealth.' From Bhandarkar Report, p. 114 f. The explanation in the commentary materially agrees with the above.

² The original repeats the phrases of the preceding paragraph.

after their death, be born within the same limits as immovable beings, from injuring which without a purpose the follower of the *Sramanas* abstains till death, but not with a purpose¹, (&c., the rest as before). (27)

“The movable beings within those limits, &c., will, after their death, be born, beyond those limits, as movable or immovable beings, (&c., the rest as before). (28)

“The immovable beings within those limits, &c., will, after their death, be born, within the same limits, as movable beings, (&c., the rest as before). (29)

“The immovable beings within those limits, &c., will, after their death, be born, within the same limits, as immovable beings, (&c., the rest as before). (30)

“The immovable beings within those limits, &c., will, after their death, be born, beyond those limits, as immovable beings, (&c., the rest as before). (31)

“The movable and immovable beings beyond those limits, &c., will, after their death, be born, within those limits, as movable beings, (&c., the rest as before). (32)

“The movable and immovable beings beyond those limits, &c., will, after their death, be born, within those limits, as immovable beings, (&c., the rest as before). (33)

“The movable and immovable beings beyond those limits, &c., will, after their death, be born, beyond

I abridge them as far as possible, and give the full text only where it differs from that of § 26.

¹ This clause comes always after the words ‘immovable beings’ down to § 34.

those limits, as movable and immovable beings, (&c. the rest as before)." (34)

The Venerable One spoke thus : " It has never happened, it does not happen, nor will it ever happen, that all movable beings will die out and become immovable ones, nor that all immovable beings die out and become movable ones. Since movable and immovable beings never die out, there is no chance, as you or somebody else say, that a layman ceases to do injury altogether by renouncing slaughter of one kind of beings ; this interpretation of yours is not right." (35)

And the Venerable One spoke thus : " If (a man) who has been instructed in right knowledge, faith, and conduct for the avoidance of sins, blames a (righteous) *Sramana* or *Brâhmana* though he is well disposed towards them, he effects the loss of his merit for another world ; but if he does not blame them, he heightens the purity of his merit for another world."

On this Udaka, the son of *Pêdhâla*, took no further notice of the Venerable Gautama and was about to return in the direction in which he had come. (36)

And the Venerable One spoke thus : " O long-lived Udaka, he who has learned from a *Sramana* or *Brâhmana* whomsoever even one noble religious truth, and considers himself thereby furthered with regard to his peace and happiness, will respect, acknowledge, praise, salute, honour, reverence, and worship him even as a blessed and holy deity or sacred shrine." (37)

Then Udaka, the son of *Pêdhâla*, spoke thus to the Venerable Gautama : ' As I had not before

known, heard, understood, and comprehended these words, I did not believe in the meaning (of your words), which I had never perceived nor heard nor understood nor appreciated, and which were never explained nor defined nor delivered nor made clear to me, nor pondered over by me. But now, Reverend Sir, as I do know, &c., these words which I have perceived, heard, &c., I believe, accept, and approve of their meaning. It is just as you say!' (38)

Then the Venerable Gautama spoke thus to Udaka, the son of Pêdhâla: "Believe it, sir; accept it, sir; approve of it, sir; it is just as we have said." Then Udaka, the son of Pêdhâla, spoke thus to the Venerable Gautama: 'I desire, Reverend Sir, in your presence to pass from the creed which enjoins four vows¹, to the creed which enjoins the five great vows and the Pratikramana².' (39)

Then the Venerable Gautama went with Udaka, the son of Pêdhâla, to the Venerable Ascetic Mahāvīra. Then Udaka, the son of Pêdhâla, solemnly circumambulated the Venerable Ascetic Mahāvīra three times from the left to the right, and having done so he praised and worshipped him, and then he spoke thus: 'I desire, Reverend Sir, in your presence to pass from the creed which enjoins four vows, to the creed which enjoins the five great vows and the Pratikramana. May it so please you, beloved of the

¹ See above, p. 121, note 2. In this way the creed of Pârsva is characterised in contradistinction to that of Mahāvīra.

² 'Pratikramana is the expiation of sins . . . by means of Nindana Garhana, Âlôkanâ, and other processes. Nindana is condemning the sinful act or repenting of it to oneself; Garhana is doing the same before a Guru; and Âlôkanâ is making a confession of it to the Guru.' Bhandarkar, Report, p. 9, note ‡.

gods, do not deny me!' Then, in the presence of the Venerable Ascetic Mahāvīra, Udaka, the son of Pêdhāla, passed from the creed which enjoins four vows, to the creed which enjoins the five great vows and the Pratikramana. (40)

Thus I say.

INDEX OF NAMES AND SUBJECTS.

- Abhayadêva, page 346 note 1.
 Activity, kinds of, 356 f.
 Agita, 85 n 2.
 Âgîvika, 267 n 1.
 Agñānavāda, 315.
 Agñānavādin, 83 n 2, 291.
 Agñānikavāda, 385.
 Agnikumâra (Bhavanavâsin), 225.
 Âgnîvîkha, 87 n 4.
 Âhâraka body, 406, n 3.
 Âhuka, 113 n 2.
 Aikshvâka, 86.
 Airāvata, Indra's elephant, 290.
 Âkârāṅga, 345, 351 n 2, 353 n 2, 354 n 2, 357 n, 358 n 2.
 Akarmabhūmi, 225, 393.
 Akriyāvāda, 315, 385.
 Akriyāvādin, 83 n 2, 291, 309, 316.
 Âlyuta (Kalpa), 226, 228.
 Ânata (Kalpa), 226, 228.
 Andhakavriṣṭi, 118.
 Âṅgavidyâ, 70 n 2.
 Animals, aquatic, 223.
 — terrestrial, 223.
 — winged, 224.
 Âṅkura, 41.
 Anuttara (gods), 227, 228, 291 n 1.
 Apabhramsa, 114 n 2.
 Aparâgita (Anuttara), 227.
 Ara, a Tirthakara, 85 n 5, 86.
 Âraṇa (Kalpa), 226, 228.
 Ardhavaitâlî, an art, 366.
 Ârdraka, a Gaiṇa sage, 409 ff.
 Arishṭanemi, 112, 114 n 2, 115.
 Ârîpadhātu, a heaven of the Buddhists, 415.
 Ârya, 241.
 Âryâ metre, 271 n 2.
 Asana, 197.
 Âshâdâ, 143, 144.
 Âsila, a rishi, 268.
 Asita Dêvala, 269 n 1.
 Âsphôta-bower, 81.
 Astrology, 71 n 1.
 Asura, 34, 53, 250, 259, 318, 382.
 Asurakumâra (Bhavanavâsin), 225.
 Asûrya, a hell, 280.
 Âsvasêna, 85 n 4.
 Âsvayuga, a month, 143.
 Âsvina, a month, 143 n 1.
 Âtharvavî, incantations, 366 n 5.
 Audârîka body, 173, 406, n 3.
 Aupapâtika Sûtra, 132 n, 269 n 1, 384 n 1, 420 n 3.
 Avasarpinî, 17 n, 42 n 2, 200.
 Ayôdhya, 85 n 1, 2.
 Bâhuka, 268.
 Bala, a Kândâla, 50 n 1.
 Bala, king of Hastinâpura, 88 n 1.
 Balabhadra, a robber, 32 n.
 Balabhadra, a king, 88.
 Baladêva, 87 n 4.
 Balakôshṭha, 50 n 1.
 Balasrî, 88.
 Bali, 86 n 1.
 Bârhaspatya, 236 n 2.
 Bauddha, 236 n 2, 316 n 3.
 Beings, living, subdivision of, 210 ff.
 Benares, 50 n 1, 87 n 4, 136.
 Bhadrâ, mother of Maghavan, 85 n 3.
 Bhadrâ, daughter of king Kausalika, 50 n 1, 53.
 Bhâdrapada, a month, 143.
 Bhandarkar, R. G., 50 n 2, 69 n 1, 129 n 2, 155 n 4, 163 n 3, 165 n 2, 182 n 4, 327 n 3, 383 n 3, 431 n 1.
 Bharata, 85, n 1.
 Bharatavarsha, 85.
 Bhârunda, fabulous bird, 19, 378.
 Bhâshya, 134 n 3.
 Bhaumêyika (gods), 225.
 Bhavabhâvanâ, 69 n 1.
 Bhâvanâ, the twelve, 329 n 2.
 Bhavanapati, 202, 207 n, 225 ff.
 Bhavanavâsin = Bhaumêyika, 225.
 Bhôga, a clan, 71, n 2, 118 n 2, 339.
 Bhôgarâga, 118 n 2.

Bhrigu, (62), (65).
 Bhūta (Vyantara), 122 n 1, 226.
 Bimbisāra, 100 n 2.
 Brahmadatta, 57.
 Brahmaḷōka (Kalpa), 226, 227.
 Brahman, the creator, 244.
 Brahman, name of a palace, 58.
 Brāhmaṇa = Mahāvīra, 310.
 Brāhmaṇas, 418.
 Brahmarāga, 87 n 5.
 Brihatkalpa, 183 n 5.
 Buddha, 415.
 Buddhists, 414 f.
 Bukkaśa, 15.
 Chess, earliest mention of, 303 n 1.
 Dānava, 77, 121.
 Dantavakra, a king, 290.
 Daśā, 183.
 Daśāra, 113 n 4.
 Daśārha, 113, 115.
 Daśārṇa, 57, 87.
 Daśārnabhadra, 87 n 1.
 Daśārṇutaskandha, 183 n 5.
 Daśavaikālika, 116 n 2, 118 n 1.
 Dasyu, 43.
 Dattaka, 274 n 1.
 Death with one's will, 20.
 — against one's will, 20.
 Dēśāvakāśika vow, 431, n 1.
 Dēśikōsha, 92 n 3, 150 n 4.
 Dēvaka, 113 n 2.
 Dēvakī, 112, 113 n 2.
 Dēvala, a rishi, 268.
 Development, 153, 154.
 Dhana, 32 n.
 Dharanēndra, a nāga, 290.
 Dhūmābha hell, 221.
 Dhyāna, 179; ārtā°, raudra°, dharma°,
 sukla°, 200 n 1.
 Digambara, 69 n 1, 119 n 2, 267 n 1.
 Dōgundaga gods, 88, n 2, 108.
 Dōsha, udgama°, 131 n 7.
 — udpādanā°, 132 n.
 — grahaṇaishanā°, 133 n.
 — paribhōgaishanā°, 134 n.
 Drishṭivāda, 155, 345.
 Dropping of case affixes, 128 n 1.
 Dvāpara, a cast of dice, 256.
 Dvārakā, 113 n 2, 115.
 Dvārakāvati, 87 n 5.
 Dvimukha, 87.
 Dvipakumāra (Bhavanavāsin), 225.
 Dvipāyana, a rishi, 268.
 Dvipriṣṭha or Vipushṭi, 87 n 5.

Earth lives, 213.
 Ēkadanādin, 245 n 2, 417 n 6.
 Ēshanā-samiti, 27 n 1, 129.
 Fick, 85 n 2.
 Fire lives, 217.
 'Former' years, 16, 201.
 Fortnight, dark, 372, 377.
 Gambōsvāmin, (8), (73), 235.
 Gambō-tree, 48.
 Ganadhara, 149, n 1.
 Gānaya = Bauddhas, 238.
 Gandharva, 8, 77, 121, 226, 250, 318.
 Gaṅgā, 290.
 Ganges, 50 n 1.
 Garāsandha, 113 n 2.
 Garbe, 214 n, 406 n 3.
 Gardabhāli, 82, 83.
 Garga, 149.
 Garuḍa, 290; gods, 382.
 Gāthā, 182.
 Gauri, 50 n 1.
 Gautama, 112, 119 ff, 420 ff.
 Gautama, law-book, 67 n 1.
 Gaya, 86 n 3.
 Gayaghōsha, 136, 140, 141.
 Gayanta (Anuttara gods), 227.
 Generatio aequivoca, 224.
 Ghanīkakumāra (Bhavanavāsin), 225.
 Gīna, 45, 77.
 Gīrnār, 115 n 1.
 Gīvanmukti, 156 n 8.
 Gīvavikāravṛtti, 219 n 2.
 Gānamārga, 26 n 1.
 Gātādharmakathā, 182 n 7.
 Gātādhyaṇa, 182.
 Gātātri, a clan, 339.
 Gātārika, 256, 257.
 Gātātriputra, 27, 232, 239, 261, 287,
 289, 290, 413.
 Gātātriputras = Gainas, 416.
 Gōśāla, 245 n 2, 409 f.
 Gōtama Gōtra, 41 n 2, 83.
 Gōtra = church or order, 321, 327,
 423.
 Graivēyaka (gods), 226, 228.
 Grierson, 277 n 5, 341 n 4.
 Gyēshibamūla, a month, 144.
 Gyōtishāṅga, 137, 141.
 Gyōtishka gods, 202, 207 n, 225 ff.
 Haravigaya, a poem, 303 n 1.
 Haribhadra, 116 n 2.
 Harikēśa, 50, n 1, 55.
 — Bala, 50.

- Harishêna, 86, n 2.
 Harivamsa, 117 n 1.
 Hastinâpura, 56, 60, 85 n 4, 86 n 1,
 87 n 1.
 Hastitâpasa, a division of Tâpasas,
 418, n 2.
 Hastiyâma, a park, 420.
 Hell, description of, 93 ff, 279 ff, 376.
 Hêmakandra, 69 n 1, 92 n 3, 95 n 1,
 118 n 4, 150 n 4.
 Himavant, mountains, 339.
 Hoernle, 383 n 4, 423 n 1, 428 n 2.
 Hüttemann, 29 n 2.
 Hypermetron, 339 n 1.
 Indra, 292.
 Indradatta, 32 n.
 Indrabhûti, 41 n 2.
 Îrâna (Kalpa), 226, 227.
 Ishatprâggbhâra, 212.
 Ishukâra, name of a town, 62;
 °ra, °ri, name of a king, 61, 62,
 68.
 Isuyâra = Ishukâra, 62 n 1.
 Îsvara, the creator, 244.
 Jackals in hell, 286.
 Jolly, 237 n 4.
 Jupiter, planet, 366.
 Kadambavâluka, river of hell, 94,
 280.
 Kailâsa, 40.
 Kaitra, a month, 143, n 1.
 Kakravâla, 239 n 1.
 Kakutsstha, 85 n 5.
 Kâkutsstha, 85 n 5.
 Kâlakûra, 77 n 1, 105.
 Kâlañgara, a hill, 57.
 Kali, a cast of dice, 256.
 Kâlidâsa, 115 n 3.
 Kalînga, 87.
 Kalpa Sûtra, 71 n 2, 100 n 4, 360 n 1,
 371 n, 381 n 1.
 Kamalâvatî, 62.
 Kâmarâstra, 274 n 1.
 Kambôga, 47, 126.
 Kampâ, 108.
 Kâmpilya, 57, 80, 81, 86 n 2.
 Kamsa, 113 n 2, 118 n 2.
 Kândâla, 15, 50, n 1, 301.
 Kandraprabha, 214.
 Kanthaka, excellent horse, 47 n 2,
 126 n 1.
 Kapila, 31 n 1.
 Karaka, 237 n 4.
 Karakandu, 87.
 Karka, 58.
 Karmabhûmi, 225, 393.
 Kârmana body, 173, 406 n 3.
 Kârttika, a month, 143.
 Kârttikâyânuprêkshâ, 69 n 1, 182 n 4.
 Kârvâka, 236 n 4, 238 n 3.
 Kâsi, 57, 87.
 Kâsyapa, 8, 10, 15, 31 n 1, 138, 158,
 260 n 3, 265, 279, 288, 310,
 314.
 Kaurava, 339.
 Kausalika, 50 n 1, 53.
 Kaurâmbi, 32 n, 102.
 Kâyôtsarga, 55 n 2, 147, 148, 149,
 159, 164.
 Kêsara, park, 81.
 Kêsvava (Krishna), 112, 115.
 Kêsi, 119 ff.
 Kêvala, 152, 193.
 Kbaluka, 245 n 2.
 Kimpurusha (Vyantara), 226, 382.
 Kinnara, 77, 122, 226, 382.
 Kitra, 56 ff.
 Kitrà, 115.
 Kôshibaka park, 120.
 Krishna, 112 n 2, 113 n 2, 261 n 3.
 Krita, a cast of dice, 256.
 Kriyâvâda, 315, 319, 385.
 Kriyâvâdin, 83 n 2, 291, 309, 317,
 319 n 2.
 Kshamikavâdin, 83 n 2.
 Kshattriya, 418.
 Kubêra, 117 n 2.
 Kulâla, 68 n 1.
 Kulânî, 57.
 Kumâraputra, Gainas, 421.
 Kunthu, a Tirthakara, 85 n 5, 86.
 Kunthu, an insect, 15, 220.
 Kûrui, 134 n 3.
 Kuru, 62 n 1.
 Lantaka (Kalpa), 226, 227.
 Lavasaptama gods, 291.
 Lekhbaî, 321 n 3.
 Lêpa, a Gaina layman, 420 ff.
 Lêsyâ, 56 n 1, 181, 196 ff.
 Leumann, E., 29 n 2, 57 n, 58 n 1,
 60 n 1, 2, 116 n 2, 118 n 1, 3,
 175 n 1, 179 n 2, 212 n 1, 269
 n 1, 339 n 1, 346 n 1, 373 n 4.
 Likhavi, 321, 339.
 Lôkâyatika, 342 n 1.
 Luke, 29 n 2.
 Madhyadêra, 268 n 1.

- Magadha, 106 f.
 Mâgha, a month, 115 n 1.
 Mâgha, the poet, 261 n 3.
 Maghavan, 85, n 3.
 Mahâbala, 88 n 1.
 Mahâhari, 86 n 2.
 Mahâpadma, 86, n 1.
 Mahâprâṇa heaven, 84.
 Mahârûkha (Kalpa), 226, 228.
 Mahâvaggâ, 83 n 2.
 Mahavîra, 8, 21, 41 n 2, 73.
 Mahendra mountain, 339.
 Mâhendra (Kalpa), 226, 227.
 Mahôraga (Vyantara), 226.
 Makara, 223.
 Malaya mountain, 339.
 Mallaki, 321 n 3.
 Manabparyâya, 152, 193.
 Mandara mountain, 49, 93, 339, 378.
 Mandîkukshi Kaitya, 100.
 Manôrama, 36, 37.
 Mâra, 244 n 5.
 Materialists, 339 f, 342 f.
 Mathurâ, 112 n 2, 113 n 2.
 Matter, 153.
 Matthew's gospel, 29 n 2, 300 n 1.
 Mâyâ, 244, n 5.
 Mēdârya Gôtra, 420.
 Mēghadûta, 115 n 3.
 Merchants, three, parable of, 29.
 Mēru, 111, 288.
 Mithilâ, 36.
 Mlêkka, 43, 241.
 Mōhaniya, 192, 193.
 Mrigâ, 88, 99.
 Mrigâputra, 88 f, 99.
 Mrîtagaṅgâ, 57.
 Munisuvrata, 86 n 1.
 Nâga gods, 382.
 Nâgakumâra (Bhavanavâsin), 225.
 Nâgârguṇîya, 254 n 1, 3, 388 n 1, 401 n 1.
 Naggati, 87.
 Nagnagit (87).
 Nalakûbara, 117, n 3.
 Nâlandâ, suburb of Râgagriha, 419 f.
 Nami, 35, 87, 268.
 Namukî, 86 n 1.
 Nandana, Indra's park, 100, 104, 290.
 Nandana, a Baladêva, 87 n 4.
 — (palace), 88.
 Nandana-parks on Mēru, 288.
 Nandanavana, park on Mēru, 288 n 5.
 Nârâyana, a rîshi, 268 n 3.
 Nâstika, 236 n 4.
 Nēmi, 115 n 3.
 Nîla, 49 n 1.
 Nirgrantha, 52, 74 ff, &c.
 Nishadha, a fabulous mountain, 289.
 Nûpurapandîtâ, 118 n 4.
 Occult sciences, 366.
 Padmagulma, 57.
 Padmôttara, 86 n 1.
 Pâlita, 108.
 Palyôpamâ, 84 n 1, 200 ff.
 Pandaka, park on Mēru, 288 n 5.
 Pandaya, a forest on Mēru, 288.
 Pânduka, see Pandaka.
 Pânini, 118 n 2.
 Pañkâbha hell, 221.
 Pañkâla, 60, 61, 87.
 Pârâra, a rîshi, 269.
 Parishaha (of 22 kinds), 9.
 Parîshishaparvan, 118 n 4.
 Pârsva, 119, 121, 420 ff.
 Pâsattha = pârsvastha, 270 n 1.
 Patañgali, 118 n 2.
 Paurushî, 142 n 1 ff.
 Pausha, a month, 143.
 Pēdbâla, father of Udaka, 420 ff.
 Phâlguna, 143.
 Pihunda, 108.
 Pisâka, 51 n 1, 225.
 Plants, 215.
 Pôsaha, 23, n 2, 428, 429, 431.
 Prakalpa, 183.
 Prâṇata (Kalpa), 226, 228.
 Prasênagit, 32 n.
 Pratikramana, 159, (163), 434, 435.
 Pratikramana Sûtra, 148, 149.
 Pratyêkabuddha, 35 n 2, 87 n 2.
 Pride, eight kinds of, 361 n 1.
 Puns, 26 n 3, 242 n 2, 170 n 3, 331 n 2.
 Purandara, 117.
 Purimâtala, 57.
 Pushrimârga, 269 n 3.
 Quality, 153.
 Râgagriha, 32 n, 86 n 3, 383, 419 f.
 Râgîmati (Râga°, Râgi°), 113.
 Raivatâka, 115, n 2, 116.
 Râkshasa, 77, 121, 226, 250, 318, 382.
 Râkshasî, 35 n 1.
 Râma (Baladêva), 112, 115.
 Râmagupta, a rîshi, 268.
 Râmâyana, 85 n 5, 144 n 2, 321 n 3.
 Râshtrakûta, 236 n 1.

- Rathanēmi, 112, 116, n 1, 117.
 Ratnābha hell, 221.
 Ratnākara, the poet, 303 n 1.
 Ratnaprabhā hell, 218 n 3.
 Ratnapura, a town, 421 n 2.
 Ratnaṛēkhara, a king, 421 n 2.
 Rishabha, 71 n 2, 85 n 1, 138, 249, 261 n 2.
 Rōhagupta, 245 n 2.
 Rōhini, 112.
 Rudradēva, 50 n 1.
 Ruṭaka, a fabulous mountain, 289.
 Rupee, 374.
 Rūpiṇī, 108.
 Sagara, 85, n 2.
 Sahadēvi, 85 n 4.
 Sahasrāra (Kalpa), 226, 228.
 Saiva, 245 n 2.
 Saivādhikārin, 237 n 4.
 Sakra = Indra, 36, 41, 87, 288.
 Śālavana, park on Mēru, 288 n 5.
 Śālmali-tree, 84, 104, 290.
 Sambhūta, 56 ff.
 Samudrapāla, 108.
 Samudravigaya, king of Srāvastī, 85 n 3.
 Samudravigaya, king of Rāgagriha, 86 n 3.
 Samudravigaya, king of Saurikapura, 112, 117.
 Sana, 197.
 Sanatkumāra, (60), 60 n 3, 85 n 4.
 Sanatkumāra (Kalpa), 226, 227.
 Saṅgaya, 80 ff.
 Saṅgivanī, a hell, 284.
 Sāṅkhyā, 237, 244 n 4, 316 n 3, 342 n 1.
 Santakshana, a hell, 281.
 Santāpanī, a caldron in hell, 284.
 Śānti, 85, n 5.
 Sankarābha hell, 221.
 Sarvārtha, a Vimāna, 211.
 Sarvārthasiddha (Anuttara gods), 227, 228.
 Saudharma (Kalpa), 226, 227, 291.
 Sauri, 112 n 2.
 Saurikapura, 112 n 2.
 Sauryapura, 112 n 2.
 Sauvira, 87.
 Sceptics, 21.
 Śēshadravyā, a bathing-hall, 420.
 Siddha, 8, 77, 183.
 Simile, 326, 338.
 Śirupāla, 261.
 Śirupālavadha, 115 n 1, 261 n 3.
 Sītā, a river, 49.
 Sītā, the highest heaven, 212.
 Sīvā, 112.
 Skandha, the five skandhas of the Buddhists, 238.
 Sōriyapura, 112 n 2.
 Souls, 153.
 Southern region, 372, 377.
 Srāvana, a month, 144.
 Srāvastī, 32 n, 85 n 3, 120.
 Srēṇika, 100 f, 409 n 1.
 Śrīṅkhalayamaka, 329 n 1.
 Story told, 383 n 1, 421 n 2.
 Subhaktandra, 69 n 1.
 Substance, 153.
 Sudarjanā, 48.
 Sudarsana = Mēru, 288, 289.
 Sudharman, (8), (73), 235.
 Śūdra, 301, 418.
 Sugrīva, a town, 88.
 Sumanasavana, park on Mēru, 288 n 5.
 Sunandā, 60 n 3.
 Śūnyavādins, Bauddhas, 317 n 1.
 Suparna, 68; gods, 290, 382.
 Śūra, 112 n 2.
 Sūrya Siddhānta, 218 n 3.
 Sutanu, 117 n 1.
 Sūtrakritāṅga, 182 n 6, 183.
 Suvarṇakumāra (Bhavanavāsin), 225.
 Suvrata, 86 n 1.
 Śvapāka, 50, 55, 57, 59.
 Svayambhū = Vishnu, 49, 290, 244, n 4.
 Svayamsambuddha, 32 n, 35 n 2, 36.
 Śvētāmbara, 69 n 1, 119 n 2.
 Syādvāda, 405 n 1.
 Syllogism, 402 n 1.
 Taigasa body, 172, 173, 406 n 3.
 Tamā hell, 221.
 Tamatamā hell, 221.
 Taṅkana, a hill tribe, 268.
 Tāpasa, 140, 418 n 2.
 Tārāgana, a rishi, 268.
 Tathāgata = tirthakara, 320, 332.
 Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra, 49 n 1.
 Time, 153.
 Tinduka grove, 50 n 1; a park, 120 f; tree, 51.
 Tīrtha, 165.
 Trailōkya Dīpikā, 49 n 1.
 Trairāsika, 245 n 2.
 Trēta, a cast of dice, 256.
 Tylor, 406 n 3.
 Udadhikumāra (Bhavanavāsin), 225.
 Udaka, follower of Pārśva, 420 ff.

- Udaya, 58.
 Udāyana, 87, n 2.
 Ugra, 71, n 2, 321, 339.
 Ugrasēna, 113 n 2, 118 n 2.
 Ukka, 58.
 Umāsvāti, 49 n 1, 152 n 1.
 Usuyāra = Ishukāra, 62 n 1.
 Uttarādhyayana, 232.
 Uvāsaga Dasāo, 23 n 2, 27 n 2, 71 n 1,
 383 n 4, 384 n 1, 423 n 1,
 428 n 2.
 Vagravāluka, 94.
 Vaigayanta (Anuttara gods), 227.
 Vaikriya body, 406 n 3.
 Vaimānika, 202, 207 n, 225 ff.
 Vainayika, 83, 291, 316; °vāda, 385.
 Vaisākha, a month, 143.
 Vaisālī, 27, 261.
 Vaisālīka, 27 n 2.
 Vaisēshika, 64 n 2, 245 n 2.
 Vaisika, part of the Kāmarāstra,
 274 n 1.
 Vaisramana, 117, n 2.
 Vairavana, 117 n 2.
 Vairya, 301, 418.
 Vaitālī, an art, 366.
 Vaitālīka, a mountain in hell, 285.
 Vaitālīya, metre, 249 n 1.
 Vaitaranī, river of hell, 95 n 3, 104,
 270, 280.
 Vālukābha hell, 221.
 Varāha Mihira, 38 n 1, 70 n 2.
 Vardhamāna, 120 f, 290.
 Vāribhadraka, a subdivision of the
 Bhāgavatas, 294 n 3.
 Varṇaka, 339 n 1.
 Vasishṭība, law-book, 67 n 1.
 Vāsishṭī, (65), 66.
 Vastrakṭbēda, 70 n 2.
 Vāstuvidyā, 70 n 2.
 Vasudēva, 112 n 2.
 Vāsudēva, 48, 87 n 5, 113.
 Vātakumāra (Bhavanavāsin), 225.
 Vēda, 137.
 Vēdānta, 343 n 2.
 Vēdāntin, 237 n 1, 417.
 Vērudēva, name of Garuda, 290.
 Vēṇupālājika-lute, 276.
 Venus, planet, 366.
 Verse quoted, 4 n 4, 8 n 4, 24 n 3,
 179 n 4, 269 n 3, 313 n 1,
 359 n 3.
 Vētāla, 105.
 Vidēha, 41, 87, 268.
 Vidyutkumāra (Bhavanavāsin), 225.
 Vigaya, a Tīrthakara, 87.
 Vigaya (Anuttara gods), 227, 228.
 Vigayaghōsha, 136, 140, 141.
 Vikrama, a poet, 115 n 3.
 Vimala, 88 n 1.
 Vimāna, 164.
 Vinayavāda, 315.
 Vishṇu, 49 n 2, 86 n 1, 244 n 5.
 Vishṇukumāra, 86 n 1.
 Vishṇu Purāṇa, 113 n 2, 117 n 1,
 118 n 2.
 Vishvaksēna, name of Krishna, 290.
 Vow of silence, 321.
 Vrishṇi, 114.
 Vukkasa, 301.
 Vyantara gods, 122 n 1, 202, 207 n,
 225 ff.
 Vyāsa, 246 n 3.
 Vyatyaya; liṅga°, vakana°, 1 n 2.
 Vyavahāra Sūtra, 183 n 5.
 Water lives, 215.
 Yādava, 113 n 2.
 Yadu, 113 n 4.
 Yaksha, 16, 50 n 1, 51 ff, 77, 122,
 226, 382.
 Yamaka, 329 n 1.
 Yajā, two women, 32 n, 62.
 Yōga, 244 n 4, 343 n 2.

INDEX OF SANSKRIT AND PRÂKRIT WORDS OCCURRING IN THE TEXT AND THE NOTES.

- akarmatâ, page 161, (172).
 akalêvararêni, 45.
 akashâya-yathâkhyâta, 157.
 akasmât, used in Magadha, 358 n 3.
 akârana, 134 n.
 akukkuô, 110.
 akkôsa, 9.
 agandhana, 118 n 3.
 agnihôtra, 138.
 anka, 214.
 aṅga, 155, 345.
 aṅgavidyâ, 34.
 aṅgula, 143, n 2.
 akakkhu, 193 n 2.
 akakshurdarsana, 172 n 3.
 akêla, 9.
 akkbarâ, 370 n 1.
 akkbahim, 114 n 2.
 akkbirôdaya, 221.
 akkbîla, 221.
 akkbivêhaya, 221.
 agîva, 154, 207 n 3.
 aggbusire, 134 n 4.
 aggbôruha = adhyârôha, 390 n 3.
 agñânavâdin, 83 n 2.
 agbhaṅgbapatta, 321 n 1.
 attîya, 7 n 5.
 anâsiya = anasita, 286 n 1.
 anissa, 189 n 1.
 aniha = nirmâya, 417 n 2.
 anullaya, 219.
 anuvrata, 410 n 3.
 anusasammi, 151 n 1.
 atasî seed, 341.
 attagâmi = âptagâmin, 309 n 1.
 addhâsamaya, 208 n 1.
 adharma, 153, 207.
 adhikaranîkî, scil. kriyâ, 181 n 5.
 adhyavapûra, 132 n.
 adhyâhrîta, 132 n.
 anaṅgapravishṭa, 155 n 2.
 anantânubandha, 194 n 1.
 anasana, 175.
 anisrîshṭa, 132 n.
 anudharma, 416 n 2.
 anuparihârika, 157 n 3.
 anupavânta, 356 n 1.
 anuprêkshâ, 69 n 1, 159, (165).
 anubhâga = karmavipâka, 169 n 1,
 281 n 2, 416 n 1.
 antara, 209 n 3.
 antarâya, 172, 193, 194, 195.
 andhiya, 221.
 annâna, 9.
 annâniya = agñânika, 315 n 4.
 aparikarma, 176 n 1.
 aparita, 133 n.
 appadîlêha, 168 n 5.
 appattiya = krôdha, 241.
 appâhastu, 338 n 4.
 apratibaddhatâ, 159, (166).
 apratyâkhyâna, 194 n 1.
 apramâna, 134 n.
 abhigama, 154.
 abhinibôdha, 152 n 1.
 abhinûma, 250 n 1.
 abhibhûyanâni = kêvalin, 287 n 3.
 abhiyôga, five kinds of, 424 n 1.
 abhyutthâna, 142.
 abhrapafala, 214.
 abhravâluka, 214.
 amalaka seed, 341.
 amûrta, 64 n 2.
 aya, 28 n 1.
 ayaurasî, 341 n 3.
 ayantrita (uncoined ?), 105 n 3.
 ara, 17 n.
 arani-wood, 341.
 arati, 9, 190 n 1.
 araim raim vâ, 308 n 1.

- arguna, a grass, 216 n 5.
 ardhapêra, 177, n 4.
 alasa, 219.
 alâbha, 9.
 alôka, 207 f.
 avaga = avakâ, an aquatic plant, 391.
 avagâha, 153 n 4.
 avadhi, 120, 152.
 avadhigñâna, 193.
 avamarâtrâ, 143.
 avamôdarika, 175.
 avirati, 184 n 3.
 avihiṃsita, 353 n 7.
 ashvâpada, chess? 303 n 1.
 asamkhakâla, 209 n 2.
 asamkhyêya, 200 ff.
 asuratvabhâvanâ, 230, 231.
 astikâya, 153 n 2, 155 n 4, 157 n 2.
 asmâkam (so pronounced in Ma-gadha), 425 n 2.
 assakanî (arvakarna), 217 n 4.
 ahâgada = yathâkrîta, 307 n 1.
 âkâmaga, 264 n 1.
 âkâra, 153 n 3.
 âkâmla, 230.
 âkârya, 179, n 4.
 âkkâbîdya, 132 n.
 âgtivikâ, 132 n.
 âgñâ, 154.
 ânâdbîya, 48 n 1.
 âdâna, 59 n 1, 248 n 2.
 âdâna-samiti, 129.
 âdhâkarmika, 131 n 7.
 âprikkbanâ, 142.
 âbhiniḃôdhika, 152, 193.
 âbhiyôgikabhâvanâ, 230, 231.
 âya, a plant, 391.
 âyatamgatvâpratyâgâta, 177, n 4.
 âyâma, 230 n 1.
 âyâmagâ, 72 n 2.
 âyushka, 165, n 2, 194, 195.
 âyubkarman, 192.
 ârambha, 135 n 7.
 ârusa = ârushya, 283 n 1.
 âroppa = arûpa, 415 n 2.
 ârgava, 160, (169).
 âlambanâ, 167 n 2.
 âlisanda, a plant, 374.
 âluya (âluka), 216, n 12.
 âlôkanâ, 158, (162).
 âvaranîya, 195.
 âvayikâ, 142.
 âvâtanâ, 184.
 ââlîka, a kind of snake, 394.
 ârama, 39.
 âsupanna = âsupragñâ, 279 n 2, 288 n 2.
 âsurakivvisiyâ, 246 n 2.
 âsuriya = asûrya, 430 n 1.
 âsrava, 81, 99, 194, &c.
 âhârapratyâkhyâna, 160, (167).
 ikkara, a reed, 357.
 iṅgâla, 134 n.
 iṅginîmarana, 176 n 1.
 ikkâkâra, 142.
 itthî, 9.
 itthîvêya, 162 n 4.
 itvara, 175.
 indagâiya, 220.
 iriyâvahiya, 364 n 2.
 îryâpathika, 364 n 2.
 îryâ-samiti, 129.
 ukkala, 220.
 ukkasa = mâna, 248 n 3.
 ukkâsa = mâna, 257 n 4.
 ukkâra-samiti, 130.
 utra, 295 n 1.
 utkalikâ, 218 n 1.
 utkuṅkana, 373 n 2.
 uttaraguna, 143, 144.
 utpalakusha, 276.
 utpâdanâ, 353 n 4.
 utsarpinî, 17 n, 42 n 2, 200.
 udaga, an aquatic plant? 391.
 udgama, 353 n 4.
 uddisha, 383 n 3.
 udbhinna, 132 n.
 unmiṣra, 132 n.
 unmiṣrita, 133 n.
 upadêsa, 154.
 upadhipratyâkhyâna, 160, (167).
 upabhôga, 194 n 2.
 upamâ, 19 n 2.
 upayukta, 130 n 3.
 upayôga, 153 n 6.
 upasânta, 356 n 1.
 upasântamôha, 155 n 1.
 upasampadâ, 142.
 upâdhyâya, 179 n 4.
 ullôva, 204 n 1.
 uvasampanna, 421 n 1.
 uvvêhaliya, a plant, 391.
 usina, 9.
 usîra, a perfume, 276.
 usu = ishu, 283 n 2.
 ussayana = mâna, 302 n 5.
 uhimgaliyâ, 221.

rigvī, 178 n 2.
rishi, 244.

ekatva, 154 n 1.
ekāgramanaśśannivēśanā, 159, (166).
ekēndriya, 42 n 1.
ēgatta, 208, 213 n 1.
ēgāyata = ēkakin, 286 n 2.
ēlamikṭṭba, a plant, 374.
ēshanā, 27 n 1, 129, 131 n 3, 178,
353 n 4.
ēsava, a plant, 391.
ēsiya, 301 n 2.

airyapathika, 172 n 5, 298 n 3, 364
n 2.

ôê = êkab, 275 n 3.
ôm, 140.
ôgādā, 135 n 2.
ôgāhanā, 211 n 1.
ôgha, 134 n 2.
ômāna = apamāna, 247 n 1.

aughika, 134 n 1.
auddēsika, 131 n 7.
aupagrahika, 134 n 1.

kaṅkana, 221.
kaṅkabhāniya, a plant, 391.
kaṅbahāra (kāshibahāra), 220.
kaṅbina, a plant, 357.
kaṇḍaka, tier, 288 n 3.
kaṇha, 217 (krishnakanda, n 1).
kandarpabhāvanā, 230, 231.
kandu, a plant, 391.
kapittha, 198.
kamār, 96 n 2.
karanaguna, 156 n 7.
karanagunārēdhī, 163 n 1.
karanasatya, 160, (169).
karnapittha, 381 n 2.
karmapatha, 83 n 2.
karvata, 176 n 7.
kalaṅkalibhāva, 387 n 2.
kalama, a plant, 374.
kalambuya = kadamba, 391.
kalpa, 16, 164.
kalpasthita, 157 n 3.
kashāyapratyākhyāna, 160, (167).
kasēruya = kavēru, 391.
kāū = kāpōta, 197 n 4.
kākinī, jewels, 366 n 4.
kākinī, a small coin, 28.
kāṅgika, 72 n 3.
kāmaduh, 104.

kāya, a plant, 391.
kāyaklēśa, 175.
kāyaguptatā, 160, (170).
kāyagupti, 130.
kāyasaṁmādhāranā, 160, (170).
kāyikī, scil. kriyā, 181 n 5.
kāṛshāpana, (28), 105.
kālapratikramana, 145, 147, 148.
kālasya pratyupēkshanā, 159, (164).
kāsha, 197.
kāsavaga = nāpita, 276 n 6.
kimpāka, 187.
kiriyaṭṭhāne, 355 n 2.
kilvishabhāvanā, 230, 231.
kukkuda, 221.
kukkaphanaka, 116 n 1.
kukkāka, a plant, 357.
kudāmbaya, 216 n 16.
kuduvvaya, 215.
kunda-flowers, 197.
kumāra, 96 n 2.
kula, 179 n 4.
kulattha, a plant, 374.
kulala, 68 n 1.
kulālaya, kulāta, mārgāra, 417 n 4.
kuṣa, a grass, 357.
kuhana, a plant, 391.
kuhana, 216 n 8.
kuhāda, 96 n 1.
kuhēdaviggā, 105 n 5.
kūra, 391, 392.
kētana, 262 n 3.
kēyakandālī, 215.
kōṭṭa = kuṭayitvā, 285 n 4.
kotthala, 92.
kōdrava, a kind of grain, 359.
kōlasunaya, 94 n 3.
kriyā, 154, 181 n 5.
krīta, 132 n.
krōdhapinda, 133 n.
krōdhavigaya, 161, (171).
krōṣa, 212.
kshapakarēnī, 45 n 2.
kshamāpanā, 159, (164).
kshānti, 160, (169).
kshīnamōha, 155 n 1.

khaladāna, 369 n 1.
khalumka, 150 n 1.
khuruduga, 395 n 7.
khēra, 176 n 6.
khōra, an animal, 395.

gaṅkba, (324).
gana, 149, n 1, 179 n 4.
ganipidage, 345.

gantbiyasatta, 195 n 1.
 gandhana, 118 n 3.
 gandhabastin, 113 n 2.
 galigaddaha, 150 n 1.
 gavēshanā, 131 n 4.
 gānamganika, 79 n 1.
 gāthāshōḍasaka, 235 n 1.
 gārava, 98 n 1, 181 n 1.
 gāhā, 333 n 1.
 gilli, a swing, 373 n 3.
 gukkā, 216 n 1.
 guṇḍguka, 216 n 5.
 guṇa, 153 n 1.
 guṇavratā, 383.
 guṇasthāna, 155 n 1, 172 n 4.
 guptatā, vide manō°, vāg°, kāya°.
 gupti, 52, 98, 107, 129, 135, &c.
 gurusādharmikarurūshanā, 158,
 (162).
 gōkkāka, 145 n 3.
 gōtra, 193, 194, 195, 305, 322;
 =church, 321, 327, 423.
 gōmūtrika, 177, n 4.
 grahanaiṣhanā, 131 n 5, 133 n.
 grāmakanṭaka, 380 n 2.
 glāna, 179 n 4.

ghana (a wind), 218.
 gharakōilla = grīhakōkila, 395.
 ghātīn, 163 n 3.
 ghrānēndriyanigraha, 161, (171).

kakkhu, 193 n 2. •
 kakra, 41.
 kakravartin, 85 n 1.
 kakshurindriyanigraha, 161, (171).
 kakshurdarṣana, 172 n 3.
 katurindriya, 43.
 katurvimsatistava, 159, (163).
 kāndana, 214, 219.
 kāndālaka, a copper vessel, 277 n 4.
 karanaḥkaranapāraṇid, 355 n 1.
 kāriyā, 9.
 karmakātaka, 224 n 1.
 kāuppāya, an animal, 395.
 kāuppāya, 103 n 1.
 kāritrasampannatā, 160, (171).
 kīkītsā, 133 n.
 kūya, 28 n 2.
 kūrnayōga, 133 n.
 kēiē, 36 n 2.
 kāitya, 36 n 2, 100 n 3.
 kāityakarman, 242 n 3.

kbatṭaga, a plant, 391.
 kbadmastha, 155 n 1, 157.

kbandanā, 142.
 kbanna = māyā, 257 n 2.
 kbardita, 133 n.
 kbimāla, 150 n 4.
 kbēdōpasthāpanā, 157.
 kbōya, 341.

gagattbabhāsī, 320 n 2.
 gamaīya = yamakīya, 329.
 gamaīya, 249 n 1.
 gammayam, 332.
 galakānta, 214.
 galakāri, 221.
 galana = krōdha, 248 n 4.
 galla, 9.
 gāyanā, 9, 130 n 2.
 gālaga, 219.
 gāvai, 215.
 gihvēndriyanigraha, 161, (171).
 gīva, 154, 164 n 5, 207 n 3.
 gōha, an animal, 395.
 gñānasampannatā, 160, (170).
 gñānāvaranīya, 192.

gbanḡgbā = kalaha, 349 n 3.
 gbanḡgbā = māyā, 321 n 1.

dbaṅka, 95 n 2, 224, 324.

tagara-powder, 276.
 tanaphāsa, 9.
 tanahāra (trinahāra), 220.
 tathākāra, 142.
 tantavagāiyā, 221.
 tantuga, 13 n 2.
 tapas, 159, (166).
 tapasvin, 179 n 4.
 tammūyattā, tamōmūkatva, 363 n 3.
 tālaputa (a poison), 77.
 tālauda, 77 n 1.
 tiutriggā, 235 n 3.
 tippāmi, 346 n 1.
 tirikkha, 221 n 4.
 tumbaka, 197.
 tulā, 386 n 2.
 tuhaga, 217.
 tūryā, 371.
 trishnā, 185 n 3.
 trāyastriṃsa, 88 n 2.
 trikaṣuka, 198.
 trīndriya, 43.

thanḍilla = krōdha, 302 n 4.
 thilli, 373 n 4.
 thihūya, 216.

damsamasaya, 9.
 danda, 181 n 1.
 dandasamādāna, 356 n 3.
 darśanasampannatā, 160, (171).
 darśanāvaranīya, 192.
 daviê=dravya, 333 n 2.
 dāyaka, 133 n.
 digāṅkṣā, 9.
 duga, 220.
 duttara, 186 n 1.
 durūvasambhava, 395 n 6.
 duhamduha, 254 n 3.
 dūtakarman, 132 n.
 dēvauttē, 244 n 3.
 dēśavakāśika, 431 n 1.
 dēhati=paryati, 240 n 3.
 dōguṅkṣī, 25 n 4.
 dōlā, 221.
 dōsa, 56 n 2.
 dravya, 153 n 1.
 drōnamukha, 176 n 8.
 dvīndriya, 42.
 dharma, 153, 154, 207, &c.
 dharmakathā, 159, (166).
 dharmasaddhā, 158, (162).
 dhātṛīkarman, 132 n.
 dhīnkana, 221.
 dhuya, 257 n 6.
 dhūma, 134 n.
 dhruva, 32 n.
 nakshatra, 144.
 nagara, 176 n 3.
 nandāvatta, 221.
 nandīāvarta, 221 n 2.
 napumsakavēda, 162 n 4.
 naya, 155.
 nayuta, 29, n 1.
 nayutānga, 29 n 1.
 nāman, 193, 194, 195.
 nāya=gñāta, a simile, 338 n 1.
 niōgattī, 2, n 2, 4 n 2.
 nikshipta, 133 n.
 nigama, 176 n 4.
 nigraha, vide śrōtrēndriya°, lakshur-
 indriya°, ghrānēndriya°, gihvēnd-
 riya°, sparśanēndriya°.
 nidāna, 60 n 3, 162 n 3.
 nidrā, 193 n 2.
 nidrānidrā, 193 n 2.
 nindā, 158, (163).
 nimitta, 132 n.
 niyāgattī, 4 n 2.
 niyāgapadivanna, 386 n 1.
 niyuta, 29 n 1.

nirgarā, 14 n 1.
 nirvēda, 158, (161).
 nivvēhaliya, a plant, 391.
 nishpāva, a plant, 374.
 nisarga, 154.
 nisīhiyā, 9.
 nissāe=nirayā, 350 n 1.
 nīyā, 221.
 nūma=prakṣbanna, 265 n 1.
 nūma=māyā, 241 n 3, 248 n 5.
 naishēdhikī, 142.
 nō-kashāya, 172 n 1, 190 n 1.

paīlāiya, an animal, 395.
 pakshapinda, 4 n 1.
 pagāsa=krōdha, 257 n 5.
 pakṣaka, 357 n 4.
 pakṣāyāti=pratyāyāti, 361 n 4.
 paggava, 153 n 1, 178 n 1.
 paṅkakusīla, 80 n 2.
 paṅkasikha=kumāra, 294 n 1.
 paṅkēndriya, 43.
 parupataha, 371.
 parvana, 176 n 9.
 padikamittu kālāssa, 148 n 4.
 padilēhā, 79 n 1.
 panaga, an aquatic plant, 391.
 patāṅgavithikā, 177, n 4.
 pattahāra (patrahāra), 220.
 pada, 143, n 2.
 padakambala, 78 n 1.
 panaka, 217.
 pannā, 9.
 pappaka, a plant, 357.
 para, a grass, 357.
 paraka, a plant, 359.
 parakada, 6 n 2, 204 n 2.
 paramādharmika, 182 n 5.
 parāvartanā, 159, (165).
 parāvritti, 132 n.
 paritāpanikī, scil. kriyā, 181 n 5.
 pariprikkbanā, 159, (165).
 paribhōgaishanā, 131 n 6, 134 n.
 parihāraviuddhika, 157.
 parihārīka, 157 n 3.
 parīsaha, 9, 183 n 2.
 paryastikā, 3 n 2.
 paryāya, 153 n 1.
 paryāyadharma, 109.
 parvaga, 216 n 7.
 paliuṅkaga, 199 n 3.
 paliuṅkana=māyā, 302 n 2.
 palimantha, 302 n 6.
 palimokkha, 317 n 3.
 paliyantam, 251 n 1.
 paliyāga=paripāka, 393.

palyôpamâ, 84 n 1, 200 ff.
 pallî, 176 n 5.
 pallôya, 219.
 palhatthiyâ, 3 n 2.
 paramsa=lôbha, 257 n 3.
 pâulla, slippers, 277 n 6.
 pâkarâsanî=indragâla, 366 n 6.
 pâtâla=samudra, 264 n 2.
 pâdapôpagamana, 176 n 1.
 pâpa, 154.
 pâsattha=pârjvastha, 240 n 2, 270 n 1.
 piha, 270.
 pîtibimamsi, 362 n 1.
 pinnâgapindî, 414 n 3.
 pivâsâ, 9.
 pihita, 133 n.
 pîdhasappî=pîdhasarpin, 269 n 2.
 pukkhalatthibhaga, 392.
 pudbôsiya, 293 n 2, 318 n 2.
 punnakhandha, punyaskandha, 415 n 1.
 punya, 154.
 purâna purabhêdanî, 102 n 2, 451.
 pulaka, 214.
 puvvasamthuya, 7 n 2.
 puhutta, 208 n 5, 213 n 1, 223 n 3.
 pûtika, 132 n.
 pûtikarman, 312 n 1.
 pûyanâ, 270 n 4.
 pûyanâsaê, 330 n 2.
 pûrva, 16 n 1, 29 n 1.
 pûrvânga, 29 n 1.
 prîthaktva, 154 n 1.
 pêra, 177, n 4.
 pokkham, 102 n 1.
 pottiyâ, 221.
 pottham, 102 n 1.
 pôyagarâu=pôtagarâyû, 302 n 1.
 pollâ (pullâ), 105 n 2.
 prakîrma, 155.
 prakâlâ, 193 n 2.
 prakâlâprakâlâ, 193 n 2.
 pramîta, 178 n 3.
 pratiprikkhanâ, 142.
 pratirûpatâ, 160, (168).
 pratyâkhyâna, 159, (164), 194 n 1, 383.
 pratyâkhyâna, vide sambhôga°,
 upadhi°, âhâra°, kashâya°, yôga°,
 sarîra°, sahâya°, bhakta°, sad-
 bhâva°.
 pradêsa, 194 n 4.
 pradêsâgra, 194 n 4.
 pramâna, 155.
 pravragyâ, 204.
 prâna, 164 n 5.
 prânâtipâtîkî kriyâ, 181 n 5.
 prâdubkarana, 132 n.

prâdvêshikî, scil. kriyâ, 181 n 5.
 prâbhritika, 132 n.
 prâmitya, 132 n.
 prâyaskitta, 179.
 prâyaskittakarana, 159, (164).
 prêmadvêshamithyâdarjanavigaya,
 161, (172).
 phalagâvatattbi, 297 n 1.
 phâsuya, 6 n 1.
 phittai, 103 n 2.
 badara, (34).
 bandha, 154.
 bâhira, 155 n 2.
 bîga, 154.
 bîgôdaka, 267 n 3, 313 n 5.
 buddha, 2 n 1, 3 n 1, 5 n 2, 7 n 2,
 45, 45 n 3 and 5, 84 n 3.
 bûhaê, 45 n 2.
 bôdhi, 34.
 brahmagupti, 182 n 2.
 brahman=môksha, 413.
 bhaktapratyâkhyâna, 160, (168),
 176 n 1.
 bhadantânam, 101 n 1.
 bhante, 338 n 2.
 bhayana=lôbha, 302 n 3.
 bhayantârô, 380 n 3.
 bhâvanâ, 69, 183 n 4.
 bhâvasatya, 160, (169).
 bhâshâ-samiti, 129.
 bhikshâkaryâ, 175.
 bhikshudharma, 182 n 3.
 bhugamôkaka, 214.
 bhûta, 164 n 5.
 bhôga, 194 n 3.
 manghu, 34.
 maggbattha=lôbha, 248 n 6.
 maramba, 176 n 10.
 mananâna, 152 n 2.
 mandalikâ, 218 n 2.
 madasthâna, 361 n 1.
 mati, 152 n 1.
 manabparyâya, 152, 193.
 manabamâdhâranâ, 160, (170).
 manô-guptatâ, 160, (169).
 manô-gupti, 130.
 mantradôsha, 133 n.
 maranakâla, 175.
 masâragalla, 214.
 masûra, a plant, 374.
 mahâpâlî, 84, n 1.
 mâitthâna=mâtristhâna (or mâya-
 sthâna?), 304 n 4.

mâivâhaya (mâtrivâhaka), 219.
 mânapinda, 133 n.
 mânavigaya, 161, (171).
 mâyavigaya, 161, (171).
 mârâdava, 160, (169).
 mâlâhrita, 132 n.
 mâlûga (mâlûka), 220.
 mâsha, 34, 374.
 mâhana, 252 n 1.
 miggati = mîyatê, 292 n 2.
 mithyâkâra, 142.
 milakkhu, mlêkka, 414 n 3, 4.
 mukti, 160, (169).
 muṅga grass, 340.
 mudga, a plant, 374.
 muni, 140.
 musundbî, 217.
 mûlakarman, 133 n.
 mûlaya, mûlaka, 215 n 15.
 mrigakakra, 366 n 7.
 mōksha, a tree, 357.
 mōhabbhâvanâ, 230, 232.
 mairēyaka, 198.
 maunapada, 253 n 2.
 mrakshita, 133 n.

yama, 136.
 Yama, 318.
 yamaka, 329.
 yamakīya, 249 n 1.
 yōga, 163 n 2, 184.
 yōgapinda, 133 n.
 yōgapratyâkhyâna, 160, (167).
 yōgasatya, 160 (169).

ragôharana, 78 n 1.
 rati, 190 n 1.
 rasaparitayâga, 175.
 râlaka, a plant, 359.
 rishraka, 197.
 rôga, 9.
 rogga, 95 n 1.
 rôhini, a fruit, 197.

lakshana, forespelling, 366.
 lagandasâinô, 379 n 2.
 lavâvasanki, 316 n 2.
 lâdha, 12 n 1, 306 n 3.
 lipta, 133 n.
 lêryâ, 56 n 1, 181, 196 ff.
 lôha = rûksha, samyama, 261 n 4.
 lôka, 207 f.
 lôdhra-powder, 276.
 lôbhapinda, 133 n.
 lôbhavigaya, 161, (172).

lôhinîhûya, 216.
 lôhitâksha, 214.

vakkasa-pulâga, 34.
 vaggakanda, 217 (vagrakanda, n 2).
 vanaspati, 217.
 vandana, 159, (163).
 vapanîka, 133 n.
 vartanâ, 153 n 5.
 vardhamâna grîha, 38 n 1.
 valaya, 216 n 6.
 vaha, 9.
 vâksamâdhârânâ, 160, (170).
 vâgguptatâ, 160 (170).
 vâggupti, 130.
 vâkanâ, 159, (165).
 vâsâniya, a plant, 391.
 vâsîkandanakappa, 99 n 1.
 vâsîmuha (°mukha), 219.
 viukkasa = mâna, 241 n 2.
 viôsagga, viussagga, viussagga, 179 n 1.
 vikatthâ, 181 n 2.
 vikahâ, 131 n 2.
 vigada, 10 n 3.
 viâitta, 221.
 viâittapattaya, 221.
 viâitrayanâsanâsēvanâ, 159, (166).
 vigaya, vide mâna°, mâya°, krô.lha°,
 lôbha°, prēma°.
 viggâ (vidvân), 84 n 2.
 vidyâpinda, 133 n.
 vinaya, 179.
 vinivartanâ, 159, (167).
 vinnavanâ = striyab, 258 n 1.
 vipratipanna, 367 n 2.
 vibhaṅga, 356 n 2.
 vibhagyavâda = syâdvâda, 327 n 3.
 viramana, 383.
 virati, 383 n 3.
 virali, 221.
 vilambaga, 293 n 2.
 visammēsi, 275 n 1.
 vistâra, 154.
 vissambhara, an animal, 395.
 vîzâ, 371.
 vîtarâgatâ, 160, (169).
 vîrâsana, 178.
 virya, 301 n 2.
 vusîmaô, 22 n 1.
 vetthi, 151 n 3.
 vêdanīya, 168 n 3, 192, 193, 195.
 vêdikâ, 145 n 5.
 vêyâliya, 249 n 1 ; °magga, 253 n 1.
 vêra = vaira, karmabandha, 408 n 2.
 vērattiya, 144.
 vêsâliya, 244 n 2.

vēsiya, 301 n 2.
vainayika, 83 n 2.
vaiyāvṛitya, 160, 179, 181 n 7.
vaishika, 353 n 8.
vyāṅgana, forespelling, 366.
vyavacāna, 159, (166).
vyutsarga, 179.

śaṅkita, 133 n.
śaṅkhānaka, 219.
śataghnī, 37.
śabala, 183 n 1.
śambhūkāvartta, 177, n 4.
śalya, 181 n 1.
śastraparīṇāmita, 353 n 6.
śastrātita, 353 n 5.
śirisha, 198.
śilavrata, 383.
śukladhyāna, 173 n 1, 205 n 1.
śaiksha, 179 n 4.
śailēṣī, 161, 171 n 2, 172.
śrāvaka, 108.
śruta, 120, 152, 193.
śrutasyārādhanā, 159, (166).
śrōtiṇḍriyanigraha, 161, (171).

śamyama, 159, (166).
śamyōganā, 134 n.
śamrambha, 135 n 5.
śamlīnatā, 175.
śamvara, 55, 73, n 2, 154.
śamvartaka, 218.
śamvêga, 158, (161).
śamstavapinda, 133 n.
śamhrita, 133 n.
śakkārapurakkāra, 9.
śaṅkaliyā = śrīṅkhala, 329 n 1.
śamkalpavikalpanā, 191 n 1.
śamkshêpa, 154.
śamkshigga, 43 n 1.
śamkshyêya, 43 n 1.
śaṅgha, 179 n 4.
śakṭha, a plant, 391.
śamgñā, 181 n 3.
śamgvalana, 194 n 1.
śadba, 29 n 3.
śattva, 164 n 5.
śatya, vide bhāva°, karana°, yoga°.
śadāvarī, 220.
śadbhāvapratyākhyāna, 160, (168).
śamtatim pappā, 208 n 3.
śandhipattē, 331 n 1.
śannivêra, 177 n 2.
śaparikarma, 176 n 1.
śapêhâê, 25.
śamaya, 200, n 3, 235 n 2.

śamara, 5 n 1.
śamavāya, 343 n 1.
śamāga, 177 n 3.
śamādhāraṇā, vide manô°, vāk°,
kāya°.
śamādhi, 185 n 1.
śamādhīyōga, 34 n 2.
śamārambha, 135 n 6.
śamāhi, 266 n 3, 306 n 1, 313 n 4,
324 n 2, 328 n 1, 384 n 1, 417
n 1.
śamita, 33.
śamiti, 52, 98, 129.
śamilā, 94 n 4.
śamudāniya, 80 n 1.
śamudānika, 354 n 1.
śamūsiya, 284 n 3.
śamōsarana = śamavasaraṇa, 315 n 2,
386 n 3.
śampannatā, vide gñāna°, darjana°,
kṣēritra°.
śamparāya, 157.
śambādha, 176 n 11.
śambhōga, 167 n 1.
śambhōgapratyākhyāna, 159, (167).
śammatta, 9.
śammūṛṭkṛbima, 223 n 1, 388 n 1.
śayōgin, 172 n 4.
śarīrapratyākhyāna, 160, (167).
śarpaṭṭabattrā, 216 n 8.
śarvagunasampūṛnatā, 160, (169).
śalilā, 68 n 1.
śavvappaga = lōbha, 241 n 1.
śavvāvanti, 336 n 1.
śassirilī, 215.
śahasamuiya, 154 n 2.
śahasambuddha, 35 n 2.
śahāya-pratyākhyāna, 160, (168).
śahiê, 251 n 4.
śāgarōpamā, 84 n 1.
śādhārmika, 179 n 4.
śāmāṭārī, 142.
śāmāyika, 157, 159, (163).
śāmudāyika, 134 n 1.
śāmparāyika, 298 n 3, 353 n 1, 364
n 1.
śāsaka, 213.
śāhaya, 221.
śāṅgiridī, 221.
śiddhi, 246 n 1.
śirilī, 215.
śīya, 9.
śīyasandimāniya, a palankin, 373 n 5.
śīhakannī, 217.
śuuttara, 186 n 2.
śukhārāta, 159, (166).

sugḍsiya, sugbḍsiya, 257 n 6.	strivêda, 162 n 4, 274.
subhagasḍniya, a plant, 392.	sthavira, 73, 149, 179 n 4.
surâthâlaya, 369 n 1.	sthâpanâkarmika, 132 n.
sûkshma, 157.	snâtaka, 140, 417 n 3.
sûtra, 154.	sparśanêndriyanigraha, 161, (171).
sûtrana(ya), 217.	smṛiti = mati, 152 n 1.
sûryakânta, 214.	svâdhyâya, 159, (165).
seggâ, 9.	
sêvâla, an aquatic plant, 391.	hamsa, a washerman, 278 n 2.
sêhiya, 239 n 3.	hamsagarbha, 214.
sômaṅgala, 219.	haritakâya, 216 n 10.
sôvariya = saukarika, 367 n 3.	harilî, 215.
sauvîra, 72 n 3.	hastipippalî, 198.
stavastutimaṅgala, 159, (164).	hâlâ, a word of abuse, 305 n 1.

CORRECTION.


Page 102, verse 18, the phrase purâna purabhêdanî has been wrongly translated: 'which is among towns what Indra is (among the gods);' it simply means: 'an old town.' For purabhêdanî is the Prâkrit equivalent of the Sanskrit and Pâli word putabhêdanam, town. Cancel note 2.

TRANSLITERATION OF ORIENTAL ALPHABETS ADOPTED FOR THE TRANSLATIONS
OF THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST.

CONSONANTS.	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.				Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pehlvi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	I Class.										
	II Class.	III Class.									
Gutturales.											
1 Tenuis	k	...	...	...	क	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	k
2 " aspirata	kh	...	...	...	ख	𐬖	𐬖	𐬖	𐬖	𐬖	kh
3 Media	g	...	...	...	ग	𐬗	𐬗	𐬗	𐬗	𐬗	...
4 " aspirata	gh	...	...	...	घ	𐬘	𐬘	𐬘	𐬘	𐬘	...
5 Gutturo-labialis	q	...	...	...	...	𐬙	𐬙	𐬙	𐬙	𐬙	...
6 Nasalis	h (ng)	...	...	...	ङ	𐬚	𐬚	𐬚	𐬚	𐬚	h, hs
7 Spiritus asper	h	...	...	...	ह	𐬛	𐬛	𐬛	𐬛	𐬛	...
8 " lenis	,	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
9 " asper faucalis	'h	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
10 " lenis faucalis	'h	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
11 " asper fricatus	...	'h	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
12 " lenis fricatus	...	'h	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Gutturales modificatae (palatales, &c.)											
13 Tenuis	...	k	...	...	ख	𐬛	𐬛	𐬛	𐬛	𐬛	k
14 " aspirata	...	kh	...	...	ख	𐬛	𐬛	𐬛	𐬛	𐬛	kh
15 Media	...	g	...	...	ग	𐬛	𐬛	𐬛	𐬛	𐬛	...
16 " aspirata	...	gh	...	...	घ	𐬛	𐬛	𐬛	𐬛	𐬛	...
17 " Nasalis	...	ḡ	...	...	ङ	𐬛	𐬛	𐬛	𐬛	𐬛	...

CONSONANTS (continued).	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pehlevi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	I Class.	II Class.	III Class.							
18 Semivocalis	y			य	𐬶 𐬷 𐬸 init.	𐬶	𐬶	𐬶	י	y
19 Spiritus asper		(y')								
20 " lenis		(y)								
21 " asper assibilatus		s		श	𐬰	𐬰	𐬰	𐬰		s
22 " lenis assibilatus		z				𐬱	𐬱	𐬱		z
Dentales.										
23 Tenuis	t			त	𐬢	𐬢	𐬢	𐬢	ת	t
24 " aspirata	th			थ	𐬣	𐬣	𐬣	𐬣	ת	th
25 " assibilata			TH							
26 Media	d			द	𐬤	𐬤	𐬤	𐬤		
27 " aspirata	dh									
28 " assibilata			DH							
29 Nasalis	n			न	𐬥	𐬥	𐬥	𐬥	נ	n
30 Semivocalis	l			ल	𐬦	𐬦	𐬦	𐬦	ל	l
31 " mollis 1		l				𐬧	𐬧	𐬧		
32 " mollis 2			L							
33 Spiritus asper 1	s			स	𐬨	𐬨	𐬨	𐬨	ש	s
34 " asper 2			s (S)							
35 " lenis	z					𐬩	𐬩	𐬩	ז	z
36 " asperimus 1			z (z)							
37 " asperimus 2			z (z)							

VOWELS.	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pehlvi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	I Class.		II Class.							
	III Class.		III Class.							
1 Neutralis	0			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
2 Laryngo-palatalis	ē			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
3 " labialis	ō			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
4 Gutturalis brevis	a			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
5 " longa	ā		(a)	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
6 Palatalis brevis	i			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
7 " longa	ī		(i)	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
8 Dentalis brevis	ē			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
9 " longa	ā			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
10 Lingualis brevis	ri			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
11 " longa	rī			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
12 Labialis brevis	u			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
13 " longa	ū		(u)	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
14 Gutturo-palatalis brevis	e			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
15 " longa	ē (ai)		(e)	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
16 Diphthongus gutturo-palatalis	āi		(ai)	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
17 " "	ei (ēi)			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
18 " "	oi (ōu)			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
19 Gutturo-labialis brevis	o			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
20 " longa	ō (au)		(o)	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
21 Diphthongus gutturo-labialis	āu		(au)	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
22 " "	eu (ēu)			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
23 " "	ou (ōu)			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
24 Gutturalis fracta	ä			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
25 Palatalis fracta	ī			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
26 Labialis fracta	ü			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
27 Gutturo-labialis fracta	ö			...	...	...	...	...	...	...



SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST

TRANSLATED BY

VARIOUS ORIENTAL SCHOLARS

AND EDITED BY

F. MAX MÜLLER.

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PART II

HYMNS TO AGNI (MANDALAS I-V)

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CONTENTS.

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	xi
HYMNS, TRANSLATION AND NOTES:—	
Mandala I, 1	1
12	6
13 Âprî Hymn	8
26	13
27	16
31	22
36	31
44	37
45	42
58	45
59	49
60	52
65	54
66	57
67	61
68	64
69	67
70	70
71	74
72	82
73	88
74	92
75	95
76	96
77	100
78	102
79	103
94	108

	PAGE
Mandala I, 95	114
96	119
97	125
98	127
99	128
127	129
128	137
140	141
141	147
142 Âprî Hymn	153
143	157
144	160
145	164
146	167
147	170
148	173
149	176
150	178
188 Âprî Hymn	179
189	181
II, 1	186
2	193
3 Âprî Hymn	198
4	202
5	206
6	209
7	211
8	213
9	215
10	217
III, 1	219
2	228
3	232
4 Âprî Hymn	236
5	240
6	244
7	248
8	252
9	256

	PAGE
Mandala III, 10	259
11	261
12 To Indra-Agni	263
13	266
14	268
15	271
16	273
17	275
18	277
19	279
20	281
21	283
22	285
23	287
24	289 +
25	291 -
26	292 -
27	296
28	300
29	302
IV, 1	307
2	316
3	325 -
4	331
5	335
6	340
7	343
8	346
9	348
10	350
11	352
12	354
13	356
14	358
15	360
V, 1	363
2	366
3	371 -
4	375

	PAGE
Mandala V, 5 Âprî Hymn	377
6	379
7	382
8	385
9	387
10	389
11	391
12	393
13	395
14	397
15	399
16	401
17	403
18	405
19	407
20	410
21	412
22	413
23	414
24	415
25	416
26	418
27	420
28	423

APPENDICES:—

I. Index of Words	427
II. List of the more important Passages quoted in the Notes	487

Transliteration of Oriental Alphabets adopted for the Translations of the Sacred Books of the East . . .	497
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INTRODUCTION.

IN preparing this volume, which contains the greater part of the Agni hymns of the Rig-veda, namely, those of the *Mandalas* I–V, the translator enjoyed the high advantage of Professor Max Müller's assistance, in the way stated in the Introduction to the first volume of *Vedic Hymns, Sacred Books of the East*, vol. xxxii, p. xxvii.

H. O.

KIEL :
November, 1895.

VEDIC HYMNS.

MANDALA I, HYMN 1.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 1-2.

1¹. I magnify² Agni, the Purohita, the divine ministrant of the sacrifice, the Hotri³ priest, the greatest bestower of treasures.

2. Agni, worthy to be magnified by the ancient Rishis and by the present ones—may he conduct the gods hither.

3. May one obtain through Agni wealth and welfare day by day, which may bring glory and high bliss of valiant offspring.

4. Agni, whatever sacrifice and worship¹ thou encompassest on every side, that indeed goes to the gods.

5. May Agni the thoughtful Hotri³, he who is true and most splendidly renowned, may the god come hither with the gods.

6. Whatever good thou wilt do to thy worshipper, O Agni, that (work) verily is thine, O Angiras.

7. Thee, O Agni, we approach day by day, O (god) who shinest in the darkness¹; with our prayer, bringing adoration to thee—

8. Who art the king of all worship, the guardian of Rita, the shining one, increasing in thy own house.

9. Thus, O Agni, be easy of access to us, as a father is to his son. Stay with us for our happiness.

NOTES.

The hymn is ascribed to Madhukkkhandas Vaisvâmitra, and may possibly belong to an author of the Visvâmitra family. See my Prolegomena, p. 261. Metre, Gâyatrî. The hymn has been translated and commented upon by M. M., Physical Religion, pp. 170-173.

Verse 1 = TS. IV, 3, 13, 3 ; MS. IV, 10, 5. Verse 3 = TS. III, 1, 11, 1 ; IV, 3, 13, 5 ; MS. IV, 10, 4 (IV, 14, 16). Verse 4 = TS. IV, 1, 11, 1 ; MS. IV, 10, 3. Verse 7 = SV. I, 14. Verses 7-9 = VS. III, 22-24 ; TS. I, 5, 6, 2 ; MS. I, 5, 3.

Verse 1.

Note 1. This verse being the first verse of the Rig-veda as we now possess it, seems already to have occupied the same position in the time of the author of the hymns X, 20-26. For, after a short benediction, the opening words of this collection of hymns are also agnîm î/e, 'I magnify Agni.' Comp. my Prolegomena, p. 231.

Note 2. The verb which I translate by 'magnify'—being well aware that it is impossible to do full justice to its meaning by such a translation—is *îd*. There seems to me no doubt that this verb is etymologically connected with the substantives *îsh*, 'food,' *îd*, *îdâ*, *îrâ* (not with the root *yag* of which Brugmann, Indogermanische Forschungen I, 171, thinks). We need not ask here whether the connection between *îd* and *îsh* is effected by a 'Wurzeldeterminativ' (root-determinative) *d*—in this case we should have here *îd* for *izhd*, comp. *nîdâ* for *nizhda*, *pîd* for *pizhd*, &c. ; see Brugmann's Grundriss, vol. i, § 591—or whether *îd* is a reduplicated present of *îd* (of the type described by Brugmann, Grundriss, vol. ii, p. 854 ; comp. *îrte*, &c.). The original meaning of *îde* at all events seems to be 'I give sap or nourishment.' Now in the Vedic poetry and ritual, the idea of sap or nourishment is especially connected with the different products coming from the cow, milk and

butter. The footsteps of the goddess *Idā* drip with butter. The words 'agnim *ide*' seem to me, consequently, originally to convey the idea of celebrating Agni by pouring sacrificial butter into the fire. There is a number of passages in the *Rig-veda* which, in my opinion, show clear traces of this original meaning of the verb. Thus we read X, 53, 2. *yāgāmahai yagñīyān hanta devān īlāmahai īdyān āgyena*, 'let us sacrifice (*yag*) to the gods to whom sacrifice is due; let us magnify (*id*) with butter those to whom magnifying is due.' V, 14, 3. *tām hī śāsvantā īlate srukā devām ghrītaskūtā agnīm havyāya vólhave*, 'for all people magnify this god Agni with the butter-dripping sacrificial spoon. that he may carry the sacrificial food.' V, 28, 1. *devān īlānā havīshā ghrītāki*, 'magnifying the gods with sacrificial food, (the spoon) filled with butter.' Comp. also I, 84, 18; VI, 70, 4; VIII, 74, 6; X, 118, 3. Then, by a gradual development, we find the verb *id* or the noun *īlenya* connected with such instrumentals as *girā* or *gīrbhīh*, 'to magnify by songs,' or *stómaiḥ* 'by praises,' *nāmasā* 'by adoration,' and the like. The *Rig-vedic* texts, however, show us very clearly that even in such phrases the original meaning of *id* was not quite forgotten. For the word is not used indifferently of any praise offered to any god whatever. No god of the Vedic Pantheon is praised so frequently and so highly by the poets of the *Rig-veda* as Indra. Yet, with very few exceptions, the word *id* is avoided in connection with this god. The whole ninth *Mandala* contains nothing but praises of Soma Pavamāna. Yet the word *id* occurs, in the whole of this *Mandala*, in two passages only (5, 3; 66, 1) of which one is contained in an *Āprī* verse transferring artificially to Soma such qualifications as belong originally to Agni. On the other hand, in the invocations addressed to Agni, this verb and its derivatives are most frequently used. We may conclude that the idea of celebration, as conveyed by these words, had a connotation which qualified them for the employment with regard to Agni, the god nourished by offerings of butter, much better than for being addressed to Indra, the drinker of the Soma juice, or to the god Soma himself.

Last comes, I believe, the meaning of *îd* as contained in a very small number of passages such as VII, 91, 2. *îndra-vâyû sustutîkâm yânâ mâdîkâm îtte suvitâm ka nâvyam*, 'Indra and Vâyû! Our beautiful praise, approaching you, asks you for mercy and for new welfare.' Here the construction of *îd* is such as if in English the phrase, 'men magnify the gods for obtaining mercy,' could be expressed in the words 'men magnify the gods mercy.'

I conclude by quoting the more important recent literature referring to *îd*: Prof. Max Müller's note on V, 60, 1 (S. B. E. vol. xxxii, p. 354); Physical Religion, p. 170; Bezzenberger, Nachrichten von der Göttinger Gesellsch. d. Wissensch. 1878, p. 264; Bechtel, Bezzenberger's Beiträge, X, 286; Bartholomae, *ibid.* XII, 91; Arische Forschungen, II, 78; Indogermanische Forschungen, III, 28, note 1; Brugmann, Indogermanische Forschungen, I, 171; K. F. Johansson, Indogermanische Forschungen, II, 47. Comp. also Bartholomae, Arische Forschungen, I, 21; III, 52, and Joh. Schmidt, Kuhn's Zeitschrift, XXXII, 389.

Verse 4.

Note 1. 'Worship' is a very inadequate translation of *adhvara*, which is nearly a synonym of *yagñā*, by the side of which it frequently stands. Possibly in the designation of the sacrifice as *yagñā* the stress was laid on the element of prayer, praises, and adoration; in the designation as *adhvara* on the actual work which was chiefly done by the *Adhvaryu*.—Prof. Max Müller writes: 'I accept the native explanation a-dhvara, without a flaw, perfect, whole, holy. *Adhvara* is generally an *opus operatum*; hence *adhvaryu*, the operating priest.' Comp. Physical Religion, p. 171. Bury's derivation of *adhvara* from *madhu* (*ṁdhu-ara*, Bezzenberger's Beiträge, VII, 339) is much more ingenious than convincing.

Verse 7.

Note 1. I have translated *dóshâvatar* as a vocative which, as is rendered very probable by the accent, was also the opinion of the diaskeuasts of the *Samhitâ* text.

The author of the sacrificial formula which is given in *Āsval. Sraut. III, 12, 4* and *Sāṅkh. Gṛīhy. V, 5, 4*, evidently understood the word in the same way; there Agni is invoked as *doshāvastar* and as *prātarvastar*, as shining in the darkness of evening and as shining in the morning. That this may indeed be the true meaning of the word is shown by *Rig-veda III, 49, 4*, where Indra is called *kshapām vastā*, 'the illuminator of the nights' (*kshapām* is gen. plur., not as Bartholomae, Bezzenberger's *Beiträge*, XV, 208, takes it, loc. sing.). The very frequent passages, however, in which case-forms of *doshā* stand in opposition to words meaning 'dawn' or 'morning'—which words in most cases are derived from the root *vas*—strongly favour the opinion of Gaedicke (*Der Accusativ im Veda*, 177, note 3) and K. F. Johansson (Bezzenberger's *Beiträge*, XIV, 163), who give to *doshāvastar* the meaning 'in the darkness and in the morning.' This translation very well suits all *Rig-veda* passages in which the word occurs. If this opinion is accepted, *doshāvastar* very probably ought to be written and accented as two independent words, *doshā vāstar*. See M. M., *Physical Religion*, p. 173.

MANDALA I, HYMN 12.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 22-23.

1. We choose Agni as our messenger, the all-possessor, as the Hotri of this sacrifice, the highly wise.
2. Agni and Agni again they constantly invoked with their invocations, the lord of the clans, the bearer of oblations, the beloved of many.
3. Agni, when born, conduct the gods hither for him who has strewn the Barhis (sacrificial grass)¹; thou art our Hotri, worthy of being magnified².
4. Awaken them, the willing ones, when thou goest as messenger, O Agni. Sit down with the gods on the Barhis.
5. O thou to whom Ghrīta oblations are poured out, resplendent (god), burn against the mischievous, O Agni, against the sorcerers.
6. By Agni Agni is kindled (or, by fire fire is kindled), the sage, the master of the house, the young one, the bearer of oblations, whose mouth is the sacrificial spoon.
7. Praise Agni the sage, whose ordinances for the sacrifice are true, the god who drives away sickness.
8. Be the protector, O Agni, of a master of sacrificial food who worships thee, O god, as his messenger.
9. Be merciful, O purifier, unto the man who is rich in sacrificial food, and who invites Agni to the feast of the gods.
10. Thus, O Agni, resplendent purifier, conduct

the gods hither to us, to our sacrifice and to our food.

11. Thus praised by us with our new Gâyatra hymn, bring us wealth of valiant men and food.

12. Agni with thy bright splendour be pleased, through all our invocations of the gods, with this our praise.

NOTES.

This hymn is ascribed to Medhâtithi Kâṇva. It is the opening hymn of a collection which extends from I, 12 to 23 (not, as Ludwig, III, 102, believes, from I, 2 to 17; see my Prolegomena, p. 220). That the authorship of this collection belongs indeed to the Kâṇva family, whose poetical compositions are found partly in the first and partly in the eighth Mandala, is shown by the text of 14, 2-5, and by other evidence; see Zeitschr. der Deutschen Morg. Gesellschaft, XXXVIII, 448.

The metre is Gâyatrî. It is possible, though I do not think it probable, that the hymn should be considered as consisting of *Trikas*. Verse 1 = SV. I, 3; TS. II, 5, 8, 5; V, 5, 6, 1; TB. III, 5, 2, 3; MS. IV, 10, 2. Verses 1-3 = SV. II, 140-142; AV. XX, 101, 1-3. Verse 2 = TS. IV, 3, 13, 8; MS. IV, 10, 1. Verse 3 = TB. III, 11, 6, 2. Verses 6, 8, 9 = SV. II, 194-196. Verse 6 = TS. I, 4, 46, 3; III, 5, 11, 5; V, 5, 6, 1; TB. II, 7, 12, 3; MS. IV, 10, 2 (3). Verse 7 = SV. I, 32. Verse 10 = VS. XVII, 9; TS. I, 3, 14, 8; 5, 5, 3; IV, 6, 1, 3; MS. I, 5, 1.

Verse 3.

Note 1. On *vṛiktábarhis*, comp. RV. I, 116, 1; M. M., vol. xxxii, pp. 84 seq., 109; Geldner, P. G., Vedische Studien, I, 152.

Note 2. On *īdyah*, comp. the note on *īde* I, 1, 1.

MANDALA I, HYMN 13.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYÂYA 1, VARGA 24-25.

ÂPRÎ HYMN.

1¹. Being well lighted, O Agni, bring us hither the gods to the man rich in sacrificial food, O Hotri, purifier, and perform the sacrifice.

2. Tanûnapât¹! make our sacrifice rich in honey and convey it to-day to the gods, O sage, that they may feast.

3. I invoke here at this sacrifice Narâsamsa¹, the beloved one, the honey-tongued preparer of the sacrificial food.

4. O magnified¹ Agni! Conduct the gods hither in an easy-moving chariot. Thou art the Hotri instituted by Manus².

5. Strew, O thoughtful men, in due order¹ the sacrificial grass, the back (or surface) of which is sprinkled with butter, on which the appearance of immortality² (is seen).

6. May the divine gates open, the increasers of Rita, which do not stick together, that to-day, that now the sacrifice may proceed.

7. I invoke here at this sacrifice Night and Dawn, the beautifully adorned goddesses, that they may sit down on this our sacrificial grass.

8. I invoke these two divine Hotris¹, the sages with beautiful tongues. May they perform this sacrifice for us.

9. Iâ ('Nourishment'), Sarasvati, and Maht ('the great one')¹, the three comfort-giving goddesses, they who do not fail, shall sit down on the sacrificial grass.

10. I invoke hither the foremost, all-shaped Tva-
shtri to come hither ; may he be ours alone.

11. O tree¹, let the sacrificial food go, O god, to
the gods. May the giver's splendour be foremost.

12. Offer ye the sacrifice with the word Svâhâ
to Indra in the sacrificer's house. Thereto I invoke
the gods.

NOTES.

The hymn is ascribed, as the whole collection to which it belongs, to Medhâtithi Kânva (see the note on the preceding hymn). Its metre is Gâyatrî. Verses 1-4 = SV. II, 697-700. Verse 9 = RV. V, 5, 8. Verse 10 = TS. III, 1, 11, 1 ; TB. III, 5, 12, 1 ; MS. IV, 13, 10.

The hymn belongs to the class of Âpri hymns, which were classed by the ancient arrangers of the Samhitâ among the Agni hymns. The Âpri hymns, consisting of eleven or twelve verses, were destined for the Prayâga offerings of the animal sacrifice (comp. H. O., Zeitschrift der D. Morg. Gesellschaft, XLII, 243 seq.). They were addressed, verse by verse in regular order, partly to Agni, partly to different spirits or deified objects connected with the sacrifice, such as the sacrificial grass, the divine gates through which the gods had to pass on their way to the sacrifice, &c. The second verse was addressed by some of the Rîshi families to Tanûnapât, by some to Narâsamsa ; in some of the hymns we find two verses instead of one (so that the total number of verses becomes twelve instead of eleven) addressed the one to Tanûnapât, the other to Narâsamsa. Bergaigne (Recherches sur l'histoire de la Liturgie Védique, p. 14) conjectures that some of the Rîshi families had only seven Prayâgas. This opinion is based on the identical appearance of four verses (8-11) in the Âpri hymns of the Visvâmitras (III, 4) and of the Vasishthas (VII, 2), and on the diversity of metres used in two other Âpri hymns, IX, 5 and II, 3. To me this conjecture, though very ingenious, does not seem convincing.

With the text of the *Āpri* hymns should be compared the corresponding *Praishas* of the *Maitrāvaruṇa* priest, i.e. the orders by which this priest directed the *Hotri* to pronounce the *Prayāga* invocations. The text of these *Praishas* is given *Taitt. Brāhm.* III, 6, 2.

Comp. on the character and the historical and ritual position of the *Āpri* hymns, *Max Müller, Hist. Anc. Sansc. Literature*, p. 403 seq.; *Roth, Nirukta*, notes, p. 121 seq.; *Weber, Indische Studien*, X, 89 seq.; *Ludwig V*, 315 seq.; *Hillebrandt, Das Altindische Neu- und Vollmondsopfer*, 94 seq.; *Schwab, Das Altindische Thieropfer*, 90 seq.; *Bergaigne, Recherches sur l'histoire de la Liturgie Védique*, 13 seq.

Verse 1.

Note 1. Comp. *Delbrück, Syntactische Forschungen*, I, 97.

Verses 2, 3.

Note 1. Does *Tanûnapât*, lit. 'son of the body,' mean, as *Roth* and *Grassmann* believed, 'son of his own self' (comp. I, 12, 6. *agnínâ agnîh sám idhyate*, 'by Agni Agni is kindled'), or is the meaning 'le propre fils' (*Bergaigne, Rel. Védique* II, 100)? *Narâsamsa*, which is nearly identical with the Avestic *Nairyôsanha*, means 'the song of men,' or 'praised by men' (*Bergaigne, l. l. I*, 305; *M. M.*'s note on VII, 46, 4). In III, 29, 11 it is said of Agni: 'He is called *Tanûnapât* as the foetus of the Asura; he becomes *Narâsamsa* when he is born.' Of course an expression like this is by no means sufficient to prove that the sacrificial gods *Tanûnapât* and *Narâsamsa*, as invoked in the *Āpri* hymns, are nothing but forms of Agni. Expressions which are constantly repeated in the *Āpri* verses show that the work of *Tanûnapât*, and likewise that of *Narâsamsa*, consisted in spreading *ghrîta* or 'honey' over the sacrifice.

Verse 4.

Note 1. 'Magnified' is *īlītāh*; comp. the note on I, 1, 1. The third, or if both *Tanûnapât* and *Narâsamsa* are invoked, the fourth verse of the *Āpri* hymns is regularly addressed to Agni with this epithet *īlīta*.

Note 2. Manurhita, 'instituted by Manus,' not 'by men.' See Bergaigne, *Religion Védique*, I, 65 seq.

Verse 5.

Note 1. On ânushák, comp. Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, II, 125.

Note 2. The last Páda is translated by Grassmann, 'wo der unsterbliche sich zeigt' (comp. Bergaigne, *R.V.* I, 194, note 1); by Ludwig, 'auf dem man das unsterbliche sieht.' To me it seems impossible to decide, so as to leave no doubt, whether *amṛtasya* is masculine or neuter. Comp. also *Atharva-veda* V, 4, 3; 28, 7; XIX, 39, 6-8, in which passages the phrase *amṛtasya káksham* recurs.

Verse 8.

Note 1. The two divine *Hotris* are mentioned in the *Rig-veda* only in the eighth (or seventh) verse of the *Āprisūktas* and besides in two passages, X, 65, 10; 66, 13, which do not throw any light on the nature of these sacrificial gods. They are called *gātavedasā* VII, 2, 7, *purohitau* X, 70, 7, *bhishagā Vāg. Samh.* XXVIII, 7. As regards the duality of these divine counterparts of the human *Hotri* priest, possibly the 'two *Hotris*' should be understood as the *Hotri* and the *Maitrāvaruṇa*; the latter was the constant companion and assistant of the former in the Vedic animal sacrifice. Comp. Schwab, *Altindisches Thieropfer*, 96, 114, 117, &c.; H. O., *Religion des Veda*, 391.

Comp. on the two divine *Hotris* also Bergaigne, *R.V.* I, 233 seq.

Verse 9.

Note 1. On *Iā*, see H. O., *Religion des Veda*, pp. 72, 326.—With regard to *Mahî* Bergaigne (*Rel. Védique*, I, 322) has pronounced the opinion that 'Bhârati et Mahî, qui, tantôt se remplacent, tantôt se juxtaposent tout en paraissant ne compter que pour une, se confondent aux yeux des *ṛishis*.' But Pischel (*Ved. Studien*, II, 84 seq.) has shown that the eminent French scholar was wrong, and that really *Mahî* ('the great one') is independent of *Bhârati*. Pischel's

own opinion that Mahî is a name of the goddess Dhishanâ, does not seem to me to be established by sufficient reasons.—On the meaning of these three goddesses Prof. Max Müller writes: ‘I should not fix on Nourishment as the true meaning of Iâ. Originally those three goddesses seem to be local: Iâ, the land or daughter of Manu, the Sarasvatî, and another river here called Mahî.’

Verse 11.

Note 1. To me it seems evident that the tree, or, to translate more literally, the lord of the forest (vanaspati) invoked in this Âprî verse can only be the sacrificial post (yûpa) to which the victim was tied before it was killed. The yûpa is called vanaspati in the Rig-veda (III, 8, 1. 3. 6. 11) as well as in the more modern Vedic texts (for inst., Taitt. Samh. I, 3, 6, 1).—In the Âprî hymn, IX, 5 (verse 10), the vanaspati is called sahasravalsâ: with this should be compared III, 8, 11 (addressed to the yûpa): vânaspate satâvalsâh ví roha sahasravalsâh ví vayâm ruhema, ‘O lord of the forest, rise with a hundred offshoots; may we rise with a thousand offshoots!’—In the Âprî hymn, X, 70 (verse 10), the rope (rasanâ) is mentioned by which the vanaspati should tie the victim; comp. with this expression the statements of the ritual texts as to the rasanâ with which the victim is tied to the yûpa; Schwab, Das Altindische Thieropfer, 81. Comp. also especially Taittiriya Brâhmana III, 6, 11, 3.—In the Âprî hymns the vanaspati is frequently invoked to let loose the victim; in connection therewith mention is made of the sacrificial butcher (samitri), see II, 3, 10; III, 4, 10; X, 110, 10, and comp. Vâg. Samhitâ XXI, 21; XXVIII, 10. The meaning of these expressions becomes clear at once, if we explain the vanaspati as the sacrificial post. When they are going to kill the victim, they loosen it from the post; the post, therefore, can be said to let it loose. Then the butcher (samitri) leads the victim away. See the materials collected by Schwab, Thieropfer, p. 100 seq., and comp. also H. O., Religion des Veda, 257.

MANDALA I, HYMN 26.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYĀYA 2, VARGA 20-21.

1. Clothe thyself with thy clothing (of light), O sacrificial (god), lord of all vigour; and then perform this worship for us.

2. Sit down, most youthful god, as our desirable Hotri, through (our prayerful) thoughts¹, O Agni, with thy word² that goes to heaven.

3. The father verily by sacrificing procures (blessings) for the son¹, the companion for the companion, the elect friend for the friend.

4. May Varuṇa, Mitra, Aryaman, triumphant with riches (?)¹, sit down on our sacrificial grass as they did on Manu's.

5. O ancient Hotri, be pleased with this our friendship also, and hear these prayers.

6. For whenever we sacrifice constantly¹ to this or to that god, in thee alone the sacrificial food is offered.

7. May he be dear to us, the lord of the clan, the joy-giving, elect Hotri; may we be dear (to him), possessed of a good Agni (i. e. of good fire).

8. For the gods, when possessed of a good Agni, have given us excellent wealth, and we think ourselves possessed of a good Agni.

9. And may there be among us mutual praises of both the mortals, O immortal one, (and the immortals)¹.

10. With all Agnis (i. e. with all thy fires), O Agni, accept this sacrifice and this prayer, O young (son) of strength¹.

NOTES.

This hymn, as well as the whole collection to which it belongs, is ascribed to Sunahsepa Āgigarti (comp. 24, 12. 13). The metre is Gâyatrī. Bergaigne (*Recherches sur l'histoire de la Samhitā*, II, 7) divides this hymn into *Triṣas*, with one single verse added at the end. I cannot find sufficient evidence for this; the appearance in the *Sāma-veda* (II, 967-9) of a *Triṣa* composed of the verses 10. 6. 7 of our hymn is rather against Bergaigne's opinion.

Verse 2.

Note 1. *Mānmabhiḥ* may possibly mean, 'with thy (wise) thoughts;' comp., for instance, III, 11, 8. *pāri vīsvāni sūdhitā agnēḥ asyāma mānmabhiḥ*, 'may we obtain every bliss through Agni's (wise) thoughts,' or 'may we obtain all the blessings of Agni for our prayers.'

Note 2. *Vākas* stands for *vākasā*. See the passages collected by Lanman, *Noun-Inflection*, 562, and comp. Roth, *Ueber gewisse Kürzungen des Wortendes im Veda*, 5; Joh. Schmidt, *Die Pluralbildungen der indogermanischen Neutra*, 304 seq. Ludwig also takes *vākas* as instrumental.

Verse 3.

Note 1. Agni is the father, the mortal whose sacrifice he performs, the son.

Verse 4.

Note 1. Can *risādas* be explained as a compound of *ri* (Tiefstufe of *rai*, as *gu* is the Tiefstufe of *gau*) and **sādas*, from the root *sad*, 'to be triumphant'? Prof. Aufrecht (*Bezenberger's Beiträge*, XIV, 33; see also Neisser, *Bezz. Beitr.* XIX, 143) connects *ri-* with the Greek *ἐρι-* (*ἐρικυδής* &c.); our hypothesis has the advantage of not leaving the limits of Sanskrit.—Comp. M. M.'s note on V, 60, 7; Ludwig, *Ueber die neuesten Arbeiten auf dem Gebiete der Rig-veda-Forschung* (1893), p. 7.

Verse 6.

Note 1. On *sāsvatâ tânâ* see Lanman, 480, 515, 518.

Verse 9.

Note 1. The comparison of verse 8 and the expression *āmṛita mārtyānām* in the second Pāda of this verse seem to show that *ubhāyeshām* does not refer to two classes of mortals, the priests and their patrons, but to the mortals and the immortals. A genitive *amṛitānām*, which would make this meaning quite clear, can easily be supplied. A Dvandva compound *amṛitamartyānām*, which one could feel tempted to conjecture, would have, in my opinion, too modern a character.—Prof. Max Müller writes: ‘I should prefer *amṛita mārtyānām*, not exactly as a compound, but as standing for *amṛitānām mārtyānām*. This seems to be Ludwig’s opinion too.’

Verse 10.

Note 1. In the translation of *sahasah yaho* I follow Geldner, Kuhn’s *Zeitschrift*, XXVIII, 195; Ludwig’s translation is similar.

MANDALA I, HYMN 27.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYÂYA 2, VARGA 22-24.

A.

1. With reverence. I shall worship thee who art long-tailed like a horse, Agni, the king of worship.

2. May he, our son of strength¹, proceeding on his broad way, the propitious, become bountiful to us.

3. Thus protect us always, thou who hast a full life, from the mortal who seeks to do us harm¹, whether near or afar.

4. And mayest thou, O Agni, announce to the gods this our newest efficient Gâyatra song.

5. Let us partake of all booty that is highest and that is middle (i. e. that dwells in the highest and in the middle world); help us to the wealth that is nearest.

6. O god with bright splendour, thou art the distributor. Thou instantly flowest for the liberal giver in the wave of the river, near at hand.

B.

7. The mortal, O Agni, whom thou protectest in battles, whom thou speedest in the races¹, he will command constant nourishment :

8. Whosoever he may be, no one will overtake him, O conqueror (Agni)! His strength² is glorious.

9. May he (the man), known among all tribes³, win the race with his horses; may he with the help of his priests become a gainer.

C.

10. O Garâbodha¹! Accomplish this (task) for every house²: a beautiful song of praise for worshipful Rudra³.

11. May he, the great, the immeasurable, the smoke-bannered, rich in splendour, incite us to (pious) thoughts and to strength.

12. May he hear us, like the rich lord of a clan, the banner of the gods, on behalf of our hymns, Agni with bright light.

13. Reverence to the great ones, reverence to the lesser ones! Reverence to the young, reverence to the old¹! Let us sacrifice to the gods, if we can. May I not, O gods, fall as a victim to the curse of my better².

NOTES.

The hymn is ascribed to Suna~~k~~sepa (see note on I, 26). The metre is Gâyatrî; the last verse is Trish~~u~~bh.

The laws of arrangement of the Samhitâ show that this hymn, which has thirteen verses and follows after a hymn of ten verses belonging to the same deity, must be divided into a number of minor hymns. On the question of this division some further light is thrown by the metre. The first six verses and then again the verses 10-12 are composed in the trochaic form of the Gâyatrî metre; of the verses 7-9, on the other hand, not a single Pâda shows the characteristics of that metre. I believe, therefore, that the verses 1-6 form one hymn by themselves, or possibly two hymns of three verses each. Then follow two hymns: verses 7-9, 10-12. As to verse 13, which is composed in a different metre, it is difficult to determine its exact nature. It may be a later addition: though in that case

we shall hardly be able to explain why it was placed at the end of the hymns addressed to Agni, to which god it contains no reference whatever. Or it may form part of the hymn 10-12 : in that case we should have to consider this whole hymn, which would then violate the rules of arrangement, as an addition to the original collection.

We may add that the Sâma-veda gives the first twelve verses of this Sûkta so as to form four independent hymns: 1-3 = SV. II, 984-6; 4. 6. 5 = SV. II, 847-9; 7-9 = SV. II, 765-7; 10-12 = SV. II, 1013-15. Besides, verse 1 is found in SV. I, 17. Verse 4 = SV. I, 28; TÂr. IV, 11, 8. Verse 7 = VS. VI, 29; TS. I, 3, 13, 2; MS. I, 3, 1. Verse 10 = SV. I, 15. Comp. Bergaigne, *Recherches sur l'histoire de la Samhitâ*, II, pp. 7-8; H. O., *Prolegomena*, 225-226.

Verse 2.

Note 1. It requires a stronger belief in the infallibility of Vedic text tradition than I possess, not to change *sávasâ* into *sávasaḥ*. I do not think that I, 62, 9 (*sánemi sakhyám svapasyámânaḥ súnúḥ dâdhâra sávasâ sudâmsâḥ*) furnishes a sufficient argument against this conjecture.

Verse 3.

Note 1. Grassmann reads *aghaâyôḥ* for the sake of the metre; Prof. Max Müller proposes *āghâyôḥ*. I think that the missing syllable should be gained by disyllabic pronunciation of -ât in *mârtyât* or rather *mârtiât*. Comp. my *Prolegomena* 185 and the quotations given there in note 1.

Verses 7-9.

Note 1. It is not my intention to enter here into a new discussion on so frequently discussed a word as *vâga*. I have translated it in verses 7, 9 by 'race,' in verse 8 by 'strength.'

Note 2. The expression used in verses 7 and 8 should be compared especially with VII, 40, 3. *sâḥ* it *ugráḥ* astu *marutaḥ sâḥ* sushmī yám *mârtyam* *prishadasvâḥ* *âvâtha*, *utâ* im *agnîḥ* *sârasvatî* *gunânti* ná *tâsya* *râyâḥ* *paryetâ* asti.

Note 3. *Viśvakarṣaṇi*, a frequent epithet of Agni, here refers to the mortal hero protected by Agni; comp. I, 64, 14 (vol. xxxii, p. 108); X, 93, 10 (*viśvākarṣaṇi srāvah*).

Verse 10.

Note 1. I think that Ludwig is right in taking *Garā-bodha* for a proper name.

Note 2. *Viśé-vise* may possibly depend on *yagnīyāya*, so that we should have to translate: 'Administer this task: a beautiful song of praise to Rudra who is worshipful for every house.'

Note 3. Rudra is here a designation of Agni, as the next verses show. Comp. Pischel-Geldner, I, 56.

Verse 13.

Note 1. The word *āsinā*, 'old,' occurring only here, is doubtful. In III, 1, 6; IV, 33, 3; X, 39, 4, *sana* or *sanaya* stands in contrast with *yuvan*. Shall we conjecture *nāmah ā sānebhyah*?

Note 2. The last Pāda of this verse, *mā gyāyasaḥ sām-sam ā vrikshi devāḥ* ('May I not, O gods, neglect the praise of the greatest,' Muir, V, 12), offers some difficulty. It may be doubted whether *ā vrikshi* belongs to *ā-vrig* or to *ā-vrask*.

Let us see what would be the meaning of the passage, if we were to decide for *ā-vrig*. VIII, 101, 16 the cow speaks: *devīm devébhyah pári eyúshīm gām ā mā avrikta mártayah dabhráketāḥ*, 'Me the goddess, the cow, who has come hither from the gods, the weak-minded mortal has appropriated.' Satapatha Bráhmaṇa XIV, 9, 4, 3. *ya evam vidvān adhopahāsam karaty ā sa strīnām sukrítam vriñkte* 'tha *ya idam avidvān adhopahāsam karaty āsya striyah sukrítam vriñgate*, 'He who knowing this, &c., appropriates the good works of the women. But the women appropriate the good works of him who without knowing this,' &c. In Rig-veda X, 159, 5 also we probably have a form of *ā-vrig*. There we find the triumphant utterance

of a wife who has gained superiority over her fellow-wives :
 ā avṛiksham anyāsām vārkaḥ, 'I have won for myself the
 splendour of the other wives.' We may conclude from
 these passages that our Pāda, if ā vṛikshi is derived from
 ā-vṛig, would mean : 'May I not draw on myself the curse
 of my better.'

On the other hand we have a great number of passages—
 they have been collected by Ludwig, IV, 249 seq.—in
 which the verb ā-vṛaṣṭ appears. Referring the reader for
 fuller information to Ludwig, I content myself here with
 selecting one or two of these passages. Taitt. Samh. II, 4,
 11, 4. devatābhyo vā esha ā vṛiskyate yo yakshya ity
 uktvā na yagate. In translating this we should remember
 that vṛaṣṭ means 'to cut down ;' ā-vṛaṣṭ, therefore, must
 be 'to cut down so that the object reaches a certain desti-
 nation.' I translate therefore : 'He who says, "I shall
 sacrifice," and does not sacrifice, is cut down for the deities,'
 —i. e. he is dedicated or forfeited to the deities and is thus
 destroyed (comp. a different explanation of ā-vṛaṣṭ by
 Delbrück, Altindische Syntax, 143). In other passages
 not the dative but the locative is used for indicating the
 being to whom somebody is forfeited ; see Atharva-veda
 XII, 4, 6. 12. 26 ; XV, 12, 6. 10.

A Rig-vedic passage containing ā-vṛaṣṭ (with the dative)
 is X, 87, 18. ā vṛiskyantām āditaye durévāḥ, 'May the
 evil-doers be forfeited to Aditi.'

Several times we find the first person aor. med. in the
 same form as in our passage, ā vṛikshi ; see, for instance, the
 Nivid formula to the Visve devāḥ, Sāṅkhāyana Srautasūtra
 VIII, 21. In this Nivid, the text of which as given by
 Hillebrandt is not quite identical with that of Ludwig, we
 read according to Hillebrandt's edition : mā vo devā avisasā
 mā visasāyur ā vṛikshi. This mā . . . ā vṛikshi looks quite
 similar to our passage. The same may be said of Taittiriya
 Samhitā I, 6, 6, 1. yat te tapas tasmai te māvṛikshi.
 Considering such passages it is difficult not to believe that
 it is the verb ā vṛaṣṭ which we have before us in our
 verse. It must be admitted indeed that the accusative

samsam does not agree with the construction of the later Vedic passages. Can the accusative stand in the ancient language of the Rig-veda in the same connection in which we have found the dative and the locative? So that *ā-vras̥k* (in the middle or passive) with the accusative would mean: to be cut down in the direction towards another being, i. e. being forfeited to that being? In that case the translation of our passage would be: 'May I not, O gods, fall as a victim to the praise (or rather, to the curse) of my better.' If this explanation of the accusative is thought too bold, we should propose to correct the text so as to get a dative or, which would suit the metre better, a locative: *mā gyāyasaḥ samsāya* (or *sāmse*) *ā vrikshi devāḥ*.

MANDALA I, HYMN 31.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYÂYA 2, VARGA 32-35.

1. Thou, O Agni, (who art) the first Ângiras *Rishi*, hast become as god the kind friend of the gods. After thy law the sages, active in their wisdom¹, were born, the Maruts with brilliant spears.

2. Thou, O Agni, the first, highest Ângiras, a sage, administerest the law of the gods, mighty for the whole world, wise, the son of the two mothers¹, reposing everywhere for (the use of) the living².

3. Thou, O Agni, as the first, shalt become¹ manifest to Mâtariśvan, through thy high wisdom, to Vivasvat. The two worlds trembled at (thy) election as *Hotri*. Thou hast sustained the burthen; thou, O Vasu, hast sacrificed to the great (gods)².

4. Thou, O Agni, hast caused the sky to roar¹ for Manu, for the well-doing Purûravas, being thyself a greater well-doer. When thou art loosened by power (?)² from thy parents, they led thee hither before and afterwards again.

5. Thou, O Agni, the bull, the augments of prosperity, art to be praised by the sacrificer who raises the spoon, who knows all about the offering¹ and (the sacrifice performed with) the word *Vasha*. Thou (god) of unique vigour art the first to invite² the clans.

6. Thou, O Agni, leadest forward the man who follows crooked ways¹, in thy company at the sacrifice², O god dwelling among all tribes, who in the strife of heroes, in the decisive moment for the

obtainment of the prize³, even with few companions killest many foes in the battle⁴.

7. Thou, O Agni, keepest that mortal¹ in the highest immortality, in glory day by day, (thou) who being thirsty thyself² givest happiness to both races (gods and men), and joy to the rich.

8. Thou, O Agni, praised by us, help the glorious singer to gain prizes. May we accomplish our work with the help of the young active (Agni). O Heaven and Earth! Bless us together with the gods.

9. Thou, O Agni, in the lap of thy parents, a god among gods, O blameless one, always watchful, be the body's creator and guardian to the singer. Thou, O beautiful one, pourest forth all wealth.

10. Thou, O Agni, art our guardian, thou art our father. Thou art the giver of strength; we are thy kinsmen. Hundredfold, thousandfold treasures come together in thee, who art rich in heroes, the guardian of the law, O undeceivable one.

11. Thee, O Agni, the gods have made for the living as the first living¹, the clan-lord of the Nahusha². They have made (the goddess) Iâ the teacher of men (manusha), when a son of my father is born³.

12. Thou, O Agni, protect with thy guardians, O god, our liberal givers and ourselves, O venerable one! Thou art the protector of kith and kin¹ and of the cows, unremittingly watching over thy law.

13¹. Thou, O Agni, art kindled four-eyed, as the closest guardian for the sacrificer who is without (even) a quiver². Thou acceptest in thy mind the hymn even of the poor³ who has made offerings⁴, that he may prosper without danger.

14. Thou, O Agni, gainest¹ for the widely-re-

nowned worshipper that property which is desirable and excellent. Thou art called the guardian and father even of the weak²; thou instructest the simple, thou, the greatest sage, the quarters of the world³.

15. Thou, O Agni, protectest on every side like well-stitched armour the man who gives sacrificial fees. He who puts sweet food (before the priests), who makes them comfortable in his dwelling, who kills living (victims), he (will reside) high in heaven¹.

16. Forgive, O Agni, this our fault (?)¹, (look graciously at) this way which we have wandered from afar. Thou art the companion, the guardian, the father of those who offer Soma; thou art the quick one² who makes the mortals *Rishis*³.

17. As thou didst for Manus, O Agni, for *Âṅgiras*, O *Âṅgiras*, for *Yayâti* on thy (priestly) seat, as for the ancients, O brilliant one, come hither, conduct hither the host of the gods, seat them on the sacrificial grass, and sacrifice to the beloved (host).

18. Be magnified, O Agni, through this spell which we have made for thee with our skill or with our knowledge. And lead us forward to better things. Let us be united with thy favour, which bestows strength.

NOTES.

The *Rishi* of the hymn is *Hiranyastûpa Âṅgirasa*. To him tradition ascribes the authorship of the collection I, 31–35, probably because in X, 149, 5 the poet invokes *Savitrî*, ‘as *Hiranyastûpa* the *Âṅgirasa* has called thee, O *Savitrî*.’ Vedic theologians of course tried to find out where this invocation of *Hiranyastûpa* to *Savitrî* was preserved, and the hymn, I, 35, seemed to agree best with the conditions

of the case (comp. *Zeitschrift der D. Morg. Ges.* XLII, 230). By this and many similar cases it is made probable that at the time when the *Anukramanî* was composed, all real knowledge as to authors to whom the collections of the first *Mandala* belong, was lost.

The metre is *Gagatî*; only the verses 8, 16, 18 are *Trishubh*. Verse 1 = VS. 34, 12. Verse 8 = MS. IV, 11, 1. Verse 12 = VS. 34, 13. With verse 16 comp. AV. III, 15, 4.

Verse 1.

Note 1. *Vidmanāpasaḥ* seems to be nom. plur., not gen. sing. Comp. I, 111, 1. *tákshan rátham . . . vidmanāpasaḥ*, 'they (the *Rābhus*), active in their wisdom, have wrought the chariot.'

Verse 2.

Note 1. As to *dvimâtā sayúḥ*, comp. III, 55, 6 (*sayúḥ parástât ádha nú dvimâtā*); Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, II, 50.—On Agni's two mothers and his double birth see Bergaigne, *Religion Védique*, II, 52.

Note 2. By 'living' I have translated *áyú*. See on this word, Bergaigne, *Rel. Véd.*, I, 59 seq.

Verse 3.

Note 1. Probably Bergaigne (*Rel. Véd.* I, 55, note 2) is right in conjecturing *bhavaḥ* for *bhava*. In this case we should have to translate: 'Thou as the first hast become manifest to *Mātarisvan*.'

Note 2. I believe that to *maháḥ* we have to supply *deván*; see II, 37, 6; III, 7, 9; VI, 16, 2; 48, 4, &c. 'Can it not be an adverb? See vol. xxxii, p. 307; Lanman, p. 501,' M. M.

Verse 4.

Note 1. Comp. V, 58, 6. let *Dyu* (sky) roar down, the bull of the dawn. V, 59, 8. may *Dyaus Aditi* (the unbounded) roar for our feast.

Note 2. The translation of *svâtra* is purely conjectural. It rests on the supposition that the word is related to *sûsue*, *savas*, &c. (thus Grassmann). Boehtlingk-Roth connect it with *svad*, which is phonetically impossible; they give the meaning 'schmackhaft,' and paraphrase our passage: *das mit einer Lockspeise (z. B. mit einem Spahn) von den Reibhölzern abgenommene Feuer kann man hin und her tragen. Ludwig: mit Geprassel.* I do not see how this translation would fit for a number of the passages in which the word occurs.

Verse 5.

Note 1. With the third Pâda compare VI, 1, 9. *yâh âhutim pâri véda námobhih.*

Note 2. *Âvívâsasi* cannot belong to the relative clause. The accent must be changed accordingly.

Verse 6.

Note 1. It is very curious to find here Agni as the protector of the *vṛiginavartani*, the man who follows crooked ways. Ludwig tries to explain the passage by understanding the *vidatha*, in which Agni is here said to protect the sinner, as an asylum, but we have no reason to believe that the word could have this meaning. See the next note.

Note 2. On the derivation and meaning of *vidátha* various opinions have been pronounced in the last years, which have been collected by Prof. Max Müller in his note on V, 59, 2 (vol. xxxii, p. 349 seq.; see also Bartholomae, *Studien zur indogermanischen Sprachgeschichte*, I, 41). Without trying to discuss here all different theories, I immediately proceed to state my own opinion, though I am far from claiming certainty for it. It will, however, I believe, solve the difficulties tolerably well. I propose to derive *vidátha* from *vi-dhâ*; the *dh* was changed into *d* by the same 'Hauchdissimulationsgesetz' (Brugmann, *Grundriss der vergleichenden Grammatik*, vol. i, p. 355 seq.), according to which Arian **bháudhati* was changed into Sanskrit

bódhati. No one will doubt that the operation of this 'Hauchdissimilationsgesetz' could be annihilated by opposite forces, but it must be admitted that the forms with 'Hauchdissimilation' could also remain intact. The verb *vi-dhā* means 'to distribute, to arrange, to ordain;' thus the original meaning of *vidātha* must be, like the meaning of *vidhāna*, 'distribution, disposition, ordinance.' In V, 3, 6 we read *vidātheshu áhnām*: this phrase receives its explanation by VII, 66, 11. *ví yé dadhúh sarādam māsam át áhah*; *ahorātrāni vidādhat*, X, 190, 2; *māsam vidhānam*, X, 138, 6; *ritūn . . . ví dadhau*, I, 95, 3. We may call attention also to VI, 51, 2. *véda yáh trīni vidāthāni eshām devānām gánma*, 'he who knows their threefold division, the birth of the gods;' VI, 8, 1. *prá nú voḥam vidāthā gâtávedasah*, 'I will proclaim the ordinances of Gâtavedas.' Within the sphere of the Vedic poets' thoughts, the most prominent example of something most artificially 'vñhita' was the sacrifice (comp. *ví yé dadhúh . . . yagñām*, VII, 66, 11; *sāmsāti ukthām yágate ví ū dhāh*, IV, 6, 11; [the moon] *bhāgām devébhyah ví dadhāti ā-yán*, X, 85, 19; and the following very significant passage: *yagñasya tvā vidāthā prikkham átra kāti hótārah ritusáh yaganti*, Vāg. Samh. XXIII, 57). Thus *yagñā* and *vidātha*, 'sacrifice' and 'ordinance,' became nearly synonymous (comp. III, 3, 3, &c.). It would be superfluous to quote the whole number of passages which show this, but I believe that an attentive reader will discern at least in some of them the traces of the original meaning of *vidātha*; see, for instance, II, 1, 4; III, 28, 4.—Finally *vidātha* seems to mean 'the act of disposing of any business' or the like; this meaning appears, I believe, in passages like the well-known phrase, *bṛhāt vadema vidāthe suvīrāh* (comp. *suvīrāsaḥ vidātham ā vadema*): 'may we with valiant men mightily raise our voice at the determining (of ordinances, &c.).' Thus the words *vidātha* and *sabhā* approach each other in their meaning; a person influential in council is called both *vidathya* and *sabhéya* (see Boehtlingk-Roth, s. v. *vidathya*).

Note 3. The exact meaning of *paritakmya* is not quite

free from doubt. Comp. Bartholomae, Bezzenberger's Beiträge, XV, 203, note 1.

Note 4. Prof. Max Müller translates this verse: 'Thou savest the man who has gone the wrong way in the thick of the battle, thou who art quick at the sacrifice; thou who in the strife of heroes, when the prize (or the booty) is surrounded (beset on all sides), killest,' &c.

Verse 7.

Note 1. The phrase begins as if a relative clause were to follow attached to the words 'that mortal.' But, instead of this, afterwards a relative clause follows referring to 'thou, O Agni.'

Note 2. Roth (Ueber gewisse Kürzungen des Wortendes, p. 4) and Bartholomae (Kuhn's Zeitschrift, XXIX, 559) think that a dative (like *tâtrishânâya*) is required; Agni gives comfort to both thirsty races, gods and men. Roth takes *tâtrishânâ[h]* for an abbreviation of *tâtrishânâya*; Bartholomae conjectures *tâtrishâya*. It would be more easy to change the form into a dative with the ending -â (=ai); comp. Kluge, Kuhn's Zeitschrift, XXV, 309; Pischel-Geldner, I, 61; Aufrecht, Festgruss an Böhrling, 1; J. Schmidt, Pluralbildungen, 234. But why not leave the nominative? Agni, being thirsty himself, quenches the thirst of other beings. Comp. J. Schmidt, Pluralbildungen, 309.

Verse 11.

Note 1. *Āyúm āyāve*. See verse 2, note 2.

Note 2. The names Nahus, Nahusha have much the same value as Manus, Manusha. But it seems that not all the Aryan tribes, but only a certain part of them, were considered as descendants of Nahus. Comp. Bergaigne, Rel. Védique, II, 324.

Note 3. The last words are very obscure. Mamaka occurs only in one other passage, belonging to the same collection of hymns, I, 34, 6: there the Asvins are invoked to bestow blessings on 'my son' (*māmakāya sūnāve*). 'When a son of my father is born' may mean 'When I am

born,' or 'When a new issue is born within our tribe:' then—thus we may possibly supply—the goddess *Iā*, the teacher of mankind, will be the new-born child's teacher also. Another possible explanation would be to take *Mamaka* as a proper name. Or Prof. Max Müller may be right, who writes: 'Could not *pitúh yát putráh mámakasya gáyate* refer to Agni, who, in III, 29, 3, was called *iāyāh putrah*. Her father and husband (Manu) is also the father of mankind, therefore of the poet who says: Whenever the son of my father is born, they made *Iā* (his mother) the teacher of man.'

Verse 12.

Note 1. *Trátā tokásya tánaye* seems to be nothing else but *trátā tokásya tánayasya*, which would have had one syllable too much.

Verse 13.

Note 1. Comp. on this verse, Pischel, I, 216 seq.

Note 2. Agni is to protect the man who has no quiver, and cannot, therefore, protect himself. The four eyes of the divine guardian seem to signify that he can look in all directions, and perhaps also that he has the power of seeing invisible bad demons. The watchdogs of Yama also are four-eyed, X, 14, 10. 11; comp. H. O., Religion des Veda, 474, note 4. Comp. *nishaṅgin*, Rig-veda III, 30, 15; V, 57, 2; X, 103, 3.

Note 3. On *kírí*, comp. Pischel loc. cit.

Note 4. *Rátáhavyah* means either a man who has made offerings, or a god to whom offerings are made. That it stands here in the first sense is shown with great probability by VIII, 103, 13, where the *kíríh rátáhavyah svadhvaráh* is described, the man who, though poor, makes offerings and is a good sacrificer. But if we are right in our translation of *rátáhavyah*, the verb *vanóshi* cannot belong to the relative clause; I propose to read *vanoshi* without accent. The way in which Pischel tries to explain the accent of *vanóshi*, by taking the words *kíréh kit mántram mánasā* as a parenthesis, is too artificial.

Verse 14.

Note 1. I think that we should here, as in verse 13, read *vanoshi* without accent.

Note 2. This must be at least the approximate meaning of *âdhra*. 'For *âdhrasya* one expects *radhrasya*,' M. M.

Note 3. I think that the quarters of the world have nothing to do here, but that instead of *prâ dīsaḥ* we should read (with Ludwig) *pradīsaḥ*. A similar mistake regarding the word *pradis* occurs several times in the text of the *Rig-veda*. I propose to translate the corrected text: 'Thou instructest the simple, well knowing the (divine) commandments.' Comp. *vayúnāni vidván*, *dūtýāni vidván*, &c.

Verse 15.

Note 1. 'Der ist des himels ebenbild' (Ludwig). But this word *upamā* is, as far as we can see, not very ancient. I take *upamā*, with Boehtlingk-Roth, as an adverbial instrumental like *dakshinā*, *madhyā*, &c. Prof. Max Müller translates 'close or near to heaven.'

Verse 16.

Note 1. *Sarāni* designates in the *Atharva-veda* VI, 43, 3 a fault or defect, the exact nature of which cannot be determined. Boehtlingk-Roth propose *Widerspänstigkeit*, *Hartnäckigkeit*; Max Müller, *Abweg*, *Fehltritt*.

Note 2. On *bhrimi*, comp. M. M.'s note on II, 34, 1.

Note 3. Comp. III, 43, 5. *kuvīt mā rīshim papivāmsam sūtāsyā* (supply *kārase*), 'Wilt thou make me a *Rishi* after I have drunk Soma?'

MANDALA I, HYMN 36.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYĀYA 3, VARGA 8-11.

1. We implore¹ with well-spoken words the vigorous² Agni who belongs to many people³, to the clans that worship the gods⁴, whom other people (also) magnify.

2. Men have placed Agni (on the altar) as the augments of strength. May we worship thee, rich in sacrificial food. Thus be thou here to-day gracious to us, a helper in our striving for gain, O good one !

3. We choose thee, the all-possessor, as our messenger and as our *Hotri*. The flames of thee, who art great, spread around ; thy rays touch the heaven.

4. The gods, Varuṇa, Mitra, Aryaman, kindle thee, the ancient messenger. The mortal, O Agni, who worships thee, gains through thee every prize.

5. Thou art the cheerful *Hotri* and householder, O Agni, the messenger of the clans. In thee all the firm laws are comprised which the gods have made¹.

6. In thee, the blessed one, O Agni, youngest god, all sacrificial food is offered. Sacrifice then thou who art gracious to us to-day and afterwards¹, to the gods that we may be rich in valiant men.

7. Him, the king, verily the adorers approach reverentially. With oblations men kindle Agni, having overcome all failures.

8. Destroying the foe¹, they (victoriously) got through Heaven and Earth and the waters ; they

have made wide room for their dwelling. May the manly (Agni)², after he has received the oblations, become brilliant at the side of Kaṇva; may he neigh as a horse in battles.

9. Take thy seat; thou art great. Shine forth, thou who most excellently repairest to the gods. O Agni, holy god, emit thy red, beautiful smoke, O glorious one!

10. Thou whom the gods have placed here for Manu as the best performer of the sacrifice, O carrier of oblations, whom Kaṇva and Medhyâtithi, whom Vṛishan and Upastuta¹ (have worshipped,) the winner of prizes.

11. That Agni's nourishment has shone brightly whom Medhyâtithi and Kaṇva have kindled on behalf of Rîta¹. Him do these hymns, him do we extol.

12. Fill (us with) wealth, thou self-dependent one, for thou, O Agni, hast companionship with the gods. Thou art lord over glorious booty. Have mercy upon us; thou art great.

13. Stand up straight for blessing us, like the god Savitrî, straight a winner of booty, when we with our worshippers and with ointments¹ call thee² in emulation (with other people).

14. Standing straight, protect us by thy splendour from evil; burn down every ghoul¹. Let us stand straight that we may walk and live. Find out our worship² among the gods.

15. Save us, O Agni, from the sorcerer, save us from mischief, from the niggard. Save us from him

who does us harm or tries to kill us, O youngest god with bright splendour !

16. As with a club¹ smite the niggards in all directions, and him who deceives us, O god with fiery jaws. The mortal who makes (his weapons) very sharp by night, may that impostor not rule over us.

17. Agni has won abundance in heroes, Agni prosperity (for *Kaṇva*). Agni and the two *Mitrās* (i.e. *Mitra* and *Varuṇa*) have blessed *Medhyâtithi*, Agni (has blessed) *Upastuta* in the acquirement (of wealth)¹.

18. Through Agni we call hither from afar *Turvasa*, *Yadu*, and *Ugradeva*. May Agni, our strength against the *Dasyu*, conduct *Navavâstva*, *Bṛihad-ratha*, and *Turviti*¹.

19. *Manu* has established thee, O Agni, as a light for all people. Thou hast shone forth with *Kaṇva*, born from *Rita*, grown strong, thou whom the human races worship.

20. Agni's flames are impetuous and violent ; they are terrible and not to be withstood. Always burn down the sorcerers, and the allies of the *Yâtus*, every ghoul¹.

NOTES.

The authorship of this hymn, and of the whole collection to which it belongs (I, 36-43), is ascribed to *Kaṇva Ghaura*. Numerous passages show indeed that it was the family of the *Kaṇvas*, or rather, to speak more accurately, a branch of that family, among which this group of hymns has been composed. But it is as great a mistake in this as in

a number of similar cases to accept the founder of one of the great Brāhmanical families as an author of Vedic poems. *Comp. Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morg. Gesellschaft*, XLII, 215 seq.

The metre is alternately *Bṛīhatī* and *Satobṛīhatī*, so that the hymn consists of strophes (*Pragātha*) of two verses. Verse 1=SV. I, 59. Verse 9=VS. XI, 37; TS. IV, 1, 3, 3 (V, 1, 4, 5); TĀr. IV, 5, 2 (V, 4, 6); MS. II, 7, 3; IV, 9, 3. Verse 13=SV. I, 57; VS. XI, 42; TS. IV, 1, 4, 2 (V, 1, 5, 3); MS. II, 7, 4. Verses 13, 14=TB. III, 6, 1, 2; TĀr. IV, 20, 1; MS. IV, 13, 1. Verse 19=SV. I, 54.

Verse 1.

Note 1. Literally, we entreat for you. *Comp.* on this use of the pronoun *vaḥ*, Delbrück, *Altindische Syntax*, 206. See also Neisser, *Bezenberger's Beiträge*, XX, 64.

Note 2. The meaning of *yahvā* cannot be determined with full certainty.

Note 3. There is no sufficient reason to change with Ludwig (IV, 254) *purūṇām* to *Pūrūṇām*, and thus to convert the metrically correct *Pāda* into an irregular one.—*Comp. Bollensen, Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenl. Gesellschaft*, XXII, 593.

Note 4. On *devayatīnām*, *comp. Lanman*, p. 399.

Verse 5.

Note 1. 'On thee all the eternal works are united, i.e. depend, which the gods have wrought; such as sun, stars, lightning.' M. M.

Verse 6.

Note 1. With the third *Pāda* compare the third *Pāda* of verse 2. It is a *galita*.

Verse 8.

Note 1. The word 'the foe' (*vṛitra*) alludes to the name of the demon conquered by Indra; see H. O., *Religion des Veda*, 135, note 2.

Note 2. The metre would become more correct by reading *vr̥ṣabháḥ* instead of *vr̥ṣhā*. Or *Vr̥ṣhani*, 'with *Vr̥ṣhan*?' Comp. verse 10.

Verse 10.

Note 1. *Medhyâtithi* or *Medhâtithi* is very frequently mentioned in connection with *Kanva*.

Vr̥ṣhan is taken as a proper name by Boehtlingk-Roth and by Grassmann (not by Ludwig) in VI, 16, 15. Possibly they are right, but in no case can *Vr̥ṣhan* of the sixth book, named by the side of *Dadhyañk* and *Atharvan*, be identified with any probability with the *Vr̥ṣhan* mentioned in our passage, who evidently belongs to the ancestors of the *Kanvas*.

Upastuta is mentioned again together with *Kanva* and *Medhyâtithi* in verse 17 of our hymn, together with *Kanva* in VIII, 5, 25. Comp. I, 112, 15; VIII, 103, 8; X, 115, 8. 9; Bergaigne, *Rel. Véd.*, II, 448.

Verse 11.

Note 1. Comp. I, 139, 2. *yát ha tyát mitrāvarunāv rītāt ádhi ádadáthe ánrītam svéna manyúnā*; X, 73, 5. *mán-damānaḥ rītāt ádhi*.

Verse 13.

Note 1. *Añgibhiḥ* can possibly mean 'who have saved themselves.' There is no reason to think of the anointing of the *yûpa* (sacrificial post), to which *Sâyana* refers the word.

Note 2. On *vi-hvâ*, comp. *Pischel-Geldner*, I, 144. There must be a technical reason, unknown to me, for the connection in which this verb repeatedly occurs, as is the case in our passage, with the noun *vâghat*: comp. III, 8, 10 (see below); VIII, 5, 16. *purutrâ kit hí vâm narâ vihváyante manishínaḥ vâghádbhiḥ arvinâ á gatam*.

Verse 14.

Note 1. The exact meaning of *atrín* is unknown.

Note 2. *Geldner's* conjectures on *duvas* seem rather bold

to me (Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, XXVII, 233). Comp. vol. xxxii, pp. 203-206 (I, 165, 14).

Verse 16.

Note 1. On ghanéva, see Lanman, *Noun-Inflection*, 334.

Verse 17.

Note 1. On Medhyâtithi and Upastuta, see the note on verse 10. Aufrecht (Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, XXVI, 612) believes that in mitrótá an abbreviation of the name Mitrâtithi (X, 33, 7) is contained; he translates: 'Agni has promoted Mitrâtithi, Medhyâtithi, and Upastuta in the acquirement of wealth.' This is very ingenious, but I do not think that the reason which Aufrecht gives is sufficient: it cannot be understood, he says, why Mitra (or Mitra and Varuṇa) should be mentioned in a hymn exclusively addressed to Agni. But similar cases are quite frequent.—Prof. Max Müller writes: 'Could mitrâ stand for mitrâṇi? Agni has protected his friends and also Medhyâtithi.' Comp. also Lanman, p. 342.

Verse 18.

Note 1. On Turvaṣa and Yadu, comp. Muir, V, 286; Bergaigne, II, 354 seq.; *Zeitschr. der D. Morg. Ges.* XLII, 220. There is not the slightest reason for Ludwig's statement (IV, 254) that this hymn is a 'gebet um sig für den auf einem kriegszuge befindlichen Turvaṣakönig.'

Ugradeva is not mentioned again. On Navavâstva and Br̥hadratha, comp. X, 49, 6; VI, 20, 11; on Turvîti, the materials collected by Bergaigne, *Rel. Véd.*, II, 358 seq.

Verse 20.

Note 1. See verse 14, note 1.

MANDALA I, HYMN 44.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYĀYA 3, VARGA 28-30.

1. Agni, at the rising of the dawn¹ bring splendid wealth, immortal *Gâtavedas*, to the worshipper, (and bring hither) to-day the gods awakening with the dawn.

2. For thou art the accepted messenger, the bearer of sacrificial food, O Agni, the charioteer of worship. United with the two *Asvins* and with the Dawn bestow on us abundance of valiant heroes, and high glory.

3. We choose to-day as our messenger Agni, the *Vasu*, the beloved of many, whose banner is smoke, whose . . . ¹ is light, at the dawning of the day, the beautifier of sacrifices².

4. I magnify at the dawning of the day Agni *Gâtavedas*, the best, the youngest guest, the best receiver of offerings, welcome to pious people, that he may go to the gods¹.

5. I shall praise thee, O food on which everything lives, immortal one¹, Agni, the immortal protector, O holy god, the best sacrificer, O bearer of sacrificial food.

6. Be kind-spoken to him who praises thee, O youngest god, honey-tongued, the best receiver of offerings. Lengthening *Praskanva's* life, that he may reach old age, do homage¹ to the host of the gods.

7. The clans kindle thee, the all-possessing *Hotri*:

therefore conduct hither speedily, much-invoked Agni, the provident gods—

8. Savitri, the Dawn, the two Asvins, Bhaga, Agni¹, at the dawning (of the day), (at the end) of night². The Kanvas, having pressed Soma, inflame thee, the bearer of sacrificial food, O best performer of worship.

9. As thou, O Agni, art the lord of worship, the messenger of the clans, conduct hither to-day the gods awakening with the dawn, of sun-like aspect, that they may drink Soma.

10. Agni, rich in splendour! thou hast shone after the former dawns, visible to all. Thou art the guardian in the hamlets, the Purohita; thou be-longest to men at the sacrifices¹.

11. O Agni, let us put thee down (on the altar) as Manus did, O god, to be the performer of the sacrifice, the Hotri, the wise priest, the quick immortal messenger.

12. When thou, the Purohita of the gods, who art great like Mitra, goest on thy errand as messenger in their midst, then the flames of Agni shine like the roaring waves of the Sindhu¹.

13. Agni with thy attentive ears, hear me, together with the gods driven (on their chariots)¹ who accompany thee. May Mitra and Aryaman sit down on the sacrificial grass, they who come to the ceremony early in the morning.

14. May the Maruts, they who give rain, the fire-tongued increasers of Rîta, hear my praise. May Varuna, whose laws are firm, drink the Soma, united with the two Asvins and with the Dawn!

NOTES.

The hymn is ascribed to Praskaṇva Kāṇva, who is the reputed author of the whole group of the hymns, I, 44-50. It is certain that these hymns really belong to a branch of the great Kaṇva family, for which the name Praskaṇva is characteristic. Comp. my Prolegomena, p. 260.

The metre is Bârhata Pragâtha. Verse 1 = SV. I, 40. Verses 1-2 = SV. II, 1130-1131. Verse 11 = TB. II, 7, 12, 6. Verse 13 = SV. I, 50; VS. 33, 15; TB. II, 7, 12, 5.

This Agni-hymn contains a number of allusions which show that it was destined for the morning service. The same may be said of the next hymn, I, 45, and of the whole collection of Praskaṇva hymns, which are addressed exclusively to the devâḥ prâtaryāvâṇaḥ, viz. Agni in his special character as a matutinal deity, the two Asvins, the Dawn, the rising Sun. From the mention of the Soma tiroahnya 45, 10; 47, 1, and from other circumstances, Bergaigne has very ingeniously drawn the conclusion that in the Praskaṇva collection an ancient Âsvinaśastra is preserved; see *Recherches sur l'histoire de la Liturgie Védique*, 45.

Verse 1.

Note 1. I believe that the text, I may perhaps not say requires, but very strongly invites, a slight correction. The tradition gives ágne vívasvat ushásaḥ kītrám rādhaḥ amartya. To connect vívasvat with rādhaḥ and to make the genitive ushásaḥ depend on rādhaḥ would give an expression which is not, strictly speaking, impossible but in every case very unusual. Nothing, on the other hand, is more frequent than combinations of the locative of a noun derived from vi-vas with the genitive ushásaḥ, 'at the rising of the dawn' (ushásaḥ vṛyushṭau, vṛyushṭishu, vyúshi; comp. the phrase vásto usráḥ treated of by Kaegi, *Festgruss an Böhtlingk*, 48; vástoḥ usráḥ, Bartholomae, *Bezzenger's Beiträge*, XV, 185). I think that such

a phrase should be restored in our verse, and propose to read *agne vivásvan usháśaḥ*, &c. The word *vivásvan* occurs in VIII, 102, 22. *agnīm ídhe vivásvabhiḥ*. The expression used here would thus be similar to that of III, 15, 2. *tvám naḥ asyáḥ usháśaḥ vṛushtau . . . bodhi gopáḥ*; comp. IV, 1, 5, &c.

Verse 3.

Note 1. The meaning of *bháḥ-rigíka* is quite uncertain. The accent would well agree with the explanation of the word as a possessive compound; *dhûmáketum bháḥ-rigíkam* would then be exactly parallel: whose banner is smoke, whose *rigíka* is light. We have then *gó-rigíka* as an epithet of Soma, 'he whose *rigíka* the cows are,' i.e. 'whose *rigíka* is milk,' and *ávih-rigíka* as an epithet of Dadhikrávan ('he whose *rigíka* is visible'). All this taken together is clearly insufficient for giving a result, and there is scarcely a better prospect for etymological guesses. Bergaigne's (Rel. Véd., I, 206) translation of *rigíka* by 'flèche' would do for *bháḥ-rigíka*, but it is not very tempting in the cases of *gó-rigíka* and *ávih-rigíka*. Roth (Zeitschrift der D. Morg. Ges. 48, 118) translates 'lichtglänzend.'

Note 2. Pischel's explanation of *adhvarasrī* (Vedische Studien, I, 53, 'Zum Opfer kommend') does not seem convincing to me.

Verse 4.

Note 1. Ludwig's translation 'dasz er die götter herbringe' is not exact. As to the real meaning of our passage, comp. VII, 9, 5. *agne yáhi dûtṛyam . . . deván ákkha*, 'Agni, go as a messenger . . . to the gods.'

Verse 5.

Note 1. Boehtlingk-Roth propose to read *amṛitabhogana*. I think the traditional text is right. Agni is called *visvasya bhogana* similarly, as it is said in I, 48, 10 (with regard to Ushas), *vísvasya hí prānanam gīvanam tvé*. *Amṛita* may be vocative s. neuter or masculine. Comp. Lanman, 339.

Verse 6.

Note 1. Benfey (*Quantitätsverschiedenheiten*, IV, 2, 27) and Ludwig take *namasyá* for a first person.

Verse 8.

Note 1. If the accusative *agním* is right, as it probably is, Agni would be invoked to conduct Agni to the sacrifice. This is quite a possible idea. Comp. the formula of the 'devatânâm âvâhanam,' 'agnim agna âvaha, somam âvaha, agnim âvaha,' i.e. 'Agni, conduct hither Agni, conduct hither Soma, conduct hither Agni.' See Hillebrandt, *Das Altindische Neu- und Vollmondsopfer*, p. 84.

Note 2. Lanman, 482, takes *kshápāḥ* as an acc. plur. I think it is gen. sing., and the accent should be *kshapáḥ*. Comp. VIII, 19, 31; III, 49, 4, and the phrase *aktóḥ vīshāu*.

Verse 10.

Note 1. Prof. Max Müller translates: 'Thou art the guardian in the hamlets, the chief-priest; thou art the human chief-priest at the sacrifices.'

Verse 12.

Note 1. With the third Pāda comp. IX, 50, 1, where it is said that the mighty strength of Soma shows itself 'sínḍhoḥ ūrméḥ iva svanáḥ,' i.e. 'like the roar of the waves of the Sindhu.'

Verse 13.

Note 1. I cannot follow the translation of Dr. Neisser, *Bezenberger's Beiträge*, XVIII, 316.

MANDALA I, HYMN 45.

ASHṬAKA I, ADHYĀYA 3, VARGA 31-32.

1. Sacrifice here, thou, O Agni, to the Vasus, the Rudras, and the Ādityas, to the (divine) host that receives good sacrifices¹, the Ghr̥ita-sprinkling offspring of Manu².

2. The wise gods, O Agni, are ready to listen to the worshippers: conduct them hither, the thirty-three, O lord of red horses, thou who lovest our praises.

3. As thou hast heard Priyamedha and Atri¹, O Gāta-vedas, as thou hast heard Virūpa and Āṅgiras, thus hear the invocation of Praskanva, O lord of high laws.

4. The Mahikerus¹, the Priyamedhas have invoked for their protection the lord of worship, Agni with his bright splendour.

5. O thou to whom Ghr̥ita oblations are poured out, good (Agni), hear these praises with which the sons of Kanva invoke thee for their protection.

6. O Agni, whose glory is brightest, beloved of many, the people in the clans invoke thee, the radiant-haired, to convey the sacrificial food.

7. The priests have established thee, O Agni, in the striving for day¹, as their Hotri, the ministrant, the greatest acquirer of wealth, with attentive ears, the most widely extended².

8. The wise who have pressed Soma have made thee speed hither to the feast (which is offered to the gods), bringing great light¹ and sacrificial food, O Agni, on behalf of the mortal worshipper.

9. O strength-made, good (Agni), make the gods who come in the morning, the divine host, sit down here to-day on our sacrificial grass, O Vasu, to drink the Soma.

10. Sacrifice, O Agni, with joint invocations, and bring hither the divine host. This is the Soma, O rain-giving gods. Drink (the Soma) which has been kept over night¹.

NOTES.

The hymn is ascribed to Praskaṇva. It is evidently addressed to Agni in his matutinal character; comp. the note on I, 44. The metre is Anushtubh. Verse 1 = SV. I, 96. Verse 6 = VS. XV, 31; TS. IV, 4, 4, 3; MS. II, 13, 7.

Verse 1.

Note 1. Comp. VIII, 5, 33. *ákṣha svadhvarám gānam*.

Note 2. As to the gods being considered here as offspring of Manu, comp. especially X, 53, 6. *mānuḥ bhava ganāya daívyam gānam*, 'become Manu, procreate the divine hosts.' See also Bergaigne, *Rel. Védique*, I, 69.

Verse 3.

Note 1. This passage is one of those which show that the Atris stood in especially friendly connection with the Kaṇvas. Of the Priyamedhas the same may be said, or perhaps we may even go further and consider them as one branch of the Kaṇvas. For a fuller discussion of these questions I refer to my paper, 'Ueber die Liedverfasser des Rig-veda,' *Zeitschr. der D. Morg. Gesellschaft*, XLII, 213 seq.

Verse 4.

Note 1. *Máhikeravaḥ*, which I have translated as a proper name, may be an adjective belonging to *Priyámedhāḥ*. Possibly it is derived from the root *kar*, 'to praise:' 'the

Priyamedhas with mighty hymns.' Comp. Bartholomae, Kuhn's Zeitschrift, XXVII, 341.

Verse 7.

Note 1. As *gó-ishā* means 'the striving for cows,' thus *dīv-ishā* means 'the striving for day,' or possibly 'the striving for heaven.' Ludwig (III, 383) takes it for 'morgenopfer,' and it is true that most of the passages, in which the word occurs, are addressed to matutinal deities. Thus our passage belongs to a hymn addressed to the matutinal Agni; I, 48, 9 is addressed to Ushas; I, 139, 4; VII, 74, 1; VIII, 87, 3 to the Āsvins; IV, 46, 1; 47, 1 to Vāyu who was invoked in the *Praūga-sastra* belonging to the *Prātaḥ-savana*, and who received the Soma offering before the other deities. There is, nevertheless, at least one passage which shows that Ludwig has gone too far: VIII, 76, 9. *pība ít indra marútsakhā sūtām sómam dīvishāshu*, 'Drink, O Indra, with the Maruts thy friends the Soma which has been pressed at the *divishās*.' The Soma oblation offered to Indra Marutvat formed part of the second (midday) *Savana*.

Note 2. 'Sapráthastamam, the most renowned, *répandu*.' M. M.

Verse 8.

Note 1. Comp. IV, 5, 1. *kathā dāsema agnáye brīhāt bhāḥ*, 'how may we offer great light to Agni?'—which seems to mean, 'how may we make Agni brilliant?' Thus in our passage the meaning seems to be: the priests kindle Agni and perform oblations.

Verse 10.

Note 1. The *tiráḥ-ahnya* Soma, which was kept from one day to the next day (not, as Ludwig translates, 'der von vorgestern'), was offered to the Āsvins at the *Atirātra* sacrifice. Comp. *Rig-veda* I, 47, 1; III, 58, 7; VIII, 35, 19; *Kātyāyana Srautasūtra* XII, 6, 10; XXIV, 3, 42. There the commentary says, *āsvinasastrakayāgasambandhināḥ kamasasthāḥ somāḥ pūrvadinanishpantatvāt tirohnyā ity ukṣyante*.

MANDALA I, HYMN 58.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYÂYA 4, VARGA 23-24.

1. The strength-begotten immortal never grows tired¹, when he, the Hotri, has become the messenger of Vivasvat². He passes through the air on the best paths. In the divine world he invites (the gods) with the sacrificial food.

2. Seizing his own food the undecaying, greedy (Agni) stands on the brushwood wishing to drink. When he has been sprinkled (with ghee), he shines like a racer with his back¹. Thundering he has roared like the ridge of heaven.

3. As soon as¹ the Rudras, the Vasus have made him their Purohita, the immortal sitting down as Hotri, the conqueror of wealth, pressing forward like a chariot among the clans, among the Âyus², the god in due course discloses desirable boons.

4. Stirred by the wind he spreads among the brushwood lightly¹ (driven forward) by the sacrificial ladles, with his sickle², loudly roaring. When thou, O Agni, thirstily rushest on the wooden sticks like a bull³, thy course, O never-aging god with fiery waves, becomes black⁴.

5. He who has fiery jaws, stirred by the wind, blazes down on the forest¹ as a strong bull (rushes) on the herd. When he proceeds² with his stream of light to the imperishable atmosphere, then what is moveable and immoveable (and) the winged (birds) are afraid.

6. The Bhṛigus have placed thee among men, who art beautiful like a treasure, who art easy to

invoke for people; thee the Hotri, O Agni, the excellent guest, a delightful friend like Mitra to the divine race!

7. I worship with good cheer Agni the steward¹ of all treasures, whom the seven ladles² (of the priests), the worshippers choose as the Hotri, the best sacrificer at the rites, and I pray for treasure³.

8. Son of strength, great like Mitra, grant to-day flawless protection to us who magnify thee. Agni! guard from distress with strongholds of iron him who praises thee, O offspring of vigour!

9. Be a shelter to him who praises thee, O resplendent one; be protection, generous giver, to the generous. Agni! guard him who praises thee from distress. May he who gives wealth for our prayer, come quickly in the morning¹.

NOTES.

The hymn is ascribed to Nodhas Gautama, who is considered as the *Rishi* of the whole collection, I, 58–64. This tradition is based on, and confirmed by, several passages of the text: I, 61, 14; 62, 13; 64, 1.

The metre is *Gagatī* verses 1–5, *Trishṭubh* verses 6–9. None of the verses of this hymn occurs in the other *Saṁhitās*.

Verse 1.

Note 1. I believe that Professor Aufrecht (Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, XXV, 435) is right in reading *nū kīit sahaḥ-gāh amṛtāh nū tandate*. Comp. as to *nū kīit nū*, I, 120, 2; VI, 37, 3; VII, 22, 8. Agni is frequently called *ātandrah dūtāh* or similarly. Possibly we might read, instead of *nū tandate*, *nī tandate*, though parallel passages for the combination of this root with *nī* are not known.—Prof. Max

Müller's opinion is different. He writes: We say, *der Funke schlägt oder fängt*. Why should not the Hindu have said that Agni strikes out. That would be *vi tundate*, Agni schlägt aus im Augenblick. But even *ni tundate* may have been used in the sense of the spark striking down on the tinder—the *atasâs*, mentioned in verse 2—which he ignites. I should translate: 'The strength-begotten immortal strikes down or breaks forth (*vi*) quickly, whenever the *Hotri* (Agni) becomes the messenger of the sacrificer (?).'

Note 2. I cannot follow Aufrecht in his translation 'zum boten des opfernden.' Comp. on Agni as the messenger of Vivasvat, Bergaigne, *Rel. Védique*, I, 87; H. O., *Religion des Veda*, 122, 275.

Verse 2.

Note 1. Literally, his back shines like a racer. On this kind of comparison, see Bergaigne, *Mélanges Renier*, 86; Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, I, 107.

Verse 3.

Note 1. *Krânâ*: comp. von Bradke, *Dyâus Asura*, Ahura Mazda und die Asuras, p. 36; Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, I, 70.

Note 2. Bergaigne, *Rel. Védique*, I, 59 seq.

Verse 4.

Note 1. On *vr̥thâ*, see Geldner, *Vedische Studien*, I, 116; Neisser, *Bezenberger's Beiträge*, XIX, 148 seq.

Note 2. The meaning is: with his flames which are sharp like a sickle. *Sr̥ni* is written here as a paroxytonon; in several other passages it is an oxytonon. Such differences are not quite rare, and there is no reason for taking on this account *sr̥nyâ* as an instr. plur. fem. of the adjective *sr̥nya*, 'mit verkürzter Endung' (Geldner, loc. cit.). 'His sickle is the sharp edge of Agni.' M. M. — On *guh̥bhih*, comp. Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, II, 111.

Note 3. As to *vriśhâyāse* with the accusative, comp. Gaedicke, 74. RV. X, 44, 4. *ûrgáḥ skambhám . . . vriśhâyase*.

Note 4. With the last Pāda comp. IV, 7, 9. *krishnám te éma rúsataḥ puráḥ bhāḥ*.

Verse 5.

Note 1. That is, among the fuel.

Note 2. I think that we have here probably—(though, of course, this explanation can be avoided)—an anacoluthon. The poet began with the nominative (*abhivrágan*), and then he changed the construction and went on as if he had begun with the ablative, taking *sthátúḥ káratham* (comp. Lanman, 422) as the subject instead of *Agni*.—*Patatrínaḥ* seems to be nom. pl. ; comp. I, 94, 11 (see below).

Verse 7.

Note 1. The translation of *aratí* is only approximative and conjectural.

Note 2. Comp. Pischel, *Ved. Studien*, II, 113.

Note 3. Comp. III, 54, 3. *saparyámi práyasâ yámi rátnam*.

Verse 9.

Note 1. The last Pāda is the standing conclusion of the Nodhas hymns.

MANDALA I, HYMN 59.

ASHṬAKA I, ADHYĀYA 4, VARGA 25.

1. The other Agnis (the other fires) are verily thy branches, O Agni. In thee all the immortals enjoy themselves¹. Vaisvânara! Thou art the centre² of human settlements; like a supporting column thou holdest men³.

2. The head of heaven, the navel of the earth is Agni; he has become the steward¹ of both worlds. Thee, a god, the gods have engendered, O Vaisvânara, to be a light for the Ârya.

3. As in the sun the rays are firmly fixed, thus in Agni Vaisvânara all treasures have been laid down¹. (The treasures) which dwell in the mountains, in the herbs, the waters, and among men—of all that thou art the king.

4. As the two great worlds to their son¹, like a Hotri, like a skilful man, (we bring) praises— manifold (praises) to him who is united with the sun, to the truly strong one, new (praises) to Vaisvânara, the manliest god.

5. Thy greatness, O Gâtavedas, Vaisvânara, has exceeded even the great heaven. Thou art the king of the human tribes; thou hast by fighting gained wide space for the gods.

6. Let me now proclaim the greatness of the bull whom the Pûrus worship as the destroyer of enemies¹. Agni Vaisvânara, having slain the Dasyu, shook the (aerial) arena and cut down Sambara.

7. Agni Vaisvânara, extending by his greatness over all dominions, who is to be worshipped, the bright one, rich in loveliness, is awake (or, is praised) among the Bharadvâgas, in the homestead of Puruṁṁtha Sâtavaneya, with his hundredfold blessings.

NOTES.

The same *Rîshi* as in I, 58. Metre, Trishṭubh. None of the verses of this hymn occurs in the other *Samhitâs*.

Verse 1.

Note 1. Comp. VII, 11, 1. ná *rité* tvát amṛtāḥ māday-ante, 'the immortals do not enjoy themselves without thee.'

Note 2. Literally, 'the navel.' Comp. Muir, V, 214.

Note 3. Comp. IV, 5, 1 (see below). úpa stabhâyat upamît ná ródhaḥ.

Verse 2.

Note 1. Comp. the remark on I, 58, 7 (note 1).

Verse 3.

Note 1. I cannot follow Prof. von Roth (*Zeitschrift der D. Morgenl. Gesellschaft*, XLVIII, 116), who explains *dadhire* as a third person sing. of *dhri*.

Verse 4.

Note 1. The incompleteness both of the construction and of the metre shows that the text of the first Pâda is corrupt. I doubt whether it ever will be possible to restore the correct reading with full certainty, but I shall be glad if others succeed better than I did—and I may add, better than Prof. von Roth (*Zeitschrift der D. Morg. Gesellschaft*, XLVIII, 117 seq.) seems to me to have succeeded—in correcting and in interpreting the text. I think that after *sûnâve*

ródasî clearly one syllable is wanted to complete the Pâda : possibly we should read therefore sūnāve ródasyoḥ (comp. verse 2, Pâda 2, aratīḥ ródasyoḥ, which words form the end of the Pâda). Agni, as is well known, is the son of the two worlds, the sūnúḥ ródasyoḥ. In the beginning of the Pâda *brīhatī* must either refer to the two worlds: in this case we have to read *brīhatyóḥ* (instead of *brīhatī iva*); or *brīhatī* may refer, as this adjective frequently does, to the *gírah*, and we shall possibly have to read *brīhatīḥ vah* (as to *vah*, comp. Delbrück, *Altindische Syntax*, 206). But of course all these are mere guesses. In every case the verb on which the accusative *gírah* depends ('we bring,' or something like that) must be supplied.

Verse 6.

Note 1. Or, as the killer of *Vṛitra*. See H. O., *Religion des Veda*, 135, note 2.

MANDALA I, HYMN 60.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYĀYA 4, VARGA 26.

1. Mâtariśvan brought (Agni) to Bhrigu as a gift precious like wealth, of double birth¹, the carrier, the famous, the beacon of the sacrifice², the ready and immediately successful messenger.

2. Both follow his command, the Usigs¹ offering sacrificial food, and the mortals. The Hotri (Agni) has sat down before daybreak among the clans, the lord of the clans, whose leave should be asked, the performer of worship.

3. May our new, beautiful praise, born¹ from our heart, reach him the honey-tongued (Agni), whom the human priests in our settlement², the Âyus, offering enjoyment have engendered.

4. The Usig¹, the purifier, the Vasu has been established among men, the best Hotri among the clans, the domestic² master of the house in the house: Agni has become the treasure-lord of treasures.

5. Thus we, the Gotamas, praise thee, O Agni, the lord of treasures, with our (pious) thoughts, rubbing thee as (they rub down) a swift racer that wins the prize. May he who gives wealth for our prayer, come quickly in the morning¹.

NOTES.

Rishi and metre are the same. No verse occurs in the other *Saṃhitās*.

Verse 1.

Note 1. The celestial and the terrestrial birth of Agni. Comp. Bergaigne, *Rel. Véd.*, II, 52.

Note 2. The text has *vidáthasya*. Comp. I, 31, 6, note 2.

Verse 2.

Note 1. On *usṛ* ('the willing one'), as denoting the mythical priests who have first established Agni and have sacrificed as the first, comp. Bergaigne, I, 57 seq. The *ubháyâsaḥ* seem to be these mythical ancestors and the actual sacrificers.

Verse 3.

Note 1. I propose to read *gāyamânâ*. Comp. I, 171, 2. *stómaḥ* . . . *hridá tashṭáḥ*; II, 35, 2. *hridáḥ á sútashṭam mántram*; VIII, 43, 2. *ágne gánâmi sushṛutím*; V, 42, 13. *gíram* . . . *gāyamânâm*, &c.—Comp. Lanman, 356.

Note 2. On the meaning of *vrigána*, see Max Müller, vol. xxxii, pp. xx, 208, 304; Geldner, *Vedische Studien*, I, 139 seq., with my remarks, *Göttinger Gelehrte Anzeigen*, 1890, 410 seq.; Ludwig, *Ueber Methode bei Interpretation des Rîg-veda*, 27 seq.; Colinet, *Les Principes de l'Exégèse Védique d'après MM. Pischel et Geldner*, 28 seq.; von Bradke, *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morg. Gesellschaft*, XLVIII, 500; Bechtel, *Nachrichten der Göttinger Gesellschaft der Wiss.*, 1894, 392 seq.

Verse 4.

Note 1. See verse 2, note 1.

Note 2. Bartholomae's theory (Bezenberger's *Beiträge*, XV, 194) that the stem *dámûnas* has been developed out of the phrase *dámû naḥ*, 'in our house,' does not carry conviction.

Verse 5.

Note 1. See I, 58, 9, note 1.

MANDALA I, HYMN 65.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYĀYA 5, VARGA 9.

1¹. Thee who hidest thyself in secret like a thief with an animal² (which he has stolen)—who hadst harnessed³ adoration and carriedst adoration—

2. The wise unanimously followed by thy foot-marks¹. All (gods) deserving worship (reverentially) sat down near thee.

3. The gods followed the laws of *Rita*. There was an encompassing as the heaven (encompasses) the earth¹.

4. In the lap, in the womb of *Rita*, the waters nourish the fine child with praise, him who is well born.

5. Like good fortune, like a broad abode, like the fertile hill¹, like the refreshing stream,

6. Like a racer urged forward in the race, like the rapids of the Sindhu¹—who can hold him back?

7. (He is) the kinsman of the rivers, as a brother of his sisters. He eats the forests as a king (eats, i. e. takes the wealth of) the rich¹.

8. When he has spread through the forests, driven by the wind, Agni shears the hair of the earth.

9. Sitting in the waters he hisses like a swan. (He is) most famous by his power of mind, he who belongs to the clans, awakening at dawn—

10. A performer of worship like Soma, the god born from *Rita*, like a young (?)¹ beast, far-extending, far-shining.

NOTES.

The authorship of the whole collection, I, 65-73, is ascribed to Parāśara Śāktya. These hymns are addressed exclusively to Agni. The greater part of them (65-70) is composed in the Virāg metre; comp. on this metre my *Prolegomena*, 95 seq. I have given there my reasons for considering that each verse consists of twenty, not of forty syllables.

This section ascribed to Parāśara has been treated of by Bollensen, *Zeitschrift der D. Morg. Gesellschaft*, XXII, 569 seq. No verse of these hymns composed in the metre Dvipadā Virāg (I, 65-70) occurs in the other *Samhitās*.

Verse 1.

Note 1. Professor Max Müller proposes the following translation for verses 1 and 2: The wise (gods) together followed thee (Agni) when in hiding, by means of footsteps, as one follows a thief by the animal; they followed thee who accepts and carries adoration (to the gods). All the worshipful gods sat down (reverentially) near thee.

Note 2. There is no reason for reading with Bartholomae (*Studien zur indogermanischen Sprachgeschichte*, I, 48) *parvān* (gen. plur.) *nā tāyūm*.

Note 3. Ludwig proposes *yuvānām*, which is quite unnecessary.—See also Gaedicke, 173.

Verse 2.

Note 1. We have here the well-known myth of the hidden Agni discovered by the gods. The 'wise ones,' (*dhīrāk*) are no doubt the searching gods, the same who are called *yāgatrāk* in the last Pāda, and who are expressly designated as *devāk* in verse 3. Comp. Bergaigne, I, 110.

Verse 3.

Note 1. Regarding the construction, see Gaedicke, 192.—Professor Max Müller's opinion on this phrase differs from

mine. He writes: 'I should prefer *parīśhā*. But *parīśhā* seems to mean a running about, reconnoitring, searching. "There was searching on earth as in heaven," lit. earth, like heaven, was reconnoitring-ground.'

Verse 5.

Note 1. Comp. VIII, 50, 2. *girīḥ nā bhugmā*. I believe that Boehtlingk-Roth, Bollensen, and Grassmann are right in correcting our passage accordingly; *raṇvā*, *prīthvī*, *sambhū* follow the gender of the corresponding substantives, and the same may be expected here. Comp. Lanman, 530. The meaning is that Agni yields nourishment to all beings as a mountain fertilises the country by the waters which come down from it; comp. VIII, 49, 2. *girēḥ iva prā rāsāḥ asya pinvire dātrāṇi purubhógasāḥ*.

Verse 6.

Note 1. Regarding the construction, comp. Gaedicke, 252 seq.; Bergaigne, *Mélanges Renier*, 95. Joh. Schmidt (*Die Pluralbildungen der indogerm. Neutra*, 305) and Ludwig (V, 524) are wrong in taking *kshódaḥ* as a locative or as an instrumental respectively.

Verse 7.

Note 1. Comp. Pischel-Geldner, *Vedische Studien*, I, p. xvi.

Verse 10.

Note 1. Can *sīsvā* be the nominative of a stem *sīsvan* which stands by the side of *sīsu* as *rībhvan* of *rībhú*? Prof. Max Müller proposes: 'Large like a cow with young, like a pregnant cow.'

MANDALA I, HYMN 66.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYĀYA 5, VARGA 10.

1. Like unto excellent wealth, like unto the shine of the sun, like unto living breath, like unto one's own¹ son—

2. Like unto a quick takvan¹ he (Agni) holds the wood, like milk, like a milch cow², bright and shining.

3. He holds safety, pleasant like a homestead, like ripe barley, a conqueror of men,

4. Like a *Rishi* uttering (sacred) shouts, praised among the clans; like a well-cared-for race-horse¹, Agni bestows vigour.

5. He to whose flame men do not grow accustomed¹, who is like one's own mind², like a wife on a couch, enough for all (happiness).

6. When the bright (Agni) has shone forth, he is like a white (horse [?])¹ among people, like a chariot with golden ornaments, impetuous in fights.

7. Like an army which is sent forward he shows his vehemence, like an archer's shaft with sharp point.

8. He who is born is one twin; he who will be born¹ is the other twin—the lover of maidens, the husband of wives².

9¹. As cows go to their stalls, all that moves and we, for the sake of a dwelling, reach him who has been kindled.

10. Like the flood of the Sindhu¹ he has driven forward the downwards-flowing (waters)². The cows lowed at the sight of the sun³.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi* and metre.

Verse 1.

Note 1. Comp. I, 166, 2; 185, 2; X, 39, 14. The second passage (*nítayam ná súnúm pitróh upásthe dyávâ rákshatam prithiví nah ábhvât*) would be sufficient to show that we cannot translate 'wie ein überlebender sohn' (Ludwig).

Verse 2.

Note 1. We do not know what animal the *takvan* is. Comp. I, 134, 5 with M. M.'s note.

Note 2. See Bergaigne, *Mél. Renier*, 101; Gaedicke, 253.

Verse 4.

Note 1. Comp. X, 101, 7. *prinitá ásvân hitám gayâtha*.

Verse 5.

Note 1. Comp. VII, 4, 3. *durókam agníh âyáve susoka*.

Note 2. Prof. Max Müller believes that *kratu* here means, 'like *kartri*, a sacrificer, so that *kratuh na nityah* sounds like *sónuh na nityah*, one's own sacrificing son. But all this is very obscure.'

Verse 6.

Note 1. The second *Páda* is translated by Grassmann: 'wie Licht in Häusern;' by Ludwig: 'fast weiss, bei den menschenstämmen.' I think that there can be no doubt that the words *svetáh ná* contain a comparison like all the other comparisons of which these hymns are full; this comparison is unduly effaced in Ludwig's translation. Nor is Grassmann right in translating *svetáh* bei 'Licht;' the word is an adjective meaning 'white' and nothing else. We must supply here, as in many passages, a substantive, and I do not see any reason why this should not be that

substantive with which *sveta* is most frequently combined in the Rig-veda, namely *arva*; comp. I, 116, 6; 118, 9 [119, 10]; VII, 77, 3; X, 39, 10. In V, 1, 4 it is said of Agni: *svetáh vâgî gâyate ágre áhnâm*, 'the white racer is born in the beginning of the days.'

Verse 8.

Note 1. The traditional text is *yamáḥ ha gâtáḥ yamáḥ gánitvam*. Ludwig translates 'bewältiger des gebornen, bewältiger auch des, was erst geboren wird.' It will scarcely be necessary to state the reasons which make against this translation. *Yamáḥ . . . yamáḥ* evidently means: 'the one twin . . . the other twin.' Now if we leave the text unchanged, we cannot but translate: 'the one twin is he who has been born, the other twin is that which will be born'—which sounds very strange. In I, 89, 10 we have *áditiḥ gâtám áditiḥ gánitvam*; IV, 18, 4. *antáḥ gâtéshu utá yé gánitvāḥ*; X, 45, 10. *út gâténa bhínadat út gánitvaiḥ*. In all these cases *gâtá* and *gánitva* stand parallel; there is no such difference as in our passage, according to the traditional text, between him (masc.) who is . . . and that (neuter) which will be . . . Thus I propose to read *gánitvaḥ*, of which conjecture Ludwig has thought also (see his note, IV, 259): that present Agni who has been born, and that future Agni who will be born, are twins.—Prof. Max Müller has discussed this passage in his *Science of Language*, II, 630 seqq. He interprets the twin who has been born as Agni representing the morning; the twin who will be born as the evening.

Note 2. The maidens very probably are the dawns (comp. Prof. Max Müller's discussion quoted in the last note). Are the wives the sacrificial ladles which approach Agni, or the offerings of ghee, or the prayers? See Bergaigne, *Rel. Védique*, II, 9 seqq.

Verse 9.

Note 1. This verse is very obscure, and I am quite aware of the merely tentative character of the translation which

I propose. I leave *vaḥ* untranslated (comp. Delbrück, *Altindische Syntax*, 206), which must be done in most of the numerous verses beginning with the words *tám vaḥ*. I then read *karáthā* (comp. 68, 1 ; 70, 3. 7). *Vasatyá* seems to be either a dative similar to the newly-discovered datives in -ā of a-stems, or we possibly should read *vasatyai* (*vasatyá* in the *Samhitā-pāṭha*).—Prof. Max Müller thinks of a correction *karāmaḥ* and would translate : ‘To him (whom you know—*vaḥ*) when lighted we go for our dwelling, as the cows reach their home.’

Verse 10.

Note 1. Comp. above, 65, 6.

Note 2. Or the downwards-streaming libations of *Ghrīta* and the like? Comp. below, I, 72, 10 with note 4.

Note 3. Comp. below, 69, 10.

MANDALA I, HYMN 67.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYĀYA 5, VARGA 11.

1. Victorious¹ in the forests, a friend among men, he demands obedience like a king, the undecaying one².

2. Like good peace, like fortunate wisdom, may he (Agni) be a kind *Hotri*, a carrier of offerings.

3. Having taken in his hand all manly powers, he has made the gods fear, when sitting down in his hiding-place.

4. There the thoughtful men find him, when they have recited the spells which they had fashioned in their heart.

5. As the goat¹ (supports) the earth², thus he supports the earth²; he upholds the sky by his efficacious spells.

6. Protect the dear¹ footsteps of the cattle². O Agni, thou who hast a full life, thou hast gone from covert to covert³.

7. He who has seen him the hidden one, he who has got near to the stream of *Rīta*¹—

8. They who get him off, doing service to *Rīta*, to him¹ he then indicates riches.

9. He who grows up with might within the plants, and within the children¹, and within the sprouting grass²—

10. The splendour [?] in the home of the waters¹, the full-lived. The sages made him as if building a seat.

NOTES.

The same *Rīshi* and metre.

Verse 1.

Note 1. '*Gâyuh* : aus *gyâyuh*, wie der compar. *gyâyân gyeshthah* zeigt,' Ludwig. But what shows that *gyâyân* is the comparative of *gâyuh* and that the utterly impossible change of *gy* into *g* is possible? Ludwig's translation 'überwindend' is right; comp. I, 119, 3.

Note 2. I propose to read *aguryáh*. Prof. Max Müller conjectures—as Roth (Pet. Dict.) has done—that *srushāi* may mean 'obedient, servant;' he translates: 'He desires a servant (or worshipper) who is not aged.'

Verse 5.

Note 1. On the mythical goat whose office it is to support the worlds, comp. I, 164, 6; VIII, 41, 10; X, 82, 6; Bergaigne, III, 21; H. O., Religion des Veda, 72.

Note 2. For 'earth' the text has two different words, *kshám* and *prithivīm*. Prof. Max Müller conjectures *dyām* for *kshám*: 'He, Agni, supports the earth, as the buck the sky.'

Verse 6.

Note 1. Literally, 'the dear footsteps;' but the meaning of *priyá* may be compared to that of the Homeric *φίλος*, his own.

Note 2. One could be tempted to refer the word *pasu* to Agni, whose footsteps (*padāni*) the 'wise ones' follow (65, 2), and whom they find out in his hiding. Thus we could translate, 'Look at the dear footsteps of the beast.' But the comparison of 70, 6 makes it more probable that the imperative *ní páhi* is addressed to Agni. I believe therefore that Grassmann is right in translating 'Die lieben Stätten der Heerden schütze.' Ludwig's translation is

similar to this. Prof. Max Müller translates: 'Observe the footsteps of the animal (the stolen animal of the thief Agni).'

Note 3. With guhá guham comp. I, 53, 7. yudhá yúdhām, purá púram.

Verse 7.

Note 1. Dhārām *ritásya*: comp. V, 12, 2. *ritásya dhārāḥ* ánu *trindhi pûrvīḥ*, 'open the many streams of *Rita*;' VII, 43, 4. *ritásya dhārāḥ sudúghāḥ dúhânāḥ*, 'milking the streams of *Rita* flowing with plenty.' The stream of *Rita* seems to mean the stream of blessings (such as rain, ghee, &c.) which flows to mankind according to the eternal laws of *Rita*.

Verse 8.

Note 1. The poet passes over from the plural to the singular.

Verse 9.

Note 1. Bollensen's conjecture *pragāsu* (instead of *pragāḥ utá*) seems very probable to me. Prof. von Roth (Ueber gewisse Kürzungen des Wortendes, p. 2) takes a different view.

Note 2. Comp. I, 95, 10 (see below); VII, 9, 3. *apām gárbhaḥ prasvāḥ ā viveśa*, 'the son of the waters has entered upon the sprouting grass.'

Verse 10.

Note 1. 'Why not *kitiḥ* *apām* dame, that is, the (burning) pile in the home of the waters.' M. M.

MANDALA I, HYMN 68.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYÂYA 5, VARGA 12.

1. Cooking¹ (the oblations?) the quick one has approached the sky. He has revealed the nights and what stands and moves²—

2. When he the god, alone of all these gods¹ encompassed (the others) by his greatness.

3. When thou, O god, hadst been born living from the dry (wood), then all (gods and men?) were pleased with thy wisdom.

4. They all obtained the name of divinity, of immortality¹, serving the *Rita* in due way.

5. The instigations of *Rita*, the thought of *Rita*¹: they all performed the works of [?] the full-lived one².

6. Bestow wealth, thou who art the knowing one, on him who worships thee or who does service to thee¹.

7. He who sits down as the *Hotri* among the offspring of *Manu*: he verily is the master of all these riches.

8. They longed together for the seed in their bodies¹, and the wise ones were concordant among each other in their minds.

9. They took pleasure in his will, as sons (take pleasure) in their father's (will), the quick ones who have listened to his command.

10. He who is rich in food has opened the gates of wealth¹. The householder (*Agni*) has adorned the sky with stars.

NOTES.

The same *Rīshi* and metre.

Verse 1.

Note 1. Boehtlingk-Roth are wrong in deriving *srīnán* (which should more correctly be written *sriṇán*, comp. my Prolegomena, 477) from the root *sri*. They supply an object like *soḥiḥ* and translate: 'Licht verbreitend hebt er sich zum Himmel.'

Note 2. Lanman, 422.

Verse 2.

Note 1. Bollensen conjectures *devánám deváh* (instead of *deváh devánám*) which seems to be right (comp. below, 69, 2), though this conjecture is not absolutely necessary (see my Prolegomena, 97).

Verse 4.

Note 1. *Amṛítam* belongs to *náma*; comp. V, 57, 5. *amṛítam náma bhegire*; X, 123, 4. *vidát gandharváh amṛítáni náma*.

Verse 5.

Note 1. With *ritásya dhītíḥ* comp. I, 71, 3; IV, 23, 8; IX, 76, 4; 97, 34; 111, 2.—Prof. Max Müller thinks that *rita* should be taken as a name of Agni: 'for the righteous (Agni) are the prayers, for the righteous the devotion.'

Note 2. Is *visváyuh* an adverb meaning 'eternally'? As *visváyu* is an epithet of Agni frequently used in the Rígvēda and especially in the Parásara hymns (see 67, 6. 10; 68, 5; 73, 4), one feels tempted to read *visváyoh* (comp. IV, 42, 1. *rāshtrám kshatríyasya visváyoh*).

Verse 6.

Note 1. Comp. III, 59, 2. *yáh te áditya śikshati vraténa*.

Verse 8.

Note 1. Some light is thrown on this obscure verse by the hymn, I, 72, a hymn belonging, as our hymn does, to the Parâsara collection. It is shown by the second verse of that hymn (see below) that the searching ones, 'ámûráh,' are the gods who seek Agni. It seems probable, consequently, that the 'seed' is Agni (comp. I, 164, 35, where Soma is said to be *vr̥tshnāh ásvasya rétaḥ*, 'the seed of the manly horse'). Of the same searching gods in I, 72, 5 the expression *samgânânāḥ* is used; comp. *sám gâṇata* in our passage.

Verse 10.

Note 1. *Ráyah* must be a genitive; comp. I, 72, 8. *râyáh dúrah ví ritagñāḥ agānan*. Probably the accent should be *râyáh*; comp., however, Lanman, 431.

MANDALA I, HYMN 69.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYÂYA 5, VARGA 13.

1. Bright, flaming, like the lover of the Dawn¹, he has, like the light of the sky, filled the two (worlds of Heaven and Earth) which are turned towards each other.

2. As soon as thou wert born thou hast excelled by thy power of mind ; being the son of the gods thou hast become their father.

3. (Agni is) a worshipper (of the gods), never foolish, (always) discriminating ; (he is) like the udder of the cows ; (he is) the sweetness of food¹—

4. Like a kind friend to men, not to be led astray¹, sitting in the midst, the lovely one, in the house ;

5. Like a child when born, he is delightful in the house ; like a race-horse which is well cared for¹, he has wandered across the clans².

6. When I call (to the sacrifice) the clans who dwell in the same nest with the heroes, may Agni then attain all divine powers¹.

7. When thou hast listened to these heroes, no one breaks those laws of thine.

8. That verily is thy wonderful deed that thou hast killed¹, with thy companions, (all foes), that, joined by the heroes, thou hast accomplished thy works².

9. Like the lover of the Dawn¹, resplendent and bright, of familiar form : may he (thus) pay attention to this (sacrificer).

10. Carrying (him) they opened by themselves the doors (of heaven). They all shouted at the aspect of the sun¹.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi* and metre.

Verse 1.

Note 1. The lover of the Dawn is here the Sun. See Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, I, 31.

Verse 3.

Note 1. Agni is the sweetness of food (comp. V, 7, 6. *svādanam pitūnām*); it is not probable that *svādma* and *ūdha* should depend on *vigānān*, as Ludwig believes.

Verse 4.

Note 1. I adopt Boehtlingk-Roth's conjecture *ahūryāh*. *Āhūrya* would mean, 'he who is to be led astray.'

Verse 5.

Note 1. See above, 66, 4.

Note 2. 'He has overcome the (hostile) clans.' M. M.

Verse 6.

Note 1. Perhaps *devatvá* is an instrumental, as Ludwig takes it. In this case we should have to translate: 'may Agni by his divine power attain everything.'—Prof. Max Müller translates this verse: 'When I with my men call the clans of the same nest (the gods), Agni will obtain all divine honours.'

Verse 8.

Note 1. The first hemistich of this verse has eleven syllables instead of ten and shows the regular *Trishubh* type. The same irregularity occurs in 70, 4. 10. As I have shown in my *Prolegomena*, p. 97, this metrical irregularity does not necessitate corrections of the text,

and the comparison of X, 147, 1 (see next note), where it is said áhan yát vrītrám . . . vivéḥ apáḥ, seems even to confirm the traditional reading. It cannot be denied, however, that the double yát and the use of áhan without an object raises some suspicion. In I, 34, 3; 186, 4 we have samāné áhan. Possibly we may read, tát tú te dámsaḥ áhan samāné, 'this wonderful deed of thine has been accomplished on one and the same day (with that mentioned in verse 7).' I am fully aware of the uncertainty of such guesses. The removal of yát has already been proposed by Bollensen (*Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morg. Gesellschaft*, XXII, 592).

Note 2. Here we may correct the text with greater certainty than in the first hemistich, or to speak more accurately, we shall have to correct not the traditional text itself, but that ancient grammatical commentary on the text which has been preserved to us in the *Padapāṭha*. The words vivérápāmsi of the *Samhitāpāṭha* are written in the *Padapāṭha* vivéḥ rāpāmsi. Now we read IV, 19, 10. āpāmsi . . . nāryā áviveshīḥ, 'thou hast performed manly works.' In X, 147, 1 we have áhan yát vrītrám nāryam vivéḥ apáḥ: here the adjective nārya clearly shows that apáḥ is a blunder for āpāḥ, and we must translate, 'when thou hast killed Vrītra and performed thy manly work.' This passage shows that in X, 76, 3 also vivéḥ apáḥ should be corrected (v. āpāḥ). Thus we have three passages in which áviveshīḥ or vivéḥ has the object āpāḥ, āpāmsi, and we may infer with full certainty that in our passage vivérápāmsi does not correspond to a *Padapāṭha* reading vivéḥ rāpāmsi but vivéḥ āpāmsi. The same may be said with regard to VI, 31, 3 (mushāyāḥ kakrām áviveḥ rāpāmsi; *Samh.* ávive rāpāmsi).

Verse 9.

Note 1. Comp. above, verse 1.

Verse 10.

Note 1. Comp. above, 66, 10.

MANDALA I, HYMN 70.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYĀYA 5, VARGA 14.

1. May we, the poor¹, succeed in many (pious) thoughts². May Agni with his pure splendour attain everything—

2. He who understands the divine laws and the birth of the human race.

3. He who is the child of the waters, the child of the trees, the child of that which stands, and the child of that which moves.

4. Even in the rock (they have done homage [?]) to him, in his dwelling¹. (He is) like a protector [?]² of the clans, the immortal one, he who is of a good mind.

5. For he, Agni, (shows himself as) an earth-protecting (lord) of riches¹ to the man who satisfies him with well-spoken (prayers).

6. Protect, O knowing one, these beings, thou who knowest the birth of gods and men¹.

7. He whom many nights (and dawns), in their different forms¹, may increase, whom that which moves² and that which stands (increases), the god penetrated by *Rita*—

8. That *Hotri* who has sat down in the sun¹, has been successfully worshipped² (by the human sacrificers), he who truly accomplishes all his works.

9. On the cows, on the trees thou hast conferred excellence. May all men bring us tribute in the sun¹.

10. In many places men have worshipped thee. They have brought (thee) to different places¹ as sons (divide) the property of an aged father².

11¹. (He is) like a greedy man² who goes straight (to his aim), like a mighty archer, like a fearful avenger [?]³, impetuous in contests⁴.

NOTES.

The same *Rīshi* and metre.

Verse 1.

Note 1. I adopt Bergaigne's opinion on the word *arī* (see *Religion Védique*, II, 218 seq.).

Note 2. The *Padapāṭha* has *manīṣhā* instead of *manīṣhāḥ*. See my *Prolegomena*, 385; Lanman, 363. Prof. Max Müller proposes to translate: 'May we by wisdom overcome many enemies!' He writes: 'Is not *vanema* almost a standing formula as applied to enemies? Let us conquer the enemies. The enemies are masculine in VII, 48, 3. *viśvān aryāḥ* . . . *van-van*, feminine in VI, 16, 27. *vanvāntaḥ aryāḥ arātiḥ*. VIII, 39, 2. *viśvāḥ aryāḥ arātiḥ*. X, 133, 3. *viśvāḥ arātayaḥ aryāḥ*. IV, 50, 11. *gagastām aryāḥ vanūṣhām arātiḥ* (repeated VII, 97, 9; cf. I, 29, 4).' For my translation I refer to II, 5, 7. *stómam* . . . *vanéma*; II, 11, 12. *dhíyam vanema*; I, 122, 14. *aryāḥ gírah*; X, 148, 3. *aryāḥ vā gírah abhí arka vidvān*.

Verse 4.

Note 1. Or: even in the rock (they have done homage) to him, and in the (human) dwelling? I believe we must supply a verb on which the dative *asmai* depends. Ludwig proposes to read *duroṣām*: 'within the stone is his dwelling.' Comp. II, 1, 1; VI, 48, 5.

Note 2. I do not understand *viśām ná viśvaḥ*. Ludwig translates 'er ist der menschen allgemeiner, unsterblicher

fürsorger.' But *vísva* does not mean 'allgemein,' and Ludwig omits *ná*, 'like.' One should expect a phrase like *visám ná vispátih*, which of course is metrically impossible. Is it too bold to correct *vísva* into *vispáh*, a word hitherto not found in the texts, but formed exactly like *stipá*, *pasupá*, *tanûpá* and others?—Prof. Max Müller takes *asmai* as dependent on *svâdhîh* and *vísva* as belonging at the same time to *amrîta* and to *visám*. He translates: 'To him also who dwells in the rock and in the house, every immortal like every one among men is well disposed.'

Verse 5.

Note 1. Comp. VII, 10, 5. *sá hí kshápâvân ábhavat rayinâm*.

Verse 6.

Note 1. Most probably we have here not the accusative *mártân* but the genitive *mártâm*, which was confounded by the arrangers of the traditional text with the accusative and treated according to the Sandhi rules which govern the ending *-ân*. See Lanman, Noun-Inflection, 353; Bartholomae, Studien zur indogermanischen Sprachgeschichte, I, 48.

Verse 7.

Note 1. Lanman (p. 422) takes *kshapáh vírûpáh* as accusatives, and translates, 'Whom through many nights and mornings all beings worship.' I believe that they are nominatives, and that we should accentuate *kshápáh*. As *vírûpa* is a regular epithet of *náktoshásá*, I think that *kshápáh* is to be understood as an elliptic plural similar to the elliptic duals *ushásá* or *áhanî* (comp. Delbrück, Altindische Syntax, 102), and that it means, 'the nights (and mornings).'
—Comp. VI, 38, 4. *várdhân māsáh saráda* *dyáva* *índram*, 'May months, years, days increase Indra's greatness.'

Note 2. Of course *ka rátham* is a mistake for *karátham*, as first pointed out by Benfey.

Verse 8.

Note 1. On the locative *svar*, see Lanman, 488; Joh. Schmidt in Kuhn's Zeitschrift, XXVII, 306; Bartholomae in Bezzenberger's Beiträge, XV, 42. Comp. X, 61, 14. *sṛaḥ* ná yé trishadhasthé nishedúḥ.

Note 2. Comp. X, 53, 2. *árādhi hótā nishádā yágíyān*.

Verse 9.

Note 1. Is it not more probable that tribute was brought to Agni (comp. V, 1, 10) than to the human worshippers? Possibly we should change *sṛaḥ naḥ* (*svar naḥ* of the *Samhitāpāṭha*) into *svarnaḥ*, a vocative of the stem *sṛanri* = *sṛanara*. The translation would be, 'All men have brought tribute to thee, O sun-hero!'

Verse 10.

Note 1. Comp. V, 11, 4. *agním nárah ví bharante grīhé-grīhe*.

Note 2. Regarding the metre, comp. above, 69, 8, note 1.

Verse 11.

Note 1. This verse may possibly be a later addition. See Bergaigne, Recherches sur l'Histoire de la *Samhitā*, I, 61.

Note 2. On *grīdhnú*, comp. Pischel, Ved. Studien, I, 231.

Note 3. Comp. I, 32, 14. *áheḥ yâtáram*.

Note 4. See above, 66, 6.

MANDALA I, HYMN 71.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYÂYA 5, VARGA 15-16.

1. The loving (women) have (amorously) excited ¹ their lover, as wives of the same nest (house) their own husband. The sisters have delighted in the dark and in the red (goddess) ², as the cows in the brightly shining dawn.

2. Our fathers, the Ângiras ¹, have broken even the strong fortresses by their hymns, the rock by their shouting. They have opened to us the path of the great heaven; they have obtained day and sun and the shine of the dawn ².

3. They founded the *Rîta*; they set into motion the thought of it ¹. Thus then the widely-spread (prayers) ² of the poor ³ which seek to obtain (wealth), which are free from thirst ⁴, the active, approach ⁵ the tribe of the gods ⁶, strengthening them by offering them delight.

4. When Mâtarisvan had produced him by attrition, he, the reddish, the noble one, who was brought to many places ¹, has come to every house. Then the Bhrîgu-like ² has undertaken the messengership ³ (for the mortal) as for a mightier king, being attached to him.

5. When he had created sap to the great father Heaven, the knowing one stealthily approached the speckled (cows). The archer fiercely shot an arrow at him. The god turned his impetuous power against his daughter ¹.

6. Augment, O Agni, twofold the strength of

the man who worships¹ thee in his house, or offers adoration to the loving one² day by day. May he whom thou incitest be united with riches³.

7. Every nourishment goes towards Agni¹, as the seven young² rivers (flow) into the ocean. Our strength does not shine from kinsmen³. Do thou therefore who knowest this, procure among the gods kindness for us.

8¹. When the sharp splendour² reached the lord of men to incite him³, the bright sperm poured down from Heaven (or, from the god Dyaus)⁴, Agni produced⁵ and furthered the blameless, young, well-wishing host⁶.

9. He who traverses the paths quickly¹ like thought, the Sun alone rules over wealth altogether. (There are) the two kings Mitra and Varuṇa with graceful hands², who watch over the beloved ambrosia³ in the cows.

10. Do not forget, O Agni, who art a sage possessed of knowledge¹, our paternal friendship. Old age impairs the appearance (of men) as a cloud (covers the sun or the sky). Before this curse (attains us), think thou (of us)².

NOTES.

The same *R̥ishi*. Metre, Trish/ubh.

Though the hymns 71-73 are not composed in the Virâg metre like the preceding hymns, it is shown by manifold evidence that they had the same origin. Verse 8 = VS. XXXIII, 11; TS. I, 3, 14, 6; MS. IV, 14, 15.

Verse 1.

Note 1. Comp. Geldner, *Vedische Studien*, II, 134.

Note 2. If the text is correct, the 'sisters' may either

be the ten fingers which generate Agni by attrition (III, 29, 13; IV, 6, 8), or the streams of water among which Agni grows up, or streams of *Ghrīta* or the like (comp. II, 5, 5; see below). Why these sisters are said to delight in the dark and in the bright goddess, the Night and the Dawn, remains doubtful.

But I think there are reasons which strongly recommend a correction of the text. In III, 55, 11 we read *syāvī ka . . . árushī ka svásārau*, 'the two sisters, the dark one and the red one.' Is it not probable that in our passage also it is the sisters who are described as dark and red? The dark goddess and the red goddess of course are Night and Dawn, and Night and Dawn, as is well known, are sisters in Vedic poetry. And furthermore the 'sisters' are described in our verse as amorously exciting the god Agni: for it cannot well be doubted that the *svásārah* of the third Páda are identical with the *usatīh* of the first: similarly it is said in 70, 7—in a hymn belonging to the same collection with our Sūkta—that the Nights and Dawns augment Agni's greatness; in other passages Agni is represented as beloved by the Dawn, or as suckled by Night and Dawn (Bergaigne, *Religion Védique*, II, 14. 15). The 'sisters' then are stated in our verse to delight (*agushran*), probably in Agni: now we read in II, 2, 2. *abhī tvā náktiḥ ushásāh vavāsire ágne vatsám ná svásareshu dhenávaḥ*, 'The Nights and Dawns, Agni, have lowed at thee as the milch-cows in their stalls at their calves;' comp. Bergaigne, II, 15. Thus everything is clear, if we take the *usatīh* and the *svásārah* for the bright and dark goddesses, i. e. for the Dawns and Nights. The correction of the text to which this interpretation leads, is *svásārah syāvīḥ árushīḥ agushran*, 'the dark and the red sisters have delighted (in Agni).' It is easy to understand that the corruption of the text was occasioned by the simile of the fourth Páda. The words *ushásam ná gávaḥ* seemed to demand a parallel nominative and a parallel accusative in the third Páda. The nominative was *svásārah*, but there was no accusative. Thus probably arose the reading *syāvīm árushīm*.

Verse 2.

Note 1. On the *Āngiras* as the fathers of the priestly tribes, see H. O., Religion des Veda, 278.

Note 2. The phrase *ushásaḥ ketúḥ* occurs several times in the *Rig-veda*. I think that *ketúm usráḥ* means exactly the same; it has been shown by Kaegi, Festgruss and Boehtlingk, p. 49, and by Bartholomae, Bezzenger's Beiträge, XV, 185, that a genitive sing. *usráḥ* existed.

Verse 3.

Note 1. Ludwig refers *asya* to the sacrificer, Bollensen to *Āgni*, and so does *Sāyana*. I believe that *asya* should be explained as *ṛitása*; the phrase *ṛitása dhīti* is frequently used, comp. IV, 23, 8; IX, 76, 4; 97, 34; 111, 2. See also Ludwig's note on III, 31, 1 (vol. v, p. 65).—Prof. Max Müller refers *ṛita* to *Āgni*. 'One might translate it by righteous: They established the righteous (*Āgni*), they moved his mind (made him attend?).'

Note 2. The substantive (of feminine gender) which is to be supplied to *didhishvāḥ*, *ātrishyantīḥ*, &c., seems to me to be *gīrah* or the like. *Aryáḥ* stands frequently together with *gīrah*.—Prof. Max Müller writes: 'Could not *ari* be a feminine like *karshani* and *vis*; see before, I, 70, 1. We should then translate, and then the people emulous, widely spread, never flagging [the stones also are called *atrishitāḥ* *atrishnagaḥ*, X, 94, 11], and active go towards the gods.'

Note 3. See above, 70, 1, note 1.

Note 4. Are the prayers called 'free from thirst' because they are accompanied by libations of *Ghrīta*, *Soma*, &c.?

Note 5. I believe that *devān gánma* depends both on *ákkhā* and on *vardháyantīḥ*.

Note 6. *Devān*, or rather *devām*, is gen. plur.; see above, 70, 6, with note 1.

Verse 4.

Note 1. The place in which *víbhṛitaḥ* stands would seem to show that it is an epithet of *Mātarisvan*, and so it is understood by Ludwig and by Bergaigne (*Rel. Véd.* I, 54).

But it is Agni himself, not Mâtariśvan, who is very frequently mentioned as *vībhṛitā* or the like. As we read here, *vībhṛitāḥ . . . grīhé-grīhe*, it is said in V, 11, 4. *agnīm nárah ví bharante grīhé-grīhe*, 'the men carry Agni hither and thither, to every house;' comp. I, 70, 10; III, 55, 4; X, 1, 2; 45, 2; 80, 4. Thus I believe the poet means to say that Mâtariśvan first kindled Agni, in one place of course, and that Agni then was brought to many places, to all human dwellings. I think that the text indeed can be understood in this way, if we suppose that the author, for the sake of the metre, allowed himself a hyperbaton or sychysis.

We must not omit to mention that the first Páda of I, 148, 1 is nearly identical with our passage: *máthīt yát ím viśtātāḥ mâtariśvā*. This Páda is deficient by one syllable. If we were to read *vībhṛitāḥ*, as in our passage, this would lead indeed to the conclusion that there is no hyperbaton in our verse—for the verse, I, 148, 1, could not be explained in that way—but that *vībhṛitāḥ* refers to Mâtariśvan. I think, however, that it is more than doubtful that the verse, I, 148, 1, really ought to be corrected in this way; whatever may have been the original form of that verse, it is quite possible, and even probable, that it differed from our passage just in that one word.

Note 2. The exact meaning of *Bhrīgavāna* is doubtful. It is, of course, derived from *Bhrīgu* as *vāsavāna*, *tákavāna*, from *vāsu*, *táku*. Agni is called *Bhrīgavāna* also in IV, 7, 4. Comp. Bergaigne, I, 54.

Note 3. With the words *á dūtīyam vivāya* comp. IV, 9, 6. *véshi ít u asya dūtīyam*.

Verse 5.

Note 1. This difficult verse evidently treats of the incest which the father Dyaus has committed with his daughter. Compare on this subject Bergaigne, Rel. Véd. II, 109 seq. Agni seems to be represented here as stimulating the desire of the father; the 'sap' (*rása*) probably is the sperm, comp. I, 105, 2.

In the second Páda, Agni, having done, as it seems, some mischief, goes away to the 'speckled cows.' We cannot say who these speckled cows were; they evidently are identical with those mentioned in another passage treating of the same story, X, 61, 8.—Bergaigne paraphrases the second Páda of our verse, wrongly in my opinion, 'Agni sort furtivement de cette fille, de cette vache, *prisaní*.'

The archer who shoots at Agni (third Páda) is not better known to us than the speckled cows. Bergaigne's opinion, 'que cet archer n'est autre que le père lui-même,' is not very convincing.

Verse 6.

Note 1. The traditional reading *vibhāti* ('he who shines for thee in his house') gives no satisfactory sense. I propose to read *vidhāti*. Cf. I, 120, 1. *kathá vidhāti ápraketāh*.

Note 2. I have some doubts as to the correctness of *usátāh* (*Samhitāpāṭha*, *usató*) *ánu dyūn*. *Usát*, of course, is an epithet not of the days, but of Agni. But then we expect the dative. Correcting the text (*usaté*) is all the easier, because before a following vowel the dative and the genitive were, in the original pronunciation, identical (*usátá-ánu*; see my *Prolegomena*, 447 sqq.); the spellings of the *Samhitāpāṭha*, *usató ánu* and *usaté ánu*, belong to the inventions of Vedic grammarians.

Note 3. Literally, May he whom thou incitest drive on the same chariot with riches. Comp. such expressions as *rathīḥ ráyāh* and the like.

Verse 7.

Note 1. Comp. IV, 44, 2. *yuvóh vápuh abhí príkshaḥ sakante*; VII, 90, 5.

Note 2. Comp. I, 26, 10, note 1.

Note 3. Ludwig: nicht unter unsern freunden ward auszufündig gemacht die kraftspeise. Grassmann: nicht bei Verwandten ward uns Nahrung sichtbar. Wilson: Our food is not partaken of by our kinsmen. Griffith: Not by our brethren was our food discovered.—Ludwig and Grassmann translate as if the text had *gāmíshu*. What the

instrumental means is shown, I believe, for instance, by IV, 14, 2. *ví sūryaḥ raśmībhiḥ kēkitānaḥ*, 'the sun shining with his rays.' Thus in our passage the poet seems to me to say, 'We have no strong kinsmen who might add lustre to our strength. Agni, procure thou strength to us.' Comp. X, 23, 7. *vidmā hī te prāmatim deva gāmivāt*, 'for we know, O god, thy providing care like that of a kinsman.'—Prof. Max Müller proposes the translation: 'Our wealth is not known by our kinsmen, i. e. we cannot support them as we ought.'

Verse 8.

Note 1. The poet returns here to the myth. of which he had spoken in verse 5. Should the order of the verses be changed?—On our verse, compare Geldner, *Ved. Studien*, II, 34.

Note 2. *Tégas* seems to be here a synonym of *rétaḥ*, as in the later language.

Note 3. Is the lord of men Agni? See the third Pāda.—*Ishé* I consider, with Geldner, as an infinitive.

Note 4. My translation rests on the supposition that *dyaúḥ* is to be corrected into *dyóḥ*; thus the ablative is obtained, of which the word *abhīke* is usually accompanied (comp. Lanman, 433; Collitz, *Bezenberger's Beiträge*, X, 15). If we leave the reading *dyaúḥ*, this nominative will be the subject of the verb *ānat*. Then *tégaḥ* must be accusative dependent on *ānat*, and we can scarcely avoid making *nṛipátim* to depend on the infinitive *ishé*. This is the way which Geldner has followed in interpreting this passage. But I cannot consider this separation of *nṛipátim* from the verb *ānat* very probable.

Note 5. The exact meaning of *ganayat* seems to be here, 'he caused them to be born.' Comp. *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa* I, 7, 4, 4. *yathā tad devā retaḥ prāganayan* (comp. *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* III, 34; see also *Rig-veda* X, 61, 7).

Note 6. This may be the host of the seven *Rishis*. Comp. III, 31, 1–5; IV, 1, 12 seq. (?). Or the Maruts are alluded to (comp. below, 72, 4), though that seems to me less probable.

Verse 9.

Note 1. Literally, in one day. But *sadyáḥ* has already in the Rig-veda the secondary meaning 'immediately, quickly.'

Note 2. Comp. III, 56, 7. *rāḡānā mitrá-várunā supānī*.

Note 3. See below, 72, 6.

Verse 10.

Note 1. Comp. VII, 18, 2 : there the words *abhí vidúḥ kavíḥ sán* are identical with our text.

Note 2. Of the second hemistich Prof. Collitz has treated in Bezzenberger's Beiträge, X, 15, note. He paraphrases the meaning in the following way : 'Der Sinn des ganzen Verses ist : unsere Freundschaft mit dir, Agni, stammt aus alter Zeit. Nun sagt man zwar "im Alter ändert sich das Aussehn wie das der Wolke." Aber stehe du uns bei vor diesem Fluche.' I do not believe that this interpretation, though very ingenious, gives the real meaning of the Vedic poet.—Comp. I, 179, 1. *mināti sríyam garimā tanūnām*.

MANDALA I, HYMN 72.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYĀYA 5, VARGA 17-18.

1. He has brought down (i.e. surpassed) the wisdom of many a worshipper¹, he who holds in his hand all manly power. Agni has become the lord of treasures, he who brought together all (powers of) immortality.

2¹. All the clever immortals when seeking did not find the calf though sojourning round about us. The attentive (gods), wearying themselves, following his footsteps², stood at the highest, beautiful³ standing-place of Agni.

3. When the bright ones¹ had done service² to thee, the bright one, Agni, with *Ghrīta* through three autumns, they assumed worshipful names; the well-born shaped their own bodies.

4. Acquiring (or, exploring?) for themselves the two great worlds, the worshipful ones brought forward their Rudra-like powers¹. The mortal, when (beings) were in discord², perceived and found out Agni standing in the highest place.

5. Being like-minded they¹ reverentially approached him on their knees. Together with their wives they venerated the venerable one². Abandoning their bodies they made them their own³, the (one) friend waking when the (other) friend closed his eyes⁴.

6. When the worshipful (gods) have discovered the thrice seven secret steps¹ (or, places) laid down in thee, they concordantly guard with them immor-

talities. Protect thou the cattle and that which remains steadfast² and that which moves.

7. Knowing, O Agni, the established orders¹ of (human) dwellings, distribute in due order gifts² that they may live. Knowing the ways which the gods go³, thou hast become the unwearied messenger, the bearer of oblations.

8. They who knew the right way and were filled with good intentions, beheld from heaven the seven young¹ (rivers) and the doors of riches. Saramâ found the strong stable of the cows from which human clans receive their nourishment².

9. The Earth has spread herself far and wide with them who are great in their greatness, the mother Aditi, for the refreshment of the bird¹, with her sons who have assumed all powers of their own dominion², preparing (for themselves) the way to immortality.

10. When the immortals created the two eyes of heaven¹, they placed fair splendour in him (Agni)². Then they rush down³ like streams let loose. The red ones have recognised, O Agni, those which are directed downwards⁴.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi* and metre.—Verse 1 = TS. II, 2, 12, 1. Verse 3 = TB. II, 4, 5, 6. Verses 8–9 = TB. II, 5, 8, 10.

Verse 1.

Note 1. The meaning seems to me to be : by his wisdom he excels all human wisdom. Prof. Max Müller translates : ‘Agni, who holds in his hand all that men desire, conquers

(or, wins for himself) the praises of many a wise worshipper.' And the last Pāda: 'he who brought together all immortal blessings.'—On *sarvat*, see VI, 61, 1; VII, 18, 18; VIII, 23, 28.

Verse 2.

Note 1. Here we have again the myth of the hidden Agni whom the gods seek. Agni is meant by the calf.

Note 2. Going on foot, *Sâyana*.

Note 3. I follow *Sâyana*, Bollensen, and Ludwig in taking *kāru* as a locative.

Verse 3.

Note 1. 'Was not *Sâyana* right in taking this verse as referring to the Maruts? Cf. VI, 48, 21. . . . *sugāta* also is an epithet of the Maruts, I, 88, 3; 166, 12.' M. M.

Note 2. As to the subjunctive, comp. Delbrück, *Syntaktische Forschungen*, I, p. 67. The *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* (II, 4, 5, 6) reads *saparyān*.

Verse 4.

Note 1. I follow the *Padapāṭha* which has *rudrīyā*. But possibly we may have the nom. plur. *rudrīyāḥ*: 'the worshipful Rudriyas (i.e. Maruts) rushed forward.'

Note 2. The translation of *nemádhitā* is in jeopardy.

Verse 5.

Note 1. Probably the mortals, as Ludwig understands it. Comp. *mártaḥ*, verse 4.

Note 2. The venerable one is Agni.

Note 3. Possibly the text is corrupt. In IV, 24, 3 we read *ririkvāmsaḥ tanvāḥ krinvata trām*, 'abandoning (i.e. risking) their bodies they took him (Indra) for their protector' (comp. I, 100, 7). Should *svāḥ* have supplanted another word, for instance, *trām*? As the pronoun *svá* very frequently stands in apposition with *tanū*, it may have found its way also into passages to which it did not belong.

Note 4. The meaning seems to be that whenever the attention of one of the friends relaxed, another friend watched instead of the first. See *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenl. Gesellschaft*, XLIV, 328; Bartholomae, *Studien zur indogerm. Sprachgeschichte*, I, 95.

Verse 6.

Note 1. *Sâyana* explains the *trīḥ sapta padā* as the three times seven kinds of sacrifices, the seven *Pākayagñas*, the seven *Haviryagñas*, the seven *Somayagñas*. But this later system of the twenty-one forms of sacrifice can scarcely have existed at the time of the *Rig-veda Samhitā*. Three times seven is a favourite number in *Rig-vedic* mysticism; comp. I, 191, 12. 14; IV, 1, 16; VII, 87, 4; VIII, 46, 26; 69, 7; 96, 2; IX, 70, 1; 86, 21; X, 64, 8; 90, 15. Possibly three times seven pieces of wood (*samīdhaḥ*) are alluded to, comp. X, 90, 15, but everybody who has studied *Bergaigne's Arithmétique mythologique* (*Rel. Véd.* II, 114 seq.; see especially p. 122) will admit that there are ever so many possible interpretations of a passage like this. Prof. Max Müller's translation is: 'The worshipful gods found in thee the twenty-one words which are hidden in thee. They guard with them the immortal (Agni).—Instead of *avidan* (*Padapātḥa*) I think we must read *ávidan*.

Note 2. Ludwig certainly is wrong in translating 'hüte du den wandel von tier und pflanze.' The author of this group of hymns is very fond of the phrase *sthātúḥ karātham* and the like; see I, 68, 1; 70, 3. 7. The same phrase, in one or the other of its possible shapes, has evidently been used by him here also. The plural masculine *sthātrīn* is indeed very strange. Possibly J. Wackernagel is right in reading *sthātúḥ* (*Kuhn's Zeitschrift*, XXV, 287; comp. Lanman, p. 422); the reading *sthātrīn* may be due to the neighbourhood of *paśūn*. This sort of blunder is very frequent in the text of the *Rig-veda*. Prof. Max Müller suggests: the stabled cattle and what moves about (in the meadows).

Verse 7.

Note 1. On vayúna, comp. Pischel, Ved. Studien, I, 295. 300. 'The thoughts of human beings.' M. M.

Note 2. Surúdh : Pischel, Ved. Studien, I, 32. 50.

Note 3. 'Which lead to the gods?' M. M.

Verse 8.

Note 1. Comp. I, 26, 10, note 1.—'Beheld the seven young rivers coming down from heaven.' M. M.

Note 2. See Delbrück, Syntaktische Forschungen, I, 87.

Verse 9.

Note 1. The bird seems to be Agni.

Note 2. The Padapáṭha gives su-apatyáni. There is no doubt a word su-apatyá, 'blessed with good offspring.' This is frequently used together with such nouns as rayi, kshaya, ish; it stands in several passages by the side of pragāvat. See I, 117, 19; II, 2, 12; 4, 8; 9, 5; III, 3, 7; 16, 1; IV, 2, 11; X, 30, 12. But from this word should be distinguished sva-patyá, derived from svá-pati (X, 44, 1, &c.), 'a man's own dominion,' or 'own rulership;' comp. gāspatyá. This word is found here, and in some other passages, for instance, VII, 91, 3. vīsvá ít náraḥ svapatyáni kakruḥ, 'the heroes have exercised all the powers of their own dominion;' VIII, 15, 10. satrá vīsvá svapatyáni dadhishe, 'thou hast assumed (Indra) all powers of thy own dominion altogether.'—Ludwig translates correctly, 'alle selbstherlichkeit.'

The Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa reads kakrúḥ for tasthúḥ. This reading evidently rests on Rig-veda IV, 34, 9; VII, 91, 3. There is no reason, however, for preferring this to the traditional reading of our Rik-text.

Verse 10.

Note 1. The sun and the moon? This very natural explanation will scarcely be modified on account of passages like the following (Satapatha Brāhmaṇa I, 6, 3, 38):

‘These are the two eyes of the sacrifice, the (oblations of butter called) *Āgyabhāgas*.’

Note 2. Comp. below, 73, 4.

Note 3. It is not necessary to change the text ; I believe, however, that the conjecture *adhá/ ksharanti* (they stream downwards) would not be quite improbable. Comp. my *Prolegomena*, p. 369, note 1.—The subject seems to be the streams of sacrificial libations.

Note 4. Both expressions, ‘the red ones’ and ‘those which are directed downwards,’ are feminine. The red ones may be the dawns. But these cannot be called ‘directed downwards.’ I take, therefore, the one noun as a nominative, the other as an accusative. Cannot ‘those which are directed downwards’ be the libations of *Ghrīta* and the like, which the dawns see?—Prof. Max Müller translates: ‘People recognised the red netherward mares (of thee), O Agni.’ He supplies *gvālā/* or takes *arushī/* as mares, cf. V, 56, 6.

MANDALA I, HYMN 73.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYÂYA 5, VARGA 19-20.

1. He who gives vigour like wealth acquired by the fathers¹, who is a good guide like the instruction of a sage, who is pleased (by worship) like a comfortably resting guest², (Agni) has crossed the (sacrificial) seat of the worshipper like a *Hotri*.

2. He who being truthful like the god *Savitri*¹ protects by his power of mind all settlements², praised by many like impetuous splendour³, the truthful one has become dear like vital breath and worthy to be searched for⁴.

3¹. (Agni) who possessing every refreshment dwells on the earth like a god, like a king who has made himself (valiant) friends², like heroes who sit in front and under shelter, like a blameless wife beloved by her husband—

4. Thee, O Agni, who art constantly kindled in the house, men have worshipped in their firm dwellings. They have placed in him rich splendour¹. Be thou possessed of all life, a supporter of riches².

5. May the liberal givers, O Agni, attain nourishment, may the rich¹ who bestow gifts (on us) attain to a full span of life. May we win in battles the booty of him who does not give¹, obtaining a (rich) share before the gods, that we may win glory².

6. The lowing milch-cows of *Rita*, assigned by Heaven, were exuberant with their full udders. The rivers imploring the favour (of the gods) from afar

have broken through the midst of the rock with their floods.

7. Imploring favour from thee, O Agni, the worshipful (gods) have won glory in the sky. They have made Night and Dawn of different shapes; they have joined the black and red colour (to Night and Dawn).

8. And may we, our liberal givers and ourselves, be the mortals whom thou furtherest to wealth, O Agni¹. Like a shadow thou followest the whole world, having filled the two worlds (Heaven and Earth) and the air².

9. May we, O Agni, guarded by thee, conquer with our racers the racers, with our men the men, with our heroes the heroes (of our enemies). Being masters of the riches which their fathers¹ have conquered, may our rich (givers) reach a hundred winters.

10. May these hymns, O Agni, worshipper (of the gods), be grateful to thee, to thy mind and heart. May we be able to bridle thee, the well-harnessed wealth¹, acquiring the glory which the gods have assigned us.

NOTES.

The same *R̥ishi* and metre.—Verse 5 = MS. IV, 14, 15.
Verse 7 = TB. II, 7, 12, 5. Verse 10 = MS. IV, 14, 15.

Verse 1.

Note 1. Agni is compared to wealth acquired by the fathers, being himself *pitṛivitta*, found by the forefathers

of the Brāhmanic tribes. Prof. Max Müller proposes to translate : 'wealth inherited from the fathers.'

Note 2. Comp. VII, 42, 4, and see also VI, 16, 42.

Verse 2.

Note 1. The first Pāda is identical with the fourth of IX, 97, 48. There the expressions are referred to Soma.

Note 2. On *vrigāna*, comp. the quotations given above, I, 60, 3, note 2 ; cf. IX, 87, 2. *vrigānam rākshamānah*.

Note 3. Comp. I, 64, 9. *amātīh ná darsatā*.

Note 4. Comp. II, 4, 1 (see below).

Verse 3.

Note 1. The first three Pādas are nearly identical with III, 55, 21.

Note 2. As to the meaning of *hitāmitra*, comp. X, 108, 3. *mitrām ena dadhāma* ; see also X, 132, 5, and H. O., Religion des Veda, 186, note 1.

Verse 4.

Note 1. Comp. I, 72, 10 (see above).

Note 2. I cannot accept Pischel's translation of *dharúnaḥ rayīnām*, 'der Reichtum fließen lässt' (Vedische Studien, I, 40).—'Be thou, who art rich in all food, the protector of riches.' M. M.

Verse 5.

Note 1. On *sûrí* and *arí*, see Bergaigne, Rel. Véd. II, 218 seq. *Aryáh* may also be nom. pl. and mean '(we) the poor ones.'

Note 2. 'May we win in battles the booty of the enemy, setting aside a share for the gods to their glory.' M. M.

Verse 8.

Note 1. In the first Pāda one syllable is wanting. Perhaps the acc. plur. *yán* had here dissyllabic value.

Note 2. The last Pāda is identical with the second of X, 139, 2.

Verse 9.

Note 1. Comp. above, verse 1, note 1.

Verse 10.

Note 1. Comp. *sakéma vâgínah yámam*, II, 5, 1 ; *agne sakéma te vayám yámam devásya vâgínah*, III, 27, 3. As *sudhúr* and *sudhúra* are epithets of horses, the poet of course could say, *sakéma sudhúrah yámam te*. But *Agni* is not only a horse ; he is also wealth (II, 1, 12 ; IV, 2, 5, &c.). The combination of the two metaphors explains the curious expression *sudhúrah ráyáh*.

MANDALA I, HYMN 74.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYÂYA 5, VARGA 21-22.

1. Going forward to the sacrifice let us repeat a prayer to Agni who hears us, may he be afar or with us—

2. He who foremost¹ in², when the human tribes met (in battle), has preserved his home to the worshipper.

3. And let the people say 'Agni is born, the slayer of foes (or, the slayer of *Vritra*), he who wins the prize in every battle.'

4. The man in whose home thou art a messenger, and to whose sacrificial food thou eagerly comest for feasting, to whose worship thou impartest wonderful power—

5. Such a man the people call a giver of good oblations, O *Āṅgiras*, a friend of the gods, O son of strength¹, and a possessor of a good *Barhis* (or sacrificial grass).

6. And thou shalt conduct them hither, the gods¹, that we may praise them, that they may eagerly come, O resplendent one, to the sacrificial offerings.

7. No noise¹ of the horses of the moving chariot² is heard any way, when thou goest on thy messengership, O Agni.

8. When guarded by thee the racer becomes fearless; the worshipper, O Agni, who is behind, gains the advantage¹ over him who is ahead.

9. And thou winnest, O Agni, brilliant, high bliss in strong heroes from the gods, O god, for the worshipper.

NOTES.

This hymn opens the section ascribed to Gotama Rāhūgana, and belonging indeed, as several passages show, to the family of the Gotamas (comp. *Zeitschrift der D. Morg. Gesellschaft*, XLII, 221). The metre is Gâyatrî.—Verse 1 = VS. III, 11; TS. I, 5, 5, 1; MS. I, 5, 1 (I, 5, 5. 6). Verses 1–3 = SV. II, 729. 730. 732. Verse 3 = TS. III, 5, 11, 4; MS. IV, 10, 3.

Verse 2.

Note 1. Or *pūrvyāh*, 'the old Agni,' cf. IX, 96, 10? (M. M.)

Note 2. I have left untranslated the obscure word *sn̥hitishu* (Sâyana, *vadhakārin̥ishu*). It seems to be identical with *sn̥hiti*, which occurs VIII, 96, 13. *āpa sn̥hiti/ nr̥imānāh* *adhatta* (the Sāma-veda has the reading *sn̥h°*). Here the verb *āpa adhatta* (comp. VI, 20, 5; X, 164, 3) and the comparison of the second hemistichs of the two following verses, 14 and 15, seem to show that the word means some kind of hostile powers, which would do very well for our passage.—In Taittiriya *Āraṇyaka* IV, 23 the word *sn̥hiti* occurs in an enumeration of the 'terrible substances' (*ghorāh tanúvah*) of Agni.—Comp. Ludwig, Ueber die neuesten Arbeiten auf dem Gebiete der *Rig-veda-Forschung*, p. 93.

Verse 5.

Note 1. See above, I, 26, 10, note 1.

Verse 6.

Note 1. See Delbrück, *Syntaktische Forschungen*, I, 20, 111.

Verse 7.

Note 1. On upabdí, which literally means the noise produced by going, see Joh. Schmidt, Kuhn's Zeitschrift, XXV, 55; Hübschmann, Das indogermanische Vocal-system, 124.

Note 2. Yóh (comp. X, 176, 3?) seems to be a genitive of yú, 'the going one;' comp. sva-yú, subham-yú; Lanman, 401.

Verse 8.

Note 1. The last syllable of asthât has the value of two syllables.

MANDALA I, HYMN 75.

ASHṬAKA I, ADHYĀYA 5, VARGA ३3.

1. Accept gladly our most widely-sounding¹ speech, the most agreeable to the gods, thou who, in thy mouth, offerest the sacrificial food (to the gods).

2. And may we then pronounce to thee, O highest Āṅgiras, Agni, best worshipper, a prayer agreeable to thee and successful.

3. Who is thy kinsman among men, O Agni? Who performs worship to thee¹? Who art thou, and where dost thou rest?

4. Thou, O Agni, art the kinsman, the dear friend ('Mitra') of men, a friend who is to be magnified by his friends.

5. Sacrifice for us to Mitra and Varuṇa. Sacrifice to the gods, (a sacrifice conforming to) the great *Rita*¹. Sacrifice, O Agni, to thy own house.

NOTES.

The same *Rīshi* and metre.—Verse 1 = TB. III, 6, 7, 1; MS. III, 10, 1 (IV, 13, 5). Verses 3–5 = SV. II, 885–887. Verse 5 = VS. XXXIII, 3; TB. II, 7, 12, 1.

Verse 1.

Note 1. Comp. VI, 68, 9. *mánma* . . . *saprátha*h.

Verse 3.

Note 1. May we not take *dâśú-adhvara* as a compound with governed final member, like *vidádvasu*, *sádádyoni* &c.?

Verse 5.

Note 1. Comp. Gaedicke, *Der Accusativ im Veda*, 159.

MANDALA I, HYMN 76.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYĀYA 5, VARGA 24.

1. What supplication is to thy mind's taste¹? What (pious) thought may be, O Agni, most agreeable to thee? Or who has won for himself thy wisdom by sacrifices? Or with what thoughts may we worship thee²?

2. Come hither, Agni, sit down here as a *Hotri*. Become our undeceivable leader¹. May Heaven and Earth, the all-embracing, protect thee. Offer the sacrifice to the gods that they may be highly gracious to us.

3. Burn down all sorcerers, O Agni; become a protector of the sacrifices against imprecations. And conduct hither the lord of Soma (Indra) with his two bay horses. We have prepared hospitality for him, the good giver.

4. With words procuring offspring, carrying thee (to our sacrifice) with my mouth¹, I call² thee hither, and thou shalt sit down here with the gods. Perform the service of a *Hotri* and of a *Potri*³, O worshipful one. Be thou a giver and a father⁴ of riches.

5. As thou didst perform sacrifice to the gods with the sacrificial food of the wise Manu¹, a sage together with sages, thus, O highly truthful *Hotri*, perform thou the sacrifice to-day, O Agni, with thy joy-giving sacrificial ladle².

NOTES.

The same *Rīshi*. Metre, *Trishṭubh*.

Verse 1.

Note 1. *Sāyana* takes *vāra* in the sense of 'holding back' (comp. I, 143, 5), and makes *mánasaḥ* depend on *várāya*. He says, 'he agne te tava manaso varāya nivāranāyāsmāsv avasthāpanāya kopetir bhuvat kidrīsam upagamanam bha- vet.' The modern translators are evidently right in assigning to *vāra* the meaning of 'wish' or the like (comp. VII, 59, 2. *yāḥ vaḥ várāya dāsati*), but they differ as to whether *mánasaḥ* should be taken as belonging to *várāya* or to *úpetiḥ*. *Ludwig* translates, 'Welches nahen des geistes ist gegenstand der wal dir?' *Grassmann*, 'Welch Nahen ist nach deines Herzens Wunsche?' My opinion is that the tradition of the text is not quite free from suspicion. My doubts are based on VI, 21, 4. *kás te yagñāḥ mánase sám várāya*, 'What sacrifice (O Indra) is agreeable to thy mind, to thy wish?' Here we have a question addressed to the god, beginning with *kás te*, quite similar to the question of our poet, which begins with *ká te*. We have the word *sám*, as in our passage *sámtamâ*. We have *várāya* exactly as in our passage. We have, by the side of *várāya*, a case-form of *mánas* as in our passage. But we have the dative *mánase* instead of the genitive *mánasaḥ*. We may add that there are some other passages in which a dative of a similar meaning stands likewise by the side of *várāya*: thus, VIII, 82, 3. *áram várāya manyāve bhúvat te indra sám* (comp. *bhúvat agne sámtamâ* in our passage) *hrídé*, 'May it be, O Indra, according to thy wish and thy mood, may it be agreeable to thy heart;' VIII, 84, 4. *várāya deva manyāve*, 'to thy wish, O god, to thy mood.'

All this tends to raise the supposition that in our

passage also we should read *mánase várāya*, which datives seem to depend on *sámtamā*. We should then translate, 'What supplication, what (pious) thought may be, O Agni, most agreeable to thy mind and to thy wish?'

Note 2. This seems to be a Páda of the defective type, with four syllables before the caesura and ending as if there were five syllables before the caesura; comp. my Prolegomena, 68 seq. It would be easy, however, to restore the normal metrical form, for instance, by reading *túbhyam* instead of *te*.

Verse 2.

Note 1. *Puráh-etá*, literally, 'he who goes before somebody.'

Verse 4.

Note 1. It would be unnatural to give to the medium *á* huve the passive sense and not to translate it, as it must be translated in so many passages, 'I call (thee) hither.' But, if so, it is very difficult to avoid the conclusion that *váhniḥ áśá* ('he who carries somebody with his mouth; comp. I, 129, 5; VI, 11, 2; 16, 9; VII, 16, 9; X, 115, 3; see vol. xxxii, pp. 42 seq.) refers here not to Agni, the divine carrier, but to the human priest, who with his mouth, i.e. by his songs, carries Agni to his sacrifice. *Váhni* is used very frequently indeed of human worshippers, and generally the transferring of epithets of the divine priest Agni to human priests, and vice versa, is quite to the taste of Vedic poets.—Comp. on *á* huve and *váhniḥ áśá*, Neisser, Bezenberger's Beiträge, XVIII, 320 seq.; XX, 69, and below, I, 127, 8, note 1; S.B.E., vol. xxxii, p. 42. See also Delbrück, Altindische Syntax, 473, who very rightly observes: es liegt kein Grund vor, dem huvé den Character einer ersten Person zu versagen.

Note 2. On the accent of *huvé*, on which Ludwig bases very bold conclusions, see Delbrück, Altindische Syntax, 41; Weber, Indische Studien, XIII, 73.

Note 3. Comp. X, 3, 3.—On the priestly functions of the

Potri, see Weber, Indische Studien, X, 141, 366, 376 seq.; H. O., Religion des Veda, 391.

Note 4. On these vocatives, see Delbrück, Altindische Syntax, 106.

Verse 5.

Note 1. Manus is here a proper name; comp. Bergaigne, I, 65 seq. On his priestly character, comp. H. O., Religion des Veda, 275.

Note 2. On *guhvâ*, comp. Pischel, Ved. Studien, II, 113. The ladle is meant for the flame of Agni.

MANDALA I, HYMN 77.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYĀYA 5, VARGA 25.

1. How shall we sacrifice to Agni? What words, agreeable to the god, shall be addressed to him, the luminous one, who, being immortal and righteous, the Hotri, the best sacrificer, conveys the gods to the mortals¹?

2. Bring hither by adoration the Hotri who is most beneficial in sacrifices and righteous. When Agni repairs to the gods on behalf of the mortal¹, may he be attentive in his mind, and may he perform the sacrifice².

3. For he is wisdom¹, he is manly, he is straightforward; like Mitra he has become the charioteer of the mysterious². Therefore the Aryan clans³, longing for the gods, address him, the wonderful one, as the first at the sacrifices.

4. May that Agni, the manliest of men, triumphant with riches [?]¹, come with help to our words, to our devotion, and (to the devotion) of those most powerful liberal givers who bent on the prize² have constantly stirred up our prayers³.

5. Thus Agni, the righteous Gâtavedas, has been praised by the priestly Gotamas¹. May he augment their splendour and their strength. He the knowing one gains increase according to his desire.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi* and metre.

Verse 1.

Note 1. The construction is *yáh krinóti deván mártyesu*. Comp., for instance, X, 40, 2. *káh vâm . . . krinute sadhásthe*

ā. Ludwig translates: *der unter den sterblichen der unsterbliche hotar . . . schafft die götter.*—‘Could it be *ishkrinoti?*’ M. M.

Verse 2.

Note 1. The third Pāda of this verse has nine syllables instead of eleven. If we read, as several times must be done, *mārtāya* for *mārtāya*, we get ten syllables, and the Pāda may belong to the defective type mentioned above, 76, 1, note 2.

Note 2. *Ka* seems to me to stand here, as it several times does, in the first of the members of sentence connected by it. See Delbrück, *Altindische Syntax*, 475. Prof. Max Müller believes that it depends on *yāt*: *yāt véh*, *yāt ka sá bódhāti*, ‘Bring hither the *Hotri* . . . so that Agni may invite the gods . . . and that he (the mortal or Agni) may be attentive, &c.’

Verse 3.

Note 1. Grassmann gives to *krātu* here and in a number of other passages the meaning ‘der Starke.’ This is inadmissible; comp. Bergaigne, III, 304.

Note 2. Here we have again a Pāda of ten syllables (see verse 2, note 1), unless *bhût* has dissyllabic value. Prof. Max Müller translates this Pāda: ‘like a friend he is the charioteer of enormous wealth.’

Note 3. Comp. I, 96, 3 (see below).

Verse 4.

Note 1. On *risādas*, comp. above, I, 26, 4, note 1.

Note 2. Comp. I, 92, 8. There Ushas receives the epithet *vāgaprasûtā*.

Note 3. Comp. VII, 87, 3. *spásah Várunasya . . . yé isháyanta mánma*.

Verse 5.

Note 1. This is again a Pāda of ten syllables.

MANDALA I, HYMN 78.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYĀYA 5, VARGA 26.

1. O *Gâtavedas*, who dwellest among all tribes, we the *Gotamas* (praise) thee with our song—we praise thee aloud with (songs full of) splendour.

2. *Gotama*¹ desirous of riches exalts thee, as thou art, with his song. We praise thee aloud with (songs full of) splendour.

3. We call thee, such as thou art, the highest winner of booty, as *Āngiras* did. We praise thee aloud with (songs full of) splendour.

4. (We praise) thee, the greatest destroyer of enemies (or, of *Vṛitra*), who hurlest the *Dasyus* away—we praise thee, such as thou art, aloud with (songs full of) splendour.

5. We the *Rahûgas*¹ have recited a honey-sweet speech to *Agni*. We praise thee aloud with (songs full of) splendour.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi*. Metre, *Gâyatri*.

Verse 2.

Note 1. This probably means, 'the descendant of *Gotama*.' See *Zeitschrift der D. Morg. Gesellschaft*, XLII, 202.

Verse 5.

Note 1. The *Rahûgas* seem to be a branch of the *Gotamas*; see *Āsvalâyana Srautasûtra* XII, 11, 1.

MANDALA I, HYMN 79.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYÂYA 5, VARGA 27-28.

I.

1. The golden-haired in the expanse¹ of the atmosphere, the roaring² snake, is hasting (through the air) like the wind; the brightly resplendent watcher of the dawn³, he who is like the glorious, ever active and truthful (goddesses)⁴.

2. By thy goings the beautifully-winged (birds) were disparaged¹; the black bull² has roared, when here³ (all this happened). He has come as if with the bounteous smiling (women)⁴. The mists fly, the clouds thunder.

3. When they have led him, who swells¹ with the milk of *Rita*, on the straightest paths of *Rita*, then Aryaman, Mitra, and Varuna, he who walks round the earth², fill the leather-bag (the cloud) in the womb of the lower (atmosphere [?])³.

II.

4. Agni, who art lord of booty, rich in cows, young son of strength¹, bestow on us, O *Gâtavedas*, great glory.

5. Being lighted, a Vasu, a sage, Agni who is to be magnified by (pious) words, O (god) with many faces, shine to us so that riches may be ours.

6. Reigning¹ by night by thy own power, O Agni, and at the break of dawn, O god with sharp teeth, burn against the sorcerers.

III.

7. Bless us, O Agni, with thy blessings, when our Gâyatra song is brought forward (to thee), thou to whom reverence is due in all our prayers.

8. Bring us wealth, O Agni, which may be always conquering, excellent and invincible¹ in all battles.

9. Bestow on us, Agni, through thy kindness¹ wealth which may last all our life², and have mercy³ on us that we may live.

IV.

10. O Gotama¹, bring forward purified words, bring songs to the sharp-flaming Agni, desirous of his favour.

11. May he who tries to harm us, whether nigh or afar, fall down. Do thou lead us alone to increase.

12. The thousand-eyed Agni, who dwells among all tribes, scares away the Rakshas. The praise-worthy Hotri (Agni) is praised¹.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi*. Metre, 1-3 Trishṭubh; 4-6 Ushnih; 7-12 Gâyatrî.

What in the traditional text is one hymn, consists really of four independent hymns of three verses each. This is to be concluded from the well-known laws of arrangement of the *Samhitâ*, and is confirmed by the change of metre and by the reception of two of the four hymns into other Vedic *Samhitâs*: the second (verses 4-6) is found in the *Sâma-veda* II, 911-913; *Vâg. Samhitâ* XV, 35-37; *Taitt.*

Samhitâ IV, 4, 4, 5; *Maitr. Samhitâ* II, 13, 8; the third (verses 7-9) in the *Sâma-veda* II, 874-876. Besides, verses 1-2 occur *Taitt. Samh.* III, 1, 11, 4-5; verse 2, *Maitr. Samh.* IV, 12, 5; verse 4, *Sâma-veda* I, 99; verses 8, 9, *Maitr. Samh.* IV, 12, 4; verse 9, *Maitr. Samh.* IV, 10, 6; *Taitt. Br.* II, 4, 5, 3.

Verse 1.

Note 1. As to *visârâ* I think we should compare VII, 36, 1. *vī sánunâ prīthivī sasre urvī*, 'The wide earth has expanded with her surface.' Prof. Max Müller observes with regard to this *Pâda*: when the sky sends forth the rain, the lightning appears.

Note 2. On *dhûni*, see vol. xxxii, p. 112 (I, 64, 5), and Geldner, *Vedische Studien*, I, 268. I do not take the word with Geldner for an epithet of *Vâta*, the wind, but of the snake, i. e. *Agni*, who very probably is to be understood here as in the whole *Trika*, as the fire of the lightning.

Note 3. Perhaps we have here again a *Pâda* of ten syllables, of the type which occurs several times in the preceding hymns. Or possibly the text should be corrected: *ushâsaḥ nâ nâvedâḥ*, 'a knower (of sacrifices, comp. IV, 23, 4; V, 12, 3) like the dawns,' or *ushâsâm nâvedâḥ* (with dissyllabic -âm), 'a knower of the dawns.'—See Lanman, p. 565.

Note 4. The waters? Or the dawns?

Verse 2.

Note 1. On the nasalization of *aminantañ* in the *Samhitâ* text, see my *Prolegomena*, p. 471.

Note 2. I. e. *Parganya*, the thundering cloud. Comp. V, 83, 1; VII, 101, 1; Bergaigne, *Rel. Védique*, III, 27 seq.

Note 3. Regarding *yâdi idâm*, comp. IV, 5, 11. There the verb belonging to *yâdi* must be supplied; in the same way our passage must be interpreted also, unless we resort to changing the text and accentuating the verb *nonâva*, in which case the translation would be, 'when the black bull has bellowed here.'

Note 4. The women may be the showers of rain. Or they could be understood as the dawns, comp. *ushásaḥ návedāḥ*, verse 1.

Verse 3.

Note 1. I propose to read *píyānam*.

Note 2. On *párigman*, see Joh. Schmidt, Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, XXV, 86; Bartholomae, *Bezzenger's Beiträge*, XV, 27 seq.; Bergaigne, *Rel. Véd.* II, 505; and compare especially X, 93, 4. The word evidently is connected not with the verb *gam*, but with *kshám*, 'the earth,' of which we find the genitives *gmáḥ* and *gmáh*.

Note 3. It does not seem probable to me that *úpara* means here the lower pressing-stone, as Grassmann, Ludwig, and Pischel (*Vedische Studien*, I, 109) suggest (Grassmann: den Schlauch beim untern Pressstein. Ludwig: den schlauch . . . an des steines ort. Pischel: sie legen das Fell mitten auf den Stein). I propose to supply *rágasaḥ*; comp. I, 62, 5. *rágaḥ úparam*; IV, 1, 11. *rágasaḥ asyá yónau*, and especially IV, 17, 14, where we find the 'womb of the atmosphere' (*rágasaḥ asyá yónau*) mentioned, quite as in our passage, together with the leather-bag (*tvák*), i. e. the cloud.—Bergaigne (*Rel. Véd.* II, 505) translates and explains, 'arrose la peau dans le séjour de l'inférieur,' c'est-à-dire fait couler les eaux du ciel pour l'Agni terrestre.

Verse 4.

Note 1. See above, I, 26, 10, note 1.

Verse 6.

Note 1. *Rāgan* seems to be the participle of *rāg*; comp. VIII, 19, 31. *kshapáḥ vástushu rāgasi*. Now it is very improbable that of this participle a vocative should occur; see Lanman, 509. I believe, therefore, that we should accentuate *rāgan* (comp. the remarks of Bartholomae, *Bezzenger's Beiträge*, XV, 204).

Verse 8.

Note 1. Comp. IX, 63, 11. *rayím . . . dushṭáram*.

Verse 9.

Note 1. As to *suketúnâ*, comp. I, 159, 5.

Note 2. Comp. VI, 59, 9. *rayīm visvāyuposhasam*.

Note 3. *Mārāḱām* is a second object of *dhehi*, not an epithet of *rayīm*. Comp. VIII, 7, 30.

Verse 10.

Note 1. Comp. above, 78, 2, note 1.

Verse 12.

Note 1. On the use of the middle of *gri* with passive meaning, comp. Delbrück, *Altindische Syntax*, 264.

MANDALA I, HYMN 94.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYĀYA 6, VARGA 30-32.

1. We have sent forward¹ with thoughtful mind this song of praise like a chariot to the worthy Gâtavedas. For blissful is his care for us in his companionship. Agni! May we suffer no harm in thy friendship.

2. He prospers for whom thou performest the sacrifice; he dwells untouched¹; he acquires abundance of heroes. He is strong; no distress overtakes him. Agni! May we suffer no harm in thy friendship.

3. May we be able to light thee. Prosper our prayers. The gods eat the sacrificial food that is offered in thee. Bring thou hither the Âdityas, for we long for them. Agni! May we suffer no harm in thy friendship.

4. Let us bring fuel and prepare sacrificial gifts for thee, awaking thy attention at each joint¹ (of the month). Help forward our prayers that we may live. Agni! May we suffer no harm in thy friendship.

5. (He is) the shepherd of the clans¹; by his nightly light the creatures walk, the two-footed and four-footed. Thou art the bright, great splendour of dawn. Agni! May we suffer no harm in thy friendship.

6. Thou art the Adhvaryu and the ancient Hotri, the Prasâstri¹, the Potri, the born Purohita². Knowing the duties of every priest thou givest

success, O wise one. Agni! May we suffer no harm in thy friendship.

7. Thou who art beautiful, of like appearance on all sides, thou shinest forth even when afar like lightning. Thou seest, O god, even over the darkness of night. Agni! May we suffer no harm in thy friendship.

8. May the chariot of him who presses Sōma, be to the front¹, O gods. May our curse overcome the malicious ones. Accept (O gods) this prayer and make it prosper. Agni! May we suffer no harm in thy friendship.

9. Strike away with thy weapons those who curse us, the malicious ones, all ghouls, be they near or afar. And make a good path to the sacrifice of him who praises thee. Agni! May we suffer no harm in thy friendship.

10. When thou hast yoked to thy chariot the two ruddy, red horses, whom the wind drives forward, and thy roaring is like that of a bull, then thou movest the trees with thy banner of smoke¹. Agni! May we suffer no harm in thy friendship.

11. And when thy grass-consuming sparks are scattered, the winged (birds)¹ also fear the noise. Then all goes well with thee and thy chariots. Agni! May we suffer no harm in thy friendship.

12. He makes Mitra and Varuṇa get refreshing drink. He mysteriously turns away the anger of the Maruts¹. Be merciful towards us. May their mind be again (as it was before). Agni! May we suffer no harm in thy friendship.

13. Thou art god of the gods, a wonderful Mitra (i.e. friend, of the gods)¹. Thou art the Vasu

of the Vasus, welcome at the sacrifice. May we be under thy most wide-reaching protection. Agni! May we suffer no harm in thy friendship.

14. That is thy glorious (nature) that when kindled in thy own house, and fed with Soma, thou art awake¹, the most merciful one. Thou bestowest treasures and wealth on the worshipper. Agni! May we suffer no harm in thy friendship.

15. May we be of those to whom thou, O possessor of beautiful wealth, O Aditi¹, art pleased to grant sinlessness in health and wealth², and whom thou wilt quicken with glorious strength and with abundance of progeny.

16. Do thou, O Agni, thou who knowest (how to grant) happiness, prolong our life here, O God! May Mitra and Varuṇa grant us this, may Aditi, the Sindhu, the Earth, and the Sky¹!

NOTES.

This hymn with the whole collection which it opens is ascribed to Kutsa Āṅgīrasa. The metre is *Gagatī*; the two last verses, as is frequently the case in *Gagatī*-hymns (see H. O., *Prolegomena*, 144 seq.), are composed in *Trishubh*. The hymn has been translated by Prof. Max Müller, *Physical Religion*, p. 173.—Verse 1 = MS. II, 7, 3; SV. I, 66; AV. XX, 13, 3. Verses 1, 3, 4 = SV. II, 414. 416. 415.

Verse 1.

Note 1. Prof. Max Müller translates, 'Let us build up this hymn of praise.' To me it rather seems that the reading should be, as Boehtlingk-Roth have proposed, s. v. sam-hi, sám ahema. Comp. I, 61, 4. asmaí ít u stómam sám

hinomi rátham ná táshā-iva, 'to him I send forward a song of praise as a carpenter (fits out) a chariot.' Compare besides, IX, 71, 5; I, 184, 4; II, 19, 7; VI, 45, 14, &c.

Verse 2.

Note 1. Comp. vol. xxxii, p. 65, I, 37, 1 note.

Verse 4.

Note 1. Párvan, 'joint,' seems to refer here, as it very frequently does in the later Vedic and post-Vedic texts, to the joints of the month, the sacrificial days of the full and change of the moon (the pārvana-sacrifices). As to the temporal use of the instrumental, comp. *ritunā* and *ritubhiḥ*; Delbrück, Altindische Syntax, p. 130.

Verse 5.

Note 1. Ludwig proposes the correction of *visām gopāḥ* into *visām gopāḥ* (genitive). But I think it will be sufficient to write *asyā* accented. As to *visām gopāḥ*, comp. 96, 4.

Verse 6.

Note 1. The *Prasāstri* (or *Upavaktri*), literally, 'the commander,' is the same priest who is more usually designated as the *Maitrāvaruṇa*. All the priests mentioned here (with the exception of the *Purohita*, see next note) belong to the ancient system of the 'seven *Hotris*,' enumerated, for instance, II, 1, 2. Comp. H. O., Religion des Veda, 383 seq.

Note 2. The *Purohita* or house-priest does not, properly speaking, belong to the number of the priests officiating at a sacrifice (*ritvigah*), though of course the *Purohita* could act as a *ritvig*. Geldner (*Vedische Studien*, II, 144) seems to be wrong in concluding from our passage that 'already in the *Rig-veda* the *Purohita*, being the superintendent of the holy service, was a real *ritvig*, i. e. officiating priest.' Comp. H. O., loc. cit., 374 seq.; 379, note 2.

Verse 8.

Note 1. On *pūrvaḥ*, comp. I, 34, 10; V, 31, 11.

Verse 10.

Note 1. The regular accentuation of a determinative compound ('banner of smoke') would be *dhûmaketúnâ*. But it is very natural that the traditional text gives the accent of the *Bahuvrîhi* ('he whose banner is smoke') which so frequently occurs.

Verse 11.

Note 1. As to *patatrîṇaḥ*, comp. above, I, 58, 5.

Verse 12.

Note 1. Most probably the meaning is not that the Maruts are expected to turn away the anger of somebody else, but that the anger of the Maruts shall be turned away by Agni. Comp. I, 171, 1; VI, 66, 5; VII, 58, 5; Bergaigne, *Religion Védique*, II, 401. It seems, consequently, that we should read *avayâtâ*.—On *ávayâtaheḥ*, scil. Indra, see vol. xxxii, p. 292 (I, 171, 6), and also IV, 1, 4; VI, 66, 5.

The genitives *Mitrásya Váruṇasya* may be understood as depending, together with *Marútâm*, on *héḥ*. In this case the translation would be: 'He mysteriously turns away the anger of Mitra and Varuṇa and of the Maruts in order that (men) may get refreshing drink.'

Verse 13.

Note 1. On the frequent identification of Agni with Mitra, see Bergaigne, *Religion Védique*, III, 134 seq.

Verse 14.

Note 1. On the root *gar* used with regard to Agni, see the remarks of Dr. Neisser in *Bezenberger's Beiträge*, XIII, 297 seq.

Verse 15.

Note 1. Agni is invoked here by the name of Aditi, with an evident allusion to the goddess Aditi, as granting freedom from bonds, which is the original meaning of Aditi. Comp. M. M., vol. xxxii, pp. 241, 260, 262; H. O., Religion des Veda, p. 204.

Note 2. Comp. III, 54, 19. On sarvátât (sarvátâti), see M. M.'s note, vol. xxxii, p. 260, note a, and compare Darmesteter, *Haurvatât et Ameretât*, p. 80. See also Lanman, p. 386.

Verse 16.

Note 1. The last hemistich is the regular conclusion of the Kutsa hymns.

MANDALA I, HYMN 95.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYÂYA 7, VARGA 1-2.

1. Two (sisters) of different shapes wander along, pursuing a good aim. The one and the other suckles the calf¹. With the one (the calf) is golden, moving according to its wont². With the other it is seen clear, full of fine splendour.

2. The ten unwearied¹ young women² have brought forth this widely-spread germ of *Tvashtri*³. Him, the sharp-faced (Agni) who is endowed with his own splendour, the shining one, they⁴ carry around among men.

3. They celebrate his three births: one in the sea, one in heaven, one in the waters¹. In the eastern region² he commanding determines the seasons of the dwellers on earth by his present power³.

4. Who among you has understood this hidden (god)?¹ The calf has by itself given birth to its mothers². The germ of many (mothers), the great seer, moving by his own strength, comes forward from the lap of the active ones³.

5¹. The fair (child Agni) grows up visibly in them in his own glory, standing erect in the lap of the down-streaming (waters). Both (Heaven and Earth) fled away in fear of (the son of) *Tvashtri*², when he was born, but turning back they caress the lion.

6. They caress him both, like two kind women; like lowing cows they have approached him in their own way. He has become the lord of all

powers¹, he whom they anoint with sacrificial gifts from the right side².

7. He raises his arms again and again like Savitri¹. He the terrible pressing on ranges both wings² (of his army). He raises up his bright vesture from himself alone³. He gives new garments to his mothers.

8. He assumes his fierce appearance which is above (i.e. the lightning?), being united with the cows¹, the waters in his seat. The prayer purifies the bottom of the seer(?)². This was the meeting among the gods³.

9. The wide space encompasses thy base, the resplendent foundation¹ of the buffalo. Agni! Being kindled protect us with all thy undeceivable guardians who are endowed with their own splendour.

10. On the dry ground he produces a stream¹, a course, a flood. With his bright floods he reaches the earth. Whatever is old he receives into his belly. He moves about within the young sprouting grass².

11. Thus, O Agni, being strengthened by fuel, shine thou to us with wealth-giving shine, O purifier, for the sake of glory. May Mitra and Varuna grant us this, may Aditi, Sindhu, the Earth, and the Sky!

NOTES.

The same *R̥ishi*. The metre is Trishubh.—Verse 1 = VS. XXXIII, 5; TB. II, 7, 12, 2. Verse 2 = TB. II, 8, 7, 4. Verse 5 = TB. II, 8, 7, 4; MS. IV, 14, 8.

Verse 1.

Note 1. The two females are evidently Night and Dawn

(comp. below, 96, 5). The calf is Agni whose bright appearance by night is contrasted here with his paler splendour by day (comp. below, 127, 5). The explanation of Professor Hillebrandt (*Vedische Mythologie*, I, 331) that 'das von ihnen wechselnd gesäugte Kalb der bald als Sonne bald als Mond erscheinende Lichtgott, d. h. Agni ist,' does not seem convincing to me.

Note 2. I cannot follow Hillebrandt (loc. cit. 335) in translating *svadhāvān* 'an Labung reich.'

Verse 2.

Note 1. On feminine nominatives in *-āsaḥ* like *ātandrāsaḥ*, see Lanman, *Noun-Inflection*, 362.

Note 2. The ten young women are the fingers which produce the fire by the attrition of woods.

Note 3. On *Tvashtri* as the father of Agni, see Hillebrandt, *Vedische Mythologie*, I, 522 seq.; Bergaigne, *Rel. Véd.*, III, 47 seq.

Note 4. Hillebrandt (loc. cit.) takes the ten fingers as the subject of *pāri nayanti*, which does not seem probable.

Verse 3.

Note 1. It is surprising that Agni's birth in the sea and his birth in the waters are distinguished. The poet's meaning is not quite clear. Prof. Max Müller thinks of the rising sun and the lightning in the clouds. Comp. H. O., *Religion des Veda*, 107.

Note 2. We ought to read *pradīsam*; comp. IV, 29, 3; IX, 111, 3.

Note 3. Comp. X, 85, 18, where it is said of the moon that she 'is born again, determining the seasons.' Thus it is possible that the poet understands here Agni as dwelling in the moon as light. Comp. on this identification Bergaigne, I, 159, and Hillebrandt, *Ved. Mythologie*, I, 330 seq. But this interpretation of our passage is by no means certain.

Verse 4.

Note 1. Possibly we should correct *kāḥ idām vaḥ ninyām*; comp. VII, 56, 4; 61, 5. The translation would be: 'Who

among you has understood this secret?'—the secret that a calf should give birth to cows.

Note 2. In my opinion the mothers are the waters; the calf is Agni. The meaning must be, consequently, that, as Agni is born from the waters thus the waters are born from Agni. Agni—we may try to interpret the poet's meaning—sends his smoke to the sky. The smoke is changed to clouds; the clouds send forth water. Exactly the same meaning seems to be expressed in I, 164, 51. Comp. also Manu III, 76. *agnau prâstâhutiḥ samyag âdityam upatishḥate, âdityâg gâyate vṛishṭir vṛishṭer annam tataḥ pragâḥ.*—Prof. Max Müller observes: 'The mothers are day and night, or heaven and earth. The calf, the son, Agni, being born of the night gives birth to the day, and being born of the day (in the evening) gives birth to the night. Or it may be that Agni, light, makes Dyaus and Prithivî to be visible.'—Prof. Hillebrandt's interpretation of our verse is quite different; see *Vedische Mythologie*, I, 335.

Note 3. I. e. the fire is born from the waters.

Verse 5.

Note 1. Comp. Hillebrandt, *Ved. Myth.*, I, 371, 523.

Note 2. I. e. the son of Tvashtri (see above, verse 2) considered as identical with his father. Comp. Bergaigne, III, 47, and see also Aufrecht, Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, I, 356.

Verse 6.

Note 1. On *dáksha* and its relation to *krátu*, comp. Geldner, *Vedische Studien*, I, 267.

Note 2. The poet seems to play upon words; 'power' is *dáksha*, 'from the right side' *dakshinatáḥ* (i. e. approaching respectfully, *dakshinikṛitya*).

Verse 7.

Note 1. Comp. Bergaigne, *Rel. Véd.*, III, 46.

Note 2. Observe the dual form *śléau* ending in -au, not in -â. Comp. Lanman, *Noun-Inflection*, 576. Prof. Max

Müller translates here: 'He the terrible tries and stretches out the hems of his sleeves.' This may indeed be the meaning of *sik*.

Note 3. See Geldner, *Vedische Studien*, II, 189.

Verse 8.

Note 1. The cows of course are intended for the sacrificial food coming from the cow, such as milk and butter.

Note 2. The two nominatives, *kavīh* and *dhīh*, can scarcely be right. The subject seems to be the prayer which cleanses, as it were, Agni, and thus augments his splendour (comp. IV, 15, 6; VIII, 103, 7). Possibly we should read *kavéh budhnám*. Comp., however, IX, 47, 4. *svayám kavīh vidhartāri víprāya rátanam ikkhati yádi marmṛigyáte dhíyah*. In this difficult verse so much is clear that the seer (*kavīh*) is subject, and that he is stated to purify the prayers.

Note 3. The meaning seems to be that at the sacrificial fire all gods assemble.

Verse 9.

Note 1. On *dháman*, comp. M. M., vol. xxxii, p. 383 seq. —Prof. Max Müller proposes the following translation: 'Thy wide effulgence goes round the firmament, the firm seat of the strong one (buffalo).'

Verse 10.

Note 1. Ludwig takes *srótaḥ* as a locative. But it is very improbable that we should have here a survival of the ancient locatives of stems in -s without a case-ending (Joh. Schmidt, Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, XXVII, 306; Brugmann, *Grundriss der vergl. Grammatik*, vol. ii, p. 611). In Ludwig's opinion 'it follows from the corresponding *gátum ūrmim* that *srotas* stands for *srotasi* as *dhanvan* for *dhanvani*.' But this is not convincing.

Note 2. On Agni as inhabiting the sprouting grass, comp. III, 5, 8; VII, 9, 3. 'I believe this refers to the blades of grass used as tinder to catch the sparks of fire.' M. M.

MANDALA I, HYMN 96.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYĀYA 7, VARGA 3-4.

1. Being born by strength¹ in the ancient way, lo! he (Agni) has assumed instantly all the qualities of a sage. The Waters and the Dhishanā² have furthered the friend (Mitra³). The gods have held Agni as the giver of wealth.

2. By the ancient Nivid¹, by Āyu's² wisdom he has procreated these children of men. With his irradiating look³ (he has procreated) the Sky and the Waters. The gods have held Agni as the giver of wealth.

3. The Āryan clans magnified¹ him as the first performer of sacrifices, as receiving offerings, as striving forward, the son of strength, the Bharata², the bestower of mighty rain (?)³. The gods have held Agni as the giver of wealth.

4. He, Mâtariśvan¹, the lord of bountiful prosperity, has found a path for (his?) offspring, he who has found the sun, the shepherd of the clans, the begetter of the two worlds. The gods have held Agni as the giver of wealth.

5. Night and Dawn, who constantly destroy each other's appearance, suckle one young calf¹ unitedly². The piece of gold³ shines between Heaven and Earth. The gods have held Agni as the giver of wealth.

6. (He is) the base of wealth, the assembler of all goods¹, the beacon of sacrifice, the fulfiller of thought, the bird². In order to guard their immor-

talities the gods have held him, Agni, as the giver of wealth.

7. Him who is now and who was formerly the abode of wealth, the earth¹ (i.e. the dwelling-place or support) of what is born and of what will be born, the shepherd and guardian of what is and of much that comes into being. The gods have held Agni as the giver of wealth.

8. May (Agni,) the giver of wealth, present us with quick wealth. May the giver of wealth (present us with wealth) united with strong men¹. The giver of wealth (should grant us) food together with valiant heroes. The giver of wealth should grant us long life.

9 = 95, 11.

NOTES.

The same *Rīshi* and metre.—Verses 1, 2 = MS. IV, 10, 6. Verse 5 = VS. XII, 2; XVII, 70; TS. IV, 1, 10, 4; 6, 5, 2; 7, 12, 3; MS. II, 7, 8.

Verse 1.

Note 1. I.e. by the attrition of the woods, as *sáhasa/putrá/*.

Note 2. Two new discussions on *dhishánā* have been given by Hillebrandt (*Ved. Mythologie*, I, 175 seq.; comp. the criticisms of Ludwig, *Ueber die neuesten arbeiten auf dem gebiete der R̥gveda-forschung*, 85 seq.) and Pischel (*Ved. Studien*, II, 82 seq.). Hillebrandt arrives at the conclusion that *dhishánā* is the Earth (in the dual, Heaven and Earth; in the plural, Heaven, Air, and Earth), and besides the *Vedi*, i.e. the excavated spot of ground which serves as a kind of altar for the sacrifice. Similar is

Pischel's opinion. He believes that the singular *dhishánâ* is everywhere to be interpreted as a proper name: the name of a goddess of wealth and prosperity. The dual *dhisháve* means 'Heaven and Earth:' thus the original meaning of *dhishánâ* must have been, as Pischel concludes, either Heaven or Earth. He tries to show that it is Earth, and so does Prof. Hillebrandt. The goddess of wealth originally was a goddess of the earth conceived as the liberal giver of wealth. This goddess, Prof. Pischel thinks, was closely related to, or even identical with, the goddess Aditi, whom the same scholar also believes to be a personification of the Earth.

I must confess that even this close agreement of these two distinguished scholars has failed to convince me. It is quite true that the dual *dhisháve* means Heaven and Earth, and it is possible that the singular may, at least in some passages, mean the Earth. But I cannot believe that this is the original meaning of the word. Originally, in my opinion, *dhishánâ* was an implement used at the sacrifice, more especially at the Soma sacrifice. The *ádrî* (Soma-stones) are said to rest in the lap of the *dhishánâ* (I, 109, 3). In a Yagus Mantra referring to the sacrificial preparation of Soma (*Vâgasaneyi Samhitâ* VI, 26) the *dhishánâ*, or more exactly the *Dhishánâs*, as goddesses (*dhishánâs ka devîh*), are mentioned together with the sacrificial fire, the waters, and the *grāvânah*, the stones. In a similar connection we find a Yagus formula pronounced when the Adhvaryu began to beat the Soma plants with the *Upâmsusavana* stone (see Weber, *Indische Studien*, X, 370). There the Soma was addressed first, and then the two *Dhishanâs*: 'Do not be afraid, do not be terrified, assume sap (O Soma!). O two *Dhishanâs*! Being firm show firmness!' (*Vâgasaneyi Samhitâ* VI, 35). Here the *Satapatha Brâhmaṇa* (III, 9, 4, 18) says, that some authorities refer the last words to the two boards (*phalake*) on which the pressing-stones rest (see Hillebrandt, *Ved. Mythologie*, I, 149 seq.). But the author of the *Brâhmaṇa* himself declares that Heaven and Earth are addressed; for as to the boards

used for pressing the Soma, it would be of no consequence if they were broken.—Other passages in which the *dhishānā* are mentioned in connection with the preparation of the Soma, are Rig-veda IX, 59, 2; X, 17, 2. In the last passage 'the lap of the Dh.' is mentioned as in I, 109, 3 (see above). The *dhishānā* was anointed, I, 102, 1. The *dhishānā* is mentioned in connection with the waters which were fetched by the Adhvaryus and used at the sacrifice, X, 30, 6, and in connection with the sacrificial fire, III, 2, 1, and in our passage. I have therefore no doubt that according to the original meaning the *Dhishanā* was, as stated above, a sacrificial implement used chiefly, though not exclusively, at the pressing of the Soma. I do not venture to determine the exact nature of this implement, but I think that from the passages collected above it will be evident that it was a sort of support on which the pressing-stones rested. A similar support may have been used for the vessel containing the sacrificial water, and for the sacrificial fire. This support was considered as yielding the Soma to Indra, as strengthening Indra, as inciting Indra and the gods to liberality towards men. Thus we have a goddess *Dhishanā* who wears the aspect of a goddess of wealth. She is invoked as one of the *Gnās* in I, 22, 10 with *Hotrā Bhāratī*. Finally the Earth, the support of everything, was likened to this support of the pressing-stones and of the Soma; and Heaven and Earth were then considered as the two *Dhishanās*.

Note 3. Comp. above, 94, 13, note 1.

Verse 2.

Note 1. On the solemn formulas of invocation, called *Nivids*, see Haug's *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, p. 32 seq.; Weber, *Indische Studien*, IX, 355; H. O., *Religion des Veda*, 387, note 2. Of course, the *Nivids* which *Sāṅkhāyana* (*Srauta-sūtra* VIII, 16–25) gives, cannot be those to which the poets of the Rig-veda several times allude.

Note 2. On *Āyu* as one of the mythical ancestors of

mankind, nearly related to Manu, see Bergaigne, Religion Védique, I, 59 seq.

Note 3. Ushas is called vivásvatī, III, 30, 13 (cf. Bergaigne, I, 86); we are justified, consequently, in translating vivásvatā *kákshasā*, 'with the irradiating look.' But in giving this translation we should not forget that the poet no doubt at the same time intended to allude to the name of Vivasvat, the father of Yama.

Verse 3.

Note 1. The text has *íḷata*. Comp. above, I, 1, 1, note 2.

Note 2. Agni seems to be called Bharatá as belonging to the people of Bharatas. Comp. H. O., 'Buddha, sein Leben, seine Lehre, seine Gemeinde' (first edition), p. 414 seq. More usually Agni is designated as Bhárata.

Note 3. *Sríprádānum*. On *dānu*, the meaning of which I consider to be 'rain' or the like, comp. the discussion of Prof. Max Müller, vol. xxxii, 113 seq. The exact meaning of *sríprá*, which should not be compared with the Greek *λιπαρός*, cannot be determined. The etymology is a very unsafe guide in such questions, and neither the connection with the root *srip*, 'to creep,' 'to crawl,' nor with the noun *sarpís*, 'butter,' seems to lead to a satisfactory result. The passages in which *sríprá* or compounds of this adjective occur, point to a meaning like 'great,' 'mighty,' 'fine.' Thus *sríprábhogas* seems to be something like *purubhógas* or *subhógas*; Indra's arms (*karásna*) are called both *sríprá* (VIII, 32, 10) and *príthú* (VI, 19, 3); finally *sríprádānu*, which is used here as an epithet of Agni, and VIII, 25, 5 of Mitra and Varuṇa, does not seem to differ very much from *sudānu*.

Verse 4.

Note 1. Mátarīśvan, the messenger of Vivasvat, who carried the fire from heaven to earth, was originally distinct from Agni, but is identified with him in several passages. See M. M., Physical Religion, p. 152; Bergaigne, Religion Védique, I, 52 seq.; H. O., Religion des Veda, 122.

Verse 5.

Note 1. Comp. above, 95, 1, and I, 113, 2. *rúśadvatsâ*. The calf, of course, is Agni.

Note 2. Literally, 'turned towards each other.'

Note 3. The gold is again Agni.

Verse 6.

Note 1. The first Pâda is identical with X, 139, 3.

Note 2. I prefer with Ludwig to take *vêh* as a nominative (comp. Lanman, Noun-Inflection, 375) instead of a genitive.

Verse 7.

Note 1. Compare the very obscure verse X, 31, 5. *iyám śâ bhûyâ ushâśâm iva kshâh*, 'may she be the earth, as it were, of the dawns.' 'She' may possibly be the earth, which would be designated here as a dwelling-place or support of the dawns.

Verse 8.

Note 1. Prof. Max Müller proposes another translation of *sánara*. He writes: 'One expects an opposition between *turá* and *sánara*. *Sánara* can hardly be the same as *virávat* in the next line. I should like to take *sánara* as a variety of *sána* and *sanâtána*. Give us fleeting, i.e. daily wealth, and give us old, i.e. lasting wealth!'

MANDALA I, HYMN 97.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYĀYA 7, VARGA 5.

1. Driving away evil¹ with thy light, Agni, shine upon us with wealth—driving away evil with thy light.

2. Longing for rich fields, for a free path, and for wealth, we sacrifice—driving away evil with thy light.

3¹. When he stands forth as the most glorious one among them², and when our liberal lords excel—driving away evil with thy light—

4. When through thee, Agni, the liberal lords, and when through thee we may multiply with offspring—driving away evil with thy light—

5. When the rays of the mighty Agni go forth on all sides—driving away evil with thy light—

6. For thou indeed, (O god) whose face is turned everywhere, encompassest (the world) everywhere—driving away evil with thy light.

7. Do thou carry us, as with a boat, across hostile powers, (O god) whose face is turned everywhere—driving away evil with thy light.

8. Do thou carry us across (evil) to welfare, as across a stream with a boat¹—driving away evil with thy light.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi*. Metre, *Gâyatrî*. The hymn is addressed to *Agni Sukî*.—Verses 1-8 = AV. IV, 33, 1-8 ; TÂ. VI, 11, 1-2. Verse 1 = TÂ. VI, 10, 1.

Verse 1.

Note 1. Lanman (*Sanskrit Reader*, p. 363) translates : 'Driving away with flames our sin.' But *aghá* is not exactly sin.

Verse 3.

Note 1. In this verse as well as in the verses 4 and 5—all commencing with the words *prá yát*—the principal clauses are wanting. As to the meaning, however, these clauses are supplied by the refrain ; 'driving away evil' of course means 'may he drive away evil.'

Note 2. 'Among them' seems to mean 'among the liberal lords.'

Verse 8.

Note 1. Cf. Lanman, p. 434.

MANDALA I, HYMN 98.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYÁYA 7, VARGA 6.

1. May we dwell in the favour of (Agni) Vaisvânara. He indeed is a king, leading all beings to gloriousness¹. As soon as born from here he looks over this whole world. Vaisvânara unites with the Sun².

2. Agni who has been looked and longed for¹ in Heaven, who has been looked for on Earth—he who has been looked for, has entered all herbs. May Agni Vaisvânara, who has strongly been looked for, protect us from harm by day and by night.

3. Vaisvânara! May this be true of thee: may wealth and liberal givers attend us! May Mitra and Varuṇa grant us this, may Aditi, the Sindhu, the Earth, and the Sky!

NOTES.

The same *Rishi*. Metre, Trishṭubh.—Verse 1 = VS. XXVI, 7; TS. I, 5, 11, 3; MS. IV, 11, 1. Verse 2 = VS. XVIII, 73; TS. I, 5, 11, 1; IV, 4, 12, 5; 7, 15, 6; TB. III, 11, 6, 4; MS. II, 13, 11.

Verse 1.

Note 1. Comp. VI, 70, 1. bhúvanânâm abhisr̥iṣā. Abhisr̥iṣ seems to mean, going or leading towards (abhi) gloriousness (sr̥iṣ). Prof. Pischel's opinion on the word is different; see *Vedische Studien*, I, 53 seq.

Note 2. As to yatate, comp. V, 4, 4. yátamānaḥ rasm̐bhiḥ sūryasya; IX, 111, 3. sám rasm̐bhiḥ yatate darsatáḥ ráthaḥ.

Verse 2.

Note 1. On the disappearance of Agni who is looked for everywhere, see M. M., *Physical Religion*, 264 seq.; Bergaigne, *Rel. Védique*, II, 75.

MANDALA I, HYMN 99.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYĀYA 8, VARGA 7.

1. Let us press Soma for *Gâtavedas*¹. May he burn down the property of the niggard². May he, Agni, bring us across all troubles, across all difficulties, as across a stream with a boat.

NOTES.

The *Rishi* is Kasyapa *Mârîka*. Metre, Trishṭubh.—Verse 1 = TĀ. X, 1.

Verse 1.

Note 1. This is one of the very rare passages in which Agni standing alone and not accompanied by Indra or the Maruts &c. is mentioned as drinking Soma. It seems as if this verse were not composed for the regular Soma sacrifice, but for a special occasion.

Note 2. Cf. Delbrück, *Syntakt. Forschungen*, I, 112.

MANDALA I, HYMN 127.

ASHṬAKA II, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 12-13.

1. I deem Agni to be the munificent *Hotri*, the Vasu, the Son of strength¹, *Gâtavedas*, like a priest, *Gâtavedas*²: the best performer of the sacrifice, the god who with his upright body that is turned towards the gods, and with his flame longs for the shine of the (boiling) ghee³, of the butter that is offered in (the fire).

2. May we, the sacrificers, call thee hither, the best of sacrificers¹, the first of the *Āngiras*, O priest, with our prayers, with priestly prayers, O bright one²: thee who like the heaven encompasseth the earth³, the *Hotri* of human tribes, the manly flame-haired, whom these folks—whom all folks should favour in order to speed him (to our sacrifice).

3. He indeed, shining mightily with his shining strength¹, becomes the conqueror of deceitful foes²—like an axe, the conqueror of deceitful foes². He at whose onslaught³ even what is strong melts away⁴, steady things (waste away) like forests (which are burnt or bend down in the storm)⁵. Conquering he holds himself back; he does not proceed⁶. As with a conquering bow-man he proceeds⁶.

4. Even what is firm gives way before him: thus it is known. With hottest kindling-sticks¹ one worships him² for winning his favour, one worships Agni for winning his favour. He who dives into many forests as if carving the wood with his flame, destroys even firm food³ with his strength—he destroys even what is firm with his strength.

5. Let us place that power¹ of his in our neighbourhood²—(that power) which is more visible by night than by day³—(more visible) than by day to the unremitting⁴ (worshipper). Therefore his life is a firm hold⁵, like (a father's) safe refuge to a son : (the fires) that never grow old, tending to blessings enjoyed or not enjoyed (before)⁶—the fires that never grow old, tending (to such blessings).

6. He indeed makes a mighty noise like the host of the Maruts, . . .¹ on the rich fields, . . .¹ on the . . .¹. He, the seizer, ate the offerings², he who has deservedly become the banner of the sacrifice. And when he joyously and joyfully (proceeds), all followed gladly on his path; men (have followed) his path as for a triumphal procession.

7. When forsooth the Kistas¹ striving for heaven, when the Bhṛigus have addressed him paying reverence—the Bhṛigus producing him by attrition, with worship: Agni is the lord of goods, the bright one, who is their² supporter. May the wise one accept the wonted coverings³; may the wise one accept them.

8. We invoke thee, the lord of all people, the common master of the house of all, to enjoy (the sacrifice): (we call) thee who truly art carried by prayers as by a vehicle¹ to enjoy (the sacrifice): the guest of men in whose presence (they live) as before a father's (face), and all those immortals (attain) to strength, and the offerings among the gods (attain) to strength.

9. Thou, O Agni, art born, the mightiest by might¹, for the divine world, the strongest one, like wealth for the divine world. For thy delight is most strong, and thy power is most brilliant. And

they walk around thee², O (god) who never growest old, like obedient (servants), O (god) who never growest old.

10. Let your praise go forth to the great Agni, who is mighty in his might, who awakens at dawn, like a winner of cattle¹—let it go forth to Agni. When (the worshipper) rich in offerings has loudly praised him² in all lands³, he wakes⁴ like a singer in front of the dawns⁵, the flaming one (?), the Hotri (in front) of the dawns⁵.

11. Thus being seen by us, bring near to us, O Agni, graciously united with the gods, benignantly, great wealth benignantly. Make us behold great (bliss of valiant offspring¹), O mightiest one, that we may obtain such enjoyment. Produce great bliss of valiant offspring, O bountiful Lord, (as fire is produced) by attrition, for those who praise thee, like a strong hero in thy might.

NOTES.

The *Rishi* is *Parukkhhepa Daivodâsi*, the metre *Atyashfi* (verse 6 *Atidhriti*).—Verses 1-3 = SV. II, 1163-1165. Verse 1 = SV. I, 465; VS. XV, 47; TS. IV, 4, 4, 8; MS. II, 13, 8; AV. XX, 67, 3.

Verse 1.

Note 1. There is no doubt that the reading of the Rig-veda text *vâsum* is correct; the Sâma-veda has *vâsoh*. Comp. H. O., Prolegomena, p. 280.

Note 2. 'Is it a play on the word? Like a priest knowing all things?' M. M.

Note 3. There is a metrical irregularity in this Pâda; it has six syllables instead of five before the caesura. The text, however, seems to be correct.

Verse 2.

Note 1. The first Pâda is Trishubh instead of Gagatî. It would be easy to correct huvemahi, but that form is never found in the Rig-veda, though both huvema and havâmahe are frequent. Thus it is very probable that we have here a metrical irregularity of the type described by H. O., Prolegomena, p. 117.

Note 2. Comp. VIII, 60, 3. vîprebhiḥ sukra mánmabhiḥ.

Note 3. If the explanation of párigman which we have adopted (see above, I, 79, 3, note 2) is correct, it will be impossible, of course, to accept Bergaigne's opinion (Rel. Véd., II, 505, note 1) that the accusative dyám is governed by párigmānam.

Verse 3.

Note 1. In the second Pâda one syllable is wanting. The text seems to be correct, and the irregularity apparently is the typical one described by H. O., Prolegomena, p. 68 seq.: the Pâda has the tetrasyllabic beginning (before the caesura), and it goes on as if the beginning had been pentasyllabic. Several Pâdas of the same irregular structure occur in our hymn, thus in verse 9: tvám (read tuám) agne ṁ sāhasâ sāhantamaḥ; verse 10: prá vaḥ mahé ṁ sāhasâ sāhasvate; ushaḥ-búdhe ṁ paru-sé ná agnáye.

Note 2. The comparison parasúḥ ná, 'like an axe,' raises doubts as to the correctness of druham-taráḥ. Parasúḥ seems to point to a compound containing the element drú, 'wood;' comp. below, 130, 4; VII, 104, 21. The second member of the compound would be han, which is frequently used with the meaning of cutting wood (II, 14, 2; X, 89, 7). Thus the reading would be dru-hántaraḥ (comp. vṛitra-hántamaḥ), 'a mighty wood-cutter.' As to this use of the comparative, see Delbrück, Altindische Syntax, p. 196.

Note 3. Comp. V, 7, 2. yásya sámritau.

Note 4. Prof. Max Müller (Science of Thought, p. 325) believes that the root sru occurs here in the sense of shaking. To me it seems that this srúvat is a misspelling

for *srúvat*. The opinion of Pischel and Geldner (*Vedische Studien*, I, p. vi) is different.

Note 5. The meaning of the comparison which I have indicated by the words in parentheses, becomes clear from VIII, 40, 1. *vánâ-iva vâte it*.

Note 6. The two last Pâdas are very obscure. In the last Pâda but one *nâ* would seem to be comparative, not negative, because it has the same meaning in the last Pâda, and because its vowel does not coalesce with the following initial vowel (comp. Benfey's dissertation, 'Behandlung des auslautenden a in *nâ* "wie" und *nâ* "nicht."') But then instead of *yamate* a substantive meaning something like 'hero' would be required. And also instead of the instrumental *dhanva-sâhâ* one should expect to find a nominative; comp. Benfey, *Vedica und Linguistica*, p. 180, note 1.—Prof. Max Müller translates: 'Holding out (or resisting) he stands firm, he does not budge; holding his bow he does not budge.'

Verse 4.

Note 1. The words *tégishthâbhih arânibhih* are repeated, probably by the same poet, below, 129, 5.

Note 2. It may be observed that several times in the *Parukkhēpa* hymns the parallelism between two subsequent Pâdas has corrupted the text, the reading of the one Pâda being wrongly introduced into the other. For instances I refer to I, 129, 11, where the last *vaso* has been added from the preceding Pâda, and to the last Pâda but one of I, 135, 4. Possibly our Pâda, which in its traditional form is metrically abnormal (comp., however, M. M.'s *Hymns to the Maruts*, 1st ed., p. cxii), has suffered damage in the same way. The comparison of I, 129, 5 would lead us to conjecture: *tégishthâbhih arânibhih nâ âvase*. 'One worships him in order that he may grant his favour as if (he were to help us) with hottest kindling-sticks. One worships Agni in order that he may grant his favour.'

Note 3. Comp. IV, 7, 10. *sthirâ kit ânnâ dayate vî gâmbhaih*. The food is the wood which Agni consumes.

Verse 5.

Note 1. See Prof. von Roth's translation of this verse, *Zeitschrift der D. Morg. Gesellschaft*, XLVIII, 117. On *prīkshām*, comp. *M. M.*, vol. xxxii, p. 302; Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, I, p. 96 seq. The translation of such a word can only be tentative.

Note 2. To *úparāsu* something like *vikshú* (IV, 37, 3) seems to be supplied.

Note 3. Comp. the Latin expression, 'argutius quam verius.' Pischel, *Göttinger Gelehrte Anzeigen*, 1884, p. 516 seq.; Delbrück, *Altindische Syntax*, p. 196.

Note 4. *Áprāyus* seems to be an anomalous formation, instead of *áprāyu*, unless we have to read *áprāyuve*. According to Pischel (*Göttinger Gel. Anzeigen*, 1890, p. 542), *áprāyushe* would mean 'dem der da lebt.' But I do not think that this *áprāyus* should be separated from *áprāyu*, which, as may be seen from I, 89, 1 compared with III, 5, 6 and X, 4, 7, is identical in meaning with, and evidently etymologically related to, *áprayukkhant*.

Note 5. *Grábhānavat* is the contrary of *agrabhaná*, I, 116, 5.

Note 6. Comp. III, 30, 7. *ábhaktam kīit bhagate*.

Verse 6.

Note 1. Ludwig: 'in den bebauten fluren zu verehren, auf den wüsten flächen zu verehren.' Prof. Max Müller observes with regard to *ishtániḥ*: 'it *staniḥ*, or *ish + staniḥ* (*ish-kartā*), much thundering.' For *ārtanā* he proposes the translation, 'ploughed field.' I have left both words untranslated.

Note 2. *Ādat* is imperfect of *ad*; there is a play upon words (*ādat* and *ā-dadīḥ*).

Verse 7.

Note 1. Who the *Kīstas* (cf. Lanman, p. 346) are is not known. They seem, however, either to be identical with the *Bhrīgus* or to be another ancient and probably mythical family of priests like them. They are mentioned also in VI, 67, 10.

Note 2. 'Their' refers to 'goods.'

Note 3. The fuel and libations with which Agni is covered?

Verse 8.

Note 1. Vāhas and its compounds, such as stómavāhas, ukthāvāhas, gírvāhas, have been treated of by Dr. Neisser in his ingenious article on váhni, Bezenberger's Beiträge, XVIII, 301 seq. (comp. on váhni, vol. xxxii, p. 37 seq.). Dr. Neisser tries to show that by the side of váhni, derived from vah=Latin vehere, and meaning 'draught-horse' (and besides—though Dr. Neisser does not admit this, see p. 316 —'a person that drives in a chariot'), there existed a second substantive váhni connected with the Greek *εὐχεσθαι*, and meaning both 'erhaben' and 'erhebend,' i.e. praising the gods (loc. cit., p. 314). With this second váhni he connects vāhas and its compounds. One of the principal arguments of Dr. Neisser is the fact quite correctly stated by him (p. 301), that 'the word váhni very frequently associates itself to the term hótri, while it does not with the compounds havyaváh and havyaváhana.' This fact, indeed, points to the conclusion that 'those compounds belong to another sphere of ideas than váhni' (p. 302). But Dr. Neisser seems to me to go too far in concluding that váhni, standing as an epithet of Agni, is not derived from vah=vehere. Agni's action consists not only in carrying the sacrificial food to the gods, but also in carrying the gods to the sacrifice of men, and in coming to that sacrifice himself with his chariot and his horses. Nor do the words stómavāhas or ukthāvāhas, if derived from vah=vehere, necessarily presuppose the admissibility of expressions such as 'uktham (stomam) vahati vipraḥ devân akkha' (p. 303), but those compounds may also rest on an idea conveyed by expressions such as 'uktham (stomaḥ) vahati devân upa yagñam,' which idea is quite Vedic. Thus stómavāhas in my opinion means, as an epithet of the god, 'carried by the stoma as by a vehicle' (comp. VII, 24, 5. eshá stomaḥ mahé ugrāya vāhe dhurí-iva átyaḥ ná vâgāyan adhâyi), or, as an epithet of the human worshippers, 'fitting out the

stoma as a vehicle.' I believe that the words in question can thus be explained in conformity with the whole range of Vedic thought, and the artificial distinction of two different substantives *vāhni*, &c., will be avoided. For special indications pointing in the same direction, which are furnished by the passages which contain the words here treated of, I refer to Bergaigne, *Religion Védique*, II, 286 seq., and to the article of Dr. Neisser himself, p. 321 seq.

Verse 9.

Note 1. On the metrical irregularity, see above, verse 3, note 1.

Note 2. *Te* seems to stand for the accusative, comp. Pischel, *Zeitschrift der D. Morgenl. Gesellschaft*, XXXV, 714 seq.; Delbrück, *Altindische Syntax*, 205. Or may the meaning be: 'and thy (worshippers) walk around thee . . . like obedient (servants)?' ●

Verse 10.

Note 1. On the metre, see above, verse 3, note 1. Prof. Max Müller translates, 'like a hunter for cattle.'

Note 2. The phrase *śísvāsu kshāsu góguve* occurs also, V, 64, 2. The same hymn contains the word *su-ḥetúnā*, which is found in the eleventh verse of our hymn.

Note 3. Literally, 'on all earths.' Comp. X, 2, 6. *nrivátih ānu kshāh*.

Note 4. *Garate*, 'he wakes,' at the same time can mean 'he sings,' and 'he is praised.' Comp. Neisser, *Bezenberger's Beiträge*, XIII, 298.

Note 5. The translation 'dawn' is conjectural only. But it gives a good meaning in all the passages which contain the word *rishûnām* (besides our passage, V, 25, 1; VIII, 71, 15; X, 6, 1). Prof. Max Müller translates the last two Pâdas: 'he sings like Rebha at the head of all singers, like a clever Hotri among the singers.'—Comp. Lanman, p. 424.

Verse 11.

Note 1. I supply *suvíryam*; see the last Pâda but one.

MANDALA I, HYMN 128.

ASHTAKA II, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 14-15.

1. He was born in Manu's firm law¹, the Hotri, the best sacrificer, according to the will of the Usigs², Agni, according to his own will. Always listening to him who wishes to be his friend, like a treasure to him who aspires to renown, the unbeguiled Hotri sat down in the abode of food (on the altar); enveloped³ (he sat down) in the abode of food.

2. We render him attentive¹, the promoter of sacrifice, on the path of Rita, by adoration with offerings, in the divine world, by (adoration) with offerings². In bringing us vigour he never becomes worn out with this body of his: he whom Mâtarisvan (has brought) to Manu from afar, the god whom he has brought from afar.

3. In his (own) way he moves in one moment round the terrestrial (space), the sudden devourer (emitting) his sperm, the bellowing bull emitting his sperm, the bellow¹, looking round with a hundred eyes, the god who quickly courses in the forests², taking his seat on the lower ridges, Agni, and on the highest ridges.

4. This highly wise Purohita, Agni watches sacrifice and service¹ house by house; by (the power of) his mind he is intent upon sacrifice. By (the power of) his mind helpful to him who desires food², he looks on all creatures, since he has been born, the guest adorned with ghee, (since) the helpful carrier (of the gods)³ has been born.

5. When through his (Agni's) power the bounties grow in strength, with the roar of Agni¹ as with that of the Maruts²—like bounties offered to a vigorous man: then he by his greatness stirs up the gift of goods. May he protect us from misfortune and injury, from evil spell and injury.

6. The far-reaching¹ steward² has taken all goods³ in his right hand, and strongly advancing does not let them loose; desirous of glory he does not let them loose. For every supplicant⁴ thou hast carried the oblations to the gods⁵. For every righteous one he procures a treasure; Agni opens both folds of the door (for him).

7. He has been established as the most blissful one in the enclosures of men, Agni, at the sacrifices, like a noble lord of the clans, a beloved lord of the clans at the sacrifices: he rules over the oblations of men to which nourishing power has been imparted¹. May he protect us from harm that comes from Varuṇa, from harm² that comes from the great god.

8. They magnify Agni the Hotṛi, the dispenser of goods. They have roused the beloved, the most shining steward¹ (of sacrifice); they have roused the carrier of oblations. The gods desirous of goods (have roused) him in whom all life dwells, who possesses all wealth, the Hotṛi, the worshipful sage, the lovely one for the sake of bliss; with praises (they have roused), desirous of goods, the lovely one.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi* and metre.—Verse 6 = TB. II, 5, 4, 4.

Verse 1.

Note 1. As to *dhárīmañi*, comp. IX, 86, 4, where it is said that the streams of Soma flow forward, '*dhárīmañi*;' Bergaigne, III, 219. 'Domain, precinct, sanctuary?' M. M.

Note 2. The *Usigas* (comp. above, I, 60, 2, note 1) are closely related to the *Bhrigus*; they are considered as the first sacrificers, the first worshippers of Agni. See Bergaigne, I, 57 seq.

Note 3. Enveloped in fuel and libations.

Verse 2.

Note 1. Comp. M. M.'s note, vol. xxxii, p. 437.

Note 2. Comp. Lanman, pp. 516, 518.

Verse 3.

Note 1. Prof. Max Müller translates the second and third *Pādas*: 'again and again shouting, bellowing forth his sperm, yea, placing his sperm with bellowing.'

Note 2. Of course the fuel is alluded to.

Verse 4.

Note 1. *Yagñāsya adhvarāsya*, 'sacrifice and service;' comp. above, I, 1, 4, note 1.

Note 2. The translation is doubtful. If the denominative *ishûy* is derived from *ishu*, the meaning must be 'to fly like an arrow,' or possibly 'to shoot arrows.' But I do not think that the poet can have meant to say that Agni acts as a *vedhā* and looks on all creatures 'for him who flies like an arrow,' or 'for him who shoots arrows.' We should rather have to write *ishûyate* without accent, so that the translation would be: 'By (the power of) his mind helpful (Agni) flies like an arrow; he looks on all creatures' (comp. VI, 3, 5, where it is said that Agni shoots arrows). But possibly *ishûy*, which is found only here, may be a synonym of *ishudhy*, see verse 6. It may be a denominative from *ish*, influenced by the type of verbs like *rigûy*, *kratûy*,

vasûy, &c. Then the accent can be retained, and the translation would be as given in the text ('to him who desires food').

Note 3. On váhni, comp. above, I, 127, 8, note 1.

Verse 5.

Note 1. The cerebral *n* in *avena* clearly points to the correction of the text *agnéh rávena*.

Note 2. The Maruts are called *bhogáh*, V, 53, 16 (*stuhí bhogán*, 'praise the liberal ones'). Here we have the corresponding abstract noun.

Verse 6.

Note 1. *Vihâyas* (comp. Bergaigne, *Religion Védique*, III, 287) seems to be formed like *vímahas*, *víketas*, *vímanas*. The meaning then will be 'of extended *hâyas*.' The substantive *hâyas*, which is not found in the texts separately, may be derived from *g'hîte* or from *hinóti*, and mean something like 'energy.' At all events it seems impossible to connect this adjective *vihâyas* with the substantive *vihâyas*, 'the aerial space,' belonging to the classical language.

Note 2. Comp. the remark above, I, 58, 7, note 2.

Note 3. I propose to read *vísvâ ví-hâyâh aratíh vásû dadhe háste dákshine*. Comp. IX, 18, 4. *á yáh vísvâni vâryâ vásûni hástayoḥ dadhé*.

Note 4. Comp. Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, I, 191.

Note 5. Comp. VIII, 19, 1. *devatrâ havyám óhire*.

Verse 7.

Note 1. *Iḁ kṛitá* seems to be identical with *íshkṛita*.

Note 2. Regarding the metre, comp. Lanman, p. 383.

Verse 8.

Note 1. Comp. I, 58, 7, note 1.

MANDALA I, HYMN 140.

ASHTAKA II, ADHYĀYA 2, VARGA 5-7.

1. For him who sits on the Vedi (i.e. on the sacrificial bed), whose foundations are pleasant, for the brilliant Agni bring forward¹ a receptacle², which is to him like a drink. Clothe¹ the bright one in prayer as in a garment, him whose chariot is light, whose colour is bright, the destroyer of darkness.

2. He who has a twofold birth¹, presses on towards the threefold food²; what he has eaten grows again after a year³. With the mouth and the tongue of the one he (shows himself as) the noble, manly one; with the other (mouth) the stubborn (Agni) wipes off the trees⁴.

3. Both his mothers¹, dwelling together, immersed in darkness, and affrighted, proceed towards the young child who stretches forward his tongue, who sparkling moves about thirstily, whom men should attach to themselves, who agitates (the world), the increaser of his father².

4. Thy speedy (teams)¹ that strive to break loose for the benefit of the man who acts as men do, the swift ones, drawing black furrows—thy quick (horses), striving apart, the agile, swift runners, incited by the wind, are yoked.

5. When he stroking his wide course proceeds panting, thundering, roaring, then those sparkling (rays) of his fly about wildly, displaying wondrous darkness, a large sight¹.

6. When he bends down over the brown (plants)¹ like a busy (servant), he roars and approaches his

wives like a bull. Displaying his power he adorns his bodies with beauty; like a terrible beast, difficult to seize, he shakes his horns.

7. He clasps (the plants, &c.) that have been laid together and have been laid out¹. Knowing them, while they know him, and being their own (friend or lover) he lies on them. They grow again and attain godhead. They produce together another shape of the parents².

8. The long-haired virgins¹ have embraced him. Having died they stand upright again for him (Agni) the living one (or, for him the Âyu). Delivering them of old age he proceeds roaring, procreating another vital spirit, an indestructible life.

9. Licking everywhere the upper garment of the mother¹, he spreads himself over the space with his mightily devouring warriors, giving strength to everything that has feet, licking and licking. The reddish white one² follows her ways³.

10. Shine, O Agni, among our liberal lords, for thou art a mightily breathing bull, a friend of the house. Throwing down the (mothers) of the young child¹ thou hast shone, (a protector of thy friends) like a coat of mail in battles, hurrying around.

11. May this well-composed (prayer), O Agni, be more welcome to thee than a badly-composed one—more welcome than even a welcome prayer. With the bright light of thy body win thou treasures for us.

12. Grant us, Agni, for our chariot and for our house a ship which has its own rudders and which has feet¹, which may save our strong men and our liberal lords and our people, and which may be a shelter for us.

13. Approve, O Agni, our hymn alone. May Heaven and Earth and the Rivers, delightful by their own nature¹, going their way², (choose for us) bliss in cows and crops, long days; may the red (Dawns) choose food for us as a choice boon.

NOTES.

The *Rishi* is *Dīrghatamas Auṣṭhaya*, the metre *Gagatī*; the two last verses are *Trishṭubh* (comp. above the note on the metre of I, 94); the tenth verse, which is considered as either *Gagatī* or *Trishṭubh*, begins with one *Gagatī Pāda* which is followed by three *Pādas* in *Trishṭubh*.—No verse occurs in the other *Samhitās*.

Verse 1.

Note 1. *Prá bhará* (*Padap. prá bhara*) and *vāsayaá* (*Padap. vāsaya*) may be 1st person.

Note 2. Possibly the 'womb' or 'receptacle' (*yóni*) here means *ghṛita* or the like, for it is said of Agni that 'his womb is *ghṛita*' (II, 3, 11), and he is called *ghṛitáyoniḥ*. This receptacle 'is to him like a drink,' because he consumes the *ghṛita* by which he is surrounded.

Verse 2.

Note 1. The terrestrial and the celestial birth. Comp. *Bergaigne*, I, 28 seq.

Note 2. *Bergaigne* (I, 29) translates: ' . . . s'élance trois fois sur la nourriture,' which he explains as referring to 'the three sacrifices of the morning, the midday, and the evening.' But *tri-vṛt* clearly is an epithet of *ánnam*, not an adverb. The explanation of *Sáyana*, who understands the threefold food as sacrificial butter, sacrificial cakes (*puroḍāsa*), and *Soma*, may be correct.

Note 3. On the locative *samvatsaré*, comp. *Delbrück*, *Altindische Syntax*, p. 117.

Note 4. The last words evidently refer to Agni's tongue, i.e. his flames, wiping off as it were the firewood. But it is not clear what the tongue of the other one is. *Sâyana* thinks of the sacrificial spoon conceived as the tongue of the officiating priest: which is very artificial, but perhaps not too artificial for a verse like this.

Verse 3.

Note 1. The 'two mothers' of Agni may be the two worlds (comp. Bergaigne, I, 238) or the two kindling-sticks. —*Ubhá* (masc.) instead of *ubhé* is to be remarked.

Note 2. Agni increases the wealth of the worshipper who has lighted the fire and may thus be considered as Agni's father. Comp. *Satapatha Brâhmaṇa* XII, 5, 2, 15. Or the father may be Heaven; on Agni as imparting strength to Heaven, see I, 164, 51.

Verse 4.

Note 1. The verse begins with feminines; the *gúvaḥ* (comp. I, 134, 1), literally the quick ones, seem to be something like the *niyútaḥ* of Agni. Then follow masculines; the horses of Agni are male (comp. Bergaigne, I, 143).

Verse 5.

Note 1. Comp. *bhūri várpaḥ kárikrat*, III, 58, 9.

Verse 6.

Note 1. The brown ones, according to *Sâyana*, are the plants. They are called brown (*babhru*) also in X, 97, 1. 'Are they the dry leaves in which the spark is caught?' M. M.

Verse 7.

Note 1. Prof. Max Müller translates *saṁstíraḥ vishítíraḥ*, '(the flames) that are together and apart.'

Note 2. The parents seem to be Heaven and Earth, as *Sâyana* explains.—Possibly *pitróḥ* depends on *sátâ* (comp.

pitróh sákā, II, 17, 7; IV, 5, 10), 'being with their parents they produce a new shape.' Prof. Max Müller translates: 'They produce together a different shape of their parents.'

Verse 8.

Note 1. Should not the plants again be referred to? 'I think it refers to the *gválās*, the flames that are hidden under the ashes and are lighted again.' M. M.

Verse 9.

Note 1. The mother is the Earth whose surface Agni licks.

Note 2. I believe the Dawn is alluded to whom the Vedic poets represent now as preceding Agni, now as following him. See Bergaigne, II, pp. 14, 15.

Note 3. For *vartanīr áha* of the *Samhitāpāṭha* the *Pada-pāṭha* has *vartanīh áha*; comp. Rig-veda *Prātisākhya*, Sūtra 259. *Vartanīh* of course is correct. Comp. X, 172, 1. *gāvah sakanta vartanīm*.

Verse 10.

Note 1. The mothers of the young child are very probably the mothers of Agni represented as a young child. They may be the Waters which Agni leaves resting on the surface of the earth while he himself rises to heaven. Or the mothers may be the woods or plants which he burns and thus throws them down as it were.

Verse 12.

Note 1. 'Which has feet in its own rudders,' M. M. That the ship has feet seems to mean only that it has the faculty of moving forward freely and quickly, and not that any real beings having feet are designated by this comparison. The ship that carries the worshippers across all dangers, is the protection and help which Agni grants, or the sacrifice which he helps to perform.

Verse 13.

Note 1. Comp. Geldner, *Vedische Studien*, I, 275.

Note 2. *Yántaḥ* seems to be corrupt; one or two syllables are wanting. Something like *yátáyantaḥ* (IX, 39, 2) or *vardháyantaḥ*, or, as Prof. Max Müller proposes, *vyántaḥ* would do. He translates: 'May Heaven and Earth and the Rivers . . . accepting (*vyántaḥ*) sacrifices of milk and corn choose for us, and may the Dawns choose for us food as a boon for many days.'—Cf. Lanman, pp. 510, 539.

MANDALA I, HYMN 141.

ASHTAKA II, ADHYĀYA 2, VARGA 8-9.

1. Lo, that beautiful splendour of the god, when he was born of strength, has truly come to be a wondrous sight. Though he slinks away¹, the prayer goes straight to him². They have led forward the flowing streams of *Rita*.

2. The powerful one¹, rich in food, the true (friend of men) has entered the wondrous (body)². His second (form of existence) is in the seven kind mothers³. The ten young females⁴ have brought the third (form) of this bull forth, him the guardian, in order to milk him.

3. When the rulers, the liberal lords brought him forth by their power out of the depth, out of the buffalo's shape¹, when from of old² at the purification of the sweet drink³ *Mâtariśvan* produces the hidden one (i.e. Agni) by attrition—

4. When he is led forward from the highest father¹, he climbs up the . . .², the plants in his (or, in their?) houses. When³ both (Heaven and Earth or the two *Araṇis*?) promote his birth, then the youngest one became bright by his heat⁴.

5. Then he entered upon the mothers¹ in whom he the bright one grew up far and wide unimpaired². When he has climbed up to the former (mothers) who from of old incite (him)³, he runs down in the younger, later (or, nearer) ones.

6¹. Then in the strivings for the day² they choose him *Hotrī*. As if to swell their good fortune they

strive towards him ³, when praised by many he moves everywhere with wisdom and power to the gods and to the praise of mortals ⁴ for (bringing them) refreshing drink.

7. When he has scattered himself, the worshipful one, driven by the wind, like . . . ¹, with the sound (which he produces) (?), he whom it is not possible to drive to a place (like cattle): on the flight of the burning one who speeds on his black way, whose birth is bright, who strays everywhere to the atmosphere . . . ²

8. Like a chariot that goes forward, he goes to Heaven with his ruddy limbs, adorned with his locks of flames¹. Then his black (clouds of smoke), O burning one (?), the liberal ones (?) (appear)². The birds flee as before the fierceness of a hero³.

9. Through thee indeed, O Agni, Varuṇa whose laws are firm, Mitra and Aryaman, the givers of good rain, are glorious, when thou the mighty one hast been born, everywhere encompassing with wisdom (all beings), as the felly encompasses the spokes of a wheel.

10. Thou, O Agni, youngest (god), furthest treasures and (the friendship of) the gods for him who performs worship, who presses Soma. May we thus establish thee the young one, O young (son) of strength, possessor of great treasures, like the winner in a race¹.

11. Make good fortune¹ swell for us like well-employed wealth belonging to the house, and like firm ability²—(fortune) which can hold both races³ like reins: and being full of good-will in (the sphere of) *Rita*, (fill our) praise of the gods (with rich reward).

12. And may the brilliant, joyful Hotri with quick horses, with a shining chariot hear us. May he, the wise Agni, lead us on the best leading (paths) to happy welfare and to bliss.

13. Agni has been praised with powerful¹ songs, he who has been brought forward furthermore for sovereignty. May both those our liberal lords and we ourselves spread out² (our power over all foes) as the sun (spreads out its light and by it destroys) the mist.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi*. The metre is *Gagatī*; the two last verses again are *Trishūbh*.—None of its verses occurs in the other *Samhitās*.

Verse 1.

Note 1. The meaning seems to be that if Agni be unwilling to officiate at the sacrifice, the prayer nevertheless reaches its aim and induces him to do his duty as the divine Hotri.

Note 2. The verb *sādh* is very frequently connected with substantives such as *dhīyāḥ* or the like. Comp. also *matinām ka sādhanam*, X, 26, 4.

Verse 2.

Note 1. It seems probable that *prīkshāḥ* is the nominative of *prīkshā*, and not the genitive of *prīksh*. Comp. VI, 8, 1, where it is said of Agni '*prīkshāsya vrīshnaḥ arushāsya*.' On the meaning of *prīkshā*, see above, I, 127, 5, note 1.

Note 2. The poet seems clearly to describe the second and third form of Agni's existence, his dwelling in the waters and his birth from the fire-sticks. But he is less explicit with regard to the first form. The epithet *pitu-*

mán would seem to point to Agni as the sacrificial fire and the receiver of offerings. But it is rather strange that this form of the god should be distinguished from the Agni procreated by the ten females, i.e. produced by the ten fingers, by the attrition of the kindling-sticks.—Prof. Max Müller differs from me in referring the words *dāsa-pramatim ganayanta yóshanaḥ*, not to the third form of Agni, but to Agni in general. He translates: ‘The powerful one, rich in food, rests always on that wondrous sight (Agni on the altar, *gārhapatya* Agni). The second rests in the seven kind mothers (*vidyudrūpa*; Agni in the clouds); the third is for milking the powerful one (Agni as the sun, *ādityarūpa*)—the ten maidens (the fingers) have brought forth the guardian.’

Note 3. Grassmann no doubt is right in proposing to read *saptā sīvāsu*. Of course the waters are alluded to.

Note 4. Read *dāsa prāmatim* (Boehtlingk-Roth). On Agni as the son of the ten fingers, comp. Bergaigne, II, 7.

Verse 3.

Note 1. The buffalo Agni was hidden in the depth. Comp. X, 8, 1. *apām upā-sthe mahisháḥ vavardha*; I, 95, 9. *budhnám vi-rókamānam mahishásya dhāma*.

Note 2. The preposition *ānu* seems to stand here with an ablative (*pra-dívaḥ*).

Note 3. The literal meaning of *mádhvaḥ ā-dhavé* is indicated by passages such as I, 109, 4. *ā dhāvatam má-dhunā*; IX, 11, 5. *mádhāv ā dhāvata mádhu*. Comp. also *ādhavaniya*. On the washing of the Soma which is technically designated by the verb *ā-dhāv*, see H. O., Göttinger Gelehrte Anzeigen, 1890, p. 426 seq.; Hillebrandt, *Vedische Mythologie*, I, 216.—The purification of the sweet drink, at which Agni is produced, was probably achieved by the tempest.

Verse 4.

Note 1. The highest father is Heaven.

Note 2. The meaning of *prīkshúdhaḥ* is unknown.

Note 3. Yát is repeated twice, as yása in X, 121, 2. yása vírve upa-āsate pra-sísham yása deváh.

Note 4. On *ghrinā*, comp. Lanman, Noun-Inflection, 335.

Verse 5.

Note 1. The mothers are the Waters.

Note 2. The reading, very probably, ought to be *vi-vávrīdhé*.

Note 3. Boehtlingk-Roth believe that the reading ought to be *sanâyúvāh* or *sanā-gúrah*. *Sanā-gúrah* (cf. *sanā-gurā pitārā*, IV, 36, 3) seems to me quite possible, although there is no positive necessity for abandoning the traditional reading.—The ‘former’ mothers may be the heavenly Waters; the mothers in whom Agni runs down are the rivers. Prof. Max Müller adds that the former mothers may possibly be ‘the burnt pieces of wood. Agni runs up in them, then leaves them to burn new pieces.’

Verse 6.

Note 1. On the whole verse, compare Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, I, 217.

Note 2. Comp. above, I, 45, 7, note 1.

Note 3. The second Pāda is translated by Pischel: ‘Wie in einen König drängen sie in ihn, wenn sie (Trank)opfer darbringen.’ But verse 11 shows that *bhágam* depends on *paprikānāśah*.

Note 4. Comp. III, 16, 4. ā devéshu . . . ā sámse utá *nrinām*.

Verse 7.

Note 1. The translation of *hvārāh* is quite uncertain. The same must be said of the rest of this Pāda.

Note 2. The sentence is incomplete.

Verse 8.

Note 1. On *síkvān* (or *síkvas*), comp. M. M.’s note, vol. xxxii, p. 318; Hübschmann, *Vocalsystem*, p. 186. The translation is only tentative.—Two syllables are wanting;

we may propose a reading like *śkvabhiḥ pārishkrītaḥ* (comp. H. O., Prolegomena, 76, note 3).

Note 2. This passage is most obscure. The first words of the Pāda are the same as above, 140, 5. The 'black ones' probably are the dark clouds of smoke that surround Agni. But it is very strange that these clouds should be designated as *sûráyaḥ*, 'liberal ones.' And the vocative (?) *dakshi* (*Padapāṭha dhakshi*), instead of which we should at least expect *daksho* or *dakshin*, is no less strange. The text seems thoroughly corrupt.

Note 3. See Lanman, p. 557.

Verse 10.

Note 1. Comp. Geldner, *Vedische Studien*, I, 121.

Verse 11.

Note 1. Comp. above, verse 6, Pāda 2.

Note 2. Comp. VIII, 24, 14. *dáksham priñkántam*.

Note 3. The human and the divine race. I do not believe that Dr. Neisser (*Zur Vedischen Verballehre*, 17) is right in interpreting *yámati* as an indicative.

Verse 13.

Note 1. The translation of *símivadbhiḥ* is only tentative. *Símî* (I, 151, 1) cannot be identical with *sámî*.

Note 2. *Níḥ tatanyuh* (*nísh tatanyuh*, *Samhitapáṭha*) of course is derived from *tan*, not from *stan*. Comp. I, 105, 12. *satyám tátāna sūryaḥ*; IV, 5, 13. *sūraḥ várnena tatanan ushāsaḥ*, &c.

MANDALA I, HYMN 142.

ASHTAKA II, ADHYÂYA 2, VARGA 10-11.

ÂPRÎ HYMN.

1. Being inflamed, Agni, bring hither to-day the gods to the man who holds forth the (sacrificial) ladle. Spin out the ancient thread (of sacrifice)¹ for the sacrificer who has prepared Soma.

2. Measure out, O Tanûnapât¹, the sacrifice rich in ghee, rich in honey, of a priest like me, of a sacrificer who has toiled hard.

3. The brilliant, purifying, wonderful Narâsamsa¹ mixes the sacrifice with honey three times a day, the god worthy of worship among the gods.

4. Agni, magnified¹ by us, bring hither the bright, beloved Indra. For this my prayer is addressed² to thee whose tongue is good.

5. (Priests) hold forth the (sacrificial) ladle, strewing the sacrificial grass at the decorous service of the sacrifice;—I¹ trim² (the sacrificial grass) which best receives the gods with its wide extent, a big shelter for Indra.

6¹. May the divine doors open themselves, the increasers of *Rîta*, the never sticking, large ones, the purifying, much-desired (doors), that the gods may come forth.

7. May Night and Dawn, of glorious appearance, the two neighbouring (goddesses), wearing beautiful ornaments¹, the young² mothers of *Rîta*, sit down together on the sacrificial grass³.

8. May the two divine Hotrîs, eager in praising (the gods), the sages with lovely tongues, perform

for us to-day this successful sacrifice which attains to Heaven.

9. The brilliant (goddess) placed among the gods, among the Maruts¹, Hotrâ Bhâratî², Iâ, Sarasvatî, and Maht³: may these worshipful (goddesses) sit down on the sacrificial grass.

10. May Tvashtri, inclined towards us, pour forth for us, in our navel¹, that wonderful seed with many treasures², plentiful by itself, for the sake of prosperity and wealth³.

11. Letting go (the sacrificial food to the gods) sacrifice by thyself to the gods, O tree¹. May² Agni make the offerings ready³, the god among the gods, the wise one.

12. For Him who is accompanied by Pûshan and by the Maruts, by the Visve devâh, (by) Vâyû¹, who is moved by the Gâyatra song, for Indra pronounce the Svâhâ over the offering.

13. Come hither to the offerings over which the Svâhâ has been pronounced, in order to feast. Indra! Come hither! Hear our call! Thee they call at the worship.

NOTES.

The hymn is an Âprîsûkta. The same *Rishi*. Metre, Anushûbh. The whole hymn is closely related to I, 13.—Verse 10: cf. VS. XXVII, 20; TS. IV, 1, 8, 3; MS. II, 12, 6.

Verse 1.

Note 1. The third Pâda of this verse is identical with VIII, 13, 14.

Verse 2.

Note 1. Comp. I, 13, 2, note 1.

Verse 3.

Note 1. Comp. I, 13, 2, note 1.

Verse 4.

Note 1. 'Magnified' is *īliták*; comp. the note on I, 1, 1. The verse is addressed to the *Idah*.

Note 2. The text has *ákkha . . . vakyáte*. To me there seems to be no doubt that this is the passive of *vak*, not of *vañk*. Comp. the name of the priest *akkhāvāka*, and the phrase *ákkhoktibhih matínām*, I, 61, 3; 184, 2. The same passive of *vak* is found III, 39, 1. *matih hridák ā vakyámānā* (then follows *ákkha . . . gigāti*); X, 47, 7 (*stómāh*) . . . *mānasā vakyámānāh*.—It may be observed that in our passage as well as in III, 39, 1 and X, 47, 7, the forms *vakyáte*, *vakyámānā*, *vakyámānāh* are preceded by a vowel; and we may infer that the poet did not say *ukyáte*, &c., in order to avoid the hiatus.

Verse 5.

Note 1. The poet begins as if he intended to say, 'Priests . . . lay down the sacrificial grass.' But he continues, 'I lay down.' Dr. Neisser (Bezenberger's Beiträge, XX, 60) tries to explain the difficulty in a way in which I cannot follow him.

Note 2. On the verb *vrig* technically connected with *barhíh*, see Geldner, *Vedische Studien*, I, 152 seq., and compare vol. xxxii, I, 38, 1, note 2; I, 64, 1, note 2.

Verse 6.

Note 1. With the whole verse compare I, 13, 6.

Verse 7.

Note 1. Pischel's opinion (*Vedische Studien*, II, 113 seq.) that *pésah* means 'Gestalt,' 'Form,' 'Farbe,' 'rūpa,' does not convince me.

Note 2. See Geldner, *Kuhn's Zeitschrift*, XXVIII, 195.

Note 3. Comp. VIII, 87, 4. $\tilde{a}$ barhíh sîdatam sumât. Geldner (*Vedische Studien*, II, 190) translates: 'das schöne Opfergras.'

Verse 9.

Note 1. 'Should we read mârteshu for marûtsu?' M. M. This conjecture seems perhaps rather bold.

Note 2. Hotrá Bhârati, i.e. the personified Offering of the Bharatas, seems to be one goddess, more usually called simply Bhârati. Comp. I, 22, 10; II, 1, 11; III, 62, 3; Bergaigne, *Religion Védique*, I, 322; H. O., *Religion des Veda*, 243, note 2. Pischel's opinion (*Vedische Studien*, II, 85) is different.

Note 3. See above, I, 13, 9, note 1.

Verse 10.

Note 1. On the navel as the symbol of the connection between father and son, see Bergaigne, I, 35, 36, and comp. the well-known name Nâbhânedishtha.

Note 2. For purú vâram very probably puruvâram should be read (Grassmann). See II, 40, 4. puruvâram . . . râyás pósham ví syatâm nâbhim asmé.

Note 3. With the last Pâda compare II, 40, 4, quoted in note 2, and II, 3, 9. pragâm Tvâshâ ví syatu nâbhim asmé; see also *Taittiriya Samhitâ* IV, 1, 8, 3. *Tvashtri* is generally considered as giving sons; see H. O., *Religion des Veda*, 234.

Verse 11.

Note 1. Comp. I, 13, 11, note 1.

Note 2. The second hemistich recurs I, 105, 14.

Note 3. See Neisser, *Zur Vedischen Verballehre*, 22.

Verse 12.

Note 1. The text has 'for Vâyu,' not 'for (the god) accompanied by Vâyu.' But there is no doubt that pû-shanvâte, &c., refers to Indra, and that Vâyu is named merely as a companion of Indra.

MANDALA I, HYMN 143.

ASHṬAKA II, ADHYĀYA 2, VARGA 12.

1. I bring forward my most powerful, entirely new (pious) thought (i.e. hymn). the prayer of my words¹ to Agni, the son of strength; he is the child of the Waters², the beloved one, who together with the Vasus has sat down on the Earth as a Hotri observing the appointed time (for sacrificing).

2. Being born in the highest heaven Agni became visible to Mātariśvan. By the power of his mind, by his greatness when kindled, his flame filled Heaven and Earth with light.

3¹. His flames are fierce; never ageing are the flames of him who is beautiful to behold, whose face is beautiful, whose splendour is beautiful. The never sleeping, never ageing (rays) of Agni whose power is light, roll forward like streams across the nights (?)².

4. Him the all-wealthy, whom the Bhrigus have set to work on the navel of the earth, with the whole power of the world¹—stir up that Agni by thy prayers in his own house—(him) who alone rules over goods like Varuṇa.

5. He who is not to be kept back like the roar of the Maruts, like an army¹ that is sent forward, like the thunderbolt of heaven—Agni eats with his sharp jaws, he chews, he throws down the forests as a warrior throws down his foes.

6. Would Agni eagerly come to our hymn? Would He the Vasu together with the Vasus fulfil our desire? Will He, the driver, stir our prayers

that they may be successful? (Thus thinking) I praise Him whose face is bright, with this my prayer.

7. He who has kindled him strives¹ towards Agni as towards Mitra (or, towards a friend)—(to Agni) whose face shines with ghee, the charioteer of *Rita*. May he who when kindled becomes a racer², shining at the sacrifices³, lift up our bright-coloured prayer.

8¹. Preserve us, O Agni, never failing with thy never-failing, kind and mighty guardians; protect our people all around with those undeceived, undismayed, never slumbering (guardians), O thou our wish²!

NOTES.

The same *Rishi*. Metre, *Gagati*; the last verse *Trishubh*. The hymn has been translated by Kaegi, *Siebenzig Lieder des Rigveda*, p. 100.—Verse 7 = TB. I, 2, 1, 12.

Verse 1.

Note 1. Comp. VIII, 59, 6. *vákāh mātīm*.

Note 2. Agni who is considered as born from the Waters, is identified several times with a god who, like *Mâtariśvan*, in my opinion had an independent origin, with *Apām napāt* ('Child of the Waters'). Comp. Bergaigne, *Rel. Védique*, II, 17 seq.; H. O., *Religion des Veda*, 118 seq.

Verse 3.

Note 1. There is no sufficient reason for transposing verses 3 and 4 (Kaegi).

Note 2. Probably we should read *āti aktūn*; comp. VI, 4, 5. *āti eti aktūn*.—See Bergaigne, *Mélanges Renier*, p. 96.

Verse 4.

Note 1. Bhúvanasya seems to depend on magmánā; comp. VII, 82, 5. bhúvanasya magmánā.

Verse 5.

Note 1. Pischel (*Vedische Studien*, I, 231) seems to me to be right in denying that sénā ever means 'Geschoss,' and in translating sénā *srishā* 'exercitus effusus.' The opinion of Prof. von Bradke and Prof. Bloomfield is different; see *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenl. Gesellschaft*, XLVI, 456; XLVIII, 549.

Verse 7.

Note 1. The text adds the dativus ethicus *vaḥ*, 'for you' (comp. Delbrück, *Altindische Syntax*, 206), which can scarcely be translated.

Note 2. Geldner (*Vedische Studien*, I, 168) has shown that *akrá* very probably means 'horse.' Agni is very frequently compared to a horse.—Comp. Ludwig, *Ueber die neuesten Arbeiten auf dem Gebiete der Rigveda-Forschung*, p. 54; Roth, *Zeitschrift der D. Morg. Ges.*, XLVIII, 118.

Note 3. See above, I, 31, 6, note 2.

Verse 8.

Note 1. With Pādas C D compare the verse VI, 8, 7. *ádabdhebbhiḥ táva gopābhiḥ ishṭe asmākam páhi trishadhasṭha sūrīn.*

Note 2. 'What is *ishṭe*? Is it thou our wish, or thou our sacrifice?' M. M.

MANDALA I, HYMN 144.

ASHTAKA II, ADHYĀYA 2, VARGA 13.

1. The *Hotri*¹ goes forward² (in order to fulfil) his duty by his wonderful power, directing upwards the brightly adorned prayer. He steps towards the (sacrificial) ladles which are turned to the right³, and which first kiss his foundation⁴.

2. They have greeted with shouts the streams of *Rita*¹ which were hidden at the birthplace of the god, at his seat. When He dwelt dispersed in the lap of the waters, he drank the draughts by (the power of) which he moves².

3. Two (beings) of the same age¹ try to draw that wonderful shape (Agni) towards themselves, progressing in turns towards a common aim². Then he is to be proclaimed by us like a winner³ (in a contest). The charioteer⁴ (governs all things) as if pulling in the reins of a draught-horse.

4. He whom two (beings) of the same age¹ serve, two twins dwelling together in one common abode, the gray one has been born as a youth by night as by day², the ageless one who wanders through many generations of men.

5. The prayers, the ten fingers¹ stir him up. We, the mortals, call him, the god, for his protection. From the dry land he hastens to the declivities². With those who approached him he has established new rules³.

6. Thou indeed, O Agni, reignest by thy own nature over the heavenly and over the terrestrial

world as a shepherd (takes care of his cattle). These two variegated, great (goddesses) striving for gloriousness, the golden ones who move crookedly¹, have approached thy sacrificial grass.

7. Agni! Be gratified and accept graciously this prayer, O joy-giver, independent one, who art born in the *Rīta*, good-willed one, whose face is turned towards us from all sides, conspicuous one, gay in thy aspect, like a dwelling-place rich in food¹.

NOTES.

The same *Rīshi*. Metre, *Gagatī*.—No verse occurs in the other *Samhitās*.

Verse 1.

Note 1. The *Hotri* is Agni.

Note 2. Comp. III, 27, 7, where it is said of Agni: *purástāt eti mâyáyā*.—The poet says *éti prá*, and not *prá eti*, in order to avoid the hiatus.

Note 3. Comp. below, III, 6, 1. *dakshinā-vā*.

Note 4. 'Which first, i. e. at the time when the sacrificial vessels are put down, kiss his *dhāman* (foundation), i. e. the place of Agni.' *Sâyana*.

Verse 2.

Note 1. Comp. IX, 75, 3. *abhí im rítasya dohánāḥ anúshata*, and VIII, 12, 32. *nābhā yagñasya dohánā prá adhvaré*. I take *dohánāḥ* as acc. plur. of an abstract noun *dohánā* formed like *garánā*, *bhandánā*, &c. But possibly it might be the nom. plur. either of the same noun or of a nomen agentis *dohána*: 'the streams of *Rīta* (the libations?) or the milkers of *Rīta*, hidden at the birthplace of the god, have greeted him with shouts.' It would

be difficult, however, to say why the milkers of *Rīta* (i. e. the priests?) are called 'hidden at the birthplace of the god.' Prof. Max Müller thinks of a reading *parī-vrītaḥ*, 'surrounding Agni.' He refers the 'streams of *Rīta*' (nom.) to the water, cf. I, 105, 12. *rītām arshanti sīndhavaḥ*.

Note 2. *Svadhāḥ* *adhayat yābhiḥ ŷyate*. In my opinion *svadhā* means 'the inherent power,' 'the power of moving according to one's own will,' and then the drink which confers this power on a being, especially on the dead ancestors.—Comp. M. M., vol. xxxii, p. 32 seq.; H. O., *Religion des Veda*, 531, note 2.

Verse 3.

Note 1. According to *Sāyana* the two beings spoken of here and in the next verse are the *Hotri* and the *Adhvaryu*.

Note 2. See I, 130, 5. *ayurṅgata samānām ārtham ākshitam*; III, 61, 3. *samānām ārtham karaniyāmānā*.

Note 3. On *bhāgaḥ nā hāvyaḥ*, see Geldner, *Vedische Studien*, I, 121.

Note 4. The charioteer is Agni.

Verse 4.

Note 1. See verse 3, note 1.

Note 2. Comp. Gaedicke, *Der Accusativ*, p. 175. He translates: 'bei Tage noch bei Nacht ergrauend.'

Verse 5.

Note 1. *Vrīś* (ῥπαξ λεγόμενον) is ranged in the *Nighantus* among the *aṅgulināmāni* and explained by *Sāyana* accordingly. The word seems indeed to mean 'finger.' Compare with our passage IX, 8, 4; 15, 8; 93, 1; 97, 57.

Note 2. Comp. I, 33, 4. *dhānoḥ ādhi vishunāk té ví āyan*, and especially X, 4, 3. *dhānoḥ ādhi pravātā yāsi hāryan*. I cannot follow Pischel (*Vedische Studien*, II, 69 seq.) in explaining these passages. 'Over the heavenly expanse he hastens down towards us.' M. M.

Note 3. See Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, I, 300. Like Pischel I do not know who 'they who approached Agni' are. Possibly the worshippers or priests are alluded to. 'He received new praises with (or from) those who approached him.' M. M.

Verse 6.

Note 1. Sâyaṇa explains the two female beings here in question as Heaven and Earth. Does the 'crooked movement' refer to the daily revolution of the sky?

Verse 7.

Note 1. The last Pāda recurs X, 64, 11.

MANDALA I, HYMN 145.

ASHTAKA II, ADHYĀYA 2, VARGA 14.

1. Ask ye him. He has come. He knows. He the intelligent one moves forward; He moves along (his way) (?)¹. In him all commands, all wishes dwell. He is the lord of strength, of mighty power.

2. They ask him. He himself¹ does not ask in turn what he, the wise one, has grasped by his own mind alone². He does not forget the first word nor another word. Unconfused he adheres to his own power of mind.

3. To him go the sacrificial ladles, to him go the racers¹. He alone may hear all my words. He who pronounces many praishas², the conqueror, the accomplisher of sacrifices whose blessings are flawless, the young child has assumed vigour.

4. When he has come together¹ (with his companions²), he goes to greet them³. As soon as born he steals upon (his prey) together with his companions. He strokes the . . .⁴ to give him delight and joy, when the loving ones⁵ approach him who stands on them⁶.

5. He, the animal living in the water and walking in the forest¹, has been placed on the highest skin² (sky?). He has proclaimed his rules to the mortals: for Agni, the knowing one, is intent upon *Rita* (Right) and is true.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi*. Metre, *Gagatī*; the last verse is *Trishṭubh*.—No verse occurs in the other *Samhitās*.

Verse 1.

Note 1. The *Samhitā* text has *sá n̄v iyate*, the *Pada* text, *sá/ nú iyate*. Comp. *Prātisākhya* 314. I propose to read *sānu* (= *sá ānu*) *iyate*.

Verse 2.

Note 1. See Geldner, *Ved. Studien*, II, p. 188.

Note 2. Possibly we should read *svéna evá*.

Verse 3.

Note 1. The text (*árvatí/*) implies that these race-horses are mares. Probably, as *Sáyana* explains, the prayers (*stutaya/*) are alluded to. See on the prayers compared with horses, Bergaigne, II, 284 seq.

Note 2. *Praishá* is the technical designation of the sacrificial commands of one priest (or more especially, of the *Maitrávaruṇa*) to another priest; comp. Schwab, *Das Altindische Thieropfer*, p. 90; H. O., *Religion des Veda*, 390.

Verse 4.

Note 1. *Samārata* may be the third person of singular or of plural.

Note 2. I supply 'with his companions' in consideration of the second *Pāda* (*yúgyebhi/*). It is difficult to say who *Agni's* companions are (the flames? the officiating priests?).

Note 3. Ludwig's conjecture, *úpa stāyam karati*, is very ingenious. 'He stealthily approaches them.'—On *upa-sthāyam*, comp. also Bollensen, *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenl. Gesellschaft*, XLVII, 586.

Note 4. The meaning of *svántám*, which occurs here and in the obscure passage X, 61, 21 (*ádha gáva/ úpamātim kanáyā/ ānu svántāsya kāsya kīṭ párá iyu/*), is unknown. Possibly it is related to *svátrá*, which means something like 'powerful' or 'prosperous.'

Note 5. The prayers? The oblations?

Note 6. *Api-sthitám* may have active or passive meaning, 'he who stands on somebody or something,' and 'he on whom somebody or something stands.'

Verse 5.

Note 1. The first *Páda* (and probably also the fourth) belong to the metrical type described by H. O., *Prolegomena*, p. 68 seq.: the first part, before the caesura, consists of four syllables; and then the *Páda* goes on as if it had the pentasyllabic opening.

Note 2. After *Agni's* abode in the Waters and in the wood has been mentioned in the first *Páda*, the second *Páda* possibly refers to his heavenly abode to which the adjective *upamá* ('highest') seems to point. Thus the 'highest skin' would be the sky. But *Sâyana*, who refers it to the *Vedi*, may possibly be right. His explanation would very well agree with the second hemistich.

MANDALA I, HYMN 146.

ASHTAKA II, ADHYĀYA 2, VARGA 15.

1. I praise Agni who has three heads and seven rays (or reins)¹, who is without flaw, sitting in the lap of his parents² and of whatever moves or is firm, who has filled (with his light) all the lights of Heaven.

2. The big bull has grown up to them¹; the ageless one who from here (from this world) distributes his blessings, the tall has stood up erect. He puts down his feet on the surface of the wide (Earth); his red ones² lick the udder (the cloud?).

3. Walking towards their common calf the two well-established¹ milch-cows² walk about in different directions. They measure interminable paths; they have invested themselves with all great desires.

4. Wise poets¹ follow his track² who in manifold ways protect the ageless one with their hearts. Wishing to acquire him they have searched the river³. He the Sun⁴ became visible to them, to the men⁵.

5. He is worthy to be looked for, round about in his race-courses, the noble who is to be magnified¹, the great one², in order that the small may live, as he, the all-visible liberal lord, has become a progenitor for those germs in many places.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi*. The metre is *Trishubh*.—No verse occurs in the other *Samhitās*.

Verse 1.

Note 1. *Sâyana* refers the three heads of Agni to the three Savanas, or the three worlds, or the three sacrificial fires. The last explanation seems to be most probable. The seven reins (rays) are, according to *Sâyana*, the seven metres or the seven flames of Agni. The last explanation is recommended by III, 6, 2 (see below). But it is possible also to think of the seven priests (*sapta hotâraḥ*).—Comp. II, 5, 2 (see below), and *Taitt. Samhitâ* I, 5, 3, 2 (to which passage Ludwig refers): *saptâ te agne samídhaḥ saptâ gihváḥ saptâ rīshayaḥ saptâ dhâma priyâni*, &c.

Note 2. The parents are Heaven and Earth.

Verse 2.

Note 1. The text has the dual feminine; no doubt Heaven and Earth are meant.

Note 2. The horses or flames of Agni.

Verse 3.

Note 1. On *su-méka*, comp. the article of Prof. Windisch in *Festgruss an Böhtlingk*, p. 114.

Note 2. The cows seem to be Night and Dawn; comp. above, I, 95, 1; 96, 5. Night and Dawn are called *su-méke*, I, 113, 3.

Verse 4.

Note 1. The priests.

Note 2. I have translated *padám nayanti* in the way indicated by *Atharva-veda* XI, 2, 13. *viddhásya padanīḥ-iva*; comp. also *Manu* VIII, 44. Prof. Max Müller translates, 'Wise poets lead (Agni) to the ageless place, keeping many things in their heart—or, lead the ageless Agni to his place (the sacrifice).'

Note 3. They have tried to find Agni in his proper dwelling, in the water.

Note 4. The Sun is here identified with Agni.

Note 5. On the form *nṛīn* standing for different cases,

compare Lanman, Noun-Inflection, 430; Bergaigne, Religion Védique, I, 136, note 1; Pischel, Vedische Studien, I, 42, and Göttinger Gel. Anzeigen, 1890, p. 541 seq.; Hillebrandt, Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenl. Gesellschaft, XLVIII, 420. Here it seems most natural to take *nr̥ñ*, as Pischel has proposed, as standing for the dative plural. Bartholomae (Studien zur indogermanischen Sprachgeschichte, I, 118, comp. p. 48), referring to III, 14, 4, believes that *nr̥ñ* (or, more correctly, **nr̥īm*), both here and there is genitive plural, and that Agni is called 'the sun of men' because men are able to light this sun themselves. To me it seems very doubtful that this is a Vedic idea, and as to the verse III, 14, 4, I believe that *nr̥ñ* there is a regular accusative plural: Agni is called there, 'a sun that spreads out men over their dwellings.'

Verse 5.

Note 1. *Ílényaḥ*. Comp. I, 1, 1, note 2.

Note 2. Agni may be called *maháḥ*, 'the great one.' But it seems more natural to read *mahé*, the ancient pronunciation of which word before a word commencing with a vowel (*mahá*') coincided, or nearly coincided, with that of *maháḥ*. The translation then would be: 'he who is to be magnified in order that the great and the small may live.'

MANDALA I, HYMN 147.

ASHTAKA II, ADHYĀYA 2, VARGA 16.

1. How, O Agni, have the resplendent ones worshipped thee, aspiring through the powers of the Āyu¹, when² the gods, obtaining kith and kin of both races³ (human and divine?), rejoiced in the song of *Rīta* (or Right)⁴?

2. Give heed to this my proffered hymn, O youngest one, which is most rich in liberal gifts¹, O self-dependent one! The one abuses thee, the other praises thee: I thy reverer revere thy body, O Agni²!

3. Thy guardians, O Agni, who saw and saved the blind son of Mamatā from distress¹—he the possessor of all wealth has saved them who have done good deeds². The impostors, trying to deceive, have not deceived.

4. The niggard, O Agni, the harmful and malicious who injures us by falsehood: may the heavy spell recoil on him; may he injure his own body by his evil words¹.

5. And, O strong one, whatever mortal knowingly injures another mortal by falsehood: from such a one, O praised Agni, protect him who praises thee. Agni! Do not deliver us to distress.

NOTES.

The same *Rīshi* and metre.—Verse 2 = VS. XII, 42; TS. IV, 2, 3, 4; MS. II, 7, 10. Verse 3 = RV. IV, 4, 13; TS. I, 2, 14, 5; MS. IV, 11, 5.

Verse 1.

Note 1. The *Āyu* seems to be Agni himself. Or is it admissible to interpret *âyóh* as standing *metri causâ* for *âyávaḥ*? Then the hemistich would refer to the mythical sacerdotal tribe of the *Āyus*, the ancient worshippers of Agni. Comp., for instance, X, 7, 5; 46, 8. The translation would be, 'How, O Agni, have the resplendent *Āyus* worshipped thee, aspiring with their powers?'

Note 2. 'Because.' M. M.

Note 3. Comp. VIII, 103, 7. *ubhé toké tánaye dasma vispate pārshi rādhāḥ maghónām.*

Note 4. As to *ritásya sáman*, comp. *Vâg. Samh.* XXII, 2, and *ritásya ślókaḥ*, *Rig-veda* IV, 23, 8. Our *Pāda* recurs IV, 7, 7 with the reading *ritásya dhāman.*

Verse 2.

Note 1. With *vákasaḥ mām̐hishṭhasya* compare *mām̐hishṭhābhiḥ matṭbhiḥ*, VIII, 23, 23.

Note 2. Cf. Aufrecht, Kuhn's Zeitschrift, III, 200.

Verse 3.

Note 1. *Dirghatamas* the son of *Mamatā* is the reputed author of this section of the first *Mandala* which belongs indeed to a family of priests claiming descent from him. The story of the blindness of *Dirghatamas* and of the distress into which he fell is told in the *Mahābhārata* I, 4179 seq., ed. Calc.; comp. also Geldner, *Vedische Studien*, II, 145.

Note 2. Considering the construction of the whole verse from the grammatical point of view only, one will scarcely be tempted to translate otherwise than we have done. But it is rather strange that Agni is represented here as saving those very guardians by the aid of whom he has saved *Māmateya*. The meaning which one should expect to find expressed, is rather that Agni, as he has saved *Māmateya* by his guardians, has saved also, and will save, all pious worshippers. This meaning may be established

if we consider the construction of the verse as similar, for instance, to that of I, 37, 12 (vol. xxxii, p. 64): *máruta/ yát ha va/ bálām gánân akutyavítana*, 'O Maruts, with such strength as yours, you have caused men to tremble.' Thus we may, I believe, translate here, 'Agni! With such guardians as thine who have seen and saved the blind son of Mamatâ from distress, he, the possessor of all wealth (i. e. Agni), has saved all those who have done good deeds.' Bergaigne (III, 191) understands the verse in the same way.

Verse 4.

Note 1. The Vedic idea of the evil deeds recoiling on the evil-doer himself has been treated of by Bergaigne, III, 190 seq.

MANDALA I, HYMN 148.

ASHTAKA II, ADHYÂYA 2, VARGA 17.

1. When Mâtariśvan . . .¹ had produced by attrition the Hotri, the . . .² who belongs to all gods, whom they have established among the human clans, shining like the sun, resplendent that (he might show his beautiful) shape—

2. They did not deceive him¹ who had granted a hymn (to the worshipper). Agni is my protection; therewith he is satisfied. They took pleasure in all his² works—(in the works) of the singer who brought praise.

3. Whom the worshipful (gods)¹ took and placed in his own seat (as priest) with their praises: him they² have carried forward, taking hold of him in their search, hastening like horses that draw a chariot.

4. The marvellous one destroys many things with his jaws. Then¹ the resplendent one shines in the forest. Then the wind blows after his flame day by day as after the arrow of an archer, after a weapon that has been shot.

5. Him whom no impostors, no harmful foes¹, no harm-doers may harm when he dwells in (his mother's) womb, him the blind ones bereft of sight did not damage by looking at him². His own friends have protected him.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi* and metre.—Verse 1 = MS. IV, 14, 15.

Verse 1.

Note 1. The first Pāda is identical with the first Pāda of I, 71, 4 (see our note there) with the exception of the word *vishtāh*, instead of which that parallel passage has the reading *vī-bhritaḥ*. It seems impossible to explain *vishtāh*, and the concurrence of the metrical irregularity in the same part of the Pāda—though metrical irregularities are not infrequent in this hymn—invites to a correction of the text. If *vī-bhritaḥ* in I, 71, 4 (see note there) refers to *Mātarisvan*, which I consider as doubtful, it would be easy to find for our passage an equivalent of that word little differing from the traditional *vishtāh*, namely, *vī-ssthitaḥ*: ‘when *Mātarisvan*, standing in different places, had produced him by attrition.’ Of course whoever adopts a conjecture like this, can scarcely avoid understanding *vī-bhritaḥ* in I, 71, 4 as an epithet of *Mātarisvan*, not of *Agni*. Another way to correct our passage would be to put into the text a form derived from the root *vish*, ‘to accomplish a work,’ for instance, *vishṭyā* (to be read as trisyllabic): ‘when *Mātarisvan* by his effort,’ &c. Grassmann’s *vī-sitaḥ* is quite improbable.

Note 2. *Visvá-apsum* (*Samhitā* text, *visvāpsum*), evidently an epithet of *Agni* the *Hotri*, seems corrupt. Shall we read *visvá-psum* (‘endowed with all food’)—comp. VIII, 22, 12. *hávam visvāpsum visvāvāryam*—or *visva-púsham* (*Samh.*, *visvāpúsham*, ‘all-nourishing’) or *visvá-apasam* (‘doing all works’)? Also *visvá-psnyam* may be thought of. It is impossible, of course, to arrive at any certain conclusion.

Verse 2.

Note 1. ‘He’ seems to be *Agni*. *Sāyana*, however, explains: *dadānam id agnaye kurvānam eva mām*. This would lead to a translation like this: ‘(The enemies) did

not deceive (me, the worshipper) who had addressed a hymn (to Agni).'

Note 2. On 'his' Sâyana remarks, 'yagamânasya mama.' But the word may refer to Agni.

Verse 3.

Note 1. There is no reason for abandoning here the usual meaning of *yagñīya*. On the gods seeking after Agni, comp. Bergaigne, I, 110. -

Note 2. It is very probable, to say the least, that 'they' are again the gods.

Verse 4.

Note 1. Is the first *ât* dissyllabic? More probably the *Pâda* is deficient by one syllable.

Verse 5.

Note 1. Two syllables are wanting before the caesura of the first *Pâda*.

Note 2. Was there a belief that a blind man by turning his blind eyes on somebody could do him harm? Possibly we might have to translate: 'Him (his foes) blind and bereft of sight did not damage though looking at him (i.e. though turning their blind eyes on him).—Prof. Max Müller writes: 'Could it be: Even the blind saw, but did not injure him (*andhâḥ aparyan ná dabhan*); *abhikhyá*, when he was seen, no longer in the womb?'

MANDALA I, HYMN 149.

ASHTAKA II, ADHYĀYA 2, VARGA 18.

1¹. Towards great wealth this lord of the house² advances³, the strong one in the abode of strong wealth. Let the stones honour him as he speeds forward.

2. He the manly (bull) as of men so of the two worlds, whose stream is drunk by living beings¹ in consequence of his renown—he who running forward has ripened in (his mother's) womb—

3. He who lighted up the . . .¹ stronghold, the racer, the sage, like a . . .² horse, shining like the sun, endowed with hundredfold life.

4. He who has a twofold birth (celestial and terrestrial), the flaming one has approached the three-fold light, all spaces of the atmosphere, the Hotri, the best sacrificer, in the abode of the Waters.

5. This is the Hotri having a twofold birth¹ who has bestowed all the best gifts, out of desire of glory, on the quick mortal who worships him.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi*. Metre, Virāg.—Verses 3-5 = SV. II, 1124-1126.

Verse 1.

Note 1. My translation of this verse differs from that of Pischel, *Ved. Studien*, II, 100.

Note 2. On *pātiḥ dán*, comp. Hübschmann, *Vocalsystem*, 142; Bartholomae, *Arische Forschungen*, I, 70; Joh. Schmidt, *Kuhn's Zeitschrift*, XXVII, 309; Pischel, *Vedische Studien*,

II, 93 seq.; Bartholomae, Indogermanische Forschungen, III, 100 seq.

Note 3. Comp. X, 93, 6. maháḥ sá râyáḥ á īshate.

Verse 2.

Note 1. Comp. I, 80, 4, and similar passages, in which the waters are called givá-dhanyâḥ, 'the prize (of contests) which living beings have gained.'

Verse 3.

Note 1. We do not know what nárminî is. Possibly in this word two words, ná árminî, are contained, so that the particle ná would be repeated in each of the three Pádas. The translation would then be: 'he who lighted up the árminî (?) like a stronghold.'

Note 2. I place no confidence in the attempts to find the meaning of a word like nabhanṛāḥ with the aid of etymology only. The same word occurs in I, 173, 1 as an epithet of the Sāman which the priest, who is compared to a bird, sings (gāyat sāma nabhanṛam yáthā véḥ). It occurs also in VII, 42, 1. prá krandanúḥ nabhanṛasya vetu. The connection in which these words stand, seems to show that the meaning is: 'the noise of the sacrificial fire shall arise;' very probably the fire is compared to a horse, and its noise to the neighing of that horse. Thus nabhanṛā would be in VII, 42, 1, quite as in our passage, an epithet of a horse. This epithet may refer either to the swift motion of the horse and of the Sāman ascending to the gods, or more probably to the gay voice of the horse, the loud noise of the Sāman.

Verse 5.

Note 1. Two syllables are wanting in the first Páda.

MANDALA I, HYMN 150.

ASHTAKA II, ADHYÂYA 2, VARGA 19.

1. I thy indigent¹ worshipper say much to thee, O Agni, dwelling in thy protection as (in the protection) of a great impeller².

2. Away even from the libation of a rich man who is feeble, who is a niggard, who never comes forward and does not care for the gods.

3. The mortal (who worships thee?), O priest, is brilliant, great, most powerful in heaven. May we, O Agni, addicted to thee, be always foremost.

NOTES.

The same *Rîshi*. Metre, Ushnih.—Verse 1 = SV. I, 97.

Verse 1.

Note 1. On *arí*, see Bergaigne, *Religion Védique*, II, 218.

Note 2. Or, 'of the great impeller'—the Sun-god who impels or stimulates his horses? Comp. VI, 6, 6?

MANDALA I, HYMN 188.

ASHTAKA II, ADHYĀYA 5, VARGA 8-9.

ĀPRĪ HYMN.

1. Being kindled thou reignest to-day, a god with the gods, O conqueror of thousandfold (wealth)! As messenger, as a sage, carry the oblations (to the gods).

2. O Tanûnapât! For him who walks in righteousness the sacrifice is anointed with honey. May he¹ grant thousandfold food.

3. Receiving libations, worthy of being magnified¹ bring hither to us the worshipful gods. Agni! Thou art a winner of thousandfold (bliss).

4. They have spread with might the eastward-turned sacrificial grass, blessing (our tribe) with a thousand men¹, (at the place) where you reign, O Âdityas!

5. The Prince, the Sovereign, the mighty ones, the eminent ones¹, the (Divine) Doors, which are many and more than many, have sent forth streams of ghee.

6. Adorned with gold, wearing beautiful ornaments you verily reign high¹ in your splendour. Sit down here, ye two Dawns².

7. May the two fine-voiced divine Hotrîs, the sages, perform as the first this sacrifice for us.

8. Bhârati! I/Â! Sarasvatî! All ye (goddesses) whom I invoke, promote us to splendour.

9. Tvashtrî indeed, the eminent (god) has shaped all forms, all cattle. Do thou by sacrifice produce their increase.

10. Yield up by thyself, O tree, (the sacrificial food) to the abode of the gods¹. May Agni make the offerings relishable.

11. Agni going in front of the gods is anointed with this Gâyatra song; he shines when Svâhâ is pronounced (over the oblations).

NOTES.

The *Rishi* is Agastya, the metre Gâyatrî. This Âpri hymn is closely related to hymn X, 110, the author of which no doubt knew and imitated our hymn.—No verses occur in the other *Samhitâs*.

Verse 2.

Note 1. I have taken *dâdhat* as a third person, the subject being *Tanûnapât*. But it may be a participle referring to *yagñâh*: 'the sacrifice which procures thousandfold food is anointed with honey.'

Verse 3.

Note 1. The text has *îdyah*.

Verse 4.

Note 1. 'This is the *Dasavira* sacrifice of the *Sâktyas*. Ten valiant sons are born to those who perform it.' *Pañka-vimsa Brâhmana* XXV, 7, 4.

Verse 5.

Note 1. These are evidently names of the divine doors.—As to the nominative *dûrah*, see Lanman, p. 486.

Verse 6.

Note 1. On *adhi-vi-râg*, comp. IX, 75, 3. *âdhi triprishthâh* *ushâsâh* *vi râgati*.

Note 2. I.e. Dawn and Evening.

Verse 10.

Note 1. Literally: 'to the abode, for the gods.' Comp. the corresponding verse (10) of the Âpri hymn X, 110. *devânâm pâthah*.

MANDALA I, HYMN 189.

ASHTAKA II, ADHYĀYA 5, VARGA 10-11.

1. Agni! Lead us to wealth on a good path, O god who knowest all rules. Drive away from us sin which leads us astray. We will offer to thee the fullest praise.

2. Agni! Thou who art young, help us safely across all difficulties. Be for us a broad, large, wide stronghold, for our kith and kin, with luck and weal¹.

3. Agni! Drive away from us all plagues. (Then) they shall plague¹ peoples who do not stand under Agni's protection (Give) us back again the earth, O god, together with all the immortals, O worshipful one, that it may go well with us.

4. Protect us, Agni, with thy unwearied guardians, thou who flameest in thy beloved seat. May no danger, O youngest of the gods, attain thy praiser, not now nor in future, O mighty one!

5. Do not deliver us, O Agni, to the harmful foe, to the greedy one, to the impostor, to misfortune. Do not surrender us, O mighty one, to one who has teeth, who bites, nor to one who has no teeth, nor to one who will hurt us.

6. May a (god) like thee, O Agni, who art born according to *Rīta*, being praised spread out a shelter for the body (of the worshipper that protects) from every one who tries to harm or to revile him. For thou, O god, art a descrier¹ of everything that leads us astray.

7¹. Thou, O Agni, distinguishing both (kinds of men, the pious and the impious, or the Aryans and the Dasyus²), eagerly approachest (Aryan) men at (the time of) the advancing (day)³, O worshipful one. At (the time of) rest thou hast become governable to the man (or, to Manu; or, thou art to be praised by men⁴); thou art to be smoothed down like a horse⁵ by the Usigs.

8. We have pronounced our invocations, I the son of Mâna¹, before this mighty Agni. May we obtain (our wishes) through a thousand *Rishis*. May we find a food-giving . . . rich in quickening rain².

NOTES.

The same *Rîshi*. Metre, *Trishubh*.—Verse 1=VS. V, 36; VII, 43; XL, 16; TS. I, 1, 14, 3; 4, 43, 1; TB. II, 8, 2, 3; TÂ. I, 8, 8; MS. I, 2, 13; IV, 10, 2; 14, 3. Verse 2=TS. I, 1, 14, 4; TB. II, 8, 2, 5; TÂ. X, 2, 1; MS. IV, 10, 1; 14, 3. Verse 3=TB. II, 8, 2, 4; MS. IV, 14, 3.

Verse 2.

Note 1. 'For health and wealth,' M. M.; see vol. xxxii, p. 193.

Verse 3.

Note 1. If the accent is correct (*Samh.* *abhyámanta*, *Pad. abhí ámanta*), the clause, though containing no subordinating word, must be understood as standing in logical dependence on the following, or—which in our case seems more probable—on the preceding clause. Examples of this kind have been collected by Delbrück, *Altindische*

Syntax, p. 43.—That *krishā* should be nominative is very improbable; comp. Lanman, Noun-Inflection, 393. See also Leo Meyer, Kuhn's Zeitschrift, XVI, 9.

Verse 6.

Note 1. Prof. Max Müller (vol. xxxii, p. 229) translates, 'For thou, god, art the deliverer from all assaults;' he derives *vishpát* 'from *vi* and *spas*, to bind.'

Verse 7.

Note 1. This verse has been treated of by Geldner, *Vedische Studien*, II, 156, 158.

Note 2. Geldner (loc. cit., 156) proposes two explanations for *ubháyân*. It may refer either to the pious and the impious spoken of in the preceding verses, or to *prapitvám* and *abhipitvám*, which words Geldner believes to be masculine. I do not attach such weight to the Avestic *frapi-thwô* (Vend. III, 3) as to draw, with Geldner, a conclusion from this word on the gender of the Vedic *prapitvá*, and in every case I think that this explanation of *ubháyân* is very forced, while it is natural to refer *ubháyân* to the pious and impious, or as we may express it in conformity with Vedic ideas, to 'men' (comp. *mánusha* Páda 2, *mánave* Páda 3), i. e. Aryans, and *Dasyus* (see VIII, 50, 8; 98, 6; IX, 92, 5). Then *ubháyân ví vidvân* would have exactly the same meaning as the words in I, 51, 8. *ví gânihi áryân yé ka dásyava*.

Note 3. On *prapitvá* we have the two ingenious discussions of Geldner, *Vedische Studien*, II, 155 seq., and of Bloomfield in the fifth series of his Contributions to the interpretation of the Veda, p. 24 seq. In my opinion Bloomfield has not succeeded in proving that the words ending in *-pitvá* (*prapitvá*, *abhipitvá*, *sapitvá*, &c.) contain the stem *pitú*, 'sap, drink, nourishment,' and that *prapitvá* means the morning-pressure of Soma, which is usually designated as *prāta*/*savana*, *abhipitvá*, the evening-pressure or the *trītiya*-*savana*. I do not think it necessary, how-

ever, to examine here the single points of his interesting and elaborate discussion, for it seems to me that Geldner has conclusively shown that the meaning of these words is different from what Bloomfield believes it to be: *abhipitvá*, as Geldner (p. 155) states, is 'Erholung,' 'Rast,' and 'die Zeit des Rastens,' 'Feierabend,' 'Abend'; *prapitvá* (p. 178), on the other hand, means 'Vorlauf,' 'das aufs Ziel Zugehen,' 'die vorgerückte Tageszeit.'

Note 4. *Sāsyaḥ*, 'governable,' does not give an impossible meaning. But should we not have to correct *sāmsyaḥ* 'thou art to be praised by men?'

Note 5. On *akráḥ*, comp. *Vedische Studien*, I, 168, and above, I, 143, 7.

Verse 8.

Note 1. *Māna* is another name of *Agastya*. See *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morg. Gesellschaft*, XLII, 221.

Note 2. On the last words of the hymn—the regularly repeated conclusion of the *Agastya* hymns—see M. M., vol. xxxii, p. xx, and also Bartholomae, *Bezenberger's Beiträge*, XV, 212. I do not think it very probable that *ishá* is here the name of an autumn month, as found in the *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa* and others of the more modern Vedic texts; to me it would seem rather strange that such a prayer for the fertility of that month should have formed, among the *Agastyas*, the standing conclusion of their sacrificial hymns. But the names of the two months *ishá* and *ūrgá* seem to point to the existence of two adjectives meaning 'giving food' and 'giving sap.'—Then follows *vṛigána*, used as a masculine. Geldner (*Vedische Studien*, I, 151) indicates the following passages, in which he believes that this masculine *vṛigána* occurs: V, 44, 1; VI, 35, 5; VII, 32, 27; X, 27, 4; and the concluding *Pāda* of the *Agastya* hymns. Of these passages the two first seem to be open to doubt as to the correctness of the text. In V, 44, 1 the true reading may be *pratīkínám vṛishanam dohase*; comp. verse 3, *vṛishá sísuḥ*, and I, 173, 6, where possibly *vṛishanam* should be read instead of *vṛigánam* (Göttinger

Gelehrte Anzeigen, 1890, 417). In VI, 35, 5 I propose to read *vrinagam* (Gött. Gel. Anzeigen, loc. cit., 416). In VII, 32, 27 and X, 27, 4 *vrigánâ* (Padap. *vrigánâh*; the letter d follows) and *vrigáneshu* seem to be masculine, though it is not absolutely impossible to see in these forms the nom. plur. and loc. plur. of the neuter *vrigána*. But I believe that any attempts to derive conclusions from these three passages on the meaning of the masculine *vrigána* are hopeless.

MANDALA II, HYMN 1.

ASHTAKA II, ADHYÂYA 5, VARGA 17-19.

1¹. Thou, O Agni, the flaming one, (art born) from out the Heavens², thou (art born) from out the Waters and the stone (the flint); thou (art born) from out the forests and the herbs; thou art born bright, O Lord of men, (as belonging) to men³.

2¹. To thee, O Agni, belongs the Hotri's and the Potri's office exercised at the appointed season; to thee belongs the office of the Neshtri; thou art the Agnidh² for the righteous. To thee belongs the office of the Prasâstri; thou actest as an Adhvaryu, and thou art the Brahman and the master of the house in our house³.

3¹. Thou, O Agni, art Indra, a bull among (all) beings. Thou art the wide-ruling Vishnu, worthy of adoration. Thou art the Brahman, a gainer of wealth, O Brahmanaspati². Thou, O Vidhartri (i. e. who keepest asunder all things), art united with Puramdhi (or the Liberality of the gods)³.

4. Thou, O Agni, art the king Varuna whose laws are firm; thou becomest Mitra, the wondrous one, worthy of being magnified. Thou art Aryaman, the lord of beings, whom I may enjoy¹. Thou, O god, art Amsa², desirous of distributing (goods) in the assembly³.

5. Thou, O Agni, being Tvashtri, (grantest) to thy worshipper abundance in heroes. To thee, who art accompanied by the (divine) wives¹, who art great like Mitra, belongs relationship². Thou,

the quick inciter³, givest abundance in horses. Thou, rich in wealth, art the host of men⁴.

6. Thou, O Agni, art Rudra, the Asura of the high Heaven¹; thou, being the host of the Maruts, rulest over nourishment. Thou goest along with the flame-coloured Winds, bringing happiness to our home. Thou, being Pûshan, protectest thy worshippers by thy own might.

7. Thou, O Agni, art a giver of wealth to him who does service to thee¹; thou art the god Savitri, a bestower of treasures. Thou, being Bhaga, O lord of men, rulest over wealth. Thou art a protector in his house to him who has worshipped thee².

8. Towards thee, in the house, the lord of the clan, O Agni, the clans strive, towards thee, the bounteous king. Thou with the beautiful face possessest all things. Thou art equal to thousands, to hundreds, to ten (of others).

9. Thee, O Agni, men (make) their father by their sacrifices¹; thee who shinest with thy body they (invite) to brotherhood by their (sacrificial) work. Thou becomest a son to him who has worshipped thee. As a kind friend thou protectest against attack.

10. Thou, O Agni, art *Rîbhû*, to be adored when near. Thou rulest over strength¹, over wealth rich in food. Thou shinest², thou burnest for the sake of giving (wealth). Thou art a hewer³, an expander of sacrifice.

11. Thou, Agni, O god, art Aditi to the worshipper. Thou, being Hotrâ Bhârati¹, growest strong by prayer. Thou art *Idâ*, living a hundred winters, for (the increase of) ability. Thou, the killer of *Vritra*, O Lord of wealth, art Sarasvati².

12. Thou, O Agni, well kept, art the highest vital power. In thy lovely colour and in thy appearance (dwell all) beauties. Thou art great strength that carries us forward. Thou art abundant wealth, extending on all sides.

13. The Âdityas have made thee, O Agni, their mouth; the bright ones have made thee their tongue, O Sage. The Râti-sâk gods (i.e. the 'bounteous' gods) accompany thee at the sacrifices. In thee the gods eat the offering which is offered to them.

14. In thee, O Agni, with (thy) mouth¹ all the guileless² immortal gods eat the offering which is offered to them. Through thee the mortals taste their drink. Thou hast been born, the bright one, as the child of the plants.

15¹. Thou art united with them and equal to them in strength, O well-born Agni, nay, thou surpasses them, O god, when thy power² has expanded here in its greatness over Heaven and Earth, over both worlds.

16. The liberal lords who pour out, O Agni, over thy praisers gifts at the head of which there are cows¹, the ornament of which are horses: lead both ourselves and them to welfare. May we speak loud in the assembly², rich in valiant men.

NOTES.

The *Rishi* is *Gṛītsamada*, the metre *Gagatī*.—Verse 1 = VS. XI, 27; TS. IV, 1, 2, 5; TÂ. X, 76, 1; MS. II, 7, 2. Verse 2 = RV. X, 91, 10. Verse 6 = TS. I, 3, 14, 1; TB. III, 11, 2, 1. Verse 13 = TB. II, 7, 12, 6.

Verse 1.

Note 1. Among the numerous texts which treat of the different origins of Agni (see Bergaigne, I, 20 seq.), especially the following two verses may be compared with this passage: VI, 48, 5. *yám ápaḥ ádrayaḥ vánâ gárbham ritásya píprati sáhasâ yáḥ mathitáḥ gáyate nr̥bhiḥ pr̥thivyáḥ ádhi sánavi*; X, 45, 1. *diváḥ pári prathamám gagñe agníḥ asmát dvitīyam pári gâtávedâḥ tritīyam apsú nr̥mánâḥ ágasram índhâna enam garate svâdhīḥ*.

Note 2. The text (*dyúbhiḥ tvám âsusukshániḥ*) seems to be corrupt. I believe that *tvám*, which is so frequently repeated through this verse and through the next verses, has been put here in the wrong place, and that we should read, *dyúbhyaḥ á susukshániḥ*.

Note 3. With the last words of this verse, comp. the conclusion of verse 14.

Verse 2.

Note 1. This whole verse is repeated, X, 91, 10.

Note 2. In my opinion there is no doubt that instead of the traditional reading, *agnít*, the correct form is *agnīt*. The word is a compound of *agní* and *idh* and means 'the inflamer of the fire.' Cf. M. M., Hist. of A. S. L., 1859, pp. 450, 469.

Note 3. This is the most ancient list of the 'seven priests,' by the side of whom the *gr̥hâ-pati* or 'master of the house' is mentioned as the eighth. Comp. the formula in which the Adhvaryu names the officiating priests, Kâtyâyana IX, 8, 8 seq., and see the remarks of Weber, Indische Studien, X, 141, 376, and my own exposition, Religion des Veda, 383 seq., 396. The 'Brahman' mentioned in our verse is the *Brâhmanâkkhamsin* of the later ritual. Comp. Kâtyâyana IX, 8, 11; Satapatha Brâhmaṇa IV, 6, 6, 5.

Verse 3.

Note 1. On verses 3-6, see von Bradke, Dyâus Asura, p. 52 seq.

Note 2. *Bṛihaspati* or *Brahmanaspati* is the Brahman among the gods. But it is doubtful whether the title of Brahman in this connection should be understood in the later technical sense of the word, as the *Ritvig* who has to superintend the whole sacrifice. Comp. H. O., Religion des Veda, 396, note 1.

Note 3. *Vidhartri* seems to be here another name of Bhaga; comp. VII, 41, 2. *bhágam huvema . . . yáh vi-dhartá*). It is known that no god is so frequently mentioned in connection with *Puramdhi* as Bhaga. The passages have been collected by Grassmann in his Dictionary, s. v. *púram-dhi*.

Verse 4.

Note 1. Prof. von Bradke (*Dyâus Asura*, 53) believes that the text is corrupt; he thinks that the fourth Páda may have occupied the place of a lost continuation of the relative clause, *yásya sam-bhúgam*. I cannot but share the feeling on which Prof. von Bradke's remark rests, though I do not believe that the solution of the difficulty which he proposes is very probable. Could not the correct reading be *yási* (instead of *yásya*) *sam-bhúgam*, 'thou goest to the enjoyment (of goods)?' Comp. VI, 71, 6, where the traditional text has *vámásya hí ksháyasya deva bhūre*, and *ksháyasya* doubtless should be changed into *ksháyasi*.

Note 2. On *Amsa*, as one of the *Ādityas*, comp. Bergaigne, III, 39, 99.

Note 3. *Vidáthe*: comp. the note on I, 31, 6. It is tempting to conjecture *vidhaté* (comp. verse 5), but there is no necessity for such a conjecture. Comp., for instance, VI, 24, 2. *vidáthe dāti vágam*.

Verse 5.

Note 1. *Gnáva* should be read without accent, as Grassmann, Prof. Weber, and M. Henry (*Revue Critique*, Jan. 12, 1891, p. 23) have seen. Cf. Lanman, 518, 519.

Note 2. The meaning probably is, 'Thou art related to the other gods and to men,' or 'Thou art related to us.' Comp. VIII, 27, 10; 73, 12.

Note 3. Agni seems to be identified here with Apām napât, who frequently is called âru-héman. Comp. Windisch, Festgruss an Roth, 143 seq.

Note 4. The men, of course, are the Maruts, as is shown by the well-known use of *sárdhaḥ* (cf. vol. xxxii, p. 67 seq.).

Verse 6.

Note 1. Comp. von Bradke, *Dyâus Asura*, 53 seq.

Verse 7.

Note 1. As to *aramkrîte*, cf. VIII, 67, 3.

Note 2. Or, thou art a protector to him who has worshipped thee in his house.—Among the various ways for explaining or removing the metrical deficiency of the last Pâda the correction *dâme á* (for *dâme*) is recommended by verse 8.

Verse 9.

Note 1. *Ishṭibhiḥ*, standing by the side of *sámyâ*, seems to be derived from the root *yag*. Thus *igé*, *igâná* stand by the side of *saramé*, *saramâná*.—Cf. *ishṭibhiḥ matibhiḥ*, II, 18, 1.

Verse 10.

Note 1. The names of the three *Rîbhûs* are *Rîbhû*, *Vâga*, *Vibhvan*. The word *vâga* used here evidently alludes to the second of these names.

Note 2. Bergaigne (*Religion Véd.*, II, 406) no doubt is right in believing that the verb *ví bhâsi* ('thou shinest') alludes to the name *Vibhvan*. Comp. X, 91, 1. *vibhúḥ vibhávâ*.

Note 3. *Vi-sîkshuḥ* again seems to convey an allusion to the *Rîbhû* myth. When dividing the cup of *Tvashtîri* into four cups, the *Rîbhûs* say, *sákhe ví sîksha* (IV, 35, 3). This *ví sîksha* and the corresponding adjective *vi-sîkshu* should be derived from the root *sas*, 'to cut to pieces.'

Verse 11.

Note 1. Here we have the three goddesses of the *Âpri* hymns, *Bhârati*, *Idâ*, and *Sarasvatî*. Of the goddess

Bhâratî the full name is given, Hotrâ Bhâratî, i.e. 'the Offering of the Bharatas.' Comp. Bergaigne, I, 322 seq.

Note 2. Comp. VI, 61, 7, where Sarasvatî is called *vṛitra-ghnî*.

Verse 14.

Note 1. Or 'through (thee who art their) mouth.'

Note 2. Comp. I, 19, 3. *vísve devásah adrúhah* ; vol. xxxii, pp. 53, 55.

Verse 15.

Note 1. On this verse, compare Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, I, 97.

Note 2. On *pṛiksháh*, see above, I, 127, 5, note 1.

Verse 16.

Note 1. On *gó-agra*, compare Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, I, 51.

Note 2. *Vidátthe*: comp. the note on I, 31, 6.

MANDALA II, HYMN 2.

ASHTAKA II, ADHYĀYA 5, VARGA 20-21.

1. Increase *Gâtavedas* by your sacrifice¹, worship Agni for ever with your offering and your prayer² —him who has been kindled, the receiver of good offerings, the solar hero, the heavenly *Hotri*, the charioteer³ in our settlements⁴.

2. For thee Nights and Dawns have been lowing, O Agni, as milch-cows in the folds for their calf¹. A steward², as it were, of Heaven, thou shinest on the human tribes, O bountiful one, on continuous nights³.

3. The gods have set him to work, as a steward¹ of Heaven and Earth, endowed with wonderful power, at the bottom of the air: Agni who is well known like a chariot², brightly shining, deserving of praise like *Mitra* (or, like a friend) in (human) dwellings.

4. They have established him who grows in the air, in his house, the serpent¹ with beautiful splendour like gold², the winged (son?) of *Prisni*³ who lights up with his eyes both tribes (of gods and of men), like a guardian of the way (?)⁴.

5. May he, the *Hotri*, encompass the whole sacrifice. Men strive towards him with offerings and prayer. (Agni) with golden jaws¹, hurrying around in the growing (plants)², lighted up the two worlds like the Sky with the stars.

6. Thus mayst thou, being brightly kindled for our welfare or being exhausted (?)¹, shine upon us with thy wealth. Carry hither to us the two

worlds for the sake of happiness, Agni, O god, that they may eagerly partake² of the offering of the man (or, of Manus).

7. Give us, Agni, mighty, give us thousandfold (gifts). Open strength for us like a door¹ for the sake of glory. Make Heaven and Earth inclined towards us through (our) spell. Make the Dawns shine like the brilliant Sun.

8. Being kindled after dawns and nights may he shine with his red light like the sun, Agni, being a good sacrificer with the help of the offerings of man (or, of Manus)¹, the king of the clans, and the welcome guest of Âyu.

9. Thus, O Agni, ancient one, our human prayer has prospered among the immortals who dwell in the great heaven. May the cow¹ when milked, yield² freely to the singer in our settlements hundredfold (wealth) of all kinds.

10. May we, O Agni, (attain) bliss in valiant men by our racers, or may we shine over (all) people by our sacred spells. May our unconquerable lustre beam on high like the sun over the fivefold dwellings (of the five peoples).

11. Be thou, O mighty one, worthy of praise among us, (thou) from whom the well-born, liberal (lords) have sought nourishment¹, unto whom the strong ones, O Agni, go for sacrifice, who shinest in thy abode among (the worshipper's) own kith.

12. May we both, O Gâtavedas, the praisers and the liberal (lords), be in thy protection, O Agni. Help us to good, resplendent, abundant wealth which is accompanied by offspring, by good progeny.

13 = 11, 1, 16.

NOTES.

The same *Rīshi* and metre.—Verse 7=TS. II, 2, 12, 6 ; MS. IV, 12, 2.

Verse 1.

Note 1. In this Pāda one syllable is wanting. It may be thought that the first word should be pronounced *iagñéna*. For supplying the missing syllable by conjecture there would, however, be many ways. Comp. also H. O., Hymnen des Rig-veda, I, p. 79.

Note 2. *Tánâ girā* : comp. I. 38, 13 (vol. xxxii, p. 82).

Note 3. *Dhûh-sâdam*. The exact meaning is, 'who occupies a decisive position.'

Note 4. *Vriganeshu* : comp. I, 60, 3, note 2.

Verse 2.

Note 1. Comp. VIII, 88, 1. *abhī vatsām ná svásareshu dhenávah indram gîrbhîh navâmahe*.

Note 2. See I, 58, 7, note 1.

Note 3. See Lanman, p. 482 ; Gaedicke, p. 89. 'During continuous nights.' M. M.

Verse 3.

Note 1. See I, 58, 7, note 1.

Note 2. Cf. VIII, 84, 1. *râtham ná védyam*.

Verse 4.

Note 1. I follow the conjecture of Böhlingk-Roth, who propose to read *hvârâm*. Comp. Atharva-veda IV, 1, 2 (*Āsvalâyana Srautasûtra* IV, 6, 3 ; *Sânkhâyana Srautasûtra* V, 9, 7). *surûkam hvârâm*. The meaning of the word is conjectural ; comp. I, 141, 7, note 1. If we read *hvâré*, the translation could be 'brilliant like gold, in a hidden place.' (M. M.)

Note 2. Comp. Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, I, 52.

Note 3. Or, the winged (bird) of *Prisni*? No other passages which make Agni the son (or the bird) of *Prisni* are known to me.

Note 4. The accent of *pāthás* points to a genitive, dependent on *pâyúm*, of a word which is, however, different from *pāthas*. Grassmann thinks that *pāthás* is a lengthening for *pathás*, but Lanman (Noun-Inflection, 470) is quite right in observing that this is hard to believe in the first syllable of a *Pāda*. Should we not correct the text and read *patháḥ* (gen. sing. governed by *pâyúm*)? The reading *pātháḥ* may be due to the influence of the neighbourhood of *pâyúm*.

Verse 5.

Note 1. See vol. xxxii, p. 301.

Note 2. Comp. X, 92, 1. *súshkāsu hárinīshu gárbhurat*.

Verse 6.

Note 1. Ludwig translates *sam-dadasván*: 'zum heile [dich selber] aufreibend;' Grassmann, 'oder seist erloschen du;' Gaedicke (p. 89), 'und wenn du verlöschest;' Griffith, 'a liberal giver;' Neisser (Bezzenger's Beitr. XIX, 286), 'deine Kunst zusammennehmend.' *Sāyana* says, '*samda-dasván samyak prayakḥhan*.' Prof. Max Müller suggests, 'being a liberal benefactor.'

Note 2. There was no reason for correcting *devá-vītaye* as Ludwig once proposed. He has himself abandoned this conjecture.

Verse 7.

Note 1. As to this metaphor ('opening' strength or the like), comp. VIII, 5, 21. *utá naḥ divyāḥ íshaḥ ... ápa dvārā-iva varshathaḥ*, and the passages collected by Dr. Hirzel, *Gleichnisse und Metaphern im Rig-veda* (Leipzig, 1890), 103.

Verse 8.

Note 1. The third *Pāda* is repeated in X, 11, 5.

Verse 9.

Note 1. The milch-cow of course is the prayer.

Note 2. *Isháni* seems to be an infinitive like *parsháni nesháni tarisháni* (Delbrück, *Altindisches Verbum*, 227; Neisser, *Bezenberger's Beiträge*, XX, 43). I believe it to come from the root *ish*, 'to incite.' As to the syntactical peculiarities of these infinitives, comp. Delbrück, *Altindische Syntax*, 416.

Verse 11.

Note 1. *Ishay* is a denominative from *ish*, as *ûrgay* is derived from *ûrg* (comp. *Āsvalâyana Srautasûtra* V, 7, 3).

MANDALA II, HYMN 3.

ASHTAKA II, ADHYĀYA 5, VARGA 22-23.

ĀPRĪ HYMN.

1. Agni being kindled, set down on the earth, has stood up with his face towards all worlds. May the Hotri, the purifier, the ancient, wise one, may god Agni sacrifice to the gods, he who is worthy (of being the sacrificer).

2. Narāsa, anointing the abodes (of the sacrifice), equal by his greatness to the three heavens, endowed with beautiful light, moistening the offering, his mind being intent on scattering ghr̥ita—may he anoint the gods on the summit of sacrifice.

3. Being magnified¹ in our mind, Agni, sacrifice for us to-day to the gods before the human (sacrificer)², thou who art worthy (of being the sacrificer). Conduct hither the unshakable host of the Maruts. Sacrifice, O men, to Indra who sits on the Barhis.

4. O divine Barhis! On this (Barhis) which is large, rich in valiant men, which has been spread on this Vedi (or sacrificial altar) rich in gain, ready for wealth, which is anointed with ghr̥ita, sit down, O Vasus, O Visve devās, O Ādityas¹ worthy of worship!

5. May the divine doors which are easily passable, open themselves wide when invoked with adoration. May they, the far-embracing, undecaying ones, open wide, purifying our glorious race¹ which is rich in valiant men.

6. May Dawn and Night, grown strong from of

old, joyful like two birds (?)¹, (do) their work well for us—they who weave, turned towards each other, the stretched-out warp, the ornamented form of the sacrifice², (the two goddesses) flowing with plenty, rich in milk.

7. May the two divine *Hotris*, the first ones, very knowing, very marvellous, perform the sacrifice rightly with their (sacrificial) verse. Sacrificing to the gods they anoint (them)¹, observing the right time, on the navel of the Earth, over the three ridges (of the three worlds).

8. May *Sarasvatī*, the accomplisher of our prayer, may the goddess *Iā*, all-victorious *Bhāratī*—may the three goddesses, according to their wont, sit down on this *Barhis* and protect it, the faultless shelter.

9. Through (the god's) hearing (our prayer) a manly son is born (to us), tawny-coloured, rich in gain, bringing vigour, loving the gods. May *Tvasṭri* deliver for us a son, the navel (i.e. the tie that binds generations together), and may he then go to the abode of the gods.

10¹. May the tree (i. e. the sacrificial post) stand by, letting loose (the offering which goes to the gods). May *Agni* make the offering ready in consequence of our prayers. May the prescient divine butcher carry the thrice-anointed offering to the gods.

11. He¹ is joined with *ghṛita*². His womb (on the altar) is *ghṛita*. He rests on *ghṛita*. His abode is *ghṛita*. Carry hither (the gods) according to thy wont! Rejoice³! Carry, O bull, the offering, over which the *Svāhā* has been spoken, (to the gods).

NOTES.

The same *Rishi*. Metre, *Trishṭubh*; verse 7 : *Gagatī*.—
Verse 9 = TS. III, 1, 11, 2; TB. II, 8, 7, 4; MS. IV, 14, 8.
Verse 11 = VS. XVII, 88; TÂ. X, 10, 2.

Verse 3.

Note 1. The text has *īlītāh*. Comp. above, I, 1, 1, note 2.

Note 2. Comp. X, 53, 1. *nī hī sātsat* (scil. *agnīh*) *ántaraḥ pūrvaḥ asmāt*.

Verse 4.

Note 1. It is very probable that the poet intends to distinguish the *Vasus*, the *Visve devās*, and the *Ādityas* as three categories of gods. But then we should expect the accent *ādityāh*. Comp. VII, 51, 3. *ādityāḥ vīsve marútaḥ ka vīsve devāḥ ka vīsve*; X, 125, 1. *ahám rudrēbhiḥ vásubhiḥ karāmi ahám ādityaḥ utá visvádevaiḥ*.

Verse 5.

Note 1. Comp. the *Gṛihya* Mantra addressed to the *Mekhalā*, of which it is said '*varṇam pavitram punatī naḥ āgāt*,' *Sāṅkhāyana Gṛihya* II, 2, 1, &c.

Verse 6.

Note 1. The meaning of *vayṣa* (comp. IX, 68, 8) is uncertain. Possibly it is derived from *vī*, 'the bird.' According to *Sāyana* it would mean 'weavers' (*vānakusale iva*). *Vayṣeva* may be *vayṣe iva* (dual feminine), in spite of the artificial theory of the *Pragr̥hya* vowels; see Lanman, p. 361; H. O., *Hymnen des Rig-veda*, I, 456. Or it may be *vayṣā iva*, dual masculine or singular feminine (comp. VII, 2, 6).

Note 2. Comp. VII, 42, 1. *adhvarāsyā pésaḥ*.

Verse 7.

Note 1. Comp. VIII, 39, 1. *agníh deván anaktu naḥ*.

Verse 10.

Note 1. With the first hemistich compare especially, III, 4, 10 (see below).

Verse 11.

Note 1. 'He' of course is Agni.

Note 2. Differing from M. M., vol. xxxii, p. 185, I take *ghṛitam* as an accusative.

Note 3. Comp. III, 6, 9 (see below).

MANDALA II, HYMN 4.

ASHTAKA II, ADHYĀYA 5, VARGA 24-25.

1. I call for you Agni, shining with beautiful shine, praised with beautiful praise¹, the guest of the clans, the receiver of fine offerings, who is desirable like Mitra (or, like an ally), Gâtavedas the god, among godly people.

2. The Bhṛigus worshipping him in the abode of the waters¹ have verily² established him among the clans of Âyu. Let him surpass all worlds, Agni, the steward of the gods³, the possessor of quick horses.

3. The gods¹ have established beloved Agni among the human clans as (people) going to settle (establish) Mitra¹. May he illuminate the nights that are longing (for him), he who should be treated kindly by the liberal (worshipper) in his house.

4. His prosperity is delightful as good pasture (?)¹; delightful is his appearance when the burning one is driven forward, he who quickly shaking his tongue among the plants waves² his tail mightily like a chariot-horse.

5. When they praised¹ to me the monstrous might of the eater of the forests², he produced his (shining) colour as (he has done) for the Usigs³. With shining splendour he has shone joyously, he who having grown old has suddenly become young (again).

6. He who shines on the forests¹ as if he were thirsty, who resounded like water on its path, like (the rattle of the wheels) of a chariot²—he whose

path is black, the hot, the joyous one has shone, laughing³ like the sky with its clouds.

7. He who has spread himself burning over the wide (earth), moves about like an animal, free, without a keeper. The flaming Agni, burning down the brushwood, with a black trail¹, has, as it were, tasted the earth.

8. Now in the remembrance of thy former blessings this prayer has been recited to thee at the third sacrifice¹. Give to us, Agni, mighty strength with a succession of valiant men, with plenty of food; (give us) wealth with good progeny².

9. Give, O Agni, such vigour to thy praiser together with his liberal (lords), that the *Gṛitsa-madas*, rich in valiant men, victorious over hostile plots, attaining (their aim) in secret, may overcome through thee (their rivals) who get behind¹.

NOTES.

The *Rīshi* is *Somāhuti Bhārgava*, the metre *Trishṭubh*.—No verse occurs in the other *Samhitās*.

Verse 1.

Note 1. To me there seems to be no doubt that the meaning of *svrīktī* is something like 'beautiful prayer,' 'beautiful song,' and then 'a god who is invoked with beautiful songs.' Thus *svrīktāya* or other cases of the same word stand by the side of *stómā* . . . *gṛā*, VIII, 8, 22; of *gṛā*, I, 64, 1; VIII, 96, 10, comp. X, 64, 4; of *brāhma*, VII, 31, 11; 97, 9; of *stómai*, VII, 96, 1; of *dhītibhi*, VI, 61, 2; of *ákṣhoktibhi* *matinām*, I, 61, 3, and so on. Comp. also VII, 83, 9. *hávāmahe vām vṛishanā svrīktibhi*; X, 41, 1. *rātham* . . . *svrīktibhi* *vayām vṛushā ushāsa* *hávāmahe*; X, 80, 7. *avakāma svrīktīm*.

This being the meaning of the word, I cannot think it probable—and herein I differ from the opinion pronounced by Prof. Max Müller, vol. xxxii, p. 109—that it stands in connection with the verb *vrig* in its well-known use referring to the Barhis. In my opinion (comp. also Geldner, *Vedische Studien*, I, 151) *suvrīktī* may be connected with another use of *vrig*, with the meaning of this verb ‘to draw a god towards himself, averting him from other sacrificers’ (materials regarding this use of *vrig* have been collected by Geldner, loc. cit., 144). Or possibly the word may be derived, as Prof. von Roth believes, from *rik* (comp. *suṽita* derived from *i*). It is true that the substantive *rikṭi* does not occur by itself: but, as Prof. Max Müller remarks (loc. cit.), this would not be fatal to Prof. von Roth’s etymology, because many other words in the Veda occur as *uttarapadas* only. If we accept this theory, we should of course have to separate *suvrīktī* from *nāmovrīktī* and *svāvrīktī*.

Verse 2.

Note 1. Comp. X, 46, 2. *imám vidhántaḥ apám sadhásthe*.

Note 2. Literally, ‘doubly.’ ‘In two places, in the abode of the waters and among the clans of man.’ M. M. Compare, however, X, 46, 2 (see last note).

Note 3. *Devánām aratīḥ*; comp. I, 58, 7, note 1.

Verse 3.

Note 1. The meaning seems to be that people going to settle anywhere, secure safety by ceremonies addressed to Mitra, i.e. possibly by concluding alliances which stand under the special protection of Mitra. Comp. IV, 33, 10; H. O., *Religion des Veda*, 186, note 1.—Mitra is *kshetrasádhas*, VIII, 31, 14.

Verse 4.

Note 1. *Sváśya-iva* seems to be corrupt. Possibly we might read *sūyávasā-iva pushṭīḥ*. In X, 11, 5 we read, *sádā asi ranvāḥ, yávasā-iva púshyate*. IV, 16, 15. *ókaḥ ná ranvā sudṛśī-iva pushṭīḥ*.—The translation of the traditional

reading would be, 'His prosperity is delightful, like that of a person belonging to us.'

Note 2. Bháribhrat seems to be a participle: but then *dodhavíti* must be accented (*dódhavíti*).

Verse 5.

Note 1. On the verb *pan*, comp. Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, I, 199 seq.

Note 2. *Vanád* seems to be, as Grassmann has seen, a compound of *ván*, 'the forest' (comp. the genitive *vanám*, the locative *vámsu*), and of *ád*. Of Agni is said several times '*vánāni atti*.'

Note 3. On the mythical ancestors designated as the *Usigas*, see Bergaigne, I, 57 seq.

Verse 6.

Note 1. The forests, of course, are the fuel.

Note 2. To *ráthyá-iva* probably *kakrá* (nom. plur.) is to be supplied.

Note 3. The 'laughing' of the sky is the lightning (Benfey, *Vedica und Verwandtes*, 138). The flames of Agni flash through the smoke as the lightning shines in the clouds.

Verse 7.

Note 1. See Geldner, *Vedische Studien*, II, 29 seq.; Roth, *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländ. Gesellschaft*, XLVIII, 107.

Verse 8.

Note 1. The text has *trítīye vidáthe* (comp. I, 31, 6, note 2). Does this mean at the *trítīya-savana*? Three *vidathas* are spoken of also in VI, 51, 2; VII, 66, 10.

Note 2. On the metrical irregularity, comp. H. O., *Die Hymnen des Rig-veda*, I, 67.

Verse 9.

Note 1. 'May prevail, destroying through thee the neighbours lying in ambush.' M. M. To me *gúhâ* seems to be connected with *vanvánta*.

MANDALA II, HYMN 5.

ASHTAKA II, ADHYĀYA 5, VARGA 26.

1. The brilliant Hotri¹ has been born², the father to protect the fathers³, aspiring after noble wealth. May we be able to bridle the strong (horse)⁴.

2. He the leader of the sacrifice towards whom the seven reins (or rays) are stretched, the Potri promotes, as (he has done) for Manu, the divine eighth (rein); all those (reins he promotes)¹.

3. Or when he has run along, and has recited the sacred words¹, and has pursued that (duty)², he has encompassed every kind of wisdom as the felly (encircles) the wheel.

4. For He has been born as the bright Prasâstri, with bright power of mind. (A man) who knows his firm laws, mounts up on them as on the branches (of a tree)¹.

5. The lively milch-cows were attached to his, the Neshtri's, (bright) colour¹. Was it according to the wish of the three sisters who have gone there²?

6. When (coming) from the mother the sister has approached, bringing ghrîta¹, the Adhvaryu rejoices at their² coming as corn (rejoices) at rain.

7. May He the Rîtvig (priest) himself make the Rîtvig (serve) for his own refreshment¹. And may we readily gain the praise and the sacrifice²; we have offered it.

8. In order that He the knowing one (Agni) may readily serve all the worshipful (gods), this sacrifice, O Agni, which we have performed, rests in thee.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi*. Metre, Anushtubh.—Verse 3=SV. I, 94; TS. III, 3, 3, 3; MS. II, 13, 5.

Verse 1.

Note 1. As the *Hotri* is mentioned here, the following verses contain each the names of the other priests as given in II, 1, 2. Only the *Agnīdh* is left out; possibly the words *svāh svāya dhāyase krinutām ritvīk ritvīgam* (verse 7) contain an allusion to this priest, who may well be termed the *Ritvīg* belonging to *Agni* and refreshing him.

Note 2. With the first *Pāda* of our verse, compare IX, 64, 10. *Induḥ pavishṭa kētanah*.

Note 3. The meaning seems to be: *Agni*, who has protected the fathers, has been born again, and will do the same for the present sacrificer.

Note 4. The strong horse, of course, is *Agni*. Comp. III, 27, 3 (see below). On the construction (*vāgīnah yāmam*), see Delbrück, *Altindische Syntax*, p. 417.

Verse 2.

Note 1. On the seven rays or reins of *Agni*, see I, 146, 1, note 1. Besides the seven priests a mysterious eighth *Ritvīg* priest is spoken of (X, 114, 9. *kām ritvīgām ashtamām sūram āhuḥ*); thus *Agni* has a mysterious eighth *rasmī* (ray or rein) besides the seven. Comp. Bergaigne, *Religion Védique*, II, 144.

Verse 3.

Note 1. *Vókat bráhmāni*: this seems to be an allusion to the Brahman priest (see verse 1, note 1).

Note 2. *Véḥ* is third singular. See Joh. Schmidt, *Kuhn's Zeitschrift*, XXV, 91.

Verse 4.

Note 1. Comp. VIII, 13, 6. *vayāh-iva ānu rohate*. Prof.

Max Müller (vol. xxxii, p. 207) translates, 'springs up like young sprouts.'

Verse 5.

Note 1. It is the *Neshtri*'s office to lead the wife of the sacrificer to the place where the sacrifice is being performed. Thus Agni, the divine *Neshtri*, is represented as accompanied by female beings, by the 'milch-cows,' meaning the oblations of *ghṛita*, &c., or possibly the dawns.

Note 2. Are the 'three sisters' (comp. Bergaigne, I, 321; II, 107) identical with the milch-cows spoken of in the first hemistich? Ludwig (vol. iv, p. 166) very appropriately calls attention to the fact that three cows were milked at the sacrifice of the full and the new moon. Comp. Hillebrandt, *Altindisches Neu- und Vollmondsopfer*, p. 12 seq. Three dawns are mentioned in VIII, 41, 3.

Verse 6.

Note 1. The sister bringing *ghṛita* seems to be the sacrificial spoon. Is the mother the milk-vessel or possibly the cow?

Note 2. Does 'their' refer to the mother and the sister (cf. Delbrück, *Altindische Syntax*, p. 102)? Or are 'the three sisters who have gone there' referred to?

Verse 7.

Note 1. The one *Ritvig* is Agni; the other possibly is the *Agnīdh* who refreshes the *Ritvig* Agni. See verse 1, note 1.

Note 2. After *āt* we should expect, instead of *áram*, another accusative, possibly *rikam* (see VII, 66, 11): 'may we master the praise, the sacrifice, and the verse.' *Áram* may have found its way into the text from verse 8.

MANDALA II, HYMN 6.

ASHTAKA II, ADHYĀYA 5, VARGA 27.

1. Accept, O Agni, this my piece of wood and this my sitting down (reverentially)¹, and hear these words of mine.

2. Let us worship thee, Agni, child of vigour, with this (piece of wood?)¹, O winner of horses², with this well-spoken (hymn), O well-born one.

3. May we thus as thy devoted servants pay devotion by our words to thee who acceptest words (of prayer), to thee who aspirest after wealth, O giver of wealth.

4. Thus be thou a liberal, bountiful lord, O lord of goods, O giver of goods. Drive hatred away from us.

5. Thus (give) us¹ rain from the sky ; thus (give) us unattainable strength ; thus (give) us thousandfold food.

6. To him who magnifies thee, who desires thy help, O youngest messenger, (invoked) by our word, best sacrificing *Hotri*, come near.

7. For thou, Agni, O sage, who knowest both races (of gods and of men), passest (to and fro) between them, like a messenger belonging to thy own people¹, belonging to thy allies.

8. Thus gladden (the gods)¹ as the knowing one ; sacrifice, O intelligent one, in due order, and sit down on this Barhis.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi*. Metre, *Gâyatrî*.—Verse 4=VS. XII, 43; TS. IV, 2, 3, 4; MS. II, 7, 10.—The hymn has been translated by M. M., *Selected Essays*, II, p. 143.

Verse 1.

Note 1. It does not seem probable that *upasád* is to be translated here according to its meaning in the later ritual, as one of the preparatory ceremonies of the Soma sacrifice. See Weber, *Indische Studien*, X, 363; Hillebrandt, *Vedische Mythologie*, I, 300.

Verse 2.

Note 1. *Ayá* may be used adverbially: comp. III, 12, 2; VI, 17, 15; IX, 53, 2; 106, 14. But it is more probable that *samídhâ* or *girá* should be supplied from verse 1. Comp. II, 24, 1. *ayá vidhema girá*; IV, 4, 15. *ayá samídhâ vidhema*.

Note 2. Comp. VIII, 61, 7. *ásvam-ishṭaye*.

Verse 5.

Note 1. The conjecture *sánaḥ*, proposed by Böhtlingk-Roth and Grassmann, is not necessary. The verb is to be supplied; comp. the passages collected by Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, I, 19.

Verse 7.

Note 1. *Gányeva* seems to be *gányah iva*, comp. II, 39, 1. *dūtá-iva hávyâ gányâ purutrâ*; IV, 55, 5. *pát pátih gányât ámhasah nah*.

Verse 8.

Note 1. Comp. VII, 17, 4. *yákshat deván amṛítân pipráyat ka*; VIII, 39, 9. *yákshat ka pipráyat ka nah*.

MANDALA II, HYMN 7.

ASHṬAKA II, ADHYĀYA 5, VARGA 28.

1. Bring us, O youngest god, Bhârata¹, Agni, the best, resplendent, much-desired wealth, O Vasu²!

2. May no malign power of a god or of a mortal overcome us. Help us across such hostile power.

3. And may we dive with thee across all hostile powers as across streams of water.

4. Bright, O purifier, worthy of adoration, Agni, thou shinest mightily; thou hast been worshipped by offerings of ghrîta¹.

5. Thou, O Bhârata¹, Agni! hast been worshipped by us with offerings of heifers, of bulls, of eight-footed (cows)².

6. The old excellent Hotrî who feeds on wood and drinks butter, he is the wonderful son of strength.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi* and metre.—Verse 1=TS. I, 3, 14, 3; MS. IV, 11, 4. Verse 4=TS. I, 3, 14, 5. Verse 6=VS. XI, 70; TS. IV, 1, 9, 2; MS. II, 7, 7.

Verse 1.

Note 1. Agni Bhârata is Agni as the protector of the Bharata tribe or as invoked by that tribe.

Note 2. With the beginning of this verse, I, 44, 4 should be compared.

Verse 4.

Note 1. Comp. VIII, 19, 22. *agnih ghrítébhih áhutaḥ*.

Verse 5.

Note 1. See verse 1, note 1.

Note 2. Roth (Petersb. Dictionary) supplies *vāgbhih* or *rigbhih*; comp. VIII, 76, 12. *vākam ashāpadim*. But there is no doubt that *ashāpadī*, standing by the side of *vasā* and *ukshán*, has the same meaning as in the later ritual, viz. a cow with calf.

MANDALA II, HYMN 8.

ASHTAKA II, ADHYÂYA 5, VARGA 29.

1. As one who runs a race¹ (praises) his chariots, praise thou the yoking of Agni (to the chariot of sacrifice), of the most glorious, bountiful (god)—

2. Who is the best leader for his worshipper, who undecaying makes the malign decay¹, the cheerful-faced who has been worshipped with offerings—

3. He who is praised in the houses on account of his beauty in the evening and at dawn, whose law is not set at nought,

4. The bright one who shines with his light as the Sun with his splendour, with his undecaying (flames)¹, he who is anointed (with *ghṛita*).

5. The hymns have strengthened Agni the devourer¹ along (the extent of) his own royalty². He has assumed every beauty.

6. May we unharmed stand under the protection of Agni, Indra, Soma, of the gods; may we overcome our foes.

NOTES.

The *Rishi* is *Gṛitsamada*; the metre is *Gâyatrî*, the last verse being *Anushṭubh*, as is frequently the case in *Gâyatrî* hymns (see H. O., *Hymnen des Rig-veda*, I, 146).—No verse occurs in the other *Samhitās*.

Verse 1.

Note 1. *Vāgayāti* means 'he strives for *vāga*,' *vāgayati* 'he incites to quickness.' The accent is not always correct in the traditional text.

Verse 2.

Note 1. Comp. II, 16, 1. *índram aguryám garáyantam*.

Verse 4.

Note 1. As to *agáraiḥ*, 'the undecaying (flames),' comp. III, 18, 2; VI, 5, 4; 6, 2; VII, 3, 3; X, 87, 20.

Verse 5.

Note 1. That Agni should be identified here with the *Rishi* Atri (see Bergaigne, II, 468) is very improbable. Possibly *átri* means simply 'the eater' (from *ad*), though the poet in calling him so may have intended to allude to the name of the *Rishi*.

Note 2. Comp. I, 80, 1 seq. *árkan ánu svarágyam*; 84, 10 seq. *vásviḥ ánu svarágyam*.

MANDALA II, HYMN 9.

ASHTAKA II, ADHYĀYA 6, VARGA 1.

1. The *Hotri* who is found on the *Hotri*'s seat has sat down (there), the fierce, the resplendent, the dexterous one, the protector of (his own) infallible laws¹, the highest Vasu, he who brings thousandfold (gain), the pure-tongued Agni.

2. Be thou our messenger, be our protector far and wide; be thou, O bull, a leader towards greater wealth. O Agni! for the continuation of our children and of ourselves be thou an unremitting, brilliant protector.

3. May we worship thee at thy highest birth (-place), O Agni; may we worship thee with praises in thy lower abode. I honour the womb from which thou hast sprung. When thou hast been kindled, they have offered offerings in thee.

4. Agni, being the best sacrificer perform thou the sacrifice with the oblation. With thy readiness to hear (us) hail our gift, the wealth (which we offer). For thou art the treasure-lord of treasures; thou art the deviser of brilliant speech.

5. Thy wealth of both kinds¹ never fails, when thou art born (kindled) day by day, O wonderful one. Make thy singer, O Agni, rich in food; make him the lord of wealth with excellent offspring.

6. With this face of thine, as a bounteous (lord), a sacrificer to the gods, the best performer of sacrifices with happiness, as an undeceivable guardian and far-reaching protector, shine among us, O Agni, with light and wealth.

NOTES.

The same *Rīshi*. Metre, Trishṭubh.—According to an observation of Bergaigne's, hymns of six verses composed in Trishṭubh should precede hymns of the same extent composed in Gāyatrī. Though this law is not without exceptions (see H. O., *Die Hymnen des Rigveda*, I, 202 seq.), the suspicion is raised that the hymns 9 and 10 should each be divided into two *Trikas*.—Verse 1=VS. XI, 36; TS. III, 5, 11, 2; IV, 1, 3, 3; MS. II, 7, 3. Verse 2=TS. III, 5, 11, 2; MS. IV, 10, 4. Verse 3=VS. XVII, 75; TS. IV, 6, 5, 4; MS. II, 10, 6. Verse 6=TS. IV, 3, 13, 2; MS. IV, 10, 5.

Verse 1.

Note 1. The long compound looks suspicious; possibly it should be read *ádabdhavratāḥ prámātīḥ*.

Verse 5.

Note 1. *Vásu* and *dhána* frequently receive the epithet *ubháya*; see VI, 19, 10; VII, 82, 4; 83, 5; X, 84, 7. No doubt celestial and terrestrial goods are referred to, see II, 14, 11; V, 68, 3; VI, 59, 9; VII, 97, 10; IX, 19, 1; 100, 3.

MANDALA II, HYMN 10.

ASHTAKA II, ADHYĀYA 6, VARGA 2.

1. Agni is to be invoked as the first like a father, when he has been inflamed by Manus¹ in the abode of Id². When he has invested himself with beauty, the wise immortal, he, the glorious strong (horse) is to be smoothed (by the worshippers as by grooms).

2. Agni with bright splendour, mayest thou hear my call with all my prayers, thou a wise immortal. The two tawny (horses) draw thy chariot or the two red (horses), or He the wide-ranging one has made the two ruddy (horses draw his chariot)¹.

3. They have generated the well-born (Agni) in her who lies on her back¹. Agni became a germ in the manifoldly-adorned (wives)². Even in the . . .³ the wise one dwells by night uncovered in his powers⁴.

4. I besprinkle with my offering, with Ghr̥ita, Agni who abides turned towards all beings, who widely extends throughout, who is mighty in his vigour, who shows himself most capacious by the food (which he consumes), and robust¹.

5. I besprinkle Him who is turned towards (us) from all sides; may he gladly accept that with his benevolent mind. Agni, who is like a beautiful youth, who has the appearance of one eagerly striving, is not to be touched, when he hurries around with his body.

6. Mayst thou know the portion (belonging to thee), being strong through thy desire. With thee as our messenger may we speak like Manu. Gaining

wealth¹ I invoke with my (sacrificial) ladle, with my eloquence, the faultless Agni who mixes the honey-drink.

NOTES.

The same *Rīshi* and metre. On the position of this hymn in the collection and its division into *Triṣas*, see the note on II, 9.—Verses 4–5 = VS. XI, 23–24; TS. IV, 1, 2, 4. 5; MS. II, 7, 2.

Verse 1.

Note 1. Comp. VII, 2, 3. *Mánunā sámiddham*.

Note 2. *Íd* is a synonym of *lā*; *ilāh padé* means the same as *ilāyāh padé*.

Verse 2.

Note 1. I cannot accept Prof. Lanman's scansion of this *Pāda* (Noun-Inflection, 342), *utá arushāha kakre víbhrītraḥ*. In my opinion the only reading in conformity with the use of Vedic poets is *utárushā áha*, &c.

Verse 3.

Note 1. Comp. III, 29, 3 (see below). Of course the kindling-stick is alluded to.

Note 2. The wives are the plants.—Comp. Lanman, p. 548.

Note 3. The meaning of *sírínā* (ἄπαξ λεγόμενον) is unknown. The Indian explanation ('night') of course is a guess, but this guess may be right.

Note 4. 'Uncovered by the night,' M. M. On *máhobhiḥ*, cf. vol. xxxii, p. 197.

Verse 4.

Note 1. See vol. xxxii, p. 212.

Verse 6.

Note 1. There is no reason for conjecturing *dhanasám* (Ludwig). Comp. X, 65, 10. *indriyám sómam dhanasāḥ u ímahe*.

MANDALA III, HYMN 1.

ASHTAKA II, ADHYĀYA 8, VARGA 13-16.

1. Thou wilt have me, O Agni, as a strong (master) of Soma¹: therefore thou hast made me the carrier (of the gods?) to perform worship at the sacrifice². Sending my thoughts to the gods³ I make the (press-) stone ready⁴; I toil, O Agni: find thou pleasure in thy own body⁵.

2¹. Eastward we have turned the sacrifice²; may the prayer increase. They honoured Agni with fuel and adoration. They have taught (him) the sacrificial ordinances of the sages of Heaven³. Though he (Agni) is clever and strong, they have sought a way for him.

3. He has conceived freshness¹, the wise one of pure² powers, he who is by his birth well allied with Heaven and Earth. The gods have found Agni the conspicuous one in the waters, in the work³ of the sisters.

4. The seven young (wives)¹ made the blessed one grow who had been born white, ruddy in his growth. They ran up to him like mares² to a new-born foal. The gods wondered at Agni at his birth.

5. Spreading with his bright limbs to the aerial space, purifying his power¹ by wise purifications, clothing himself in light, the life of the waters², he creates mighty, perfect beauty.

6. He has gone to (the waters) who do not eat, the undeceived ones, the young (daughters) of Heaven who are not clothed and (yet) are not naked.

Here the former young (women) having the same origin, the seven sounds¹ have conceived one germ.

7. His compact masses assuming every shape are spread in the womb of ghee, in the streaming of honey. There the swelling milch-cows have stationed themselves. Great are the parents of the wonderfully mighty (Agni) who are turned towards each other¹.

8. Having been carried (in the waters) thou hast shone forth, O son of strength, assuming wonderful shapes brilliant and fierce. The streams of honey and ghee drip, where the male has grown by wisdom.

9. By (his) nature he has found his father's udder¹; he has sent forth his streams and his showers². Walking³ hidden to his dear friends he has not been hidden to the young (daughters) of Heaven⁴.

10. He bore (in his womb) the germ of the sire, of the father who begat him¹. He, being one, sucked many (nurses) rich in milk². Observe for this manly, bright one the two wives bound in kinship, belonging to men³.

11. The great one has grown up in the wide unbounded space¹. The Waters (have made) Agni (grow): for many glorious ones² (have come) together³. He lay in the womb of *Rita*, the domestic (god) Agni, in the work⁴ of the uterine sisters.

12. Like a horse that carries (the prize), in the assembly of the great (waters)¹, visible to his son², he whose . . . is light³: he who as father begat the ruddy cows⁴, he the son of the waters is the most manly, restless⁵ Agni.

13. To him, the glorious son of the waters and of the plants, the blessed wood¹ has given birth, in his many shapes. Even the gods, for they agreed in

their mind, honoured him who had been born the most wonderful and strong.

14. Mighty rays of light like brilliant lightnings, milking (the sap of) immortality in the boundless stable, accompanied Agni whose . . . is light¹, who had grown up in his own house, as it were in secret.

15. I magnify thee, worshipping thee with offerings; I magnify (thee) desirous of thy friendship, of thy favour. Together with the gods give help to him who praises thee, and protect us with thy domestic faces.

16. As thy followers, O Agni, best leader, winning all precious (treasures), pressing onward with fertile glory, may we overcome the godless who seek to combat us.

17. Thou hast been here as the banner of the gods, Agni, joy-giving, knowing all wisdom. As the domestic (god) thou hast harboured the mortals. As the charioteer thou goest along straightway after the gods.

18. The immortal, the king, has sat down in the dwelling of the mortals, performing the sacrifices¹. He the ghee-faced one has shone forth widely, Agni knowing all wisdom.

19¹. Come to us with thy gracious friendship, speeding, great, with thy great blessings. Bestow on us plentiful victorious wealth; make our share glorious and adorned with fine speech.

20. These old births of thine, O Agni, and the recent ones I have told forth to thee the ancient one. These great libations (of Soma) have been prepared for the manly one; generation by generation *Gâtavedas* has been placed (on the altar).

21. *Gâtavedas*, placed (on the altar) generation

after generation, is kindled by the Visvâmitras, the indefatigable (or everlasting). May we dwell in the grace of him the worshipful, yea, in his blissful kindness.

22. Bring thou, O strong one, this sacrifice of ours to the gods, O wise one, as a liberal giver. Bestow on us, O Hotri, abundant food; Agni, obtain by sacrificing mighty wealth for us.

23. Procure, O Agni, for ever, to him who implores thee, (the gift of) nourishment¹, the wonderful acquiring of the cow. May a son be ours, offspring that continues our race. Agni, may this favour of thine abide with us!

NOTES.

The *Rishi* is Visvâmitra Gâthina, the metre Trishubh.—Verse 1 = MS. IV, 11, 2. Verse 19 = MS. IV, 14, 15. Verse 23 = SV. I, 76; VS. XII, 51; TS. IV, 2, 4, 3; MS. II, 7, 11; IV, 11, 1; 12, 3.

Comp. on this hymn Geldner, *Vedische Studien*, I, 157 seq., and the article of Regnaud, *Études Védiques*, l'hymne III, 1 du Rig-Véda.

Verse 1.

Note 1. Vákshi, which is very frequent as 2nd person of vah, occurs also as belonging to vas (see VII, 98, 2. pítim ít asya vakshi), and in this sense no doubt it is to be understood in our passage.—Ludwig and Geldner take tavásam vákshi agne as a parenthesis. G. translates: 'Du hast mich zu deinem Somaschenken—denn dich gelüstet nach dem starken, o Agni—bestellt, dass ich vor den Weisen opfern soll.' To me it seems more natural to understand the first Pâda as one continual clause; vákshi is accented on account of the logical dependence in which this clause

stands, the clause being considered, even without a subordinating word, as a dependent one. See Delbrück, *Altindische Syntax*, p. 42; A. Mayr, *Sitzungsberichte der phil. hist. Classe der Kais. Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Vol. LXVIII (Vienna, 1871), 248, 259.—If we were to consider *vákshi* as a locative infinitive (see Bartholomae's theory on such infinitives, *Indogermanische Forschungen*, II, 271 seqq.), the translation would be: 'Thou hast made me, O Agni, a strong carrier of Soma at the carrying (of the oblations),' &c. I do not think, however, this interpretation of *vákshi* very probable, nor is it, as far as I can see, favoured by any passage which contains the word.—For *sómasya tavásam*, Prof. Max Müller suggests the translation 'strong of Soma,' i. e. full of Soma.

Note 2. The text has *vidáthe*.

Note 3. The traditional text has *ákkha dīdyat*, which means, 'shining towards or as far as the gods.' The verb *dī* with *ákkha* occurs still in two other passages of this *Mandala*, in 15, 5 and 55, 3. In the first of these passages the text seems to be correct: *deván ákkha dīdyānah*, 'shining as far as the gods.' In the second passage I believe that we ought to read *ákkha dīdhye pūrvyāni*, 'I think of the ancient things,' or more exactly, 'I send my thoughts to the ancient things.' In the same way it seems to me very probable that in our verse *dīdhyat* would be the correct reading, for the participle refers to the priest who says of himself, 'I make the stone ready;' and this priest does not send his light (*dīdyat*) but his thoughts (*dīdhyat*) to the gods. Comp. I, 132, 5 = 139, 1. *deván ákkha ná dhītāyah*; III, 4, 3, and numerous passages which represent the *mati*, the *girah*, &c., as going towards (*ákkha*) the gods, such as III, 39, 1; 42, 3; VII, 10, 3; 36, 9; X, 43, 1; 47, 6.—Prof. von Roth (*Zeitschrift der D. Morg. Ges.*, XLVIII, 108) speaks of the 'häufige Verwechslungen von Formen der beiden Wurzeln *dī* scheinen und *dhī* wahrnehmen, denken.' The reading *dīdyat* in our verse, and *dīdye* III, 55, 3, may rest on the influence of III, 15, 5. *deván ákkhā dīdyānah*.

Note 4. On the accent of *yuñgé* the same may be said as above (note 1) regarding the accent of *vákshi*.

Note 5. I. e. cause the fire to flare up.

Verse 2.

Note 1. The verses 2, 3, and 4 have been translated by Bergaigne, *Religion Védique*, I, 109.

Note 2. Many sacrificial rites are performed from west to east; comp. with regard to the Barhis, I, 188, 4; X, 110, 4; with regard to the sacrificial ladle, III, 6, 1; V, 28, 1; to the Havirdhânas, *Vâgas. Samhitâ* V, 17. Thus the whole sacrifice is spoken of as proceeding in an eastward direction; see X, 66, 12. *prāñkam nah yagñām prá nayata*; X, 87, 9. *yagñām prāñkam . . . prá naya*.

Note 3. Comp. *Mahābhārata* XIV, 280. *tasmāt svayam sādhi yagñe vidhānam*. *Vidātha* indeed is here an equivalent of *vidhāna*.

Verse 3.

Note 1. The meaning seems to be that Agni won vigour (*máyah*) by dwelling in the waters (see *Pāda* 3); comp. the well-known words *ápah hí sthá mayah-bhúvah* (X, 9, 1), 'for you, O waters, give vigour.'

Note 2. More exactly, of purified faculties.

Note 3. The accent *apási*, instead of *ápasi*, looks very suspicious. It is easy, but perhaps too easy, to correct *ápasi*, as possibly in III, 6, 7. *ápah* should be read for *apáh*. (In I, 31, 8; 151, 4 Grassmann is wrong in assuming a neutral stem *apás-* 'die Arbeit.') To me Ludwig's conjecture *upási* (in the lap of the sisters, i.e. of the waters) seems excellent. *Upási* occurs in V, 43, 7; X, 27, 13 in the meaning of *upásthe*. Thus *upási svásrīnām* would be the same as *apām upásthe*; comp. I, 144, 2; VI, 8, 4; IX, 86, 25; X, 45, 3; 46, 1. 2, &c.—Comp. below, verse 11, note 4.

Verse 4.

Note 1. Of course the seven wives are the rivers or waters.

Note 2. I cannot adopt Prof. Weber's conjecture *asvāh* (Altiranische Sternnamen, 10). His translation is: 'Die Götter liefen zu dem wundersamen Agni bei seiner Geburt (neugierig) hinzu, wie die jungen Mädchen zu einem neu-gebornen Kinde.'

Verse 5.

Note 1. For *krátum punánáh*, cf. III, 31, 16; VIII, 12, 11; 13, 1; 53, 6.

Note 2. I take *pári* as belonging to *vásānah*; *sókih* and *āyuh* are objects. Comp. X, 16, 5. *āyuh vásānah*; X, 53, 3. *sáh āyuh á agāt surabhíh vásānah*.

Verse 6.

Note 1. The number of the seven sounds (comp. Sten Konow, *Das Sāmavidhāna-brāhmaṇa*, p. 33, note 3) seems to be connected with the seven *Rishis*, see IX, 103, 3. *vānīh rīshinām saptá* (comp. IX, 62, 17). The seven sounds seem to be identified with the seven rivers also in III, 7, 1 (see below). Comp. Bergaigne, *Religion Védique*, II, 132; H. O., *Religion des Veda*, 117, note 1.

Verse 7.

Note 1. Heaven and Earth.

Verse 9.

Note 1. Comp. Bergaigne, *Religion Védique*, II, 99.

Note 2. See volume xxxii, 441 seq. (I, 2, 3, note 1).

Note 3. Here I believe we have an anacoluthon. The poet seems to have intended to say, 'Him who walked . . . the daughters of Heaven saw.'—Prof. Max Müller translates this hemistich: 'He found him (the father) moving along with dear friends, with the young maidens of Heaven—he was not hidden.'

Note 4. Agni was hidden to the gods but not to the waters.

Verse 10.

Note 1. The verse X, 3, 2, though very obscure, seems to contain a similar idea. Should the meaning be that

Agni bears in his womb the Dawn, the daughter of Heaven?

Note 2. The waters.

Note 3. This phrase, which I have translated as literally as possible, is very obscure. The two wives seem to be wives of Agni. Are they Night and Dawn (the two *sabardúghe*, III, 55, 12?), whose designation as 'belonging to men' seems not to be impossible? Or the two kindling-sticks (comp. V, 47, 5)? Or the two *Darvis* (V, 6, 9)?

Verse 11.

Note 1. Comp. V, 42, 17. *uraú deváh anibádhé syâma*.

Note 2. This is feminine.

Note 3. The phrase *yasásh sám hí pûrvîh* occurs also X, 46, 10. It may have been, as Geldner believes, a proverbial locution. But the verb which it is most natural to supply, seems to be *gam* (i, yâ), so that the meaning may have been: 'Many superior (wives) are wont to assemble,' i. e. where one such wife is, there will be many. This is applied here to the waters, in X, 46, 10 to such beings as *íshah*, *ûtáyah* or the like. That *yasás* may be meant for the waters is shown by VII, 36, 6, where the *yasásh vâvasánáh*, mentioned by the side of *Sarasvatî*, evidently are the waters.—It should be observed that several expressions of this hymn have been made use of by the author of X, 46.

Note 4. Or rather 'in the lap' (*upási*). Comp. above, verse 3, note 3.

Verse 12.

Note 1. With regard to *akráh* I adopt the translation proposed by Geldner (*Ved. Studien*, I, 168).—On the accent of *mahñâm*, see Lanman, p. 398.

Note 2. This seems to be the human worshipper. I cannot follow Prof. von Roth, *Zeitschrift der D. Morg. Gesellschaft*, XLVIII, 118, who explains *sûnáve* as a corrupt third person of the verb *su*.

Note 3. See above, I, 44, 3, note 1.

Note 4. The dawns.

Note 5. Comp. above, I, 36, 1, note 2.

Verse 13.

Note 1. Vánâ : the wood considered as a wife.

Verse 14.

Note 1. See verse 12, note 3.

Verse 18.

Note 1. The text has vidáthâni.

Verse 19.

Note 1. Comp. Kuhn, Kuhn's Zeitschrift, I, p. 445.

Verse 23.

Note 1. Íām, which more especially means the nourishing substance of the cow. Comp. H. O., Religion des Veda, 72, 326.—Prof. Max Müller translates: 'Procure to him who implores thee, O Agni, exuberant land for ever, rich in cows.'

MANDALA III, HYMN 2.

ASHTAKA II, ADHYÂYA 8, VARGA 17-19.

TO AGNI VAISVÂNARA.

1. For Vaisvânara, the increaser of *Rita*, for Agni we produce¹ a *Dhishanzâ*² like purified ghee. And verily³ by their prayer the invoking men (accomplish) him, the *Hotri*, as the axe accomplishes a chariot.

2. By his birth he has given splendour to both worlds (Heaven and Earth). He became the praiseworthy son of his parents, Agni, the carrier of oblations, never ageing, with satisfied mind, undecivable, the guest of men, rich in light.

3. Through the power of their mind, within the sphere of their superior strength the gods have procreated Agni by their thoughts. Desirous of winning the prize¹ I address Him who shines with his splendour, who is great in his light, as (one who desires to win the prize addresses his) race-horse.

4. Desirous of winning the choice, glorious, and praiseworthy prize (which is the gift) of the joy-giver, we choose the boon of the *Bhrigus*¹, the *Usig*², who has the mind of a sage, Agni, who reigns with his heavenly light.

5. Men, having spread the sacrificial grass, holding the sacrificial ladle, have placed here in front (as *Purohita*), for the sake of (the divine) blessing, Agni renowned for strength, with great splendour, united with all the gods, the *Rudra* of sacrifices¹, who accomplishes the oblations of active (worshippers).

6. O (Agni) whose flame is purifying, around thy

dwelling, O Hotri, the men who at the sacrifices have spread the sacrificial grass, O Agni, seeking (how to do) honour (to thee), and (desiring) thy friendship, surround thee (reverentially);—bestow thou wealth on them!

7. He has filled the two worlds (Heaven and Earth) and the great Sun, when the active ones (i.e. the priests) held him fast who had been born. He the sage is led round for the performance of worship, like a racer for the winning of the prize¹, with satisfied mind.

8. Adore ye him, the giver of offerings, the best performer of worship; honour ye him the domestic Gâtavedas. Agni, the charioteer of the mighty Rita, he who dwells among manifold tribes, has become the Purohita of the gods.

9. The immortal Usigs have purified three logs for the vigorous¹ Agni² who wanders round the earth³: of these they have placed one among the mortals for their enjoyment; two have passed into the sister world⁴.

10. The food offered by men has sharpened him, the sage of the tribes, the lord of the tribes, as an axe. Busily he goes to the heights and to the depths. He has held fast the germ in these worlds.

11. He the generator, the strong one, stirs in the resplendent bellies like a roaring lion, Vaisvânara with his broad stream of light, the immortal, distributing goods and treasures to his worshipper.

12. Vaisvânara has mounted the firmament, the back of heaven, as of old, glorified by those who are rich in good thoughts. He, creating wealth for the creatures as of old, goes watchful round the common course.

13. The righteous, worshipful priest deserving of praise, the dweller in heaven¹ whom Mâtariśvan has established (on earth): him we approach whose way is bright and hair golden, the resplendent Agni, for the sake of ever new welfare.

14. Like the flaming one (the sun?) on his way, the quick one, of sun-like aspect, the banner of heaven, who dwells in light, who wakes at dawn—Agni the head of heaven, the unrepressed, him we approach with adoration, the strong one mightily.

15. The joy-giving, bright Hotṛi, in whom is no falsehood, the domestic, praiseworthy dweller among all tribes, like a splendid chariot, wonderful to behold, established by Manus: him we constantly approach for the sake of wealth.

NOTES.

The same *R̥ishi*. The metre is *Gagati*.—Verse 7=VS. XXXIII, 75. Verse 9 = MS. I, 3, 35.

Verse 1.

Note 1. Literally, 'we generate.'

Note 2. On the meaning of this word, which I may be allowed to leave in its Sanskrit form, I refer to I, 96, 1, note 2.

Note 3. Literally, 'doubly.' Comp. below, III, 17, 5, note 1.

Verse 3.

Note 1. *Vāgam sanishyán* refers to the worshipper who desires to obtain *vāga* (quick strength, and the booty or prize obtained by it), and in the comparison, to the owner of a race-horse who desires to win the race.

Verse 4.

Note 1. Comp. I, 60, 1 (see above).

Note 2. Comp. Bergaigne, Religion Védique, I, 57 seq.

Verse 5.

Note 1. Comp. von Bradke, Dyâus Asura, p. 54.

Verse 7.

Note 1. Again, as in verse 3, *vāgasātaye* means, with reference to the race, 'for the winning of the prize,' and with reference to sacrifice, 'for the obtainment of quick strength, of booty, &c.'

Verse 9.

Note 1. See above, I, 36, 1, note 2.

Note 2. Agni is stated here to have one terrestrial and two celestial forms: the fire belonging to men, and, it seems, sun and lightning. Comp. M. M., Physical Religion, 229; Bergaigne, Religion Védique, I, 22. With regard to the three forms of Agni, compare also H. O., Religion des Veda, 106 seq.

Note 3. On *párigman*, comp. above, I, 79, 3, note 2.

Note 4. Into the celestial world.

Verse 13.

Note 1. I read *divikshayám* (Bergaigne, Rel. Védique, I, 55, note). The blunder has been caused by X, 63, 5. *dadhiré diví ksháyam*.

MANDALA III, HYMN 3.

ASHTAKA II, ADHYÂYA 8, VARGA 20-21.

TO AGNI VAISVÂNARA.

1. They have worshipped Vaisvânara with his broad stream of light with prayers¹ and treasures in order that he may walk on firm ground. For immortal Agni honours the gods, and from of old he has not violated the laws.

2. The wonderful messenger goes between the two worlds (heaven and earth), the *Hotri* who has sat down, the Purohita of Manus. He takes care of his wide dwelling day by day, Agni who, incited by the gods, gives wealth for our prayers.

3. The priests have exalted with their thoughts Agni, the banner of sacrifices, the achiever of sacrifice¹. From him in whom they have put together their (sacrificial) works and their prayers, the sacrificer desires blessings.

4. The father of sacrifices, the miraculous lord of those who know prayers (?)¹, Agni, is the measure and rule² of the sacrificers; he has entered the two manifold-shaped worlds; the sage beloved by many people is glorified in his foundations.

5. The gods have established here in great beauty Agni the bright with his bright chariot, whose every law is golden¹, Vaisvânara who dwells in the waters, who finds the sun, the diver, the swift one covered with strength, the quick one.

6. Agni, spreading out with his thought the manifold-adorned sacrifice, together with the gods and

with the people of Manus, goes as a charioteer to and fro with (gods and men) who accomplish the sacrifice, the quick, domestic (god), the dispeller of curses.

7. Agni, be wakeful¹ in our life which may be blessed with offspring; swell with sap; shine upon us (plenty of) food. Stir up vigour and the great ones, O watchful (god). Thou art the *Usig* (or willing one) of the gods, the good-minded (lord) of prayers.

8. The lord of the tribe, the vigorous¹ guest, the guider of prayers, the *Usig* (or willing one) of those who invoke him, *Gâtavedas*, the light of worship—him men constantly praise with adoration, with solicitations for their welfare.

9. The resplendent, joyous god, Agni on his chariot, has with his might encompassed the dwellings. May we honour in our house with beautiful prayers¹ his commands who is rich in manifold prosperity.

10. O *Vaisvânara*, I love thy statutes by which thou hast found the sun, O far-seeing one. When born thou hast filled the worlds, heaven and earth; Agni, thou encompassed all these (beings) by thyself.

11. For *Vaisvânara*'s wonderful deeds he the sage alone has by his great skill mightily¹ let loose (his powers?). Agni has been born exalting both his parents, Heaven and Earth, rich in seed.

NOTES.

The same *Rîshi* and metre.—Verse 10 = MS. IV, 11, 1.
Verse 11 = TS. I, 5, 11, 1.

Verse 1.

Note 1. A meaning like 'prayer' seems to recommend itself for most of the passages in which the substantive *víp* occurs, for instance, V, 68, 1. *prá vah mitráya gâyata várunâya vipá girá*; IX, 22, 3. *eté pûtáh vipaskítah sómâsah . . . vipá ví ânasuh dhíyah*; IX, 65, 12. *ayá kittáh vipá anáyâ hárih pavasva dhárayâ*; III, 10, 5 (see below), &c. As the verb *víp* means 'to be in trembling agitation,' the same word as a substantive may designate enthusiastic thoughts or prayers. Comp. *vépate matí*, IX, 71, 3; X, 11, 6, and the nouns *vípra*, *vipaskít*, *vipodhá*. We need not enter here upon the question, whether some concrete trembling or shaking objects also were designated as *vípah*, and whether Bergaigne (*Religion Védique*, I, p. vii) is right in taking the *víp áyah-agrá*, with which Trita killed the boar (X, 99, 6), as a 'prière à pointe de fer' (comp. Macdonell, *Journ. R. Asiatic Society*, 1893, p. 431; 1895, p. 185).—In our verse *vípah* may be either nominative or accusative. I have translated it as an accusative; in the case of the nominative the translation would be: 'The prayers have worshipped Vaisvânara with treasures.'

Verse 3.

Note 1. The text has *vidáthasya*.

Verse 4.

Note 1. *Ásurah vipah-kítâm*. On the meaning of *ásura*, which implies the possession of secret, supernatural power, see H. O., *Religion des Veda*, 162 seq.—Comp. von Bradke, *Dyâus Asura*, pp. 64–65.

Note 2. 'Richtschnur und Weg der Opferer,' Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, I, 306.

Verse 5.

Note 1. Literally, 'whose rules are yellow.' The meaning is that Agni's whole sphere of activity bears the golden

yellow colour. Sâyana gives the interesting remark 'haritvaṭam iti sâkhântaram,' but no doubt hârivratam is right.

Verse 7.

Note 1. Comp. Neisser, Bezzenberger's Beiträge, XIII, 297.

Verse 8.

Note 1. Comp. I, 36, 1, note 2.

Verse 9.

Note 1. Comp. II, 4, 1, note 1.

Verse 11.

Note 1. Prof. Max Müller proposes to translate, 'has sent forth his great song,' and observes, 'Might not *br̥i*hat be like *br̥i*hat sâma, a name of a hymn?'

MANDALA III, HYMN 4.

ASHTAKA II, ADHYÂYA 8, VARGA 22-23.

ÂPRÎ HYMN.

1. Log by log¹ be kind towards us. Flash by flash grant us thy, the Vasu's, favour². Bring hither, O god, the gods that we may sacrifice. Sacrifice, O Agni, as a kind friend to thy friends.

2. Thou whom the gods, Varuna, Mitra, Agni, thrice every day bring hither by sacrifice day by day, Tanûnapât, make this our sacrifice honey-sweet, having its abode in ghee¹, (this sacrifice) which worships (the gods).

3. (Our adoring) thought rich in all boons goes forward for worshipping as the first the Hotri of the sacred food (i/), for saluting the strong bull with adoration and homage. May he, the best sacrificer, incited (by our prayers) sacrifice to the gods¹.

4. Upwards your¹ course has been directed at the worship; upwards (your) flames² are gone; ready (for receiving you) is the air³. Or the Hotri has sat down at heaven's navel. We spread out the sacrificial grass which receives the gods.

5¹. Choosing in their mind the sevenfold work of the Hotris², enlivening everything (the gods) came hither in the right way. (The divine doors³) with men as their ornaments⁴, born at the sacrifices⁵, have come hither and thither to this sacrifice, many of them.

6. Hither (shall come) the two Dawns¹, the neighbourly (goddesses) of glorious appearance².

Of different forms, they both smile. (They shall come) that Mitra and Varuṇa may be satisfied with us, and Indra accompanied by the Maruts with their powers³.

7. I catch hold of the two divine Hotṛis first. The seven strong ones¹ rejoice according to their wont. Teaching the right, they proclaim the right, the guardians of law, contemplating the law.

8¹. May Bhâratī, in concord with the Bhâratts, I/â with the gods, Agni with men, Sarāsvatī with all (beings) belonging to Sarāsvatī (come) hither; may the three goddesses sit down on this sacrificial grass.

9. O divine Tvashṭrī, grant us and send forth this our seed which is to thrive: (the seed) from which a manly son is born able and skilful, who sets to work the press-stones, loving the gods.

10. O tree¹, send (the offering) forth to the gods. May Agni the slaughterer make the offering ready. May the same, the very true Hotṛī, sacrifice according as he knows the generations of the gods.

11. Agni, being kindled, come hither, on one chariot with Indra, with the quick gods. May Aditi, the mother of noble sons, sit down on our sacrificial grass. With Svâhâ may the immortal gods rejoice.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi*. Metre, *Trishṭubh*.—Verse 9 = TS. III, 1, 11, 1; MS. IV, 13, 10. Verse 10 = VS. XXVII, 21; TS. IV, 1, 8, 3; MS. II, 12, 6.

Verse 1.

Note 1. Agni is invoked as personified in each log of fuel which is put on the sacrificial fire.

Note 2. Comp. VII, 39, 1. *sumatīm vásvaḥ*.

Verse 2.

Note 1. Comp. II, 3, 11. *ghṛitām asya yónih*.

Verse 3.

Note 1. Comp. X, 110, 3. *sáḥ enân yakshi ishitáḥ yágyân* (cf. also X, 110, 9).

Verse 4.

Note 1. The text has the dual *vâm*. But who are the two beings addressed? According to Sáyana, Agni and the Barhis, which does not seem very probable. The structure of the phrase gives the impression—though this impression is by no means certain—that *vâm*, which belongs to *gātu*, is to be supplied to *sokīmshi* also. If we are right in this supposition, are not the two beings in question the two first of the three sacred fires, the *Āhavanīya* and *Gārhapatya*? These two fires are frequently spoken of in the ritual texts as of a dyad, with the omission of the third fire.—Prof. Max Müller proposes to change *vâm* into *vā*. According to him the meaning may be: Either the road has been made upward, i. e. the flames have gone upward to the sky, or Agni has sat down at heaven's navel.

Note 2. Comp. VII, 43, 2. *ūrdhvā sokīmshi devayūni asthuḥ*.

Note 3. Possibly the words *ūrdhvā sokīmshi prāsthita rāgāmsi* may form one clause, 'upwards (your) flames are gone towards the sky.' M. M.

Verse 5.

Note 1. On this verse, comp. Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, II, 115 seq.

Note 2. On the seven priests of the ancient Soma sacrifice, comp. H. O., *Religion des Veda*, 383 seq.

Note 3. That this subject is to be supplied, is shown by the regular composition of the Âprî hymns. It is confirmed by the word *pûrvîh*, which is evidently an epithet of the divine doors; comp. I, 188, 5; VII, 2, 5.

Note 4. 'In human form.' M. M.

Note 5. The text has *vidátheshu*.

Verse 6.

Note 1. I. e. Night and Dawn.

Note 2. Comp. above, I, 142, 7.

Note 3. Comp. M. M., vol. xxxii, p. 196 seq.

Verse 7.

Note 1. Comp. above, I, 127, 5, note 1. Pischel (*Vedische Studien*, I, 96) may be right in taking the seven *prîkshâsa* as the Ângiras, the *saptá víprâh*.

Verse 8.

Note 1. The verses 8-11 are repeated in VII, 2, 8-11.

Verse 10.

Note 1. The tree is the sacrificial post (*yûpa*).

MANDALA III, HYMN 5.

ASHTAKA II, ADHYĀYA 8, VARGA 24-25.

1. Shining Agni has awoke over against the Dawns, the priest who traces the footsteps of the sages¹. With his broad stream of light kindled by the pious, the carrier (of the gods) has opened the two doors of darkness.

2. Agni has grown strong by praises, by the speeches of the praisers, by hymns, the adorable one. Loving many aspects of *Rīta* the messenger has shone up at the bursting forth of the Dawn.

3. Agni has been established among the tribes of men, the son of the waters, *Mitra*¹, acting in the right way. The delightful, worshipful one has reached the top; the priest has become one who should be invoked by prayers.

4. Agni becomes *Mitra*¹, when he has been kindled; he the *Hotri* (Agni becomes) *Mitra*; he, *Gâtavedas*, (becomes) *Varuṇa*. The quick *Adhvaryu*, the domestic (god, Agni, becomes) *Mitra*, the *Mitra* (i.e. friend or ally) of the rivers and of the mountains.

5. He observes the deceiver's dear summit¹, the footstep of the bird¹; the vigorous one² observes the course of the Sun. Agni observes at his (?) navel the seven-headed (song?)³; tall (Agni) observes the enjoyment of the gods.

6. The *Ribhu*¹ has created for himself a good name worthy of being magnified, he, the god who knows all laws. The skin of the herbs², the bird's footstep³ rich in ghee: Agni watches (all) that, never failing.

7. Agni has approached the place¹ rich in ghee (the altar), with broad passages, (the place) longing (for him), longing (himself). He the resplendent, bright, tall purifier has made his two parents² new again and again.

8. As soon as born he has grown by the grass¹, when the sprouting (grass-)blades strengthen him with ghee. Like waters beautiful on their precipitous path, Agni, being in the lap of his parents, has escaped into wide space.

9. Receiving praise the vigorous one¹ has shone forth with his fuel, on heaven's summit, on the earth's navel. May Agni worthy of being magnified, (being) Mitra and Mâtarisvan, the messenger, carry hither the gods that they may receive our sacrifice.

10. The tall one has, by (receiving) fuel, upheld the firmament, Agni, becoming the highest of lights, when Mâtarisvan for the sake of the Bhṛīgu¹ kindled the carrier of oblations, (Agni) who dwelt in secret.

11 = III, 1, 23.

NOTES.

The same *Rīshi* and metre.—No verse occurs in the other *Samhitās*.

Verse 1.

Note 1. On pada-vī, comp. Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, I, 299.

Verse 3.

Note 1. Mitra has here and in verse 4 two meanings: it is the name of the god Mitra, with whom Agni is identified (Bergaigne, *Religion Védique*, III, 134 seq.), and it means also 'friend' or 'ally' (comp. H. O., *Religion des Veda*, 186, note 1). See von Bradke, *Dyāus Asura*, p. 13.

Verse 4.

Note 1. See verse 3, note 1.

Verse 5.

Note 1. All this is very enigmatical. In the parallel passage, IV, 5, 8, we have, instead of *ripáh ágram*, the reading *rupáh ágram*, which is confirmed by verse 7 of the same hymn (*ágre rupáh*) and by X, 13, 3 (*páñka padáni rupáh ánu aroham*); in support of the reading *ripáh*, on the other side, the verse, X, 79, 3 (*ripáh upásthe antáh*), may be quoted. The meaning of *rúp* is unknown; *rip* means 'deceit' and 'deceiver:' but what is the summit of the deceiver? Bergaigne (*Religion Védique*, II, 77 seq.) has tried to solve the riddle, but it is really hopeless.—The meaning of the following words, *padám véh*, is not quite so obscure; there is at least some probability that the bird is Agni himself (cf. below, III, 7, 7), or possibly the sun. The latter explanation is advocated by Prof. Max Müller, who writes: 'May it not be a description of sunrise? *priyam ripah agram* I do not understand; but *padam veh* is the place of the bird, as in I, 130, 3. *veh na garbham*, the nest of the bird or of the sun. This nest is covered by a stone, is in fact the *vraga*, which has to be opened to let out the light of day. It is also the *yoni* or the altar. *Ripah agram* may possibly be the summit of the *Pani* or of *Vritra*, X, 79, 3.'

Note 2. See above, I, 36, 1, note 2.

Note 3. *Saptá-sirshan* ('seven-headed') occurs again in two other passages of the *Rig-veda* (VIII, 51, 4, and X, 67, 1); in both it is an epithet of words which signify 'hymn' or 'prayer' (*arká, dhî*). Possibly a similar word should be supplied here. But why are the prayers called 'seven-headed?' Does this refer to unknown technicalities of the Vedic liturgy? Does it stand in connection with the seven tones of the scale, with the expression *saptá dhítayah*, with the number of the seven *Hotris*? 'Celui qui a sept têtes est sans doute un personnage équivalent à lui seul au

groupe des sept prêtres,' says Bergaigne (II, 145), which is very ingenious, but should not be given as a doubtless fact. —Prof. Max Müller observes that saptasīrshan may be, like saptāsya, the vraga of *Pāzi*, opened by Agni, IV, 51, 4, and that *Bṛihaspati* is called saptāsya, IV, 50, 4, and saptagu, X, 47, 6.

Verse 6.

Note 1. Agni is here called *Rībhū* in his quality as a skilful artisan. See Bergaigne, *Religion Védique*, II, 408.

Note 2. There seems to be no doubt that *sasá* (comp. *sasyá*) means 'herb' or possibly 'grain' in X, 79, 3; the text there has *sasám ná pakvám*; comp. I, 66, 2. *yávaḥ ná pakváḥ*. The same meaning is quite admissible in I, 51, 3; V, 21, 4; VIII, 72, 3; though these passages are too uncertain for deciding anything. I cannot find any reason for believing that we have here and in IV, 5, 7; 7, 7 (see below), another word derived from the root *sas*, and meaning 'the sleeper.' At all events I neither pretend to know what mysteries are hidden under the 'skin of the herbs,' nor what stories may have happened to the 'peau du dormeur' (Bergaigne, II, 78 seq.).

Note 3. See verse 5, note 1.

Verse 7.

Note 1. *Yónim*, literally 'womb.'

Note 2. Probably Heaven and Earth.

Verse 8.

Note 1. Prof. Max Müller refers this to the grass of the *barhis*, or the tender blades in which the spark is caught and kept alive by ghee.

Verse 9.

Note 1. Comp. above, I, 36, 1, note 2.

Verse 10.

Note 1. I have adopted, though I do not believe it certain, Grassmann's opinion on the meaning of *pári* in this connection. Comp. H. O., *Religion des Veda*, 123, note 4.

MANDALA III, HYMN 6.

ASHTAKA II, ADHYĀYA 8, VARGA 26-27.

1. Bring forward, ye pious singers, stirred in your thoughts¹, (the ladle) which is turned towards the gods. Carrying (the sacrificial butter) from left to right² it turns eastward, rich in strength, bringing the offering to Agni, full of ghee.

2. When born thou hast filled the two worlds, nay thou hast even exceeded them, O friend of sacrifices¹. May, O Agni, thy seven-tongued horses² move along, by the greatness of heaven and earth³.

3. Heaven and Earth the worshipful¹ establish thee as Hotri for the house, whenever the pious human tribes offering food magnify the bright light.

4. (Thou art) seated, the great one, in a firm place¹, between the two mighty Heavens², thou who art longed for—(between) the two united³ never-ageing, inviolable wives, the two juice-yielding milch-cows⁴ of the far-reigning one⁵.

5. Thy, the great (god's) laws, O Agni, are great. Through the power of thy mind thou hast spread out the two worlds. Thou hast become a messenger at thy birth, thou, O bull, the leader of the tribes.

6. Or bind to the pole by means of thy (art of) harnessing the two long-maned, red (horses) of Rīta, that swim in ghee¹, and carry hither, O god, all gods; perform splendid worship, O Gâtavedas!

7¹. Even from heaven thy shining lights have shone; thy splendour follows many resplendent dawns, when the gods, O Agni, praised the cheerful Hotri's work² who eagerly burns in the forests³.

8. Whether it be the gods who rejoice in the wide air, or those who dwell in the heavenly light, or those who are helpful¹, ready to hear our call, and worshipful; or whether the horses of thy chariot, O Agni, have turned themselves hither—

9. Come hither with them, O Agni, on one chariot or on many chariots, for thy horses are powerful. Bring hither, after thy nature, the thirty and the three gods with their wives, and rejoice (in the Soma).

10. He is the Hotri whose sacrifice even the two wide worlds salute over and over again for the sake of prosperity. Turned to the east¹, the two well-established² (goddesses, Heaven and Earth), the righteous, true ones stand as at the sacrifice³ of (Agni) the right-born.

11 = III, 1, 23.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi* and metre.—Verse 1 = TB. II, 8, 2, 5; MS. IV, 14, 3. Verse 9 = AV. XX, 13, 4.

Verse 1.

Note 1. The translation of *mananā* is conjectural, and based only on the etymology. The passage *āt it rāḡānam manānāḥ agrībhūnata*, IX, 70, 3, does not help us much. 'Does not X, 47, 7. *stómāḥ hṛdisprīśaḥ mānasā vakyā-mānāḥ*, indicate the original reading, *mānasā vakyāmānām*?' M. M.

Note 2. The *srúkaḥ* are called *dakshināvrītaḥ*, I, 144, 1. By the word *dakshināvāt* the poet probably intended to designate the ladle also as procuring a *Dakshinā* (sacrificial fee) to the priest.

Verse 2.

Note 1. On *práyagyu*, see M. M., vol. xxxii, p. 335, and Pischel, *Ved. Studien*, I, 98.

Note 2. The flames of Agni.

Note 3. Comp. below, 7, 10. The meaning seems to be: by thy (Agni's) greatness which is equal to that of Heaven and Earth.

Verse 3.

Note 1. I refer *yagñíyāsaḥ*, though it is a plural, to Heaven and Earth. Comp. Delbrück, *Altindische Syntax*, 103.

Verse 4.

Note 1. The *Padapāṭha* has *dhruváḥ*. I think it should be *dhruvé*, comp. II, 41, 5. *dhruvé sádasi úttame . . . āsāte*; IX, 40, 2. *dhruvé sádasi sīdati*.

Note 2. I.e. Heaven and Earth.

Note 3. *Āskra* seems derived from *ā-saḥ* (Joh. Schmidt, *Kuhn's Zeitschrift*, XXV, 71).

Note 4. Or 'the two milch-cows which instantly give milk,' if *sabar-* is to be connected with the Greek *ἄφαρ*; comp. Bartholomae, *Bezenberger's Beiträge*, XV, 17.

Note 5. *Vishṇu* is not the only god who is called *uru-gâyá*, and there is no reason therefore why the epithet should not be referred here to Agni.

Verse 6.

Note 1. Comp. Lanman, *Noun-Inflection*, pp. 402, 413.—See below, IV, 2, 3.

Verse 7.

Note 1. See Geldner, *Vedische Studien*, I, 114 seq.

Note 2. Should the accent be *ápāḥ*? Comp. III, 1, 3, note 3.

Note 3. It is very probable that *usádhak* (comp. III, 34, 3; VII, 7, 2) is an epithet of Agni. We should expect the genitive; *usádhak*, which violates the construction, seems

to stand *metri causa*. Or is *usádhak* an accusative singular neuter, so that the literal translation would be: 'When the gods praised the work, burning in the forests, of the *Hotri*'?

Verse 8.

Note 1. On *ŕma*, comp. Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, I, 223.

Verse 10.

Note 1. Comp. above, II, 2, 7.

Note 2. See Windisch in the *Festgruss an Boehtlingk*, p. 114.

Note 3. There is one syllable above the number; the metre and meaning would be all right if we were to read *adhvaré* (for *adhvaréva*): '(the two goddesses) stand at the sacrifice,' &c. Prof. Max Müller explains: '*Adhvarā-iva*, like two sacrifices, like two sacrificial altars, *barhis*.'

MANDALA III, HYMN 7.

ASHTAKA III, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 1-2.

1. They who have risen out of the drink of the white-backed one, have entered the two parents, the seven sounds. The (all-)encompassing parents come together; they go forth to aspire after long life¹.

2. The milch-cows dwelling in heaven¹ are the mares of the manly one. He has bestridden the goddesses who carry the sweet (food)². Thee who livest in peace in the abode of *Rita*, the one cow³ circumambulates, making her way.

3. He has mounted the (mares)¹ that became well-manageable, the wise lord, the finder of riches. He with the dark blue back, with many faces, has made them depart from the drink of the brush-wood².

4. Giving mighty vigour to the never-ageing son of *Tvashtri*¹, the streams² carry Him the firmly fixed one. Flashing in his abode with his limbs he has entered upon the two worlds as if they were one.

5. They know friendship towards the manly, the red one, and they delight in the command of ruddy (*Agni*), (the gods) shining from heaven, resplendent with bright shine, to whose host I/Â belongs, the mighty praise.

6. And finding it out by following the noise they brought to the great one's great parents a song of praise, when the bull about nightfall (?) has grown strong according to the singer's own law¹.

7. With the five Adhvaryus the seven priests watch the beloved footstep which the bird has made¹. Turned forwards the never-ageing bulls² rejoice: for they, being gods, have followed the laws of the gods.

8 = III, 4, 7.

9. The many (mares) are full of desire for the mighty stallion. For the manly, bright one, the reins easily direct (the horses)¹. Divine Hotri! Thou who art a great joy-giver and wise, bring hither the great gods and the two worlds².

10. The dawns, O wealth-giver, the mighty sacrificers¹, well spoken and bright have shone with wealth. And by the earth's greatness², O Agni, forgive us even committed sin³, that we may be great.

11 = III, 1, 23.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi* and metre.—No verse of this hymn occurs in the other *Samhitās*.

Verse 1.

Note 1. On the meaning of this difficult verse conjectures only can be given. The white-backed one may be Agni. If this is right, 'they who have risen out of Agni's drink,' may be Agni's rays or flames (*ye rasmayah . . . prakarshenodgakkhanti*, *Sâyana*); these flames enter upon the two mothers, i.e. Heaven and Earth, and upon the seven sounds, the sacrificial songs which are identified with the terrestrial and celestial seven rivers (comp. above, III, 1, 6). All this rests on the supposition that the traditional text is correct. Now Ludwig remarks with reference

to the pronoun *yé*: 'Warscheinlicher ist, dass wir hier eine archaistische anwendung der form auf *e* für fem. vor uns haben,' and Griffith says that *yé* is 'apparently used for the feminine.' I do not believe in this possibility, but for *yé* (*yá*) the true reading may be *yā(h)*. In this case the seven *vānis* would be subject: 'They who have risen out of the drink of the white-backed one, the seven sounds have entered the two parents.' The meaning of this may be: The sacrificial songs, rising as it were out of the offering made to Agni, and in the same way the streams of water which, in the shape of clouds of smoke rise out of the offering (comp. I, 164, 51), have gone to Heaven and Earth.

That the parents in the third Pāda are again Heaven and Earth is shown by X, 65, 8. *parikshítā pitárā . . . dyāvāpr̥ithivī*. It may be observed that the author of X, 65 (see especially the verses 6-8) evidently imitated the expressions of the hymn, III, 7. 'The coming together of Heaven and Earth marks the beginning of the day and of the year.' M. M.

Verse 2.

Note 1. On *divákshas*, comp. Joh. Schmidt, *Pluralbildungen der Neutra*, 417 seq.

Note 2. The milch-cows, mares, or goddesses seem to be the celestial waters or Dawns.

Note 3. Comp. X, 65, 6, quoted at the end of this note. Is the cow (*Vāh*, according to *Sāyana*) the Dawn which daily returns in her due way? Or the butter offered to Agni? In our verse and in the parallel passage, X, 65, 6, the *vartanī* of the cow is mentioned; it may be observed that the *vartanī* of Ushas is referred to in X, 172, 1. 4. And Ushas is represented in I, 123, 9 as coming to the *nishkr̥itā*: comp. X, 65, 6. *yā gaúh vartanīm pari-éti nishkr̥itām*.

Verse 3.

Note 1. See verse 2.

Note 2. The meaning may possibly be the following. The Waters dwell in the plants as their sap (comp. H. O.,

Religion des Veda, 113). Agni, when burning or drinking as it were, the brushwood, destroys this dwelling of the Waters; he makes the Waters depart from the wood.

Verse 4.

Note 1. On Agni as the son of Tvashtri, see Hillebrandt, *Vedische Mythologie*, I, 522 seq.

Note 2. 'Could vahátaḥ be the suyámāḥ of verse 3?' M. M.

Verse 6.

Note 1. Or, 'when the singer's bull . . . has grown strong according to his own law'? The bull, of course, is Agni.

Verse 7.

Note 1. See above, 5, 5. 6.

Note 2. The flames of Agni?

Verse 9.

Note 1. Rasmáyaḥ, 'the reins,' at the same time means 'the rays' (of Agni). Suyámāḥ being an apposition to rasmáyaḥ, one is tempted to derive it from the root yam, 'to direct,' but it may contain the word yāma, 'the way,' and mean 'having a good way.'—It is difficult to believe that rasmáyaḥ suyámāḥ is a second subject of vrishâyánte, in which case the translation would be: 'The many (mares) are desirous of the mighty stallion, the . . . reins (or rays) of the manly, bright one.'

Note 2. 'Bring hither to the two worlds the great gods.' M. M.

Verse 10.

Note 1. On prīkshá-prayagaḥ, comp. M. M., vol. xxxii, p. 335; Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, I, 98.

Note 2. The meaning seems to be: By thy greatness which is equal to that of the earth.

Note 3. Comp. X, 63, 8. kṛitāt ákṛitāt énaśaḥ. See also I, 24, 9; VI, 51, 8.

MANDALA III, HYMN 8.

ASHTAKA III, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 3-4.

1. The worshippers of the gods anoint thee at the sacrifice, O lord of the forest¹, with heavenly honey². When standing upright bestow wealth (on us) here, or when abiding in this mother's lap³.

2. Situated in front of the kindled (fire), accepting our sacred spell which protects from old age and gives valiant offspring, driving away far from us lack of thoughts¹, rise up² for the sake of great prosperity.

3. Rise up, O lord of the forest, on the summit of the earth. Erected by skilful erection bestow splendour on (the worshipper) who fits out the sacrifice as a vehicle¹.

4. A well-clothed youth dressed has come hither. He becomes more excellent when born¹. Wise sages full of pious thoughts, longing for the gods in their mind, bring him forth.

5. He who has been born is born¹ in the auspiciousness of days, growing up in the assembly and at the sacrifice². Wise, active men purify him by pious thoughts; the priest approaching the gods raises his voice³.

6. You whom the worshippers of the gods have fastened down (in the earth), or whom the axe has fashioned, O lord of the forest: may those divine posts¹ standing (here) take care to bestow on us treasures with offspring.

7. (The posts) which have been hewn on the earth and fastened down, and to which the sacrificial

ladles have been raised¹: may they, giving bliss to our fields², eagerly seek precious goods for us among the gods.

8. May the Âdityas, the Rudras, the Vasus, the good leaders, Heaven and Earth, the Earth¹ and the Air—may the gods unanimously bless this sacrifice; may they raise up the banner of the sacrifice (the Yûpa).

9. Like swans ranging themselves in rows, arraying themselves in brightness the sacrificial posts have come to us. Led up by the sages they go forward as gods to the abode of the gods.

10. Like horns of horned animals the sacrificial posts with their head-pieces¹ are seen on the earth. Hearing (us) in the emulating call of the invoking (priests) may they protect us in the racings of battles.

11. O lord of the forest, rise with a hundred branches; may we rise with a thousand branches (offspring)—thou whom this sharpened axe has led forward to great prosperity.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi*. The metre is Trishṭubh (verses 3 and 7 Anushṭubh).

This Sûkta is a collection of liturgical verses that refer to the erecting and anointing of the sacrificial post, and to the winding of a rope about it. See Aitareya Brâhmaṇa II, 2; Âsvalâyana Srautasûtra III, 1, 8 seq.; Sâṅkhâyana Srautasûtra V, 15, 2 seq.; Schwab, Das Altindische Thieropfer, 68 seq.; Bergaigne, Recherches sur l'Histoire de la Liturgie Védique, 16. On the ritual acts referring to the sacrificial post which seem to be connected with ancient

tree-worship, comp. also H. O., Religion des Veda, 90 seq., 256.—Verses 1–5 = TB. III, 6, 1, 1, 3; MS. IV, 13, 1. Verse 3 = MS. I, 2, 11. Verse 4 = TĀ. I, 27, 2. Verse 10 = TB. II, 4, 7, 11. Verse 11 = TS. I, 3, 5, 1; VI, 3, 3, 3.

Verse 1.

Note 1. The tree of which the sacrificial post is made.

Note 2. The post is anointed with butter, see Schwab, l. c., 69. This butter is spoken of as honey also in the Yagus, which refers to this rite, 'May the god Savitri anoint thee with honey,' Taittirīya Saṃhitā I, 3, 6, 1.

Note 3. In the lap of the mother Earth.

Verse 2.

Note 1. Āmati has nothing to do with the verb am; it is the contrary of matī. See Rig-veda IV, 11, 6. āmatim . . . āmhaḥ . . . duḥmatīm; X, 33, 2, and such passages of the younger Vedic Saṃhitās as Vāg. Saṃh. XVII, 54 (āpa āmatim duḥmatīm bādhamânâḥ). The same is the opinion of Geldner (Ved. Studien, II, 184, note 4).

Note 2. The sacrificial post is addressed.

Verse 3.

Note 1. Comp. below, III, 24, 1.

Verse 4.

Note 1. The sacrificial post, round which a rope of grass (Schwab, Thieropfer, p. 49) is tied, is compared here with a well-dressed youth. This seems to contain an allusion to the Upanayana ceremony, at which the youth was invested with the sacred girdle, and which was considered as a second birth (comp. Pāda B: 'He becomes more excellent when born'). There is no doubt that this rite is as old and older than the Rig-veda; see H. O., Religion des Veda, 466 seq. It may be noted that several Grihya-sūtras prescribe the use of our verse at the Upanayana (Āśvalāyana I, 20, 9, &c.).

Verse 5.

Note 1. Does this expression refer again to the second birth (see the preceding note)?

Note 2. The text has *vidát*he.

Note 3. Comp. V, 76, 1. *út víprānām devayā́h vā́kaḥ asthuḥ*. The conjecture *devayām* easily suggests itself, but it is not necessary.

Verse 6.

Note 1. In the Rig-veda, *sváru* means the sacrificial post itself, not, as in the later ritual texts (Schwab, Thieropfer, pp. 11, 74), that splinter of the wood of the sacrificial post (*yûpasakala*), with regard to which Kâtyâyana (VI, 3, 17) prescribes: 'Yûpasakalam asyām (scil. rasanâyām) avagûhati.' 'He hides the splinter of the wood of the sacrificial post in the rope (tied round the post).'—See Weber, *Indische Studien*, IX, 222.

Verse 7.

Note 1. Comp. below, IV, 6, 3.

Note 2. Comp. VIII, 71, 12. *kshaîtrâya sâdhase*.

Verse 8.

Note 1. The Earth is mentioned twice, firstly together with the Heaven, in the compound *Dyāvâ-Kshâmâ*, and then separately as *Prîthivî*.

Verse 10.

Note 1. On the wooden head-piece of the sacrificial post (*kashâla*), see Schwab, *Das Thieropfer*, p. 9.

MANDALA III, HYMN 9.

ASHTAKA III, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 5-6.

1. We, thy friends¹, have chosen thee for our protection, (we) the mortals (thee) the god, the offspring of the Waters, the blessed one with fine splendour², who gloriously advances, the unmenaced one.

2. When thou, finding pleasure in the wood, hast gone to thy mothers, the Waters, that return of thine, Agni, (to this world) should not be slighted, when dwelling afar thou hast come hither.

3. High above (all) pungent sharpness thou hast grown up¹, and verily thou art kind-hearted. Some go forward here and there ; others sit around thee, in whose friendship thou abidest².

4. He who has passed beyond (all) failures, beyond all hindrances¹, the guileless, watchful ones² have found him as a lion (is found), when he had gone into the Waters ;

5. He who had run as it were by his own might, Agni, who thus dwelt in concealment—Him Mâtarisvan brought hither from afar, from the gods, when he had been produced by attrition (of the woods).

6. (And thus) the mortals have taken thee up, O carrier of sacrificial food towards the gods¹, because thou, O (god) belonging to Manus, protectest all sacrifices by the power of thy mind, O youngest one!

7¹. This is something glorious ; herein thy wonderful power shows itself even to the simple, that the cattle lie down round about thee when

thou hast been kindled, O Agni, at the approach of darkness².

8. Make your offerings in (Agni), the best performer of worship, the sharp one who purifies with his flames¹. Serve ye obediently the god, the quick messenger, the agile, the old, the adorable.

9¹. Three hundred and three thousand gods and thirty and nine did service to Agni. They sprinkled him with ghee and spread out for him the sacrificial grass: then they made him sit down as a Hotri.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi*. The metre is *Br̥hātī*; the last verse is *Trishṭubh*.—Verse 1=SV. I, 62. Verse 2=SV. I, 53. Verse 9=VS. XXXIII, 7; TB. II, 7, 12, 2.

Verse 1.

Note 1. For this expression, compare I, 30, 7; VIII, 21, 2. 9.

Note 2. Comp. VIII, 19, 4. *subhāgam sudīditim*.

Verse 3.

Note 1. Comp. I, 81, 5. *āti vísvam vavakshitha*; 102, 8. *āti idám vísvam bhúvanam vavakshitha*.

Note 2. The different officiating priests seem to be alluded to.

Verse 4.

Note 1. Comp. I, 42, 7. *āti nah saskátaḥ naya*; VII, 97, 4. *parshat nah áti saskátaḥ*; Lanman, Noun-Inflection, 467.

Note 2. The gods who searched for Agni.

Verse 6.

Note 1. For *devébhyaḥ havyaváhana*, comp. X, 118, 5; 119, 13; 150, 1.

Verse 7.

Note 1. Comp. Prof. von Schroeder's translation of this verse, Kuhn's Zeitschrift, XXIX, 205.

Note 2. Regarding apisarvaré, comp. VIII, 1, 29; Geldner, Vedische Studien, II, 178. I cannot adopt the conclusions of Prof. Bloomfield, Contributions to the Interpretation of the Veda, Fifth Series, p. 36. 'Wild animals run away from the fire at night, tame animals are attracted by it.' M. M.

Verse 8.

Note 1. For this Pāda, comp. VIII, 43, 31; 102, 11; X, 21, 1.

Verse 9.

Note 1. This verse is identical with X, 52, 6.

MANDALA III, HYMN 10.

ASHṬAKA III, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 7-8.

1¹. Thee, O Agni, the highest king of human tribes, the god, thoughtful mortals kindle at their worship.

2. Thee, O Agni, the *Ritvig*, the *Hotri*, they magnify at the sacrifices. Shine as the guardian of *Rita* in thy own house¹.

3. He indeed who may worship thee, the *Gâta-vedas*, with fuel, acquires abundance in valiant men, O Agni; he will prosper.

4. May He, the banner of the sacrifices, Agni, come hither with the gods, anointed by the seven *Hotris*¹ for the sake of the man who offers sacrificial food.

5. Bring ye forward an ancient, mighty speech to Agni, the *Hotri*, who is like a worshipper bearing the lights of prayers¹.

6. May our prayers increase Agni, since he is born deserving of praises, the conspicuous one, for the sake of great strength and wealth.

7¹. May Agni, as the best sacrificer at the worship (of men), perform the sacrifice to the gods for the man devoted to the gods. As a joyous *Hotri* thou reignest (passing) beyond (all) failures.

8. Thus, O purifier, shine on us glorious abundance in heroes. Be the nearest (friend) to those who praise thee, for their welfare.

9. Thus the priests full of admiring praise, having awoke, kindle thee, the immortal carrier of sacrificial food, the increaser of strength.

NOTES.

The same *Rīshi*. The metre is *Ushnih*.—Verse 5 = SV. I, 98; TB. III, 2, 11, 1. Verse 7 = SV. I, 100.

Verse 1.

Note 1. The first Pāda is identical with VIII, 44, 19.

Verse 2.

Note 1. Comp. above, I, 1, 8.

Verse 4.

Note 1. The most ancient list of officiating priests at the Soma sacrifice contained seven priests. See H. O., Religion des Veda, 383 seq. Hence Agni is called *saptáhotá*, cf. III, 29, 14.

Verse 5.

Note 1. On *vīp*, see the note on III, 3, 1. As to the 'lights' of the *vipas*, comp. *vākah gyótiḥ-agrāh*, VII, 101, 1, the expression *gyotiḥshoma*—though this word is not known in the Rig-veda—and the materials collected by Bergaigne, Religion Védique, I, 285.

Verse 7.

Note 1. The second Pāda is identical with I, 15, 12.

MANDALA III, HYMN 11.

ASHTAKA III, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 9-10.

1. Agni is the Hotṛi, the Purohita of our worship, he who dwells among many tribes, He knows the sacrifice in due order.

2. He, the immortal carrier of oblations, the Usig¹, the messenger, with satisfied mind, Agni sets himself in motion ² (incited) by the thought (of praying men?).

3. Agni takes heed¹ (of us) by the thought (the prayer?), the banner of the sacrifice, the ancient one; for his purpose triumphs².

4. The gods have made Agni, the old-renowned son of strength, the Gâtavedas, their carrier (towards the sacrifice)¹.

5. Agni the undeceivable one who goes before the human tribes, he is the quick chariot¹, ever new.

6. Overcoming all attacks, He, the uninjured mind (power) of the gods, Agni, is most mightily renowned.

7. Through the vehicle¹ (which carries the gods) towards the delights (of sacrifice), the worshipping mortal attains the dwelling-place² of (Agni) whose flames are purifying.

8. May we, the priests, by our prayers obtain all the blissful gifts of Agni Gâtavedas.

9. Agni! May we win all the best things in (the trials of) strength. In thee the gods have established them¹.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi*. The metre is Gâyatrî.—Verse 2=VS. XXII, 16; TS. IV, 1, 11, 4; MS. IV, 10, 1. Verses 5, 7, 6=SV. II, 9c6-9o8. Verse 5=TB. II, 4, 8, 1.

Verse 2.

Note 1. Comp. Bergaigne, *Religion Védique*, I, 57 seq.

Note 2. On the intransitive use of *rinvāti*, comp. Gae-dicke, *Der Accusativ im Veda*, p. 53.

Verse 3.

Note 1. The meaning seems to be that Agni is intent on his purpose (*ártham*, Páda 3); comp. I, 10, 2. *tát índrah ártham ketati*.

Note 2. Comp. Neisser, *Bezzenberger's Beiträge*, XX, 42.

Verse 4.

Note 1. See the note on I, 127, 8.

Verse 5.

Note 1. On Agni considered as a chariot, see Bergaigne, *Religion Védique*, I, 144.

Verse 7.

Note 1. Comp. I, 127, 8, note 1.

Note 2. Comp. above, III, 2, 6.

Verse 9.

Note 1. I.e. all the best things (Páda 1); comp. VI, 5, 2. *tvé vásūni . . . á írire yagñlyâsah*.

MANDALA III, HYMN 12.

ASHTAKA III, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 11-12.

TO INDRA-AGNĪ.

1. Indra-Agnī, in consequence of our prayers come hither to the pressed (Soma), to the precious cloud¹. Drink of it incited by our thoughts (i.e. by our prayers).

2. Indra-Agnī, the brilliant¹ sacrifice of him who praises you goes forward together (with the Soma libations, the praises, &c.). Thus drink this pressed (Soma)!

3. By this stirring sacrifice I choose Indra and Agni who show themselves as sages¹; may they here satiate themselves with Soma.

4. I call the bounteous¹, the killers of foes², the united conquerors, unconquered, Indra-Agnī, the greatest winners of booty.

5. The praisers rich in hymns, knowing all the ways (of the sacrifice), laud you. Indra-Agnī, I choose the food (which you give).

6. Indra-Agnī, you have hurled down by one deed the ninety strongholds together of which the Dâsas were the lords.

7. Indra-Agnī, the thoughts (of the worshippers) go forward towards (you) from the work (of sacrifice) along the paths of *Rita*.

8. Indra and Agni, yours are powerful abodes and delights. You cross the waters: this is the deed which belongs to you¹.

9. Indra and Agni, you display the lights of heaven in your deeds of strength; that mighty deed of yours has been known far and wide.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi* and metre. The hymn is addressed to the couple Indra and Agni.—Verses 1–3=SV. II, 19–21. Verse 1=VS. VII, 31; TS. I, 4, 15, 1; MS. I, 3, 17. Verses 4–6=SV. II, 1052–1054. Verses 5–8=SV. II, 925–928. Verse 5=MS. IV, 11, 1. Verse 6=TS. I, 1, 14, 1; MS. IV, 10, 5. Verses 9, 7, 8=SV. II, 1044–1045. Verse 9=TS. IV, 2, 11, 1; 3, 13, 8; TB. III, 5, 7, 3; MS. IV, 10, 4; 11, 1.

Verse 1.

Note 1. ‘Cloud,’ of course, means that which comes from the cloud. In the Soma hymns of the ninth *Mandala*, the word *nábhaḥ* seems frequently to refer to the water with which the Soma is mixed (see IX, 69, 5; 71, 1. 3; 74, 4; 83, 5; 86, 14; 97, 21; Prof. Hillebrandt’s opinion on these passages is different, see his *Vedische Mythologie*, I, 212). Perhaps we should go too far in believing that in our verse the poet invited the gods to come and drink that water, but possibly the mixture of water and of the juice of the Soma plant descending from heaven and nourished by the heavenly waters represented itself to the poet’s mind as something coming from, and thus being identical with, the cloud.

Verse 2.

Note 1. On *kétanaḥ*, Prof. Max Müller remarks, ‘perhaps which appeals to you . . . so that they take note of it.’

Verse 3.

Note 1. There may be doubts about *kavikkhádā*. Prof. Max Müller remarks, ‘is it, wishing for sages?’ I think that my translation is recommended by X, 81, 1. *prathamakkhát*.

Verse 4.

Note 1. Comp. I, 169, 5. *rāyaḥ* *torātamāḥ*; VIII, 38, 2. *torāsā* *rathayāvânâ* . . . *īndrāgnî*, and Brugmann in Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, XXIV, 24.

Note 2. Or, the killers of *Vṛitra*.

Verse 8.

Note 1. On *aptúr* and *aptūrya*, comp. Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, I, 122 seq., and H. O., *Göttingische Gelehrte. Anzeigen*, 1889, 4 seq.

MANDALA III, HYMN 13.

ASHTAKA III, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 13.

1. To this god Agni I sing¹ for you most powerfully. May he come to us with the gods; may he, the best sacrificer, sit down on the sacrificial grass.

2. The righteous one to whose skill the two worlds (Heaven and Earth) and (all) blessings cling—Him the men rich in offerings magnify, Him those who long for gain, that they may obtain his blessing.

3. He, the priest, is the guide of these (men)¹, and he indeed (is the guide) of sacrifices. Praise ye this Agni who is the giver, the winner of wealth.

4. May this Agni give us most blissful shelter for our (sacrificial) feast, whence he may shower wealth on us in heaven, the (human) dwellings¹, and in the waters.

5. The singers kindle Agni, the *Hotri*, the lord of the tribes, the brilliant, the wonderful, with his excellent thoughts¹.

6. And mayst thou, the best invoker of the gods, help us in our spell, in our hymns. Shine bliss on us, Agni whom the Maruts strengthen¹, the greatest winner of thousandfold (wealth).

7. Now bestow on us thousandfold wealth with offspring and prosperity, splendid, most powerful, and undecaying abundance in heroes, O Agni!

NOTES.

The *Rishi* is *Rishabha Vaisvâmitra*. The metre is *Anushṭubh*.—Verses 6, 7=MS. IV, 11, 2.—Comp. concerning this hymn, *Aitareya Brâhmaṇa* II, 40.

Verse 1.

Note 1. *Arka* (*arkâ*) may be first or second person. Comp., for instance, VI, 16, 22. *prâ vaḥ sakhâyaḥ agnâye stómam . . . ârka gâya ka vedhâse*; X, 50, 1. *prâ vaḥ mahé . . . ârka* (*Samhitâp. ârkâ*) *visvânârâya visvabhûve*, and see Benfey, *Die Quantitätsverschiedenheiten in den Samhitâ- und Pada-Texten der Veden*, III, p. 8.—On the metre of the second *Pâda*, comp. my *Prolegomena*, p. 188.

Verse 3.

Note 1. Perhaps we should supply, on account of the preceding nominative, *vîpraḥ* ('priest'): of these (priests).

Verse 4.

Note 1. *Kshitîbhyaḥ* seems to me to be co-ordinated with *divî* and *apsû á*; comp. X, 89, 11. The locative *kshitîshu* would not have suited the metre as well as the dative. Prof. Max Müller proposes to translate: 'Whence he may shower wealth on our dwelling, whether he be in the sky or in the waters.'

Verse 5.

Note 1. Comp. X, 172, 2. *á yâhi vásvyâ dhiyâ*.

Verse 6.

Note 1. Comp. *Sâṅkhâyana Srautasûtra* VIII, 16. *indrah marutvân . . . marutstotraḥ marudganaḥ marudvridhaḥ marutsakhâ*.

MANDALA III, HYMN 14.

ASHTAKA III, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 14.

1. The joy-giving Hotri has taken his place at the sacrifices¹, He the true, the sacrificer, the highest sage, the worshipper. Agni whose chariot is lightning, the son of strength, whose hair is flame, has spread forth his light over the earth.

2. It¹ has been offered to thee—be pleased with the adoring speech²—to thee who is observant of it, O righteous, strong one. Bring hither thou who art wise, the wise (gods). Sit down on the sacrificial grass in the middle (of it) for bliss, O worshipful one!

3. To thee, Agni, Night and Dawn who further thy strength¹, shall hasten on the paths of the wind. When (the mortals) anoint the ancient one² with offerings, they³ stand in the house as on a chariot-seat⁴.

4. Mitra and Varuṇa, O strong Agni, and all the Maruts shall sing to thee a pleasant song, when thou, O son of strength, standest with thy flames, a sun spreading out men¹ over the (terrestrial) dwellings.

5. We have given thee thy desire to-day, sitting down near thee adoringly with outstretched hands¹: sacrifice thou to the gods as a priest with thy mind most skilled in sacrifice, with unerring thoughts, O Agni!

6. From thee indeed, O son of strength, proceed manifold divine blessings and gains¹. Give us thousandfold true wealth according to thy guileless word, O Agni!

7. What we have done here for thee at this sacrifice, we mortals, O skilful and thoughtful god, take thou notice of all that, O (god) with the good chariot¹; make all this (sacrificial food) here savoury, immortal Agni!

NOTES.

The same *Rishi*. The metre is *Trishṭubh*.—Verse 5 = VS. XVIII, 75.

Verse 1.

Note 1. On *vidátha*, comp. I, 31, 6, note 2.

Verse 2.

Note 1. The subject to be supplied seems to be *námaḥ-uktiḥ*.

Note 2. The words *námaḥ-uktim gushasva* form a parenthesis, as Ludwig has seen.

Verse 3.

Note 1. It is possible that here, as in several other passages, a confusion between the two verbs *vāgáyati* and *vāgayáti* has taken place. If the reading were *vāgayánti*, we should have to translate, 'Night and Dawn who are striving together (as if running a race against each other?).'

Note 2. The ancient one is Agni.

Note 3. The two goddesses, Night and Dawn.

Note 4. The *Padapáṭha* has *vandhúrâ-iva*, which may be the dual of *vandhúr* (I, 34, 9). But more probably it should be *vandhúre-iva* (nom. dual, neuter or loc. sing.), comp. I, 64, 9. *ā vandhúreshu . . . tasthau*; I, 139, 4. *ádhi vām stháma vandhúre*; III, 43, 1. *vandhureshtáḥ*, and see III, 6, 10. *adhvaréva*. On contracted *Pragrihya* vowels, see H. O., *Die Hymnen des Rig-veda*, I, p. 456.

Verse 4.

Note 1. On *nṛīn* and the different theories proposed for this word, see above, I, 146, 4, note 5.

Verse 5.

Note 1. Comp. X, 79, 2. *uttānāhastāh*.

Verse 6.

Note 1. For this hemistich, comp. VI, 13, 1 ; 34, 1.

Verse 7.

Note 1. The traditional text has *tvām vīsvasya surāthasya bodhi*, which can only mean, 'take thou notice of every one who has a good chariot'—which Bergaigne (*Quelques observations sur les figures de rhétorique dans le Rig-veda*, p. 15) explains: 'Le char en question est la prière qui amène le dieu au sacrifice.' I believe that the text is corrupt; instead of *surāthasya* I think we should read *surathāsyā* (= *suratha asyā*).

MANDALA III, HYMN 15.

ASHTAKA III, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 15.

1. Flaming with thy broad stream of light beat away fiends, sorcerers, plagues. May I dwell in the protection of the great, well-protecting (god), under the guidance of Agni who readily listens to our call.

2. Be thou our protector when this dawn shines forth, be thou (our protector) when the sun has risen. Cherish, O Agni, well-born in body, this praise of mine as (a man rejoices) in the birth (of a son), in his own offspring¹.

3. Beholding men, shine thou after many (dawns)¹, O bull, Agni, red in the dark (nights). O Vasu! Lead us and bring us across anguish. Help us, the *Usigs*², to wealth³, thou youngest (of the gods)!

4. Shine, O Agni, thou the invincible bull, who hast conquered all strongholds and all delights, the leader of the first, the protecting¹, mighty sacrifice, O *Gâtavedas*, best guide.

5. O singer, thou who art wise, brightly shining towards the gods¹, bring to us thy many perfect shelters, and gain like a victorious car²; Agni, (carry) thou (hither) towards us the two well-established³ worlds (Heaven and Earth).

6. O bull, increase and rouse our gains. Agni! (Increase) for us the two worlds (Heaven and Earth) rich in milk, O god together with the gods, shining with beautiful shine! May a mortal's hatred never enclose us.

7 = III, 1, 23.

NOTES.

The *Rishi* is Utkīla Kātya, the metre *Trishubh*.—
Verse 1 = VS. XI, 49; TS. IV, 1, 5, 1; MS. II, 7, 5;
III, 1, 6.

Verse 2.

Note 1. Comp. VII, 1, 21. *tānaye nītye*; X, 39, 14. *nītyam ná sūnúm tānayam dádhanāh*, and besides II, 26, 3. *gānena . . . visā . . . gānmanā . . . putrah*; Hirzel, Gleichnisse und Metaphern im Rig-veda, 77.

Verse 3.

Note 1. For this expression, compare IV, 19, 8; IX, 71, 7; X, 31, 7, and especially III, 6, 7; VI, 39, 4.

Note 2. The poet compares himself and his friends with the mythical priestly tribe of the *Usigs* (Bergaigne, *Religion Védique*, I, 57 seq.), using, as it seems, at the same time the word *usgaḥ* in its adjective sense 'the willing ones.'

Note 3. The *Padapāṭha* is right in giving *rāyé*; comp. VIII, 26, 13. *subhé kakráte*.

Verse 4.

Note 1. Is the text correct? I think that *pâyóh* should be corrected into *pāyo* or *pâyúh*: 'the leader and protector of the first mighty sacrifice.' The mistake may have been caused by the genitives which surround the word.

Verse 5.

Note 1. Geldner (*Vedische Studien*, I, 160) translates this hemistich: 'Die vielen sicheren Zufluchtsorte (= Opferplätze) bis zu den Göttern erleuchtend als Weiser, o Sänger.' I do not believe that *sárma* is the object of *dīdyānaḥ*; and 'Zufluchtsorte = Opferplätze' is too much in the style of *Sāyana*. I take *ákkhidrá sárma* as depending on *abhí vakshi*; comp. I, 34, 6. *tridhātu sárma vahatam*.

Note 2. For *abhí vakshi vāgam*, comp. III, 30, 11; VI, 21, 12.

Note 3. On *suméka*, comp. Windisch, *Festgruss an Boehtlingk*, 114.

MANDALA III, HYMN 16.

ASHTAKA III, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 16.

1. This Agni rules over abundance in valiant men, over great happiness. He rules over wealth consisting in offspring and cows; he rules over the killing of foes.

2. O Maruts¹, ye men, cling to this furtherer² who possesses joy-furthering boons—(the Maruts) who³ in battles overcome ill-minded (foes), who have deceived the enemy⁴ day by day.

3. As such, O bounteous Agni, prepare¹ us riches² and wealth in valiant men, which, O highly glorious one, may be most exalted, rich in offspring, free from plagues, and powerful.

4. The maker who victoriously (stands) over all beings, the maker who makes the praise arrive among the gods¹: he stands firm among the gods, among the host of heroes, firm also in the praise of men.

5. Give us not up, Agni, to want of thought¹ nor to want of heroes nor to want of cows, O son of strength, nor to the scoffer. Drive away hostile powers².

6. Help us at this sacrifice, O blessed one, with mighty gain which is accompanied by offspring, O Agni! Let us be united with greater, gladdening, glorious wealth, O thou of mighty splendour!

NOTES.

The same *Rishi*. The metre is *Pragâtha*, each *Pragâtha* distich being composed of one *Bṛihati* and one *Satobṛihati*. The position of the *Sûkta* in the collection and the opening words of verse 3 show that the three *Pragâthas* are not independent, but form one hymn.—Verse 1 = SV. I, 60.

Verse 2.

Note 1. Comp. VII, 18, 25. *imám naraḥ marutaḥ sas-kata ánu*.

Note 2. The passages which Grassmann gives for the meaning of *vr̥dh*, 'stärkend, erquickend,' I, 167, 4; X, 89, 10, are quite doubtful. Probably we should have to alter the accent and read *vr̥dhám*.

Note 3. The relative clause seems to refer to the Maruts, not to the goods (*rāyaḥ*).

Note 4. Comp. VI, 46, 10. *yé . . . sátrum ádabhúḥ*.

Verse 3.

Note 1. Literally, 'sharpen.'

Note 2. The genitive seems, as is also Prof. Ludwig's opinion, to be the partitive genitive, so that the literal meaning would be: 'Prepare us (a deal) of riches and of wealth,' &c. Comp. *p̥ba sutásya*, 'drink of the pressed Soma,' &c.

Verse 4.

Note 1. On *kákriḥ devéshu á dúvaḥ*, comp. IV, 2, 9; VIII, 31, 9.

Verse 5.

Note 1. On *ámati*, comp. above, III, 8, 2, note.

Note 2. Comp. VI, 59, 8. *ápa dvéshāmsi á kr̥itam*.

MANDALA III, HYMN 17.

ASHṬAKA III, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 17.

1. He who is inflamed after the primitive ordinances, is anointed with ointments¹, the giver of all treasures, he whose hair is flame, whose stately robe is ghee, the purifier, skilled in sacrifice, Agni—that he may sacrifice to the gods.

2. As thou hast performed, O Agni, the Hotri's duty for the Earth, as thou hast done it for Heaven, O Gâtavedas, full of intelligence, in the same way sacrifice with this offering to the gods. Prosper this sacrifice to-day as thou hast done for Manus.

3. Thou hast three lives, O Gâtavedas, and three births from the Dawn¹, O Agni! Being wise, sacrifice with these to the favour of the gods, and bring luck and welfare to the sacrificer.

4. Praising Agni full of splendour, full of beauty, we adore thee, O Gâtavedas, deserving to be magnified. Thee the gods have made their messenger, their steward¹, and carrier of offerings, the navel of immortality.

5. O Agni, the Hotri who before thee was an excellent sacrificer, who verily¹ sat down and brought luck by himself²: sacrifice according to his rules, O intelligent one, and set down our sacrifice at the feast of the gods.

NOTES.

The *Rîshi* is *Kata Vaisvâmitra*, the metre *Trishubh*.—
Verse 1 = TB. I, 2, 1, 10. Verse 3 = TB. III, 2, 11, 2;

MS. IV, 11, 1; 12, 5. Verse 4 = TB. III, 6, 9, 1; MS. IV, 13, 5.

Verse 1.

Note 1. Possibly the poet intended to allude also to the other meaning of *aktúbhih*, which means both 'ointments' and 'nights.' The nights render Agni conspicuous and anoint (*añg*) him as it were with beauty. I do not believe that the existence of a Vedic word *aktú*, 'ointment,' should be denied; cf. Bechtel, *Nachrichten d. Göttinger Ges. d. Wiss.* 1894, p. 398.

Verse 3.

Note 1. See Bergaigne, *Religion Védique*, II, 14. Prof. Max Müller translates: Three lives are thine, the dawns are thy three birthplaces, or three dawns are thy birthplaces.

Verse 4.

Note 1. See above, I, 58, 7, note 1.

Verse 5.

Note 1. Literally, 'doubly.' Grassmann is right in observing that the Vedic poets show a certain predilection for the word *dvitá* when speaking of Agni's being established and doing his work at the sacrifice. Prof. Max Müller thinks of Agni's two homes, earth and heaven.

Note 2. On the *Hotri* more ancient than Agni, comp. Bergaigne, *Religion Védique*, I, 109. Probably this simply refers to the Agni or the fire used at former sacrifices.

MANDALA III, HYMN 18.

ASHTAKA III, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 18.

1. Be kind, O Agni, when we approach thee, as a friend a friend, as parents¹, a straight leader. For full of deceit are the tribes of men : burn thou against (all) malign powers so that they turn back.

2. Burn, O Agni, the nearer enemies, burn the curse of the distant evil-doer. Burn, O Vasu, seeing the unseen ones. May thy never-ageing, never-tiring flames¹ spread out.

3. Wishing for (thy blessings), O Agni, by fuel and ghee I offer this sacrificial food for (the attainment of) advancing power and of strength ; worshipping thee with my spell as far as I have power (I offer) this divine prayer for the attainment of hundred(fold blessings).

4. (Shining) forth with thy flame, O son of strength, praised (by us), bestow mighty vigour on those who toil for thee, bright luck and welfare, O Agni, on the Visvāmitras ! We have cleaned thy body many times.

5. Give us treasures, O best gainer of riches : such indeed art thou, Agni, when thou hast been kindled. In the blessed praiser's house thou hast placed, together with wealth, thy mighty(?) arms¹, thy marvellous shapes.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi* and metre.—Verse 2 = TĀ. IV, 5, 5.
Verse 3 = AV. III, 15, 3.

Verse 1.

Note 1. It is rather strange that Agni is compared with the two parents. Generally it is the two Asvins, or Heaven and Earth, or the pair of Indra and Varuṇa, &c., who are compared with father and mother (see Hirzel, *Gleichnisse und Metaphern im Rigveda*, 71 seq.). No doubt in our verse the dual was chosen on account of the metre.—I do not think that Bollensen (*Orient und Occident*, II, 473) and Kirste (*Bezenberger's Beiträge*, XVI, 297) are right in believing that a dative of *pitrī* is found here, and in translating: 'as a good (son) to his father.'

Verse 2.

Note 1. The meaning of *ayāsaḥ* is doubtful; comp. Brugmann in Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, XXIV, 24 seq.; M. M., vol. xxxii, p. 371 (VI, 66, 5); von Bradke, *Festgruss an Roth*, 124.

Verse 5.

Note 1. On *srīprā*, see I, 96, 3, note 3. *Karāsna* must mean something like 'arm,' though the exact meaning is doubtful. In VIII, 32, 10 the compound *srīprākaraśna* occurs. Prof. Max Müller writes: 'Thou hast brightly assumed a body with soft arms or with stretched-out arms, if we do not read *srīprakaraśnā*.'

MANDALA III, HYMN 19.

ASHTAKA III, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 19.

1. I choose Agni as *Hotri* at this sacrificial meal, the clever sage all-knowing and not foolish. May he, the excellent sacrificer, sacrifice for us amid the host of the gods; may he obtain liberal boons (for us) for the sake of wealth and strength.

2. To thee, O Agni, I stretch forth the (ladle) rich in sacrificial food, splendid, full of gifts, full of ghee. From left to right, choosing the host of the gods¹, he has established the sacrifice with gifts and goods².

3. Whoever is favoured by thee, is blessed with the sharpest spirit. Favour him with good offspring, O god rich in favours¹! Agni, may we, (dwelling) in the copiousness of manliest wealth, be rich in perfect praise of thee, the Vasu.

4. On thee indeed, O Agni, sacrificing men have put many faces of (thee) the god¹. Bring hither then the host of the gods, O youngest one, when thou wilt sacrifice to-day to the divine host².

5. When the gods will anoint thee as the *Hotri* at the sacrificial meal making thee sit down for the sacrifice, be thou here, O Agni, our furtherer, and bestow glory on our bodies.

NOTES.

The *Rishi* is Gāthā Kausika, the metre *Trishūbh*.—
Verse 3 = TS. I, 3, 14, 6; MS. IV, 14, 15.

Verse 2.

Note 1. Comp. below, IV, 6, 3. This parallel passage shows that *pradakshinā* belongs to *urānāh*, not to *asret*. Agni is represented as choosing, i.e. inviting the host of the gods by moving around the sacrificial food from left to right. See concerning the *Paryagnikarāṇa*, which seems to be alluded to, Hillebrandt, *Neu- und Vollmondsopfer*, 42 seq.

Note 2. Or, 'with the (divine) givers and with the Vasus.'

Verse 3.

Note 1. Boehtlingk-Roth seem to be right in reading *siksho*. Comp. VIII, 52, 8. *yāsmāi tvām . . . śiksho śikshasi dāśúshe*.

Verse 4.

Note 1. They have inflamed many fires, each of which is a face of the god Agni.

Note 2. Or, 'that thou mayest sacrifice,' &c. See Delbrück, *Syntaktische Forschungen*, I, 148.

MANDALA III, HYMN 20.

ASHTAKA III, ADHYÂYA 1, VARGA 20.

1. The carrier (of the gods)¹ calls by his hymns Agni, Ushas (dawn), the two Asvins, Dadhikrâ² at daybreak. May the gods rich in light, unanimously longing for our sacrifice, hear us.

2. Agni, threefold is thy strength; three are thy abodes; three are thy many tongues, O thou who art born in *Rita*! And three, O Agni, are thy bodies beloved by the gods. With these protect our prayers unremittingly,

3¹. Agni! Many are the names, O *Gâtavedas*, of thee the immortal one, O self-dependent god! And whatever the secret powers of the powerful² are, thou all-enlivener, in thee they have placed together (those) many (powers), O (god) after whose relations men ask³.

4. Agni is the divine leader of the divine tribes like Bhaga, the guardian of the seasons¹, the righteous. May He, the killer of *Vṛitra*², the ancient one, the possessor of all wealth, bring the singer across all troubles.

5. I invite hither¹ Dadhikrâ², Agni, and the goddess Ushas, *Bṛihaspati* and the god *Savitṛi*, the Asvins, Mitra and Varuṇa and Bhaga, the Vasus, Rudras, and *Âdityas*.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi* and metre.—Verse 2 = TS. II, 4, 11, 2; III, 2, 11, 1; MS. II, 4, 4. Verse 3 = TS. III, 1, 11, 6.

Verse 1.

Note 1. The 'carrier' of the gods is the *Hotri*. See above, I, 127, 8, note 1, and compare the article of Dr. Neisser quoted there. See also M. M., vol. xxxii, pp. 40-43 (I, 6, 5).

Note 2. On *Dadhikrâ* or *Dadhikrâvan*, the deified horse of *Trasadasyu*, see Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, I, 124; Ludwig, vol. iv, p. 79; H. O., *Religion des Veda*, 71. Prof. Max Müller writes, 'It seems to me some form of Agni generally in company with matutinal gods.'

Verse 3.

Note 1. The reader who compares this passage with 19, 4, will observe a general resemblance pointing to the conclusion that both verses belong to the same author.

Note 2. *Mâyāh mayínâm* : comp. concerning the idea of *mâyá*, H. O., *Religion des Veda*, 163, 294.

Note 3. With *prishṭabandhu*, comp. *bandhupríkh*, *bandhveshá*.

Verse 4.

Note 1. Perhaps *ritu-páh* should be changed into *rita-páh* : 'the god who protects the *Rita*, the righteous.'

Note 2. Or 'the killer of foes.'

Verse 5.

Note 1. Possibly we have to read, on account of the metre, *ihá hve*.

Note 2. See above, verse 1, note 1.

MANDALA III, HYMN 21.

ASHṬAKA III, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 21.

1. Take this our sacrifice to the immortals; accept graciously these offerings, O *Gâtavedas*. O *Agni*, partake of the drops of fat and ghee, O *Hotri*, having sat down as the first.

2. To thee, O purifier, the drops of fat mixed with ghee drip down. O (god) who followest thy own ordinances, give us the best boon for this feast to which the gods come eagerly.

3. To thee, the priest, O *Agni*, (belong) the drops dripping with ghee, O good one! Thou art kindled as the best *Rishi*. Be a furtherer of our sacrifice!

4. For thee, O liberal one¹, full of power, the drops of fat and ghee drip down, O *Agni*! Praised by the sages thou hast come hither with mighty light. Accept graciously the offerings, O wise one!

5. For thee the richest fat¹ has been taken out from the midst. We give it to thee. On thy skin, O *Vasu*, the drops drip down. Accept them eagerly for each of the gods.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi*. Verses 1 and 4 are *Trishṭubh*, verses 2 and 3 *Anuṣṭubh*, verse 5 *Virâḍrûpâ Satobṛīhatī*.

The hymn belongs to the ritual of the animal sacrifice. It has to be recited, according to the prescription of the later Vedic texts, while the vapâ (omentum) of the sacrificial animal is roasted and the drops of fat drip down from it. See Schwab, *Das Altindische Thieropfer*, p. 114

seq., and the Sûtra texts quoted by him (for instance, *Āsvalâyana Srautasûtra* III, 4, 1). Bergaigne (*Recherches sur l'Histoire de la Liturgie Védique*, 18) seems to be right in observing: 'Bien qu'il (l'hymne III, 21) soit récité tout d'une pièce dans le *pasubandha*, pendant la cuisson de la *vapâ*, pour les gouttes de graisse qui tombent dans le feu, sa complexité métrique . . . le trahit et nous y fait voir une simple collection de vers liturgiques.' It may be observed, however, that the two last verses seem to form a distich of an irregular *Pragâtha* type; comp. H. O., *Die Hymnen des Rigveda*, vol. i, p. 118.—Verses 1–5 = TB. III, 6, 7, 1. 2; MS. IV, 13, 5.

Verse 4.

Note 1. On the word *ádhrigu*, cf. Bloomfield, *American Or. Soc. Proceedings*, March, 1894, p. cxxiii.

Verse 5.

Note 1. *Vapâkhyam havih, Sâyana*. This explanation is evidently correct. After the sacrificial animal has been killed, the omentum, which is very rich in fat, is first drawn out of its body and offered. See H. O., *Die Religion des Veda*, 360 seq.

MANDALA III, HYMN 22.

ASHTAKA III, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 22.

1. This is that Agni with whom the desiring Indra took the pressed Soma into his body. Having obtained thousandfold strength like a horse, a racer¹, thou art praised, O Gâtavedas!

2¹. Thy splendour, O Agni, which dwells in heaven and on earth, in the plants, O worshipful one, and in the waters, wherewith thou hast spread through the wide air—that light of thine is fierce, waving², man-beholding.

3. Agni, thou goest to the floods of heaven. Thou hast spoken to the gods who are liberal (?)¹. (Thou goest) to the waters which (dwell) on high in the ether of the sun, and to those which approach below.

4. May the fires of the soil united with those on the hill-sides¹, without guile graciously accept our sacrifice and plentiful food free from all plague.

5 = III, 1, 23.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi*. The metre is *Trishṭubh*, except in verse 4 which is *Anuṣṭubh*.—A conjecture on the ritual use for which the hymn has been composed, see in the note on verse 4.—Verses 1–5 = VS. XII, 47–51; TS. IV, 2, 4, 2. 3; MS. II, 7, 11.—A sort of commentary on this hymn is found in the *Satapatha Brâhmaṇa* VII, 1, 1, 22 seq.

Verse 1.

Note 1. In the traditional text the words, ‘a horse, a racer,’ are accusatives. But it is the *átya* who attains

(san) the *vāga* and who is called *vāgīn* (comp. M. M., vol. xxxii, pp. 116, 442, and on *sāpti*, *ibid.* p. 102): see I, 130, 6; III, 2, 7; 38, 1 (V, 30, 14; IX, 93, 1; 96, 15, &c.); VII, 24, 5; IX, 43, 5; 82, 2; 85, 5; 86, 3; 96, 20; X, 96, 10 (I, 52, 1, and III, 2, 3 do not contradict this). Pischel (*Vedische Studien*, I, 105) believes that *átyam ná* stands for *átyaḥ ná*, which seems impossible to me. But I think that we should correct the text and read *átyaḥ ná sāptiḥ*. The preceding accusatives have caused the blunder.

Verse 2.

Note 1. Comp. Grassmann, Kuhn's Zeitschrift, XVI, 165.

Note 2. Comp. *ketúḥ arṇaváḥ sūryasya*, VII, 63, 2.

Verse 3.

Note 1. In the translation of *dhīshnya* I have followed Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, II, 87, though this translation is quite uncertain. Should the meaning be: 'the gods who dwell on the *dhīshnya* altars'?

Verse 4.

Note 1. *Agni purishya*, i.e. the fire dwelling in the soil (comp. Roth in Kuhn's Zeitschrift, XXVI, 64), is mentioned very frequently in the Mantras belonging to the *Agnikayana*, i.e. to the construction of the brick altar. *Agni* is considered as residing in the soil used at that rite. Now in the *Yagus* texts the whole of our hymn occurs among the texts to be recited at the *Agnikayana* (*Taitt. Samh.* IV, 2, 4, 2, &c.; comp. also *Āsvalāyana Srautasūtra* IV, 8, 20). Perhaps we may conjecture, therefore, that the *Agnikayana* rite in its simplest form was known already in the *Rig-veda* period, and that our hymn was destined for it.—The *prāvāna* fires (fires dwelling on the hill-sides) may be the fires dwelling in the rivers which run down the *prāvaṇas* or descents.

MANDALA III, HYMN 23.

ASHTAKA III, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 23.

1. Produced by attrition, well preserved in his abode, the young sage, the leader of worship, Agni ever young in the forests¹ that grow old—Gâtavedas, has here assumed immortality².

2. The two Bharatas¹, Devasravas and Devavâta, in the midst of wealth have produced by attrition Agni the skilful (god). Agni, look forth with mighty wealth, and then be² for us a guide of food day by day.

3¹. The ten fingers have brought him to the birth, the ancient, beloved (Agni), well born in his mothers². Praise, O Devasravas, the Agni of Devavâta who³ should be the lord of people.

4. I have laid¹ thee² down in the best (place) of the earth³, in the place of Iâ³, in the auspiciousness of days. O Agni, as the god who has belonged to Manus⁴, shine with wealth on the Drishadvatî, on the Âpayâ, on the Sarasvatî.

5 = III, 1, 23.

NOTES.

The *Rishis* are Devasravas Bhârata and Devavâta Bhârata (see verse 2); the metre is Trishubh (verse 5 Satobrihati).—No verse occurs in the other Samhitâs.

Verse 1.

Note 1. The 'forests' are the fuel. 'Does the poet mean: Never consumed in the consumed wood or forests,

i. e. the fire burns and is kept alive while the wood is burnt up?' M. M.

Note 2. Or, 'he has received the drink of immortality'—which may refer to the ghee offered in the fire.

Verse 2.

Note 1. On the tribe of the Bharatas having their seats, as verse 4 seems to show, on the borders of the Sarasvatî and of the Drishadvatî, see H. O., Buddha (first edition), 413 seq.

Note 2. This is an imperative in -tât, signifying, as Delbrück has shown (*Syntaktische Forschungen*, III, 2 seq.; *Altindische Syntax*, 363), an injunction to be carried out after something else has been done or has happened. Agni is first to look about (*ví parya*), and shall then become (*bhavatât*) a guide of food, i. e. he shall lead plenty of food to the worshipper's house.—Prof. Max Müller translates *ishâm netá*, 'a guide to food.'

Verse 3.

Note 1. Should this *Satobṛīhatī*, standing alone among *Trishūbh* verses, be considered as forming a distich together with verse 2? Comp. H. O., *Die Hymnen des Rigveda*, vol. i, p. 102, note 7.

Note 2. The woods.

Note 3. Agni, not *Devavāta*, is referred to.

Verse 4.

Note 1. Or, 'he has laid.' The form may be first or third person, present or perfect.

Note 2. Agni is addressed.

Note 3. The best place of the earth, the place of *Iṣā* (i. e. of the nourishment coming from the cow, of the ghee offered into Agni) is the sacrificial ground or more especially the spot on which the sacrificial fire is established.

Note 4. Or 'to men.' The *Padapāṭha* has *mānushe*, but *mānushaḥ* seems more probable.

MANDALA III, HYMN 24.

ASHTAKA III, ADHYÂYA 1, VARGA 24.

1. Agni, be victorious in battles ; thrust away the plotters. Difficult to overcome, overcoming malign powers, bestow splendour on (the worshipper) who fits out the sacrifice as a vehicle¹.

2. Agni, thou art kindled with nourishment¹, the immortal offerer of a feast (to the gods). Accept graciously our worship.

3. Agni, wakeful one, son of strength, into whom offerings are poured, sit down with thy splendour on this sacrificial grass of mine.

4. Agni, together with all Agnis, with the gods exalt our prayers and those who are respectful at the sacrifices.

5. Agni, give wealth to the worshipper, abundance in valiant men ; further us¹ that we may be rich in sons.

NOTES.

The *Rîshi* is Visvâmitra, the metre *Gâyatrî*, the first verse *Anushṭubh*. On this combination of a beginning *Anushṭubh* with *Gâyatrî*s following, comp. H. O., *Die Hymnen des Rig-veda*, vol. i, p. 148.—Verse 1 = VS. IX, 37. Verse 5 = TS. II, 2, 12, 6 ; MS. IV, 12, 2 ; 14, 6.

Verse 1.

Note 1. See above, III, 8, 3, and on *yagñávāhas*, I, 127, 8, note 1; Bergaigne, *Religion Védique*, II, 287, note 2.

Verse 2.

Note 1. *Iḥā*: especially designating the nourishment coming from the cow (personified as *Iḥā*), such as ghee.

Verse 5.

Note 1. Literally, 'sharpen us.'

MANDALA III, HYMN 25.

ASHTAKA III, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 25.

1. Agni, thou art for ever the wise son of Heaven and of the Earth, the all-wealthy one. In thy peculiar way¹ sacrifice here to the gods, O intelligent one !

2. Agni, the knowing, obtains (for his worshipper) heroic powers ; he obtains (for him) strength, being busy for the sake of immortality. Bring then the gods hither, O (Agni), rich in food.

3. Agni, the wise, shines on Heaven and Earth, the two immortal goddesses who encompass all people—he who rules through his strength, and who is full of light through adoration.

4. Agni and Indra, come hither to the sacrifice in the house of the worshipper rich in pressed (Soma), never failing, ye two gods, at the drink of Soma.

5. Agni, thou art kindled in the house of the waters, (our) own (god), O son of strength, *Gâtavedas*, who exaltest the abodes (in which thou dwellest) by thy blessing.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi*. Metre, *Virâg*.—Verse 4=MS. IV, 12, 6.

Verse 1.

Note 1. On *rdhak*, see Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, II, 45.

MANDALA III, HYMN 26.

ASHTAKA III, ADHYÂYA 1, VARGA 26-27.

1. With our offerings revering in our mind Agni Vaisvânara, the follower of truth, the finder of the sun—we, the Kusikas¹, desirous of goods, call with our prayers the god who gives rain, the charioteer, the cheerful.

2. We call that beautiful Agni to help us, Vaisvânara, Mâtariśvan the praiseworthy¹; we the men (call) Brîhaspati² for (the worship) of the divine host, the priest who hears us, the guest who swiftly glides along.

3. Vaisvânara, neighing like a horse, is kindled by the women¹, by the Kusikas, from age to age; may this Agni give us abundance in valiant men and in horses and treasures, he who wakes among the immortals.

4. May the Vâgas¹ come forward, the Agnis with their powers. United² they have harnessed the spotted deer for their triumphal procession³. The Maruts, mightily growing, the all-wealthy, make the mountains tremble, the unbeguiled ones.

5. The Maruts who possess the beauty of Agni¹, belong to all races of men. We implore their fierce, strong help. They are tumultuous, the sons of Rudra, clothed in rain, hot-spirited like lions², givers of rain.

6. We implore with our best praises every host, every troop (of the Maruts)¹, the splendour of Agni,

the power of the Maruts. With the spotted deer as horses², with gifts that cannot be taken away, they go to the sacrifice wise in the (sacrificial) ordinances³.

7. Agni am I, by birth *Gâtavedas*. Ghee is my eye; (the drink of) immortality is in my mouth. The threefold song¹ traversing the aerial space, the imperishable *Gharma*², the sacrificial food am I by name.

8. With three purifying strainers he (Agni) purified the song, with his heart the thought, discovering the light. The mightiest treasure he produced by the powers of his own nature, and then he looked over heaven and earth.

9. Carry him who is the inexhaustible spring with a hundred rills, who has knowledge of prayers (?), the father of (every speech) that should be uttered, the roaring one¹, gladly excited in the lap of his parents—carry him the truth-speaking across (all dangers), O ye two worlds!

NOTES.

Visvâmitra is the *Rîshi* of this *Sûkta* with the exception of the seventh verse of which the *Âtman* or *Brahman* is the *Rîshi*. The metre is *Gagatî* verses 1-6, *Trishṭubh* verses 7-9.—Verse 5 = TB. II, 7, 12, 3. Verse 7 = VS. XVIII, 66; MS. IV, 12, 5.

The position of this *Sûkta* in the collection shows that it is to be divided into three independent hymns. This is confirmed by the metre, the first and second of these three hymns being in *Gagatî*, the third in *Trishṭubh*, and also by the contents: the first hymn is addressed to Agni *Vaisvânara*, the second to Agni accompanied by the Maruts, the third contains mystical speculations about the nature and the deeds of Agni.

Verse 1.

Note 1. The Kusikas are identical with the Visvâmitras, or possibly the latter form one branch of the Kusikas ; see H. O., Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, XLII, 209.

Verse 2.

Note 1. On the relation of Mâtârisvan to Agni, see above, I, 96, 4, note 1.

Note 2. *Brîhaspati*, though in his origin distinct from Agni, is here identified with him, like Mâtârisvan.

Verse 3.

Note 1. By the ten fingers. Comp. above, I, 71, 1.

Verse 4.

Note 1. I adopt the interpretation of Bergaigne (*Religion Védique*, II, 405, note 1) and Pischel (*Vedische Studien*, I, 46). *Vāgāh* seems to be the proper name synonym with *Rîbhávaḥ*; the Maruts may be called *Vāgāh* as they are called several times *Rîbhukshānah*. But it is possible that we should have to translate simply, 'May the powers of strength,' &c.; comp. below, 27, 1.

Note 2. Possibly we have to supply, 'united with their spotted deer, with their beauty,' &c.; see II, 36, 2. *yagñāḥ sāmmlâḥ prîshatîbhiḥ rishîbhiḥ*; VII, 56, 6. *sriyâ sāmmlâḥ*. Or the meaning may be, 'the Maruts united with Agni or with the Agnis;' comp. I, 166, 11. *sāmmlâḥ indre*.

Note 3. On *subhé*, see M. M., I, 87, 3, note 2 (vol. xxxii, p. 162).

Verse 5.

Note 1. Or, they receive their beauty through Agni.

Note 2. Of *heshâkratu* the probable explanation has been given by Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, I, 48. See also von Bradke, Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, XXVIII, 297.

Verse 6.

Note 1. Comp. V, 53, 11, vol. xxxii, p. 320.

Note 2. Comp. II, 34, 4, vol. xxxii, p. 302, note 5.

Note 3. The text has vidátheshu.

Verse 7.

Note 1. Comp. VIII, 51, 4. arkám saptásirshânam . . . tridhâtum uttamé padé. Is the song called tridhātu because it is sung by the three Udgâtrîs (singers)? Or because it generally comprises three verses (see H. O., Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, XXXVIII, 453)?

Note 2. The Gharma is the offering of hot milk brought to the Asvins. On the probable meaning of this offering, see H. O., Religion des Veda, 447 seq.

Verse 9.

Note 1. The translation of meḥ (comp. IV, 7, 11; Atharva-veda XI, 7, 5; Taitt. Samh. V, 7, 8, 1) is quite conjectural.

MANDALA III, HYMN 27.

ASHṬAKA III, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 28-30.

1. Forward (goes) your ¹ strength tending heavenward, rich in offerings, with the (ladle) full of ghee. To the gods goes (the worshipper) desirous of their favour.

2. I magnify¹ with prayer Agni who has knowledge of prayers (?), the accomplisher of sacrifice, who hears us, and in whom (manifold wealth) has been laid down.

3. O Agni, may we be able to bridle thee the strong god¹; may we overcome (all) hostile powers.

4. Agni, inflamed at the sacrifice, the purifier who should be magnified, whose hair is flame—him we approach (with prayers).

5. With his broad stream of light the immortal Agni, clothed in ghee, well served with oblations, is the carrier of offerings at the sacrifice.

6. Holding the (sacrificial) ladles, performing the sacrifice they have with right thought pressingly brought Agni hither¹ for help.

7. The Hotri, the immortal god goes in front with his secret power¹, instigating the sacrifices².

8. The strong (horse, i.e. Agni) is set at the races. He is led forth at the sacrifices, the priest, the accomplisher of sacrifice.

9. He has been produced¹ by prayer, the excellent one. I have established² him, the germ of beings, for ever the father of Daksha³.

10. I have laid thee down¹, the excellent one, with the nourishment² of Daksha, O thou who art produced by power, O Agni, thee the resplendent one, O Uṣig³.

11. The priests, eager to set to work the *Rīta*¹, kindle with quick strength Agni the governor², him who crosses the waters³.

12. I magnify¹ the child of vigour at this sacrifice, who shines under the heaven, the thoughtful Agni.

13. He who should be magnified and adored, who is visible through the darkness, Agni, the manly, is kindled¹.

14. Agni, the manly, is kindled, he who draws hither the gods like a horse. The (worshippers) rich in offerings magnify him.

15. We the manly ones will kindle thee the manly (god), O manly Agni who shinest mightily.

NOTES.

The same *Rīshi*. The metre is Gāyatrī.—The position of the hymn in the collection shows that it is to be divided into *Trikas*, and this is confirmed by the ritual use of several of these *Trikas* (see Bergaigne, *Recherches sur l'Histoire de la Liturgie Védique*, 19, note 1). Some of the *Trikas* at least, however, do not seem to form independent hymns; verse 10 very probably stands in connection with verse 9, and the same seems to be the case with verses 12 and 13. Ludwig (IV, 305) and Bergaigne (loc. cit.) consider the whole *Sūkta* as a collection of *Sāmidhenīs* or verses to be recited for each piece of wood thrown into the fire. Comp. Hillebrandt, *Neu- und Vollmondsopfer*, 77.—Verse 1

= TS. II, 5, 7, 2; TB. III, 5, 2, 1; MS. I, 6, 1; IV, 14, 3. Verses 2, 3 = TB. II, 4, 2, 4. 5; MS. IV, 11, 2. Verse 4 = TS. II, 5, 8, 6; TB. III, 5, 2, 3. Verses 5-6 = TB. III, 6, 1, 3; MS. IV, 10, 1 (verse 5 = MS. IV, 11, 2). Verses 7-9 = SV. II, 827-829. Verses 13-15 = SV. II, 888-890; TB. III, 5, 2, 2; AV. XX, 102, 1-3.

Verse 1.

Note 1. Of the priests and sacrificers?

Verse 2.

Note 1. The text has *ī/e*.

Verse 3.

Note 1. Comp. above, II, 5, 1.

Verse 6.

Note 1. Comp. IV, 17, 18. *vayám hí ā te kakrimá sabādhaḥ*.

Verse 7.

Note 1. *Mâyáyâ*: comp. H. O., Religion des Veda, 163, 294.

Note 2. *Vidáthâni*: comp. I, 31, 6, note 2.

Verse 9.

Note 1. This seems to mean, 'he has been set to work.'

Note 2. *Ā dadhe* must be first person (comp. *ní dadhe*, verse 10) for the *bhûtánâm gárbhaḥ* is Agni.

Note 3. Or, the father of intelligence. Daksha is the personified intelligence. Comp. vol. xxxii, p. 245 seq.; Bergaigne, Religion Védique, III, 93 seq.

Verse 10.

Note 1. See above, III, 23, 4.

Note 2. The text has *i/ā*, the same word as in 24, 2.—Prof. Max Müller observes, 'Could it be, *ní tvā dadhe i/ā*, I have placed thee on the altar with nutriment, son of the strength of Daksha?'

Note 3. Or, 'the willing one.'

Verse 11.

Note 1. 'Setting to work the Right (*Rīta*)' means here 'performing the sacrifice.' The sacrifice is considered as a sphere especially pervaded by the power of *Rīta*. Comp. H. O., *Religion des Veda*, 197.

Note 2. Yantúram (comp. *VIII*, 19, 2. agnīm ūishva yantúram; Lanman, 486) must be the same as yantáram (comp. *μάπτρω*? [M. M.] See de Saussure, *Mémoire sur le Système Primitif des Voyelles*, p. 207; but comp. also Kretschmer, Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, XXXI, p. 447). To me it seems to be an accommodation to aptúram, facilitated probably by the influence of the genitive yantúr. See Lanman, *Noun-Inflection in the Veda*, p. 486; Wackernagel in Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, XXV, 287.

Note 3. See Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, I, 122 seq.; H. O., *Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen*, 1889, p. 4 seq.

Verse 12.

Note 1. The text has *ī/e*. In the same way *ī/énya/i* verse 13, *ī/ate* verse 14.

Verse 13.

Note 1. Observe sám idhyate here and verse 14, sám idhīmahi verse 15. The verses 13-15 form one *Trika*.

MANDALA III, HYMN 28.

ASHTAKA III, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 31.

1. O Agni *Gâtavedas*, accept graciously our offering, the sacrificial cake at the morning libation, O god who givest wealth for our prayers.

2. The sacrificial cake, O Agni, has been baked or made ready for thee: accept it graciously, O youngest (god).

3. Agni, accept eagerly the sacrificial cake which has been offered, which has stood overnight. Thou art the son of strength, established at the sacrifice.

4. At the midday libation, *Gâtavedas*, accept here graciously the sacrificial cake, O sage. Agni, the wise ones do not diminish at the sacrificial distributions¹ the portion which belongs to thee, the vigorous one².

5. Agni, at the third libation take joyfully the sacrificial cake, O son of strength, which has been offered. And in thy admirable way place our wakeful sacrifice, blessed with treasures, before the immortal gods.

6. Agni, grown strong, O *Gâtavedas*, accept graciously our offering, the sacrificial cake which has stood overnight.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi*. The metre is *Gâyatrî* in verses 1, 2, 6, *Ushnih* in verse 3, *Trishubh* in verse 4, and *Gagatî* in verse 5.—No verse occurs in the other *Samhitâs*.

This Sûkta and the following are, as their position at the end of the Anuvâka and the number of their verses show, later additions to the original collection. The 28th hymn contains verses destined for the offerings of sacrificial cakes to Agni at each of the three Savanas. Quite in the same way hymn 52, which also belongs to the later additions, refers to sacrificial cakes offered to Indra. The oblation of such cakes to Indra at each Savana is found also in the later Vedic ritual (comp. Kâtyâyana IX, 9, 2 seq.; Weber, Indische Studien, X, 369, 376), and several verses of III, 52 are indicated there as Puronuvâkyâ verses for those very offerings; see Âsvalâyana Srautasûtra V, 4, 2. 3. After each cake-offering to Indra follows the Svishṭakṛit-oblation to Agni: and for these oblations Âsvalâyana (loc. cit. Sûtra 6) prescribes verses 1, 4, and 5 of our hymn, according to the order of the three Savanas. From the text of the hymn it seems to be evident that verses 1-3 have been composed for the first, verse 4 for the second, and verses 5-6 for the third Savana. With this distribution the change of the metres evidently stands in connection. In accordance with the theories of the later Vedic theologians, we have here the Gâyatrî as the characteristic metre of the first, the Trishṭubh of the second, the Gagatî of the third Savana.

Comp. also Âsvalâyana VI, 5, 25, and the very ingenious but at the same time somewhat hazardous observations of Bergaigne, *Recherches sur l'Histoire de la Liturgie Védique*, 16 seq.

Verse 4.

Note 1. The text has vidâtheshu.

Note 2. Comp. I, 36, 1, note 2.

MANDALA III, HYMN 29.

ASHṬAKA III, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 32-34.

1¹. This is the support on which the rubbing (for producing the fire) is performed ²; the creative organ ³ has been prepared. Bring hither the house-wife ⁴; let us produce Agni by rubbing in the old way.

2. In the two fire-sticks dwells *Gâtavedas*, as the germ (lies) safe in pregnant women—Agni who should be magnified ¹ day by day by wakeful men who bring offerings.

3. Place it ¹ skilfully into her who lies extended ². Having conceived she has quickly given birth to the manly one. He whose summit is red—bright is his splendour—the son of *I/â* has been born in the (due) way ³.

4. In the place of *I/â*, on the navel of the earth we will lay thee down, *Gâtavedas*, that thou, O Agni, mayst carry the offerings (to the gods).

5. Rub, ye men, the truthful sage, the wise, the immortal, the fair-faced. Bring forth, ye men, Agni, the banner of sacrifice, the first in the front, the gracious one.

6. When they produce him by rubbing with their arms, he shines forth flaming in the wood like a red race-horse. Like the bright one on the path of the *Asvins* ¹ the unrestrained (Agni) spares the stones, burning the grass ².

7. Agni, when born, shines forth resplendent, the racer, the priest, praised by the sages, the giver of rain, whom the gods placed in the sacrifices, to be

magnified, as the omniscient carrier of the sacrificial offerings.

8. Sit down, O Hotri, in the space which is thine, as the knowing one. Place the sacrifice in the abode of good works (i.e. on the altar). Eagerly longing for the gods thou shalt worship the gods by offerings. Agni, bestow mighty vigour on the sacrificer.

9. Produce a mighty¹ smoke, ye friends. Without fail go forward towards strength. This Agni is the conqueror in battles, rich in valiant men, he by whom the gods have overpowered the Dasyus.

10. This is thy birth-place in due time whence born thou shonest forth ; knowing it, O Agni, sit down on it, and make our prayers prosper.

11. He is called Tanūnapât as the Asura's germ. Narâsamsa he becomes when he is born, Mâtariśvan when he has been shaped in the mother¹. And he has become the rush of the wind in his swift course².

12. Rubbed forth by skilful rubbing, established by skilful establishing, as a sage, O Agni, perform excellent sacrifices. Sacrifice to the gods for him who is devoted to the gods¹.

13. The mortals have generated the immortal one, the . . .¹, advancing one with strong jaws. The ten unwedded sisters² united take care of the man (Agni) when he has been born.

14. He the god of the seven Hotri's shone forth from of old, when he flamed up in his mother's lap, at her udder. Day by day the joyous one never closes his eyes, when he has been born from the Asura's (i.e. of the Heaven's ?) belly¹.

15. The onsets of (Agni) when he attacks his enemies, are like those of the Maruts. (He is) the

first-born (son) of the sacred spell. They know every (fire)¹. The Kusikas have raised their brilliant spell; they have kindled Agni, every one in his house.

16. After we had chosen thee here to-day, O wise Hotri, while this sacrifice was going on, thou hast firmly sacrificed and firmly laboured. Come to this Soma, expert and knowing !

NOTES.

The same *Rîshi*. The prevalent metre is Trishṭubh.—Verses 1, 4, 10, 12 are Anushṭubh; verses 6, 11, 14, 15, Gāgati.

The Sūkta, which belongs to the later additions (see the note on hymn 28), consists of a number of verses and small groups of verses referring to the production of fire by the attrition of the two fire-sticks. The order in which the verses stand does not always agree with the natural order of the ritual acts.—Verse 2 = SV. I, 79. Verse 3 = VS. XXXIV, 14. Verse 4 = VS. XXXIV, 15; TS. III, 5, 11, 1; MS. I, 6, 2, 7; IV, 10, 4; II, 1. Verse 8 = VS. XI, 35; TS. III, 5, 11, 2; IV, 1, 3, 3; MS. II, 7, 3; IV, 10, 4. Verse 10 = VS. III, 14; XII, 52; XV, 56; TS. I, 5, 5, 2; IV, 2, 4, 3; 7, 13, 5; TB. I, 2, 1, 16; II, 5, 8, 8; MS. I, 5, 1; 6, 1; AV. III, 20, 1. Verse 13 = TB. I, 2, 1, 19. Verse 16 = VS. VIII, 20; TS. I, 4, 44, 2; MS. I, 3, 38; AV. VII, 97, 1.

Verse 1.

Note 1. The verses 1-3 a, b have been translated by Muir, *Original Sanskrit Texts*, V, p. 209.

Note 2. On the *adhimanthanasakala*, the piece of wood on which the lower fire-stick is laid, see *Satapatha Brâh-*

mana III, 4, 1, 20. so-dhimanthanam sakalam ádatte agner ganitram asity atra hy agnir gáyate. Schwab, Das Altindische Thieropfer, p. 78 seq.

Note 3. Pragánana seems to be used in the concrete sense as the male organ. As such, the poet may have considered the so-called pramantha in the generation of Agni, which is described as having the shape of the male organ (Schwab, loc. cit., 78 ; see also Roth, Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenl. Gesellschaft, XLIII, 591). It does not seem very probable that the darbhapīṅgūla of which Sáyana thinks should be meant.

Note 4. Sáyana explains this as meaning the Arani (fire-stick), i. e. the lower Arani, the receptacle of the upper fire-stick. In the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa I, 2, 1, 13 the two Aranis are addressed as mahī vispatnī.

Verse 2.

Note 1. The text has *īdyah*.

Verse 3.

Note 1. The upper fire-stick or, more accurately, the pramantha.

Note 2. Comp. above, II, 10, 3. The lower Arani is alluded to, which is considered as a wife and more particularly as the nymph Urvasī (Kātyāyana V, 1, 30, &c.).

Note 3. Prof. Pischel (Vedische Studien, I, 301) takes the genitive *īāyāh* as dependent on vayúne : ' wurde der Sohn geboren am Orte (Wege) der Opferspende.' To me it seems unnatural not to connect *īāyāh* with *putráh*, which words are connected also by the Sandhi (the Samhitā text has *īāyās putró*, not *īāyāh putró*).

Verse 6.

Note 1. For yáman, cf. I, 37, 3 ; III, 2, 14 ; VI, 15, 5. Should not the bright one on the path of the Asvins be the sun? Sáyana thinks of the chariot of the Asvins, which also may be right.

Note 2. Are the stones and the grass identical with the stones and grass-blades occurring in the later ritual of the agnyâdheya and agnimanthana (Satapatha Br. II, 1, 1, 8; III, 4, 1, 21; Kâtyâyana IV, 8, 16, &c.)?

Verse 9.

Note 1. Literally, a manly, strong, or bull-like smoke.

Verse 11.

Note 1. This is a play upon words (Mâtariśvâ and âmi-mîta mâtâri, 'he has been shaped in the mother').

Note 2. Von Bradke (Dyâus Asura, p. 51): des Windes Heerde (?) wird er, wenn er dahingleitet.

Verse 12.

Note 1. This Pâda is identical with I, 15, 12. It is a galita.

Verse 13.

Note 1. The meaning of asremân (comp. X, 8, 2. asremâ vatsâh [i.e. Agni] śmîvân arâvît) is unknown.

Note 2. The ten fingers.

Verse 14.

Note 1. Comp. von Bradke, loc. cit., 50.

Verse 15.

Note 1. Or prathamagâm brâhmanah vîsve it viduḥ: 'all (people) know him the first-born (son) of the sacred spell'? Comp. I, 34, 2. sômasya venâm ânu vîsve it viduḥ.—Prof. Max Müller writes: 'Prathamagâh is the wind, X, 168, 3. It might here refer to the Maruts, who are often said to sing prayers; they know all about Brahman (prayer).'

MANDALA IV, HYMN 1.

ASHTAKA III, ADHYĀYA 4, VARGA 12-15.

1. Thee, O Agni, the gods concordantly have ever set to work as their divine steward ; with this intention¹ they have set thee to work. They have generated² thee, O worshipful one², the immortal among the mortals, the wise, god-loving god ; they have generated every wise, god-loving (Agni)³.

2. Do thou, [O Agni¹,] turn to brother Varuna, towards the gods² with thy kindness³, to (Varuna) who accepts the sacrifice, to the eldest (god) who accepts the sacrifice, the righteous Āditya who supports the (human) tribes, the king who supports the (human) tribes.

3. O friend, turn to thy friend (Varuna), as a wheel of a chariot¹ rapidly (follows) the swift (horse), for our sake, O wonderful one, rapidly. O Agni, find mercy (for us) with Varuna, with the all-brilliant Maruts. Bless (us), O flaming one, that we may propagate ourselves, that we may press onward ; bless us, O wonderful one !

4. Mayst thou, O Agni, who knowest Varuna, deprecate for us the god's anger. Being the best sacrificer, the best carrier (of the gods), flaming, remove from us all hatred.

5. As such, O Agni, be for us the lowest¹ (god) with thy help, our nearest (friend) while this dawn shines forth. Being liberal (towards us), cause, by sacrificing, Varuna to go away from us. Love mercy ; readily hear our call.

6. His, the fortunate god's, appearance is excellent, and most brilliant among mortals. Like the bright, heated butter of the cow (the appearance) of the god is lovely, like the bountifulness of a milch-cow.

7. Three¹ are those highest, true, and lovely births of this god Agni. Being enveloped in the infinite² he has come hither, the bright, brilliant, shining Aryan.

8. He, the messenger, longs for all seats, the *Hotri* with the golden chariot, with the lovely tongue, with the red horses, of marvellous appearance, brilliant, always lovely like an assembly abundant in food.

9. He, the kinsman of sacrifice, has enlightened men¹. They lead him forward by a great rope². He dwells in his (the mortal's) dwelling, accomplishing (his task). The god has obtained the companionship of the mortal.

10. May this Agni, the knowing one, lead us to the god-given treasure which belongs to him¹. That (treasure) which all the immortals have created by their thought, which Dyaus, the father, the begetter (has created): that real (treasure) they have besprinkled².

11. He has been born in the dwellings as the first, at the bottom of the great (air)¹, in the womb of this air², footless, headless, hiding both his ends, drawing towards himself (his limbs?), in the nest of the bull³.

12. The host¹ came forth wonderfully at first, in the womb of *Rita*, in the nest of the bull², lovely and young, of marvellous appearance, and brilliant³. Seven friends⁴ were born for the bull.

13. Here our human fathers have sat down¹,

aspiring after *Rita*². Invoking the dawns³, they have driven out the milch-cows which dwelt in the rock-stable, in the prison.

14. Having rent the rock they cleaned themselves. Others around told forth that (deed) of theirs. Taking . . . as an instrument (?)¹, they sang triumphantly². They found the light; they chanted their prayers.

15. Longing for the cows in their mind, those men, the *Usigs*¹, have opened with godly words the fast-holding, closed rock, which enclosed and encompassed the cows, the firm stable full of cows.

16. They have devised the first name of the milch-cow; they have found the three times seven highest (names or essences) of the mother¹. The hosts², understanding this, acclaimed. The red one³ became visible through the brilliant (milk?)⁴ of the cow.

17. The confused¹ darkness disappeared; the sky appeared in splendour; the shine of the goddess Dawn rose up. The Sun ascended to the wide plains, beholding right and wrong deeds among the mortals.

18. Then, afterwards, being awake they looked around; then they took that treasure given by Heaven, all the gods in all the houses. O *Mitra*, may true (fulfilment) belong to (our) prayer, O *Varuna*!

19. I will address flaming *Agni*, the *Hotri*, the supporter of everything¹, the best sacrificer. He has perforated, as it were, the pure udder of the cows, (and has made flow the milk) purified like the poured sap of the *Soma* shoots.

20. He, the *Aditi* (i. e. the freedom) of all the

worshipful gods, the guest¹ of all men, Agni, choosing (for us) the protection of all gods—may he, Gâtavedas, be merciful.

NOTES.

The *Rîshi* is Vâmadeva, the metre *Trishṭubh*, except in verses 1–3, the metres of which are *Ashṭi*, *Atigagati*, and *Dhṛiti* respectively.—Verses 4–5=VS. XXI, 3–4; TS. II, 5, 12, 3; IV, 2, 11, 3; TB. III, 7, 11, 3; 12, 6; TÂ. II, 4, 4; IV, 20, 3; MS. IV, 10, 4; 14, 17. Verse 20=VS. XXXIII, 16; TB. II, 7, 12, 5.—The hymn has been translated and commented upon by Bergaigne, *Quarante Hymnes du Rig-véda*, p. 11 seq.

This *Sûkta* seems to be composed of two independent hymns. Grassmann believed that the first three verses are the fragment of one hymn, and that verses 4–20 form a second hymn. His reason was that verses 1–3 are composed in metres similar to *Atyashṭi*, while the rest are composed in *Trishṭubh*. I think that he was on the right way, but his opinion should be slightly modified. In verses 1–5 Agni is invoked to appease the anger of *Varuna*; while, on the other hand, no allusion to *Varuna* occurs in verses 6–20. I believe, therefore, that the first hymn should be considered as consisting of verses 1–5; it is composed in the metres of the *Atyashṭi* class (1–3) with two concluding *Trishṭubh* verses (4, 5). The second hymn comprises the verses 6–20. The arrangers of the *Samhitâ*, however, considered these two hymns as one, as is shown by the position which they have assigned to it, before the second *Sûkta*, which has the same number of verses (20) as this first *Sûkta*. Comp. my *Prolegomena*, p. 141.

Verse 1.

Note 1. I.e. with the intention that he should act as the steward of the gods. As to *îti krátvâ*, comp. I, 138, 3. *îti*

krátvâ bubhugrîré. Delbrück, *Altindische Syntax*, p. 530, paraphrases *îti krátvâ* : mit Entschluss 'so sei es.'

Note 2. *Sâyana*, whom *Ludwig* follows, seems to be right in explaining *yagata* as a vocative ('*yaganiya*'), and *ganata* as 3rd plural ('*aganayan*'). *Bergaigne* takes both forms as 2nd plural imperative: 'honorez l'immortel chez les mortels; engendrez le Dieu qui honore les Dieux.'

Note 3. I cannot believe that *Bergaigne* is right in translating *vîsvam âdevam*, 'celui qui honore tous les Dieux.' His theory is that '*vîsvam dépend . . . de â, qui logiquement gouverne le terme devâ à l'accusatif.*'

Verse 2.

Note 1. The metre shows, as *Benfey* (*Vedica und Verwandtes*, p. 19, note 1) has pointed out, that this vocative *agne* is a spurious addition.

Note 2. Should we not read *devâm*? 'Turn to brother *Varuna* with thy kindness, towards the god who accepts the sacrifice.'

Note 3. Or 'for the sake of his kindness,' 'for winning his favour (for the mortals)'? *Sumatî* may be dative; see *Lanman*, p. 382; *Brugmann*, *Grundriss der vergleichenden Grammatik*, II, p. 602. *Comp. I*, 186, 10. *âkkhâ sumnâya vavṛitiya devân*, 'may I turn to the gods for the sake of their favour.'

Verse 3.

Note 1. I believe that *râthyeva* (*Padapâṭha* *râthyâ-iva*) stands for *râthyam-iva*. *Comp. Lanman*, p. 331; *Roth*, *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, XLVIII, p. 681 seq. *Prof. Max Müller* refers *râthyâ-iva* to two horses; he translates: 'O friend, bring hither thy friend, as two swift chariot-horses bring rapidly a swift wheel.'

Verse 5.

Note 1. I.e. the nearest to men.

Verse 7.

Note 1. Literally 'thrice.' But I think that we should correct *trī* ('three'). The same blunder seems to occur in III, 56, 5. *trī sadhāsthā sindhavaḥ trīḥ* (read *trī*) *kavīnām*, 'Three are your abodes, O rivers; three (are those) of the sages.' Comp. also III, 56, 8; I, 116, 4.

Note 2. This seems to mean, in the infinite sky.

Verse 9.

Note 1. *Mánushaḥ* seems to be acc. plur.; comp. VII, 86, 7. *áketayat akítah*, 'he has enlightened the unenlightened ones.' Bergaigne takes *mánushaḥ* as a genitive depending on *yagñābandhuḥ*, 'fils du sacrifice de Manus.'

Note 2. Bergaigne compares IX, 87, 1, where it is said that they lead Soma to the sacrificial grass like a horse by ropes (*ákkhā barhīḥ rasanābhiḥ nayanti*). Sáyana says, *stutirūpayā raggvā*, 'by a rope which has the shape of praises.'

Verse 10.

Note 1. Comp. below, verse 18.

Note 2. I. e. anointed, adorned. 'Poured down.' M. M.

Verse 11.

Note 1. *Maháḥ budhné* seems to mean, *maháḥ rágasaḥ budhné*; comp. *rágasaḥ budhnám*, I, 52, 6; *budhné rágasaḥ*, II, 2, 3; *maháḥ rágasaḥ*, I, 6, 10; *rágasaḥ maháḥ*, I, 168, 6; *mahī rágasī*, IX, 68, 3.

Note 2. With the second Páda, compare IV, 17, 14. *tvaḥáḥ budhné rágasaḥ asyá yónau*.

Note 3. The bull seems to be Agni himself. Comp. verse 12.

Verse 12.

Note 1. The word *sárdha* (or *sárdhaḥ*? see note 3), which in most passages is applied to the host of the Maruts (see vol. xxxii, p. 67 seq.), seems here to refer to the company of the *Āṅgiras* or seven *Rishis*, alluded to in the fourth

Pâda. The seven *Rishis*, 'our fathers' (verse 13), have, with the aid of Agni, rent the mountain and delivered the cows or dawns (verses 13 seqq.; IV, 2, 15 seq.). Comp. H. O., Religion des Veda, p. 145 seq.

Note 2. The bull again seems to be Agni. Comp. verse 11, note 3.

Note 3. Do these epithets (comp. verse 8, Pâda 3) refer to the *sârdha* (host)? Or are they applied to Agni, so that we would have to translate: 'Lovely was the young one (Agni), of marvellous appearance, and brilliant'? In this way Bergaigne interprets the passage. If this translation is right, *sârdha* may be considered as neuter, and the first Pâda could be translated: The first host came forth wonderfully.

Note 4. Evidently the seven *Rishis* (see note 1). Bergaigne: Les sept prières? ou les sept rivières?

Verse 13.

Note 1. The seven *Rishis* sat down for chanting and sacrificing, by which they have opened the mountain-prison of the cows.

Note 2. The mention of *Rita* in this connection is both Vedic and Avestic. Comp. Darmesteter, Ormazd et Ahriman, p. 146; H. O., Religion des Veda, p. 144, note 2.

Note 3. The cows in this myth seem to be a mythical representation of the dawns. Comp. M. M., Science of Language, II, p. 584; H. O., Religion des Veda, pp. 147, 149 seq.

Verse 14.

Note 1. *Parvāyantra* (comp. *ślōkayantra*, IX, 73, 6) is quite doubtful. Does there exist a stem *parva*, meaning possibly, 'the herd of cattle'? And can we translate, 'they who had their (battering-?) machines directed on the cow-herds'? Or, 'holding the herds with their instruments (i.e. with the ropes used for drawing the cows out of the cavern)'?—Prof. Max Müller suggests the translation, 'the cattle-drivers,' and writes, 'Does it stand for *pasu-yantrâ-*

saḥ? Yantra seems the same as yoktra, or something like it, cf. X, 94, 7, 8. Pasuyantra would be they who hold the ropes of the cattle, who drive them away.' Bergaigne's translation, 'n'ayant rien (d'autre) pour conduire le bétail' (pasu-ayantra), and that of Roth ('die der Sperre ledigen Thiere [pasvaḥ ayantrāsaḥ] erhoben ein Freudengeschrei,' Zeitschr. der D. Morg. Gesellschaft, XLVIII, 678), do not carry conviction, nor does a conjecture like pasvā yantāraḥ ('the leaders of the cattle together with the cattle itself shouted triumphantly'), seem to furnish a satisfying solution of the difficulty.

Note 2. See Geldner, *Vedische Studien*, I, 120.

Verse 15.

Note 1. On the *Usigs*, compare Bergaigne's *Religion Védique*, I, 57 seq.

Verse 16.

Note 1. The mother seems again to be the cow, or more exactly the Dawn considered as the mother of the cows (mâtā gāvām, IV, 52, 2. 3; VII, 77, 2), and as the mother of the *Rishis* (IV, 2, 15). Comp. V, 45, 2. á ūrvāt gāvām mâtā gānatī gāt. The seven names of the cow are mentioned also in I, 164, 3, its three times seven names, in VII, 87, 4.

Note 2. Bergaigne (*Quarante Hymnes*, p. 14) and Pischel (*Ved. Studien*, II, 121 seq.) give to the word vrā the meaning 'woman' (Bergaigne: 'femme,' particulièrement 'femme en rut,' 'femme amoureuse'). I prefer to follow the opinion of Bechtel, *Nachrichten der Göttinger Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften*, philolog.-historische Klasse, 1894, p. 393 seq. The hosts seem to be the assembly of the *Rishis*.

Note 3. The dawn.

Note 4. Comp. IX, 81, 1 (H. O., *Religion des Veda*, p. 147, note 1). dadhnā yāt im ūnnitāḥ yasā gāvām, 'When (the Somas) have been drawn, together with the brilliant curds of the cow.' The brilliant milk of the cow which the

Rishis have obtained, seems to be considered as a magical means for procuring to men the aspect of the brilliant light of the dawn. Comp. H. O., Religion des Veda, p. 450.

Verse 17.

Note 1. On *dúdhitam*, comp. Geldner, Ved. Studien, II, 9, and see Rig-veda II, 17, 4; IV, 16, 4.

Verse 19.

Note 1. Comp. vol. xxxii, p. 330 (V, 54, 10, note 1).

Verse 20.

Note 1. 'Guest' is *átithiḥ*; the play on words (*áditih* and *átithiḥ*) is untranslatable.

MANDALA IV, HYMN 2.

ASHTAKA III, ADHYĀYA 4, VARGA 16-19.

1. He who has been established as the steward among the mortals, the immortal, righteous one, and among the gods, being a god himself, the Hotri, the best sacrificer shall mightily flame¹; Agni shall rise up¹ with the offerings of Manus.

2. Here, O Agni, son of strength, thou goest for us to-day as a messenger, thou who art born, between the two races (of men and gods), having harnessed, O tall one, thy puissant, manly, brilliant (stallions)¹.

3. Harnessing the two mighty, red steeds that swim in ghee—(the steeds) of Rīta, I think, that are most swift with their mind¹, the ruddy ones, thou goest (as a messenger) between you, the gods, and the tribes of men².

4. O Agni, with thy good horses, and thy good chariot, rich in bounties, bring hither from among them (the gods)¹ Aryaman, Varuṇa, and Mitra, Indra and Vishṇu, the Maruts and the Asvins, to him who offers good oblations.

5. This sacrifice, O Agni, is rich in cows¹, in sheep and horses, in manly friends; it is never to be despised; it is rich in nourishment, O wonderful lord², rich in offspring; it is long-lasting wealth, broad-based, with (brilliant) assemblies.

6¹. Be a self-strong protector, O Agni, of the man who in the sweat of his brow brings fuel to thee², or heats his head desirous to worship thee. Deliver him from every harmful man.

7. The man who brings food to thee who art desirous of food, he who stirs up¹ the cheerful guest and rouses him, the godly man who kindles thee in his dwelling : to him may belong lasting and generous wealth.

8. The sacrificer who praises thee in the evening and in the morning and gratifies thee : that liberal man thou shouldst bring across all distress, like a well-impelled horse¹, (dwelling) in his house.

9. The man who worships thee, the immortal one, O Agni, and who honours thee, holding the sacrificial ladle—may he, the toiling (sacrificer), not be deprived of wealth ; may no distress that comes from a harmful (foe), surround him.

10. That mortal whose well-ordered sacrifice thou, as the god, acceptest, O Agni, as a liberal giver, may his worship¹ be welcome, O youngest god, (the Hotri's work performed) for a worshipper whose helpers we may be.

11. May he, the knowing one, distinguish wisdom and folly of mortals¹, like straight and crooked backs (of horses)². And for the sake of wealth and noble offspring, O god, grant us Diti and keep off Aditi³.

12. The undeceived sages instructed the sage (Agni), setting him down in the dwellings of Âyu¹. Hence mayst thou behold, O Agni, with thy eyes² these beings visible and secret (that move) on the Arya's ways³.

13. Bring thou, O Agni, youngest (god), who art a good guide, a plentiful, brilliant treasure to the worshipper who presses Soma, who serves thee and toils, to help him, O brisk one, who fillest the dwellings of peoples.

14¹. And whatsoever we have done, O Agni, out

of devotion for thee, with our feet², with our hands, with our bodies: (in those deeds of ours) the wise have held up the *Rîta*, aspiring after it, like those who manage a chariot by means of the two pole-arms (?)³.

15. And may we be born from the Dawn, the mother, as the seven priests¹, as the first worshippers among men². May we be the *Aṅgiras*, the sons of Heaven. May we flaming break the rock which contains the prize of the contest³.

16. And as our first, ancient fathers, O Agni, were aspiring after *Rîta*¹—they attained to pure devotion², chanting their litanies. Cleaving the earth they disclosed the red (cows).

17. The pious men, well performing the acts (of worship), resplendent, melting¹ the generations of the gods² like ore³, kindling Agni, strengthening Indra, went along⁴, besieging the stall of cows.

18. He looked (on the gods) as on herds of cattle¹ in a rich (pasture)², when the generations of the gods (were) near him, O mighty one³. After (the generations) of the mortals the *Urvastis*⁴ have pined, for the growing strong of the *Arya*⁵, of the nearer *Āyu*⁶.

19. We have done our work for thee; we have been good workers—the brilliant dawns have shone out *Rîta*¹,—brightening² the perfect Agni who manifoldly shines with fine splendour, (brightening) the god's beautiful eye.

20. We have recited these hymns for thee, the sage, O Agni, worshipper (of the gods)¹; accept them! Blaze up; make us wealthier. Bestow great wealth on us, O bountiful one!

NOTES.

The *Rīshi* is Vāmadeva, the metre Trishṭubh.—Verse 5=TS. I, 6, 6, 4; III, 1, 11, 1; MS. I, 4, 3. Verse 6=TĀ. VI, 2, 1. Verse 11=TS. V, 5, 4, 4. Verse 16=VS. XIX, 69; TS. II, 6, 12, 4. Verses 16–19=AV. XVIII, 3, 21–24.

Verse 1.

Note 1. On this use of these infinitives, comp. Delbrück, *Altindische Syntax*, p. 412.—*Mánushaḥ* seems to be genitive; comp. II, 2, 6. *havyāḥ mánushaḥ*; II, 2, 8. *hótrābhiḥ* . . . *mánushaḥ*; I, 76, 5. *mánushaḥ havírbhiḥ*.

Verse 2.

Note 1. Comp. below, IV, 6, 9.

Verse 3.

Note 1. As to the horses of *Rīta*, comp. above, III, 6, 6. In spite of the different accent there is no doubt that *ghrītasnúvā*, which occurs in that verse, is the same word as *ghrītasnū*, in our verse, a compound of *ghrīta* with a noun *snu* which seems to be different from *sānu*, and connected with the root *snā* (cf. *ghrītasnā*, IV, 6, 9; and see Bechtel, *Hauptprobleme der Indogerm. Lautlehre*, p. 211). *Vrīdhasnū*, on the other hand, seems to be no compound, but an adjective formed like *vadhasnu*, *ni-shatsnū*. It is evident, however, that the poet here employed the two words *vrīdhasnū* and *ghrītasnu* as parallel expressions.

Note 2. Read *mártām* (for *mártān*; gen. plur.). Comp. below, verse 11; VI, 47, 16. *vīsaḥ manushyām*, where we ought to read *manushyām*. See Lanman, p. 353; Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, I, p. 44; Bartholomae, *Studien zur Indogermanischen Sprachgeschichte*, I, p. 48.

Verse 4.

Note 1. 'Could it be Mitrám eshám, the rapid Mitra?' M. M.

Verse 5.

Note 1. The meaning is, it is rich in reward consisting in cows, &c.

Note 2. The text has asura. Cf. H. O., Religion des Veda, p. 164.

Verse 6.

Note 1. With the first Páda, comp. below, 12, 2.

Note 2. On svátavân, see Benfey, *Vedica und Linguistica*, p. 1 seqq.; Lanman, p. 559; Joh. Schmidt, *Kuhn's Zeitschrift*, XXVI, p. 357 seq.; H. O., *Prolegomena*, p. 471.

Verse 7.

Note 1. Nisísшат is not derived, as is the case for instance with á sishámahi, VIII, 24, 1, from (ni-)sás (Grassmann, Ludwig), but from ni-sá (Böhtlingk-Roth); comp. VII, 3, 5. nisísânâ/ átithim. We must read, consequently, nisísat, formed like dádhat (3rd sg. subj. pres., or possibly nom. sing. part. pres.).

Verse 8.

Note 1. Böhtlingk-Roth conjecture harmyávan 'im Hause, im Stall gehalten.' It is true that beasts may be kept in the harmya; comp. VII, 56, 16; X, 106, 5; Zimmer, *Altindisches Leben*, p. 149. But I do not think that 'being kept in the harmya' could be expressed by harmya-vat. Hemyávat seems to be derived from the root hi, and to have the same meaning as ásuhéman; such a word very well fits into a phrase referring to a swift horse. Hemyávat stands to hemán in the same relation as omyávat to omán. All this was pointed out first by Ludwig (vol. iv, p. 22).

Verse 10.

Note 1. Literally the Hotri's work (performed for such a Yagamána).

Verse 11.

Note 1. I read *mártām* (gen. plur.); comp. above, verse 3, note 2. It is possible, however, to leave the text unchanged; in this case the translation would be: 'May he, the knowing one, distinguish wisdom and folly, the (wise and foolish) mortals like straight and crooked backs (of horses).'

Note 2. Comp. *vítāprishṭha*, 'straight-backed,' a frequent epithet of horses.

Note 3. For Prof. Max Müller's interpretation of this passage, comp. vol. xxxii, p. 256. See also Bergaigne, *Rel. Védique*, III, 97; Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, I, 297 seq. It is very strange that the poet should ask the god to keep off Aditi (comp. I, 152, 6. *áditim urushyet*) who must here be considered, consequently, as a malevolent deity. I think that this conception of Aditi is derived from the idea of this goddess as punishing sin; it is the same goddess who may free the sinner from the bonds of sin and who may fetter and destroy him. Keeping off Aditi seems to mean, consequently, removing from the mortal the danger of being bound by the fetters of sin; the idea is the same as above in IV, 1, 5, where Agni is invoked to make Varuṇa, the son of Aditi, go away (comp. H. O., *Religion des Veda*, p. 336, note 1). In that case granting Diti would mean granting freedom from those same fetters. (On Diti, who very appropriately has been called a mere reflex of Aditi, see M. M., loc. cit.; Bergaigne, III, 97 seq.)

Verse 12.

Note 1. On Áyu, the mythical ancestor of the human race, see Bergaigne, *Religion Védique*, I, p. 59 seq.

Note 2. On *paḍbhíḥ*, comp. Pischel, *Ved. Studien*, I, 228 seq.; Bartholomae, *Bezenberger's Beiträge*, XV, 3 seq.; Bloomfield, *Contributions to the Interpretation of the Veda*, Second Series, p. 32 seq. (*American Journal of Philology*, XI, 350 seq.). I believe that in our verse *paḍbhíḥ* should be derived from a noun *pás*, and translated, 'with thy eyes,'

while in verse 14 we ought to read *padbhíh*, and to translate, 'with the feet.'

Note 3. Pischel (Ved. Studien, I, 229, note 1) believes that *aryáh* is nom. sing., referring to Agni. But compare VI, 51, 2. *rigú márteshu vṛiginá ka pásyān abhí kashṭe sūrah aryáh évān*. This verse makes it very probable that *aryáh* is a genitive dependent on *évaih*, *évān* ('beholding right and wrong deeds among the mortals, the Sun looks upon the Arya's ways'). On the stem *arí*, 'the Arya,' see Pischel, Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, XL, p. 125.

Verse 14.

Note 1. This verse has been commented upon by Pischel, Ved. Studien, I, 229 seq.

Note 2. On *padbhíh* or rather *padbhíh*, comp. verse 12, note 2.

Note 3. In translating *bhurgr* I have followed, though not without doubt, the theory of Pischel, Ved. Studien, I, 239 seq.—Pischel seems to be right in making *ritám* depend both on *yemuh* (comp. IV, 23, 10) and on *ásushânáh* (comp. above, IV, 1, 13, and below, verse 16).

Verse 15.

Note 1. The seven *Rishis* or *Āngiras*, the sons of Heaven and the Dawn (cf. above 1, 16).

Note 2. *nrīn* (or rather *nrīm*) is genitive plural. See Lanman, p. 430; Pischel, Vedische Studien, I, p. 42.

Note 3. Here we have again the seven *Rishis* breaking the mountain in which the cows were imprisoned.

Verse 16.

Note 1. The apodosis is wanting. As verse 15 shows, the meaning is: As our fathers have done their mighty deeds, aspiring after *Rita*, thus may we do the same.

Note 2. *Súkīt* (Padap. *súki ít*) possibly stands for *súkim ít*; cf. Roth, Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, XLVIII, p. 680. Or may we correct *súki ít*...

dīdhiti (instr. sing.), 'they went along in pure devotion'? Dīdhiti seems to be what is called in III, 31, 1; IX, 102, 1. 8, *ritāsya dīdhitiḥ*.

Verse 17.

Note 1. See Zimmer, *Altindisches Leben*, p. 252.

Note 2. Evidently the pious men, not the gods, form the subject. I propose to read, therefore, *devām* (gen. plur.) *gānimā*; cf. verse 18 *devānām yāt gānimā*. They kindle Agni; they strengthen Indra: in short, they treat the divine people as the smith treats the metal.

Note 3. I do not enter here upon the archaeological question as to the meaning of *āyaḥ*. Comp. on this much-discussed question especially Max Müller, *Biographies of Words*, p. 252 seq.; Schrader, *Sprachvergleichung und Urgeschichte* (2nd ed.), p. 271 seq.; von Bradke, *Methode der arischen Alterthumswissenschaft*, p. 93 seq.

Note 4. Cf. X, 61, 13. *parishadvānaḥ agman*.

Verse 18.

Note 1. *Parvāḥ* is genitive sing.; it depends on *yūthā*. Cf. V, 31, 1; VI, 19, 3.

Note 2. There is no reason for taking, as Lanman (p. 516) does, *kshumāti* as acc. plur. neut., which would be *kshumānti*. See Joh. Schmidt, *Pluralbildungen der Indogermanischen Neutra*, p. 237; Bartholomae, *Kuhn's Zeitschrift*, XXIX, p. 493. Bartholomae translates, 'bei einem wolhabenden.'

Note 3. Is this vocative *ugra* right? It would be easy to correct, with Ludwig, *ugrá* ('when the mighty generations of the gods were near him') or *ugráḥ*, as suggested by Delbrück (*Grassmann's Translation*, vol. i, p. 573): 'the mighty one (Agni) looked on them,' &c.

Note 4. I believe that Geldner (*Ved. Studien*, I, 260, note 1) is right in contending that *Urvasī*, wherever it occurs, is the name of an Apsaras and nothing else. The name of *Āyu*, occurring in the fourth Pāda, confirms this; for *Āyu*, as is well known, is the son of *Purūravas* and of the nymph *Urvasī*. Geldner translates, 'Selbst mit den

Sterblichen hatten die Urvasis Mitleid.' But I do not think that *kṛip* means 'having compassion.' In my opinion we should, with Ludwig, supply *gānimā* to *mārtānām*, so that *devānām gānimā* in the second Pāda corresponds with *mārtānām (gānimā)* in the third. This *gānimā* is an accusative which depends on *akṛipran* ('they pined after . . .', cf. IX, 85, 11. *nāke suparṇām upapativāmsam gīraḥ venānām akṛipanta pūrvīḥ*; X, 74, 3. *yé kṛipānanta rātnam*). Thus the meaning seems to be: When the cows had been conquered, and when Agni looked over the generations of the gods that were near him, the Urvasis, i. e. the Apsarases such as Urvasī, longed for the love of mortals such as Purūravas, and for the propagation of the human generations; they gave birth to children such as *Āyu*.

Note 5. Or 'of the indigent'? Or is *aryāḥ* nom. plur. fem. referring to the Urvasis? Or nom. sing. masc. referring to Agni?

Note 6. On *Āyu*, see note 4. But I cannot tell why he is called the nearer *Āyu*. Is this nearer *Āyu* opposed, as a nearer or later (*ūpara*) ancestor, to the *pitāraḥ pārāsaḥ prasnāsaḥ*, the *Aṅgiras*, mentioned in verse 16? The same nearer *Āyu* (*ūpara* which stands there in opposition to *pūrvābhiḥ*) is mentioned also in I, 104, 4, connected, as it seems, with some Apsarases. I do not pretend to be able to interpret that very difficult verse, but I am convinced that it has been misinterpreted both by Roth (Siebenzig Lieder, p. vii) and by Bergaigne (I, 60).

Verse 19.

Note 1. I. e. the dawns have sent forth their shine, which is a visible manifestation of the eternal law of *Rīta*.

Note 2. The construction is: we have been good workers, brightening &c. The words, 'the brilliant dawns have shone out *Rīta*,' are a parenthesis.

Verse 20.

Note 1. The text is nearly identical with the first hemistich of I, 73, 10 (see above).

MANDALA IV, HYMN 3.

ASHTAKA III, ADHYĀYA 4, VARGA 20-22.

1. Draw Rudra hither for your protection¹, the king of sacrifice, the truly sacrificing Hotri of the two worlds², the golden-coloured Agni, before the unseen thunderbolt (strikes you).

2. This is the home which we have prepared for thee as a well-dressed, loving wife (prepares the marriage-bed) for her husband¹. Directed hitherward, dressed (in offerings and prayers?)² sit down. These (sacrificial ladles or prayers?) are turned towards thee, O most skilful one³!

3. To him who hears us, who is not proud, who beholds men, to the merciful, immortal god recite a prayer, O worshipper, a hymn—to Agni) whom the presser (of Soma), the Madhu-presser, magnifies like the pressing-stone¹.

4. Thou who art well-intentioned, give heed to this our toiling¹, to this Rīta², O observer of Rīta! When will our hymns share in thy rejoicings? When will our friendship dwell in thy house?

5. How wilt thou, O Agni, before Varuna, and how wilt thou, and which sin of ours wilt thou blame before Dyaus? How wilt thou speak to bountiful Mitra, to the Earth? What (wilt thou say) to Aryaman, to Bhaga?

6. What wilt thou say, O Agni, when thou hast grown strong on the Dhishnya altars¹? What to strong Vāta who goes forward in triumph²? To the Nāsatya³ who goes round the earth⁴, to . . .⁵? What, O Agni, to Rudra, the man-killer?

7. How (wilt thou speak) to great Pûshan who brings prosperity? What (wilt thou say) to martial Rudra, the giver of offerings¹? What sin² wilt thou announce to wide-ruling Vishnu, what, O Agni, to the mighty weapon (of the gods)?

8. How wilt thou answer, when thou art asked, to the righteous¹ host of the Maruts? How to the mighty Sun, to the quick Aditi²? Accomplish thy work, O Gâtavedas, thou who knowest the Heaven!

9. I magnify¹ the *Rîta* of the cow² ruled by *Rîta* and also by the raw one³, the honey-sweet, ripe (milk), O Agni. Though being black this (cow) swells of bright drink, of . . .⁴ milk.

10. With *Rîta* indeed, with the milk of the back¹, the bull has been anointed, Agni the man. Without trembling he moved on bestowing his vigour. The speckled bull has poured out his bright udder².

11¹. By the *Rîta* the Aṅgiras have broken the rock and cleft it asunder; they have shouted together with the cows. Prosperously the men have surrounded² the Dawn. The Sun appeared when Agni (the fire) had been born³.

12. By the *Rîta* the immortal, uninjured¹ goddesses, the Waters, O Agni, with their honey-sweet waves have sped forward² for ever to flow (along their course), like a racer incited by shouting when (the race-horses) are let loose.

13. Go never on thy crooked way to the spirit (which avenges the guilt) of anybody¹, of a vassal who has trespassed, or of a friend. Require not (of us) a sinful brother's debt². May we not have to suffer under the spirit which avenges a friend's or a (hostile) deceiver's guilt³.

14. Protect us, O Agni, with all thy protection, thou who art protected, O martial one¹, and art gladdened (by us). Sparkle forth, and destroy even strong evil! Slay the Rakshas even though it has grown large.

15. Be gracious, O Agni, through these our hymns. Touch, O hero, this wealth moved by our prayers. And accept, O Angiras, our sacred words. May the praise, beloved by the gods, resound to thee¹.

16. I, the priest, have rehearsed to thee the omniscient one, O Agni, worshipper (of the gods), all these songs, these inmost words, these recitations and words of wisdom, to thee the wise one, with prayers and hymns.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi* and metre.—Verse 1=SV. I, 69; TS. I, 3, 14, 1; TB. II, 8, 6, 9; MS. IV, 11, 4. Verse 6=MS. IV, 11, 4.

Verse 1.

Note 1. On the identification of Agni with Rudra, comp. Bergaigne, *Rel. Védique*, III, 36; von Bradke, *Dyâus Asura*, p. 54 (*Rig-veda* I, 27, 10; III, 2, 5; VIII, 72, 3).

Note 2. The second *Pâda* of this verse is identical with VI, 16, 46.

Verse 2.

Note 1. Cf. Hirzel, *Gleichnisse und Metaphern im Rig-veda*, p. 69.

Note 2. On *párivîtaḥ* *Sâyana* remarks, *yashṭavyadevais tegobhir vâ parivîtaḥ*. In the commentary on I, 128, 1, on the other hand, he says, *ṛitvighbhiḥ paridhibhir vâ parito veshṭitaḥ*.

Note 3. I take su-apâka as a compound of su and a-pâka (comp. Vâg. Samh. XX, 44 = Taitt. Br. II, 6, 8, 4 = Maitr. Samh. III, 11, 1, where Tvashtri is called apâkâh). In Rig-veda VI, 11, 4 we read : ádidyutat sú apâkaḥ vibhāvâ ; in VI, 12, 2. á yásmin tvé sú apâke yagatra, &c. Should we not correct in both passages suapâkaḥ, suapâke ?

Verse 3.

Note 1. The pressing-stone (grávan) is frequently considered as speaking, as praising the gods. Cf. Hillebrandt, Vedische Mythologie, I, p. 152 sq.

Verse 4.

Note 1. The Padapâtka has sámyai. I think it should be sámyâh.

Note 2. I. e. to this sacrifice, which is considered as one of the chief manifestations of Rîta. See H. O., Religion des Veda, p. 197.

Verse 6.

Note 1. At the Soma sacrifice fire burns on eight altars called Dhishnya ; see Weber, Indische Studien, X, pp. 366, 375.

Note 2. See vol. xxxii, p. 164.

Note 3. This is the only passage in the Rig-veda in which násatya occurs in the singular.

Note 4. On párigman, cf. above, I, 79, 3 note.

Note 5. Kshé (cf. Lanman, pp. 440, 448, 534) is evidently corrupt. But neither Bollensen's conjecture, ukshné, nor those of Ludwig (kakshe, yakshe), carry conviction.

Verse 7.

Note 1. It is very strange to find Rudra here designated as 'giver of offerings.' But it seems too bold to explain haviḥ-dé as a dative of haviḥ-ád ('eater of offerings').

Note 2. I read with Grassmann répaḥ ('sin') for rétaḥ ('sperm').

Verse 8.

Note 1. The text has *ritāya*, used as an adjective (see Bergaigne, Rel. Védique, III, 216).

Note 2. Aditi is masculine and seems to be an epithet ('unrestrained, free') of the Sun. Cf. vol. xxxii, p. 262; Bergaigne, III, 92. Probably at the same time the word is intended to allude to the goddess Aditi.

Verse 9.

Note 1. The text has *īle*, on which Ludwig says, 'so viel wie *nīle*.' *īle* of course cannot be the same as *nīle*, but should we not conjecture *nīlé*? Cf. above, IV, 1, 11. *vrishabhāsya nīlé*, and IV, 1, 12. *ritāsya yónā vrishabhāsya nīlé*. The translation would be, 'By *Rita* the *Rita* is restrained in the nest of the cow.'

Note 2. The '*Rita* of the cow,' if the reading is correct (see note 1), seems to be the milk.

Note 3. The 'raw one' is the cow as opposed to the ripe milk.

Note 4. The meaning of *gāmarya* (ἄπαξ λεγόμενον) is unknown. Cf. Bergaigne, II, 398, note 1. Sāyana reads *gā amaryena*. 'I should prefer *gā amartyena*.' M. M.

Verse 10.

Note 1. Does this mean, with the milk that comes from the ridge of heaven? Cf. IV, 20, 4. *sám āndhasā mamadaḥ prishthēna*.

Note 2. This Pāda seems to be an imitation of VI, 66, 1, where *Prisni* ('the speckled one') is the mother of the Maruts: *sakṛt sukrām duduhe prisniḥ ūdhaḥ*. See vol. xxxii, p. 368.

Verse 11.

Note 1. Here we have again the same myth of the *Āngiras* and the cows, to which so many allusions are found in the preceding hymns.

Note 2. The red cows of the myth are the dawns; the

Āngiras besiege the stronghold in which these cows are imprisoned.

Note 3. On the kindling of the fire as a charm by which the sun is made to rise, see H. O., Religion des Veda, p. 109 seq. The Āngiras kindle the fire for performing their sacrifice; thereby they make the sun rise.

Verse 12.

Note 1. The same epithet is applied to the waters also in X, 104, 8.

Note 2. The optative dadhanyuḥ is very strange. Probably we ought to read dadhanvuḥ.

Verse 13.

Note 1. The meaning seems to be that Agni is requested not to turn against the sacrificer a spirit which has to avenge the guilt committed by a third person. 'Why not read yagñam? Go not secretly to anybody's sacrifice, not of a hostile house, not of a friend. Do not require (of us) a sinful brother's debt. May we not feel the might of friend or foe.' M. M.

Note 2. Geldner (Ved. Studien II, 157) translates and interprets: 'tilge nicht, O Agni, die Schuld eines falschen Bruders,' nämlich die Schuld an die Manen, also dem Sinn nach 'mache ihn kinderlos.' This is quite unacceptable.

Note 3. The text is evidently corrupt. I propose to read: mā sákhyuḥ yakshám mā ripóḥ bhugema. Comp. V, 70, 4. mā kásya adbhutakratú yakshám bhugema tanúbhiḥ.

Verse 14.

Note 1. I cannot adopt Bergaigne's opinion on sūmakha (Quarante Hymnes, p. 75).

Verse 15.

Note 1. Or, awake for thee.

MANDALA IV, HYMN 4.

ASHTAKA III, ADHYĀYA 4, VARGA 23-25.

1. Produce thy stream of flames like a broad onslaught. Go forth impetuous like a king with his elephant¹; . . .² after thy greedy onslaught, thou art an archer; shoot the sorcerers with thy hottest (arrows).

2. Thy whirls fly quickly. Fiercely flaming touch (them). O Agni, (send forth) with the ladle¹ thy heat, thy winged (flames); send forth unfettered thy firebrands all around.

3. Being the quickest, send forth thy spies against (all evildoers). Be an undeceivable guardian of this clan. He who attacks us with evil spells, far or near, may no such (foe) defy thy track.

4. Rise up, O Agni! Spread out against (all foes)! Burn down the foes, O (god) with the sharp weapon! When kindled, O Agni, burn down like dry brushwood, the man who exercises malice against us.

5. Stand upright, strike (the foes) away from us! Make manifest thy divine (powers), O Agni! Unbend the strong (bows) of those who incite demons (against us)¹. Crush all enemies, be they relations or strangers.

6. He knows thy favour, O youngest one, who makes a way for a sacred speech like this. Mayst thou beam forth to his doors all auspicious days and the wealth and the splendour of the niggard.

7. Let him, O Agni, be fortunate and blessed with good rain, who longs to gladden thee with

constant offerings and hymns through his life in his house. May such longing ever bring auspicious days to him.

8. I praise thy favour ; it resounded here. May this song (which is like) a favourite wife, awaken for thee¹. Let us brighten thee, being rich in horses and chariots. Mayst thou maintain our knightly power day by day.

9. May (the worshipper) here frequently of his own accord approach thee, O (god) who shinest in darkness¹, resplendent day by day. Let us worship thee sporting and joyous, surpassing the splendour of (other) people.

10. Whoever, rich in horses and rich in gold, approaches thee, O Agni, with his chariot full of wealth—thou art the protector and the friend of him who always delights in showing thee hospitality.

11. Through my kinship (with thee) I break down the great (foes) by my words¹. That (kinship) has come down to me from my father Gotama. Be thou attentive to this our word, O youngest, highly wise Hotri, as the friend of our house.

12. May those guardians of thine, infallible Agni, sitting down together protect us, the never sleeping, onward-pressing, kind, unwearied ones, who keep off the wolf, who never tire.

13¹. Thy guardians, O Agni, who seeing have saved the blind son of Mamatâ from distress—He the possessor of all wealth has saved them who have done good deeds. The impostors, though trying to deceive, could not deceive.

14. In thy companionship we dwell, protected by thee. Under thy guidance let us acquire gain. Accomplish both praises¹, O (thou who art the)

truth! Do so by thy present power, O fearless one!

15. May we worship thee, O Agni, with this log of wood. Accept the hymn of praise which we recite. Burn down those who curse us, the sorcerers. Protect us, O (god) who art great like Mitra, from guile, from revilement, and from disgrace.

NOTES.

The hymn is addressed to Agni Rakshohan. The same *Rishi* and metre.—Verses 1-15=TS. I, 2, 14, 1-6; MS. IV, 11, 5. Verses 1-5=VS. XIII, 9-13; MS. II, 7, 15.

Verse 1.

Note 1. On *ībhena*, cf. Pischel-Geldner, *Vedische Studien*, I, p. xv.

Note 2. The meaning of *drûṇánáḥ*, which evidently should be pronounced *druṇánáḥ* (H. O., *Prolegomena*, p. 478), is uncertain. This verb is stated to occur still in one other passage, *Maitr. Samh.* II, 4, 2. *tad ya evam vidvānt surām pibati na hainam drûṇāti* (*druṇāti*, two MSS.). But should we not read there *hruṇāti*? [And possibly in our passage, as Prof. Max Müller observes, *hrûṇánáḥ*?]

Verse 2.

Note 1. On *guhvā*, see Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, II, 113. Wherever butter is poured out with the ladle, the flames arise.

Verse 5.

Note 1. The third *Pāda* is identical with X, 116, 5 b.

Verse 8.

Note 1. Or 'resound to thee' (*sám garetā*). Cf. above, 3, 15. Shall we read, in consideration of this parallel

passage, sám devávâtâ garatâm iyám gíh (' may this song beloved by the gods resound ' or ' awaken ')?

Verse 9.

Note 1. On dóshâvasta^h, see above, I, 1, 7, note 1.

Verse 11.

Note 1. I have taken mahá^h as acc. plural. If it is.gen. singular, the translation will be : ' Through my kinship with the great (Agni) I break down (my foes) by my words.'

Verse 13.

Note 1. This verse is identical with I, 147, 3. See the notes there. The original place of this verse seems to be in the first *Mandala*, because it mentions Mâmateya.

Verse 14.

Note 1. Probably the praise or song of the gods and of men. See vol. xxxii, p. 439.

MANDALA IV, HYMN 5.

ASHTAKA III, ADHYĀYA 5, VARGA 1-3.

1. How may we unanimously offer mighty light ¹ to bountiful Agni Vaisvânara? With his mighty perfect growth he supports the high bank ² like a pillar.

2. Do not reproach Him, the self-dependent one, who has given this bounty to me, the god to the mortal, the clever one to the simple, the wise immortal, the most manly, restless ¹ Agni Vaisvânara.

3. Agni, the sharp-pointed, the mighty bull with thousandfold sperm, has proclaimed to me the great, doubly-powerful ¹ Sâman, the prayer, having found, as it were, the hidden track of a cow ².

4. May Agni, he who is rich in wealth, whose teeth are sharp, consume with his hottest flames those who violate the laws founded by Varuṇa, the beloved, firm (laws) of attentive Mitra.

5¹. They who roam about like brotherless girls ², of evil conduct like women who deceive their husbands, being wicked, sinful, and untrue—they have created for themselves this deep place ³.

6. On me, however small, but innocent, thou, O purifying Agni, hast fiercely placed this mighty, deep, vigorous prayer, like a heavy burden, this *Prishtha* ¹, consisting of seven elements ².

7. Let our prayer which purifies Him, through the power of mind (inherent in it), reach Him who is the common (property of all men) alike, the good (name?) of *Prisni* on the skin of the herbs, on the summit of the . . . ¹.

8. What should be openly uttered by me of this speech? They secretly speak of that which is hidden¹. When they have uncovered, as it were, the water of the cows², he guards the beloved summit of the . . .³, the footstep of the bird⁴.

9. He has found in secret that great face of the great ones which the bright cow accompanied¹, the ancient (face) shining in the abode of *Rita*, the quickly running, quickly moving.

10. And resplendent near his parents (Heaven and Earth), in their presence, he thought of the secret, good (name?) of *Prisni*. The tongue of the manly, forward-bent flame (seized) that which was near at hand in the highest abode of the mother, the cow¹.

11. I speak, when being asked, *Rita* (i.e. truth), out of reverence (for Agni, or for the gods), out of hope¹ placed in thee, O *Gâtavedas*, as I am here². Thou rulest over all this wealth whatever (dwells) in heaven and earth.

12. Which of this wealth is ours, what treasure? Mayst thou who knowest it declare to us (that treasure), O *Gâtavedas*! What is the highest (aim) of this our way, is hidden. We have not come scolding to an empty (?)¹ place.

13¹. What is the limit, what the objects? What pleasant (wealth) may we obtain as swift (horses gain) the prize? When will the Dawns, the divine consorts of the immortal, expand over us with the sun's splendour?

14. And what do those insatiable ones here say, O Agni, with their sapless, feeble, weak speech that has to be listened to? Let them unarmed fall into nothingness.

15. The face of this kindled, manly Vasu has shone gloriously in the house. Clothed in brilliancy, with his shape beautiful to behold, the bountiful has shone like a house¹ with its wealth.

NOTES.

The hymn is addressed to Vairvânara. The same *Rishi* and metre.—No verse occurs in the other *Samhitâs*.

Verse 1.

Note 1. Cf. especially I, 45, 8 (above, p. 42). *bṛhāt bhāḥ bībhṛataḥ havīḥ*.

Note 2. Cf. vol. xxxii, p. 93 (I, 38, 11, note 2).

Verse 2.

Note 1. See above, I, 36, 1, note 2.

Verse 3.

Note 1. *Dvibārhāḥ* is neuter. See Lanman, p. 560 ; Joh. Schmidt, *Pluralbildungen der Indogermanischen Neutra*, p. 132.

Note 2. Agni has discovered the *Sāman* which he proclaims to the mortal, like the track of a lost cow.

Verse 5.

Note 1. See H. O., *Religion des Veda*, p. 539.

Note 2. *Abhrātāraḥ* cannot be accusative plural fem., as Zimmer (*Altindisches Leben*, p. 419) seems to take it. The correct interpretation has been given by Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, I, p. 299.

Note 3. I.e. hell.

Verse 6.

Note 1. In the younger Vedic ritual certain Stotras are technically designated as *prishṭha* or 'backs' of the liturgies

(see, for instance, Weber, *Indische Studien*, X, 385). Does the word stand here in the same sense? Or should we correct *préshtham*?

Note 2. The seven tones of the scale?

Verse 7.

Note 1. This passage is obscure. The text runs thus: *śasāsya kárman ádhi káru prísneh ágre rupáh árupitam (árupitam Samhitâpâtha) gábâru*. As to the first words, see III, 5, 6. To *káru* possibly a noun like *nâma* should be supplied (cf. below, verse 10). The last Pâda (cf. above, III, 5, 5, note 1) is simply untranslatable.

Verse 8.

Note 1. Of the milk alluded to in the third Pâda?—On *nizik*, cf. Lanman, p. 436; Joh. Schmidt, *Pluralbildungen der Indogerm. Neutra*, p. 397.

Note 2. The water of the cows is the milk, cf. X, 12, 3. Roth (*Zeitschr. der D. Morgenl. Gesellschaft*, XLVIII, 682): als sie den Schatz der Kühe entdeckt hatten (*vâr iva=vâram iva*).

Note 3. *Rupáh ágram*.

Note 4. Comp. above, III, 5, 5 with note 1; III, 5, 6, note 2.

Verse 9.

Note 1. The sun, the face of the great gods (cf. I, 115, 1), accompanied by the dawn?

Verse 10.

Note 1. Is the meaning of all this that Agni, shining on the altar between heaven and earth, desires, and consumes with his flames, the oblation of butter which has its home in the udder of the cow?

Verse 11.

Note 1. On *ásásâ*, see Lanman, p. 492 seq.; Bartholomae *Indogermanische Forschungen*, I, 182 seq.; Bechtel, Haupt-

probleme der Indogerm. Lautlehre, p. 262. This noun is not to be derived from the root *sās*, but from *sams*.

Note 2. Compare I, 79, 2 (with note 3).

Verse 12.

Note 1. Comp. X, 108, 7, where the *Paris* say to Saramā : réku padām álakam á gagantha ('the place is empty(?); thou hast come in vain').

Verse 13.

Note 1. This verse has been treated of by Pischel, Ved. Studien, I, 306.

Verse 15.

Note 1. On this comparison, see Hirzel, Gleichnisse und Metaphern im Rigveda, p. 102 seq.

MANDALA IV, HYMN 6.

ASHṬAKA III, ADHYĀYA 5, VARGA 4-5.

1. Stand upright for us, O Agni, Hotri of the sacrifice, the best performer of sacrifices among the gods. For thou art the master of every thought; thou promotest the worshipper's prayer.

2. The unerring Hotri has sat down among the people, joy-giving Agni, the wise one at the sacrifices¹. Like Savitri he has sent his light upward. Like a builder he has reared his smoke up to the sky.

3¹. (The ladle) glowing, filled with gifts, with butter, is stretched forth. From left to right (does Agni move) choosing the divine people. Upright (stands) the (sacrificial) post like a new-born foal²; well-placed, well-established it anoints the victims³.

4. After the sacrificial grass has been spread and the fire kindled, the delighted Adhvaryu has stationed himself upright. Agni, the Hotri, chosen from of old, goes round thrice, like a shepherd.

5. As Hotri, measuredly running, Agni, the joy-giving, sweet-tongued, the righteous, 'goes around by his own might. His flames run forward like race-horses; all beings are afraid when he has shone forth.

6. Beautiful, O fair-faced Agni, is thy aspect, who art terrible and manifold; pleasant (it is). As they have not hindered thy light by darkness, no bespatterers have left stains on thy body.

7. He whose mother (?)¹ has not been hindered from giving birth, nor his father and mother when-

ever they were incited (?)²: this Agni, the purifier, well-established like Mitra³, has shone among the tribes of men,—

8. Agni, whom the twice-five sisters¹, dwelling together, have engendered among the human tribes, who awakes at dawn, who is bright like an elephant's (?)² tooth, whose mouth is beautiful, who is sharp like an axe.

9¹. Agni, those golden horses of thine swimming in ghee, the red ones which go straight forward, the fleet ones, the brilliant, manly, wonderful horses, puissant stallions, have called hither the divine people.

10. Those victorious, never-tiring¹, fierce flames of thine, O Agni, which move about, hasten² to their goal like hawks; they roar mightily like the host of the Maruts.

11¹. (This) hymn has been produced for thee, O Agni, when thou wert kindled. May (the priest) recite the litany; mayst thou distribute (treasures) to him who sacrifices. Men have set down Agni as the Hotri, the Usigs, adoring (Him), the praise of Âyu².

NOTES.

The same *Rishi* and metre.—Verse 6 = TS. IV, 3, 13, 1.

Verse 2.

Note 1. The text has *vidátheshu*. Cf. above, I, 31, 6 note.

Verse 3.

Note 1. With the first hemistich compare above, III, 19, 2. See also VI, 63, 4.

Note 2. On *akrá*, see Geldner, *Vedische Studien*, I, 168.

Note 3. The meaning seems to be that the sacrificial post, which has been anointed itself, imparts ointment to the victim tied to it.

Verse 7.

Note 1. The meaning of *sātu* is uncertain. Boehtlingk-Roth give 'receptaculum.' Joh. Schmidt (*Kuhn's Zeitschrift*, XXV, p. 29, cf. Hübschmann, *Indogerm. Vocalsystem*, p. 75) translates '*Mutterleib*,' and connects the word with *strī*. If 'womb' is right, it seems to be the womb from which Agni was born.

Note 2. Does this *isháu* belong to *ish*, 'to incite,' or to *ish*, 'to wish'? 'Whenever he (Agni) wishes.' M. M.

Note 3. On the well-established *Mitra*, comp. H. O., *Religion des Veda*, p. 186, note 1.

Verse 8.

Note 1. The ten sisters of course are the fingers.

Note 2. In translating *atharṛā ná dántam* I have followed the opinion of Pischel (*Vedische Studien*, I, 99) on the meaning of *atharṛ*, though his theory is very doubtful.

Verse 9.

Note 1. With this description of Agni's horses, comp. above, IV, 2, 2. 3.

Verse 10.

Note 1. On *ayása*, cf. above, III, 18, 2, note 1.

Note 2. See Geldner, *Kuhn's Zeitschrift*, XXVII, 234.

Verse 11.

Note 1. The second hemistich of this verse is nearly identical with V, 3, 4.

Note 2. Cf. *nárāmsa*, vol. xxxii, p. 439.

MANDALA IV, HYMN 7.

ASHTAKA III, ADHYĀYA 5, VARGA 6-7.

1. This (Agni) has been established here as the first by the establishers, the *Hotri*, the best sacrificer who should be magnified at the sacrifices, whom *Apnavâna* and the *Bhrigus* have made shine, brilliant in the woods, spreading to every house.

2. Agni! When will the splendour of thee, the god, appear in the right way? For verily the mortals have seized thee who shouldst be magnified in the houses.

3. Seeing the righteous, wise one, like the heaven with the stars, who produces joy at all sacrifices, from house to house—

4. The quick messenger of *Vivasvat* who rules over all human tribes: Him the *Âyus* have brought hither to every house, the light, him who belongs to the *Bhrigus*.

5. Him the knowing one they have set down in the right way as the *Hotri*, the gay one with his purifying flames, the best sacrificer with his seven (forms¹)—

6. Him who is enveloped in many mothers, in the wood¹, who does not rest thereon (?)², who is brilliant, though hidden in secret, easily to be found, and striving for all that is desired.

7. When the gods rejoiced in the . . . of the herbs¹, in that udder², in the foundation of *Rita*³, the great Agni, to whom offerings are made with adoration, the righteous one, always approached eagerly for the sake of sacrifice.

8¹. Thou, the knowing one, hast eagerly performed the messengership of the sacrifice, looking over both ends, over the two worlds. Thou goest as a messenger, chosen from of old, thou who knowest best the ascents to heaven.

9. Thy path is black. Light is before thee, the red one. Thy flame is speedy. This is one of the wonders: when the virgin conceives (thee as her) child¹, thou becomest a messenger, as soon as thou art born.

10. As soon as he is born, his strength shows itself, when the wind blows upon his flame. He turns his sharp tongue among the dry brushwood. Even solid food he tears to pieces with his teeth.

11. When he thirstily has grown strong by thirsty food¹, restless Agni appoints a thirsty messenger. Consuming (the wood) he follows the . . .² of the wind. He seems to drive forward a quick horse; the racer speeds along.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi*. The metre is *Gagatī* in verse 1, *Anushṭubh* in verses 2-6, *Trishṭubh* in verses 7-11.—Verse 1=VS. III, 15; XV, 26; XXXIII, 6; TS. I, 5, 5, 1; MS. I, 5, 1.

Verse 5.

Note 1. The seven flames or tongues of Agni? The seven *Hotris*? The seven *Ratnas*?

Verse 6.

Note 1. Cf. IX, 107, 18. *pāri góbhiḥ úttaraḥ sídan vāneshu avyata.*

Note 2. Possibly we might conjecture *ásritam*, 'who rests thereon.'

Verse 7.

Note 1. On *sasásya*, cf. above, III, 5, 6, note 2. *Víyutá* seems to be a locative standing parallel with the locative *ūdhan*. We have here *sasásya víyutá . . . rításya dhāman*, quite as in V, 21, 4 the two accusatives *rításya yónim* and *sasásya yónim* stand parallel. The meaning of *víyutá*, however, seems to me quite uncertain. Is it an action-noun derived from *vi-yu*, 'to separate,' 'to keep off,' or from (vi-) *vā*, 'to weave'? Professor Max Müller proposes: 'at the removal of the grass or tinder in which the spark is kept.'

Note 2. *sásmin ūdhan*; cf. below, 10, 8.

Note 3. Cf. above, I, 147, 1.

Verse 8.

Note 1. With this verse, compare below, hymn 8, verse 4.

Verse 9.

Note 1. The wood, the child of which is Agni.

Verse 11.

Note 1. I take *ánnā* here as an instrumental.—Compare with our passage VII, 3, 4. *trishú yát ánnā samāvṛikta gámbhaiḥ*; X, 79, 5. *yáḥ asmai ánnam trishú ádádhati*; X, 91, 7. *trishú yát ánnā vévishat vitíshihase*; X, 113, 8. *agníḥ ná gámbhaiḥ trishú ánnam ávayat*.

Note 2. *meḥm*; cf. above, III, 26, 9.

MANDALA IV, HYMN 8.

ASHTAKA III, ADHYĀYA 5, VARGA 8.

1. I press on for you with my prayer to the all-possessing messenger, the immortal bearer of offerings, the best sacrificer.

2. He, the great one, knows indeed the place of wealth¹, the ascent to heaven; may he, (therefore,) conduct the gods hither.

3. He, the god, knows how to direct the gods for the righteous (worshipper), in his house. He gives (us) wealth dear (to us).

4. He is the Hotri; he who knows the office of a messenger, goes to and fro (between men and gods), knowing the ascent to heaven.

5. May we be of those who have worshipped Agni with the gift of offerings, who cause him to thrive and kindle him.

6. The men who have brought worship to Agni, are renowned as successful by wealth and by powerful offspring.

7. May much-desired wealth come to us day by day; may gains arise among us.

8. He (Agni), the priest of the tribes, (the priest) of men, pierces (all hostile powers) by his might as with a tossing¹ (bow).

NOTES.

The same *Rīshi*. The metre is Gāyatrī.—Verse 1 = SV.
I, 12 ; MS. II, 13, 5.

Verse 2.

Note 1. Comp. Pischel, Ved. Studien, II, 118.

Verse 8.

Note 1. Kshiprá evidently is an instrumental. Cf. kshi
práadhanvan, kshipréshu, kshipréṇa dhánvanâ, II, 24, 8.

MANDALA IV, HYMN 9.

ASHTAKA III, ADHYĀYA 5, VARGA 9.

1. Agni, have mercy! Thou art great, who hast come to this pious man to sit down on the sacrificial grass.

2. He who cannot be deceived, the zealous, the immortal has among men become the messenger of all.

3. He, the joy-giving Hotri, is led around the sacred seat at the heaven-aspiring sacrifices. And he sits down as the Potri also.

4. Agni sits down also as (the sacrificer's) wife¹ at the sacrifice, and as the master of the house in the house, and as the Brahman².

5. Thou zealously approachest as the Upavaktri¹ of the people who perform the sacrificial service, and (thou approachest) the offerings of men.

6. And thou zealously performest the messenger-ship for the man in whose sacrifice thou takest pleasure, in order to bear the mortal's offering (to the gods).

7. Find pleasure¹ in our rites, in our sacrifice, O Angiras. Hear our call!

8. May thy unerring chariot, by which thou protectest the worshippers, encompass us from every side.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi* and metre.—Verse 1 = SV. I, 23. Verse 8 = VS. III, 36; MS. I, 5, 4. 5. 11.

Verse 4.

Note 1. 'Wir vermuten: utágná agnir adhware . . . die correctur dürfte evident sein.' Ludwig. The same conjecture has been proposed already in 1868 by Prof. Max Müller (*Chips*, 2nd ed., vol. iii, p. 157). In my opinion the traditional text is correct.

Note 2. The Brahman very probably is not the Brahman of the later ritual, but the *Brāhmanākkhamsin*. See H. O., *Religion des Veda*, p. 396.

Verse 5.

Note 1. The *Upavaktri* is identical with the *Prasāstri* or *Maitrāvaruṇa* of the later ritual. H. O., *Religion des Veda*, p. 390.

Verse 7.

Note 1. On *goshi*, cf. Bartholomae, *Studien zur Indog. Sprachgeschichte*, I, 21.

MANDALA IV, HYMN 10.

ASHṬAKA III, ADHYĀYA 5, VARGA 10.

1¹. O Agni ! May we to-day successfully perform, with thy heedfulness², this praise³ which touches thy heart, which is like a horse, like auspicious power of the mind.

2. For verily thou, O Agni, hast become the charioteer of auspicious power of the mind, of real ability, and of the mighty *Rita*.

3. Through these our hymns direct thyself hitherwards to us like the sun with its light¹, O Agni, gracious with all thy faces.

4. May we to-day worship thee, O Agni, praising thee with these songs. Thy roarings thunder like (the thunder) of Heaven.

5. Thy sweetest aspect, O Agni, shines near us for glory's sake, now by day, now by night, like gold.

6. Like purified *ghṛita* is thy stainless body ; (it is) brilliant gold : that (body) of thine has shone¹, O self-dependent one, like gold.

7. For even a malice which one has committed, thou verily drivest away entirely, O righteous Agni, from the sacrificing mortal¹.

8. May our friendship, O Agni, our brotherhood with you, the gods, be blessed. This is our navel (i. e. relation) in our seat, in this udder¹.

NOTES.

The same *Rīshi*. The metre is stated to be Padapañkti (verses 4, 6, 7, Padapañkti or Ushnih; verse 5, Mahāpada-pankti; verse 8, Ushnih): see on this metre M. M., vol. xxxii, p. xcvi seq.; H. O., Prolegomena, p. 98; Kühnau, Die Trishubh-Gagati-Familie, p. 234 seq.—Verse 1=SV. I, 434; MS. I, 10, 3. Verses 1-3=SV. II, 1127-1129; VS. XV, 44-46. Verses 1-4=TS. IV, 4, 4, 7. Verse 1, 2, 4=MS. II, 13, 8. Verse 3=MS. IV, 10, 2. Verse 6=TS. II, 2, 12, 7; MS. IV, 12, 4.

Verse 1.

Note 1. The Avasāna in this verse ought to stand before *hrīdisprīsam*, not after this word, as the traditional text places it. *Rīdhya*ma, consequently, cannot be accented.

Note 2. Dr. Neisser's opinion on *óha* is different (Bezzenberger's Beiträge, XVIII, 312).

Note 3. I read *stómam*, which is frequently found as the object of the verb *ridh*, and which in several passages receives the epithet *hrīdisprīś*.

Verse 3.

Note 1. On the syntactical form of this comparison, see Bergaigne, Mélanges Renier, p. 95.

Verse 6.

Note 1. Or *roḥate*, 'shines'?

Verse 7.

Note 1. The Avasāna ought to stand before *mártāt*. Cf. above, verse 1, note 1.

Verse 8.

Note 1. Cf. above, IV, 7, 7. The meaning seems to be: in this sacrificial place, where the cows give milk.

MANDALA IV, HYMN 11.

ASHTAKA III, ADHYĀYA 5, VARGA 11.

1. Thy auspicious face, O mighty Agni, shines in the neighbourhood of the sun¹. Brilliant to see, it is seen even by night. Soft to behold is the food in thy (beautiful) body².

2. O Agni, disclose (wise) thoughts for him who praises thee; (disclose) the opening, when thou, O strong-born, hast been praised with trembling. Grant unto us, O very great one, such a rich prayer as thou with all the gods wilt hold dear, O brilliant one.

3. From thee, O Agni, genius is born, from thee (wise) thoughts, from thee beneficent hymns. From thee comes wealth adorned with heroes¹ to the thus-minded mortal who worships thee.

4. From thee the racer is born that wins booty, whose energy expands round-about¹, the helpful, of true strength; from thee delightful wealth sent by the gods; from thee, O Agni, the swift and impetuous horse.

5. Thee, O Agni, the pious mortals seek to win by their prayers as the first, thee the god with agreeable speech, O immortal, who drivest away malice, the household god, the lord of the house, the wise one.

6. (Drive) far from us senselessness and anguish; (drive) far all ill-will from him whom thou attendest¹. Be gracious at evening, Agni, son of strength, to him whom thou, the god, attendest with welfare.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi*. Metre, Trishṭubh.—Verse 1 = TS. IV, 3, 13, 1.

Verse 1.

Note 1. Comp. above, IV, 10, 5. *roḥate upâké*.

Note 2. Literally, 'in thy appearance' (*rûpé*). Thus the Soma is stated, IX, 16, 6, to purify itself *rûpé avyáye*, literally, 'in the appearance of the sheep,' i. e. in the filter made of sheep's hair.

Verse 3.

Note 1. See Lanman, p. 560 ; Pischel, *Ved. Studien*, II, 115.

Verse 4.

Note 1. On *vîhâyâh*, see V. Henry, *Les livres VIII et IX de l'Atharva-véda* (1894), p. 40 (AV. VIII, 2, 7).

Verse 6.

Note 1. Probably the correct *Padapâṭha* reading would be, as Prof. Bartholomae (*Bezzenger's Beiträge*, XV, 190) has noticed, *yám nîpási* (cf. *Pâda d* : *yám . . . sákase*). If *yát* is correct, the translation will be: '(drive) far all ill-will when thou protectest (us).'
—Bartholomae proposes either to change *asmát* to *asmât*, or to interpret it as an equivalent of *asmât*. It is possible, though in my opinion not very probable, that the text should be changed. The ablative *asmât* very frequently depends on *âré*.

MANDALA IV, HYMN 12.

ASHTAKA III, ADHYĀYA 5, VARGA 12.

1. May the man who holds the sacrificial ladle and kindles thee, O Agni, who thrice prepares food for thee on this day, victoriously overcome (his foes) through his lustre, wise through the power of thy mind, O *Gâtavedas*.

2¹. He who toiling brings fuel to thee, doing service to thy, the great (god's) face, O Agni, kindling thee at evening and at dawn—he prospers, obtains wealth, and destroys his enemies.

3. Agni is master of mighty royal power¹; Agni (is master) of gain, of the highest wealth. He, the youngest, self-dependent (god) in the right way distributes treasures to the mortal worshipper.

4. Whatever sin, O youngest (god), we have committed against thee in thoughtlessness, men as we are¹, make thou us sinless before Aditi; release us from (every) guilt on all sides, O Agni!

5. Even from great guilt, O Agni, from the prison of gods and of mortals—let us, thy friends, never be harmed; grant luck and weal to kith and kin.

6¹. As you formerly have released, O Vasus, the buffalo cow bound by the foot, O worshipful gods, thus take away from us this distress. May, O Agni, our life be further prolonged.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi* and metre.—Verse 4=TS. IV, 7, 15, 6; MS. III, 16, 5. Verse 5=MS. IV, 11, 1. Verse 6=TS. IV, 7, 15, 7; MS. III, 16, 5; IV, 11, 1.

Verse 2.

Note 1. With the beginning of this verse, comp. above, IV, 2, 6.

Verse 3.

Note 1. Comp. Roth, Zeitschr. der D. Morg. Ges., XLVIII, 114.

Verse 4.

Note 1. Grassmann is right in giving to *purushatrā* the meaning 'unter den Menschen,' and in observing with reference to our passage: 'wo die Bedeutung "nach Menschenweise" (s. *purushātā*) besser passt.' The same is the opinion of Böhtlingk-Roth. No doubt we should read *purushātā*; cf. VII, 57, 4=X, 15, 6. *yāt vah āgah purushātā kārāma*; IV, 54, 3. *ākitti yāt kakrimā . . . purushatvātā*.

Verse 6.

Note 1. This verse is identical with Rig-veda X, 126, 8.

MANDALA IV, HYMN 13.

ASHTAKA III, ADHYĀYA 5, VARGA 13.

1. Benevolent Agni has looked on the breaking of the shining dawns, on the bestowal of treasures. Come to the dwelling of the virtuous (mortal), ye Asvins. The god Sūrya rises with his light.

2. The god Savitṛi has sent his light upward¹, shaking his banner² like a warrior who fights for cows³. Varuṇa and Mitra follow the law, when they make the Sun rise on heaven.

3. Him whom (the gods) dwelling in firm peace, and never losing their object, have created for dispersing the darkness—Him, the Sun, the all-observer, the seven young fallow mares carry forward.

4. With (thy horses) most ready to run thou goest¹ forward, spreading out thy web (of light), removing (from the world) the black cloth (of darkness), O god. The rays of the Sun have shaken² the darkness, and have sunk it into the waters like a hide.

5. Unsupported, unattached, spread out downwards-turned—how is it that he¹ does not fall down? By what power of his does he move? Who has seen (that)? Erected as the pillar of Heaven he protects the firmament.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi* and metre.—Verse 4=TB. II, 4, 5, 4.

This hymn and the next evidently form a couple. They have the same number of verses, and are composed in the same metre. They are both addressed to Agni in his matutinal character, or rather to the *Asvins*, who are invoked to partake of the matutinal oblation (13, 1; 14, 1. 4). The first verse of 13 is quite similar to that of 14; the same may be said of the second verses of the two hymns; the concluding verse of both is identical.

Verse 2.

Note 1. Cf. above, IV, 6, 2.

Note 2. Cf. Zend *drafsha*, 'banner.'

Note 3. Cf. IV, 40, 2. *sátvâ bharisháh gavisháh*.

Verse 4.

Note 1. The Sun is addressed.

Note 2. It is more natural to take *dávidhvatah* as nom. plur. than as gen. sing. (Ludwig).

Verse 5.

Note 1. The Sun.

MANDALA IV, HYMN 14.

ASHṬAKA III, ADHYĀYA 5, VARGA 14.

1. Agni *Gâtavedas*, the god, has looked on the dawns that shine with all their might¹. Come hither, O *Nâsatyas*², wide-ruling (gods), on your chariot to this our sacrifice.

2. The god *Savitri* has sent his shine upward, producing light for the whole world. The Sun, shining with his rays, has filled Heaven and Earth and the air.

3. The red one¹, carrying hither (bliss)², has come with her light, the great, brilliant one, shining with her rays. *Ushas*, the goddess, awakening (all beings) to welfare, goes along on her well-yoked chariot.

4. May those chariots and horses, most ready to drive, drive you¹ hither at the break of dawn. For these *Somas* are for you¹ that you may drink the honey-drink². Rejoice, O manly ones, at this sacrifice.

5. = IV, 13, 5.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi* and metre.—No verse of this hymn occurs in the other *Samhitâs*. On the parallelism in which IV, 14 stands to IV, 13, see the introductory note on IV, 13.

Verse 1.

Note 1. On *mâhobhih*, see vol. xxxii, p. 196 seq. (I, 165, 5, note 3). Here the word refers to the powerful light of

the dawn, not of Agni, cf. VI, 64, 2. úshaḥ devi róṁamānā máhobhiḥ.

Note 2. On the mention of the Násatyas (Asvins) in this connection, compare the introductory note on IV, 13.

Verse 3.

Note 1. The Dawn as before.

Note 2. That an object like 'bliss' is to be supplied, is shown by such passages as I, 48, 9. úshaḥ . . . áváhantī bhūri asmábhyam saúbhagam; I, 92, 3. (the Dawns) ísham váhantīḥ sukríte sudánave; I, 113, 15. (the Dawn) áváhantī póshyá váryāni.

Verse 4.

Note 1. The text has the dual of the pronoun. The Asvins are addressed.

Note 2. It is the peculiar character of the Asvins that they drink mádhu; see Hillebrandt, *Vedische Mythologie*, vol. i, p. 239 seq. H. O., *Religion des Veda*, p. 208, note 4; p. 367, note 2.

MANDALA IV, HYMN 15.

ASHTAKA III, ADHYĀYA 5, VARGA 15-16.

1. Agni, the Hotrī, he who is a strong horse, is led around at our sacrifice, the god worshipful among the gods.

2. Agni goes thrice¹ around the sacrifice, like a charioteer, conveying the enjoyment² to the gods.

3. Agni, the lord of booty, the sage, has circum-ambulated the oblations, bestowing treasures on the worshipper.

4. This (is the Agni) who is kindled in the front for Devavāta's son, the *Sriṅgaya*¹, the brilliant (god), the deceiver of foes.

5. May the strong mortal be the master of this (god), of an Agni like this, with sharp teeth and bountiful.

6¹. Him they clean day by day like a racer that wins (booty), like (Soma), the red young child of Heaven².

7. When Sahadeva's son, the prince, thought of me with two bay horses¹, I rose up like one who is called.

8. And immediately I accepted from Sahadeva's son, the prince, those adorable two bay horses which he offered me.

9. May this prince Somaka, Sahadeva's son, live long, for your sake, O divine Asvins!

10. Give long life, O divine Asvins, to this son of Sahadeva, the prince!

NOTES.

The same *Rīshi*. Metre, *Gāyatrī*.—Verses 1–3 = TB. III, 6, 4, 1; MS. IV, 13, 4. Verse 3 = SV. I, 30; VS. XI, 25; TS. IV, 1, 2, 5; MS. I, 1, 9.

The first three verses are characterised by the constant allusions to Agni's being carried around, and, in connection therewith, by the frequent repetition of the preposition *pári*. Probably these verses formed an independent *Trika*-hymn, the position of which would be according to the laws of arrangement of the *Samhitā*; this *Trika* seems, consequently, to belong to the original collection of hymns. The verses 4–10, on the other hand, or at least the verses 7–10, would seem to be a later addition; the verses 4–6 can be considered as a *Trika* belonging to the original *Samhitā*, though in this case it is difficult to explain why the verses 7–10, which do not contain any reference to Agni, have been inserted here at the end of the series of Agni hymns. Another argument against the separation of the verses 4–6 from the rest of the *Sūkta* is the mention of the prince *Sriṅgaya* in verse 4: verses 7–10 refer to a prince *Somaka Sāhadevya*, and we know from the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* (VII, 34, cf. *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa* II, 4, 4, 4) that this prince also belonged to the *Sriṅgaya* tribe.

Verse 2.

Note 1. Cf. above, IV, 6, 4.

Note 2. I. e. the offering which the gods enjoy.

Verse 4.

Note 1. This *Sriṅgaya* *Daivavāta* is mentioned also in VI, 27, 7.

Verse 6.

Note 1. The first *Pāda* of this verse is identical with the first *Pāda* of VIII, 102, 12.

Note 2. The red young child of Heaven seems to be the Soma. The Soma frequently is called arushá ('red'), and is said to be cleansed by men; in IX, 33, 5; 38, 5, the expression *diváh śśuḥ* ('the young child of Heaven') is used with regard to him.

Verse 7.

Note 1. I. e. when he thought of presenting me with the two horses.

MANDALA V, HYMN 1.

ASHTAKA III, ADHYĀYA 8, VARGA 12-13.

1. Agni has been wakened by the fuel of men, in face of the Dawn who approaches like a milch-cow. His flames stream forward to the sky like quick (birds) that fly up to a branch.

2. The *Hotri* has been wakened that there may be sacrifice for the gods. Gracious Agni has stood upright in the morning. When he has been kindled, his brilliant stream of flames has been seen. The great god has been released from darkness.

3. When he has wakened the string of the crowd (of worshippers)¹, the bright Agni anoints himself with bright cows². Then the *Dakshinâ* is yoked, striving for gain³. He who stands upright has, by the sacrificial ladles, sucked her who lies extended⁴.

4. Towards Agni the minds of the pious turn together as (all) eyes (turn) to the sun. When both Dawns of different colour¹ give birth to him, the white racer is born at the beginning of days.

5. For He, the noble one, has been born at the beginning of days, the red one has been laid down in the woods that have been laid down. Agni, the *Hotri*, the best sacrificer, has sat down, bestowing his seven treasures on every house.

6. Agni, the *Hotri*, the best sacrificer, sat down in the mother's lap, in the sweet-smelling place, the young sage growing up in many places, the righteous one, the supporter of tribes, and kindled in their midst.

7. They magnify with adorations that priest efficacious at sacrifices, Agni the Hotri, who has spread himself over heaven and earth according to *Rita*; they groom (Agni), the own racer (of men), with *Ghrīta*.

8. He who likes to be groomed, is groomed in his own (abode), the house-friend¹, praised by sages, our auspicious guest, the bull with a thousand horns who has the strength of such a one. O Agni! By this power thou surpassest all other (beings).

9. O Agni! Thou overtakest all other (beings) in one moment (for the sake of him) to whom Thou hast become visible as the fairest one, thou who shouldst be magnified, the wonderful, brilliant one, the beloved guest of human clans.

10. To thee, O youngest (god), the tribes bring tribute, O Agni, from near and far. Behold¹ the grace of the most glorious (god)! Mighty, O Agni, is thy great and glorious shelter.

11. Mount to-day, O shining Agni, the shining car, in the neighbourhood of the worshipful (gods). Knowing the paths, the wide air¹, bring hither the gods that they may eat the oblation.

12. We have pronounced an adoring speech to the holy sage, to the manly bull. Gavishthira adoringly has sent his song of praise to Agni as the gold (i. e. the sun) far-reaching (is sent by the gods upward) to the sky.

NOTES.

The *Rīshis* are Budha *Ātreya* (cf. verse 1, *ābodhi*) and Gavishthira *Ātreya* (cf. verse 12). The metre is Trishubh.—Verse 1 = SV. I, 73; AV. XIII, 2, 46; VS. XV, 24; TS.

IV, 4, 4, 1. Verses 1-2=MS. II, 13, 7. Verses 1-3=SV. II, 1096-1098. Verse 5=TS. IV, 1, 3, 4. Verse 6=MS. IV, 11, 1; TB. I, 3, 14, 1. Verse 9=TB. II, 4, 7, 10. Verse 10=MS. IV, 11, 4; TB. II, 4, 7, 9. Verse 12=MS. II, 13, 7; TB. IV, 4, 4, 2; VS. XV, 25.

Verse 3.

Note 1. The meaning seems to be : when Agni has set into motion the string (representing the prayers, &c.) by which the worshippers tie and instigate him and the other powers of the sacrifice. Cf. IV, 1, 9. *prá tám* (scil. *agním*) *mahyá rasanáyā nayanti*; IX, 87, 1. *ásvam ná tvā* (scil. *sómam*) *vâgínam margáyantaḥ ákṣha barhíḥ rasanábhiḥ nayanti*. See also I, 163, 4-5.

Note 2. I.e. with bright *ghṛita*.

Note 3. The *Dakshinā* or sacrificial gift offered by the *Yagamāna* to the ministrant priests, is represented here as a car which is yoked in the morning. Cf. Bergaigne, *Rel. Védique*, I, 128; III, 283.

Note 4. 'He who stands upright' is Agni; 'she who lies extended' seems to be the cow, i.e. the *ghṛita* which Agni sucks by means of the sacrificial ladles.—See also Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, II, 113, from whose interpretation I differ.

Verse 4.

Note 1. I.e. Night and Dawn.

Verse 8.

Note 1. I cannot adopt the conjectures of Bartholomae (Bezenberger's *Beiträge*, XV, 197) on *své dāmūnāḥ*.

Verse 10.

Note 1. The human worshipper seems to be addressed; the 'most glorious one' is very probably Agni.

Verse 11.

Note 1. *Vidvân*, which may be construed with the genitive or with the accusative, stands here with both cases.

MANDALA V, HYMN 2.

ASHTAKA III, ADHYĀYA 8, VARGA 14-15.

1. The young mother carries in secret the boy confined¹; she does not yield him to the father. People do not see before them his fading² face laid down with the Arāti³.

2. Who is that boy, O young woman, whom thou, the Peshṭ¹, carriest? It is the queen who has borne him. Through many autumns the fruit of the womb has increased. I saw him born when his mother gave birth to him.

3. I saw him the gold-toothed, brilliant-coloured preparing his weapons far from his dwelling-place¹. After I have offered to him the ambrosia cleared (from all impure mixture)²—what may the Indraless, the hymnless do to me?

4. I saw him, the highly shining (Agni), walking far from his dwelling-place, like (a bull) together with the herd¹. Those (women) have not held him, for he has been born. The young women become grey².

5. Who have separated my young bull from the cows that¹ had no cow-herd, not even a stranger? May those who have held him, let him loose. May he, the knowing one, lead the cattle towards us.

6. Him, the king of dwellings (?)¹, the dwelling-place of people, the Arātis have laid down² among men. May the spells of Atri loose him. May the reproachers become reproachable (themselves).

7. Thou hast loosed the bound Sunaśepa from

the thousand sacrificial posts ; for he toiled (worshipping thee). Thus, O Agni, loose from us the fetters, O knowing *Hotri*, sitting down here.

8¹. For thou hast gone away ² from me, because thou wert angry ; (this) the protector of the laws of the gods³ has told me. (But) Indra, the knowing one, has looked after thee. Instructed by him, O Agni, I have come hither.

9. Agni shines with mighty light ; he makes all things visible by his greatness. He conquers godless, wicked wiles. He sharpens his two horns in order to pierce the *Rakshas*.

10. And may the roarings of Agni mount up to the sky, with sharp weapons in order to kill the *Rakshas*. In his rapture his flames break down (everything); the godless hindrances do not hold him back.

11. This song of praise, O strong-born (Agni), I, the priest, have fashioned for thee, as a skilful workman (builds) a chariot¹. If thou acceptest that (praise), O god Agni, may we conquer thereby waters together with the sun.

12. May the bull¹ with mighty neck, grown strong, with no foe to resist him, get together the niggard's wealth. Thus the immortal (gods) have spoken to this Agni : may he grant protection to the man who has spread the *Barhis* ; may he grant protection to the man who brings offerings.

NOTES.

The *Rishi* of verses 1, 3-8, 10-12 is *Kumâra Âtreya*, or *Vṛisa Gâna* ; or both are the *Rishis* of these verses. Of the verses 2 and 9 *Vṛisa* alone is the *Rishi*. The metre is

Trishūbh (verse 12, Sakvarī).—Verse 9=AV. VIII, 3, 24. Verses 9, 10=TS. I, 2, 14, 7. Verse 11=TB. II, 4, 7, 4.

A part of this hymn is very obscure. I do not think, as does Prof. Geldner (Festgruss an Roth, 192), that the story of the *Sātyāyanakam* (see *Sāyana's* commentary, and compare *Pañkavimsa Brāhmaṇa* XIII 3, 12), of the Purohita *Vriśa*, who drives with the king on the royal chariot and kills a boy, throws any real light on the difficult points of the hymn. Nor does it seem to me that, as is the opinion of Prof. Hillebrandt (*Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, XXXIII, 248 seq.), the first six verses, which Hillebrandt considers as an independent hymn, contain a description of how the fire which they try to produce by the attrition of the *Araṇis*, does not appear. In my opinion the hymn—which is really one hymn as the tradition gives it—is a prayer of a person who suffers, who feels himself bound by the fetters of distress (verse 7) and persecuted by the power of *Rakshas* (verses 9, 10). *Agni*, formerly resplendent, has decayed and has forsaken him : may *Agni* be restored to his former might (verse 6), and may we ourselves be released from all distress (verse 7, &c.). Possibly the hymn is connected with the rite of *Punarādheya*, where the sacrificial fire which has brought no luck to the sacrificer, is extinguished, and after an interval a new fire is established (*H.O., Religion des Veda*, p. 353). There may of course be other special points, beyond the reach of our conjectures, which, if known, would elucidate several of the obscure allusions so frequent in the first verses of the hymn.

Verse 1.

Note 1. The boy very probably is *Agni*.—With the words *sámubdham gūhā bibharti*, cf. I, 158, 5. *súsamubdham ava-ádhuḥ*.

Note 2. Not without hesitation I translate *minát* as if it were the middle *minánám*. Possibly the word means : 'which violates (the ordinances),' i.e. which does not shine and bring luck to men as it usually does. *Ná* seems, as it

usually does (cf. Delbrück, *Altindische Syntax*, p. 543), to belong to the whole clause, and not to *minát*.

Note 3. Böhtlingk-Roth and Grassmann conjecture *aratnáu*; Hillebrandt, *arâtáu*; Geldner (*Festgruss an Roth*, 192), *áratau*. Geldner seems to be right (cf. verse 6), though it will scarcely be possible to determine what concrete being was here thought of. Geldner says, 'Gemeint ist die *Pisákiká*, welche die Gluth des Feuers entführt hat;' but, as has already been observed, I do not think that this traditional story on the meaning of our hymn is of any real value.

Verse 2.

Note 1. The meaning of *Peshî* is unknown. The word seems anyhow to describe the wrong mother as low or contemptible. *Agni* is degraded by sojourning with her, while his proper nature is glorious, for he is the queen's son.

Verse 3.

Note 1. *Agni* has forsaken his proper dwelling.

Note 2. On *viprîkvat*, cf. *Taitt. Samhitâ* III, 1, 6, 2. *yunágmi tistráh viprîkah sūryasya te*; *Vāg. Samhitâ* IX, 4. *samprîkau sthah sám mâ bhadréna prîñktam*; *viprîkau sthah ví mâ pâpmánâ prîñktam*. *Vi-prik* seems to mean, consequently, 'to free something from an admixture,' and *amrîtam viprîkvat* seems to be ambrosia in which dwells the power of getting free from bad admixtures. Thus in the passage quoted from the *Taitt. Samhitâ* the Sun is referred to as thrice cleared from all impure elements. It is quite uncertain whether the expression used here refers or not to the myth of the churning of the ocean (Geldner, loc. cit.), and I do not think that we should translate *amrîtam viprîkvat*, as Geldner does, 'das was sich als Nektar ausscheidet.'

Verse 4.

Note 1. I read with Böhtlingk-Roth *sumádyûtham*.

Note 2. The young women seem to be hostile beings of

the same kind as the young woman mentioned in verse 2. They try to seize Agni, but he has been born already; his fiery, unassailable nature has been formed. I do not pretend to know what it means that then those female foes become grey with age. 'I think they are the Dawns who hold Agni in the dark; but when he escapes and is actually born, they, the Dawns, become grey.' M. M.

Verse 5.

Note 1. The relative pronoun *yéshâm* seems to refer both to the bull (*maryakâm*) and to the cows (*góbhiḥ*). The bull probably is Agni who has been separated from the cows, i.e. the oblations, prayers, &c. (?) 'Possibly the bull Agni, the rising sun, has been separated from the cows, the clouds or dawns.' M. M.

Verse 6.

Note 1. *Vasám rāḡānam*. I cannot follow the interpretation of Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, I, 210.

Note 2. Or *ní daduḥ*, 'they have bound him'? Cf. *áva srigantu* in the third Pāda, and *n/ditam* in verse 7.

Verse 8.

Note 1. The whole verse is nearly identical with X, 32, 6.

Note 2. I consider *aíyeḥ* (cf. Bartholomae, *Arische Forschungen*, II, 72, 76; *Studien zur Indogermanischen Sprachgeschichte*, I, 21) as 2nd sing. pluperfect of the root *i*.

Note 3. *Varuṇa*?

Verse 11.

Note 1. With the second Pāda compare I, 130, 6; V, 29, 15.

Verse 12.

Note 1. The bull of course is Agni.

MANDALA V, HYMN 3.

ASHTAKA III, ADHYĀYA 8, VARGA 16-17.

1. Thou, O Agni, art Varuṇa, when born; thou becomest Mitra when kindled. In thee, O son of strength, the Visvedevās (dwell). Thou art Indra for the mortal worshipper.

2. Thou becomest Aryaman when thou bearest¹ the secret name of the maidens, O self-dependent one. They anoint (thee) with cows² like the well-established Mitra³, when thou makest husband and wife one-minded.

3. For thy glory the Maruts have cleansed themselves¹, who are thy fair and brilliant offspring, O Rudra²! The footprint of Viṣṇu which is put down in the highest place: therewith thou protectest the secret name of the cows.

4. By thy beauty, O god, the gods are beautiful to behold¹. Assuming many (powers or goods) they attached themselves to immortality. Men have set down Agni as the Hotṛi, the Uṣis, honouring (him), the praise of Āyu².

5. There is no (other) Hotṛi before thee, a better sacrificer¹; no one surpasses thee, O self-dependent one, by wisdom. And that house of which thou art the guest, he², O god, will overcome the mortals by his sacrifice.

6. May we overcome the mortals, O Agni, protected by thee, striving for wealth, awaking (thee) with offerings; may we (overcome mortals) in the contest, in the distribution¹ of days; may we (overcome them) by wealth, O son of strength!

7. If a man should turn upon us sin or guilt, bring ye the evil on him who pronounces evil spells (against us). Destroy, O knowing one, such a curse, O Agni, (of a man) who injures us by falsehood.

8. Thee, O god, the ancient (mortals) have made their messenger at the break of this (dawn), and have sacrificed with their oblations, when thou goest along, O Agni, in the abode of wealth, a god kindled by the mortals and by the Vasus.

9. Protect the father—drive away (evil) as the knowing one—(the father) who is considered¹ as thy son, O son of strength². When, O sapient (Agni), wilt thou look upon us? When wilt thou, who knowest *Rîta*, requite (human deeds)?

10. The father¹ adoring gives many names to thee, O Vasu, if thou shouldst take pleasure therein. Will not Agni, delighting in his divine power, grant us his favour, he who has grown strong?

11. Thou indeed, O Agni, youngest one, bringest thy praiser across all dangers. Thieves have been seen and deceitful men; dishonest people have come with unknown designs.

12. These our processions have been directed towards thee. Yes, to thee, the Vasu, this guilt has been confessed. Verily this Agni, grown strong, will never surrender us to the curse nor to him who does harm to us.

NOTES.

The *Rîshi* is Vasusruta Âtreya; the metre is Trishṭubh.—No verse of this hymn occurs in the other *Saṃhitās*.

Verse 2.

Note 1. I think that we must read *bîbharshi*.

Note 2. I.e. with butter.

Note 3. On Mitra as the god of alliances, and the anointing of Mitra—possibly of an object that represents Mitra—see H. O., *Religion des Veda*, p. 186, note 1. Cf. also Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, I, 92 seq.

Verse 3.

Note 1. I.e. they have adorned themselves. Cf. VII, 39, 3. *urāṁ antárikṣhe margayanta subhrāh.*

Note 2. Rudra of course is here a name of Agni.

Verse 4.

Note 1. *Sudrīśah*, which I have translated as nom. plur., may also be understood as gen. sing.: 'by thy beauty, who art beautiful to behold, O god, the gods, assuming, &c.'

Note 2. Cf. *Narāsaṁsa*.—This hemistich is nearly identical with IV, 6, 11.

Verse 5.

Note 1. Comp. above, III, 17, 5.

Note 2. The construction is rather free.

Verse 6.

Note 1. *Vidátheshu áhnām*: cf. above, I, 31, 6, note 2 (p. 26 seq.).

Verse 9.

Note 1. See Neisser, Bezzenberger's *Beiträge*, XVIII, 310.

Note 2. Bergaigne (*Religion Védique*, II, 103) proposes to read *yodhi* without accent and to derive it, as Delbrück does, from *yu* (not from *yudh*); he translates the first hemistich: 'Protège-nous, écarte le père qui passe pour ton fils.' I think that he is right as to the verb *yu*, but that the accent of *yódhi* is correct; the words *yódhi vidván* form a parenthesis. Agni is invoked to protect the father of the sacrificing tribe (comp. verse 10), or the father of

Agni himself, i.e. the sacrificer or the priest, who is himself considered, at the same time, as the son of Agni (see Bergaigne, I, 37 seq. ; Geldner, *Vedische Studien*, I, 167).

Verse 10.

Note 1. 'The father' may either be the father spoken of in verse 9 (see verse 9, note 2). Or the word may refer to Agni: 'He who adores thee, gives many names to thee, if thou, the father, O Vasu, &c.'

MANDALA V, HYMN 4.

ASHTAKA III, ADHYÂYA 8, VARGA 18-19.

1. Thee, O Agni, the treasure-lord of treasures, I gladden at the sacrifices, O king! May we, striving for gain, conquer gain through thee; may we overcome the hostilities of mortals.

2. Agni, the bearer of oblations, our ever-young father, is mighty, brilliant, beautiful to behold among us. Shine (on us) food with a good household¹. Turn all glory towards us².

3. Establish Agni as the Hotrî, the sage of the clans, the lord of human clans, the bright purifier, whose back is covered with ghee, the omniscient. May he obtain the best goods (for us) among the gods.

4. Enjoy thyself, O Agni, joined with Idâ, uniting thyself with the rays of the sun. Enjoy our fuel, O Gâtavedas, and bring the gods hither that they may eat our offerings.

5. Welcome, as our household-god and the guest in our dwelling, come to this our sacrifice as the knowing one. Dispelling, O Agni, all (hostile) attempts, bring to us the possessions of those who are at enmity with us.

6. Drive away the Dasyu with thy weapon, creating strength for thy own body. When thou bringest the gods across (to us), O son of strength, then, O manliest Agni, protect us in (our striving for) gain.

7. May we worship thee, O Agni, with hymns, with offerings, O purifier with glorious light. Stir for us wealth with all goods; bestow on us all riches!

8. Enjoy, O Agni, our sacrifice, our offering, O son of strength who dwellest in three abodes. May we be well-doers before the gods. Protect us with thy thrice-protecting shelter.

9. Bring us across all difficulties and dangers, O Gâtavedas, as with a boat across a river. Agni, being praised with adoration as (thou hast been praised) by Atri, be a protector of our bodies.

10. When I, the mortal, call thee, the immortal, thinking of thee with humble mind¹, bestow glory on us, O Gâtavedas; may I attain immortality, O Agni, with my offspring.

11. The well-doer to whom thou, O Agni Gâtavedas, createst pleasant freedom, will happily attain wealth with horses and sons, with valiant men and cows.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi* and metre.—Verse 1=TS. I, 4, 46, 2. Verse 2=TS. III, 4, 11, 1; MS. IV, 12, 6; 14, 15. Verse 5=AV. VII, 73, 9; TB. II, 4, 1, 1; MS. IV, 11, 1. Verse 9=TB. II, 4, 1, 5; TÂ. X, 2, 1; MS. IV, 10, 1. Verses 10, 11=TS. I, 4, 46, 1.

Verse 2.

Note 1. According to the traditional text, *su-gârhapatyâh* must be an epithet of *ishah*. But the conjecture of Böhlingk-Roth, *su-gârhapatyáh*, has great probability: 'as the good protector of our household, shine food on us.' Cf. AV. XII, 2, 45=TB. I, 2, 1, 20.

Note 2. The second hemistich is nearly identical with III, 54, 22.

Verse 10.

Note 1. See Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, I, 221.

MANDALA V, HYMN 5.

ASHTAKA III, ADHYĀYA 8, VARGA 20-21.

ĀPRĪ HYMN.

1. Sacrifice sharp *ghṛita* to the well-kindled light, to Agni *Gâtavedas*.

2. May the unbeguiled *Narâsamsa* make this sacrifice ready; for he is a sage with honey in his hand.

3¹. Agni, magnified by us, bring hither to our help the bright, beloved Indra, with easy-going chariots.

4. Soft like wool¹ spread thyself (O Barhis). The hymns have been sung to thee. Be to us for success, O beautiful (Barhis)!

5. O divine, easily passable doors, open yourselves for our protection. Fill the sacrifice (with bliss) further and further!

6. We approach (with prayers) Night and Morning, whose face is beautiful, the increasers of vital strength, the two young mothers of *Rita*.

7. On the wind's flight, magnified, ye two divine *Hotṛis* of man, come hither to this our sacrifice.

8¹. I/Ā, *Sarasvatī*, and *Mahtī*, the three comfort-giving goddesses, they who do not fail, shall sit down on the sacrificial grass.

9. Come hither as a friend, *Tvashtri*, and mighty in welfare, and also by thyself, protect us in every sacrifice.

10. Where thou knowest, O tree (i. e. sacrificial

post), the secret names of the gods, to that place make the offerings go.

11. Svâhâ to Agni and Varuna! Svâhâ to Indra and the Maruts! Svâhâ to the gods for our offering!

NOTES.

The same *Rîshi*. Metre, Gâyatrî.—Verse 1=VS. III, 2. Verse 9=TS. III, 1, 11, 2. Verse 10=TB. III, 7, 2, 5.

Verse 3.

Note 1. The first hemistich is identical with I, 142, 4.

Verse 4.

Note 1. On *ūrna-mradâh*, see Lanman, Noun-Inflection, p. 560.

Verse 8.

Note 1. This verse is identical with I, 13, 9.

MANDALA V, HYMN 6.

ASHTAKA III, ADHYÂYA 8, VARGA 22-23.

1. I think of that Agni who is a Vasu, to whom the milch-cows go home, the swift horses (go) home, (our) own racers (go) home. Bring food to thy praisers!

2. He is Agni who is praised as the Vasu, he to whom the milch-cows come together, and the quickly running horses, and the well-born liberal patrons. Bring food to thy praisers!

3. For Agni, dwelling among all tribes, gives a racer to the clan. Agni (gives a racer) that is truly helpful for (winning) wealth¹: he (the racer) being well cherished, will attain precious gain. Bring food to thy praisers!

4. May we kindle thee¹, Agni, O god, the brilliant, never ageing, in order that yon highly miraculous fuel of thine² may shine in the sky. Bring food to thy praisers!

5. To thee¹, O Agni, our oblation is offered with a *Rik*, O lord of bright splendour, highly brilliant, wonderful lord of the clan, carrier of oblations! Bring food to thy praisers!

6. Those Agnis make everything precious prosper in the Agnis; they drive forward (precious wealth); they incite it; they speed it hither in the due way¹. Bring food to thy praisers!

7. Those flames of thine, O Agni, the racers, have boasted mightily—they who with the flight of their

hoofs have made tremble¹ the stables of the cows. Bring food to thy praisers!

8. Bring fresh food with fine dwellings, O Agni, to us, thy praisers! May we be of those who have praised (thee), who have thee as their messenger, house by house. Bring food to thy praisers!

9. Thou warmest in thy mouth, O highly brilliant one, the two (sacrificial) ladles full of butter. And mayst thou fill us (with gifts) at our hymns, O lord of strength! Bring food to thy praisers!

10. Thus¹ they have driven, they have led², Agni in the due way by prayers and sacrifices. May he bestow on us plenty of valiant men, and that plenty of swift horses (wished for)³. Bring food to thy praisers!

NOTES.

The same *Rîshi*. The metre is Pañkti.—Verse 1=SV. I, 425. Verses 1-2=VS. XV, 41, 42; MS. II, 13, 7. Verses 1, 3, 2=SV. II, 1087-1089. Verse 3=TB. III, 11, 6, 4. Verse 4=SV. I, 419; AV. XVIII, 4, 88; MS. II, 13, 7. Verses 4, 5, 9=SV. II, 372-374; TS. IV, 4, 4, 6. Verse 9=VS. XV, 43; TS. II, 2, 12, 7.

Verse 3.

Note 1. At first sight the conjecture of Böhtlingk-Roth and Grassmann, *rayím*, is very tempting, cf. IX, 12, 9. *rayím* . . . *su-âbhúvam*; X, 122, 3. *rayínâ* . . . *su-âbhúvâ*. I believe, nevertheless, that on closer examination the traditional text will prove correct. *Sá príták* evidently refers to the racer (*vâgín*) cf. I, 66, 4=69, 5. *vâgñ ná príták* (cf. also X, 101, 7. *prîñitâ ásvân*): then it follows that *su-âbhúvam* also refers to the racer, and *râyé* (cf. I, 100, 16; III, 53, 16) will be quite right.

Verse 4.

Note 1. *Te* stands for the accusative ; see Pischel, *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländ. Gesellschaft*, XXXV, 715 ; Delbrück, *Altindische Syntax*, p. 205.

Note 2. This refers to the sun. By kindling the sacred fire men make the sun rise. See H. O., *Religion des Veda*, p. 110.

Verse 5.

Note 1. The pronoun 'to thee' stands twice, *te* in the first Pāda (where it is repeated from the first Pāda of verse 4, *ā te agne*), and *túbhyam* (or rather *túbhya*) in the fourth Pāda, unless we construe *te havih*.

Verse 6.

Note 1. See Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, II, 127.

Verse 7.

Note 1. See Gaedicke, *Der Accusativ*, p. 57.

Verse 10.

Note 1. On the nasalization of *evāñ*, cf. H. O., *Prolegomena*, p. 469 seq.

Note 2. Pischel (*Vedische Studien*, II, 127) explains *aguḥ* as *agush*, the contrary of *sagūsh*. Bartholomae (*Studien zur Indogermanischen Sprachgeschichte*, II, 159, note 2 ; cf. *Indogermanische Forschungen*, III, 108, note 1) conjectures *águr* (= *ágman*) *yamuḥ* : 'sie haben ihn jetzt auf seiner Bahn festgehalten.' I believe, as Sáyana does, that this *aguryamuḥ* contains two independent verbs, *aguḥ* and *yamuḥ*, which are quite correct forms of the roots *ag* and *yam* (see Delbrück, *Altindisches Verbum*, p. 65). As to *ag*, cf. VI, 2, 8. *agyáse ágne vâgī ná* ; V, 30, 14. *átyah ná vâgī raghúḥ agyámānah* ; as to *yam* II, 5, 1. *sakéma vâgīnah* (i.e. *agnéh*) *yámam*. But should not the accent be *yamúh* ?

Note 3. The fourth Pāda is identical with VIII, 6, 24.

MANDALA V, HYMN 7.

ASHTAKA III, ADHYĀYA 8, VARGA 24-25.

1. O friends, (bring) together your united food and praise to Agni, the strongest (god) of (human) dwellings, the offspring of Vigour, the mighty one—

2. At whose onslaught¹, wherever it be, men rejoice in the seat of men, whom the worthy ones kindle, whom (human) creatures produce.

3. When we get together the food and the offerings of men, he has grasped, with the strength of his splendour, the rein of *Rita*.

4. He indeed produces light even by night to him who is afar, when he, the ever-young purifier, destroys the lords of the forest.

5. He at whose officiating (men) pour down the offering of their sweat on the paths—to Him who is noble by his own nature, the worlds have risen as to ridges (of hills)—

6. He whom the mortal has acquired, the much-desired (god), for the refreshment of every one, the sweetener of nourishment, the homestead for the *Āyu*—

7. He indeed, the beast, mows off deserts and habitable land like a mower, the golden-bearded with brilliant teeth, the *Ribhu* of undecaying strength.

8. The bright one for whom (the *ghrita*) streams (quickly) like an axe¹, as at (the sacrifice of) Atri. Him the well-bearing mother has born, as soon as² she had enjoyed love³.

9. He who satisfies thee for refreshment, O Agni

who drinkest butter : mayst thou bestow splendour, renown, and (wise) mind on such mortals ¹.

10. Thus I have seized upon the spirit of Adhrig(?) as upon a head of cattle given by thee ¹. May then Atri, O Agni, overcome the Dasyus who do not give (to the Brahmans); may Isha overcome the men (who do not give).

NOTES.

The *Rishi* is Isha Âtreya (cf. verse 10); the metre is Anushṭubh (verse 10, Pañkti).—Verse 1 = VS. XV, 29; TS. II, 6, 11, 4; IV, 4, 4, 3; MS. IV, 11, 1. Verses 2, 3 = TS. II, 1, 11, 3; MS. IV, 12, 4.

Verse 2.

Note 1. Yásya sám-ritau : see I, 127, 3.

Verse 8.

Note 1. With the expression svádhitih-iva rīyate (Lanman, Noun-Inflection, p. 375), compare V, 48, 4. ritīm parasóh-iva. Of course we must ask: what is the thing that streams so brightly and quickly as an axe moves? The thing in question is stated to stream (rīyate) for Agni now as it did at Atri's sacrifice. The expression 'as at Atri's sacrifice' seems to show that something like prayers or libations is alluded to. The verb rīyate, on the other hand, seems to point either to rivers, or to streams of Soma or of Ghrīta. Thus, considering that Ghrīta is mentioned much more frequently in connection with Agni than Soma, we are led to the conclusion that the poet speaks here of streams of Ghrīta. Should we not for súkīh read súki, which would be here as in IV, 1, 6; VI, 10, 2; IX, 67, 12, an epithet of Ghrīta? 'He for whom the bright (Ghrīta) streams quickly like an axe.' The origin of the reading

súkih may easily be accounted for ; the word was thought to refer to Agni.—Another interpretation of this hemistich has been given by Benfey, *Vedica und Linguistica*, p. 177.

Note 2. *Krâná* : cf. I, 58, 3, note 1 (p. 47).

Note 3. 'Sobald sie den Liebesgenuss erlangt hatte.' Pischel, *Ved. Studien*, I, 71.

Verse 9.

Note 1. The first hemistich speaks of the worshipper in the singular, the second in the plural.

Verse 10.

Note 1. This hemistich is quite obscure. With manyúm á dade, cf., for instance, X, 48, 2. *dásyubhyaḥ pári nrimnám á dade*. *Adhrigaḥ* may be the genitive of a proper name, as I have translated it ; but this is quite doubtful. Was the hymn intended for a charm in which the sacrificer seized a head of cattle which represented the spirit of an enemy, and thus deprived that enemy of his courage ?

MANDALA V, HYMN 8.

ASHTAKA III, ADHYÂYA 8, VARGA 26.

1. Thee, O Agni, the men who love *Rîta* have kindled, the ancient ones thee the ancient, for the sake of bliss, O (god) who art produced by strength ; the highly-brilliant, worshipful, in whom all refreshment dwells, the household god, the lord of the house, the chosen.

2. Thee, O Agni, the clans have set down, the ancient guest, the flame-haired lord of the house, with mighty light, with many shapes, the winner of prizes, giving good shelter and good help, who is busy among the decayed (wood)¹.

3. Thee, O Agni, the human clans magnify, who knowest (the art of sacrificial) libations, who separatest (what was mixed)¹, the highest bestower of treasures, who, (though) dwelling in secret, O blessed one, (yet) art visible to all, mightily roaring, an excellent sacrificer, shining with ghee.

4. Thee, O Agni, the supporter, we always have praised with our songs and have sat down near thee with adoration. Thus being kindled, O *Angiras*, be pleased with us, as a god through the mortal's brilliant (offering)¹, with thy glorious splendours.

5. Thou, O Agni, manifold-shaped, bestowest vigour on every house in thy ancient way, O much-praised one ! Thou rulest with might over much food. This impetuosity of thine, when thou rushest forward impetuously, is not to be defied.

6. Thee, O Agni, when kindled, O youngest one, the gods have made their messenger and bearer of

oblations. Thee who extendest over wide spaces, who dwellest in ghee, into whom offerings are poured, they have made their eye, impetuous, stirring thoughts.

7. Thee, O Agni, on whom offerings of ghee are poured, (men) desirous of thy favour have kindled from of old with good fuel. Thus, grown strong, increased by the plants, thou spreadest thyself over the terrestrial spaces.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi*. Metre, *Gagati*.—Verse 3=TS. III, 3, 11, 2. Verses 6, 7 = TB. I, 2, 1, 12.

Verse 2.

Note 1. The *Padapāṭha* gives *garat-vīsham*. I prefer this explanation to *gara-dvīsham* ('who hates decay').

Verse 3.

Note 1. Agni is, in the later ritual, worshipped as 'separator' (*vīvikī*), if the sacrificer's fires have become mixed with other fires. See *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* III, 7, 3, 5; *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa* XII, 4, 4, 2 (where this very verse is quoted), &c.

Verse 4.

Note 1. For *yaśāsā*, Böhtlingk-Roth conjecture *yāsasā*, which seems to me a *conjectura nimis facilis*. I think that the adjective *yaśāsā* is right, and that a noun, meaning 'offering' or the like, should be supplied. Cf. above, IV, 1, 16, note 4.

MANDALA V, HYMN 9.

ASHTAKA IV, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 1.

1. Thee, O Agni, the god, mortals bringing offerings magnify. I deem thee the *Gâtavedas*. Carry then the offerings (to the gods) in thy due way.

2. Agni is the *Hotri* of the dwelling where they offer gifts and spread the sacrificial grass, he with whom sacrifices, with whom glorious gains assemble.

3. And he whom the kindling-stick has born, the young one, like a young (calf), the supporter of human clans, Agni the best sacrificer—

4. And thou showest thyself hard to seize like a son of . . .¹, thou who art a burner of many woods, O Agni, like an animal (that consumes all grass) on a meadow².

5¹. And he whose smoky² flames come together, when Trita in heaven blows upon him like a smelter, sharpens (him) as in smelting (him)³ . . .

6. May I through thy protection, O Agni, and through the praises of Mitra—may we¹, like dispellers of malice, overcome the dangers of mortals.

7. Bring this wealth to us, O powerful Agni, to (these our) men. May he¹ give us dwelling; may he¹ give us prosperity; may he¹ help us in winning booty. And help us to grow strong in fights!

NOTES.

The *Rishi* is *Gaya Âtreya* (cf. V, 10, 3); the metre is *Anushŭbh* (verses 4 and 7, *Pañkti*).—Verse 1 = TB. II, 4, 1, 4.

Verse 4.

Note 1. *Putráh ná hváryānām.* The meaning of *hváryá* is conjectural. Cf. on *hvára*, to which it very probably is related, I, 141, 7, note 1; II, 2, 4, note 1. Does *hváryá* mean 'serpent,' or a kind of horse (VI, 2, 8. *átyaḥ ná hváryāḥ sísuḥ*)?

Note 2. The last Pāda is identical with VI, 2, 9. Considering the occurrence of the word *hváryá* here and in VI, 2, 8 (see note 1) we cannot believe that this is merely a casual coincidence.

Verse 5.

Note 1. On this verse, compare Neisser, Bezzenberger's *Beiträge*, XX, 40; Macdonell, *Journal Roy. As. Soc.*, 1893, p. 446.

Note 2. *Dhūmínaḥ* may be gen. sing.: 'he whose, the smoky (god's), flames.'

Note 3. Ludwig and Neisser (*Bezz. Beitr.*, loc. cit.) regard *dhmâtārî* (*Padap. dhmâtári*) as a nom. sing. masculine. I think that Geldner (*Vedische Studien*, I, 146, note 1) and Bartholomae (*Indogermanische Forschungen*, I, 496, note 2) are right in explaining it as a locative infinitive. Compare also Johansson, *Kuhn's Zeitschrift*, XXX, 415; Joh. Schmidt, *Pluralbildungen der Indogermanischen Neutra*, p. 247. Macdonell translates, 'as in a smelting furnace.'

Verse 6.

Note 1. The poet, who has begun his sentence in the first person singular ('may I'), goes on in the plural.

Verse 7.

Note 1. 'He,' i. e. Agni, or 'it,' i. e. the wealth?

MANDALA V, HYMN 10.

ASHTAKA IV, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 2.

1. Agni, bring us the mightiest splendour, O liberal one¹! With wealth and plenty cleave a path for us to booty.

2. Thou, O wonderful Agni, (protect) us, through thy power of mind, through the bounteousness of thy strength. Upon thee mysterious power has entered. (Thou art) indeed¹ like worshipful Mitra.

3. Thou, O Agni, increase for our sake the dominion and the prosperity of those liberal givers, (of those) men who have accomplished liberalities (towards us) for our songs of praise.

4. They who adorn prayers for thee, O bright Agni, the givers of horses¹: those men are powerful in their power, whose glory awakes by itself (shining) more mightily than even the sky².

5. Those shining flames of thine, Agni, go fiercely along, like lightnings (flashing) around the earth, like a thundering chariot bent on victory.

6. Now then, Agni, (come) for our protection, and for the reward of the urgent (worshipper)! May our liberal patrons pass across¹ all regions²!

7. Thou, O Agni, Aṅgiras, who hast been praised and who art being praised, bring us, O Hotṛi, wealth which overpowers (even) skilful men, to thy praisers, and thou shalt be praised by us. And help us to grow strong in fights¹.

NOTES.

The same *Rīshi*. Metre, Anuṣṭubh (verses 4, 7, Pañkti).
—Verse 1 = SV. I, 81. The hymn seems to stand parallel with V, 9.

Verse 1.

Note 1. On adhrigo, compare above, III, 21, 4, note 1 (p. 284).

Verse 2.

Note 1. *Krāñā* : see I, 58, 3, note 1 (p. 47) ; von Bradke, *Dyāus Asura*, p. 35 ; Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, I, 71.

Verse 4.

Note 1. *Sumbhānti āsva-rādhasaḥ* ; see X, 21, 2.

Note 2. On the ablative dependent on a positive, compare Speijer, *Sanskrit Syntax*, p. 78, and see also Delbrück, *Grundriss der vergleichenden Grammatik* (Brugmann), III, 1, 216 ; Pischel, *Göttinger Gelehrte Anzeigen*, 1884, 509.

Verse 6.

Note 1. On the use of this infinitive, see Delbrück, *Altindische Syntax*, p. 416.

Note 2. The last Pāda is identical with IV, 37, 7.

Verse 7.

Note 1. The last words are identical with those of V, 9, 16, 17.

MANDALA V, HYMN 11.

ASHTAKA IV, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 3.

1. The guardian of people, the watchful one, Agni, the highly dexterous, has been born, for the sake of new welfare. With *ghṛita* on his face, with his mighty, heaven-touching (light) he, the bright one, brilliantly shines for the Bharatas.

2. Agni, the beacon of sacrifice, the first Purohita¹ men have kindled in the threefold abode². (Driving) on the same chariot with Indra and with the gods, he, the highly wise Hotṛi, has sat down on the Barhis for sacrificing.

3. Though not cleansed, thou art born bright from thy two mothers¹. Thou hast arisen as the joy-giving sage belonging to Vivasvant². They have strengthened thee by *ghṛita*, O Agni, into whom oblations are poured. Smoke, reaching the sky, has become thy beacon.

4. May Agni straightway come to our sacrifice. Men carry Agni here and there, house by house. Agni has become the messenger, the carrier of oblations. Choosing Agni they choose a thoughtful (god).

5. For thee, O Agni, is this sweetest speech, for thee this prayer; may this one do thy heart good¹! The prayers fill thee with power and strengthen thee, like great rivers the Sindhu.

6. Thee, O Agni, who wert hidden, dwelling here and there in every wood, the Aṅgiras have discovered¹. Thus thou art born, produced by attrition, a mighty force. Thee, O Aṅgiras, they call the son of strength.

NOTES.

The *Rishi* is Sutambhara Âtreya, the metre *Gagati*.—
Verses 1, 6, 2=SV. II, 257-259; TS. IV, 4, 4, 2-3.
Verses 1, 6, 5=MS. II, 13, 7. Verses 1, 6=VS. XV,
27-28. Verse 3=TB. II, 4, 3, 3.

Verse 2.

Note 1. This Pâda is identical with the first Pâda of X,
122, 4.

Note 2. The three sacrificial fires are alluded to.

Verse 3.

Note 1. The two kindling-sticks.

Note 2. *Vivâsvatah* is genitive, not ablative, as Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, I, 241, believes. Agni opens his earthly career by doing service at the sacrifice of Vivasvant, i. e. originally, in my opinion, the first man. Comp. H. O., *Religion des Veda*, p. 122.

Verse 5.

Note 1. On the curious spelling *manîshâ iyâm* in the *Samhitâ* text, instead of *manîsheyâm*, see the *Rig-veda Prâtisâkhya* 163; H. O., *Prolegomena*, p. 386.

Verse 6.

Note 1. The ancestors of the priestly tribes, being the first priests themselves, discover Agni.

MANDALA V, HYMN 12.

ASHTAKA IV, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 4.

1. To the mighty, sacrificial Agni, to the bull of *Rita*¹, the Asura, I bring this prayer and this song, which is turned towards him, to (him) the bull, as well-clarified *ghṛita* (is poured) into his mouth at the sacrifice.

2. O knower of *Rita*, know the *Rita*! Bore for many streams of *Rita*. I (do) not (serve) a *Yātu*¹ by violence nor by falsehood; I serve the *Rita* of the red bull².

3. How, O Agni, performing the *Rita* through *Rita*, mayst thou become a witness of our newest¹ hymn? The god, the protector of the seasons, knows of my seasons². I (do) not (know another) lord but him who attains (for us) this wealth.

4. Who, O Agni, are thy fetterers to (fetter) the impostor¹? What brilliant guardians were successful? Who, O Agni, drink the drink of falsehood? Who are the protectors of untrue speech?

5. These friends of thine, O Agni, turning themselves from (thee)¹, they who had been kind, have become unkind. They have harmed themselves by their own speeches, uttering wrong words to the righteous.

6. He who magnifies thy sacrifice, O Agni, by adoration, and serves¹ the *Rita* of the red bull: may a large, good dwelling come to him, to the offspring of the advancing Nahusha.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi*; the metre is *Trishúbh*.—No verse of this hymn occurs in the other *Samhitás*.

Verse 1.

Note 1. The genitive *ritásya* seems to depend on *vríshne*, not on *mánma*. On the connection of *Agni* with the *Ríta*, see Bergaigne, III, 229 seq.; H.O., Religion des Veda, 201.

Verse 2.

Note 1. A bad demon.

Note 2. Of *Agni*.

Verse 3.

Note 1. I think that *návyaḥ* stands for *návyasaḥ*. Thus Ludwig translates: 'des neuen liedes.' It seems evident that it is not the nominative of *návya*, 'praiseworthy' (Böhtlingk-Roth, Grassmann).

Note 2. Probably we ought to read *ritapá ritánâm*. Cf. IV, 23, 4. *deváh bhuvat návedáh me ritánâm*, and see III, 20, 4, note 1 (above, p. 282). The translation will be: 'The god, the protector of *Ríta*, knows of my (deeds of) *Ríta*.'

Verse 4.

Note 1. Or *ripávaḥ*? 'Who, O *Agni*, are the impostors who fetter thee?'

Verse 5.

Note 1. On *víshunáh*, compare V, 34, 6: *ásunvataḥ víshunáh sunvatáh vridháh*.

Verse 6.

Note 1. The second verse (*ritám sapâmi arushásya vríshnaḥ*) shows with evidence that for *sá páti* we ought to read *sápâti* (see Roth, Kuhn's Zeitschrift, XXVI, 49, and compare on the expression *ritám sap*, Geldner, Vedische Studien, II, 135).

MANDALA V, HYMN 13.

ASHṬAKA IV, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 5.

1. Praising we call¹ thee ; praising let us kindle¹ thee, Agni, praising, for thy help.

2. Desirous of riches, we devise to-day an effective song of praise, of Agni the heaven-touching god¹.

3. May Agni take pleasure in our prayers, he who is the *Hotri* among men. May he sacrifice¹ to the divine host.

4. Thou, O Agni, art widely extended, the gladly accepted, desirable *Hotri* ; through thee they spread out the sacrifice.

5. The priests make thee grow, O Agni, the greatest acquirer of wealth, the highly praised one. Bestow thou on us abundance of heroes.

6. Agni ! Thou encompassest the gods as the felly (encompasses) the spokes (of a wheel). Thou strivest¹ for brilliant wealth.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi*. The metre is *Gāyatrī*.—Verse 2=MS. IV, 10, 2 (cf. TS. V, 5, 6, 1). Verses 2-4=SV. II, 755-757. Verse 4=TB. II, 4, 1, 6 ; MS. IV, 10, 2. Verse 5=TS. I, 4, 46, 3 ; MS. IV, 11, 4. Verse 6=TS. II, 5, 9, 3. As the *Sāma-veda* forms a *Trika* of the verses 2-4, not 1-3 or 4-6, we have here an instance of those liberties which the arrangers of the *Sāma-veda* not unfrequently took with regard to the *Rig-veda* text (see H. O., *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, XXXVIII, 469).

seq.) ; we have no reason, in such a case, to resort to such an expedient as changing the traditional order of verses in the Rig-veda text.

Verse 1.

Note 1. We have first the indicative, then the optative.

Verse 2.

Note 1. *Divispr̥śah* no doubt is genitive sing. referring to Agni, not nominative pl. referring to the worshippers.

Verse 3.

Note 1. Ludwig is right in observing here : ‘eigentlich er spreche die yāgyās als einladung für die götter.’

Verse 6.

Note 1. On *riñgase*, comp. Bartholomae, Indogermanische Forschungen, II, 281 ; Neisser, Bezzenberger's Beiträge, XX, 59. I take the form here as 2nd singular.

MANDALA V, HYMN 14.

ASHTAKA IV, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 6.

1. Awaken ¹ Agni by thy song of praise, kindling (him) the immortal one. May he place our offerings among the gods.

2. Him, the immortal god, the mortals magnify at their sacrifices, the best sacrificer among the tribe of men.

3. Him indeed they all magnify, the god, with the (sacrificial) ladle that overflows with *ghṛita*, Agni, in order that he may bear the oblation.

4. Agni when born has shone, killing the *Dasyus*, (killing) darkness by light. He has found the cows, the waters, the sun ¹.

5. Worship Agni, the sage who should be magnified, whose back is covered with *ghṛita*. May he come and hear my call ¹.

6. They have made Agni grow by *ghṛita*, him who dwells among all tribes, and by longing, eloquent praises.

NOTES.

The same *Rishi* and metre. — Verse 1 = TS. IV, 1, 11, 4; MS. IV, 10, 1; VS. XXII, 15. Verse 3 = TS. IV, 3, 13, 8; MS. IV, 10, 1. Verse 4 = MS. IV, 10, 2.

Verse 1.

Note 1. We have no reason and, unless we write *bodhaya*, no right for taking *bodhaya* as an equivalent of *bodhayāni* (Ludwig).

Verse 4.

Note 1. Agni is considered here, as is done frequently, as the performer of deeds which properly belong to Indra (see H. O., Religion des Veda, 98 seq.). Indra is the conqueror of the cows and of the waters ; as to the sun, it may be said of both gods with the same right that they have acquired it for mankind (Religion des Veda, 110 seq. ; 15c seq.).

Verse 5.

Note 1. Although me can be accusative (Pischel, Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, XXXV, 714 seq.), I have no doubt that it is here genitive, and depends on hávam. Cf. II, 24, 15. véshi me hávam ; X, 61, 4. vítám me yagñám.

MANDALA V, HYMN 15.

ASHTAKA IV, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 7.

1. I bring a prayer to the worshipper, the renowned sage, the glorious, ancient one. Agni is the highly gracious Asura, taking his seat in *ghṛita*, the holder of wealth, supporting goods.

2. By *Rita* they have supported the supporting *Rita*, near the powerful (performer)¹ of sacrifice, in highest heaven, the men who sit² on the supporting support of the sky, and who with born (men) attained to the unborn.

3. Dispelling anguish¹ they spread out for the ancient one² his bodies³, mighty vital power, difficult to overcome. May he, the new-born, traverse the spaces. They have stood round him as round an angry lion.

4. When thou carriest, spreading out, man after man like a mother, for their nourishment and for their sight, when thou growest old¹ assuming life after life, thou goest around by thyself in manifold shapes.

5. May gain protect now the boundaries of thy strength, the wide, firmly supporting milkstream¹ of wealth, O god! Putting down thy foot in secret like a thief², thou hast enlightened and freed Atri for the sake of wealth mightily³.

NOTES.

The *Rishi* is *Dharuṇa Āṅgīrasa* (cf. *dharúṇaḥ vásvaḥ agníḥ*, verse 1; *ritám dharúṇam, diváh dhárman dharúne*, verse 2; *dógham dharúṇam*, verse 5); the metre, *Trishúbh*.—No verse of this hymn occurs in the other *Samhitás*.

Verse 2.

Note 1. It may be asked whether *sáká*, beside its meaning 'the powerful (helper),' may also mean 'the power.' This would suit very well, V, 30, 10. *sám táḥ* (scil. *gáh*) *índraḥ asrigat asya sákáḥ*; VI, 19, 4. *tám vaḥ índram katínam asya sákáḥ ihá núnám vāgayántaḥ huvema*. The translation then would be: 'by the power of sacrifice.' Böhtlingk-Roth conjecture *sáke*.

Note 2. I believe that *sedúshaḥ* stands for the nominative, cf. *deváh ábibhyushaḥ*, I, 11, 5; S. B. E. XXXII, p. 28. This *sedúshaḥ* led on to a second accusative standing for the nominative, *nr̥ṇ*.—The men sitting on the support of the sky seem to be the forefathers who have established the universal laws, the *Āṅgīras*.

Verse 3.

Note 1. I consider *amhoyúvaḥ* as nom. plur. masc., but it may also be gen. sing. masc., or acc. plur. fem., as an epithet either of *Agni* or of his *tanvāḥ*.

Note 2. The ancient one (*pūrvyá*) seems to be *Agni* (cf. verse 1).

Note 3. Cf. VI, 46, 12. *yátra sūrásaḥ tanvāḥ vitanvaté*.

Verse 4.

Note 1. I think, like Ludwig, that *garase* should be accented.

Verse 5.

Note 1. These are accusatives.—Cf. on this passage, Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, I, 39 seq.

Note 2. Cf. H. O., *Prolegomena*, p. 73.

Note 3. Cf. VI, 1, 2. *maháḥ rāyé kitáyantaḥ*.—See Geldner, *Ved. Studien*, I, 268.

MANDALA V, HYMN 16.

ASHṬAKA IV, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 8.

1. Sing¹ (a song that gives) mighty vital power, to the light, to god Agni, whom the mortals have placed in front² like Mitra by their praises³.

2. For he, Agni, the Hotṛi of men, day by day, in the arms of Daksha, discloses the offering in the due way, as Bhaga¹ (discloses) a treasure.

3. (We abide [?]) in his praise, the liberal (god's), in his friendship, the mightily brilliant one's, in whom, the loudly roaring Aryan, all (beings) have put together their strength.

4. For verily, O Agni, (thou belongest [?]) to them¹ through thy bounteousness² in (bestowing) abundance of heroes. Him indeed, the vigorous one, his glory the two worlds could not encompass³.

5. Now then, Agni, come hither and, being praised, bring treasure¹ to us who, we ourselves and our liberal givers, may acquire welfare together. And help us to grow strong in fights.

NOTES.

The *Rishi* is Pûru Âtreya (cf. 17, 1); the metre Anushubh (verse 5, Pañkti). This hymn and V, 17 are parallel hymns; the concluding words of both are identical (see also V, 9, 7; 10, 7).—Verse 1=SV. I, 88.

Verse 1.

Note 1. *Ārka* may be first or second person.

[46]

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Note 2. Dadhiré puráh: they have made him their Purohita.

Note 3. Comp. above, V, 9, 6.

Verse 2.

Note 1. On Bhaga, the divine Bestower or Dispenser of riches, cf. Herbert Baynes. The Biography of Bhaga (Actes du huitième Congrès intern. des Orientalistes, Sect. II, fasc. 1, pp. 83 seq.).

Verse 4.

Note 1. To them, i. e. the Maghavans. Compare below, 18, 3. 4.

Note 2. Mamhánâ seems to be instrumental. Comp. 10. 2; 18, 2.

Note 3. Agni is himself yahvá; so ná cannot be the comparative particle, but it must be the negation. Similarly it is said in II, 16, 3 that Heaven and Earth cannot encompass the indriya of Indra; cf. also X, 27, 7.

Verse 5.

Note 1. Váryam seems to depend on á bhara. With the whole phrase compare the first Pâda of V, 17, 5.

MANDALA V, HYMN 17.

ASHTAKA IV, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 9.

1. May the mortal truly by sacrifices, O god, (magnify) the stronger one for help; may the Pûru, when good service has been performed, magnify Agni (and thereby draw him) hither for his aid.

2. For thou art manifestly considered as his (i. e. Agni's) disposer, highly brilliant by thyself¹: (magnify then Agni who is) a firmament of bright splendour, lovely beyond² thought³.

3. (It is) yonder (sun?) who verily has been yoked by his (i. e. Agni's) light¹ through the impetuous speech²—(by the light of Agni) whose flames mightily shine as if (they were made to shine) by the sperm of heaven³.

4. Through his, the wise one's, insight there is wealth on his, the wonderful (Agni's), chariot. And Agni is praised, he who is to be invoked among all peoples.

5. Now indeed our liberal lords have manifestly attained¹ treasure. Offspring of vigour! Protect us for the sake of victory! Help us to welfare! And assist us to grow strong in fights!

NOTES.

The same *Rishi* and metre.—No verse occurs in the other *Samhitās*.

Verse 2.

Note 1. I have translated the text in its traditional form, which I think is correct. On the vocative vidharman, comp. Delbrück, *Altindische Syntax*, p. 106. One could think, however, of reading vídharman as a locative, and sváyasastare, and of considering mányase as a first person, like arkase, &c.: 'For in his extension, brilliant by itself, I manifestly comprehend that firmament,' &c.

Note 2. Cf. VIII, 72, 3. antáh ikkhanti tám gáne rudrám paráh manisháyá. 'Ueber alle Vorstellung hinaus.' Ludwig.

Note 3. If we read sváyasastaráh, vídharman, and explain mányase as second person, the following translation of this difficult verse may be attempted: 'Thou art manifestly, indeed, considered as very brilliant by thyself in its (the firmament's) extension: that firmament of bright splendour (I praise), lovely beyond thought.' It is not very probable, however, that ásyā should refer to anything else but Agni.

Verse 3.

Note 1. Sâyana, whom Ludwig follows, very probably is right in interpreting asáu as the sun.—On the Sandhi, compare Roth, *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländ. Gesellschaft*, XLVIII, 679.

Note 2. Through the sacred spell, by which the sun is made to rise through the kindling of the fire.—Cf. VIII, 17, 15. tugá . . . grībhá.

Note 3. Does this mean that Agni's flames shine like lightning which receives its light from the waters of the cloud, the sperm of heaven? Cf. IX, 74, 1, where it is said of the Soma mixed with water: diváh rétasā sakate.

Verse 5.

Note 1. I think that sakanta should be accented, because it is connected with hí.

MANDALA V, HYMN 18.

ASHTAKA IV, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 10.

1. May Agni, beloved of many, the guest of the house¹, be praised in the morning, the immortal who delights² in all offerings among the mortals.

2¹. To Dvita who by the liberal power of his dexterousness carries away injury², this praiser of thine, O immortal, prepares Soma in the due way.

3. I call for your sake Him who flames through long life, with the speech that belongs to the liberal patrons¹ whose chariot moves uninjured, O giver of horses²;

4. And in whom (dwells) brilliant thought, who guard the hymns of praise in their mouth, (whose) sacrificial grass is spread in the realm of the sun: they have invested themselves with glory.

5. On the liberal patrons who have given me fifty horses for my song of praise¹, bestow brilliant, mighty, high glory, O Agni; on those men (bestow glory) with (valiant) men, O immortal!

NOTES.

The *Rishi* is *Mṛiktavâhas Dvita Âtreya* (see verse 2); the metre is the same.—Verse 1 = SV. I, 85. Verse 5 = TB. II, 7, 5, 2.

Verse 1.

Note 1. *Viśāh* . . . *âtithiḥ*: cf. above, V, 3, 5.

Note 2. On *ran* with the accusative, compare Gaedicke, p. 76.

Verse 2.

Note 1. Compare on this verse Macdonell, *Journal Roy. As. Soc.*, 1893, p. 463 seq.

Note 2. Dvita, who seems to be identified with Agni, is, in the same way as Trita (see Bloomfield, *Proceedings Amer. Or. Soc.*, March, 1894, p. cxix seqq.), supposed to take away human sin and all sorts of mischief and misfortune (cf. VIII, 47, 16. Tritāya ka Dvitāya ka úshaḥ dushvāpnyam vaha). Thus he is invoked here as carrying away *mṛiktá*, i.e. injury.

Verse 3.

Note 1. The speech of the priest belongs to the sacrificer who has engaged him.

Note 2. This seems to be Agni, with an evident allusion to the human giver of horses (see verse 5).

Verse 5.

Note 1. Sadhástuti seems to be instrumental. Cf. Lanman, p. 381.

MANDALA V, HYMN 19.

ASHTAKA IV, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 11.

1. They are born for retirement¹. Out of the cover he² has shone forth, being a cover himself. In the lap of the mother he looks about³.

2. Causing him to discern (the pious and the impious?), they have sacrificed. With unwinking eyes they protect his manly power. They have penetrated into the firm stronghold¹.

3. The people of Svaitreya¹, his clans, have thriven brilliantly. *Br̥haduktha* with a golden ornament at his neck, is eager for the race as if by this honey-drink².

4. Like the dear milk of love¹—(a thing) unrelated with two (things) related²—like the gharma vessel with booty in its belly—undeceived, the deceiver of all³.

5. Sporting, O beam of light, appear to us, joined with the ash, with the wind. May those well sharpened . . . of his, standing on . . . , be sharp like . . .¹.

NOTES.

The *R̥ishi* is Vavri Ātreya (cf. verse 1. *prá vavrēh vavrīh kīketa*). The metre is *Gāyatrī* in verses 1, 2, *Anuṣṭubh* in verses 3, 4, *Virāḍrūpā* in verse 5.—No verse occurs in the other *Samhitās*.

This *Sūkta* seems to be anything rather than an ordinary Agni hymn. It may be a collection of verses belonging to an *Ākhyāna*, or of verses serving another purpose which we can scarcely hope to discover. In several parts of this

Sūkta I must content myself with translating the words without being able to elucidate the poet's meaning.

Verse 1.

Note 1. I translate the noun *avasthā* in accordance with the Vedic meaning of the verb *ava-sthā*. Possibly it means the secret parts, cf. *avastha*, AV. VII, 90, 3 (B.-R.). Ludwig translates: 'Ein zustand erzeugt einen andern,' and paraphrases, 'Nur zustände und formen, gestalten lernen wir kennen, das wesen des gottes bleibt uns verborgen.' This seems too modern. Prof. Max Müller proposes: 'The remnants (afterbirth) have been brought forth. Skin has shone forth from skin.'—On the question who are the beings 'born for retirement,' I do not venture any conjecture.

Note 2. Is *Agni* meant?

Note 3. Cf. X, 5, 1. (*Agnih*) *asmāt hridāh bhūrganmā ví kash/c*.

Verse 2.

Note 1. The meaning seems to be that the worshippers (possibly the first worshippers, the *Āṅgiras*), by discovering *Agni* and by worshipping him, have conquered the hostile strongholds.

Verse 3.

Note 1. *Svaitreya* is mentioned as a victorious hero also in I, 33, 14.

Note 2. Does this phrase allude to the rite of offering, at the *Vāgapeya* sacrifice, to the horses that were going to run the sacred race, a *naivāra karu*? In the Mantras connected with this rite the words occur: 'Drink of this honey-drink' (*asyā mādхваh pibata*). See *Rig-veda* VII, 38, 8; *Taittirīya Samhitā* I, 7, 8, 2; Weber, *Ueber den Vāgapeya*, p. 30.

Verse 4.

Note 1. The *retas*?

Note 2. Does this refer to an offering or the like, composed of two substances related among each other (such as

milk and butter), and a third substance unrelated (such as rice)? Of course all this is absolutely uncertain.

Note 3. Is this Agni?

Verse 5.

Note 1. The meaning of *dhr̥ishág*, *vakshī*, *vakshanesthá* is unknown.—On the first hemistich of this verse, compare Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, II, 54.

MANDALA V, HYMN 20.

ASHTAKA IV, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 12.

1¹. Whatever good, O Agni, best acquirer of gain, thou thinkest (fit), praise thou ² that (good), which is celebrated in songs, among the gods as our share.

2. They, Agni, who do not set into motion for thee (prayers or offerings), when grown full of mighty strength ¹, turn away to encounter the hatred and the tricks of him who follows another (i. e. a wrong) law ².

3. We choose thee as our Hotri; Agni, the giver of skill; offering delight (to thee) we call with our prayer (thee), the foremost at the sacrifices.

4. So that we, O strong one, (may be ready) for thy favour, for wealth and Rita, O highly wise one : thus may we day by day rejoice ¹ with cows and rejoice with heroes.

NOTES.

The *Rishi* is Prayasvanta Ātreya (cf. verse 3. *prāyasvantaḥ havāmahe*), the metre *Anuṣṭubh*, verse 4 *Pañkti*.— Verse 1 = VS. XIX, 64.

Verse 1.

Note 1. Professor Max Müller proposes to read *vāgasā-tamam*, as in IX, 98, 1. Pischel (*Vedische Studien*, I, 200) translates this verse : 'O Agni, das rühmenswerte Gut, das du für geeignet hältst, das preise du zugleich mit unsern Liedern (no *gīrbhīr yūgam*) den Göttern an (diis *vendita*).' He explains : 'Agni soll den Göttern Gut bringen und sie

veranlassen, es den Menschen für die Lieder zu schenken.' I cannot follow Pischel's theory about the identity of the roots *pan* and *paṇ* (comp. about *paṇ* the quotations collected by Bartholomae, *Indogermanische Forschungen*, III, 180); and the paraphrase '*diis vendita*' seems inadmissible to me. I differ from Pischel, besides, in the interpretation of *yúgam*; cf. *rayám . . . yúgam*, IV, 37, 5; *ráyá yugá*, VII, 43, 5; 95, 4.

Note 2. Neisser, *Bezzenberger's Beiträge*, XX, 55, explains *panayá* as standing for *panayâma*, and compares V, 56, 2 (?).

Verse 2.

Note 1. On *vṛidh* with the genitive, compare Delbrück, *Altindische Syntax*, p. 158; Macdonell, *Journal Roy. As. Soc.*, 1893, p. 433. Grassmann's conjecture *vṛiddhâ(v)* is a failure.

Note 2. With the second hemistich compare VS. XXXVIII, 20 (*Satapatha Brâhmaṇa* XIV, 3, 1, 9); TÂr. IV, 11, 4 (cf. V, 9, 7).

Verse 4.

Note 1. *Syâma* stands, as the accent shows, in an independent clause. Prof. Max Müller proposes to change the accent: 'So that we . . . may for thy favour, for wealth and *Rîta* day by day rejoice with cows.'

MANDALA V, HYMN 21.

ASHTAKA IV, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 13.

1. Let us lay thee down, as Manus did. Let us kindle thee, as Manus did. O Agni Aṅgiras, sacrifice to the gods for the worshippers of the gods as (thou didst) for Manus.

2. For thou, O Agni, art kindled, highly pleased, among human people. To thee the (sacrificial) ladles proceed in due order, O well-born one who drinkest butter.

3. Thee all the gods unanimously have made their messenger. Serving thee, O sage, they magnify at the sacrifices (thee) the god.

4. Let the mortal magnify for your sake Agni, the god, with worship as is due to the gods. Being kindled, O brilliant one, shine! Sit down in the abode¹ of *Rīta*; sit down in the abode¹ of herbs².

NOTES.

The *Rīshi* is Sasa Ātreya (cf. verse 4); the metre is the same.—Verse 1 = TB. III, 11, 6, 3.

Verse 4.

Note 1. Literally 'in the womb.'

Note 2. On *sasá*, see III, 5, 6, note 2. Is the abode (or womb) of the herbs the Barhis? 'Is it *satyasya*?' M.M.

MANDALA V, HYMN 22.

ASHṬAKA IV, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 14.

1. Lo, Visvasāman! Like Atri sing to him who purifies with his flames, to the Hotri who should be magnified at the sacrifices, most delightful in the clan.

2¹. Lay down Agni Gâtavedas, the god, the priest. May the sacrifice which best encompasses the gods, proceed to-day in due order.

3. We, the mortals, approaching thee, the attentive-minded god, for thy help, have thought of thy desirable aid.

4. Agni, be intent on this—on this our word¹, O strong one. As such, O strong-jawed² lord of the house, the Atris strengthen thee by their praises; the Atris beautify thee by their prayers.

NOTES.

The *Rishi* is Visvasāman (see verse 1); the metre is the same.—No verse of this hymn occurs in the other *Samhitās*.

Verse 2.

Note 1. With this verse compare below, V, 26, 7. 8.

Verse 4.

Note 1. The verb *kit* stands here first with the genitive *asyá*, then with the accusative *idám vákaḥ*.

Note 2. Compare vol. xxxii, p. 301 (II, 34, 3, note 3).

MANDALA V, HYMN 23.

ASHTAKA IV, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 15.

1. Agni, bring hither, through the power of thy splendour, powerful wealth which may manifestly prevail over all tribes in the (contests for) booty.

2. O powerful Agni! Bring hither that wealth powerful in battles. For thou art the true, wonderful giver of booty rich in cows.

3. For all men who have spread out the sacrificial grass, unanimously ask thee, the beloved Hotri in the seats (of sacrifice), for many boons.

4. For he who dwells among all tribes, has invested himself with power against assault¹. Agni! In these dwelling-places shine to us richly, O bright one, shine brilliantly, O purifier!

NOTES.

The *Rishi* is Dyumna Visvakarshani Ātreya (cf. verse 1); the metre is the same.—Verses 1-2 = TS. I, 3, 14, 6-7.

Verse 4.

Note 1. Is abhīmāti (abhīmāti?) a dative? Should we read abhīmāti-sahāḥ (cf. X, 83, 4) as a compound: 'he has been established as the conqueror of assaults.'

MANDALA V, HYMN 24.

ASHTAKA IV, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 16.

1. Agni, be thou our nearest (friend) and our kind, protecting guardian.
2. Agni is Vasu, renowned as Vasu (or, renowned by goods). Obtain, (and) bestow (on us), most brilliant wealth ¹.
3. Listen to us then; hear our call; deliver us from every harmful man.
4. We entreat thee now, O brightest, shining (Agni), for thy grace, for our friends.

NOTES.

The *Rishis* are the Gaupāyanas or Laupāyanas, Bandhu (verse 1), Subandhu (verse 2), Srutabandhu (verse 3), Viprabandhu (verse 4). The metre is Dvipadā Virāg.—Verses 1, 2, 4, 3 = VS. III, 25–26. Verses 1, 4, 2, 3 = MS. I, 5, 3. Verses 1, 2, 4 = SV. II, 457–459; VS. XV, 48; XXV, 47. Verses 1, 4, 2 = TS. I, 5, 6, 2–3; IV, 4, 4, 8. Verse 1 = SV. I, 448.

Verse 2.

Note 1. The accusative *dyumáttamam rayīm* seems to depend both on *ákṣhā* nakshi and on *dāh*. I cannot find any reason for preferring the reading of SV. and TS. *dyumáttamah* (Ludwig).

MANDALA V, HYMN 25.

ASHTAKA IV, ADHYÂYA 1, VARGA 17-18.

1. Address thy song¹ for your sake to the god Agni, for his help. He is our Vasu. May the son of the dawns(?)² give us (wealth). May the righteous one help us across our enemies.

2. He is the true one, whom the men of old, whom the gods have kindled, the Hotri with the delightful tongue, rich in splendour with glorious shine.

3. As such, with thy widest thought and with thy best favour, shine wealth on us, excellent Agni, for our beautiful praises¹.

4. Agni reigns among the gods, Agni among mortals, entering among them. Agni is the carrier of our offerings. Serve ye Agni with prayers!

5. Agni gives to the worshipper a son most mightily renowned, a knower of mighty spells, most excellent, unconquered, who brings renown to his lord¹.

6. Agni gives a good lord who is victorious in battles with his men; Agni (gives) a steed, swiftly running, victorious (in races), unconquered.

7. Sing mightily to Agni the (song) which may best bring him (to us), O (god) rich in splendour¹! From thee (proceeds) wealth (mighty) like a buffalo-cow²; from thee proceed gains.

8. Thy brilliant flames resound mightily like the pressing-stone (of the Soma)¹. And thy roaring arose like thunder by itself from heaven².

9. Thus we have paid homage, desirous of goods, to powerful Agni. May he, the highly wise one, help us, as with a ship, across all enemies.

NOTES.

The *Rīshis* are the *Vasūyavañ* *Ātreyañ* (cf. verse 9); the metre is *Anushūbh*. Verse 5=MS. IV, 11, 1. Verse 6=MS. IV, 11, 1. Verse 7=SV. I, 86; VS. XXVI, 12; TS. I, 1, 14, 4. The *Sūkta* consists of hymns of three verses each.

Verse 1.

Note 1. On *gāsi*, comp. Neisser, *Bezenberger's Beiträge*, XX, 70, note 1; Bartholomae, *Indogermanische Forschungen*, II, 278, 283.

Note 2. *Rishûñām*: comp. above, I, 127, 10, note 5.

Verse 3.

Note 1. On *suvrīktī*, comp. above, II, 4, 1, note 1.

Verse 5.

Note 1. I.e. to his father? Or to his patrons?

Verse 7.

Note 1. This vocative very probably refers to Agni.

Note 2. Or 'like a king's consort'? It may be doubted whether the difference of accent (*māhishî* and *mahishî*) holds good for the *Rig-veda*.—Comp. on *māhishiva*, Roth, *Zeitschr. der Deutschen Morgenländ. Gesellschaft*, XLVIII, 680.

Verse 8.

Note 1. *Brīhat* is not the name of the *Sāman*; cf. X, 64, 15 (100, 8). *grāvā yātra madhu-sút ukyāte brīhāt*. Comp. Hillebrandt, *Vedische Mythologie*, I, p. 153.—The singular *ukyate* is explained by the connection with *grāvā*.

Note 2. With the last *Pāda* comp. the conclusion of V, 52, 6 (vol. xxxii, p. 312).

MANDALA V, HYMN 26.

ASHTAKA IV, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 19-20.

1. Agni, purifier! With thy splendour, with thy delightful tongue, O god, bring hither the gods and perform the sacrifice.

2. Thee therefore we approach, who swimdest in *ghṛita*¹, O (god) with brilliant light, thee of sun-like aspect. Bring hither the gods that they may feast.

3. Let us kindle thee, O sage, the brilliant offerer of feasts (to the gods), O Agni, the mighty (god) at the sacrifice.

4. Agni, come hither with all the gods to the gift of the offering. We choose thee as our *Hotri*.

5. Bring to the sacrificer who presses (Soma), Agni, abundance of heroes. Sit down on the sacrificial grass together with the gods.

6. Being kindled, Agni, conqueror of thousandfold (wealth), thou makest the ordinances (of the world) thrive, the praiseworthy messenger of the gods.

7¹. Lay down Agni *Gâtavedas*, the carrier of offerings, the youngest, the god, the priest.

8. May the sacrifice which best encompasses the gods, proceed to-day in due order. Spread the sacrificial grass that (the gods) may sit down on it.

9. May the Maruts, the Asvins, Mitra and Varuṇa sit down on this (sacrificial grass), the gods with all their folk.

NOTES.

The same *Rishis*. Metre, Gâyatri. Verses 1-3=SV. II, 871-873. Verse 1=TS. I, 3, 14, 8; 5, 5, 3; IV, 6, 1, 2; MS. I, 5, 1; II, 10, 1; IV, 10, 1; VS. XVII, 8. Verse 3=TS. I, 1, 11, 2; VS. II, 4; comp. MS. I, 1, 12. Verse 7=MS. IV, 11, 1.

As V, 26, this Sûkta also consists of *Trika* hymns.

Verse 2.

Note 1. Comp. above, IV, 2, 3, note 1.

Verse 7.

Note 1. With verses 7 and 8, compare above, V, 22, 2.

MANDALA V, HYMN 27.

ASHTAKA IV, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 21.

1. The good lord has presented me with two oxen together with a car, the most brilliant Asura among the liberal givers¹. Tryaruna, the son of Trivri-shan, O Agni Vaisvânara², has distinguished himself by (his gift of) ten thousand (cows ?)³.

2. To him who gives me one hundred¹ and twenty cows and two fallow steeds, harnessed and well-yoked, to Tryaruna grant thy protection, Agni Vaisvânara, who art highly praised and grown strong.

3. Thus, O Agni, desiring thy favour¹, Trasadasyu² (sings) for the ninth time³ to thee the youngest (god)—Tryaruna who responds to my, the strong-born's, many hymns with (the gift of) a yoked (chariot)⁴—

4¹. Who may thus announce me² to Asvamedha the liberal (prince): may he give to him who with his verse strives for gain; may he give to him who lives in the *Rita* for (acquiring) wisdom³—

5. Asvamedha whose gifts, a hundred speckled bulls, delight me like Soma juices with threefold admixture¹.

6. Indra-Agni! Bestow on Asvamedha, the giver of a hundred (bulls), abundance of heroes and mighty royal power, like the never-ageing Sun in heaven.

NOTES.

The *Rīshis* are Tryaruna Traivṛishna, Trasadasyu Paurukutsya, and Asvamedha Bhārata, or, according to others, Atri alone. The metre is Trishṭubh in verses 1-3, Anuṣṭubh in verses 4-6.

The position of this Sūkta shows that it is a later addition to the original collection.

Verse 1.

Note 1. With Delbrück, Grassmann, von Bradke (Dyaus Asura, p. 67) I read maghónām instead of maghónāh. Cf. III, 3, 4. ásurah vipah-kítām.

Note 2. On the invocation of Agni in Dānastutis, comp. H. O., Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, XXXIX, 87.

Note 3. Geldner (Ved. Studien, I, 268) is right in observing: 'Hier ist unter sahasrāni eine bestimmte Geld- oder Wertsumme zu verstehen,' and in adding that it is not necessary that such a sum consisted in cows.

Verse 2.

Note 1. On satá, 'one hundred,' compare Delbrück, Altindische Syntax, p. 82.

Verse 3.

Note 1. Cf. X, 148, 3. sumatīm kakánāh.

Note 2. That is, very probably, a descendant of Trasadasyu.

Note 3. I do not adopt Sáyana's explanation navamam = navatamām, though I do not know what the number 'nine' means here. Ludwig is absolutely right in observing 'dass man eben hier, wo es sich um specielle concrete, uns aber sonst her nicht bekannte verhältnisse und ereignisse handelt, eben sich bescheiden muss, nichts

zu wissen.'—Prof. Max Müller believes that *navishtāya* makes *navamam* for *navatamam* excusable : 'to the newest god the newest song.'

Note 4. *Sāyana* supplies to *yuktena*, not *rathena*, but *manasā*.

Verse 4.

Note 1. I do not think that Ludwig is right in believing that with verse 4 a new, independent section begins.—Comp. on this verse, vol. xxxii, p. 304 (II, 34, 7, note 3).

Note 2. *Me* may be accusative, as it frequently is. Should it be a dative, we should have to translate : 'Who may tell *Asvamedha* for my sake.'

Note 3. *Medhām* can scarcely depend on *dādat* ; wisdom is not a gift which liberal princes may bestow on singers.

Verse 5.

Note 1. Of milk, curds, and barley. See Hillebrandt, *Vedische Mythologie*, I, p. 209.

MANDALA V, HYMN 28.

ASHTAKA IV, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 22.

1. Agni kindled has sent his light to the sky ; turned towards the dawn he shines far and wide. (The sacrificial ladle) goes forward with adoration, rich in all treasures, magnifying the gods with sacrificial food.

2. Being kindled thou reignest over immortality ; thou attendest for welfare the man who prepares the sacrificial food. He whom thou furtherest, acquires all wealth and puts in front hospitality (towards thee), O Agni¹.

3. Agni, show thy prowess for the sake of great bliss. May thy splendours be highest. Make our householdership easy to conduct¹. Set thy foot on the greatness of those who show enmity to us.

4. I adore thy beauty, Agni, who hast been kindled, who art highly exalted. A bull, brilliant art thou. Thou art kindled at the sacrifices.

5. Being kindled, Agni into whom offerings are poured, sacrifice to the gods, best sacrificer, for thou art the carrier of oblations.

6. Sacrifice into (Agni) ; exalt Agni, while the sacrifice is going on. Choose him for your carrier of oblations.

NOTES.

The *Rishi* is Visvavârâ Âtreyaî (cf. verse 1); the metre is Trishûbh in verses 1 and 3, *Gagatî* in verse 2, *Anushûbh* in verse 4, *Gâyatrî* in verses 5 and 6. Verse 3=AV. VII, 73, 10; VS. XXXIII, 12; TS. II, 4, 1, 1; 5, 2, 4; MS. IV, 11, 1. Verse 5=TS. II, 5, 8, 6. Verses 5-6=TB. III, 5, 2, 3.

The *Sûkta* is a later addition to the original *Samhitâ*.

Verse 2.

Note 1. Should not *dhatte* be accented? 'He whom thou furthest and (who) puts in front hospitality (towards thee), O Agni, acquires all wealth.'

Verse 3.

Note 1. Cf. X, 85, 23. *sâm gâspatyâm suyâmam astu devâh*. The additions to the single *Mandalas* seem, as a rule, to be of later origin than the hymns of the tenth *Mandala* (see H.O., Prolegomena, p. 265); so it may be conjectured that the author of our verse imitated that passage of the great marriage hymn.

APPENDICES.

- I. INDEX OF WORDS.
- II. LIST OF THE MORE IMPORTANT PASSAGES QUOTED
IN THE NOTES.

THE following is not (like the Index to vol. xxxii) a complete Index verborum to the hymns translated in this volume, but only an Index of all the words which can be of any importance. It contains all rare, difficult, and doubtful words, all words of any mythological importance, and especially all words about which something is said in the Notes.

Three figures refer to *Mandala*, hymn, and verse, a small figure to a note. If a word occurs in a note only, the passage is put in parentheses.

M. W.

I. INDEX OF WORDS.

- a, demonstr. pronoun : ayá, II, 6, 2¹.
Amsa, one of the *Ādityas*, II, 1, 4².
amsú, Soma shoot, IV, 1, 19.
amhab-yú, dispelling anguish, V, 15, 3¹.
amhatí, distress, I, 94, 2.
ámhas, evil, distress, anguish, I, 36, 14; 58, 8; 9; III, 15, 3; IV, 2, 8; 9; 3, 14; 11, 6; 12, 6.
aktú, night, I, 36, 16; 68, 1; 94, 5; II, 10, 3; III, 7, 6; IV, 10, 5; *áti aktúb* (conj. *áti aktún*), I, 143, 3².
aktú, ointment : *aktú-bhiḥ agyate*, III, 17, 1¹.
akrá, a racer, I, 143, 7²; 189, 7²; III, 1, 12¹; IV, 6, 3².
akshán, eye : *śatám ákshānab akshā-bhiḥ*, I, 128, 3.
akshí, eye : *diváb akshí íti*, I, 72, 10¹.
ákshita, imperishable, I, 58, 5.
ákshiyamāna, inexhaustible, III, 26, 9.
agótā, want of cows, III, 16, 5.
ágopā, without a keeper, II, 4, 7.
Agní, fire, and god of fire, I, 1, 1, &c.; III, 2, 9²; *agním-agnim*, I, 12, 2; *agnínā agnib sám idhyate*, I, 12, 6; *agne agnibhiḥ*, I, 26, 10; *agním (ā vaha āgne)*, I, 44, 8¹; *vayáb íti agne agnáyab te anyé*, I, 59, 1; *índram agním*, III, 12, 3; *puríshyāsab agnáyab*, III, 22, 4; *āgne víṣvebhiḥ agnī-bhiḥ*, III, 24, 4; *āgne índrab ka*, III, 25, 4; *agnáyab agnīshu*, V, 6, 6.
agni-gihvá, fire-tongued : *agni-gihvāb*, I, 44, 14.
agnídh, the *Agnídh* (priest) : *agnít* (conj. *agnít*), II, 1, 2².
agni-ṛṣí, possessing the beauty of *Agni*, III, 26, 5¹.
ágra, summit : *ripáb ágram*, III, 5, 5¹; *ágre*, at first, I, 31, 5; in front of, I, 127, 10.
agriyá, foremost : *agriyám*, I, 13, 10.
agrú, virgin : *agrúvab*, I, 140, 8¹; III, 29, 13².
aghá, evil, I, 97, 1¹-8; 128, 5; V, 3, 7; harmful foe, I, 189, 5.
agha-yát, harmful, IV, 2, 6; 24, 3.
agha-yú, harmful, I, 27, 3¹; 147, 4; IV, 2, 9.
aghá-samsa, attacking with evil spells, IV, 4, 3; V, 3, 7.
ághnyā, cow, IV, 1, 6.
āngá : *yát āngá*, whatever, I, 1, 6.
Āngiras, N. of *Agni*, I, 1, 6; 31, 1; 17; 74, 5; IV, 2, 15; 3, 15; 9, 7; V, 8, 4; 10, 7; 11, 6; 21, 1; *gyéshítam āngirasām*, I, 127, 2; *āngirab-tamab*, the highest *Āngiras*, I, 31, 2; 75, 2;—pl. the *Āngiras* (*Rishis*), I, 71, 2¹; IV, 3, 11¹; V, 11, 6¹;—*āngirasvát*, I, 31, 17; 45, 3; 78, 3.
akítta, unseen, IV, 3, 1.
ákitti, folly, IV, 2, 11; thoughtlessness : *ákitti-bhiḥ*, IV, 12, 4.
ákṣbāvāka, a certain priest, (I, 142, 4²).
ákṣbidra, flawless, I, 58, 8; II, 3, 8; III, 15, 5.
ákṣbidra-úti, whose blessings are flawless, I, 145, 3.
ákyuta, unshakeable, II, 3, 3.

ag, to drive: út agate, he raises up, I, 95, 7; út âgan, they have driven out, IV, 1, 13; â agâti, may he lead, V, 2, 5; sám agâti, may he get together, V, 2, 12; agur yamub, V, 6, 10².

agá, goat, I, 67, 5¹.

agára, undecaying, never ageing, I, 58, 2; 4; 127, 5; 9; 143, 3; 144, 4; 146, 2; II, 8, 4¹; III, 2, 2; 6, 4; 8, 2; 18, 2; 23, 1; V, 4, 2.

ágasra, unwearied, I, 189, 4; III, 1, 21; 26, 7.

ágâta, unborn, V, 15, 2.

ágâmi, unrelated, IV, 4, 5; V, 19, 4.

agirá, agile, I, 140, 4; III, 9, 8.

aguryá, undecaying, I, 146, 4; II, 3, 5; 8, 2; III, 7, 4; 7; aguryám (conj. aguryáb), I, 67, 1².

ágñâta-keta, with unknown design, V, 3, 11.

ágma, course, III, 2, 12.

ágman, race, I, 65, 6.

âgra, plain: brîhatâb âgrân, IV, 1, 17.

âg, to anoint, I, 95, 6, &c.;—sam-ânagé, he has shaped, I, 188, 9; sám âgatab, II, 3, 7¹; trîdhâ sám-aktam, thrice-anointed, II, 3, 10; aktû-bhiâ agyate, III, 17, 1¹; ankte, he anoints himself, V, 1, 3; anakti, IV, 6, 3².

âgí, ointment: âgí-bhiâ, I, 36, 13¹.

âtandra, unwearied, I, 72, 7; 95, 2¹; IV, 4, 12.

atasá, brushwood, I, 58, 2; 4; II, 4, 7; III, 7, 3²; IV, 4, 4; 7, 10.

âtithi, guest, I, 44, 4; 58, 6; 73, 1²; II, 2, 8; 4, 1; III, 2, 2; 3, 8; 26, 2; IV, 1, 20¹; 2, 7; V, 1, 8; 9; 3, 5; 4, 5; 8, 2; 18, 1.

atúrta, unconquered, V, 25, 5.

atripá, insatiable, IV, 5, 14.

átka, vesture, I, 95, 7.

átya, racer: átyab ná prishbám rokate, I, 58, 2¹;—I, 65, 6; 149, 3; II, 4, 4; III, 2, 3; 7; 7, 9; átyam ná sáptim, III, 22, 1¹; IV, 2, 3; V, 25, 6.

Átri, V, 2, 6; 7, 10;—pl. the Atris, V, 22, 4;—atri-vát, I, 45, 3¹; V, 4, 9; 7, 8¹; 22, 1.

átri, devourer, II, 8, 5¹.

atrin, ghoul, I, 36, 14¹; 20; 94, 9.

átha, and, I, 26, 9.

atharí, elephant (?): atharyâb ná dântam, IV, 6, 8².

ad, to eat: âdat, I, 127, 6².

adát, having no teeth, I, 189, 5.

ádabdhâ, undeceivable, I, 76, 2; 95, 9; 128, 1; 143, 8; II, 9, 6; III, 1, 6; IV, 4, 3; V, 19, 4.

ádabdhavratâ-pramati, protector of infallible laws, II, 9, 1¹.

adás: asaú, yonder (sun), V, 17, 3¹.

ádâbhya, undeceivable, I, 31, 10; III, 11, 5; 26, 4; V, 5, 2.

Áditi, I, 94, 16; 95, 11; 98, 3; II, 1, 11; III, 4, 11; IV, 12, 4; mâtâ Áditib, I, 72, 9;—a name of Agni, I, 94, 15¹;—Freedom, IV, 1, 20¹;—âditim urushya, IV, 2, 11²;—m., IV, 3, 8².

ádripta, undismayed, I, 143, 8; not proud, IV, 3, 3.

ádripta, never foolish, I, 69, 3.

ádeva, goddess, III, 1, 16; V, 2, 9; 10.

ádeva-yu, not caring for the gods, I, 150, 2.

ádbhuta, mysterious, wonderful, I, 77, 3²; 94, 12; 13; 142, 3; 10; II, 7, 6; V, 10, 2; 23, 2;—secret, IV, 2, 12.

ádman, food, I, 58, 2.

ádri, rock, I, 70, 4¹; 71, 2; 73, 6; 149, 1; IV, 1, 14; 15; 2, 15²; 3, 11;—press-stone, III, 1, 1.

adrúh, guileless, II, 1, 14²; III, 9, 4; 22, 4.

adroghá, guileless, III, 14, 6.

ádvayâ, truthful, III, 29, 5.

ádvayâvin, in whom is no falsehood, III, 2, 15.

ádha, then: ádha ksharanti (for adháb ksharanti?), I, 72, 10².

ádhi, prep. with abl, on behalf of: ritât ádhi, I, 36, 11¹.

ádhi-iti, remembrance, II, 4, 8.

adhi-mánthana, the support on which the rubbing (for producing the fire) is performed, III, 29, 1².

adhivásâ, upper garment, I, 140, 9.

ádhriḡu, liberal, III, 21, 4¹; V, 10, 1. Adhriḡ? V, 7, 10¹.

ádhvan, way, I, 31, 16; 71, 9;

ádhvanâb deva-yânân, I, 72, 7².

adhvarâ, worship, rite, sacrifice, I, 1, 4¹; 8; 12, 7, &c.: adhvarám yaga, I, 26, 1; pátib adhvarâ-nân, I, 44, 9; rāgantam adh-

- varāwām, I, 45, 4; yagñāsya
 adhvarāsya, I, 128, 4¹; adhvarā-
 iva (conj. adhvaré-iva), III, 6,
 10³; adhvarāsya pra-netā, III,
 23, 1.
 adhvara-srī, beautifier of sacrifices,
 I, 44, 3².
 adhvari, to be as an Adhvaryu:
 adhvari-yasi, II, 1, 2.
 adhvari-yāt, performing the sacrificial
 service, IV, 9, 5.
 adhvaryú, the Adhvaryu priest, I,
 94, 6; II, 5, 6; III, 5, 4; IV,
 6, 4; adhvaryú-bhiḥ pañká-bhiḥ,
 III, 7, 7.
 ánagna, not naked, III, 1, 6.
 ánagni-trā, not standing under Agni's
 protection, I, 189, 3.
 ánadat, not eating, III, 1, 6.
 anantá, infinite, IV, 1, 7².
 anapa-vrīgá, interminable, I, 146, 3.
 anamivá, free from plagues, III, 16,
 3; 22, 4.
 anarván, untouched, I, 94, 2¹; un-
 attainable, II, 6, 5.
 anavadyá, blameless, I, 31, 9; 71,
 8; 73, 3.
 anavabhra-rādhās, with gifts that can-
 not be taken away, III, 26, 6.
 ánasvat, together with a car, V, 27, 1.
 ánākṛita, whom it is not possible to
 drive to a place, I, 141, 7¹.
 ánāga, sinless, IV, 12, 4.
 ánāgāb-tvá, sinlessness, I, 94, 15.
 ánāyata, unsupported, IV, 13, 5.
 anāyudhá, unarmed, IV, 5, 14.
 aniná, feeble, I, 150, 2.
 anindrá, Indra-less, V, 2, 3.
 áni-baddha, unattached, IV, 13, 5.
 ani-bādhá, unbounded, III, 1, 11¹.
 ánihrishya-tavishi, of undecaying
 strength, V, 7, 7.
 ani-māná, immeasurable, I, 27, 11.
 ánimishat, never slumbering, I, 143, 8.
 áni-misham, with unwinking eyes,
 V, 19, 2.
 áni-mesham, unremittingly, I, 31, 12.
 anirá, sapless, IV, 5, 14.
 áni-vṛita, unrestrained, III, 29, 6.
 anishagá, without a quiver, I, 31,
 13².
 ánika, face, II, 9, 6; III, 1, 15; 19,
 4¹; IV, 5, 9¹; 15; 10, 3; 11,
 1; 12, 2; V, 2, 1.
 ánu, prep. with ablat., I, 141, 3².
 anukthá, hymnless, V, 2, 3.
 ánupa-kshita, undecaying, III, 13, 7.
 anushṭbú, by one's present power, I,
 95, 3.
 anushṭbuyá, by one's present power,
 IV, 4, 14.
 anu-satyá, follower of truth, III, 26, 1.
 anu-svadhám, according to one's
 wont or nature, II, 3, 11; III,
 6, 9.
 ánūna, without flaw, I, 146, 1; II,
 10, 6; III, 1, 5; IV, 2, 19; 5, 1.
 ánṛigu, sinful, IV, 3, 13.
 anṛitá, sinful, IV, 5, 5.
 ánṛita, falsehood, V, 12, 4.
 anehás, unmenaced, III, 9, 1.
 antab-vidváms, knowing, I, 72, 7.
 ántama, nearest (friend), I, 27, 5;
 III, 10, 8; V, 24, 1.
 ántara, closest, I, 31, 13; nearer,
 III, 18, 2;—in the midst, I,
 44, 12.
 antáriksha, air, I, 73, 8; III, 6, 8;
 8, 8; 22, 2; IV, 14, 2; V, 1, 11.
 ánti, nigh, I, 79, 11; 94, 9.
 andhá, blind, I, 147, 3¹; 148, 5².
 ándhas, darkness, I, 94, 7.
 ándhas, sap, IV, 1, 19.
 áнна, food: shirā ánnā, I, 127, 4³;
 IV, 7, 10; tri-vṛit ánnam, I,
 140, 2²; ánnā, instr., IV, 7, 11¹.
 ánniyat, desirous of food, IV, 2, 7.
 anyád-anyad, the one and the other,
 I, 95, 1.
 anyá-vrata, following another law,
 V, 20, 2.
 áp, pl., water, Waters, I, 36, 8; 95,
 3¹; 96, 1; 2; IV, 3, 12, &c.; gár-
 bhaś apām, I, 70, 3; III, 1, 12;
 13; 5, 3; apām nāpāt, I, 143,
 1²; III, 9, 1; apām upá-sthe,
 I, 144, 2; apām sadhá-sthe, I,
 149, 4; II, 4, 2; áyub apām,
 III, 1, 5; mātṛib apáb, III,
 9, 2; ap-sú sritám, III, 9, 4;
 apām duroné, III, 25, 5; ávin-
 dat apáb, V, 14, 4¹.
 ápatya, offspring, I, 68, 7.
 ápará-gita, unconquered, III, 12,
 9; V, 25, 6.
 ápari-vṛita, uncovered, II, 10, 3.
 apaśyá, bereft of sight, I, 148, 5².
 ápas, work, I, 68, 5; 69, 8²; 70, 8;
 II, 3, 6; III, 3, 3; 12, 7; IV,
 2, 14; see apás.
 apás, active, I, 31, 8; 71, 3; 95, 4;
 III, 2, 5; 7; 8, 5;—work:

- apási (conj. upási), III, 1, 3³; 11⁴; apáb (conj. ápaḥ), III, 6, 7².
- apasyú, ever active, I, 79, 1.
- apād, footless, IV, 1, 11.
- apārá, boundless, III, 1, 14.
- api-dhí, covering, I, 127, 7³.
- api-jarvará, approach of darkness, III, 9, 7².
- api-sthitá, standing on, I, 145, 4⁶.
- ápūrvya, wonderful, III, 13, 5.
- áprinat, not giving, V, 7, 10.
- ap-túr, crossing the waters, III, 27, 11⁸.
- ap-tūrya, crossing the waters, III, 12, 8¹.
- Ápnavāna, IV, 7, 1.
- ápnasvat, rich: ápnasvatishu urvá-rāsu, I, 127, 6.
- ápya, living in the water, I, 145, 5.
- ápra-āyu(s), unremitting, I, 127, 5⁴.
- áprati-skuta, unrepressed, III, 2, 14.
- ápra-drīpita, unconfused, I, 145, 2.
- apra-mrīshyá, not to be despised, IV, 2, 5.
- ápra-yukṣbat, never failing, unremitting, I, 143, 8; II, 9, 2; III, 5, 6; 20, 2.
- ápra-vītā, virgin, IV, 7, 9¹.
- apsu-sád, dwelling in the waters, III, 3, 5.
- abhi-khyá, looking at, I, 148, 5².
- abhi-gñú, on one's knees, I, 72, 5.
- abhi-dyu, striving for heaven, I, 127, 7; III, 27, 1.
- abhi-pitvá, the time of rest, I, 189, 7^{2, 3}.
- abhi-māti, plotter, III, 24, 1; assault, V, 23, 4¹.
- abhimāti-sáh, victorious over hostile plots, II, 4, 9.
- abhi-yúg, attack, III, 11, 6; V, 4, 5.
- abhi-jasti, curse, I, 71, 10; V, 3, 7; 12.
- abhi-jasti-kātana, dispeller of curses, III, 3, 6.
- abhi-jasti-pāvan, protector against imprecations, I, 76, 3.
- abhi-jrī, leading to, or striving for, gloriousness, I, 98, 1¹; 144, 6.
- abhi-shri, victory, V, 17, 5.
- abhi-shri-krīt, helpful, IV, 11, 4.
- abhi-hrút, injury, I, 128, 5; anything leading astray, I, 189, 6¹.
- abhiḥke with ablat., I, 71, 8⁴.
- abhrá, cloud, I, 79, 2.
- abhrāt-ri, brotherless: abhrátaráb, IV, 5, 5².
- ábhya, wondrous, I, 140, 5; monstrous might, II, 4, 5.
- am, to plague: abhi ámanta, I, 189, 3¹.
- áma, vehemence, I, 66, 7; fear: áme dhāt, I, 67, 3.
- amāti, impetuous splendour, I, 73, 2³.
- ámati, lack of thoughts, senselessness, III, 8, 2¹; 16, 5; IV, 11, 6.
- ámartya, immortal, I, 44, 1; 11; 58, 3; III, 2, 11; 10, 9; 11, 2; 24, 2; 27, 5; 7; IV, 1, 1; 8, 1; 9, 2; V, 4, 10.
- ámardhat, never failing, III, 25, 4.
- áma-vat, violent, impetuous, I, 36, 20; IV, 4, 1.
- amitra, enemy, III, 18, 2; IV, 4, 4; 12, 2.
- amitra-dámbhana, deceiver of foes, IV, 15, 4.
- amitra-yúdh, attacking the enemies, III, 29, 15.
- áminat, innocent, IV, 5, 6.
- amíva-kātana, driving away sickness: amíva-kātanam, I, 12, 7.
- ámivā, plague, I, 189, 3; III, 15, 1.
- ámúra, not foolish, unerring, wise, I, 68, 8¹; 72, 2; 141, 12; III, 19, 1; 25, 3; IV, 4, 12; 6, 2; 11, 5.
- ámrikta, uninjured, inviolable, III, 6, 4; 11, 6; IV, 3, 12¹.
- amrita, immortal (Agni), I, 26, 9¹; 44, 5¹; 58, 1; 70, 4², &c.;—pl. the immortal gods, I, 59, 1, &c.;—immortality, I, 13, 5²; 68, 4¹; 72, 1¹; 6; III, 1, 14; 23, 1²; 25, 2; V, 3, 4; 28, 2; amritasya nábhim, III, 17, 4;—ambrosia, I, 71, 9²; III, 26, 7; V, 2, 3².
- amrita-tvá, immortality, I, 31, 7; 72, 9; 96, 6; V, 4, 10.
- ámrityu, immortal, III, 2, 9.
- áyas, ore, IV, 2, 17³.
- ayá, thus, III, 12, 2.
- ayás, never-tiring (flame), III, 18, 2¹; IV, 6, 10.
- ará, spoke of a wheel, I, 141, 9; V, 13, 6.
- arakshás, benevolent, II, 10, 5.
- árana, stranger, V, 2, 5.
- aráni, kindling-stick, I, 127, 4¹; III, 29, 2; V, 9, 3.

- aratí, steward (?), I, 58, 7¹; 59, 2; 128, 6; 8; II, 2, 2; 3; 4, 2; III, 17, 4; IV, 1, 1; 2, 1; V, 2, 1¹.
- áram, enough, I, 66, 5; dávat áram, he satisfies, I, 70, 5; readily, II, 5, 7²; 8; purú vā áram (conj. puruvāram), I, 142, 10³.
- aram-kṛt, doing service, II, 1, 7¹.
- árarivams, niggardly, I, 147, 4; 150, 2; III, 18, 2.
- árāti, malign power, II, 7, 2; III, 18, 1; 24, 1; IV, 4, 4; árātau (conj. for arataú), V, 2, 1¹; pl., V, 2, 6.
- arāti-yāt, niggard, I, 99, 1².
- arāti-ván, malicious, I, 147, 4.
- árāvan, niggard : árāvnab, I, 36, 15; 16.
- arí, poor : aryáb, I, 70, 1¹; 71, 3²; 150, 1¹—he who does not give, niggard, I, 73, 5¹; II, 8, 2; IV, 4, 6; V, 2, 12.
- arí, the Arya : aryáb, IV, 2, 12³; 18³.
- árishra, uninjured, V, 18, 3.
- árishtat, unharmed : árishtanta, II, 8, 6.
- aruná, red, I, 73, 7; II, 1, 6.
- aruní, the red (cow, or Dawn), I, 140, 13; IV, 1, 16³; 2, 16; 14, 3¹.
- árupita? IV, 5, 7¹.
- arushá, red, ruddy, I, 36, 9; 141, 8; II, 2, 8; III, 1, 4; 7, 5; 15, 3; 29, 6; IV, 15, 6²; V, 1, 5; arushá, the two ruddy horses, I, 94, 10; II, 10, 2¹; IV, 2, 3; arushásab, I, 146, 2²; IV, 6, 9; arushásya vrishnab, V, 12, 2²; 6; —árushīm (conj. árushīb?), I, 71, 1²; árushīb, I, 72, 10⁴.
- arushá-stūpa, whose summit is red, III, 29, 3.
- árūkshita, soft, IV, 11, 1.
- arepás, stainless, IV, 10, 6.
- arká, song, I, 141, 13; III, 26, 7¹; 8; IV, 3, 15; 10, 3; V, 5, 4.
- ark, to sing, praise : arkan, III, 14, 4; árkāmi, IV, 4, 8; ānrikúb, V, 6, 8; árkañtab, V, 13, 1; árka, V, 16, 1¹; 22, 1; 25, 7;—abhí kārām arkan, they sang triumphantly, IV, 1, 14²;—prá arkānti, III, 12, 5; prá arka, I sing, III, 13, 1¹.
- arkí, flame, I, 36, 3; 20, &c.
- arkís, flame, IV, 7, 9; V, 17, 3.
- árna, flood : diváb arnam, III, 22, 3.
- arnavá, waving, III, 22, 2².
- árnas, wave, IV, 3, 12.
- ártha, aim, I, 144, 3²; III, 11, 3²; IV, 6, 10.
- árbha, small, I, 146, 5.
- arbhaká, little : arbhakébhya, I, 27, 13.
- ármizí in nārmizí? (I, 149, 3¹).
- aryá, Aryan, IV, 1, 7; (2, 12³; 18⁵;) V, 16, 3.
- Aryamán, I, 26, 4; 36, 4; 44, 13; 79, 3; 141, 9; II, 1, 4; IV, 2, 4; 3, 5; V, 3, 2.
- arvák : arvákam yáksuva, sacrifice and bring hither, I, 45, 10.
- árvat, horse, I, 27, 9; 73, 9; 145, 3¹; II, 2, 10; IV, 15, 6; V, 6, 1; 2.
- árvan, horse, I, 149, 3; IV, 7, 11; 11, 4.
- arhánā, deservedly, I, 127, 6.
- árhat, worthy, I, 94, 1; II, 3, 1; 3; V, 7, 2.
- av, to protect, bless, help : ávāb, I, 27, 7; avishab, III, 13, 6, &c.
- áva : agnéb ávena for agné rávena, I, 128, 5¹.
- avadyá, disgrace, IV, 4, 15.
- aváni, course, I, 140, 5;—river, V, 11, 5.
- avamá, lowest (god), IV, 1, 5.
- ávata, later (or, nearer), I, 141, 5;—lower, II, 9, 3.
- ávasāna, not clothed, III, 1, 6.
- avástāt, below, III, 22, 3.
- ava-sthá, retirement, V, 19, 1¹.
- avasyú, desiring help, II, 6, 6.
- avitrí, helper, I, 36, 2; 44, 10; III, 19, 5.
- ávi-mat, rich in sheep, IV, 2, 5¹.
- avishyāt, wishing to drink, I, 58, 2.
- avishyú, greedy, I, 189, 5.
- avīratā, want of heroes, III, 16, 5.
- avriká, without danger, I, 31, 13;—keeping off the wolf, IV, 4, 12.
- as, to eat : prá asāna, III, 21, 1.
- asatrú, without a foe, V, 2, 12.
- asáni, thunderbolt, I, 143, 5.
- asás, cursing, IV, 4, 15.
- ásiva, unkind, V, 12, 5.
- asīrshán, headless, IV, 1, 11.
- ásman, stone (flint), II, 1, 1; III, 29, 6.

- āsma-vraga, dwelling in the rock-stable, IV, 1, 13.
 āsramishṭba, never tiring, IV, 4, 12.
 āsrita, not resting on (?), IV, 7, 6².
 asva-dāvan, giver of horses, V, 18, 3².
 āsva-peṣas, the ornament of which are horses, II, 1, 16.
 āsvam-ishṭi, winner of horses, II, 6, 2².
 Asva-medha, N. p., V, 27, 4-6.
 āsva-rādhas, giver of horses, V, 10, 4¹.
 āsvā, mare, III, 1, 4; 7, 2².
 asvin, rich in horses, IV, 2, 5¹; V, 4, 11.
 Arvīnau, du., the two Asvins, I, 44, 2; 8; 14; III, 20, 1; 5; 29, 6¹; IV, 2, 4; 13, 1; 15, 9; 10; V, 26, 9.
 ārvya, of the horses, I, 74, 7.
 āshā/ba, invincible, III, 15, 4.
 ashṭamā, eighth (rein or priest of Agni), II, 5, 2¹.
 ashṭā-padī, eight-footed (i.e. cow with calf), II, 7, 5².
 as, to be: prā astu, may it be foremost, I, 13, 9;—satāb ka bhā-vatāb ka, I, 96, 7; tvām tām sām ka prāti ka asi, thou art united with them and equal to them, II, 1, 15.
 as, to throw: ava-āsyā, I, 140, 10.
 āsat, nothingness, IV, 5, 14;—untrue, V, 12, 4.
 asanā, weapon, I, 148, 4.
 asamanā, striving apart, I, 140, 4.
 āsam-dita, unfettered, IV, 4, 2.
 āsam-mrisha, not cleansed, V, 11, 3.
 asaṣkāt, not sticking together, I, 13, 6; 142, 6.
 āsasat, never sleeping, I, 143, 3.
 āsita, black, IV, 13, 4.
 āsu, vital spirit, I, 140, 8.
 āsura, the Asura, miraculous lord, II, 1, 6; III, 3, 4¹; 29, 14¹; IV, 2, 5²; V, 12, 1; 15, 1; 27, 1.
 asuryā, mysterious power, V, 10, 2.
 āsta, stall, I, 66, 9;—home: āstam yānti, V, 6, 1.
 āsta-tāti, homestead, V, 7, 6.
 āstri, archer, I, 66, 7; 70, 11; 71, 5¹; 148, 4; IV, 4, 1.
 āstrita, indestructible, I, 140, 8.
 āspandamāna, without trembling, IV, 3, 10.
 asmād, pers. pronoun: asmākam astu, may he be ours, I, 13, 10; prā vab īmahe, we entreat for you, I, 36, 1¹; vab untranslated, I, 66, 9¹; sāv nab, thus (give) us, II, 6, 5¹; āre asmāt, IV, 11, 6¹.
 asma-drūh, he who deceives us: asma-dhrūk, I, 36, 16.
 asmadryāk, turned towards us, V, 4, 2.
 asma-yū, inclined towards us, I, 142, 10.
 asrīdh, not failing, I, 13, 9; V, 5, 8.
 āsredhat, unerring, III, 14, 5.
 asremān? III, 29, 13¹.
 āsvapnag, never sleeping: āsvapnagab, IV, 4, 12.
 āhan, day, I, 71, 2; dīrghā āhā, I, 140, 13; āhnab, by day, IV, 10, 5; āgre āhnām, V, 1, 4; 5.
 āhi, snake, I, 79, 1.
 ahūryā, not to be led astray: ahūr-yāb (conj. for āhūryab), I, 69, 4¹.
 āhraya, fearless, I, 74, 8; glorious, III, 2, 4.
 āhrayāna, fearless, IV, 4, 14.
 āké, near, II, 1, 10.
 ā-kshita, habitable, V, 7, 7.
 āgas, sin, IV, 3, 5; 12, 4; V, 3, 7; 12.
 ā-gāni, birth: tistrāb ā-gāni, III, 17, 3¹.
 āt, then, I, 148, 4¹.
 ā-tāni, an expander: yagñām ā-tāni, II, 1, 10.
 ātithyā, hospitality, I, 76, 3; IV, 4, 10; V, 28, 2.
 ātmán, vital breath: ātmā-iva révab, I, 73, 2.
 ā-dadi, seizer: ādat ā-dadīb, I, 127, 6².
 Ādityā, IV, 1, 2; pl., the Ādityas, I, 45, 1; 94, 3; 188, 4; II, 1, 13; 3, 4¹; III, 8, 8; 20, 5.
 ā-deva, godly, II, 4, 1; devām ā-devam, IV, 1, 1¹.
 ā-dhavā, purification, I, 141, 3².
 ā-dhrīsh, attack, II, 1, 9.
 ādhrā, weak: ādhrāsyā, I, 31, 14².
 ānushák, in due order, I, 13, 5¹; 58, 3; 72, 7; II, 6, 8; III, 11, 1; IV, 4, 10; 7, 2; 5; 12, 3; V, 6, 6¹; 10; 9, 1; 16, 2; 18, 2; 21, 2; 22, 2; 26, 8.
 āp: pári āpa, he has won, I, 76, 1.
 Apayā, N. of a river, III, 23, 4.
 āpi, companion, I, 26, 3; 31, 16; IV, 3, 13.

- â-*prikkhya*, whose leave should be asked, I, 60, 2.
 âpya, companionship, I, 36, 12; III, 2, 6.
 âmâ, raw, IV, 3, 9².
 â-yagish**ta**, best performer of sacrifices, II, 9, 6.
 âyasa, of iron, I, 58, 8.
 âyû, the living, I, 31, 2²; II, 66, 1; 140, 8; 147, 1¹;—lively: âyûvab dhenāvab, II, 5, 5;—Âyû, N. p., I, 96, 2²; II, 2, 8; 4, 2; IV, 2, 12¹; 18^{4, 6}; V, 7, 6; samsam âyôb, IV, 6, 11²; V, 3, 4²; pl., the Âyus, I, 58, 3²; 60, 3; IV, 7, 4;—n., life, III, 3, 7.
 âyudha, weapon, V, 2, 3.
 âyus, life: vîsvam âyub, I, 73, 5; âyub apâm, III, 1, 5²; dirghâm âyub pra-yâkshe, III, 7, 1; trîni âyûmshi, III, 17, 3¹, &c.
 â-rôdhana, ascent, IV, 7, 8; 8, 2; 4.
 ârtanâ? I, 127, 6¹.
 ârtvigya, duty of a priest, I, 94, 6.
 ârya, the Aryan, I, 59, 2; vîsab ârib, I, 77, 3²; 96, 3.
 âvib-rigîka, (I, 44, 3¹).
 âvib-tya, visible, I, 95, 5.
 âvîs, manifest: âvib bhava, I, 31, 3¹; âvib babhûtha, V, 1, 9; âvib krintute, V, 2, 9.
 â-sâs, hope: â-sâsâ, IV, 5, 11¹.
 ârâ, region, V, 10, 6.
 ârinâ, old (?), I, 27, 13¹.
 ârû, swift racer, I, 60, 5; IV, 7, 11.
 âru-ârya, plenty of swift horses, V, 6, 10.
 âru-yâ, quickly, IV, 4, 2.
 âru-sukshâni, flaming, II, 1, 1.
 ârushânâ, aspiring after, IV, 1, 13.
 âru-hêman, quick inciter, II, 1, 5².
 âs: ūpa âsate, they approach reverentially, I, 36, 7; III, 2, 6;—sam-âsate, they lie down round about, III, 9, 7.
 âs, mouth: âsâ, I, 76, 4¹; 140, 2; II, 1, 14¹; in the presence of, IV, 5, 10; manifestly, V, 17, 2; 5; 23, 1.
 âsân, mouth, I, 75, 1; III, 26, 7; V, 6, 9; 18, 4.
 âsâ, face: yâsya âsayâ, in whose presence, I, 127, 8.
 âsât, adv., near, I, 27, 3.
 â-sutî, drink, II, 1, 14.
 âsurâ, of the Asura: gârbhab âsurâb, III, 29, 11.
 âskra, united, III, 6, 4².
 âsyâ, mouth, II, 1, 13; V, 12, 1.
 â-huta, see hu.
 â-hûrya, to be led astray: â-hûryab (conj. ahûryâb), I, 69, 4¹.
 i: ayate, he proceeds, I, 127, 3⁶; yântab, corrupt for vyântab? I, 140, 13²; sanîm yaté, striving for gain, V, 27, 4;—âdhi ihi, think thou (of us), I, 71, 10²;—sâb nû iyate (Samhitâ: sâ nvî-yate), conj. sânu (= sâ ânu) iyate, I, 145, 1¹;—ântab iyase, thou passest between, II, 6, 7;—âpa aiye**b**, V, 2, 8;—ûpa â imasi, we approach, I, 1, 7;—pari-etâ, will overtake, I, 27, 8;—pra-yatî yagñé, while the sacrifice is going on, III, 29, 16; V, 28, 6; pra-yatî devébhyab, that the gods may come forth, I, 142, 6; éti prá, I, 144, 1²;—ná prâti-itaye, not to be withstood, I, 36, 10;—sâm yanti, come together, I, 31, 10; see sam-yât.
 id, nourishing power, sacred food: iâ kritâni, I, 128, 7; iâb padé, I, 128, 1; II, 10, 1²; hôtâram iâb, III, 4, 3.
 iâ, 'Nourishment,' N. of a goddess, I, 13, 9¹; 31, 11²; 142, 9; 188, 8; II, 1, 11¹; 3, 8; III, 1, 23¹; 4, 8; 7, 5; 27, 10²; V, 4, 4; 5, 8; iâyâb padé, III, 23, 4²; 29, 4; iâ, instr., III, 24, 2; iâyâb putrâb, III, 29, 3².
 iâ-vat, rich in nourishment, IV, 2, 5.
 itâb-ûti, who from here distributes his blessings, I, 146, 2.
 iti, thus: iti krâtvâ, with this intention, IV, 1, 1¹.
 itthâ, truly, I, 36, 7; 141, 1; V, 17, 1; itthâ dhiyâ, with right thought, III, 27, 6.
 itthâ-dhî, thus minded, IV, 11, 3.
 idâm, this: asmai (after the plural yé), I, 67, 8¹; asmai (verb to be supplied), I, 70, 4¹; yâdi idâm, when here (all this happened), I, 79, 2²; yâdi idâm, as I am here, IV, 5, 11²;

- there, II, 5, 5; *eshâm* (conj. *eshâm*), IV, 2, 4¹.
- idā kit-idā kit*, now-now, IV, 10, 5.
- idhmā*, fuel, I, 94, 4; III, 18, 3.
- in: *inōshi*, thou drivest away, IV, 10, 7;—*prā ainot*, he has driven forward, I, 66, 10.
- inā*, strong, I, 149, 1.
- īndu*, Soma, V, 18, 2.
- Indra*, I, 13, 12; 142, 4; 5; 12; 13; II, 1, 3; 3, 3; 8, 6; III, 4, 6; 11; 22, 1; 25, 4; IV, 2, 17; V, 2, 8; 3, 1; 5, 3; 11; 11, 2; *īndram agnīm*, III, 12, 3.
- īndrāgni*, du., III, 12, 1; 2; 4-9; V, 27, 6.
- īndrāvishnū*, du., *Indra and Vishnu*, IV, 2, 4.
- inv, to stir up, to further: *īnvati*, I, 128, 5; *īnvatab*, I, 141, 4; *īnvasi*, I, 94, 10; 141, 10; V, 28, 2; *īnvantab*, III, 4, 5; *invire*, V, 6, 6.
- ībha*, elephant, IV, 4, 1¹.
- ībhya*, rich, I, 65, 7.
- iva*: *svēna-iva*, read *svēna evā*? I, 145, 2².
- ish*, to long, seek: *īkkbānta*, I, 68, 8; *īkkbāntab*, I, 72, 2; *īshub*, III, 1, 2.
- ish*, to incite: *ishé*, infin., I, 71, 8²; *ishāyanta mánma*, they have stirred up our prayers, I, 77, 4²; *ishāni*, II, 2, 9²; *ishitá*, III, 3, 2; 4, 3; 12, 1.
- ish*, food, I, 12, 11; 27, 7; 36, 11, &c.; V, 6, 1-10; *ishān netā*, III, 23, 2².
- ishá*, food-giving, I, 189, 8².
- Ishá*, N. p., V, 7, 10.
- ishany*: *ishanyanti*, they speed it hither, V, 6, 6¹.
- ishay*, to seek nourishment: *ishāyanta*, II, 2, 11¹.
- ishirā*, vigorous, quick, I, 128, 5; III, 2, 13; 5, 4.
- ishudhyát*, supplicant: *ishudhyaté*, I, 128, 6¹.
- ishuy*, to fly like an arrow, to shoot arrows (?): *ishūyate*, I, 128, 4².
- ishu-yát*, desiring food (?), I, 128, 4².
- ishráni*? I, 127, 6¹.
- ishrí*, wish, search, I, 143, 8²; 145, 1; 148, 3; IV, 4, 7.
- ishrí*, sacrifice, II, 1, 9¹.
- ishrí*, incitement (?), IV, 6, 7².
- ī*: *prā imahe vab*, we entreat for you, I, 36, 1¹;—*ā imahe*, we implore, III, 26, 5.
- id*, to magnify: *īle*, I, 1, 1²; 44, 4; III, 1, 15; 27, 2; 12; IV, 3, 3; 9¹; *īlate*, I, 36, 1; 128, 8; III, 6, 3; 10, 2; 13, 2; 27, 14; V, 1, 7; 8, 3; 9, 1; 14, 2; 3; 21, 3; *īlata*, I, 96, 3¹; *īlte*, V, 12, 6; *īlita*, V, 17, 1; 21, 4; *īlāna*, II, 6, 6; 28, 1; *īlita*, I, 13, 4¹; 142, 4¹; II, 3, 3; V, 5, 3; 7.
- īlénya*, to be magnified, I, 79, 5; 146, 5; III, 27, 13; V, 1, 9; 14, 5.
- īdya*, worthy of being magnified: *īdyab*, I, 1, 2; 12, 3²; 75, 4; 188, 3; II, 1, 4; III, 2, 2; 5, 6; 9; 9, 8; 17, 4; 27, 4; 29, 2; 7; IV, 7, 1; 2; V, 22, 1.
- īr*: *īratām*, may they arise, IV, 8, 7; *īrayādhyai*, he shall rise up, IV, 2, 1¹;—*ā-īriré*, they have raised, set to work, I, 143, 4; III, 11, 9; 29, 15;—*ní erire*, they have roused, I, 128, 8; II, 2, 3; IV, 1, 1.
- īvat*, like this, IV, 4, 6; 15, 5.
- īr*, to rule: *īrata*, I, 36, 16; II, 7, 2; *vāsvab īre*, I, 71, 9; *yāvat īre*, as far as I have power, III, 18, 3.
- īrānā*, master, lord, I, 73, 9; 79, 4; 141, 3.
- īsh*: *īshate*, they flee, I, 141, 8;—*ā īshate*, he advances, I, 149, 1².
- ukthá*, hymn, litany, I, 27, 12; 71, 2; 140, 13; II, 8, 5; III, 5, 2; 13, 6; 20, 1; IV, 3, 4; 16; 6, 11; 11, 3; V, 4, 7; 6, 9; 18, 4.
- ukthāvāhas*, (I, 127, 8¹).
- uktha-jás*, chanting litanies, IV, 2, 16.
- ukthín*, rich in hymns, III, 12, 5.
- ukthya*, praiseworthy, I, 79, 12; III, 2, 13; 15; 10, 6; 26, 2; V, 26, 6.
- uksh*, to sprinkle: *aúkshan*, III, 9, 9; *satyám ukshan*, IV, 1, 10.
- uksh*, to grow. See *vaksh*.
- ukshán*, bull, I, 146, 2; II, 7, 5; III, 7, 6; 7²; V, 27, 5.
- ugrá*, strong, mighty, I, 127, 11; III, 26, 5; IV, 2, 18².
- Ugrá-deva*: *ugrá-devam*, I, 36, 18¹.

- ukátha, hymn, I, 73, 10; 143, 6; IV, 2, 20; V, 12, 3.
 uttáná: uttáná, lying extended on her back, II, 10, 3¹; III, 29, 3²; V, 1, 3⁴;—nyāñ uttánáb, spread out downwards-turned, IV, 13, 5.
 uttáná-hasta, with outstretched hand, III, 14, 5¹.
 ut-vát: ut-vátāb ni-vátāb, to the heights and to the depths, III, 2, 10.
 útsa, spring, III, 26, 9.
 udanyā, of water, II, 7, 3.
 údyata-sruṭ, the sacrificer who raises the spoon, I, 31, 5.
 und, to moisten: havyám undán, II, 3, 2.
 upa-ābhrit, the bringing: ūrgām upa-ābhriti, I, 128, 2.
 úpa-iti, approaching, supplication, I, 76, 1¹; III, 18, 1.
 upa-kshetrí, follower, III, 1, 16.
 upabdí, noise produced by going, I, 74, 7¹.
 upa-mā, high up, I, 31, 15¹.
 upamā, likeness, (I, 31, 15¹).
 upa-māda, enjoyment, III, 5, 5.
 upa-mít, supporting, I, 59, 1²; pillar, IV, 5, 1.
 úpara, lower, I, 79, 3²; 128, 3; úparāsu, in our neighbourhood, I, 127, 5²; úparasya, nearer, IV, 2, 18²; úparān, getting behind, II, 4, 9¹.
 upa-vaktrí, the U. priest, IV, 9, 5¹.
 upás, lap: upási (conj. for apási), (III, 1, 3²; 11⁴).
 upa-sád, sitting down (reverentially), II, 6, 1¹.
 Upa-stutá, I, 36, 10¹; 17¹.
 úpa-stuti, praise, I, 148, 2.
 upá-stha, lap, I, 95, 4; 5; pitrób upá-sthe, I, 31, 9; 146, 1; III, 5, 8; 26, 9; apām upá-sthe, I, 144, 2; mātúb upá-sthe, III, 8, 1; 29, 14; V, 1, 6; 19, 1.
 upa-stháyam karati, he goes to greet them, I, 145, 4².
 úpāka, neighbouring, I, 142, 7; III, 4, 6.
 upāké, near at hand, I, 27, 6; IV, 10, 5; 11, 1.
 úpeti, see úpa-iti.
 ubh: ubdhám, closed, IV, 1, 15;—sám-ubdham, confined, V, 2, 1¹.
 ubhá, both: ubhá for ubhé, I, 140, 3¹; ubhé íti toké íti tánaye, I, 147, 1².
 ubháya, both, I, 26, 9¹; 31, 7; ubháyan, both (kinds of men, the pious and the impious), I, 189, 7²; of both kinds (wealth), II, 9, 5¹.
 urú, wide: urú ksháyāya kākriṇe, I, 36, 8; urvī, the wide (Earth), I, 146, 2; II, 4, 7; urú, wide space, III, 1, 11¹.
 uru-gāyá, wide-ruling, II, 1, 3; III, 6, 4²; IV, 3, 7; 14, 1.
 uru-grāyas, extending over wide spaces, V, 8, 6.
 uru-vyāñk, far-reaching, V, 1, 12.
 uru-sāmsa, widely-renowned: uru-sāmsāya, I, 31, 14.
 urushy, to guard, deliver: urushya, I, 58, 8; 9; IV, 2, 6; to keep off: áditim urushya, IV, 2, 11²; urushyát, he has escaped into wide space, III, 5, 8.
 urvárā, field, I, 127, 6.
 Urvári: urvárīb, IV, 2, 18⁴.
 urviyā, far and wide, I, 141, 5; II, 3, 5; III, 1, 18; V, 28, 1.
 ulkā, firebrand, IV, 4, 2.
 us, see vas.
 usádhak, eagerly burning, III, 6, 7².
 Usíg, (Agni) the Usig (or willing one), III, 3, 7; 8; 11, 2¹; 27, 10²;—pl., the Usigs, mythical priests, I, 60, 2¹; 4; 128, 1²; 189, 7; II, 4, 5²; III, 2, 4²; 9; 15, 3²; IV, 1, 15¹; V, 3, 4.
 ush, to burn down: ushán, II, 4, 7;—ní oshatāt, burn down, IV, 4, 4.
 ush, to shine. See vas.
 usháb-búdh, awakening with the dawn, I, 44, 1; 9; 65, 9; 127, 10; III, 2, 14; IV, 6, 8.
 ushár, dawn: usráb, gen. sing., I, 71, 2².
 ushás, dawn, I, 71, 1; 94, 5; ushásab návedāb, I, 79, 1²; vástob ushásab, I, 79, 6; doshá ushási, II, 8, 3; IV, 2, 8; prāti doshám ushásam, IV, 12, 2; ushásab vi-roké, III, 5, 2; ushásab ví-ushrau, III, 15, 2; IV, 1, 5; 14, 4;—Dawn, the goddess, I, 44, 1¹; 2; 8; 14; III, 17, 3¹; 20, 1; IV, 2, 15; 3, 11²; V, 1,

- 1; 28, 1; *usháb gârâb*, lover of the Dawn, I, 69, 1¹; 9; *devî ushâb*, III, 20, 5; IV, 1, 17; 14, 3; *doshâm ushâsam*, Night and Morning, V, 5, 6;—*du.*, *nâktâ ka ushâsâ*, I, 73, 7; *ushâsau*, the two Dawns, Night and Dawn, I, 188, 6²; III, 4, 6¹; 14, 3; V, 1, 4;—*ushâsab*, the Dawns, I, 44, 10; II, 2, 2; 7; 8; III, 5, 1; IV, 1, 13²; 2, 19; 5, 13; 14, 1; *ushâb vi-bhâtîb*, III, 6, 7; *ushâsab ūshub*, III, 7, 10; *ushâsâm āgram*, IV, 13, 1.
- ushâsânâktâ*, Dawn and Night, II, 3, 6.
- usrâ*, bright, I, 69, 9.
- usrâ*, milch-cow, IV, 1, 13; see also *ushar*.
- usrîyâ*, ruddy cow, III, 1, 12⁴; IV, 5, 8²; 9.
- ûtî*, blessing, protection, I, 36, 13, &c.
- ūdhan*, udder, I, 69, 3¹; 146, 2; III, 29, 14; IV, 1, 19; 3, 10; *pitûb ūdhab*, III, 1, 9¹; *sâsmin ūdhan*, IV, 7, 7²; 10, 8¹.
- ūma*, helpful, III, 6, 8¹.
- ūrg*: *mâhi ūrgâyantîb*, giving mighty vigour, III, 7, 4.
- ūrg*, vigour: *ūrgâm pate*, I, 26, 1; *ūrgâb napât*, I, 58, 8; II, 6, 2; III, 27, 12; V, 7, 1; 17, 5; *ūrgâb putrâm*, I, 96, 3; *ūrgâ pinvasva*, III, 3, 7.
- ūrna-mradas*, soft like wool, V, 5, 4¹.
- ūrnu*: *vî ūrnot*, he has revealed, I, 68, 1; *vî aurnot*, he has opened, I, 68, 10.
- ūrdhvâ*, straight, standing erect, I, 36, 13; 14; 95, 5, &c.
- ūrmi*, wave, I, 27, 6; 44, 12; 95, 10.
- ūrmyâ*, night, II, 4, 3.
- ūrvâ*, stable, stall, prison, I, 72, 8; III, 1, 14; IV, 2, 17; 12, 5.
- ūh*: *ūhé*, he is considered, V, 3, 9¹.
- ri*, to go, &c.: *rinvati*, he procures, I, 128, 6; he hastens, I, 144, 5; *arta tmânâ divâb*, arose, V, 25, 8²;—*abhî ârub*, they ran up to, III, 1, 4;—*ut-âritha*, thou hast sprung, II, 9, 3; *ût iyarti vâtam*, he raises his voice, III, 8, 5³; *ût arta*, it rose up, IV, 1, 17; *ût aram*, IV, 15, 7;—*prâ ârûb*, they have risen, III, 7, 1; *prâ iyarmi*, I stretch forth, III, 19, 2; *prâ ârta*, it came forth, IV, 1, 12;—*vî rinvati*, he discloses, I, 58, 3; *vî rinvan*, they opened, I, 69, 10; *vî rinvati*, he opens, I, 128, 6; V, 16, 2;—*sam-ârata*, he has come together, I, 145, 4¹; *sâm rinvati*, it accomplishes, III, 2, 1; he sets himself in motion, III, 11, 2²; *sâm-ritâb*, erected, IV, 13, 5.
- rikvan*, singer, III, 13, 5.
- rigmîya*, praiseworthy, III, 2, 4.
- rik*, see *ark*.
- rik*, hymn, (sacrificial) verse, I, 36, 11; II, 3, 7; V, 6, 5; 27, 4.
- rig*, *riñg*, to press on, strive forward: *riñgasânâ*, I, 58, 3; 96, 3; *riñgân*, I, 95, 7; *riñgate*, I, 141, 6; 143, 7; II, 1, 8; 2, 5; *riñgase*, I press on, IV, 8, 1;—*abhî rigyate*, I, 140, 2;—*â riñgase*, V, 13, 6¹;—*nî riñgate*, he throws down, I, 143, 5; *nî riñge*, I catch hold, III, 4, 7.
- rigîka*, (I, 44, 3¹).
- rigû*, rightly, II, 3, 7; right deeds, IV, 1, 17.
- rigu-âñk*, going straight forward, IV, 6, 9.
- rigu-mushkâ*, puissant, IV, 2, 2; 6, 9.
- rigu-yât*, righteous, V, 12, 5.
- rinâ*, debt, IV, 3, 13².
- ritâ*, the *Rita*, Right, I, 1, 8; 75, 5¹; 79, 3; 141, 1; 11; III, 4, 7; 6, 6; IV, 1, 13²; 2, 3¹; 14²; 16; 19¹; 3, 4²; 9-12; 5, 11; V, 1, 7; 12, 1¹; 6¹; 15, 2; 20, 4; *ritât âdhi*, on behalf of *Rita*, I, 36, 11¹; *ritâsya vratâ*, I, 65, 3; *ritâsya yôni*, I, 65, 4; III, 1, 11; IV, 1, 12; V, 21, 4; *dhârâm ritâsya*, I, 67, 7¹; V, 12, 2; *ritâ sâpantâb*, I, 67, 8; 68, 4; *ritâsya prêshâb ritâsya dhîtîb*, I, 68, 5¹; *dâdhan ritâm*, I, 71, 3¹; *ritâsya dhenâvâb*, I, 73, 6; *ritâsya pathâ*, I, 128, 2; *yahvî iti ritâsya*, *mâtârâ*, I, 142, 7; V, 5, 6; *ritâsya dhûb-sâdam*, I, 143, 7; *ritâsya dohânâb*, streams of *Rita*, I, 144, 2¹; *rathîb ritâsya*, III, 2, 8; IV, 10, 2; *ritâsya sâman*, I, 147,

- 1⁴; *ritám yaté*, I, 188, 2; *pûr-vib ritásya sam-drśab*, III, 5, 2; *ritásya sādasi*, III, 7, 2; *gopāb ritásya*, III, 10, 2; *ritásya pathyāb ānu*, III, 12, 7; *ritásya yóge vanúshab*, eager to set to work the *Rita*, III, 27, 11¹; *riténa ritám ni-yatam*, IV, 3, 9^{1,2}; *ritásya padé*, IV, 5, 9; *ritásya dhāman*, IV, 7, 7²; *ritásya raśmim*, V, 7, 3; *riténa*, in the right way, III, 4, 5; 5, 3;—adj., righteous, IV, 3, 8¹.
- rita-ñit*, intent upon *Rita* (Right), I, 145, 5; IV, 3, 4; V, 3, 9.
- ritā-gāta*, born in or from the *Rita*: *ritā-gātab*, I, 36, 19; 144, 7; 189, 6; III, 6, 10; 20, 2.
- rita-gñā*, knowing the right way, I, 72, 8.
- rita-pā*, protecting the *Rita*, (III, 20, 4¹; V, 12, 3²).
- ritā-pragāta*, born from *Rita*, I, 65, 10.
- ritā-pravita*, penetrated by *Rita*, I, 70, 7.
- ritay*, to perform the *Rita*: *ritāyan riténa*, V, 12, 3.
- rita-yāt*, righteous, II, 1, 2; IV, 8, 3; V, 27, 4.
- rita-yú*, loving *Rita*, V, 8, 1.
- ritā-van*, righteous, I, 77, 1; 2; 5; III, 2, 13; 6, 10; 13, 2; 14, 2; 20, 4; IV, 1, 2; 2, 1; 6, 5; 7, 3; 7; 10, 7; V, 1, 6; 25, 1.
- rita-vridh*, increaser of *Rita*, I, 13, 6; 44, 14; 142, 6; III, 2, 1.
- ritú*, season, I, 95, 3²; V, 12, 3².
- ritu-thā*, observing the right time, II, 3, 7.
- ritu-pā*, guardian of the seasons, III, 20, 4¹; V, 12, 3².
- ritvīg*, ministrant, priest, I, 1, 1; 44, 11; 45, 7; 60, 3; II, 5, 7¹; III, 10, 2; V, 22, 2; 26, 7.
- ritviya*, at the appointed season, I, 143, 1; II, 1, 2; III, 29, 10.
- ridh*, to accomplish: *ridhyāma*, I, 31, 8; IV, 10, 1¹.
- ridhak*, in one's peculiar way, III, 25, 1¹.
- Ribhú*, II, 1, 10¹; III, 5, 6¹; V, 7, 7.
- rishi*, a *Rishi*, I, 1, 2; 31, 1; 66, 4; III, 21, 3; *sahāśram rīshibhiḥ*, I, 189, 8.
- rishi-kṛt*, making (one) a *Rishi*, I, 31, 16².
- rishú*, pl., dawns (?), I, 127, 10²; V, 25, 1².
- rishvá*, tall, I, 146, 2; III, 5, 5; 7; 10; IV, 2, 2.
- éka: *ékaḥ-ekab*, every one, III, 29, 15.
- éka-āyu, of unique vigour, I, 31, 5.
- éna, variegated: *éni iti*, I, 144, 6¹.
- énas, sin, I, 189, 1; III, 7, 10²; IV, 12, 4; 5; V, 3, 7.
- éman, course, path, I, 58, 4¹; IV, 7, 9.
- éva, way: *évaib*, in due way, I, 68, 4; 95, 6; *évena*, in his way, I, 128, 3; *aryāb évaib*, IV, 2, 12²;—the going, I, 79, 2.
- evá, thus, I, 76, 5; 77, 5; 95, 11; III, 17, 2; *evām*, *Samh.*, V, 6, 10¹.
- eshá, rapid, (IV, 2, 4¹).
- óka, homestead, I, 66, 3.
- ogāyāmāna, displaying his power, I, 140, 6.
- ógishṭba, richest: *ógishṭbam médaḥ*, III, 21, 5¹.
- óshadhī, herb, I, 59, 3; 98, 2; II, 1, 1; 4, 4; III, 1, 13; 5, 8¹; 22, 2; V, 8, 7.
- óha, heedfulness, IV, 10, 1².
- Kánva, I, 36, 8; 10¹; 11; 17; 19; *kānvāsab*, I, 44, 8; *Kānvasya sūnāvab*, I, 45, 5.
- katidhāñit, everywhere, I, 31, 2.
- kadā kaná, never, I, 150, 2.
- kan: *tásya kñkan*, therewith he is satisfied, I, 148, 2; *kakñáb*, loving, III, 5, 2; *kānishab*, take joyfully, III, 28, 5; *kakñáb*, delighting, desiring, V, 3, 10; 27, 3¹;—*ā kake*, he desires, III, 3, 3; *ā kake*, I love, III, 3, 10.
- kanyā, maiden, I, 66, 8¹; *kanñnām*, V, 3, 2.
- kāya: *kāyasya ñit*, of whomsoever, I, 27, 8; *kāyā*, how, V, 12, 3.
- kar, to praise, (I, 45, 4¹).
- karásna, arm: *sriprā karásnā*, III, 18, 5¹.
- karmanyā, able, III, 4, 9.
- kārman, work, deed, I, 31, 8; III, 12, 6.
- kalyāna, beautiful, I, 31, 9.
- kaví, sage, I, 12, 6; 7; 13, 2; 8, &c.; I, 95, 8²; *dhīrāsab kavāyab*, I, 146, 4¹.

- kavi-kratu, having the mind of a sage, thoughtful, I, 1, 5; III, 2, 4; 14, 7; 27, 12; V, 11, 4.
- kavi-*kṛd*, showing himself as a sage, III, 12, 3¹.
- kavi-tama, the highest sage, III, 14, 1.
- kavi-prastā, praised by sages, V, 1, 8.
- kavi-jastā, praised by the sages, III, 21, 4; 29, 7.
- kavyātā, wisdom, I, 96, 2.
- kā: *kāyamānab*, finding pleasure, III, 9, 2. See *kan*.
- kāmya, of love: *dugdhām nā kāmyam*, V, 19, 4¹.
- kārā, race: *bhāgam nā kārē*, I, 141, 10¹;—triumph: *abhī kārām arāṇ*, IV, 1, 14².
- kārū, singer, I, 31, 8; 9; 148, 2; II, 2, 9; III, 6, 1.
- kāvya, quality of a sage, wisdom, I, 72, 1¹; 96, 1; II, 5, 3; III, 1, 8; 17; 18; IV, 3, 16; 11, 3; V, 3, 5.
- kāshībā, pl., the (aerial) arena, I, 59, 6; race-course, I, 146, 5.
- kīyat, however small, IV, 5, 6.
- kīrī, poor, humble, I, 31, 13⁸; V, 4, 10¹.
- Kistā: *Kistāsab*, the Kistas, I, 127, 7¹.
- kūpaya, agitating, I, 140, 3.
- kumārā, prince, IV, 15, 7-10; boy, V, 2, 1¹; 2.
- kūlija, axe, III, 2, 1.
- Kujikā, pl., the Kuikas, III, 26, 1¹; 3; 29, 15.
- kūṇit-arthīn, striving for all that is desired, IV, 7, 6.
- kri*, to make, &c.: *yagñām kṛinotana*, I, 13, 12; *kṛinuhi*, I, 31, 8; *kṛidhī nab rāyē*, help us to wealth, III, 15, 3⁸; *kṛinōti devān mārtYEShu*, he conveys the gods to the mortals, I, 77, 1¹; *kārikṛatāb*, displaying, I, 140, 5¹; *kṛitāḥ* (read *pāriṣh-kṛitāb*?), adorned, I, 141, 8¹; *dhiyā ṭakre*, III, 27, 9¹; *krāntāb*, IV, 2, 14; *ākarma te*, we have done our work for thee, IV, 2, 19;—*āram karat*, he may readily serve, II, 5, 8; *urū ṭakrire*, they have made wide room for, I, 36, 8; *satṛā ṭak-rānāb*, I, 72, 1;—*ā kṛinōshi*, thou givest, I, 31, 7; *ā kṛinudhvam*, bring hither, I, 77, 2;—*āpa ā kṛidhi*, drive away, III, 16, 5²;—*nī kab*, he has brought down (i. e. surpassed), I, 72, 1¹;—*pāri-kṛita*, made ready, III, 28, 2;—*sām akrinvan tégase*, they have sharpened, III, 2, 10; see *krānā*.
- kṛidhū*, weak, IV, 5, 14.
- kṛip*: *akṛipran*, they have pined, IV, 2, 18⁴.
- kṛip*, body, I, 127, 1; 128, 2.
- krishīrī*, human race, I, 36, 19; 59, 5; 74, 2; 189, 3;—tribe, clan, V, 1, 6; 19, 3;—dwelling, II, 2, 10.
- krishnā*, black, I, 58, 4⁴; 73, 7; 141, 8²; *krishnāb vṛishabhāb*, I, 79, 2²; darkness, I, 140, 5; *krishnāsu*, in the dark nights, III, 15, 3.
- krishnā-adhvan*, whose path is black, II, 4, 6.
- krishnā-gamhas*, speeding on his black way, I, 141, 7.
- krishna-prūta*, immersed in darkness, I, 140, 3.
- krishnā-vyathi*, with a black trail, II, 4, 7¹.
- krishnā-sita*, drawing black furrows, I, 140, 4.
- kṛip*: *ṭakṛipānta dhībhiḥ*, they chanted their prayers, IV, 1, 14.
- kéta*, desire, I, 146, 3.
- ketú*, light, shine, splendour, I, 36, 14; IV, 7, 4; 14, 2; V, 7, 4; *ketúm usṛāb*, I, 71, 2²;—*ketú*, beacon, banner, I, 27, 12; III, 1, 17; 2, 14; V, 11, 3; *vidā-thasya*, I, 60, 1; *yagñāsya*, I, 96, 6; 127, 6; III, 11, 3; 29, 5; V, 11, 2; *yagñānām*, III, 3, 3; *adhvarāsya*, III, 8, 8; *adh-varānām*, III, 10, 4.
- kévala*, alone, I, 13, 10.
- kesin*, long-haired, I, 140, 8; long-maned, III, 6, 6.
- krātu*, power of mind, wisdom, I, 65, 9; 67, 2; 68, 3; 69, 2; 73, 2; 77, 3¹; 128, 4; 141, 6; 9; 143, 2; 145, 2; II, 5, 4; III, 2, 3; 6, 5; 9, 6; 11, 6; IV, 5, 7; 10, 1; 2; 12, 1; V, 10, 2; 17, 4;—mind, I, 66, 5²; will, I, 68, 9; *ṭti krátvā*, with this intention, IV, 1, 1¹;—power, I, 127, 9; 128, 5; III, 1, 5¹.

- krand, to neigh, bellow, roar : krándat, I, 36, 8; *akikradat*, I, 58, 2; *kánikradat*, bellowing, I, 128, 3¹; *krándan*, III, 26, 3.
- kram : pári akramít, he has circumambulated, IV, 15, 3.
- krāṇā, as soon as, I, 58, 3¹; V, 7, 8²; indeed, V, 10, 2¹.
- krīḍ, to sport : *krī/antaḥ*, IV, 4, 9; *krī/ān*, V, 19, 5.
- kshatrā, royal power, IV, 4, 8; V, 27, 6.
- kshatriya, royal power, IV, 12, 3¹.
- ksháp, night : *kshápāḥ* (conj. *kshápāḥ*), I, 44, 8²; *kshápāḥ* (conj. *kshápāḥ*), nights and dawns, I, 70, 7¹; *kshápāḥ*, by night, I, 79, 6; *kshápāḥ sam-yātaḥ*, II, 2, 2².
- kshápā-vat, earth-protecting, I, 70, 5¹.
- kshám, earth, (I, 79, 3²); III, 8, 7.
- ksháya, dwelling, I, 36, 8; 74, 4; 144, 7; III, 2, 6; 3, 2; 11, 7²; V, 9, 2; 12, 6; 23, 4; *divi ksháyam* (conj. *divikshayám*), III, 2, 13¹.
- kshar, to flow : *ksharasi*, I, 27, 6; *ksharanti*, I, 72, 10.
- kshā, earth, I, 67, 5²; 95, 10; 96, 7¹; 189, 3; *vīsvāsu kshāsu*, I, 127, 10².
- kshāman, earth, IV, 2, 16.
- kshi, to dwell : *ksheti*, I, 94, 2; *ksheshyántaḥ*, going to settle, II, 4, 3¹; *ksháyāḥ*, III, 8, 1; *kshēpayat*, may he give us dwelling, V, 9, 7; —*prithivīm upa-kshéti*, he dwells on the earth, I, 73, 3; —*prati-kshiyántam*, who abides turned towards, II, 10, 4; —to rule : *ksháyan*, III, 25, 3; *kshayasi*, IV, 5, 11.
- kshiti, dwelling, human settlement, I, 59, 1; 65, 5; 72, 7; 73, 4; II, 2, 3; III, 3, 9; 13, 4¹; 14, 4; IV, 5, 15¹; V, 7, 1; —tribe, III, 18, 1; V, 1, 10; *kshitinām*, *daivínām*, III, 20, 4.
- kshíp, finger : *dāva kshípāḥ*, III, 23, 3.
- kshiprá, a tossing (bow ?), IV, 8, 8¹.
- kshī, to fail : *kshiyate*, II, 9, 5.
- kshu-mát, rich in food, II, 1, 10; 4, 8; 9, 5; IV, 2, 18².
- kshé ? IV, 3, 6².
- kshétra, dwelling-place, V, 2, 3¹; 4.
- kshetra-sādhās, giving bliss to our fields, III, 8, 7².
- kshéma, safety, peace, I, 66, 3; 67, 2.
- kshema-yát, living in peace, III, 7, 2.
- kshóda, stream, I, 65, 5; 6¹; 10.
- khá, opening, IV, 11, 2.
- khyā : *práti akhyat*, he has looked on, IV, 13, 1; 14, 1; —*vī akhyān*, they looked around, IV, 1, 18.
- ganá, troop : *ganám-ganam*, III, 26, 6; crowd, V, 1, 3.
- gánya, belonging to the host, III, 7, 5.
- gabhirá, deep, IV, 5, 5²; 6.
- gam, to go : *gagamyát*, I, 58, 9; *pari-sádantaḥ agman*, IV, 2, 17²; —*ákṣba gamema*, we may obtain, IV, 5, 13; —*sám-gatāni*, comprised, I, 31, 5¹; *sam-gagmānāsu kṛishṣhu*, when the human tribes met (in battle), I, 74, 2; *mānasā sám gagmúb*, they agreed in their mind, III, 1, 13.
- gáya, home, I, 74, 2; dominion, V, 10, 3.
- gárbha, womb, I, 65, 4; 148, 5; —fruit of the womb, germ, I, 95, 2; 4; 146, 5; II, 10, 3; III, 1, 6; 10¹; 2, 10; 29, 2; 11; V, 2, 2; *bhūtānām gárbham*, III, 27, 9; —child, son : *gárbhaḥ apām, vānānām, &c.*, I, 70, 3; III, 1, 12; 13; 5, 3; *gárbhaḥ virúdhām*, II, 1, 14; *dádhate gárbham*, IV, 7, 9¹.
- garbhīnī, pregnant, III, 29, 2.
- garh, to blame : *garhase*, IV, 3, 5.
- gavishá, see *go-ishá*.
- gávishri, see *gó-ishri*.
- Gávishṭbira, V, 1, 12.
- gávya, of the cows, I, 72, 8; IV, 2, 17; —bliss in cows, I, 140, 13.
- gavyát, longing for the cows, IV, 1, 15.
- gā, to go : *pra-gigataḥ*, coming forward, I, 150, 2.
- gā, to sing : *ákṣba agnīm gāsi*, V, 25, 1¹.
- gātú, path, course, I, 71, 2; 72, 9; 95, 10; 96, 4; III, 1, 2; 4, 4.
- gâyatrā, Gâyatra song, I, 12, 11; 27, 4; 79, 7; 188, 11.
- gâyatrā-vepas, moved by the Gâyatra song, I, 142, 12.
- gāh, to dive : *āti gāhemahi*, II, 7, 3.
- gīr, praise, prayer, I, 26, 5; 59, 4¹; II, 2, 1², &c.

- girl, hill, I, 65, 5.
 grívaṇas, loving praises, I, 45, 2; II, 6, 3.
 gu : góguve, he has loudly praised, I, 127, 10².
 gur : gugurvánīti, eager in praising, I, 142, 8;—abhí guguryāb, approve, I, 140, 13.
 gurú, heavy: mántrab gurúb, I, 147, 4.
 guh, to hide : guhámānab, IV, 1, 11.
 gúh, covert : guhá gúham, I, 67, 6³.
 gúhā, in secret, I, 65, 1; 67, 3; II, 4, 9¹; III, 1, 9; 14; V, 2, 1; 15, 5; gúhā bhávāntam, sántam, the hidden one, I, 67, 7; 141, 3; III, 5, 10; V, 8, 3; gúhā hitám, hidden, IV, 5, 8¹; 7, 6; V, 11, 6.
 gúhya, secret, I, 72, 6; IV, 5, 10; V, 3, 2; 3; 5, 10.
 gri, to praise, I, 44, 6, &c.; grínite, he is praised, I, 79, 12¹;—desh-nám abhí grínīhi, hail our gift, II, 9, 4; abhí grínītāb, they salute, III, 6, 10; girāb abhí grínāti, he responds to my hymns, V, 27, 3.
 gri : gāgri-vāmsab, having awoke, III, 10, 9; ágigar íti, he has awakened, V, 1, 3¹. See gri.
 grítsa, clever, III, 1, 2; 19, 1; IV, 5, 2.
 Grítsa-madá : grítsa-madáśab, II, 4, 9.
 gridhnú, greedy, I, 70, 11².
 gríhā-pati, master of the house, I, 12, 6; 36, 5; 60, 4; II, 1, 2³; IV, 9, 4; 11, 5; V, 8, 1; 2.
 gó, cow, I, 31, 12, &c.; 95, 8¹; V, 1, 3²; 3, 2²; ástam ná gāvāb, I, 66, 9; údhab ná gónām, I, 69, 3; puru-dámsam sanīm gób, III, 1, 23; ékā gaúb, III, 7, 2³; gúhyam náma gónām, V, 3, 3; ávindat gāv, V, 14, 4¹; ánasvantā gāvā, two oxen with a car, V, 27, 1.
 gó-agra, at the head of which are cows, II, 1, 16¹.
 go-ishá, fighting for cows, IV, 13, 2³.
 gó-ishri, 'striving for cows,' battle, I, 36, 8; (45, 7¹).
 gó-rigika, (I, 44, 3¹).
 Gótama, I, 79, 10; IV, 4, 11; pl., the Gotamas, I, 60, 5; 77, 5; 78, 1; 2¹.
 gopā, shepherd, guardian, protector, I, 96, 7; II, 9, 2; 6; III, 15, 2; V, 2, 5; 11, 1; 12, 4; gopām rítāśya, I, 1, 8; III, 10, 2; virām gopāb, I, 94, 5¹; 96, 4.
 gó-mat, rich in, or consisting in, cows, I, 79, 4; III, 16, 1; IV, 2, 5¹; V, 4, 11; 24, 2; vragām gó-mantam, full of cows, IV, 1, 15.
 gaurí, buffalo cow : gauryam, IV, 12, 6.
 gnā, wife, IV, 9, 4¹.
 gnāvat, accompanied by the divine wives : gnāvab (conj. gnāvab), II, 1, 5¹.
 grābhana-vat, a firm hold, I, 127, 5⁵.
 grāma, hamlet, I, 44, 10.
 grāvan, pressing-stone (of the Soma), IV, 3, 3¹; V, 25, 8¹.
 ghanā, club, I, 36, 16¹.
 gharma, offering of hot milk to the Asvins, III, 26, 7²; the gharma vessel, V, 19, 4.
 ghush : ghóshi, it resounded, IV, 4, 8.
 ghri, to besprinkle : gígharmi, II, 10, 4; 5.
 ghrinā, heat : ghrinā, I, 141, 4¹.
 ghrítā, the Ghríta, or ghee, I, 72, 3; 127, 1, &c.; II, 3, 11²; 5, 6¹; ghrítāni aksharan, I, 188, 5; ghrítam ná pútām, III, 2, 1; ghrítébhiā ā-hutab, worshipped by offerings of ghríta, II, 7, 4¹; sūki ghrítam ná taptām, IV, 1, 6.
 ghríta-āhavana, to whom ghríta oblations are poured out, I, 12, 5; 45, 5.
 ghríta-nirrig, whose stately robe is ghee, III, 17, 1; 27, 5.
 ghríta-prishṭa, whose back is covered with ghee, I, 13, 5; V, 4, 3; 14, 5.
 ghríta-pratika, whose face shines with ghee, I, 143, 7; III, 1, 18; V, 11, 1.
 ghríta-prasatta, taking his seat in ghee, V, 15, 1.
 ghríta-prúsh, ghríta-sprinkling, I, 45, 1; II, 3, 2.
 ghríta-yoni, having his abode in ghee, (I, 140, 1²); III, 4, 2¹; V, 8, 6.
 ghríta-vat, rich in ghee, I, 142, 2; III, 5, 6; 7; 21, 2.

- ghrita-*śrūt*, dripping with ghee, III, 21, 3; V, 14, 3.
 ghrita-*śrī*, adorned with ghee, I, 128, 4; V, 8, 3.
 ghrita-*snā*, swimming in ghee, IV, 6, 9.
 ghrita-*snū*, swimming in ghee, III, 6, 6¹; IV, 2, 3¹; V, 26, 2.
 ghrita-*lā*, (the ladle) full of ghee, III, 6, 1; 19, 2; 27, 1; IV, 6, 3; V, 28, 1.
 ghrī-*śvi*, brisk, IV, 2, 13.
 ghorā, terrible, IV, 6, 6.
 ghōsha, noise, III, 7, 6.
 ka, and : ka rātham for karātham, I, 70, 7²; (in the first member), I, 77, 2².
 kākri, maker, III, 16, 4.
 kaksh, to look : jatām kākshānab akshābhīb, I, 128, 3;—ānu kāksha, V, 2, 8;—abhi kakshase, V, 3, 9;—vi kashve, I, 98, 1; V, 19, 1³;—nab krīdhi sam-kākshē, make us behold, I, 127, 11.
 kākshana, appearance, I, 13, 5.
 kākshas, look, sight, I, 96, 2³; V, 15, 4.
 kat, to hide : kātantam, I, 65, 1;—prā kātāyasva, drive away, V, 4, 6.
 katub-akshā, four-eyed : katub-akshāb, I, 31, 13².
 kātub-pad, four-footed, I, 94, 5.
 kānab-hita, with satisfied mind, III, 2, 2; 7; 11, 2.
 kānas : kānab dhāb, accept, I, 26, 10.
 kandrā, gold, II, 2, 4².
 kandrā-ratha, with a shining chariot, I, 141, 12; III, 3, 5.
 kar, to move, walk : karāthāya gī-vāse, that we may walk and live, I, 36, 14; karāthā (conj. karāthā), I, 66, 9¹; karatab dhruvāsyā, of whatever moves or is firm, I, 146, 1; gūhā kārantaṁ, III, 1, 9²;—nīb karati, he comes forward, I, 95, 4;—te pāri karanti, they walk around thee, I, 127, 9²;—vi karanti, spread around, I, 36, 3;—abhi vi karanta, they have come hither and thither, III, 4, 5.
 karātha, all that moves, (I, 66, 9¹); sthātūb karātham, I, 58, 5²; 68, 1; 70, 7²; sthātām karātham, I, 70, 3; sthātṛin karātham ka, I, 72, 6².
 karishnū, speedy, IV, 7, 9.
 kārman, skin : saśasya kārma, III, 5, 6²; 7¹;—kārma-iva, like a hide, IV, 13, 4.
 karshanī, human tribe, I, 127, 2; III, 6, 5; 10, 1; IV, 7, 4; 8, 8; V, 23, 1.
 karshani-dhrī, supporting the human tribes, IV, 1, 2.
 karshani-prā, filling the dwellings of people, IV, 2, 13.
 kashāla-vat, with head-pieces, III, 8, 10¹.
 kāyū, respectful, III, 24, 4.
 kārū, beautiful, I, 58, 6, &c.; kārū, loc., I, 72, 2².
 kārū-pratīka, cheerful-faced, II, 8, 2.
 ki : ni-kāyā, revering, III, 26, 1;—vi kinavat, may he distinguish, IV, 2, 11.
 kikitvit-manas, attentive-minded, V, 22, 3.
 kit, to shine, light up : kitāyantam, II, 2, 4; kitayat, II, 2, 5; kitayema, II, 2, 10; kitreṇa kikitē bhāṣā, II, 4, 5; kiteta, II, 4, 6; kēkitānab, resplendent, III, 29, 7; kiteta, he has distinguished himself, V, 27, 1;—prā kiteta, he has shone forth, V, 19, 1;—vi kikitē, it shines, I, 71, 7².
 kit, to see, watch, be intent on : kikitā, I, 67, 7; kikitat asmai, may he pay attention to this (sacrificer), I, 69, 9; kitāyantab, awaking attention, I, 94, 4; kitati, I, 128, 4; III, 11, 3¹; kitāte, III, 14, 2; kikitānab akitān, seeing the unseen ones, III, 18, 2; kitatab, attentive, IV, 5, 4; kikitdhī, V, 22, 4¹; kitayat, he has enlightened, IV, 1, 9¹; kitāyan, enlightening, V, 15, 5²; kikitvān, knowing, I, 68, 6, &c.;—ā kiteta, he has understood, I, 95, 4;—keti prā, it has been known, III, 12, 9;—vi kitāyantab, causing to discern, V, 19, 2;—sam-kikitvān, looking over, IV, 7, 8.
 kiti, pile, (I, 67, 10²).
 kittā, mind, V, 7, 9.

- kitti*, splendour (?), I, 67, 10¹.
kitti, thought, III, 2, 3; 3, 3; wisdom, IV, 2, 11.
kitrá, bright, excellent, I, 66, 1; 6, &c.
kitrá-bhānu, with bright splendour, I, 27, 6; II, 10, 2; V, 26, 2.
kitrá-yāma, whose way is bright, III, 2, 13.
kitrá-śokis, of bright splendour, V, 17, 2.
kitrá-ravab-tama, whose glory is brightest, I, 1, 5; 45, 6.
kud, to quicken, promote: *kodáyāsi*, I, 94, 15; *kodayata*, I, 188, 8.
krī: *vi krītānti*, they get off, I, 67, 8.
kētana, brilliant, II, 5, 1²; III, 12, 2;—n., splendour, light, I, 13, 11; III, 3, 8; IV, 7, 2.
kētishība, most famous, I, 65, 9; most shining, I, 128, 8; most brilliant, V, 27, 1.
kodā, driver, I, 143, 6.
kodayāt-mati, stirring thoughts, V, 8, 6.
kyu: *ā tvā akuṣyavub*, they have made thee speed hither, I, 45, 8.
kbad, to show oneself: *kbadayati*, III, 9, 7.
kbâyā, shadow, I, 73, 8.
gaṭbāra, belly, I, 95, 10; III, 2, 11; 22, 1; 29, 14¹.
gan, to be born: *gagñānāb*, I, 12, 3; *gātāb* and *gāni-tvab*, I, 66, 8¹; *ganayat*, he caused to be born, I, 71, 8¹; *gātāsya ka gāyamānasya ka kshām*, the earth (i.e. the support) of what is born and what will be born, I, 96, 7¹; *gāyemahi*, we may multiply with offspring, I, 97, 4; *ganāmasi*, III, 2, 1¹; *gātāb gāyate*, III, 8, 5¹; *ganata*, they have generated, IV, 1, 1; *gātān ubhāyān*, the two races (of men and gods), IV, 2, 2; *gānitos*, from giving birth, IV, 6, 7;—*ā gāyamānam* (conj. *gāyamānā*), I, 60, 3¹;—*pragagñi-vān*, generator, III, 2, 11.
gāna, man, people, I, 36, 2, &c.; *daivyaṃ gānam*, the divine host, I, 31, 17; 44, 6; 45, 1^{1,2}; 9; 10; V, 13, 3; *gānāya śāsvate*, I, 36, 19.
gānas, tribe: *gānasī iti ubhé* (ti, both tribes (of gods and of men), II, 2, 4.
gāni, wife, I, 66, 8; *gānayab sāni/āb*, I, 71, 1;—woman, III, 26, 3¹; IV, 5, 5.
ganitrī, begetter, I, 76, 4¹; *ganitā*, *rōdasyob*, I, 96, 4; *pitūb ka gārbham ganitūb ka*, III, 1, 10¹; *dyaūb pitā ganitā*, IV, 1, 10.
gāni-tva, who will be born: *gāni-tvam* (conj. *gāni-tvab*), I, 66, 8¹.
gāniman, birth, III, 1, 4; 20; *trīb gānimāni*, IV, 1, 7;—*devānām gānimāni*, III, 4, 10; IV, 2, 17; 18;—offspring, V, 3, 3.
ganūs, birth: *ganūshā*, by birth, by nature, I, 94, 6; III, 1, 3; 9; 2, 2; *ganūsham*, I, 141, 4.
gantū, people, human creature, I, 45, 6, &c.; *mānushab gantūbhiḥ*, III, 3, 6.
gānman, birth: *mānushasya gānasya gānma*, I, 70, 2; *devānām gānma*, I, 70, 6; *gānma-iva nityam tānayam*, III, 15, 2¹;—birth-place: *paramē gānman*, II, 9, 3;—race: *ubhāyāya gānmane*, I, 31, 7; *divyāya gānmane*, I, 58, 6; *devān* (i.e. *devām*) *gānma*, I, 67, 3^{1,6}; *gānmani iti ubhé* (ti, I, 141, 11⁸; *gānma ubhāyā*, II, 6, 7; *gānman-ganman*, generation by generation, III, 1, 20; 21.
gānya, belonging to one's own people: *gānyā-iva* (conj. *gānyab-iva*), II, 6, 7¹.
gābāru? IV, 5, 7¹.
gāmbha, jaw, I, 143, 5; 148, 4; IV, 7, 10.
gar, see *gri*.
garāna, sound (?), I, 141, 7¹.
garat-vīsha, busy among the decayed (wood), V, 8, 2¹.
Garā-bodha, N. pr.: *Gārā-bodha*, I, 27, 10¹.
garitrī, praiser, I, 189, 4; II, 9, 5; III, 7, 6¹; 12, 2; 5; 15, 5; V, 3, 11.
garimān, old age, I, 71, 10.
gāvishība, most swift, IV, 2, 3.
gā, people: *nab gāb*, I, 143, 8.
gāb-patyā, householdership, V, 28, 3¹.

- gāgrivi*, watchful: *gāgrivib*, I, 31, 9; III, 2, 12; 3, 7; 24, 3; 26, 3; 28, 5; 29, 2; V, 11, 1.
- Gātā-vedas*, I, 44, 1; 5; 45, 3, &c.; 127, 1².
- gāna*, birth: *trīni gānā*, I, 95, 3.
- gāmarya*?, IV, 3, 9⁴.
- gāmī*, kinsman, I, 31, 10; 65, 7; 71, 7³; 75, 3; 4; IV, 4, 5; V, 19, 4; *gāminām svāsrinām*, uterine sisters, III, 1, 11; *lokām gāmīm*, the sister world, III, 2, 9⁴.
- gāyā*, wife, I, 66, 5; IV, 3, 2¹.
- gāyū*, victorious, I, 67, 1².
- gārā*, lover, I, 66, 8; 69, 1¹; 9.
- gi*, to conquer, to gain: *gayati*, I, 36, 4;—*sam-gigivān*, III, 15, 4.
- ginv*, to stir: *ginvate*, III, 2, 11;
- ginva*, III, 3, 7; 15, 6;—*ūpa prā ginvan*, they have excited, I, 71, 1¹.
- gīvri*, aged, I, 70, 10.
- gihmā*, down-streaming, I, 95, 5.
- gihvā*, tongue, I, 140, 2; II, 1, 13; 4, 4; III, 20, 2; IV, 5, 10; 7, 10; V, 26, 1.
- gīrā*, quick, I, 44, 11; III, 3, 6.
- gīrā-arva*, with quick horses, I, 141, 12; II, 4, 2.
- gīrā-dānu*, rich in quickening rain, I, 189, 8.
- gīv*, to live: *gīvāse*, I, 36, 14; 72, 7; 79, 9; *gīvātave*, I, 94, 4.
- gīvā*, living, I, 68, 3;—*life*, I, 140, 8.
- gīvā-dhanya*, the prize (of contests) which living beings have gained, (I, 149, 2¹).
- gīvāpita-sarga*, whose stream is drunk by living beings, I, 149, 2¹.
- gīva-yāgā*, a sacrifice of living (victims), I, 31, 15.
- gur*, see *gri*.
- gush*, to be pleased, accept gladly: *gushasva*, I, 12, 12; 75, 1; 144, 7; *gushanta*, I, 68, 3; 9; *a-gushran*, I, 71, 1, &c.; *gushanta pānthām*, they followed gladly his path, I, 127, 6; *tanvām gushasva*, III, 1, 1⁶; *goshi*, find pleasure, IV, 9, 7¹;—*prāti goshayete iti*, they caress, I, 95, 5; 6.
- gūshra*, welcome, I, 44, 2; 4;—*grateful*, I, 73, 10.
- guhū-āsyā*, whose mouth is the sacrificial spoon, I, 12, 6.
- guhurānā*, leading astray, I, 189, 1.
- guhū*, sacrificial ladle, I, 58, 4³; 76, 5³; 145, 3; II, 10, 6; IV, 4, 2¹; V, 1, 3; *saptā guhvāb*, I, 58, 7².
- gū*, to speed, incite: *gunāb*, I, 27, 7; *gunāsi*, I, 71, 6; *gūgu-vat*, impetuous, IV, 11, 4.
- gū*, speedy: *gūvāb*, I, 140, 4¹.
- gūti*, speeding, I, 127, 2;—*solicitation*, III, 3, 8;—*yagñāsyā gūtyā*, stirring, III, 12, 3.
- gūrvi*, flaming (?), I, 127, 10.
- gūrv*, to consume: *ni-gūrvan*, IV, 7, 11.
- gri*, to grow old: *gūryati*, I, 128, 2; *gugurvān*, II, 4, 5; *gūryat-su*, III, 23, 1; *garāyan*, making decay, II, 8, 2¹; *garase*, V, 15, 4¹.
- gri*, to praise: *garate*, he is praised (?), I, 59, 7;—*sām te garetā*, may it resound to thee, IV, 3, 15¹.
- gri*, to be awake: *garate*, I, 59, 7; 127, 10⁴; *garase*, I, 94, 14¹; *garasva*, III, 3, 7¹;—*sām garatām*, may it awaken, IV, 4, 8¹.
- gētri*, conqueror, I, 66, 3; V, 25, 6.
- gēnya*, noble, I, 71, 4; 128, 7; 140, 2; 146, 5; II, 5, 1; V, 1, 5.
- gōsha*, desire: *gōsham ā*, I, 77, 5.
- gohūtra*, to be invoked, II, 10, 1.
- gñā*, to know: *ā gñāta*, accept, I, 94, 8;—*pra-gñān*, prescient, II, 3, 10; *ānu pra-gñān*, III, 26, 8;—*vi-gñān*, discriminating, I, 69, 3¹;—*sām gñāta*, they were concordant, I, 68, 8¹; *sam-gñānāb*, being like-minded, I, 72, 5.
- gyāyas*, better, I, 27, 13.
- gyēshība*, the first, I, 127, 2; eldest, IV, 1, 2.
- gyotīb-ratha*, whose chariot is light, I, 140, 1.
- gyōtis*, light, I, 36, 19; 59, 2; III, 26, 8; *divāb gyōtib*, I, 69, 1; *vipām gyōtimshi*, III, 10, 5¹; *vidānta gyōtib*, IV, 1, 14; *svāb nā gyōtib*, IV, 10, 3¹.
- grāyas*, space, I, 95, 9; 140, 9; V, 8, 7.
- tākvan*, N. of an animal, I, 66, 2¹.
- taksh*, to fashion: *hrīdā tashān māntrān*, I, 67, 4; *tatāksha*, III, 8, 6; *ataksham*, V, 2, 11.

ta/it, lightning, I, 94, 7.

tát-ogas, having the strength of such a one, V, 1, 8.

tan, to spin out, stretch out: *tántum* tanushva, I, 142, 1; *tántum* tatám, II, 3, 6; *tanvânáb* yag-ñám, III, 3, 6;—*áva* tanuhi, unbend, IV, 4, 5;—*â-tatántha*, thou hast spread, III, 22, 2;—*âti nîb* tatanyub, may they spread out, I, 141, 13²;—*vî* tanvate, V, 13, 4; 15, 3³.

tán, continuation: *jâsvatâ* tânâ, constantly, I, 26, 6¹; *tânâ*, for ever, I, 77, 4; II, 2, 1²; III, 25, 1; 27, 9;—*tokâsya nab* tâne tanûnâm, II, 9, 2.

tânaya, offspring, I, 96, 4; III, 15, 2¹;—*tokâsya* tânaye, of kith and kin, I, 31, 12¹; *toké iti* tânaye, I, 147, 1³; *tokâya* tânayâya, I, 189, 2; IV, 12, 5.

tanayitnú, thunderbolt, IV, 3, 1.

tânâ, see *tân*.

tanû, body: *tanvâb*, I, 31, 12; 72, 3; 5³; *ikkânta rétâb* mithâb tanûshu, I, 68, 8¹; *tâne* tanûnâm, II, 9, 2; *tanvâm* gushasva, III, 1, 1⁶; *tanvâ* su-gâta, III, 15, 2; *tanû-bhiô*, IV, 2, 14; *tanvâb* tanvate *vî*, V, 15, 3³.

tanû-krit, the body's creator: *tanû-krit*, I, 31, 9.

Tânû-napât, 'son of the body,' I, 13, 2¹; 142, 2; 188, 2; III, 4, 2; 29, 11.

tanû-rûk, shining with his body, II, 1, 9.

tântu, thread (of sacrifice), I, 142, 1;—*tântum* tatám, warp, II, 3, 6;—web (of light), IV, 13, 4.

tand, to grow tired: *tandate* (by conjecture), I, 58, 1¹.

tanyatú, thunder, V, 25, 8.

tap, to burn, heat: *tápo iti*, *tápa*, III, 18, 2; *tatápate*, IV, 2, 6.

tápishtâ, hottest, IV, 4, 1; 5, 4.

tápu, hot, II, 4, 6.

tápub-gambha, with fiery jaws, I, 36, 16; 58, 5.

tápus, heat: *tápûmshi*, IV, 4, 2.

tamab-hán, destroyer of darkness, I, 140, 1.

támas, darkness: *dvârâ* támasab, III, 5, 1; *tirâb* támâmsi dar-jatâb, III, 27, 13.

taráni, strongly advancing, triumphant, I, 128, 6; III, 11, 3²; 29, 13; IV, 4, 12.

târas, advancing power, III, 18, 3.

târutri, a winner, I, 27, 9.

târus: *dâkshasya* târushab, of superior strength, III, 2, 3.

tavás, strong, III, 1, 1¹; 2; 13.

tavishâ, powerful, III, 12, 8.

tâvishî, strength, I, 128, 5; III, 3, 5; 26, 4.

tâvyams, most powerful, I, 143, 1; V, 17, 1.

tâyú, thief, I, 65, 1; V, 15, 5².

tâvakâ, thy, I, 94, 11.

tigitâ, sharp, I, 143, 5.

tigmâ, sharp, IV, 6, 8; 7, 10; V, 19, 5.

tigmâ-anika, sharp-faced, I, 95, 2.

tigmâ-âyudha, with sharp weapons, V, 2, 10.

tigmâ-gambha, with sharp teeth, I, 79, 6; IV, 5, 4; 15, 5.

tigmâ-bhrishî, sharp-pointed, IV, 5, 3.

tigmâ-jokis, sharp-flaming, I, 79, 10.

tigmâ-heti, with the sharp weapon, IV, 4, 4.

tig, to sharpen: *tégamânab*, sharpened, III, 8, 11.

titvishânâ, rushing forward impetuously, V, 8, 5.

tir, see *tri*.

tirâb-ahnya, kept over night, I, 45, 10¹; III, 28, 3; 6.

tirâb-hita, dwelling in concealment, III, 9, 5.

tirâkâ, throughout, II, 10, 4.

tirás, through, III, 27, 13.

tu: *tûtâva*, he is strong, I, 94, 2.

tug, to stir, press onward: *tutugyât*, I, 143, 6; *tûngamânâb*, III, 1, 16; *tugé*, IV, 1, 3.

túg, impetuous: *tugâ girâ*, V, 17, 3².

túturi, conqueror, I, 145, 3.

tud, to strike: *nî* *tundate* (conj. nú *tandate*), I, 58, 1¹.

turâ, quick, I, 68, 9; 96, 8; III, 4, 11; IV, 3, 8.

turîpa, seed, I, 142, 10; III, 4, 9.

Turvâsa, I, 36, 18¹.

Turvîti, I, 36, 18¹.

tuvi-grâ, mightily devouring, I, 140, 9.

tuvi-grîva, with mighty neck, V, 2, 12.

tuvi-gâtâ, strong-born, IV, 11, 2; V, 2, 11; 27, 1.

- túvi-dyumna, highly glorious, III, 16, 3; 6.
 tuví-brahman, knower of mighty spells, V, 25, 5.
 tuvísravab-tama, most mightily renowned, III, 11, 6; V, 25, 5.
 túvishmat, mighty, IV, 5, 3.
 tuvi-sván, loudly roaring, V, 16, 3.
 tuvi-svanás, roaring mightily, IV, 6, 10; V, 8, 3.
 tuvi-sváni, loudly roaring, I, 58, 4; 127, 6.
 túrni, swift, III, 3, 5; 11, 5.
 túrni-tama, quickest, IV, 4, 3.
 tri, to get through, to overcome: ataran, I, 36, 8; táran, III, 24, 1; turyāma, V, 9, 6; tarishāni, may they pass across, V, 10, 6'; tuturyāt, may he traverse, V, 15, 3;—titirvāmsab āti srīdhab, I, 36, 7; āti tarema, III, 27, 3;—with prá, to prolong, promote: pra-tirán, I, 44, 6; prá tira, I, 94, 16; III, 17, 2; prá tirasi, IV, 6, 1; prá tāri pra-tarám, IV, 12, 6;—ví tārít, he has crossed, I, 69, 5²; 73, 1; vi-tāritratā, progressing, I, 144, 3.
 trína, grass, III, 29, 6.
 trid, to perforate: atrinat, IV, 1, 19;—ānu trindhi, V, 12, 2.
 trip, to satiate oneself: sómasya trimpatām, III, 12, 3.
 trish, to be thirsty: tatrishānāb, I, 31, 7²; ātrishyanti, free from thirst, I, 71, 3²; 4; tatrishānāb, II, 4, 6.
 trishú, thirsty, greedy, I, 58, 2; 4; IV, 4, 1; 7, 11.
 trishu-kyút, moving about thirstily, I, 140, 3.
 trishrá, pungent sharpness, III, 9, 3.
 tégas, sharp splendour, I, 71, 8²; sharpness: sám akrinvan tégase, III, 2, 10.
 tégishāba, hottest, I, 127, 4¹.
 tégiyas, sharpest, III, 19, 3.
 toká, children: toká tánaya, kith and kin, I, 31, 12¹; 147, 1³; 189, 2; IV, 12, 5; nitye toké, II, 2, 11; tokāsa táne tanū-nām, II, 9, 2; tokāya tugé, IV, 1, 3.
 toká-vat, with offspring, III, 13, 7.
 todá, an or the impeller, I, 150, 1².
 tośá, bounteous, III, 12, 4¹.
 tmánā, by oneself, by one's own power, I, 69, 10; 79, 6, &c.
 tmányā, thyself, I, 188, 10.
 tráyab-trimsat, thirty-three (gods), I, 45, 2.
 Trasādasyu, V, 27, 3².
 trā: trāsate, may he protect, I, 128, 5; 7.
 trā, protector, (I, 72, 5¹):
 trātrī, protector, I, 31, 12; V, 24, 1.
 trí, three, I, 13, 9, &c.; trí roka-nāni, the threefold light, I, 149, 4; tistrī-bhyab ā vāram, II, 5, 5²; tistráb devīb, II, 3, 8; III, 4, 8; V, 5, 8; trīni satú trī sahasrāni trimśat ka devāb náva ka, III, 9, 9; trīni āyūmshi, tistráb ā-gānīb, III, 17, 3¹; trí, tistráb, III, 20, 2.
 trimśat, thirty: trimśatam trīn ka devān, III, 6, 9.
 Trī-aruna, V, 27, 1-3.
 trī-āvir, with threefold admixture (Soma), V, 27, 5¹.
 Tritá, V, 9, 5.
 tri-dhātu, threefold: arkáb tri-dhātub, III, 26, 7¹.
 tri-mūrdhān, having three heads, I, 146, 1¹.
 tri-várūtha, thrice-protecting, V, 4, 8.
 tri-vishī, thrice, IV, 6, 4; 15, 2¹.
 tri-vrīt, threefold: tri-vrīt ānnam I, 140, 2².
 tris, thrice: trīb saptá, I, 72, 6¹; trīb āban, III, 4, 2; trīb (read trī?), IV, 1, 7¹.
 tri-sadhassthā, dwelling in three abodes, V, 4, 8;—threefold abode, V, 11, 2².
 Traivriśhná, the son of Trivriśhan, V, 27, 1.
 tvák, skin, III, 21, 5;—leather-bag (cloud), I, 79, 3²;—tvakī upamāsyām, I, 145, 5².
 tvád, pers. pron.: tvé iti, in thee, I, 26, 6; 36, 5¹; 6; te, acc., I, 127, 9²; V, 6, 4¹; te túbhyam, V, 6, 5¹.
 tvadrík, directed towards thee, V, 3, 12.
 Tváshtri, N. of a god, I, 13, 10; 95, 2²; 5²; 142, 10; 188, 9; II, 1, 5; 3, 9; III, 4, 9; V, 5, 9.
 tvā-ūta, guarded by thee, I, 73, 9; 74, 8; III, 19, 3; IV, 4, 14; V, 3, 6.

tvā-dāta, given by thee, V, 7, 10.
 tvā-dūta, with thee as messenger,
 II, 10, 6; V, 6, 8.
 tvā-yā, desire of worshipping thee,
 IV, 2, 6; 14.
 tvā-vat, like thee: tvā-vān, I, 189, 6.
 Tvāshtrā, son of Tvashtri, III, 7, 4¹.
 tvish, see titvishānā.
 tvīshi, impetuous power, I, 71, 5;
 V, 8, 5.
 tveshā, impetuous, fierce, I, 36, 20;
 66, 6; 70, 11; 95, 8; 143, 3;
 II, 9, 1; III, 22, 2; 26, 5;
 IV, 6, 10; V, 8, 6.
 tveshātha, fierceness, I, 141, 8.
 tveshā-pratika, with sharp point, I,
 66, 7.
 tsar: tatsāra, he steals upon (his
 prey), I, 145, 4;—āva tsarat, he
 stealthily approached, I, 71, 5.
 damr, to bite: dārate, I, 189, 5.
 damsānā, wonderful deed, III, 3,
 11; wonderful power, III, 9, 7.
 dāmsas, wonderful deed, I, 69, 8.
 dāksha, mind, I, 68, 8;—power,
 ability, skill, I, 76, 1; 95, 6¹;
 141, 11²; III, 2, 3; 13, 2; IV,
 10, 2; V, 10, 2; 18, 2; 20, 3;
 dāksham (conj. yakshām), IV,
 3, 13³; Dāksha personified,
 III, 27, 9²; 10; V, 16, 2;—
 skilful, I, 59, 4; III, 14, 7.
 dāksha-pati, lord of power, I, 95, 6.
 dākshas, ability, II, 1, 11.
 dakshāyya, to be treated kindly, II,
 4, 3.
 dakshinatās, from the right side, I,
 95, 6².
 dākshinā, the sacrificial gift, V, 1, 3³.
 dakshinā-āvrīt, turned to the right,
 I, 144, 1³.
 dakshinā-vāh, carrying from left to
 right, III, 6, 1².
 dāgdhri, burner, V, 9, 4.
 datvāt, having teeth, I, 189, 5.
 Dadhī-krā, III, 20, 1²; 5.
 dán, house: pátib dán, lord of the
 house, I, 149, 1².
 dánta, tooth: atharyāb ná dántam,
 IV, 6, 8².
 dabh, to deceive: dípsanta ná de-
 bhub, I, 147, 3; dadabhanta, I,
 148, 2; dabhan, I, 148, 5;—
 sátram ā-dabhúb, III, 16, 2.
 dábha, deceiver, V, 19, 4³.

dabhrā, few, I, 31, 6.
 dām, house: dām-su, I, 141, 4.
 dáma, house, I, 1, 8, &c.; II, 1, 7²;
 8; kítib apām dáme, I, 67,
 10¹; dáme-dame, house by
 house, I, 128, 4; IV, 7, 3; V,
 1, 5; 6, 8.
 dāmūnas, domestic, friend of the
 house, I, 60, 4²; 68, 9; 140,
 10; 141, 11; III, 1, 11; 17;
 2, 15; 3, 6; 5, 4; IV, 4, 11;
 11, 5; V, 1, 8¹; 4, 5; 8, 1.
 dām-pati, master of the house, I,
 127, 8; V, 22, 4;—dām-patī,
 husband and wife, V, 3, 2.
 dāmya, domestic, III, 1, 15; 2, 8.
 day, to bestow: dayasva, I, 68, 6;—
 vi dāyamānab, distributing, III,
 2, 11; ví dayate, he tears to
 pieces, IV, 7, 10.
 dārvī, sacrificial ladle, V, 6, 9.
 darsatā, conspicuous, beautiful, I,
 36, 9; 141, 1; 144, 7; III, 1,
 3; 10, 6; 27, 13.
 dāra-pramati: dāsa-pramatim, read:
 dāsa prāmatim, I, 141, 2⁴.
 darasy: sám darasya, forgive, III, 7,
 10.
 das: sam-dadasvān, being ex-
 hausted (?), II, 2, 6¹.
 dasmā, wonderful, I, 77, 3; 148, 4;
 II, 1, 4; 9, 5; III, 1, 7; 3, 2;
 IV, 1, 3; 6, 9; V, 6, 5; 17, 4.
 dasmāt, possessed of wonderful
 power, I, 74, 4.
 Dāsyu, I, 36, 18; 59, 6; V, 4, 6;
 pl., the Dasyus, I, 78, 4; III,
 29, 9; V, 7, 10; 14, 4.
 dah, to burn: dāha, I, 12, 5, &c.;
 dhākshat, burning, II, 4, 7;—
 ānu dhakshi, II, 1, 10;—prā
 dhakshi, I, 76, 3;—prāti dahatāt,
 burn against, III, 18, 1;—sām
 dāha, I, 36, 14; 20.
 dā, to give: ānu dāb, they give way,
 I, 127, 4;—ná pára dāt, he will
 not surrender, V, 3, 12.
 dā, to bind: ní-dadub, (V, 2, 6²);
 ní-ditam, V, 2, 7.
 dā (do), to cut, to shear: dāti, I, 65,
 8; V, 7, 7.
 dātrī, giver, I, 13, 11.
 dātri, mower, V, 7, 7.
 dāna, gift, V, 27, 5.
 dāvān: dāvāne, for the sake of giving,
 II, 1, 10.

- dār, to offer, worship: dadāsa, I, 36, 4, &c.; yāb tūbhyam dārat, I, 68, 6; dārat, IV, 2, 9; dārat yāb asmai āram, who satisfies him, I, 70, 5; nāmab dārat, I, 71, 6; agnāye dāshri āvase, I, 127, 4¹.
- dāś, worship, I, 127, 7.
- dāśu-adhvara, performing worship, I, 75, 3¹.
- dāśvāms, worshipper, liberal giver, I, 1, 6; 27, 6, &c.
- dās: abhi-dāsati, he tries to harm, I, 79, 11.
- dāsā-patnī, (strongholds) of which the Dāsas are the lords, III, 12, 6.
- dāsvat, munificent, I, 127, 1; II, 4, 3; IV, 2, 7; V, 9, 2.
- Diti, IV, 2, 11¹.
- didrikshēnya, worthy to be looked for, I, 146, 5.
- didrikshēya, visible, III, 1, 12.
- didyū, arrow, I, 71, 5.
- didyūt, shaft, I, 66, 7.
- didhishāyā, worthy to be searched for, desirable, I, 73, 2⁴; II, 4, 1.
- didhishū, seeking to obtain, I, 71, 3².
- dīv, see dyū.
- divab-rūt, shining from heaven, III, 7, 5.
- divākshas, dwelling in heaven, III, 7, 2¹.
- divā-tarāt, more than by day, I, 127, 5².
- divi-kshayā, dweller in heaven: divi-kshayām (conj. for divi kshāyam), III, 2, 13¹.
- divitmat, going to heaven, I, 26, 2.
- divishri, the striving for day, I, 45, 7¹; 141, 6: — heaven-aspiring sacrifice, IV, 9, 3.
- divi-sprīś, attaining to Heaven, I, 142, 8; V, 11, 1; 13, 2¹.
- divyā, heavenly, I, 143, 5; 144, 6; III, 2, 4; — divine: divyāya gānmane, I, 58, 6.
- dīs, quarter of the world: dīsab, I, 31, 14²; prā dīsam (for prādīsam), I, 95, 3².
- dī, didī, to shine, I, 36, 11, &c.; rayim asmāsu didīhi, shine upon us with thy wealth, II, 2, 6; didayet, may he illuminate, II, 4, 3; dīdyat (conj. dīdhyat), III, 1, 1²; devān ākṣba dīdy-
- ānab, brightly shining towards the gods, III, 15, 5¹; dīdyatam brihāt, III, 27, 15.
- dīdi-vāms, resplendent, I, 12, 5; 10, &c.
- dīdivi, shining, I, 1, 8.
- dīdhiti, (adoring) thought, devotion, III, 4, 3; IV, 2, 16²; V, 18, 4.
- dirghā, long-lasting: dirghāb rayīb, IV, 2, 5.
- dirghā-āyus, long living, IV, 15, 9; 10.
- dirghāyu-śokis, flaming through long life, V, 18, 3.
- dub-itā, trouble, misfortune, danger, I, 99, 1; 128, 5; III, 20, 4; V, 3, 11; 4, 9; 9, 6.
- dub-uktā, evil word, I, 147, 4.
- dub-ēva, of evil conduct, IV, 5, 5; V, 2, 9.
- dub-gā, trouble, I, 99, 1; 189, 2.
- dub-gāha, difficulty, V, 4, 9.
- dub-grībhī, difficult to seize, I, 140, 6.
- dub-grībhīy: dub-grībhīyase, thou showest thyself hard to seize, V, 9, 4.
- dub-dābha, undeceivable, III, 2, 2; IV, 9, 2; 8.
- dúb-dhita, badly-composed (prayer). I, 140, 11.
- dub-dhī, malicious, I, 94, 8; 9; III, 16, 2.
- dub-matī, hatred, ill-will, III, 15, 6; IV, 11, 6.
- dub-sāmsa, one who curses, I, 94, 9.
- dugdhā, milk, V, 19, 4¹.
- dukkṣūnā, misfortune, I, 189, 5.
- dúdhita, confused, IV, 1, 17¹.
- dúr, gate, door, I, 68, 10; II, 2, 7¹; IV, 4, 6; dúrab, the doors (of heaven), I, 69, 10; 188, 5¹; rāyāb dúrab, I, 72, 8.
- duritā, see dub-itā.
- durōka-śokis, he to whose flame men do not get accustomed, I, 66, 5¹.
- duronā, house, I, 69, 4; 5; 70, 4¹, &c.
- durgā, see dub-gā.
- dúryā, pl., dwelling, IV, 1, 9; 18; 2, 12.
- dúvas, worship, I, 36, 14²; III, 2, 6; 16, 4; IV, 2, 9; 8, 6.
- duvasanā, hastening, IV, 6, 10².
- duvasy, to exalt: duvasyati, I, 78, 2; III, 3, 1; duvasyan, III, 1, 2; 13; duvasyāta, III, 2, 8; V, 28, 6.

- dush, to violate: *dūdushat*, III, 3, 1.
dustāra, invincible, I, 79, 8¹; II, 2, 10; III, 24, 1; V, 15, 3.
duh, to milk: *dohāse*, I, 141, 2; *amṛitam dūhānāb*, III, 1, 14.
duhitṛī, daughter, I, 71, 5¹.
dūtā, messenger (*Agni*), I, 12, 1; 8; 36, 3-5; 44, 2; 3; 9; 11; 58, 1; 60, 1; 72, 7; 74, 4; 188, 1; II, 6, 6; 7; 9, 2; III, 3, 2; 5, 2; 9; 6, 5; 9, 8; 11, 2; 17, 4; IV, 1, 8; 2, 2; 7, 4; 9; 11; 8, 1; 9, 2; V, 3, 8; 8, 6; 11, 4; 21, 3; 26, 6.
dūtyā, the work of a messenger: *dūtyām* (*yāsi*), I, 12, 4; 44, 12; 74, 7; messengership, I, 71, 4³; IV, 7, 8; 8, 4; 9, 6.
dūrē-bhā, far-shining, I, 65, 10.
dri, to rend: *dadri-vāmsab*, IV, 1, 14.
driḷbā, strong, I, 71, 2; 72, 8.
driṣika, beautiful, I, 27, 10;—sight, I, 65, 10; 69, 10.
driṣya, visible, IV, 2, 12.
driśāt-vatī, N. of a river, III, 23, 4.
devā, god, I, 1, 2, &c.; *devāb devē-bhiḥ*, *devānām*, &c., I, 1, 5; 13, 11; 31, 1; 9; 68, 2¹; 94, 13; 142, 11; II, 3, 1; IV, 15, 1; *devām-devam*, this or that god, I, 26, 6; *bhūvab devānām pitā putrāb sán*, I, 69, 2; *devānām gánma*, I, 70, 6; *devān* (i. e. *devām*) *gánma*, I, 71, 3⁵; IV, 1, 2²; 2, 17²; *pāthab devēbhyab*, I, 188, 10¹; *devānām gánimāni*, III, 4, 10; *devānām gūhyā nāmāni*, V, 5, 10; *devāsab sārvaḥ viśā*, V, 26, 9;—*viśve devāb*, II, 3, 4¹; V, 3, 1; 26, 4;—divine, I, 1, 1; III, 20, 4; *dvārab devīb*, I, 13, 6; II, 3, 5; V, 5, 5; *dēva barhiḥ*, II, 3, 4; *dhiyam devim*, III, 18, 3; *devīb pātnīb*, IV, 5, 13.
deva-avī, eagerly longing for the gods, III, 29, 8.
devā-kāma, loving the gods, II, 3, 9; III, 4, 9.
devā-gusha, agreeable to the god, I, 77, 1.
devā-gūta, sent by the gods, IV, 11, 4.
devā-tāti, the divine world, host of the gods, I, 127, 9; 141, 10; III, 19, 2; 4; 26, 2; IV, 6, 3; 9; *devā-tātā*, among the gods, I, 58, 1; 95, 8²; 128, 2; III, 19, 1; IV, 6, 1.
deva-trā, to the gods, I, 128, 6²; III, 1, 22;—among the gods, III, 8, 7; V, 20, 1.
deva-tvā, divinity, I, 68, 4; 69, 6¹.
devadryāḥ, turned towards the gods: *devadrīkim*, III, 6, 1².
devāpsara-b-tama, most agreeable to the gods, I, 75, 1.
devā-bhakta, god-given, IV, 1, 10.
deva-yagyā, worship as is due to the gods, V, 21, 4.
deva-yāt, worshipping, or longing for, the gods, pious, I, 36, 1⁴; 77, 3; III, 5, 1; 6, 1; 3; 8, 1; 4; 6; 10, 7; 29, 12; IV, 2, 17; 11, 5; V, 1, 4; 21, 1.
deva-yā, approaching the gods, III, 8, 5².
deva-yāna, (the ways) which the gods go: *ādhvanab deva-yānān*, I, 72, 7².
deva-yū, godly, IV, 2, 7; 9, 1.
devā-vāta, beloved by the gods, III, 20, 2; IV, 3, 15;—*Devavāta*, N. p., III, 23, 2.
deva-vāhana, drawinghither the gods, III, 27, 14.
deva-vītama, most excellently repairing to the gods, I, 36, 9.
devā-vīti, feast of the gods, I, 12, 9; III, 17, 5; 21, 2.
devāvyakab-tama, which best receives the gods with its wide extent, I, 142, 5; IV, 26, 8; V, 22, 2.
devā-vyakas, receiving the gods, III, 4, 4.
deva-jās, for each of the gods, III, 21, 5.
Devā-sravas, N. p., III, 23, 2; 3.
deva-hūtama, best invoker of the gods, III, 13, 6.
devāhūti, invocation of the gods, I, 12, 12.
devāḥ, turned towards the gods, I, 127, 1.
devī, goddess, I, 13, 9; III, 7, 2²; 25, 3; IV, 14, 3; *tisrāb devīb*, II, 3, 8; III, 4, 8; V, 5, 8.
devyā, godhead, I, 140, 7.
deshnā, gift, II, 9, 4.
Daiva-vātā, (*Agni*) of *Devavāta*, III, 23, 3;—son of *Devavāta*, IV, 15, 4¹.
daivya, divine, I, 27, 12; II, 5, 2;

- III, 20, 4; *daivyâ hôtârâ*, I, 13, 8¹; 142, 8; 188, 7; II, 3, 7; III, 4, 7; V, 5, 7; *daivya* *gânam*, host of the gods, I, 31, 17; 44, 6; 45, 1²; 9; 10; V, 13, 3; *daivyâni vratâ*, I, 70, 2; *daivya* *jamitâ*, II, 3, 10; *mâdhunâ daivya*, III, 8, 1²; *vâkasâ daivya*, IV, 1, 15; *daivya* *ni*, divine powers, IV, 4, 5.
- do, see *dâ*.
- dôgha*, milkstream, V, 15, 5¹.
- doshâ*, evening: *doshâ ushâsi*, II, 8, 3; IV, 2, 8; *prâti doshâ* *ushâsam*, IV, 12, 2; V, 5, 6; *doshâ*, at evening, IV, 11, 6.
- dôshâ-vastar*, shining in the darkness, I, 1, 7¹; IV, 4, 9¹.
- dohâna*, stream (?), I, 144, 2¹.
- dyâvâkshâmâ*, du., Heaven and Earth, I, 96, 5; 140, 13; III, 8, 8¹.
- dyāvâprithivî*, du., Heaven and Earth, I, 31, 8; II, 1, 15; 2, 3; 7; III, 3, 11; 25, 3; 26, 8; IV, 14, 2.
- dyû*, sky, heaven, Heaven, I, 31, 4¹, &c.; 67, 5²; *upa-mâ divâb*, I, 31, 15¹; *divâb nâ sânu*, I, 58, 2; *mûrdhâ divâb*, I, 59, 2; III, 2, 14; *divâb brihatâb*, I, 59, 5; 71, 2; *dyaûb nâ bhûma*, I, 65, 3¹; *divâb gyôtib*, I, 69, 1; *mahe pitre divê*, I, 71, 5¹; IV, 1, 10; *dyaûb* (conj. *dyôb*), I, 71, 8²; *divâb akshî* *îti*, I, 72, 10¹; *pârigmânam-iva dyâm*, I, 127, 2³; *dyâvâ prithivî* *îti*, Heaven and Earth, I, 143, 2; *vîsvâ divâb rokanâ*, I, 146, 1; III, 6, 8; 12, 9; *dyû-bhih tvâm* (conj. *dyû-bhya*), II, 1, 1²; *âsurâb mahâb divâb*, II, 1, 6; *divâb-iva aratib*, II, 2, 2; *dyaûb nâ strî-bhih*, II, 2, 5; IV, 7, 3; *tisrâb divâb*, II, 3, 2; *divâb kavînam*, III, 1, 2; *divâb prithivyâb*, III, 1, 3; 6, 2³; 3; 25, 1; IV, 5, 11; *divâb yahvib*, III, 1, 6; 9²; *divâb prishitâb*, III, 2, 12; *divî kshâyam* (conj. *divikshayâm*) III, 2, 13¹; *ketûm divâb*, III, 2, 14; *divâb nâbhâ*, III, 4, 4; *vârshman divâb*, III, 5, 9; *dyâvâ*, III, 6, 4²; *divâb ârnam*, III, 22, 3; *divâb putrâb*, IV, 2, 15; *divâb kikitvân*, IV, 3, 8; *divâb â-rôdhanânî*, IV, 7, 8; 8, 2; 4; *divâb skambhâb*, IV, 13, 5; *divâb sîsum*, IV, 15, 6²; *divâb it* *brihât*, more mightily than even the sky, V, 10, 4²; *divâb dhârman*, V, 15, 2²; *divâb nâ rétasâ*, V, 17, 3².
- dyû*, day: *divê-dive*, day by day, I, 1, 3; 7, &c.; *divâb pûrvâb*, before daybreak, I, 60, 2; *ânu dyûn*, day by day, I, 71, 6; 148, 4; III, 23, 2; IV, 4, 8; 9; *divâ nâktam*, I, 98, 2; 144, 4²; *trib â divâb*, I, 142, 3; *dyû-bhih*, day by day, III, 3, 2; V, 16, 2.
- dyukshâ*, heavenly, II, 2, 1.
- dyut*, to shine: *vî abhîdyaut*, mayest thou beam forth, IV, 4, 6;—*vî didyutâb*, make shine, II, 2, 7; *vî adyaut*, thou hast shone forth, III, 1, 8; 18; *vî didyutânâb*, flashing, III, 7, 4;—*sâm adyaut*, III, 5, 2.
- dyû-bhakta*, assigned by Heaven, I, 73, 6; IV, 1, 18.
- dyu-mât*, brilliant, I, 74, 9; II, 7, 1; 9, 6; III, 10, 8; 13, 7; V, 23, 4.
- dyumât-tama*, most brilliant, V, 24, 2¹.
- dyumnâ*, splendour, I, 73, 4, &c.; *dyumnâib*, with (songs full of) splendour, I, 78, 1-5; *dyumnâsya sâvasâ*, V, 7, 3.
- dyumnâ-vat*, brilliant, III, 29, 15.
- dyumnîn*, brilliant, I, 36, 8.
- dyumnîn-tama*, most brilliant, I, 127, 9.
- drapsâ*, spark, I, 94, 11;—*banner*, IV, 13, 2².
- dravât*, see *dru*.
- dravinâb-dâs*, giver of wealth, II, 6, 3.
- dravinâb-dâ*, giver of wealth, I, 96, 1-8; II, 1, 7.
- drâvinas*, wealth, I, 96, 8;—*wealth-giver*, III, 7, 10.
- dravinasyû*, aspiring after wealth, II, 6, 3; V, 13, 2.
- dru*, to run: *dravât*, speedily, I, 44, 7; *drâvatâm*, III, 14, 3; *drû-nânâb*? IV, 4, 1².
- drû-anna*, feeding on wood, II, 7, 6.
- drûh*, guile, IV, 4, 15.
- dru-hântara*, a mighty woodcutter, (I, 127, 3²).
- druham-tarâ*, conqueror of deceitful foes, I, 127, 3².

- dvayá, falsehood, I, 147, 4; 5; V, 3, 7; 12, 2.
 dvār, door: dvārab devīb, the divine doors, I, 13, 6; 142, 6; II, 3, 5; V, 5, 5; dvārā, the two folds of the door, I, 128, 6; dvārā tāmasab, III, 5, 1.
 dvīb páñka, twice five, IV, 6, 8¹.
 dvi-gánman, of double birth (Agni), I, 60, 1¹; 140, 2¹; 149, 4; 5.
 Dvitá, V, 18, 2².
 dvitā, forsooth, verily, I, 127, 7; II, 4, 2²; III, 2, 1³; 17, 5¹.
 dvi-pád, two-footed, I, 94, 5.
 dvi-bárhas, twofold, I, 71, 6;—doubly-powerful, IV, 5, 3¹.
 dvi-mâtrī, having two mothers, I, 31, 2¹.
 dvīsh, hostile power, I, 97, 7; II, 7, 2; 3; III, 15, 1.
 dveshab-yút, driving away malice, IV, 11, 5; V, 9, 6.
 dvéshas, hatred, malice, II, 6, 4; IV, 1, 4; 10, 7; V, 20, 2;—hostile power, III, 16, 5; 27, 3.
 dhakshi (Samhitā: dakshi), voc. (?), O burning one (?), I, 141, 8².
 dhákshu, burning, II, 4, 4.
 dhakshús, burning, I, 141, 7.
 dhan: dhanáyan, they set into motion, I, 71, 3;—dadhanyub (read dadhanvub?), IV, 3, 12².
 dhána, prize, I, 31, 6; 8; 36, 4.
 dhanam-gayá, winning the prize, I, 74, 3.
 dhana-sá, gaining wealth, II, 10, 6¹.
 dhana-sprít, winner of prizes, I, 36, 10; V, 8, 2.
 dhanín, rich, I, 150, 2;—containing the prize of the contest, IV, 2, 15³.
 dhánus, dry land: dhánob ádhi, I, 144, 5².
 dhánya, precious, III, 1, 16.
 dhanv, to run along: dadhanvé, II, 5, 3; dadhanvub, (IV, 3, 12²).
 dhánvan, dry ground, I, 95, 10;—desert, V, 7, 7.
 dhanva-sáh, a conquering bowman, I, 127, 3⁶.
 dham, to melt: dhámantaś, IV, 2, 17¹;—úpa dhámati dhmâtári, V, 9, 5³.
 dháríman, firm law, I, 128, 1¹.
 dharúna, supporter: dharúnab rayi-nām, I, 73, 4²; supporting, V, 15, 1; 2; 5¹;—firm ground, III, 3, 1.
 dharvasí, firm, I, 141, 11;—supporter, V, 8, 4.
 dharuś, supporter, I, 127, 7.
 dhartrī, supporter, V, 1, 6; 9, 3.
 dhárman, law, ordinance, III, 3, 1; V, 26, 6; prathamā́nu dhárma, III, 17, 1; ánu dhárma, III, 17, 5;—support, V, 15, 2.
 dhâ, to put, place, give: dadhiré, I, 26, 8, &c.; kánaś dhâb, accept, I, 26, 10; dadhire, have been laid down, I, 59, 3¹; dádhanâb, obtaining, I, 73, 5³; mákiś nab dub-itāya dhāyīb, do not deliver us to distress, I, 147, 5; dádhat, 3rd pers. or part., I, 188, 2¹; dadhire puráb, they have placed in front (as Purohita), III, 2, 5; dhishva, III, 6, 6; didhishantu, may they bestow, III, 8, 6; dhâmahe, may we acquire, V, 16, 5;—â dadhe, I have established, III, 27, 9²;—ní dadhe, he has established, I, 36, 19; ní dadhe, I have laid down, III, 23, 4¹; 27, 10¹; ní dadhub (conj. ní dadub?), V, 2, 6²; ní dhatte puráb, V, 28, 2¹;—vi-dhâti, he worships (conj. for vi-bhâti), I, 71, 6¹; ví dhâb, distribute, I, 72, 7; IV, 6, 11; ví dadhau, he determines, I, 95, 3.
 dhâ, to suckle: dhâpayete íti, I, 96, 5; adhayat, I, 144, 2; III, 1, 10; V, 1, 3³;—úpa dhâpayete íti, I, 95, 1.
 dhât, establisher, IV, 7, 1.
 dhâna: pári dhānam aktób, about nightfall (?), III, 7, 6.
 dhāman, foundation, I, 95, 9¹; 144, 1⁴; III, 3, 4; IV, 7, 7;—abode, II, 3, 2; 11;—statute, law, III, 2, 10; 7, 6; IV, 5, 4;—form: sapta dhāma-bhīb, IV, 7, 5¹.
 dhāyas, prospering, I, 31, 13;—refreshment, refreshing drink, I, 72, 9; 94, 12; 141, 6; II, 5, 7; V, 7, 6; 9; 15, 4.
 dhārā, stream: dhārām ritāsya, I, 67, 7¹; V, 12, 2; dhārāb udan-yāb-iva, II, 7, 3; dhārāb, III, 1, 8; 9.

- dhâv : ní dhâvate, he runs down, I, 141, 5.
 dhâsí, drink, I, 140, 1²; III, 7, 1¹; 3²; IV, 3, 9; V, 12, 4.
 dhitâ-van, in whom (wealth) has been laid down, III, 27, 2.
 dhiyam-dhâ, thoughtful, I, 67, 4; 72, 2.
 dhiyâ-vasu, giving wealth for prayer, I, 58, 9; 60, 5; III, 3, 2; 28, 1.
 Dhishânâ, N. of a goddess, I, 96, 1²; III, 2, 1².
 dhishnya, liberal (?), III, 22, 3¹.
 dhishnyâ, the Dhishnya altar, IV, 3, 6¹.
 dhî, to think : d-vân âkka dîdhyat (conj. for dîdyat), III, 1, 1²;—ânu vratam dîdhyânâb, contemplating the law, III, 4, 7.
 dhî, (pious) thought, prayer, I, 1, 7; 27, 11, &c.; 95, 8²; III, 11, 2; 3; 12, 1; yantâram dhînâm, III, 3, 8; dhiyâ âkre, III, 27, 9¹; âkripânta dhîbhîb, IV, 1, 14.
 dhîtî, thought, I, 68, 5¹; 71, 3¹; III, 12, 7; 13, 5; V, 25, 3; devotion, I, 77, 4; pious thought, i. e. hymn, or prayer, I, 143, 1; 144, 5; IV, 5, 7.
 dhîra, wise, I, 65, 2, &c.
 dhûni, roaring, I, 79, 1².
 dhur, to harm : âdhûrshata, V, 12, 5.
 dhûr, pole, III, 6, 6.
 dhû, to shake : âdhûnot, I, 59, 6; davidhâva, I, 140, 6; dodhaviti, he waves, II, 4, 4²; adhûnutam, you have hurled down, III, 12, 6; dâvidhvat, shaking, IV, 13, 2; dâvidhvatab, having shaken, IV, 13, 4²;—ava-dhûnushé, thou hurlest away, I, 78, 4.
 dhûb-sâd, charioteer, I, 143, 7; II, 2, 1².
 dhûmâ, smoke, I, 36, 9; III, 29, 9; IV, 6, 2; V, 11, 3.
 dhûmâ-ketu, whose banner is smoke, I, 27, 11; 44, 3.
 dhûma-ketu, banner of smoke, I, 94, 10¹.
 dhûmîn, smoky, V, 9, 5².
 dhûrtî, mischief, I, 36, 15; 128, 7.
 dhri, to hold : dâdhâra, I, 66, 3, &c.;—ni-dhârâyantab, setting down, IV, 2, 12.
 dhritâ-vrata, whose laws are firm, I, 44, 14; 141, 9; II, 1, 4.
 dhrîsh : â dadharshît, may he defy, IV, 4, 3; ná â-dhrîshe, not to be defied, V, 8, 5.
 dhrîshâg? V, 19, 5¹.
 dhrîshatâ, fiercely, I, 71, 5; IV, 4, 2; 5, 6.
 dhrîshau-yâ, fiercely, V, 10, 5.
 dhênâ, stream, I, 141, 1; shower, III, 1, 9².
 dhenû, milch cow, I, 66, 2; 73, 6; II, 2, 2; 9¹; 5, 5¹; III, 1, 7; 6, 4; IV, 1, 6; 16; dhenû itî, I, 146, 3²; divâkshasab dhenâvab, III, 7, 2².
 dhmâ, see dham.
 dhmâtîrî, smelter, V, 9, 5.
 dhrag : úpa dhrágantam, speeding forward, I, 149, 1.
 dhrágîmat, hastening, I, 79, 1.
 dhruvâ, firm, I, 36, 5¹, &c.; kâratâb dhruvâsya, I, 146, 1; dhruvé (for Pada : dhruvâb), III, 6, 4¹.
 dhruvâ-kshema, dwelling in firm peace, IV, 13, 3.
 dhvams : dhvasâyantam, sparkling, I, 140, 3; dhvasâyantab, I, 140, 5.
 dhvasmán, bespatterer, IV, 6, 6.
 dhvri, see dhur.
 ná, 'like,' and ná, 'not,' I, 127, 3⁶.
 nákis, not, I, 27, 8; 69, 7.
 náкта, Night : náktâ ka ushâsâ, I, 73, 7; náktam, by night, I, 98, 2; 127, 5; 144, 4²; V, 7, 4.
 nakta-yâ, by night, IV, 11, 1.
 nákti, Night : náktîb ushâsâb, II, 2, 2.
 Náktoshâsâ, du., Night and Dawn, I, 13, 7; 96, 5; 142, 7.
 naksh, to reach : nákshante, I, 66, 9;—abhî nakshati, I, 95, 10.
 nad : nânadat, roaring, I, 140, 5; III, 2, 11.
 nápât, offspring : úrgab napât, I, 58, 8; II, 6, 2; III, 27, 12; V, 17, 5;—apâm nápât, the child of the Waters, I, 143, 1²; III, 9, 1.
 náptri, offspring : úrgab náptre, V, 7, 1.
 nabhanyâ? I, 149, 3².
 nábhas, cloud, I, 71, 10; II, 4, 6; III, 12, 1¹.
 nam : â-námam, to direct, IV, 8, 3.
 námab-ukti, praise, I, 189, 1; III, 14, 2².
 námas, adoration, reverence, I, 1, 7,

- &c.; *nāmasâ*, adoringly, III, 14, 5.
namasy, to worship, adore: *namasy-ānti*, I, 36, 19; *namasyā*, I, 44, 6¹; *namasyan*, I, 72, 5; *namasyāta*, III, 2, 8; *namasyāmaḥ*, III, 17, 4; *namasyāntaḥ*, adoring, IV, 6, 11.
namasyā, to be adored, venerable, I, 72, 5²; II, 1, 3; 10; III, 5, 2; 27, 13.
namasvīn, adorer, I, 36, 7.
Nārāmsa, 'song of men' or 'praised by men,' I, 13, 3¹; 142, 3; II, 3, 1; III, 29, 11; V, 5, 2.
nārya, manly power, I, 72, 1¹.
nāva, new, young, I, 31, 8, &c.;—*nāvyaṃs*, *nāvyaśi*, I, 27, 4; 60, 3; 141, 5; 143, 1; III, 2, 13; *nāvīyaśa*, I, 12, 11;—*nāvyaḥ*, gen., V, 12, 3¹;—*nāvishṭa*, youngest, V, 27, 3.
nava-gā, new-born, IV, 6, 3.
nāva-gāta, new-born, V, 15, 3.
navati, ninety: *navatīm pūraḥ*, III, 12, 6.
navamām, for the ninth time, V, 27, 3².
Nāva-vāstva, I, 36, 18¹.
nāvedas, watcher: *ushāsaḥ nāvedāḥ*, I, 79, 1²;—witness, V, 12, 3.
nāvya, young, I, 141, 10; 189, 2.
naś, to attain: *naśate*, V, 4, 11;—*āśnat*, I, 71, 8.
naś: *nērat*, it disappeared, IV, 1, 17.
Nāhusha, N. of a clan, I, 31, 11²; V, 12, 6.
Nahus, (I, 31, 11²).
nāka, sky, firmament: *pipēsa nākam strībhiḥ*, I, 68, 10;—III, 2, 12; 5, 10; IV, 13, 5; V, 1, 1; 17, 2.
nānā-rathām, on many chariots, III, 6, 9.
nāndī, delight: *nāndyē*, I, 145, 4.
Nābhānedishṭa, (I, 142, 10¹).
nābhi, navel, centre, I, 59, 1²; 142, 10¹; III, 5, 5; IV, 10, 8; *nābhiḥ prithivyāḥ*, I, 59, 2; 143, 4; II, 3, 7; III, 5, 9; 29, 4; *pra-gām nābhim*, II, 3, 9; *divāḥ nābhā*, III, 4, 4; *amṛtasya nābhim*, III, 17, 4.
nāman, name: *deva-tvām nāma*, *amṛtām nāma*, I, 68, 4¹; *nāmāni dadhire yagñīyāni*, I, 72, 3; *prathamām nāma dhenōḥ*, IV, 1, 16; *gūhyam nāma*, V, 3, 2; 3; 5, 10; *bhūri nāmā da-dhāti*, V, 3, 10.
nārī, wife, I, 73, 3.
nārminī? I, 149, 3¹.
nāvā, boat: *nāvāyā*, I, 97, 8¹.
Nāsatya, IV, 3, 6³;—du., the *Asvins*, IV, 14, 1².
nims, to kiss: *nīmsate*, I, 144, 1⁴.
ni-kāma, desirous of, III, 1, 15.
niksh: *vi-nīkshe*, to pierce, V, 2, 9.
ni-kīra, watchful, III, 9, 4.
nizik, secretly, IV, 5, 8¹.
ninyā, hidden, I, 95, 4²; inmost, IV, 3, 16.
nītya, one's own, I, 66, 1¹; 5; 71, 1; 140, 7; 148, 3; 5; II, 2, 11;—true (friend of men), I, 141, 2²;—*nītyam*, constantly, I, 73, 4.
nītya-aritra, with its own rudders, I, 140, 12¹.
nid: *nidānāḥ*, scolding, IV, 5, 12.
nīd, scoffer, III, 16, 5;—revilement, IV, 4, 15.
ninitśū, who tries to revile, I, 189, 6.
ninditrī, reproacher, V, 2, 6.
nīndya, reproachable, V, 2, 6.
ni-mish, closing of the eyes, I, 72, 5⁴.
ni-vātana, invocation, I, 189, 8;—recitation, IV, 3, 16.
ni-vāt, depth: *ut-vātaḥ ni-vātaḥ*, III, 2, 10.
ni-vārtana, return, III, 9, 2.
ni-vīd, the *Nivid* formula, I, 96, 2¹.
nishkā-grīva, with a golden ornament at his neck, V, 19, 3.
nī-hita, laid down, I, 72, 6.
nī, to lead: *padām nayanti*, they follow his track, I, 146, 4²;—*pāri nayanti*, they carry around, I, 95, 2⁴; *pāri nīyate*, he is led around, IV, 15, 1.
nīlā, nest, IV, 1, 11; 12.
nīthā, song, IV, 3, 16.
nītha-vīd, knowing all the ways, III, 12, 5.
nīla-prishṭa, with the dark blue back, III, 7, 3.
nu, to low, roar: *nāvanta*, I, 66, 10; *nonāva*, I, 79, 2;—to shout (hymns of praise): *nāvanta*, I, 69, 10;—*abhi prā nonumaḥ*, I, 78, 1-5; *abhi anūshata*, they have greeted with shouts, I, 144, 2; IV, 1, 16; *abhi anūshata*,

- (the hymns) have been sung, V, 5, 4;—*sām navanta*, IV, 3, 11.
- nú*, now: *nú kīṭ nú*, I, 58, 1¹; *nú ka purā ka*, I, 96, 7.
- nūṭana*, present, recent, I, 1, 2; III, 1, 20.
- nūnām*, now: *adyā nūnām ka*, I, 13, 6; *nūnām aparām*, now and in future, I, 189, 4.
- nṛī*, man: *nṛīn* (for various cases), I, 146, 4⁰; III, 14, 4¹; IV, 2, 15²; V, 15, 2²; *narab mṛutab*, III, 16, 2¹; *jāmse nṛinām*, III, 16, 4.
- nṛī-kāśhas*, beholding men, III, 15, 3; 22, 2; IV, 3, 3.
- nṛī-tama*, manliest, I, 59, 4; 77, 4; III, 1, 12; 19, 3; IV, 5, 2; V, 4, 6.
- nṛī-pāti*, lord of men, I, 71, 8³; II, 1, 1; 7.
- nṛī-pēras*, (the divine doors) with men as their ornaments, III, 4, 5³, 4.
- nṛīmā*, manly power, I, 67, 3; V, 19, 2.
- nṛī-vāt*, with men, V, 18, 5.
- nṛivāt-sakhi*, rich in manly friends, IV, 2, 5¹.
- nṛī-sādana*, seat of men, V, 7, 2.
- nṛī-hān*, man-killer, IV, 3, 6.
- netṛī*, leader, III, 15, 4; 20, 4; *iśhām netā*, III, 23, 2².
- nédishṭba*, near, nearest, I, 127, 11; IV, 1, 5.
- nemá-dhiti*, discord, I, 72, 4².
- nemí*, felly, I, 141, 9; II, 5, 3; V, 13, 6.
- nésha-tama*, best leading, I, 141, 12.
- néshtri*, the N. priest, II, 5, 5¹.
- neshtrá*, office of the *Neshtri* (priest), II, 1, 2.
- naú*, boat: *nāvā-iva*, I, 97, 7; 99, 1; V, 25, 9; *sindhūm ná nāvā*, V, 4, 9; *nāvam nitya-aritrām pat-vātim*, I, 140, 12¹.
- nyāñk*, directed downwards: *nññib*, I, 66, 10²; 72, 10⁴.
- pakvá*, ripe, I, 66, 3; IV, 3, 9.
- paṭatá*, baked, III, 28, 2.
- pāññan*, five: *ádhi pāññā krishṭishu*, over the fivefold dwellings (of the five peoples), II, 2, 10.
- paññāśat*, fifty, V, 18, 5.
- pat*: *patyate*, he rules, I, 128, 7; *patyase*, thou possessest, II, 1, 8.
- pat*, to fly: *pátanti mīhab*, I, 79, 2.
- patangá*, winged (flames), IV, 4, 2.
- patatrín*, winged, I, 58, 5²; 94, 11.
- patará*, winged: *prisnyāb patarám*, II, 2, 4.
- pāti*, lord, I, 26, 1, &c.; *pátib dán*, I, 149, 1²;—husband, I, 66, 8; 71, 1; IV, 3, 2¹.
- pátigushṭā* (*nāri*), (a wife) beloved by her husband, I, 73, 3.
- pati-rip*, deceiving her husband, IV, 5, 5.
- pátnī*, consort: *devīb pátnīb*, IV, 5, 13.
- pátnī-vat*, together with the wife, I, 72, 5; III, 6, 9.
- pátman*, flight, I, 141, 7; V, 5, 7.
- pat-vát*, having feet, I, 140, 9; *pat-vātim nāvam*, I, 140, 12¹.
- pátvan*, flight, V, 6, 7.
- pathyā*, path, III, 14, 3.
- pad*, to fall: *padishṭá*, I, 79, 11;—*áva padyate*, IV, 13, 5.
- pád*, foot: *padáb ní dadhâti*, I, 146, 2; *pad-bhñib* (conj. for *par-bhñib*), IV, 2, 14².
- padá*, footstep, footmark, track, I, 65, 2; 67, 6²; IV, 5, 3; *padám nayanti*, they follow his track, I, 146, 4²; *padám véb*, III, 5, 5¹; 6; IV, 5, 8⁴; *padám Vishnob upa-mām*, V, 3, 3;—standing-place, abode: *padé paramé*, I, 72, 2; 4; *trib saptá gúhyāni padá*, steps or places, I, 72, 6¹; *iláb padé*, I, 128, 1; *ritásya padé*, IV, 5, 9; *mâtúb padé paramé*, IV, 5, 10.
- pada-vī*, following the footsteps, I, 72, 2²; III, 5, 1¹.
- pan*, to praise: *pánanta*, II, 4, 5¹; *panáyanta*, III, 6, 7; *panaya*, V, 20, 1², 3.
- pánishṭba*, most wonderful, III, 1, 13.
- páníyams*, highly miraculous, V, 6, 4.
- panū*, praise, I, 65, 4.
- páyas*, milk, I, 66, 2; 79, 3; IV, 3, 9; 10.
- páyasvat*, rich in milk, II, 3, 6.
- par*, see *pri*.
- pára*, distant, III, 18, 2.
- parab-pá*, a protector far and wide, II, 9, 2; 6.
- parasú*, axe, I, 127, 3; IV, 6, 8.

- parás, beyond : *paráb* manisháyâ, V, 17, 2².
- paríśtât, on high, III, 22, 3.
- parā-vátāb, from afar, I, 36, 18 ; 73, 6 ; III, 9, 5.
- pári, prep., from, I, 31, 4 ;—for the sake of, III, 5, 10¹.
- pari-kshít, encompassing, III, 7, 1.
- pári-gman, walking round the earth, I, 79, 3² ; 127, 2² ; III, 2, 9³ ; IV, 3, 6⁴ ; V, 10, 5.
- pári-takmya, the decisive moment, I, 31, 6^{3,4}.
- pari-bádh, hindrance, V, 2, 10.
- pari-bhū, encompassing, I, 1, 4 ; 97, 6 ; 141, 9 ; III, 3, 10.
- pári-víta, enveloped, I, 128, 1³ ; III, 8, 4¹ ; IV, 1, 7.
- párishri, encompassing, I, 65, 3¹.
- párinās, abundance, III, 24, 5 ; V, 10, 1.
- parishri, searching, (I, 65, 3¹).
- parushá, speckled, V, 27, 5.
- párvan, joint (of the month) : *pár-vaṇā-parvaṇā*, I, 94, 4¹.
- palitá, grey, I, 144, 4 ; fem. *páliknī*, V, 2, 4².
- pav'tra, purification, III, 1, 5 ;—purifying strainer, III, 26, 8.
- par, to see : *āti paryasi*, I, 94, 7 ;—*pári aparyanta*, they have searched, I, 146, 4 ;—*ví parya*, look forth, III, 23, 2².
- pár, eye : *par-bhíś*, IV, 2, 12² ; *par-bhíś* (conj. *pad-bhíś*), IV, 2, 14².
- parśú, animal, beast : *parśá ná táyúm*, I, 65, 1^{1,2} ; *parśúb rá śivâ*, I, 65, 10 ; (Agni), II, 4, 7 ; V, 7, 7 ; cattle, I, 67, 6² ; 72, 6 ; III, 9, 7 ; IV, 2, 18¹ ; V, 2, 5 ; victim, IV, 6, 3.
- paru-pá, shepherd, I, 144, 6 ; IV, 6, 4.
- paru-sá, winner of cattle, I, 127, 10¹.
- parśvā-yantra, taking . . . as an instrument (?), IV, 1, 14.
- pastyâ, dwelling, IV, 1, 11.
- pā : *sáb pāti* (conj. *sápāti*), V, 12, 6¹.
- pāka, simple, I, 31, 14 ; III, 9, 7 ; IV, 5, 2.
- pāgas, stream of light, I, 58, 5 ; III, 14, 1 ; 15, 1 ; 29, 3 ; IV, 4, 1 ; V, 1, 2.
- pāthas, abode, I, 188, 10¹ ; II, 3, 9 ; III, 8, 9 ; *pātháb* (conj. *pa-tháb?*), II, 2, 4¹.
- pâyú, guardian, I, 31, 12 ; 13 ; 95, 9 ; 143, 8 ; 147, 3 ; 189, 4 ; II, 1, 7 ; 2, 4 ; III, 15, 4¹ ; IV, 2, 6 ; 4, 3 ; 12 ; V, 12, 4.
- pārthiva, dweller on earth, I, 95, 3 ;—the terrestrial (space), I, 128, 3 ; 144, 6 ; *grāyāmsi pārthivâ*, V, 8, 7.
- pāvaká, purifier, I, 12, 9 ; 10 ; 13, 1 ; 60, 4 ; 95, 11 ; 142, 3 ; 6 ; II, 3, 1 ; 7, 4 ; III, 5, 7 ; 10, 8 ; 17, 1 ; 21, 2 ; 27, 4 ; IV, 5, 6 ; 6, 7 ; V, 4, 3 ; 7 ; 7, 4 ; 26, 1.
- pāvaka-jókī, whose flame is purifying, III, 2, 6.
- pāvaká-jókis, purifying with his flames, III, 9, 8¹ ; 11, 7 ; IV, 7, 5 ; V, 22, 1.
- pāsa, fetter, V, 2, 7.
- pitú, food, I, 69, 3 ; V, 7, 6.
- pitū-mát, rich in food, I, 141, 2² ; 144, 7 ; IV, 1, 8.
- pitṛ, father : *mahé pitṛé divé*, I, 71, 5 ; *pitúb paramāt* (Heaven), I, 141, 4¹ ; *pitúb ka ganitúb ka*, III, 1, 10¹ ; *pitá yagñānām*, III, 3, 4 ;—V, 3, 9¹ ; 10¹ ;—du., parents, I, 140, 7² ; III, 7, 1¹ ; 18, 1¹ ; *pitṛób upá-sthe*, I, 146, 1² ; III, 26, 9 ; *mâtará pitárâ*, IV, 6, 7 ;—*pitárâb Āngirasab*, I, 71, 2¹ ; *pitá pitṛi-bhyab útāye*, II, 5, 1³ ; *pitárâb manushyâb*, IV, 1, 13¹ ; *pitárâb párasab prasnâsab*, IV, 2, 16.
- pitṛi-vittá, acquired by the fathers, I, 73, 1¹ ; 9.
- pítrya, paternal : *sakhyâ pítryāni*, I, 71, 10.
- pinv, to swell : *pínvamânâb*, III, 1, 7 ; *pinvasva*, III, 3, 7.
- piś, to adorn : *pipéśa*, I, 68, 10.
- piśānga-rūpa, tawny-coloured, II, 3, 9.
- pīy, to abuse : *pīyati*, I, 147, 2.
- putrín, with sons, V, 4, 11.
- púnar : *púnab astu sáb asmai*, may it (the spell) recoil on him, I, 147, 4 ; *púnab*, give us back, I, 189, 3.
- púr, stronghold : *púb-bhíś áyasibhíś*, I, 58, 8 ;—I, 149, 3 ; 189, 2 ; III, 12, 6 ; 15, 4 ; V, 19, 2.
- purab-etrá, leader, I, 76, 2¹ ; III, 11, 5.
- purab-gá, going in front, I, 188, 11.
- purab-sád, sitting in front, I, 73, 3.
- puráb-hita, the Purohita, I, 1, 1 ;

- 44, 10¹; 12; 58, 3; 94, 6¹, 2;
128, 4; III, 2, 8; 3, 2; 11, 1;
V, 11, 2.
- Púram-dhi, Liberality of the gods,
II, 1, 3³.
- purás, in front: dadhiré puráb, III,
2, 5; V, 16, 1².
- purā, before (with gen.), I, 71, 10;
—formerly, I, 96, 7.
- purishyā, of the soil: purishyāsab
agnāyab, III, 22, 4¹.
- purú, many, I, 36, 1³, &c.; III, 4,
5²; purú vā áram (conj. puru-
vāram), I, 142, 10²; ánu pūrvāb,
III, 15, 3¹;—mightily, I, 127, 3.
- puru-anika, with many faces, I, 79, 5.
- puru-kshú, rich in food, I, 68, 10;
III, 25, 2.
- puru-kandrá, rich in splendour, I,
27, 11; II, 2, 12; III, 25, 3;
V, 8, 1.
- puru-trā, in many places, I, 70, 10;
146, 5.
- puru-dāmsa, wonderful, III, 1, 23.
- puru-drúh, full of deceit, III,
18, 1.
- purudhá-pratíka, with many faces,
III, 7, 3.
- purudhá, manifoldly, IV, 2, 19.
- puruniḥ-sthá, growing up in many
places, V, 1, 6.
- Puru-nithá, N. pr., I, 59, 7.
- puru-péśa, manifoldly-adorned, II,
10, 3².
- puru-péśas, manifold-adorned, III,
3, 6.
- puru-prasastá, praised by many, I,
73, 2.
- puru-priyá, beloved of many, I, 12,
2; 44, 3; 45, 6; III, 3, 4; V,
18, 1.
- puru-praishá, he who pronounces
many Praishas, I, 145, 3².
- puru-rúpa, of all kinds, manifold-
shaped, II, 2, 9; V, 8, 2; 5.
- puru-vásu, rich in wealth, II, 1, 5.
- puru-vāra, with many treasures,
bountiful: puru-vāram (conj.
for purú vā áram), I, 142, 10²;
—II, 2, 2; IV, 2, 20; 5, 15.
- puruvāra-pushi, lord of bountiful
prosperity, I, 96, 4.
- purusha-trā: conj. purusha-tā, men
as we are, IV, 12, 4¹.
- puru-stutá, praised by many, I, 141,
6; V, 8, 5.
- puru-spríh, much desired, I, 142, 6;
II, 7, 1; IV, 8, 7; V, 7, 6.
- puru-hútá, much-invoked, I, 44, 7.
- Purúrávas, I, 31, 4.
- puroḥās, sacrificial cake, III, 28, 1-6.
- puróhita, see puráb-hita.
- push, to make prosper: pushyasi, I,
94, 6; V, 26, 6; pushyata, I,
94, 8; pushyati, III, 10, 3;
púshyantab, causing to thrive,
IV, 8, 5.
- pushi, prosperity, I, 65, 5; 77, 5;
II, 4, 4; V, 10, 3.
- pushi-mát, with prosperity, III,
13, 7.
- pushim-bhará, bringing prosperity,
IV, 3, 7.
- pushi-várdhana, augments of pros-
perity, I, 31, 5.
- pû, to purify: punānāb, II, 3, 5;
krátum punānāb, III, 1, 5¹;
punānti, III, 8, 5; ápuṣot, III,
26, 8;—abhí punatī, IV, 5, 7.
- pûtá, purified, I, 79, 10.
- pûtá-daksha, of pure powers, III,
1, 3².
- Pûrú, the Pûrus, I, 59, 6; V, 17, 1.
- pûrva, former, ancient, I, 1, 2, &c.;
pûrva-vát, as for the ancients,
I, 31, 17;—diváb pûrvab, before
daybreak, I, 60, 2; to the front,
I, 94, 8¹; mánushāt pûrvab, II,
3, 3²; tvát hótá pûrvab, III,
17, 5;—eastern: pûrvám ánu
pra-dīsam, I, 95, 3.
- pûrvá-thā, in the old way, III, 29, 1.
- pûrvyá, ancient, I, 26, 5; 94, 6;
III, 14, 3²; 23, 3; V, 15, 3²;—
foremost, I, 74, 2¹.
- Pûshan, II, 1, 6; IV, 3, 7.
- pûshan-vát, accompanied by Pûshan,
I, 142, 12.
- pri or par, to bring across: piparshi,
thou ledest forward, I, 31, 6⁴;
párshi, II, 7, 2; párshat, III,
20, 4; pipritam, III, 26, 9;
parshati dvisháb, may he help
us across our enemies, V, 25, 1;
9;—áti páraya, I, 97, 7; áti
parsha, I, 97, 8; áti parshat, I,
99, 1.
- pri, to till: pûrdhi, I, 36, 12; paprá,
I, 69, 1;—âpapi-vân, I, 73, 8;
146, 1; â aprimat, III, 2, 7; â
aprinab, III, 3, 10; â apráb,
IV, 14, 2;—prá-pra prinitana,

- fill (with bliss) further and further, V, 5, 5.
- priksh*, nourishment, I, 71, 7¹; 73, 5; II, 1, 6.
- prikshā*, power, I, 127, 5¹; II, 1, 15²; —powerful, I, 141, 2¹; *saptā prikshāsab*, III, 4, 7¹.
- prikshā-prayag*, mighty sacrificer, III, 7, 10¹.
- prikshúdh*: *prikshúdhah*? I, 141, 4².
- prik*: *priṅkanti*, they fill, I, 79, 3; *priṅkátē*, they grow, I, 128, 5; *paprikānāsab*, swelling, I, 141, 6²; *paprikāsi*, make swell, I, 141, 11²; —*tāmase vi-prike*, for dispersing the darkness, IV, 13, 3; *vi-prikvat*, cleared from admixture, V, 2, 3²; —*sam-priṅkānáb*, being united, I, 95, 8.
- prít*, battle, I, 27, 7; 79, 8; V, 9, 7; 10, 7; 16, 5; 17, 5.
- prítanā*, battle, III, 16, 2; 24, 1.
- pritanāgya*, racing of battle, III, 8, 10.
- pritanā-yú*, seeking to combat, III, 1, 16.
- pritanā-sáh*, powerful in battles, III, 29, 9; V, 23, 2.
- prítanyát*, foe, II, 8, 6.
- pritsutí*, hostility, V, 4, 1.
- prithiví*, earth, Earth: *nābhiḥ prithivyāb*, I, 59, 2; III, 29, 4; *agnih dāti rōma prithivyāb*, I, 65, 8; *kshām* and *prithivīm*, I, 67, 5; *dyāvā prithiví ití*, Heaven and Earth, I, 143, 2; *divāb prithivyāb*, III, 1, 3; *mahinā prithivyāb*, III, 7, 10²; *vārshman prithivyāb*, III, 8, 3; *vāre ā prithivyāb*, III, 23, 4²; *divāb sūnób prithivyāb*, III, 25, 1; —Earth, I, 72, 9; 94, 16; 95, 11; 98, 3; III, 8, 8¹; 17, 2; IV, 3, 5.
- prithú*, broad, I, 65, 5; II, 1, 12.
- prithu-pāgas*, with broad stream of light, III, 2, 11; 3, 1; 5, 1; 27, 5.
- prithú-pragāna*, with broad passages, III, 5, 7.
- prithú-pragāman*, proceeding on his broad way, I, 27, 2.
- prithu-budhnā*, broad-based, IV, 2, 5.
- prisanī*, the speckled (cow), I, 71, 5¹.
- prisni*, speckled, IV, 3, 10²; —*Prisni*, the mother of the Maruts, II, 2, 4²; IV, 5, 7¹; 10.
- prishat-arva*, with the spotted deer as horses, III, 26, 6².
- prishatí*, the spotted deer, III, 26, 4².
- prishra-bandhu*, after whose relations men ask, III, 20, 3².
- prishrabā*, back, I, 58, 2¹; IV, 2, 11²; ridge, V, 7, 5; —a certain Stotra? IV, 5, 6¹.
- prishtbodyā*, of the back: *pāyasā prishtbodyēna*, IV, 3, 10¹.
- péras*, the ornamented form: *yagñā-sya pérasab*, II, 3, 6².
- Péshī*, V, 2, 2¹.
- pótri*, the Potri priest, I, 94, 6; II, 5, 2; IV, 9, 3.
- potrá*, service of a Potri, I, 76, 4²; II, 1, 2.
- pósha*, welfare, I, 1, 3; V, 5, 9.
- poshayitnú*, which is to thrive, III, 4, 9.
- pyai*, to swell: *pipáyanta*, they were exuberant, I, 73, 6; *pipayat*, may he augment, I, 77, 5; *piyānab* (conj. *piyānam*), I, 79, 3²; *pipāya*, it has prospered, II, 2, 9; *piyānāb*, rich in milk, III, 1, 10²; —*prá pipaya*, increase, III, 15, 6.
- pra-avitri*, protector, I, 12, 8; furtherer, III, 21, 3.
- pra-avis*, zealous, IV, 9, 2.
- pra-ketá*, splendour, I, 94, 5.
- prá-ketas*, provident, wise, I, 44, 7; 11; II, 10, 3; III, 25, 1; 29, 5.
- prakb*, to look for: *prishrabā*, I, 98, 2¹.
- pra-gánana*, the creative organ, III, 29, 1².
- pra-gā*, children: *pra-gāb utá* (conj. *pra-gāsu*), I, 67, 9¹; *pra-gām ví syatu*, may he deliver a son, II, 3, 9.
- pragā-vat*, procuring offspring, I, 76, 4; *pragā-vat rádhas*, abundance of progeny, I, 94, 15; accompanied by offspring, II, 2, 12; III, 8, 6; 16, 6; rich in offspring, III, 16, 3; IV, 2, 5.
- pra-tárana*, carrying forward, II, 1, 12.
- prá-tavas*, strong, IV, 3, 6.
- práti*, equal to, II, 1, 8; 15; 3, 2.
- pratítya*, to be listened to, IV, 5, 14.
- pratná*, old: *pratnám*, I, 36, 4; II, 7, 6; III, 9, 8.
- pratná-thā*, in the ancient way, I, 96, 1; III, 2, 12; V, 8, 5.

- pratyáñk, turning back, I, 95, 5; II, 3, 1; III, 18, 1.
- prath, to spread out: pratháyan nrñ, III, 14, 4; paprathánáb, V, 15, 4;—vi prathantám, may they open wide, II, 3, 5; vi prathasva, spread thyself, V, 5, 4.
- prathamá: prathamá ánu dhárma, after the primitive ordinances, III, 17, 1.
- prathama-gá, first-born (son), III, 29, 15¹.
- pra-dakshinít, from left to right, III, 19, 2¹; IV, 6, 3.
- pra-diva, ancient, II, 3, 1.
- pra-divas, from of old, I, 141, 3²; IV, 6, 4; 7, 8; V, 8, 7.
- pradís, commandment: pradísab, (I, 31, 14³).
- pra-dis, region: pra-dísam (conj. for prá dísam), I, 95, 3².
- prá-niti, guidance, III, 15, 1; IV, 4, 14.
- pra-netrí, leader, II, 9, 2; III, 23, 1.
- pra-pitvá, the time of the advancing day, I, 189, 7².
- prá-bharman, the bringing forward, I, 79, 7.
- pra-bhú, eminent: pra-bhváb (dúrab), I, 188, 5¹; 9.
- prá-bhúti, copiousness, III, 19, 3.
- prá-mati, guardian, I, 31, 9; 10; 14; 16; 141, 2⁴;—kindness, I, 71, 7; care, I, 94, 1.
- prá-mahas, highly exalted, V, 28, 4.
- prá-yagyu, friend of sacrifices, III, 6, 2¹.
- prá-yata, forward-bent, IV, 5, 10.
- práyata-dakshina, giving sacrificial fees, I, 31, 15.
- pra-yantrí, giver, I, 76, 4⁴.
- práyas, joy, delight, feast, I, 31, 7; 45, 8; 58, 7²; 71, 3; III, 11, 7; 12, 8; IV, 5, 6; 15, 2².
- práyasvat, offering enjoyment, I, 60, 3; III, 6, 3; V, 20, 3.
- pra-yá, onset, III, 29, 15.
- pravaná, hill-side, III, 22, 4.
- pra-vát, declivity, I, 144, 5²;—precipitous: pra-vátâ, III, 5, 8.
- pra-vátya, to be openly uttered, IV, 5, 8.
- pra-vid, finding out, III, 7, 6.
- pra-jámsya, deserving of praise, II, 2, 3; 11.
- pra-jastá, praised, glorious, precious, I, 36, 9; 60, 1; 66, 4.
- prá-jasti, praise, I, 26, 9; 70, 9; 74, 6; 148, 3; V, 9, 6; 16, 1.
- pra-jâstrí, the Prasâstri priest, I, 94, 6¹; II, 5, 4.
- pra-jâstrá, office of the Prasâstri priest, II, 1, 2.
- pra-jish, command, I, 145, 1.
- pra-sáh, power, V, 23, 1.
- prá-siti, onslaught, IV, 4, 1.
- pra-sû, sprouting grass, I, 67, 9²; 95, 10²; III, 5, 8.
- Práskanva, I, 44, 6; 45, 3.
- prá-svanita, roaring, I, 44, 12¹.
- pra-hoshá, libation, I, 150, 2.
- prâkâ-gihva, stretching forward his tongue, I, 140, 3.
- prâkîna, eastward-turned (barhís), I, 188, 4.
- prâñk, inclined towards, II, 2, 7;—eastward: prâñkam yagñám kâkrîma, III, 1, 2²; prâkî iti, III, 6, 10¹;—turned forwards, III, 7, 7.
- prâná, breath: áyub prânáb, I, 66, 1.
- prâtab-yávan, coming early in the morning, I, 44, 13; 45, 9.
- prâtab-sávâ, morning libation, III, 28, 1.
- priyá, beloved, I, 13, 3, &c.; dear= φίλος, I, 67, 6¹; saptá priyásab, seven friends, IV, 1, 12; priyám tvâ krináivate, he gratifies thee, IV, 2, 8.
- priyá-dhâma, whose foundations are pleasant, I, 140, 1.
- Priyá-medha: priyamedha-vát, I, 45, 3¹; priyá-medhâb, I, 45, 4¹.
- prî, to please: prîñanáb, I, 73, 1; píprishati, he longs to gladden, IV, 4, 7;—â píprayab, gladden (the gods), II, 6, 8¹.
- prítâ, well-cared for, I, 66, 4¹; 69, 5.
- prush, to sprinkle, shower: prushitâ, I, 58, 2; prushnávat, III, 13, 4.
- pretrí, friend, I, 148, 5.
- présha, instigation, I, 68, 5¹.
- praishá, sacrificial command of a priest, (I, 145, 3²).
- phalgvá, feeble, IV, 5, 14.
- bát, lo! I, 96, 1; 141, 1.
- bándhana, fetterer, V, 12, 4.
- bandhútâ, kinship, IV, 4, 11.
- babhrí, carrying (the prize), III, 1, 12.

babhrū, brown (plants), I, 140, 6¹.
 bārhiṣṭam, most powerfully, III, 13, 1.
 bārhiṣmat, he who has spread the Barhiṣ, V, 2, 12.
 barhiṣ, the sacrificial grass, I, 12, 4; 13, 5; 7; 9, &c.; *prākīnam* barhiṣ, I, 188, 4; *déva* barhiṣ, II, 3, 4; *mádhye ā* barhiṣ, III, 14, 2.
 barhi-sād, sitting on the Barhiṣ, II, 3, 3.
 balí, tribute, I, 70, 9; V, 1, 10.
 bahú, many: *bahvīb ka bhūyasib ka yāb dūrab*, I, 188, 5.
 bahulá, large, I, 189, 2.
 bādh, to drive away: *bādhmānab*, III, 8, 2; *bādhasva*, beat away, III, 15, 1.
 bāhú, arm, III, 29, 6.
 budh, to take notice: *bodhi*, III, 14, 7; V, 24, 3; *sāb ka bōdhāti*, may he be attentive, I, 77, 2¹;—to think: *bōdhat*, IV, 15, 7¹;—*ābodhi*, he has been awakened, V, 1, 1; 2; *būdhyamānab*, awaking, V, 3, 6; *bodhaya*, awaken, V, 14, 1¹;—*vi bodhaya*, awaken, I, 12, 4.
 budhná, bottom, base, I, 95, 8²; 9; 96, 6; II, 2, 3; *mahāb budhné rāgasab*, IV, 1, 11¹;—depth, I, 141, 3¹.
 brīhát, great: *brīhát bhāb*, I, 45, 8¹; *brīhatī ivēti brī*, I, 59, 4¹; *ā brīhát vadema*, loud, II, 1, 16; mightily, III, 3, 11¹; V, 25, 8¹.
 Brīhát-uktha, V, 19, 3.
 brīhat-ūksh, mightily growing, III, 26, 4.
 brīhát-ketu, with mighty light, V, 8, 2.
 brīhát-diva, dwelling in the great heaven, II, 2, 9.
 brīhát-bhānu, with bright light, I, 27, 12; 36, 15.
 Brīhát-ratha, I, 36, 18¹.
 Brīhaspáti, III, 20, 5; 26, 2².
 bradhná, ruddy, III, 7, 5.
 brahmán, the Brahman (priest), II, 1, 2²; 3²; IV, 9, 4².
 brāhman, (sacred) spell, I, 31, 18; II, 2, 7; 10; III, 8, 2; 13, 6; 18, 3; V, 2, 6; *prathama-gāb brāhmanab* III, 29, 15¹;—sacred

word, II, 5, 3¹; IV, 3, 15; 4, 6;—prayer, hymn: *voḷéma brāhma*, I, 75, 2; *brahmanab* pate, *Brahmanaspati*, II, 1, 3; *ākāri brāhma*, IV, 6, 11.
 brū: *upa-bruvé*, I invoke, I, 188, 8.
 bhága, good fortune, I, 141, 6²; 11¹;—love, V, 7, 8²;—a winner (in a contest), I, 141, 10¹; 144, 3²;—Bhaga, the god, I, 44, 8; II, 1, 7; III, 20, 4; 5; IV, 3, 5; V, 16, 2¹.
 bhag, to obtain: *bhāganta . . nāma*, I, 68, 4; *bhaktám ābhaktam āvab*, blessings enjoyed or not enjoyed (before), I, 127, 5⁶;—*ā nab bhaga*, let us partake, I, 27, 5.
 bhadrá, good, I, 1, 6; fortunate, I, 67, 2; blissful, I, 94, 1; glorious, I, 94, 14, &c.
 bhadra-jōki, with glorious light, V, 4, 7.
 bhand: *bhādamāne iti*, of glorious appearance, I, 142, 7; III, 4, 6²; *bhādamānab*, glorified, III, 2, 12; *bhandate*, he is glorified, III, 3, 4.
 bhāndishṭā, most glorious, I, 97, 3; V, 1, 10¹.
 Bharatá, Agni the B., I, 96, 3²; pl., the Bharatas, V, 11, 1.
 Bharát-vāga, the Bharadvâgās, I, 59, 7.
 bhārgas, splendour, I, 141, 1.
 bhav, to chew: *bhārvati*, I, 143, 5.
 bhas: *prá babhasat*, may he consume, IV, 5, 4.
 bhásman, ash, V, 19, 5.
 bhā, to shine: *ānu bhāsi*, III, 6, 7;—*vi-bhāti*, heshines (conj. *vidhāti*), I, 71, 6¹; *vi bhāsi*, thou shinest, II, 1, 10¹; 2²; *vi bhāhi*, I, 95, 11.
 bhāb-rīgika, whose *rīgika* (?) is light, I, 44, 3¹; III, 1, 12; 14.
 bhâga, share, portion, I, 73, 5²; II, 10, 6; III, 1, 19.
 bhâga-dhēya, portion, III, 28, 4.
 bhâgayú, desirous of distributing (goods), II, 1, 4.
 bhā-tvakshas, whose power is light, I, 143, 3.
 bhânú, ray, I, 36, 3; 97, 5; III, 1, 14; flame, I, 143, 3; V, 1, 1; light, splendour, II, 2, 8, &c.

- bhānu-māt**, shining, V, 1, 11.
bhāma, splendour, III, 26, 6;—**flame**, V, 2, 10.
bhāmn, luminous, I, 77, 1.
bhārā, burthen, I, 31, 3.
Bhārata, (Agni) of the Bharata tribe, II, 7, 1¹; 5;—**Bhāratā**, the two Bharatas, III, 23, 2¹.
Bhāratī: **Hotrā Bhāratī**, I, 142, 9²; II, 1, 11¹;—I, 188, 8; II, 3, 8; **bhāratī bhāratibhiḥ**, III, 4, 8.
bhās, light: **brīhāt bhāb**, I, 45, 8¹; IV, 5, 1¹;—II, 4, 5; IV, 7, 9.
bhiksha, to implore, I, 73, 6; 7.
bhid: **āva bhet**, he cut down, I, 59, 6.
bhug: **bhógate**, receives nourishment, I, 72, 8²; **bhugé**, to enjoy, I, 127, 8; 11; **bhúgam**, for the enjoyment, III, 2, 9;—**yásya sam-bhúgam**, whom I may enjoy, II, 1, 4¹.
bhugmān, fertile: **bhúgma** (conj. **bhugmā**), I, 65, 5¹.
bhur: **gārbhurat**, hurrying around, II, 2, 5; **gārbhurānab**, II, 10, 5; **bhurānta**, they have made tremble, V, 6, 7¹;—**pari-gārbhurānab**, hurrying around, I, 140, 10.
bhuranyú, quick, I, 68, 1.
bhurig, pole-arm (?), IV, 2, 14³.
bhúvana, world, I, 31, 2; 73, 8; II, 3, 1; III, 2, 10; 3, 10; IV, 14, 2; **bhúvanasya magmānā**, I, 143, 4¹;—**being**, I, 98, 1; III, 16, 4.
bhū: **satāb ka bhāvatab ka**, of what is and what comes into being, I, 96, 7;—**bhavatāt**, be, III, 23, 2²;—**pāri bhúvat**, he encompassed, I, 68, 2; **pāri babhútha**, thou hast excelled, I, 69, 2.
bhūman, earth, I, 65, 3¹; II, 4, 7;—**being**: **etā bhūma**, I, 70, 6;—**world**: **vīsvāni bhūma**, II, 4, 2;—V, 7, 5.
bhūyams, many, I, 31, 6.
bhūri, rich, I, 73, 4;—**bhūri kṛitvab**, many times, III, 18, 4.
bhūri-poshīn, rich in manifold prosperity, III, 3, 9.
bhūri-retas, rich in seed, III, 3, 11.
bhūri-varpas, manifold-shaped, III, 3, 4.
bhūrni, quick, I, 66, 2; III, 3, 5.
bhūsh, to be busy: **bhūshan**, I, 140, 6; III, 25, 2;—**ūpa bhūshema**, may we honour, III, 3, 9;—**pāri bhūshasi vratām**, thou administerest the law, I, 31, 2; **pāri bhūshanti**, they celebrate, I, 95, 3; **pāri bhūshati**, he takes care of, III, 3, 2; **pāri bhūshathab**, you display, III, 12, 9.
bhri, to bring: **nāmaḥ bhārantaḥ**, I, 1, 7; **bhār īti bhāb**, I, 128, 2; **bibharshi** (conj. **bībharshi**), V, 3, 2¹;—**ūt-bhrita**, taken out, III, 21, 5;—**prā gabhrire**, I, 72, 4; **prā bhara** (**Samhitā**: **bharā**), 2nd or 1st person, I, 140, 1¹; **prā-bhrita**, proffered, I, 147, 2;—**vī bharanta**, they have brought to different places, I, 70, 10¹; **vī-bhritab**, brought to many places, I, 71, 4¹; **dispersed**, I, 144, 2; **vī bhāribhrat**, quickly shaking, II, 4, 4².
Bhrīgavāna, **Bhrigu**-like, I, 71, 4²;—**belonging to the Bhrigus**, IV, 7, 4.
Bhrigu, I, 60, 1;—**bhrīgavab**, the **Bhrigus**, I, 58, 5; 127, 7; 143, 4; II, 4, 2; III, 2, 4¹; 5, 10; IV, 7, 1.
bhrīmi, quick, I, 31, 16².
bhógana, food: **vīsvasya bhogana**, O food on which everything lives, I, 44, 5¹;—**possession**, V, 4, 5.
bhogyā, bounty, I, 128, 5.
bhramā, whirl, IV, 4, 2.
bhrāg, to shine: **bhrāgante**, I, 44, 12; **ābhrāt**, I, 66, 6; IV, 6, 5.
bhrāgat-rishī, with brilliant spears, I, 31, 1.
bhrātri, brother, I, 65, 7; **bhrātaram vārunam**, IV, 1, 2; **bhrātuḥ rinām**, IV, 3, 13².
bhrātrā, brotherhood, II, 1, 9; IV, 10, 8.
manhānā, bountifulness, IV, 1, 6; V, 10, 2; **manhānā**, instr., V, 16, 4²; 18, 2.
māmhishṭha, most rich in liberal gifts, I, 147, 2¹.
makshū, quickly, I, 58, 9, &c.
maghā, wealth, III, 13, 3;—**liberal boon**, III, 19, 1;—**liberality**, V, 10, 3.
maghā-vat, generous, I, 58, 9; 140, 10.

- maghá-van, liberal giver, I, 31, 12; 58, 9; 73, 5; 8; 77, 4; 98, 3; 127, 11; 140, 12; 141, 13; 146, 5; II, 6, 4; V, 16, 3; 18, 3; 5; maghónab (conj. maghónām), V, 27, 1¹.
- magmán, greatness, power, I, 128, 5; 141, 6; 143, 2; 4¹; II, 1, 15.
- matí, (pious) thought, I, 60, 5; III, 26, 8;—prayer, I, 141, 1; 142, 4; III, 5, 3; IV, 3, 16; *vākāb* matím, I, 143, 1¹.
- math or manth, to produce by attrition: máthit, I, 71, 4; 148, 1; mathnántab, I, 127, 7; máthib, I, 127, 11; mathâyáti, I, 141, 3; mathitá, III, 9, 5; ámanthishrām, III, 23, 2; manthāma, III, 29, 1; manthata, III, 29, 5; manthanti, III, 29, 6; mathyāmānab, V, 11, 6;—*nib*-mathitab, produced by attrition, III, 23, 1; 29, 12.
- mad or mand, to be pleased, rejoice: mándasva (with gen.), I, 26, 5; mādayante, I, 59, 1¹; mādāyasva, II, 3, 11¹; III, 6, 9; madanti, III, 4, 7; 7, 7; mādāyantām, III, 4, 11; mādantam, III, 26, 9; mādayethām, IV, 14, 4;—abhí prá mande, I glad-den, V, 4, 1.
- mád, pronoun: me, acc., V, 27, 4².
- máda, delight, I, 127, 9; V, 2, 10.
- mádhu, sweet drink: mādhuab ādhavé, I, 141, 3³;—honey, I, 142, 3; 188, 2; III, 1, 7; 8; mādhunā dāvyena, III, 8, 1²;—honey-drink, V, 19, 3².
- mádhu-gihva, honey-tongued, I, 13, 3; 44, 6; 60, 3.
- madhu-péya, honey-drink, IV, 14, 4².
- madhu-prík, mixing the honey-drink, II, 10, 6.
- mádhu-mat, rich in honey, I, 13, 2; 142, 2; honey-sweet, I, 78, 5; III, 4, 2; IV, 3, 9; 12;—sweet (food), III, 7, 2.
- mádhumat-tama, sweetest, V, 11, 5.
- mádhu-vaśas, sweet-tongued, IV, 6, 5.
- madhu-sút, Madhu-presser, IV, 3, 3.
- mádhu-hastya, with honey in his hand, V, 5, 2.
- madhyatáb, out from the midst, III, 21, 5.
- madhyamá, middle: madhyaméshu, I, 27, 5.
- man: manvata, they have devised, IV, 1, 16; mánayase, thou art considered, V, 17, 2¹, 3.
- mananá, thought, III, 6, 1¹.
- mánas, thought: mánab ná sadyáb, I, 71, 9; mind: mánasab várāya, I, 76, 1¹; ghrīta-prúshā mánasā, his mind being intent on scattering ghrīta, II, 3, 2; mánasā sám gagmúb, they agreed in their mind, III, 1, 13.
- manishā, (pious) thought: manishā (Pada text for manishāb?), I, 70, 1²; 76, 1; III, 8, 5; prayer, IV, 5, 3; 6, 1; V, 11, 5¹;—thoughtful mind, I, 94, 1;—wise thoughts, IV, 11, 2; 3;—*paráb* manisháyā, beyond thought, V, 17, 2².
- manishín, thoughtful man, I, 13, 5; III, 10, 1.
- mánu, man, I, 96, 2; 140, 4; V, 2, 12;—mánave, to the man, or to Manu, I, 189, 7⁴;—Manu, N.p., I, 31, 4; 36, 10; 19; 68, 7; 128, 2.
- mánu-bhita, instituted by Manus, I, 13, 4²; III, 2, 15.
- Mánu-gāta, offspring of Manu, I, 45, 1².
- Manu-vát, like Manu, II, 10, 6.
- mánusha, man, I, 31, 11².
- manushyā, man, I, 59, 4;—belonging to men, III, 1, 10.
- Manushvát, as for Manu, I, 31, 17; II, 5, 2; III, 17, 2; as Manus did, I, 44, 11; V, 21, 1.
- mánuś, man, (I, 31, 11²); I, 36, 7; III, 26, 2; IV, 1, 9¹; 6, 11; V, 3, 4; 5, 7; mánushab, (Aryan) men, I, 189, 7²;—mánushab, of the man, or, of Manus, II, 2, 6; 8;—Manus, N.p., I, 26, 4; 76, 5¹; 128, 1; II, 10, 1; IV, 2, 1¹; mánushab puráb-hitab, III, 3, 2;—Mánushab gantú-bhiḥ, III, 3, 6; manótri, deviser, II, 9, 4.
- mántra, hymn, I, 31, 13; spell, I, 67, 4; 5; 147, 4; prayer, I, 74, 1.
- mand, see mad.
- mandíá, joy-giving, cheerful, I, 26, 7, &c.; lovely, delightful, V, 17, 2; 26, 1.

mandrá-gihva, with lovely tongues, I, 142, 8; — with agreeable speech, IV, 11, 5; — with the delightful tongue, V, 25, 2.
 mandrá-tama, most delightful, V, 22, 1.
 mandrá-tara, a great joy-giver, III, 7, 9.
 mánman, thought, I, 26, 2¹; III, 14, 5; IV, 6, 1; — prayer, I, 77, 4; 127, 2; 140, 1; 11; 148, 2; II, 4, 8; III, 11, 8; IV, 3, 3; 15; 5, 6; 11, 2; V, 12, 1.
 manma-sādhana, fulfiller of thought, I, 96, 6.
 manyú, spirit, V, 7, 10¹.
 māmaka, mine, I, 31, 11³.
 mayab-bhū, comfort-giving, I, 13, 9; III, 16, 6; IV, 11, 4; V, 5, 8.
 máyas, happiness, I, 31, 7; freshness, III, 1, 3¹.
 Marút : marútāb, the Maruts, I, 31, 1; 44, 14; 94, 12; 128, 5; 142, 9¹; III, 26, 4-6; 29, 15; IV, 1, 3; 2, 4; V, 3, 3; 5, 11; 26, 9; marútām-iva svanāb, I, 143, 5; marútām jārđhab, II, 3, 3; IV, 3, 8; víśve marútāb, III, 14, 4; narāb marutāb, III, 16, 2¹.
 marútvat, accompanied by the Maruts, I, 142, 12; III, 4, 6.
 marút-vridh, whom the Maruts strengthen, III, 13, 6¹.
 mártā, mortal, man : mártān (for mártām, gen. plur ?), I, 70, 6¹; IV, 2, 3²; 11¹; mártāya (for mártāyā ?), I, 77, 2¹; mártam jāmsani, praise of mortals, I, 141, 6⁴.
 mártya, the mortal, I, 26, 9¹; mártyeshu devān kṛimōti, I, 77, 1¹; devāsya mártasya ka, II, 7, 2.
 márya, manly, I, 77, 3.
 maryaká, young bull, V, 2, 5¹.
 márya-jrī, like a beautiful youth, II, 10, 5.
 maryādā, limit, IV, 5, 13.
 mah : mamahantām, may they grant, I, 94, 16; 95, 11; mamahé me, he has presented me, V, 27, 1; — to exalt : mahayanta, III, 3, 3; mahāyan, III, 3, 11; mahaya, III, 24, 4; mahāyamānāb, III, 25, 5; — sám mahema (conj. sám aheha), I, 94, 1¹.

máh, great : maháb (acc. pl.), I, 31, 3², &c.; IV, 4, 11¹; mahīnām, of the great (waters), III, 1, 12¹.
 máh, greatness : mahé, III, 7, 10.
 mahá, great : maháb, I, 146, 5².
 mahán, greatness : mahnā mahát-bhiḥ, I, 72, 9.
 máhas, power : máhab-bhiḥ, II, 10, 3⁴; III, 4, 6³; with all their might, IV, 14, 1¹; — mightily : maháb rāyē kitāyan, V, 15, 5³.
 máhi, great, I, 79, 4.
 Máhi-keru : máhi-keravaḥ, I, 45, 4¹.
 mahi-tvá, greatness, might, I, 59, 5; 6; mahi-tvá, I, 67, 9; 68, 2; growth, III, 1, 4.
 mahinā, greatness, III, 6, 2; 7, 10².
 mahimán, greatness, I, 59, 7.
 mahi-ratna, possessor of great treasures, I, 141, 10.
 mahi-vrata, lord of high laws, I, 45, 3.
 mahishá, buffalo, I, 95, 9¹; 141, 3¹.
 máhishī, queen, V, 2, 2¹; buffalo-cow, V, 25, 7².
 Mahī, 'the Great One,' N. of a goddess, I, 13, 9¹; 142, 9; V, 5, 8.
 mâ, to create, produce : amimita, he produced, II, 4, 5; mimitē, III, 1, 5; amimita (mâtāri), he has been shaped, III, 29, 11¹; mīmānam, preparing, V, 2, 3; — úpa māsī, measure out, I, 142, 2; — ví rāgab mame, he passes through the air, I, 58, 1; vimānāb, traversing, III, 26, 7; — sam-māya, building, I, 67, 10.
 mākis, not, I, 147, 5.
 Mâtariśvan, I, 31, 3; 60, 1; 71, 4¹; 96, 4¹; 128, 2; 141, 3; 143, 2; 148, 1; III, 2, 13; 5, 9; 10; 9, 5; 26, 2¹; 29, 11¹.
 mâtṛī, mother : mâtā Áditīb, I, 72, 9; mother (Earth), I, 140, 9¹; mâtúb, II, 5, 6¹; mâtúb upāsthe, III, 8, 1³; 29, 14; V, 1, 6; amimita mâtāri, III, 29, 11¹; trīb saptā mâtúb paramāni, IV, 1, 16¹; mâtúb uśhāsāb, IV, 2, 15; mâtúb gób, IV, 5, 10¹; mâtā yuvatīb, V, 2, 1; 2; mâtā-iva, V, 15, 4; — du., ubhā mâtārā, I, 140, 3¹; mâtārā samikī, the parents turned towards each other (Heaven and Earth), III, 1, 7¹; parents, III, 2, 2; 5, 7²; 7, 1¹; V, 11, 3¹; mâtārā pitārā,

- IV, 6, 7; yahvī iti rītāsya mātārā, V, 5, 6;—pl., mothers, I, 95, 7; 141, 5¹; vatsāb mātṛīb ganayata, I, 95, 4²; saptā jivāsu mātṛīshu, I, 141, 2²; mātṛīb apāb, III, 9, 2; sū-gātam mātṛīshu, III, 23, 3; jāsvatīshu mātṛīshu, IV, 7, 6.
- mādhyaṇdina, midday: mādhyaṇdine sāvane, III, 28, 4.
- Māna, N. p.: mānasyasūnūb, I, 189, 8¹.
- mānavasyāt, acting as men do, I, 140, 4.
- mānusha, man, I, 58, 5, &c.;—belonging to men, I, 44, 10¹; 128, 7; human, I, 59, 5; 60, 3; mānushasya gānasya gānma, I, 70, 2; mānushī vit, I, 72, 8; dhīb mānushā, II, 2, 9; human (sacrificer): mānushāt pūrvab, II, 3, 3²;—belonging to Manu, III, 9, 6; mānushē (conj. mānushab), III, 23, 4⁴.
- Māmatelyā, son of Mamatā, I, 147, 3¹.
- māyā, wonderful power, I, 144, 1;—secret power, III, 20, 3²; 27, 7¹;—wile, V, 2, 9.
- māyān, powerful, III, 20, 3.
- Māruta, of the Maruts: sārddhab mārutam, I, 127, 6; II, 1, 6; IV, 6, 10.
- mārgāya, liking to be groomed, V, 1, 8.
- mārd kā, mercy, I, 79, 9².
- mā-vat, like me, I, 141, 2.
- māhina, mighty, III, 6, 4; 7, 5.
- mi, to erect: miyāmānab, III, 8, 3;—ni-mimyūb, they have fastened down, III, 8, 6; nī-mita, III, 8, 7.
- miksh, to mix: mimikshati, I, 142, 3; ghrītām mimikshe, he is joined with ghrīta, II, 3, 11².
- mitā-dru, measuredly running, IV, 6, 5.
- mitrā, friend, I, (36, 17¹); 67, 1; 75, 4;—friend or Mitra, the god, I, 96, 1²; II, 2, 3; 4, 1; III, 5, 3;—Mitra, the god, I, 26, 4; 36, 4; 44, 13; 58, 6; 77, 3²; 79, 3; 94, 12¹; 13¹; 16; 95, 11; 98, 3; 141, 9; 143, 7; II, 1, 4; III, 4, 2; 6; 5, 9; 14, 4; IV, 1, 18; 2, 4; 3, 5; 5, 4; 6, 7²; 13, 2; V, 3, 1; 2³; 9, 6; 10, 2; 16, 1; 26, 9; mitrā, the two Mitras i.e. Mitra and Varuṇa, I, 36, 17¹; ksheshy-āntab nā mitrām, II, 4, 3¹; mitrāb agnīb bhavati, III, 5, 4.
- mitra-mahas, great like Mitra, I, 44, 12; 58, 8; II, 1, 5; IV, 4, 15.
- Mitrāvāruṇau, du., Mitra and Varuṇa, I, 71, 9²; 75, 5; III, 20, 5.
- mītrya, belonging to one's allies, II, 6, 7.
- mithās, mutually, I, 26, 9;—together, I, 68, 8.
- mithunā, twin, I, 144, 4.
- miyédha, sacrificial meal, III, 19, 1; 5.
- miyédhya, sacrificial, I, 26, 1;—holy: I, 36, 9; 44, 5.
- mish: nī mishati, he closes his eyes, III, 29, 14.
- mīsh, mist, I, 79, 2; 141, 13.
- mī, to break (a law): minantī, I, 69, 7; yāsya vratām nā miyate, II, 8, 3;—to impair: mināti, I, 71, 10;—mināt, fading, V, 2, 1²;—ā aminanta (Samhitā text: °ntañ), they were disparaged, I, 79, 2¹;—āmemyāne ity ā-mēmyāne, constantly destroying, I, 96, 5;—prā minanti, they diminish, III, 28, 4; pra-minatāb, trespassing, IV, 3, 13; prā mināti, he destroys, V, 7, 4.
- mīdbvāms, bountiful, I, 27, 2; II, 8, 1; III, 16, 3; IV, 3, 5; 5, 1; 15, 5.
- muk, to loosen: mūkyase, I, 31, 4.
- mūd, joy, I, 145, 4.
- mumukshū, striving to break loose, I, 140, 4.
- muhub-gīr, the sudden devourer, I, 128, 3.
- mūrdhān, head: mūrdhā divāb, I, 59, 2; III, 2, 14; mūrdhānam tatāpate, IV, 2, 6;—summit: mūrdhān yagñāsya, II, 3, 2.
- mri, to die: marmrūshīb, I, 140, 8.
- mri: prā mriṇīhi, crush, IV, 4, 5.
- mriktā-vāhas, carrying away injury, V, 18, 2².
- mrigā, animal, I, 145, 5.
- mrik, to injure: markāyati, mrik-sh'shta, I, 147, 4; 5; V, 3, 7.
- mrig, to rub: margāyantab, I, 60, 5; marmrigēnya, to be smoothed down, I, 189, 7; II, 10, 1;—to clean, brighten: marmrigmā, III, 18, 4; marmrigata, IV, 1,

- 14; mármrigatab, IV, 2, 19; margayema, IV, 4, 8; marmri-gyánte, IV, 15, 6; margayanta, they have cleansed themselves, V, 3, 3';—to groom: mriganti, V, 1, 7; mrigyate, V, 1, 8;—pári marmrigyate, purifies, I, 95, 8².
- mrid*, to be merciful: *mrilaya*, I, 12, 9; *mrila*, I, 36, 12; 94, 12; IV, 9, 1.
- mrilayát-tama*, most merciful, I, 94, 14.
- mriliká*, mercy, IV, 1, 3; 5.
- mrís*: abhi *mrísate*, he strokes, I, 145, 4; ná abhi-*mríse*, not to be touched, II, 10, 5.
- mrísh*, to forgive: *mímriśhab*, I, 31, 16; to forget: má prá marshi-*śháb*, I, 71, 10; ná tát pra-*mríshe*, it should not be slighted, III, 9, 2.
- mell*, roaring (?), III, 26, 9¹; IV, 7, 11².
- métrí*, builder, IV, 6, 2.
- médas*, fat, III, 21, 1; 2; 4; 5¹.
- médha*, sacrifice, I, 77, 3.
- medhá*, wisdom, V, 27, 4.
- médhira*, wise, I, 31, 2; 127, 7; 142, 11; III, 1, 3; 21, 4.
- médhya*, holy, V, 1, 12.
- Médhya-atithi*, I, 36, 10¹; 11; 17¹.
- menâ*, woman, I, 95, 6.
- yaksh* with *prá*, to aspire after: pra-yákshan *vásu*, II, 5, 1; pra-yákshé, III, 7, 1.
- yakshá*, a spirit, IV, 3, 13¹, 3 (bis).
- yag*, to sacrifice: *yákshi*, I, 13, 1; 31, 17; 36, 6; *yáshave*, I, 13, 6; *yagñám yakshatâm*, I, 13, 8; *arvāñtām yákshva*, I, 45, 10; *yágadhyai*, III, 4, 3; *áyagab hotrá*, III, 17, 2; *yát yágási*, III, 19, 4²; *dhruvám ayāb*, III, 29, 16; *yagáthâya*, see *yagátha*;—*áva yakshva*, cause, by sacrificing, to go away, IV, 1, 5;—*ā yágati*, procures (blessings) by sacrificing, I, 26, 3; *ā-yágase*, I, 94, 2; *ā yaga*, produce by sacrifice, I, 188, 9; *ā yagasva*, obtain by sacrificing, III, 1, 22; *ā-yágante*, they bring hither by sacrifice, III, 4, 2; *ā yakshat*, V, 13, 3¹.
- yagatá*, to be worshipped, worshipful, I, 59, 7; 128, 8; II, 5, 8; III, 5, 3; IV, 1, 1²; 15, 8; V, 1, 11; 8, 1.
- yágatra*, deserving worship, worshipful, I, 65, 2², &c.
- yagátha*, the sacrificing, sacrifice: *yagáthâya*, III, 4, 1; 5, 9; 17, 1; 19, 5; V, 1, 2; 11, 2.
- yágamâna*, sacrificer, I, 127, 2; V, 26, 5.
- yágishtha*, best sacrificer, I, 36, 10; 44, 5; 58, 7; 77, 1; 127, 1; 128, 1; 149, 4; II, 6, 6; III, 10, 7; 13, 1; 14, 5; IV, 1, 4; 19, 2, 1; 7, 1; 5; 8, 1; V, 14, 2.
- yágíyams*, the best, or excellent, sacrificer, II, 9, 4; III, 4, 3; 17, 5; 19, 1; IV, 6, 1; V, 1, 5; 6; 3, 5.
- yagñá*, sacrifice, I, 1, 1; 4¹, &c.; II, 2, 1¹; *yagñānām adhvara-riyam*, I, 44, 3²; *mūrdhán yagñásya*, II, 3, 2; *yagñásva netári*, II, 5, 2; *rudrám yagñā-nām*, III, 2, 5¹; *ketúm yagñā-nām*, III, 3, 3; 11, 3; 29, 5; *pitā yagñānām*, III, 3, 4; *yagñām-yagñam*, III, 6, 10; *yagñásya netā prathamásya*, III, 15, 4.
- yagñá-bandhu*, kinsman of sacrifice, IV, 1, 9¹.
- yagñá-vat*, performing the sacrifice, III, 27, 6.
- yagñá-vanas*, accepting the sacrifice, IV, 1, 2.
- yagñá-vâhas*, fitting out the sacrifice as a vehicle, III, 8, 3¹; 24, 1¹.
- yagñā-sādh*, performer or promoter of sacrifices, I, 96, 3; 128, 2.
- yagñā-sādhana*, accomplisher of sacrifices, I, 145, 3.
- yagñíya*, worshipful, I, 27, 10²; 72, 3; 4; 6; 73, 7; 148, 3¹; II, 3, 4; III, 1, 21; 2, 13; 6, 3; IV, 1, 20; V, 10, 2;—sacrificial, V, 12, 1.
- yágyu*, sacrificer, I, 31, 13; III, 19, 4.
- yágvan*, sacrificer, I, 13, 12; III, 14, 1.
- yat*: *yatate*, he ranges (the wings of his army), I, 95, 7²; he unites with, I, 98, 1²; *yátānāb*, ranging themselves, III, 8, 9;—*yátate*, he stands firm, III, 16, 4;—

- yātayāse, thou wilt requite, V, 3, 9.
 yātab, since, I, 128, 4.
 yatā-sruk, holding forth the sacrificial ladle(s), I, 142, 1; 5; III, 2, 5; 27, 6; IV, 2, 9; 12, 1;—to which the sacrificial ladles have been raised, III, 8, 7¹.
 yád, adv. when (repeated twice), I, 141, 4³.
 yádi, when: yádi idám, when here (all this happened), I, 79, 2³;—as I am, IV, 5, 11².
 Yádu, I, 36, 18¹.
 yantúr, governor, III, 27, 11².
 yantrí, guider: yantáram dhínám, III, 3, 8;—guide, III, 13, 3.
 yam, to command: yántâ, I, 27, 7;—to hold: yayantha, I, 59, 1; yámati, it can hold, I, 141, 11³; yemânám, fast-holding, IV, 1, 15; yemub, they have held up, IV, 2, 14;—to bridle: jakéma yámam, I, 73, 10¹; II, 5, 1⁴; III, 27, 3; yamate, he holds himself back, I, 127, 3;—áyâmite, it has been offered to thee, III, 14, 2¹;—to lead: agur yamub, V, 6, 10²;—â-yemiré, they have turned themselves hither, III, 6, 8;—út yamyamiti, he raises again and again, I, 95, 7; út yamsate, may he lift up, I, 143, 7;—ní-yata, ruled, IV, 3, 9;—with prá, to bestow: prá yamsi, III, 1, 22; prá yandhi, bestow, IV, 2, 20; prá-yatâ, IV, 15, 8;—ví yamsat, may he spread out, I, 189, 6;—sám ayamsta, he pulls in (the reins), I, 144, 3.
 yamâ, twin: yamâb ha gâtâb yamâb gâni-tvam, I, 66, 8¹.
 Yayâti: yayâti-vât, I, 31, 17.
 yáva, barley, I, 66, 3; corn, II, 5, 6.
 yávasa, meadow, V, 9, 4.
 yavasa-ád, grass-consuming, I, 94, 11.
 yávishtâ, the youngest (god, Agni), I, 26, 2; 44, 4; 141, 4; 10; 147, 2; 189, 4; II, 6, 6; 7, 1; III, 15, 3; 19, 4; IV, 2, 10; 13; 4, 6; 11; 12, 3; 4; V, 1, 10; 3, 11.
 yávishtâya, youngest (Agni), I, 36, 6; 15; 44, 6; III, 9, 6; 28, 2; V, 8, 6; 26, 7.
 yáva, bliss in crops, I, 140, 13.
 yasâb-tama, most glorious, II, 8, 1.
 yasâs, bringing glory, glorious, I, 1, 3; 31, 8; 60, 1; II, 3, 5; III, 1, 19; V, 15, 1; yasâsab (fem.), III, 1, 11^{2,3}; yasâsâ gób, through the brilliant (milk?) of the cow, IV, 1, 16⁴; mártasya yasâsâ, through the mortal's brilliant (offering), V, 8, 4¹.
 yá-asvat, glorious, I, 79, 1⁴; III, 16, 6.
 yahú, young son: sahasab yaho íti, I, 26, 10¹; 74, 5¹; 79, 4.
 yahvá, vigorous, I, 36, 1²; III, 2, 9¹; 3, 8; 5, 5; 9; 28, 4; IV, 5, 6; V, 16, 4³; restless, III, 1, 12⁶; IV, 5, 2; 7, 11;—young, V, 1, 1;—yahvíb, new, I, 59, 4;—saptâ yahvíb, I, 71, 7²; 72, 8¹; III, 1, 4¹; IV, 13, 3;—diváb yahvíb, young (daughters), III, 1, 6; 9⁴;—yahví íti mâtârâ, I, 142, 7²; V, 5, 6.
 yâ, to go: yâmi rátanam, I pray for treasure, I, 58, 7³; yâsat, may he drive on, I, 71, 6³;—âkkba yâhi, come hither, I, 31, 17; devân âkkba yâtave, I, 44, 4¹;—ava-yâtâm (conj. ava-yâtâ), I, 94, 12¹; âva yâsisishabâb, mayest thou deprecate, IV, 1, 4.
 Yâtú, a bad demon, V, 12, 2¹.
 yâtu-gú, inciting demons, IV, 4, 5.
 yâtu-mâvat, ally of the Yâtus: yâtu-mâvatab, I, 36, 20.
 yâtri, avenger (?), I, 70, 11³.
 yâma, procession, V, 3, 12.
 yâman, way, III, 2, 14; 29, 6¹.
 yu: yúyûshatab, they try to draw towards themselves, I, 144, 3;—yuyodhi, drive away, I, 189, 1; 3; II, 6, 4; yódhi, V, 3, 9²;—â yuvâmânâb, seizing, I, 58, 2; â-yôyuvânâb, drawing towards himself, IV, 1, 11;—ví yoshat, may he be deprived of, IV, 2, 9.
 yú, going: yób, I, 74, 7².
 yuktâ, see yug.
 yuktâ-grâvan, who sets to work the pre-s-stones, III, 4, 9.
 yugâ, generation, tribe: mânushâ yugâ, I, 144, 4; II, 2, 2;—age: yugé-yuge, III, 26, 3.
 yug, to harness, yoke: yugânám, I, 65, 1³; âyukthâb, I, 94, 10; ayukshata, III, 26, 4; dâkshinâ

- yugyate, V, 1, 3²; yuktá, V, 27, 2; 3⁴;—to join: *nri-bhiḥ* yuktáb, I, 69, 8;—*yuñgē*, I make ready, III, 1, 1⁴.
- yúg, share: yúgam, V, 20, 1¹.
- yúgya, companion: yúgyebhiḥ, I, 145, 4².
- yúdh, the fighting, I, 59, 5; battle, I, 140, 10; V, 25, 6.
- yuvati, young woman: *dāra* yuvatā-yab, I, 95, 2²;—III, 1, 6; V, 2, 1; 2; 4¹.
- yúvan, young, I, 12, 1; 27, 13; 71, 8; 141, 10; 144, 4; III, 23, 1; IV, 1, 12; V, 1, 6; yúvā su-vāsāb, III, 8, 4¹;—see yāvishṭba, yāvishṭbā.
- yushmád, pron.: *vab*, dativus ethicus, I, 143, 7¹; *vām*, III, 4, 4¹.
- yúthá, herd, I, 58, 5; IV, 2, 18; V, 2, 4¹.
- yúpa, sacrificial post, (I, 13, 11¹); V, 2, 7.
- yóga, the yoking, II, 8, 1;—setting to work, III, 27, 11.
- yogyā, the harnessing, III, 6, 6.
- yóni, womb, I, 149, 2; II, 3, 11; 9, 3; *ritásya* yónau, I, 65, 4; III, 1, 11; IV, 1, 12; V, 21, 4¹; *úparasya* yónau, I, 79, 3³; *ghritásya* yónau, III, 1, 7; *rágasab* yónau, IV, 1, 11;—couch, I, 66, 5;—receptacle, I, 140, 1²;—birthplace, I, 144, 2; III, 29, 10;—abode: *samāné yónā*, I, 144, 4; *su-kritásya* yónau, III, 29, 8;—place, III, 5, 7¹; home, IV, 3, 2.
- yóshan, young female: *dāra* yóshanab, I, 141, 2⁴; *abhrātārab ná yóshanab*, IV, 5, 5².
- yós: *sám yób*, with luck and weal, I, 189, 2; III, 17, 3; 18, 4; IV, 12, 5.
- ramh, to hasten: *rarahānāb*, I, 148, 3.
- rámhyā, rapidly, IV, 1, 3.
- rákshas, pl., *rákshāmsi*, the Rakshas (devils), I, 79, 12; IV, 3, 14; V, 2, 9; 10.
- rakshás, sorcerer, I, 36, 15; 76, 3; 79, 6; III, 15, 1; IV, 4, 1; 4, 15.
- rakshasvín, sorcerer, I, 12, 5; 36, 20.
- raghú, swift, IV, 5, 13.
- raghu-drú, quickly running, I, 140, 4; V, 6, 2.
- raghu-yát, quickly moving, IV, 5, 9.
- raghu-syád, swift runner, I, 140, 4; III, 26, 2; IV, 5, 9; V, 25, 6.
- rágas, air, atmosphere, aerial space, I, 58, 1; 5; 79, 1; 141, 7; 149, 4; II, 2, 3; 4; III, 1, 5; 4, 4²; 26, 7; *rágasab* yónau, IV, 1, 11².
- rágishṭba, straightest, I, 79, 3.
- ran, to rejoice, delight: *ranáyanta*, I, 147, 1; *rananti*, III, 7, 5; *ranáyanta*, IV, 7, 7; *havyā ranayati*, V, 18, 1².
- rána, battle: *rāne-rane*, I, 74, 3.
- ranv, to be joyful: *ranvitē iti*, II, 3, 6.
- ranvā, pleasant, lovely, I, 65, 5; 66, 3-5; 128, 8; II, 4, 4; IV, 1, 8;—gay, joyous, cheerful, I, 144, 7; II, 4, 6; III, 26, 1; IV, 7, 5; V, 7, 2.
- rátna, treasure: *yāmi* rátnam, I, 58, 7²; *vāsu* rátnā, III, 2, 11; *kridhī* rátnam, III, 18, 5.
- ratna-dhā, bestower of treasures, II, 1, 7.
- ratna-dhātama, highest bestower of treasures, I, 1, 1; V, 8, 3.
- ratna-dhéya, bestowal of treasures, IV, 13, 1.
- rátna-vat, blessed with treasures, III, 28, 5.
- rátha, chariot: *rátham-iva védyam*, II, 2, 3²; *ráthab ná sásniḥ*, like a victorious car, III, 15, 5.
- rathirá, charioteer, III, 1, 17; 26, 1.
- rathí, drawing a chariot: *ásvasab rathyab*, I, 148, 3; III, 6, 8;—charioteer, I, 77, 3; III, 3, 6; IV, 15, 2; *rathíḥ adhvarānām*, I, 44, 2; *rathíḥ ritásya*, III, 2, 8; IV, 10, 2.
- ráthya, of a chariot: *átyab ráthyab*, II, 4, 4; *ráthyā-iva* (supply *akrá?*), II, 4, 6²; *akráram ráthyā-iva* (rather *ráthyam-iva?*), IV, 1, 3¹.
- rad, to cleave: *rātsi*, V, 10, 1.
- radhrá: *radhrásya* for *ādhrásya*, (I, 31, 14²).
- rápas: *rápāmsi*, Pada text instead of *ápāmsi*, I, 69, 8².
- rabh: *sám rebhire*, they have embraced, I, 140, 8;—*abhi sám rabhante*, they take care of, III, 29, 13.

rābhas, vigour, I, 145, 3.
 rabhasā, robust, II, 10, 4¹; fierce, III, 1, 8.
 rām-su, joyously, II, 4, 5.
 rām-sugihva, with lovely tongue, IV, 1, 8.
 rayī, riches, treasures: kshapā-vān rayinām, I, 70, 5¹.
 rayi-pāti, treasure-lord: rayi-pātib rayinām, I, 60, 4; 72, 1; II, 9, 4.
 rayi-vīd, gainer of wealth, II, 1, 3; III, 7, 3.
 rayishāh, conqueror of wealth, I, 58, 3.
 rāva, shouting, roaring, I, 71, 2; 94, 10; agnē rāvena (Pada: agnēb āvena), I, 128, 5¹.
 rāvanā, rope, (I, 13, 11¹); IV, 1, 9²; V, 1, 3¹.
 rasmī, ray, I, 59, 3; IV, 13, 4; 14, 2; 3; V, 19, 5;—saptā rasmāyab, seven rays or reins, II, 5, 2;—rein, I, 141, 11; III, 7, 9¹; ritāsyā rasmim, V, 7, 3.
 rāsa, sap, I, 71, 5¹.
 Rāhūgana, plur., the Rāhūganas, I, 78, 5¹.
 rā, to give: rāsate, I, 96, 8; rarishe, II, 1, 5; rarimā, II, 5, 7; rārānāb, a liberal giver, III, 1, 22; IV, 1, 5; 2, 10.
 rāg, to be king or lord: rāgantam adhvarānām, I, 1, 8; 45, 4; rāgasi, I, 36, 12; 188, 1; rāgan (conj. rāgan), I, 79, 6¹;—virāgatha, I, 188, 4;—ādhi virāgatab, you reign high, I, 188, 6¹.
 rāgan, king, I, 59, 3; 5, &c.; rāgānā mitrāvarunā, I, 71, 9²; rāgā Vārunab, II, 1, 4; IV, 1, 2; rāgā viśām, II, 2, 8; vasām rāgānam, V, 2, 6¹.
 rātā-havya, who has made offerings: rātā-havyab, I, 31, 13⁴;—to whom offerings are made, IV, 7, 7.
 rātī, gift, I, 60, 1; II, 1, 16; III, 2, 4; 19, 2².
 rātīnī, full of gifts, III, 19, 2; IV, 6, 3.
 Rāti-sāk, pl., the Rātisāk or 'bounteous' gods, II, 1, 13.
 rātri, night, I, 94, 7.
 rād̥h, to worship: ārad̥hi, I, 70, 8²;—

mā nab rīradhab, give us not up, III, 16, 5.
 rād̥has, abundance, wealth, I, 94, 15; II, 9, 4.
 rād̥hya, beneficent, IV, 11, 3.
 rāmyā, night, II, 2, 8.
 rāyāb-kāma, desirous of riches, I, 78, 2.
 ri, to let loose: ārināt, III, 3, 11¹;—svādhitib-iva rīyate, it streams, V, 7, 8¹;—nī rināti, he destroys, I, 127, 4; 148, 4.
 rik̥, ririkvāmsab, abandoning, I, 72, 5³;—with prā, to exceed: prā riri̥ke, I, 59, 5; prā rik̥yase, II, 1, 15; prā rikthāb, III, 6, 2.
 rīp, deceive: priyām rīpāb āgram, III, 5, 5¹.
 ripū, impostor, I, 36, 16; 147, 3; 148, 5; 189, 5; IV, 3, 13³; V, 3, 11; ripāve (conj. ripāvab?), V, 12, 4¹.
 ririkshū, who tries to harm, I, 189, 6.
 riśādas, triumphant with riches (?), I, 26, 4¹; 77, 4¹.
 rish, to do harm: rishatab, I, 12, 5; 36, 15; mā rishāma, may we suffer no harm, I, 94, 1-14; IV, 12, 5; reshāyanti, I, 148, 5; rishate, I, 189, 5; V, 3, 12.
 rīsh, harm, I, 98, 2.
 rishayū, harmful foe, I, 148, 5.
 rih, to lick: rērihat śādā, licking and licking, I, 140, 9; rihānti ūdhab, I, 146, 2;—pāri rihān, licking everywhere, I, 140, 9.
 rī, see ri.
 ru: rōruvat, roaring, I, 140, 6.
 rukmā, gold, I, 96, 5¹; IV, 10, 5; 6; V, 1, 12.
 rukmin, with golden ornaments, I, 66, 6.
 ru̥k, to shine: rokate, I, 58, 2, &c.; rurukvān, I, 149, 3; su-rūkā ru̥kānāb, III, 15, 6; rokata, IV, 10, 6¹;—āti rokase, thou shinest forth, I, 94, 7;—prā arokayat, it filled with light, I, 143, 2;—virōkamānam, I, 95, 2; 9; vi rokase, II, 7, 4; vi-rurukūb, they have made shine, IV, 7, 1.
 rug, to break: rugan, I, 71, 2; ādrim rugema, IV, 2, 15³;—vi ruga, destroy, IV, 3, 14.
 Rudrā, a name of Agni, I, 27, 10³; IV, 3, 1¹; rudrām yagñānām,

III, 2, 5¹;—Rudra, the father of the Maruts, II, 1, 6; IV, 3, 6; 7; V, 3, 3²;—pl., the Rudras, I, 45, 1; 58, 3; III, 8, 8; 20, 5.
Rudriya, Rudra-like: *rudriyā*, I, 72, 4¹;—pl., the sons of Rudra, III, 26, 5.
rudh: *vi ródhat*, he grows up, I, 67, 9.
rúp: *rupáb*? IV, 5, 7¹; 8.
rúsat, bright, brilliant, III, 29, 3; IV, 3, 9; 5, 15; 11, 1; V, 1, 2;—red, IV, 7, 9.
rúsat-úrmi, with fiery waves, I, 58, 4.
ruh: *vayáb-iva ánu rohate*, he mounts up as on the branches (of a tree), II, 5, 4¹.
rúpá, appearance, I, 71, 10; 95, 8; IV, 11, 1².
réku, empty (?), IV, 5, 12¹.
rékñas, property, I, 31, 14.
reg, to tremble: *áregetām*, I, 31, 3; *regante*, they roll forward, I, 143, 3.
rétas, seed, sperm, I, 68, 8¹; 71, 8; 128, 3; *rétab* (read *répab*), IV, 3, 7²; *diváb ná rétasā*, V, 17, 3².
répas, sin: *répab* (conj. for *rétab*), IV, 3, 7²; stain, IV, 6, 6.
rebhá, singer, I, 127, 10⁶.
revát, rich: *revān*, I, 27, 12;—*revát*, with riches, I, 79, 5; 95, 11; II, 2, 6; 9, 6; III, 7, 10; 18, 4; 5; 23, 2; 4; V, 23, 4.
reshaná, harm-doer, I, 148, 5.
raí, wealth: *rāyab*, gen., I, 68, 10¹; *yāsat rāyā sa-rātham*, I, 71, 6²; *rāyáb dūrab*, I, 72, 8; *rāyáb su-dhūrab*, I, 73, 10¹; *rāyáb jīsihi*, III, 16, 3².
roká, shining light, III, 6, 7.
rokaná, light: *visvā diváb rokanā*, I, 146, 1; III, 12, 9; *diváb rokané*, III, 6, 8; *trī rokanāni*, I, 149, 4; *ut-tamāb rokanānām*, III, 5, 10; *rokané sūryasya*, III, 22, 3.
rokanāsthā, dwelling in light, III, 2, 14.
rok's, splendour, V, 26, 1.
ródasī, du., the two worlds, Heaven and Earth, I, 31, 3, &c.; I, 59, 2; 4¹; III, 7, 9²; V, 16, 4³.
ródhas, bank, IV, 5, 1².
róman, hair, I, 65, 8.
róhita, red (horses), I, 94, 10; II, 10, 2; III, 6, 6; IV, 2, 3; 6, 9.

rohit-asva, lord of red horses, I, 45, 2; IV, 1, 8.
loká, world: *lokām gāmim*, III, 2, 9¹;—*svē u loké*, space, III, 29, 8;—*surabhaú u loké*, in the sweet-smelling place, V, 1, 6; *lokām syonám*, pleasant freedom, V, 4, 11.
váktva, (speech) to be uttered, III, 26, 9.
vákvan? I, 141, 7¹.
vákvara, moving crookedly: *vákvarī iti*, I, 144, 6¹.
vaksh, to grow: *ukshitā*, I, 36, 19; II, 3, 6; V, 8, 7; *ukshāmānam rāgasi*, II, 2, 4; *vavakshe*, III, 5, 8; *vaváksha*, IV, 7, 11;—*āti vavakshitha*, III, 9, 3¹;—*abhi vavakshe*, he has grown up, I, 146, 2.
vakshane-sthā? V, 19, 5¹.
vakshātha, growth, IV, 5, 1.
vakshī? V, 19, 5¹.
vak, to pronounce (a prayer): *vokeṃa*, I, 74, 1; 75, 2; *vak-yāte*, I, 142, 4²;—*ānu vókat brāhmāni*, II, 5, 1¹;—with *prā*, to announce: *prā vókat*, I, 27, 4; *pra-vókatī*, V, 27, 4; *piā vavāta*, he indicates, I, 67, 8.
vákas, word: *vákab*, instr., I, 26, 2²; *adroghēna vákasā satyām*, according to thy guileless word, III, 14, 6;—prayer, I, 26, 10, &c.
vakasyā, eloquence, II, 10, 6.
vakasyú, eloquent, V, 14, 6.
vañk, to stir: *vakyāmāna*, III, 6, 1; *vakyántām*, may they move along, III, 6, 2.
vat: *āpi vātayāmasi*, we render attentive, I, 128, 2¹.
vatsā, calf, I, 72, 2¹; 95, 1¹; 4²; 146, 3; II, 2, 2.
vadhā, weapon, I, 94, 9; V, 4, 6.
van, to accept: *vanóshi*, I, 31, 13⁴; *vanishishṭa*, I, 127, 7; *vaner iti vaneb*, II, 6, 1; *vanvānáb*, III, 8, 2;—to gain, win: *vanóshi*, I, 31, 14¹; *vavne*, I, 36, 17; *vanéma*, I, 70, 1²; II, 5, 7; *vanvántab*, attaining (their aim), II, 4, 9; *vanate*, may he obtain, III, 19, 1; V, 4, 3;—to conquer, overcome: *vanuyāma*, I, 73, 9;

- vanavat, V, 3, 5; vanuyâma, V, 3, 6;—vanúshab, addicted to, eager, I, 150, 3; III, 27, 11; vavánab, thou wilt hold dear, IV, 11, 2;—to grant: vanate, V, 3, 10;—â vanase, win thou, I, 140, 11;—sám vânamabe, we get together, V, 7, 3.
- vána, forest = fuel, wood, I, 58, 5¹; II, 4, 6¹; III, 1, 13¹; 9, 2; 23, 1¹; váne â vitám, IV, 7, 6¹;—tree: gárbhab vânanâm, I, 70, 3; 9;—forest: vâná-iva yât sthirâm, I, 127, 3²;—I, 128, 3², &c.
- vanád, eater of the forests, II, 4, 5².
- vanargú, walking in the forest, I, 145, 5¹.
- vânaspati, lord of the forest, tree (i.e. sacrificial post), I, 13, 11¹; 142, 11¹; 188, 10; II, 3, 10; III, 4, 10¹; 8, 1¹; 3; 6; II; V, 5, 10;—vânaspatin prá minâti, V, 7, 4.
- vânitri, winner, III, 13, 3.
- vanin, wooden stick, I, 58, 4;—tree, I, 94, 10; 140, 2.
- vand, to worship, salute: vandádhyai, I, 27, 1; III, 4, 3.
- vandáru, reverer, I, 147, 2; V, 1, 12.
- vándya, venerable, I, 31, 12; 79, 7; II, 7, 4.
- vandhúra, chariot-seat: vandhúre-iva (conj. for vandhúra-iva), III, 14, 3⁴.
- vap: â úpishe, thou pourest forth, I, 31, 9.
- vapúb-tara, very marvellous, II, 3, 7.
- vápusha: vápushâya darjatám, wonderful to behold, III, 2, 15.
- vapushy, to wonder: vapushyan, III, 1, 4.
- vapushyâ, of marvellous appearance, IV, 1, 8; 12; V, 1, 9.
- vápus, a wondrous sight, wonder, I, 141, 1; IV, 7, 9; wondrous body, wonderful shape, I, 141, 2²; 144, 3; 148, 1; III, 1, 8; 18, 5.
- vayab-krit, giver of strength: vayab-krit, I, 31, 10.
- vayab-dhâ, giving vigour, I, 73, 1; II, 3, 9; IV, 3, 10.
- vayab-vridh, increaser of vital strength, V, 5, 6.
- váyas, vigour, strength, vital power, I, 66, 4, &c.; váyab-vayab, life after life, V, 15, 4.
- vayâ, branch, I, 59, 1; II, 5, 4¹; V, 1, 1.
- vayí, weaver (?): vayyâ-iva, (II, 3, 6¹).
- vayúna, established order, rule: vid-vân vayúnâni, I, 72, 7¹; 189, 1; III, 5, 6; vayúnâ návâ adhita, I, 144, 5²; 145, 5; vayúnam vâghátâm, III, 3, 4²; vayúne, in the due way, III, 29, 3³;—ká vayúnâ, what are the objects, IV, 5, 13.
- vára, wish: mânasab várâya, to thy mind's taste, I, 76, 1¹; a choice boon, I, 140, 13; tis-í-bhyab â váram, according to the wish of the three (sisters), II, 5, 5; desire, II, 10, 6.
- vára, the holding back: ná várâya, he is not to be kept back, I, 143, 5.
- várvas, wide space, I, 59, 5.
- Várúna, I, 26, 4; 36, 4; 44, 14; 79, 3; 94, 12¹; 16; 95, 11; 98, 3; 128, 7; 141, 9; 143, 4; II, 1, 4; III, 4, 2; 6; 5, 4; 14, 4; IV, 1, 2-5; 18; 2, 4; 3, 5; 13, 2; V, 3, 1; 5, 11; 26, 9.
- várútha, shelter, I, 58, 9; 148, 2; 189, 6.
- varúthyâ, protecting, V, 24, 1.
- várenya, elect, desirable, excellent, I, 26, 2; 3; 7, &c.
- várêas, splendour, III, 8, 3; 22, 2; 24, 1.
- várna, colour, I, 73, 7; II, 1, 12; 4, 5;—(bright) colour, splendour, II, 5, 5; IV, 5, 13;—appearance, I, 96, 5;—race, II, 3, 5¹.
- vartaní, way: vartaníb (Pada: vartaníb), I, 140, 9²;—III, 7, 2.
- várdhana, increaser: várdhanam pitúb, I, 140, 3².
- várpas, sight, shape, I, 140, 5¹; 7; 141, 3.
- várman, armour, I, 31, 15; 140, 10.
- varshá-nirnig, clothed in rain, III, 26, 5.
- várshishúba, most powerful, III, 13, 7; 16, 3; 26, 8; V, 7, 1.
- várshman, summit: várshman diváb, III, 5, 9; várshman prithivyâb, III, 8, 3.
- vavâtâ, a favourite wife, IV, 4, 8.
- vavrá, prison, IV, 1, 13.

- vavri, cover, V, 19, 1.
 var, to be willing, long for, love :
 usatáb, I, 12, 4; usatíb usántam,
 I, 71, 1; usatáb (read usaté?),
 I, 71, 6²; usmási, I, 94, 3;
 usatíb, I, 145, 4⁶; II, 4, 3;
 vákshi, III, 1, 1¹; usántam
 usánáb, III, 5, 7; vāvarānáb,
 III, 20, 1; vāvarāna, III, 22, 1;
 usatí, loving, IV, 3, 2;—ānu
 vashri, I, 127, 1;—abhi vashri,
 IV, 1, 8.
 varā, heifer, II, 7, 5.
 varin, lord, III, 23, 3.
 vāshar-kriti, the word Vashar, I, 31, 5.
 vas, to shine : ukkātāntam, I, 71, 1;
 tshub, III, 7, 10; ritām avasran,
 IV, 2, 19¹.
 vas, to clothe : vāsishva, I, 26, 1;
 vāsaya (Samhitā : vāsaya),
 clothe, or I clothe, I, 140, 1¹;
 srīyam vāsānab, II, 10, 1; sukṛā
 vāsānab, arraying themselves in
 brightness, III, 8, 9; rūsat
 vāsānab, clothed in brilliancy,
 IV, 5, 15;—pāri vāsānab, III,
 1, 5².
 vas, to dwell : avāsayat, he has
 made depart, III, 7, 3;—prāti
 avāsaya, thou hast harboured,
 III, 1, 17;—sam-vāsānab, dwell-
 ing together, IV, 6, 8.
 vās, dwelling (?) : vāsām rāgānam,
 V, 2, 6¹.
 vasatí, dwelling, I, 31, 15; 66, 9¹.
 vāsana, garment, I, 95, 7.
 vasavyā, wealth, II, 9, 5¹.
 vāsishṭha, the highest Vasu, II, 9, 1.
 vāsu, excellent : vāsvibhiḥ dhītī-bhiḥ,
 III, 13, 5¹;—wealth, treasure,
 goods, I, 27, 5, &c.; vīsvab vāsub
 (conj. vīsvā vāsū), I, 128, 6²;
 vāsvab rāgati, I, 143, 4; vāsu
 rātnā, III, 2, 11; goods, or
 Vasus, III, 19, 2²;—see vāsya.
 Vāsu, ep. of Agni, I, 31, 3; 44, 3;
 45, 9; 60, 4; 79, 5; 127, 1¹;
 II, 7, 1; III, 4, 1²; 15, 3; 18,
 2; 19, 3; 21, 5; IV, 5, 15; V,
 3, 10; 12; 6, 1; 2; 24, 2; 25,
 1; vāsub vāsūnām asi, I, 94, 13;
 vāsub vāsu-bhiḥ, I, 143, 6;—
 pl., the Vasus, a class of gods, I,
 45, 1; 58, 3; 143, 1; II, 3, 4¹;
 III, 8, 8; 19, 2²; 20, 5; IV,
 12, 6; V, 3, 8.
 vāsu-dāvan, giver of goods, II, 6, 4.
 vāsu-dhiti, dispenser of goods, I,
 128, 8.
 vāsu-dhiti, place of wealth, IV, 8, 2¹.
 vāsu-pati, lord of wealth, II, 1, 11; 6,
 4; V, 4, 1.
 vasu-yā, desire for wealth, I, 97, 2.
 vasu-yū, desirous of goods, I, 128,
 8; III, 26, 1; V, 3, 6; 25, 9.
 vasuvīt-tamā, the greatest acquirer
 of wealth, I, 45, 7.
 vāsu-sṛavas, renowned as Vasu (or,
 as goods), V, 24, 2.
 vāstu, daybreak : vāstob ushāsab, I,
 79, 6.
 vāstrī, illuminator : kshapām vāstā,
 (I, 1, 7¹).
 vāstra, clothing, I, 26, 1.
 vāsman, cloth, IV, 13, 4.
 vāsya, better things, I, 31, 18;—
 bliss, I, 141, 12; welfare, II, 1,
 16;—greater wealth, II, 9, 2;—
 wealthier, IV, 2, 20.
 vah, to carry : vākshi, (III, 1, 1¹);
 havyāya vólave, I, 45, 6; III,
 29, 4;—abhi vakshi vāgam, III,
 15, 5²;—ā vakshati, may he
 conduct, I, 1, 2; ā vakshat, may
 he carry hither, III, 5, 9; ā
 vakshi, bring, III, 14, 2; ā-
 vāhantī, carrying (bliss), IV,
 14, 3².
 vahāt, stream, III, 7, 4².
 vāhishṭha, (horses) most ready to
 drive, IV, 13, 4; 14, 4.
 vāhni, driven (on a chariot) : vāhni-
 bhiḥ devaib, I, 44, 13¹;—carrier
 (of the gods), I, 60, 1; 128, 4³;
 III, 1, 1; 5, 1; 11, 4¹; 20, 1¹;—
 carrying : vāhniḥ āsā, I, 76, 4¹;
 —horse : vāhnayab, III, 6, 2²;—
 vāhni and vāhas, (I, 127, 8¹).
 vāhni-tama, best carrier (of the gods),
 IV, 1, 4.
 vā, to blow : vātab ānu vāti, I, 148,
 4;—āva vāti, he blazes down, I,
 58, 5.
 vā : vivāsasi, thou winnest, I, 74, 9;
 —ā-vivāsati, (who) invites, I, 12,
 9; 58, 1; ā-vivāsasi, thou in-
 vitest, I, 31, 5²;—ā vivāsanti,
 they seek to win, IV, 11, 5.
 vā, to weave : samvāyantī iti sam-
 vāyantī, II, 3, 6.
 vāghāt, worshipper, I, 31, 14; 36,
 13²; 58, 7; IV, 2, 13; invoking,

- III, 2, 1; 3, 8; 8, 10; sacrificer, III, 3, 4.
vāk, word, I, 79, 10.
vāga, strength, I, 27, 8¹; 11; 77, 5; II, 1, 10¹; 12; 2, 7; 4, 8; 6, 5; III, 10, 6; 11, 9; 19, 1; 22, 1; 25, 2; 3; 27, 1; 11; 29, 9; *vāgasya pátib*, I, 145, 1;—deed of strength, III, 12, 9;—booty, I, 27, 5, &c.;—prize, gain, III, 2, 3¹; 4, &c.; *abhi vakshi vāgam*, III, 15, 5²;—race (striving for gain, contest for booty), I, 27, 7¹; 9¹; 36, 2; III, 27, 7; V, 23, 1.
Vāga, pl., the *Vāgas*, III, 26, 4¹.
vāga-gatbāra, with booty in its belly, V, 19, 4.
vāga-pati, lord of booty, IV, 15, 3.
vāga-prasūta, bent on the prize, I, 77, 4².
vāgam-bharā, winning the prize, I, 60, 5; winning booty, IV, 11, 4.
vāgay, to run a race: *vāgayān-iva*, II, 8, 1¹;—to further strength: *vāgayānti iti*, III, 14, 3¹;—to drive forward: *vāgayate*, IV, 7, 11;—to strive for gain: *vāgayānti*, V, 1, 3; *vāga-yāntab*, V, 4, 1.
vāga-yú, bent on victory, V, 10, 5;—eager for the race, V, 19, 3.
vāga-vat, bestowing strength, I, 31, 18.
vāga-ravas, renowned for strength, III, 2, 5.
vāga-sātama, highest winner of booty, I, 78, 3; III, 12, 4; V, 13, 5; 20, 1¹.
vāga-sāti, winning of the prize, III, 2, 7¹.
vāgín, strong, II, 2, 11; III, 6, 1;—the strong horse, racer, I, 66, 4¹, &c.; II, 5, 1⁴; III, 27, 3¹; *ārvab ná vāgí*, III, 29, 6.
vāgina, strength, III, 20, 2.
vāñi, sound: *saptá vāñib*, III, 1, 6¹; 7, 1¹.
vāta, wind, I, 79, 1; 148, 4; IV, 7, 10; 11; *vātaib arunaib*, II, 1, 6; *vātasya pathyābhīb*, III, 14, 3; *vātasya sárgab*, III, 29, 11²; *vātasya pátman*, V, 5, 7; *Vāta*, the god, IV, 3, 6.
vāta-kodita, stirred by the wind, I, 58, 4; 141, 7..
vāta-gūta, stirred or driven by the wind, I, 58, 4; 65, 8; 94, 10; 140, 4.
vāmá, happy, I, 141, 12;—pleasant (wealth), IV, 5, 13.
Vâyú, the god, I, 142, 12¹;—*vâyú*, wind, V, 19, 5.
vār, water, II, 4, 6; *usriyānām vāb-iva*, IV, 5, 8.
vāra, treasure, I, 128, 6; V, 16, 2.
vāra, tail, II, 4, 4.
vāraná, stubborn, I, 140, 2.
vāra-vat, long-tailed, I, 27, 1.
vārya, excellent wealth, treasure, I, 26, 8; III, 8, 7; V, 16, 5¹; 17, 5; desirable boon, I, 58, 3; III, 21, 2; V, 23, 3; best gifts, I, 149, 5; III, 11, 9.
vār, to roar, low: *avārayab*, I, 31, 4¹; *vāvañāñb*, I, 73, 6; *vavāñire*, II, 2, 2.
vārā, lowing, I, 95, 6.
vāhas, vehicle, (I, 127, 8¹); III, 11, 7¹.
vāhishṛba, which may best bring, V, 25, 7.
vi, to weave. See *vā*.
vi, bird: *vér iti véb*, I, 72, 9¹; 96, 6²; III, 5, 5¹; 6; III, 7, 7¹; IV, 5, 8⁴; *váyab*, I, 141, 8; *vayyā-iva*? II, 3, 6¹.
ví, away from, I, 150, 2.
vi-adhvan, straying everywhere, I, 141, 7.
vi-úsh, the break of dawn, V, 3, 8.
vi-ushri, dawning: *vi-ushrishu*, I, 44, 3; 4; 8; III, 20, 1; *ushásab vi-ushrau*, at the break of dawn, III, 15, 2; IV, 1, 5; 14, 4.
vi-oman, heaven: *paramé vi-omani*, I, 143, 2; V, 15, 2.
vi-gāhá, diver, III, 3, 5.
vi-kakshana, far-seeing, III, 3, 10.
vi-karshani, dwelling among all tribes, I, 31, 6⁴; 78, 1; 79, 12; III, 2, 8; 11, 1.
vi-ketas, wise, I, 45, 2; II, 10, 1; 2; IV, 5, 2; 7, 3.
vig: *vevigé iti*, they are affrighted, I, 140, 3.
vigā-van, continuing our race: *sūnúb tánayab vigā-vā*, III, 1, 23.
vid, to find: *vévidāñb*, acquiring (or, exploring?), I, 72, 4; *avidan* (conj. *ávidan*), I, 72, 6¹.
vid, to know: *yáthā vidé*, as it is

- known, I, 127, 4; vidvân, knowing (with gen. and acc.), V, 1, 11¹;—*pári véda*, I, 31, 5¹;—*ví vidvân*, distinguishing, I, 189, 7.
- víd, knowledge: *vidā*, I, 31, 18.
- vidátha, sacrifice, I, 31, 6²; 60, 1²; 143, 7; III, 1, 1²; 18; 3, 3; 4, 5; 8, 5; 14, 1¹; 27, 7²; IV, 6, 2; *trīṣṭhe vidáthe*, II, 4, 8¹;—*vidáthā*, sacrificial ordinances, III, 1, 2³; 26, 6²;—sacrificial distribution, III, 28, 4; *vidátheshu áhñâm*, V, 3, 6¹;—assembly, II, 1, 4³; 16².
- vidathya, influential in council, (I, 31, 6²).
- vidúb-tarab, the greatest sage, I, 31, 14; II, 3, 7.
- vidús, possessed of knowledge, I, 71, 10².
- vidmanā-apas, active in wisdom, I, 31, 1¹.
- vi-dyút, lightning, III, 1, 14; V, 10, 5.
- vidyút-ratha, whose chariot is lightning, III, 14, 1.
- vidh, to worship: *vidhema*, I, 36, 2; *vidhatáb*, I, 73, 1, &c.
- vidh, vyadh, to pierce, to shoot: *vidhya*, IV, 4, 1.
- Vidhartrí, he who keeps asunder all things, II, 1, 3³.
- ví-dharman, sphere, III, 2, 3;—disposer, V, 17, 2^{1, 3}.
- vip, to tremble: *prá vepayanti*, they make tremble, III, 26, 4.
- víp, prayer, III, 3, 1¹; 7; *vipām gyótimshi*, III, 10, 5.
- vipab-kít, knowing prayers, III, 3, 4¹; 26, 9; 27, 2.
- vipanyá, vipanyáyā, in thy admirable way, III, 28, 5; *vipanyá*, wonderfully, IV, 1, 12.
- vipanyú, full of admiring praise, III, 10, 9.
- vípra, priest, I, 27, 9, &c.; *saptá vipráb*, III, 7, 7; IV, 2, 15¹.
- vi-bhaktrí, distributor: *vi-bhaktā*, I, 27, 6.
- vi-bhâtí, resplendent, III, 6, 7.
- vibhā-van, resplendent, I, 58, 9; 59, 7; 66, 2; 69, 9; 148, 1; 4; III, 3, 9; IV, 1, 8; 12; V, 1, 9; 4, 2.
- vibhā-vasu, rich in splendour, I, 44, 10; III, 2, 2; V, 25, 2; 7¹.
- vi-bhú, mighty, I, 31, 2; 141, 9; III, 6, 9; V, 4, 2; 5, 9; *vi-bhvíb (dúrab)*, I, 188, 5¹;—far-extending, I, 65, 10;—spreading, IV, 7, 1.
- ví-bhrít-ra, widely-spread, I, 71, 3²; 95, 2; wide-ranging, II, 10, 2.
- ví-bhrāshri, shine, I, 127, 1.
- vibhva-sáh, overpowering skilful men, V, 10, 7.
- vi-mána, measure, III, 3, 4².
- ví-yutā? IV, 7, 7¹.
- vi-rág, Prince, I, 188, 5.
- virúkmat, shining, I, 127, 3.
- ví-rúpa, of different shapes or forms, I, 70, 7¹; 73, 7; 95, 1; III, 1, 13; 4, 6;—of different colour, V, 1, 4¹.
- Vírúpa: *virúpa-vát*, I, 45, 3.
- vi-roká, the bursting forth: *ushásab vi-roké*, III, 5, 2.
- vivasvat, irradiating: *vivasvat* (conj. *vivasvan*), I, 44, 1¹; *vivasvatā kákshasā*, I, 96, 2⁵.
- Vivasvat, N. pr., I, 31, 3; 58, 1^{1, 2}; IV, 7, 4; V, 11, 3².
- vivasvan, the shining forth: *vivasvat* (conj. *vivasvan*) *ushásab*, at the rising of the dawn, I, 44, 1¹.
- vívikí, separating, V, 8, 3¹.
- vís, house, clan, tribe: *visé-vise*, I, 27, 10², &c.; *visām ná visvab*, I, 70, 4²; *mánushí vít*, I, 72, 8; *rágā visām*, II, 2, 8; *visām kavím vispátim*, III, 2, 10; *purab-etā visām mánushinām*, III, 11, 5; *visab mártán*, IV, 2, 3²; *visáb átithib*, V, 18, 1; *devásab sárwayā visā*, the gods with all their folk, V, 26, 9.
- vi-śkshu, a hewer, II, 1, 10³.
- vispáti, lord of the clans, I, 12, 2; 26, 7; 27, 12; 31, 11; 60, 2; 128, 7; II, 1, 8; III, 2, 10; 3, 8; 13, 5; V, 4, 3; 6, 5.
- vispátní, housewife, III, 29, 1⁴.
- vispā, lord of clans, (I, 70, 4²).
- visva, every one: *visām ná visvab*, I, 70, 4²; *visvam idám*, this whole world, I, 98, 1; *visve devāb*, II, 3, 4¹; V, 3, 1; 26, 4; *visvam ít vidub*, III, 29, 15¹.
- visvá-apsu? I, 148, 1².
- visvá-āyu, having a full life, or, in whom all life dwells, I, 27, 3; 67, 6; 10; 73, 4; 128, 8; *visvá-*

- âyub (conj. *visvá-âyob*), I, 68, 5².
visvá-âyus, adv., eternally (?), (I, 68, 5²).
visvá-kṛishī, extending over all dominions, I, 59, 7; belonging to all races of men, III, 26, 5.
visvá-karshāni, dwelling among all tribes, I, 27, 9²; III, 2, 15; V, 6, 3; 14, 6; 23, 4.
visvá-ganya, encompassing all people, III, 25, 3.
visvatab-mukha, whose face is turned everywhere, I, 97, 6; 7.
visvá-tūrti, all-victorious, II, 3, 8.
visvá-thā, everywhere, I, 141, 9.
visvá-darśata, visible to all, I, 44, 10; 146, 5; V, 8, 3.
visvá-deva, accompanied by the *Vive devāb*, I, 142, 12.
visvá-devya, belonging to all gods, I, 148, 1; united with all the gods, III, 2, 5.
visvādhā, everywhere, I, 141, 6; always, V, 8, 4.
visvá-dhāyas, possessing every refreshment, I, 73, 3; V, 8, 1.
visvá-bharas, supporter of everything, IV, 1, 19¹.
visvá-bhānu, all-brilliant, IV, 1, 3.
visvam-invā, all-embracing, I, 76, 2; —all-enlivener, III, 20, 3.
visvá-rūpa, all-shaped, I, 13, 10; assuming every shape, III, 1, 7.
visvá-vāra, rich in all boons, III, 4, 3; giver of all treasures, III, 17, 1; with all goods, V, 4, 7; rich in all treasures, V, 28, 1.
visva-vid, all-knowing, III, 19, 1; —omniscient, III, 29, 7; V, 4, 3.
visvá-vedas, all-possessor, possessor of all wealth, I, 12, 1; 36, 3; 44, 7; 128, 8; 143, 4; 147, 3; III, 20, 4; 25, 1; 26, 4; IV, 8, 1.
visvá-jrushī, always listening, I, 128, 1.
Visva-sāman, V, 22, 1.
Visvāmitra, pl., the *Visvāmitras*, III, 1, 21; 18, 4.
visvāyu-poshas, lasting all our life, I, 79, 9².
visvāhā, day by day, III, 16, 2.
vish, to accomplish: *viuddhi*, I, 27, 10; *vévishat*, busy, III, 2, 10.
vishvāna, manifold, IV, 6, 6; —turning oneself from one, V, 12, 5¹.
vishu-rūpa, in manifold shapes, V, 15, 4.
vishrá? I, 148, 1¹.
Vishru, II, 1, 3; IV, 3, 7; V, 3, 3.
vishpár, descrier: *vishpár*, I, 189, 6¹.
vishvak, in all directions, I, 36, 16; IV, 4, 2.
vi-sārā, expanse, I, 79, 1¹.
vi-stīr, laid out: *vi-stīrab*, I, 140, 7¹.
vi-havā, the emulating call, III, 8, 10.
vī-hāyas, far-reaching, I, 128, 6¹; whose energy expands round-about, IV, 11, 4¹.
vī, to accomplish, pursue, perform eagerly: *vivéb rāpāmsi* (rather *vivér āpāmsi*), I, 69, 8²; *véshi* (*hotrām*), I, 76, 4; *véb*, II, 5, 3²; IV, 7, 8; —to come or approach eagerly, to move: *véshi*, I, 74, 4; 189, 7; IV, 9, 5; 6; *véb*, he repairs, I, 77, 2; IV, 7, 7; *vetu*, I, 77, 4; *véti*, I, 141, 6; *vítāye*, that they may eagerly come or partake, I, 74, 6; II, 2, 6²; see also *vītí*; —*vihi*, accept eagerly, III, 28, 3; —*vyántab*, tending to, I, 127, 5; *vyantu*, may they eagerly seek, III, 8, 7; *vihi mrihikām*, love mercy, IV, 1, 5; *mā veb*, require not, IV, 3, 13; —*ā dūtyām vivāya*, he has undertaken the messengership, I, 71, 4²; —*ūpa vetu*, may he come, V, 11, 4; —*prā-vita*, having conceived, III, 29, 3; —*prāti vihi*, accept eagerly, III, 21, 5.
vī, to envelop. See *vyā*.
vī, eager: *vīb*, I, 143, 6.
vīlū, strong, safe, I, 127, 3; 5; IV, 3, 14; —fortress, I, 71, 2.
vīlū-gambha, with strong jaws, III, 29, 13.
vītā, straight, IV, 2, 11.
vītí, (sacrificial) feast: *vítāye*, I, 13, 2; 74, 4; 142, 13; III, 13, 4; V, 26, 2.
vītí-hotra, offerer of a feast (to the gods), III, 24, 2; V, 26, 3.
virā, hero, a manly son, I, 73, 3, &c.
virā-peras, adorned with heroes, IV, 11, 3¹.
virā-vat, with valiant heroes, I, 12, 11; 96, 8; III, 24, 5; V, 4, 11.

- vīrávat-tama**, high bliss of valiant offspring, I, 1, 3.
- vīrúdh**, plant, I, 67, 9; 141, 4; **gár-bhab** **vīrúdhām**, II, 1, 14.
- vīryā**, mighty deed, III, 12, 9;—heroic power, III, 25, 2.
- vri**, to choose: **vrinimahe**, I, 12, 1, &c.; **vrinité**, he demands, I, 67, 1;—**urânáb**, choosing, III, 19, 2; IV, 6, 3; chosen, IV, 6, 4; 7, 8.
- vri**, to hold back, hinder: **varâte**, I, 65, 6; **váranta**, IV, 6, 6; **ávâri**, IV, 6, 7;—**āpa vridhi**, open, II, 2, 7; **āpa āvar** **ity āvab**, he has opened, III, 5, 1; **āpa vrân**, they have uncovered, IV, 5, 8; **āpa vran**, they disclosed, IV, 2, 16;—**kāmam ā-varat**, would he fulfil our desire, I, 143, 6;—**pāri-vrita**, hidden, I, 144, 2;—see **ūruu**.
- vrīktā-barhis**, havingspread the sacrificial grass, I, 12, 3¹; III, 2, 5; 6; V, 23, 3;—where they spread sacrificial grass, V, 9, 2.
- vrīgāna**, settlement, I, 60, 3²; 73, 2²; II, 2, 1⁴; 9;—enclosure, I, 128, 7;—**masc. ?** I, 189, 8².
- vriginā**, wrong, dishonest, IV, 1, 17; V, 3, 11; 12, 5.
- vriginā-vartani**, following crooked ways, I, 31, 6^{1, 4}.
- vrīṅg**, to trim: **vrīṅgé**, I, 142, 5²;—to turn: **vrinākti**, IV, 7, 10;—**ā vrikshi**, may I draw on myself, (I, 27, 13²);—**pāri vrinakti**, he spares, III, 29, 6.
- vrītrā**, foe, I, 36, 8¹.
- vrītra-hātha**, the killing of foes, III, 16, 1.
- vrītra-hān**, slayer of foes or of **Vrītra**, I, 59, 6¹; 74, 3; II, 1, 11; III, 12, 4²; 20, 4².
- vrītrahān-tama**, the greatest destroyer of enemies (or of **Vrītra**), I, 78, 4.
- vrīthā**, lightly, I, 58, 4¹;—wildly, I, 140, 5.
- vriddhā-jōis**, mightily brilliant, V, 16, 3.
- vrīdh**, to increase, grow, &c.: **vār-dhamāna**, increasing, I, 1, 8, &c.; **vavridhasva**, be magnified, I, 31, 18; **vrīdhé**, for welfare, prosperity, III, 3, 8; 6, 10; IV, 2, 18; **vrīddhā**, grown full of, V, 20, 2¹;—**vārdhanti**, they nourish, I, 65, 4;—**vardhayā-masi**, we extol, I, 36, 11; **vardhaya gīrab**, make prosper, III, 29, 10;—**vī vavridhe** (conj. **vi-vavridhé**), I, 141, 5².
- vrīdh**, furtherer, III, 16, 2².
- vrīdhā**, helper, furtherer, (III, 16, 2²); IV, 2, 10.
- vrīdhasānā**, growing: **vrīdhasānāsu**, in the growing (plants), II, 2, 5².
- vrīdha-snū**, mighty, IV, 2, 3¹.
- vrīshan**, manly, bull, I, 36, 8²; 10¹, &c.; III, 29, 9¹; **ritāsyā vrīshne**, V, 12, 1¹; **arushāsyā vrīshnab**, V, 12, 2².
- Vrīshan**, N. pr., I, 36, 10¹.
- vrīshabhā**, bull (Agni), I, 31, 5, &c.; I, 141, 2²; IV, 1, 11²; 12²; V, 2, 12¹; **kṛishnāb vrīshabhāb**, I, 79, 2².
- vrīshay**: **vrīsha-yāse**, thou rushest on (acc.) like a bull, I, 58, 4²;—**vrīsha-yānte**, they are full of (sexual) desire, III, 7, 9.
- vrīshī**, rain, II, 5, 6; 6, 5.
- védas**, property, I, 70, 10; 99, 1; V, 2, 12.
- vēdi**, sacrificial altar: **vēdi īti asyām**, II, 3, 4.
- vedī-sād**, sitting on the sacrificial bed, I, 140, 1.
- vēdya**, well known: **rātham-iva vedyam**, II, 2, 3²;—renowned, V, 15, 1.
- vedhab-tama**, best worshipper, I, 75, 2.
- vedhās**, worshipper, I, 60, 2; 65, 10; 69, 3; 72, 1¹; 73, 10; III, 10, 5; 14, 1; IV, 2, 15; 20; 3, 3; 16; 6, 1;—helpful, I, 128, 4 (bis).
- vēpas**, trembling, IV, 11, 2.
- veśā**, vassal, IV, 3, 13.
- vēshana**, officiating, V, 7, 5.
- Vairvānarā**, I, 59, 1-7; 98, 1-3; III, 2, 1; 11; 12; 3, 1; 5; 10; 11; 26, 1-3; IV, 5, 1; 2; V, 27, 1²; 2.
- vōlbri**, draught-horse, I, 144, 3.
- vyākasvat**, far-embracing, II, 3, 5.
- vyākishṭha**, most capacious, II, 10, 4.
- vyāthis**, track, IV, 4, 3.
- vyadh**, see **vidh**.
- vyā (vi)**, to envelop: **ava-vyāyan**, re-

- moving, IV, 13, 4;—*ā vītām*, enveloped, IV, 7, 6¹;—*pāri-vita*, dressed (in offerings and prayers?), IV, 3, 2².
vyōman, see *vi-oman*.
vrag, to go: *vavrāga*, III, 1, 6;—*abhi-vrāgan*, proceeding, I, 58, 5²; *abhivvrāgat-bhiḥ*, approaching, I, 144, 5³.
vragā, stable, IV, 1, 15; V, 6, 7.
vratā, law, I, 31, 1; 2; 12; 65, 3; 69, 7; II, 8, 3; III, 3, 9; 4, 7; 6, 5; 7, 7; IV, 13, 2; *vratā dhruvā*, I, 36, 5¹; II, 5, 4; *daivyaṇi vratā*, I, 70, 2;—*ānu vratām*, according to his will, I, 128, 1;—*duty*, I, 144, 1.
vratā-pā, guardian of the law, I, 31, 10; III, 4, 7; V, 2, 8³.
vrasak: *unāgyāyasab sāmsam ā vrikshi*, may I not fall as a victim to the curse of my better, I, 27, 13²; *vrikśāsab*, hewn, III, 8, 7.
vrā, host, IV, 1, 16².
vrāta, host: *vrātam-vrātam*, III, 26, 6.
vrādh: *vrādhanta*, they have boasted, V, 6, 7.
vrāadhan-tama, most powerful, I, 150, 3.
vrīś, finger: *dāsa vrīśab*, I, 144, 5¹.
sams, to recite: *āsamsan*, I, 67, 4; *mānma samsi*, II, 4, 8;—to teach: *ritām sāmsantab*, III, 4, 7.
sāmsā, curse, I, 27, 13²; 94, 8; III, 18, 2; *sāmsāt aghāt*, from evil spell, I, 128, 5;—praise, I, 141, 6⁴; 11; *sāmse nrinām*, III, 16, 4; *ubhā sāmsā*, IV, 4, 14¹; *sāmsam āyōb*, IV, 6, 11²; V, 3, 4².
sak, to be able: *saknāvāma*, I, 27, 13; *sakēma yāmam*, I, 73, 10¹; II, 5, 1⁴; III, 27, 3; *sakema sam-idham*, I, 94, 3;—to help to: *sagdhi* (with gen.), II, 2, 12; III, 16, 6; *sagdhī svastāye*, V, 17, 5.
sakti, skill: *saktī*, I, 31, 18.
sagmā, mighty, I, 143, 8.
saki-vat, full of power, III, 21, 4.
satā, hundred: *satā ka vimśatim ka*, V, 27, 2¹.
satā-ātman, endowed with hundred-fold life, I, 149, 3.
satadāvan, giver of a hundred (bulls), V, 27, 6.
satā-dhāra, with a hundred rills, III, 26, 9.
satā-valsa, with a hundred branches, III, 8, 11.
sata-sēya, attainment of hundred-fold blessings, III, 18, 3.
satā-hima, living a hundred winters, II, 1, 11.
satā-himā, pl., a hundred winters, I, 73, 9.
satīn, hundredfold, I, 31, 10; II, 2, 9; *satīnibhiḥ*, with his hundred-fold blessings, I, 59, 7.
sātru, enemy: *sātrum ā-dabhūb*, III, 16, 2⁴.
satru-yāt, being at enmity, V, 4, 5; 28, 3.
sad, to be glorious: *sāsadré*, I, 141, 9.
saphā, hoof, V, 6, 7.
sam, to toil (esp. in performing worship): *samānā*, who has toiled hard, I, 141, 10; 142, 2; III, 18, 4; IV, 2, 9; 13; *samishṭbāb*, III, 29, 16; *śa-mishṭa*, he toiled, V, 2, 7.
sām, bliss, luck: *sām yōb*, with luck and weal, I, 189, 2; III, 17, 3; 18, 4; IV, 12, 5; *sām nab soka*, III, 13, 6; *sām kridhi*, IV, 1, 3; *sām āsti*, he satisfies, V, 7, 9; *sām hridé*, V, 11, 5.
samāy, to toil: *sam-āyé*, III, 1, 1.
sāmi, toiling, (sacrificial) work: *sāmyā*, II, 1, 9¹; *sāmyai* (read *sāmyāb*?), IV, 3, 4¹.
samitrī, the sacrificial butcher, or slaughterer, (I, 13, 12¹); II, 3, 10; III, 4, 10.
sam-gayā, bringing happiness to our home, II, 1, 6.
sām-tama, most agreeable, beneficial, blissful, I, 76, 1¹; 77, 2; 128, 7; III, 13, 4.
Sāmbara, I, 59, 6.
sam-bhū, refreshing, I, 65, 5; bringing luck, III, 17, 5.
sayū, reposing, I, 31, 2.
sarāni, fault (?), I, 31, 16¹.
sarād, autumn: *tisrāb sarādab*, I, 72, 3.
sāru, weapon, IV, 3, 7.
sārdha, host, I, 71, 8⁸; IV, 1, 12¹, 8; *sārdhāya marūtām*, IV, 3, 8.
sārdhas, host: *sārdhab mārutām*, I,

127, 6; II, 1, 6; IV, 6, 10;
marútām sárdhab, II, 3, 3;
narām sárdhab, II, 1, 5¹; *sárdhab*
divyám, III, 19, 4; —*sárdhab*,
 m. or n.? IV, 1, 12¹, 3.
sárman, shelter, protection, I, 58, 8,
 &c.; *sármani* *syām*, III, 15, 1;
ákkhidrá sárma, III, 15, 5¹.
sarma-sád, sitting under shelter, I,
 73, 3.
sáryā, arrow, I, 148, 4.
sávas, strength, might, power: *sávasā*
 (conj. *sávasab*), I, 27, 2¹, &c.;
sávasab sushminab pátib, I, 145,
 1; *savasab* *pate*, V, 6, 9.
sávishtā, most powerful, I, 77, 4;
 mightiest, I, 127, 11.
sásvat: *sásvatā* *tánā*, constantly, I,
 26, 6¹; *sásvatib*, constant, I, 27,
 7; *gánāya sásvate*, all people, I,
 36, 19; *sásvatab*, many, I, 72, 1¹.
sasvat-tamām, for ever, III, 1, 23.
sasti, hymn, praise, IV, 3, 3; 15.
sā, to sharpen, further: *sīśhi*, III,
 16, 3¹; 24, 5¹; *sīśite*, V, 2, 9;
 9, 5; —*āti sīśite*, I, 36, 16; —*ni-*
sīshat, he stirs up, IV, 2, 7¹.
sākā, powerful, V, 15, 2¹.
Sāta-vaneyā, N. pr., I, 59, 7.
sās, to teach, instruct: *sarāsūb*, III,
 1, 2; IV, 2, 12; —*ānu-sīshā*,
 instructed, V, 2, 8; —*prā sāsī*,
 thou instructest, I, 31, 14; *prā-*
sāsāt, commanding, I, 95, 3.
sās, command, I, 68, 9.
sāsana, command, III, 7, 5.
sāsani, teacher, I, 31, 11.
sāsus, command, instruction, I, 60,
 2; 73, 1.
sāsya, governable, I, 189, 7¹.
sīkvan, plur., locks of flames, I, 141, 8¹.
sīksh, to help one to, to favour with
 a thing (gen.): *sīksha*, I, 27,
 5; III, 19, 3; *yāb te sīkshāt*,
 who does service to thee, I,
 68, 6¹.
sīkshū, rich in favours: *sīkshób*
 (conj. *sīksho*), III, 19, 3¹.
siti-prīshṭā, white-backed, III, 7, 1¹.
sīmī-vat, powerful (?), I, 141, 13¹.
sīrinā? II, 10, 3³.
sivā, kind, bounteous, gracious,
 blessed: I, 31, 1; 79, 2; 143,
 8; III, 1, 9; 19; IV, 10, 8;
 11, 6; V, 24, 1.
sīsu, the young one: *parūb nā sīvā*,

like a pregnant cow, (I, 65, 10¹);
 young calf, I, 96, 5¹; the young
 child (Agni), I, 140, 3; 145, 3;
 V, 9, 3; a foal, III, 1, 4; *divāb*
sīsum, (Soma) the child of
 heaven, IV, 15, 6².
sīsu-matī, the mother of the young
 child, I, 140, 10¹.
sīsvan (?), young: *parūb nā sīvā*, I,
 65, 10¹.
sīrā, sharp, III, 9, 8.
sukrá, bright, I, 12, 12, &c.; —bright-
 ness: *sukrá vásānāb*, III, 8, 9.
sukrá-varna, whose colour is bright,
 I, 140, 1; 143, 7.
sukrá-sokis, brightly shining, II, 2, 3.
suk, to shine forth, flame up: *sókasva*,
 I, 36, 9; *susukvān*, flaming, I,
 69, 1; *sukáyantab*, the re-
 splendent ones, I, 147, 1; *susu-*
kānā, I, 149, 4; *sām nab soka*,
 III, 13, 6; *śókāt*, III, 29, 14;
sukādhyai, IV, 2, 1¹; —to kindle:
sukāntab *agnīm*, IV, 2, 17; —
āpa nab sósukat *aghām*, driving
 away evil with thy light, I, 97,
 1-8; —*susugdhī ā rayīm*, shine
 upon us with wealth, I, 97, 1; —
vī sósukānab, flaming, III, 15, 1.
súk, flash: *sukā-sukā*, flash by flash,
 III, 4, 1.
súki, brilliant, bright, I, 31, 17, &c.;
 V, 7, 8¹; *súkim sūkayab*, I, 72,
 3¹; *súki* *it* (for *súkim* *it*?), IV,
 2, 16².
súki-ganman, whose birth is bright,
 I, 141, 7.
súki-gihva, pure-tongued, II, 9, 1.
súki-dant, with brilliant teeth, V, 7, 7.
súki-peṇas, brightly adorned, I, 144, 1.
súki-pratīka, whose face is bright, I,
 143, 6.
súki-bhrāgas, brightly resplendent, I,
 79, 1.
súki-varna, brilliant-coloured, V, 2, 3.
Sūnab-sēpa, V, 2, 7.
sunām, prosperously, IV, 3, 11.
subh, to adorn, beautify: *subbhānti*,
 V, 10, 4¹; 22, 4.
súbh, a triumphal procession, I, 127,
 6; III, 26, 4¹.
subham-yā, going in triumph, IV,
 3, 6².
subhrā, beautiful, III, 26, 2.
surúdh, gift, I, 72, 7².
sush, see *svas*.

śūshka, dry (wood), I, 68, 3.
 śūshma, roaring, IV, 10, 4;—power,
 V, 10, 4; 16, 3.
 śushmān, mighty, powerful, I, 145,
 1; III, 16, 3; V, 10, 4.
 śushmān-tama, strongest, I, 127, 9.
 śūra, mighty, I, 70, 11;—hero, IV,
 3, 15.
 śūra-sāti, strife of heroes: śūra-sâtā,
 I, 31, 6.
 śūshā, song of praise, III, 7, 6.
 śrīṅga, horn, III, 8, 10; V, 2, 9.
 śrīṅgin, horned animal, III, 8, 10.
 śridh: śardha, show thy prowess, V,
 28, 3.
 śēva, a kind friend, I, 58, 6; 69, 4;
 73, 2;—friendship, III, 7, 5.
 śē-vridha, joy-furthering, III, 16, 2.
 śēsha, offspring, V, 12, 6.
 śōka, flame, IV, 6, 5.
 śokīb-keśa, whose hair is flame, I,
 45, 6; 127, 2; III, 14, 1; 17,
 1; 27, 4; V, 8, 2.
 śokishṭha, brightest, V, 24, 4.
 śokishmat, flaming, II, 4, 7.
 śokis, splendour, flame, I, 12, 12, &c.
 śkut, to drip down: śkotanti, III, 1,
 8; 21, 2; 4, 5.
 śyāva, dark: śyāvīm (conj. śyāvīb?),
 I, 71, 1^a; śyāvā, the two tawny
 horses, II, 10, 2.
 syetā, reddish, I, 71, 4.
 syenā, hawk, IV, 6, 10.
 syēñī, the reddish white one, I, 140, 9^a.
 śrath, to let loose: śirathat, I, 128,
 6;—*vī śirathāb*, release from,
 IV, 12, 4.
 śram: śramānāb, toiling, IV, 12, 2.
 śramayū, wearying oneself, I, 72, 2.
 śravayāt-pati, who brings renown to
 his lord, V, 25, 5¹.
 śrāvas, glory, renown, I, 31, 7, &c.;
 śrāvase, I, 73, 5².
 śravasyā, glorious, II, 10, 1.
 śravasyāt, aspiring to renown, I,
 128, 1.
 śravasyā, desire of glory, I, 128, 6;
 149, 5.
 śravasyū, glorious, V, 9, 2.
 śravāyya, glorious, celebrated, I, 27,
 8; 31, 5; V, 20, 1.
 śrā, see śrī.
 śri, to rest, abide: *asi śritāb*, I, 75,
 3; III, 9, 3; *śiriyānā*, dwelling
 here and there, V, 11, 6;—*asret*,
 he has spread forth, established,

III, 14, 1; 19, 2;—to send:
śirdhvām asret, he has sent up-
 wards, IV, 6, 2; 13, 2; 14, 2;
asret, he has sent, V, 1, 12; 28,
 1;—*ūt śrayasva*, rise up, III, 8,
 2;—with *vī*, to open (intr.): *vī*
śrayantām, I, 13, 6; 142, 6; II,
 3, 5; *vī śrayadhvam*, V, 5, 5.
 śrī, to cook: *śrīnān*, I, 68, 1¹; *śirītā*,
 he has ripened, I, 149, 2; *śrī-*
nishe, thou warmest, V, 6, 9.
 śrī, splendour, beauty, glory, I, 72,
 10^a, &c.; *śrīyam vāsānāb*, II,
 10, 1; *śrīyé*, gloriously, IV, 5, 15.
 śru, to hear: *śrudhi*, I, 26, 5, &c.;
śrúvat (conj. *śrúvat*), it melts
 away, I, 127, 3⁴; *śrōshamānāb*,
 hearing, III, 8, 10;—*vī śrin-*
vire, they are renowned, IV,
 8, 6.
 śrúti, glory, II, 2, 7.
 śrut-karna, with attentive ears, I, 44,
 13; 45, 7.
 śrútya, glorious, I, 36, 12.
 śrushī, obedience, I, 67, 1^a; III, 9,
 8;—hearing, readiness to hear,
 I, 69, 7; II, 3, 9; 9, 4.
 śrushī-vān, ready to listen, hearing,
 I, 45, 2; III, 27, 2;—obedient,
 I, 127, 9.
 śreni-śās, in rows, III, 8, 9.
 śvas, to hiss: *śvasīti ap-sū*, I, 65, 9;
 —*abhi-śvasān*, panting, I, 140,
 5;—*āśushānāb*, aspiring after, I,
 147, 1; IV, 2, 14; 16.
 śvasīvat, mightily breathing, I, 140,
 10.
 śvâtrâ, power (?), I, 31, 4².
 śvântâ? I, 145, 4⁴.
 śvetâ, white (horse?), I, 66, 6¹;—
śvetām gagānām, who had been
 born white (Agni), III, 1, 4.
 Svaitreyâ, V, 19, 3¹.
 samyât-vīra, with a succession of
 valiant men, II, 4, 8.
 samvatsarâ, year: *samvatsaré*, after
 a year, I, 140, 2³.
 sâkman, company: *sâkman* (loc.), I,
 31, 6⁴.
 sa-kshîta, dwelling together, I, 140, 3.
 sâkhi, friend, I, 31, 1; 75, 4; III,
 9, 1¹; *sâkhâ sâkhye*, I, 26, 3;
 III, 18, 1; *sâkhâ sâkhyub* *ni-*
mîshi rākshamānāb, I, 72, 5⁴;
gūhâ sâkhi-bhih, III, 1, 9³.

- sakhi-yāt, wishing to be a friend, I, 128, 1.
 sakhyā, friendship, I, 26, 5; 71, 10; 94, 1-14; III, 9, 3; IV, 10, 8.
 sagh, to sustain : āsaghnob, I, 31, 3.
 sak (sark), to be united with, accompany : sātāsva nab, stay with us, I, 1, 9; sakase, II, 1, 3; sakire, II, 1, 13;—to attend, worship : sakante, I, 59, 6; sākanta, I, 73, 4; sakantām, I, 98, 3;—to follow : sakante, I, 60, 2; sisakshi, I, 73, 8;—to hold, cling, adhere : sisakti, I, 66, 2; sakate (krātvā), I, 145, 2; sākante, III, 13, 2; saskata, III, 16, 2;—sakanta, they have attained, V, 17, 5¹;—ānu sakate vartanāb, she follows her ways, I, 140, 9²;—āpa sakire, they turn away to encounter, V, 20, 2;—abhi sakante, go towards, I, 71, 7¹;—ā sātayam, whom men should attach to themselves, I, 140, 3.
 sātānas, graciously united, I, 127, 11.
 sātā, together with : sātā sāt, being attached, I, 71, 4;—III, 12, 2; IV, 5, 10.
 sa-gātyā, relationship, II, 1, 5².
 sa-gītvān : sa-gītvānā, united conquerors, III, 12, 4.
 sa-gūṣh, united with : sa-gūṣh, I, 44, 2; 14.
 sa-gōṣha, unanimous, concordant, I, 65, 2; 72, 6.
 sa-gōṣhas, in concord with, unanimous, III, 4, 8; 8, 8; 20, 1; 22, 4; IV, 5, 1; V, 4, 4; 21, 3; 23, 3.
 sāmgāṭa-rūpa, of familiar form, I, 69, 9.
 sāttri, sitting down, III, 17, 5.
 sāt-pati, lord of beings, II, 1, 4;—a good lord, V, 25, 6; 27, 1.
 satyā, true, truthful, I, 1, 5; 73, 2; 79, 1; 98, 3; kṛinvān satyā, I, 70, 8; satyām, true (fulfilment), IV, 1, 18;—satyām, verily, I, 1, 6;—efficacious, I, 67, 5;—real, IV, 1, 10.
 satyā-gīrvāhas, truly carried by prayers as by a vehicle, I, 127, 8¹.
 satyā-tara, highly truthful, I, 76, 5; III, 4, 10.
 satyā-tāti, truth, IV, 4, 14.
 satyā-dharman, whose ordinances are true, I, 12, 7.
 satyā-manman, truthful, I, 73, 2.
 satya-yāg, truly sacrificing, IV, 3, 1.
 satya-vāk, truth-speaking, III, 26, 9.
 satyā-rushma, truly strong, I, 59, 4; IV, 11, 4.
 satrā, altogether, I, 71, 9;—together : satrā kākṛānāb, I, 72, 1.
 satrā-sāha, always conquering, I, 79, 7.
 sātvan, warrior, I, 140, 9; IV, 13, 2³.
 sad, to sit : ūpa sīdan, they reverentially approached, I, 72, 5;—pari-sādantab, besieging, IV, 2, 17⁴.
 sādana, (priestly) seat, I, 31, 17;—seat, abode, I, 95, 8; 96, 7.
 sa-drīś, of like appearance, I, 94, 7.
 sādman, seat, I, 67, 10; the (sacrificial) seat, I, 73, 1; IV, 1, 8; 9, 3; V, 23, 3.
 sadyāb-ārtha, immediately successful, I, 60, 1.
 sadyās, instantly, I, 27, 6, &c.; quickly, I, 71, 9¹.
 sadhani-tvā, companionship, IV, 1, 9.
 sa-dhanī, companion : sa-dhanyāb, IV, 4, 14.
 sadha-māḍ, rejoicing, V, 20, 4.
 sadha-māḍya, sharing in rejoicings, IV, 3, 4.
 sadhā-stuti, song of praise, V, 18, 5¹.
 sadhā-stha, abode, II, 9, 3; III, 6, 4; 7, 4; 12, 8; 23, 1; 25, 5; apām sadhā-sthe, I, 149, 4; II, 4, 2; trī sadhā-ssthā, III, 20, 2.
 sadhryāñk, together, IV, 4, 12.
 san, to win : sanēma, I, 73, 5; 189, 8; sanishyān, sanishyāntab, desirous of winning, III, 2, 3¹; 4; 13, 2; sanishāmahe, III, 11, 9; sasa-vān, having obtained, III, 22, 1; sasa-vāmsab, successful, IV, 8, 6; sanishanta, they were successful, V, 12, 4;—see also sā.
 sāna, old, I, (27, 13¹); 95, 10; III, 1, 6; 20.
 sanakāt, from of old, III, 29, 14.
 sanātā, from of old, II, 3, 6; III, 3, 1.
 sanāya, ancient, III, 20, 4.
 sánara, united with strong men, I, 96, 8¹.
 sāna-ruta, old-renowned, III, 11, 4.

- sanâ-gû, inciting from old, I, 141, 5³.
 sanî, efficient, I, 27, 4;—sanî, gain:
 sanâye, I, 31, 8; sanîm gôb, the
 acquiring of the cow, III, 1,
 23; sanîm yaté, V, 27, 4.
 sánitri, a gainer, winner: sánitâ, I,
 27, 9; 36, 13; sanitûb, V, 12, 3.
 sâ-nî/a, dwelling in the same nest,
 I, 69, 6; 71, 1.
 sanutâr, far, V, 2, 4.
 sánemi, entirely, IV, 10, 7.
 santya (voc.), good, I, 36, 2; 45, 5;
 9; III, 21, 3.
 sap, to serve, worship: ritâ sâpantab,
 I, 67, 8; 68, 4; sapema, IV, 4,
 9; sapâmi, V, 12, 2; sâpâti
 (Pada: sab pâti), V, 12, 6¹;—
 to attach oneself: sapanta, V,
 3, 4.
 sapâtñi, the two wives, III, 1, 10³;
 6, 4.
 sapary, to worship, do service:
 saparyâti, I, 12, 8; saparyâmi
 prâyasâ, I, 58, 7³; saparyân, I,
 72, 3²; saparyâtab, I, 144, 4;
 saparyéma saparyâvab, II, 6, 3;
 saparyata, III, 9, 8; V, 14, 5;
 25, 4; asaparyan, III, 9, 9;
 saparyântab, V, 21, 3;—â sa-
 paryân, IV, 12, 2;—vi saparyan,
 I, 70, 10.
 saparyû, devoted servant, II, 6, 3.
 saptâ-gihva, seven-tongued, III, 6, 2³.
 saptâ-dhâtu, consisting of seven
 elements, IV, 5, 6².
 saptân, seven: saptâ guhvâb, I, 58,
 7; yahvîb, I, 71, 7; 72, 8¹; III,
 1, 4¹; rasmâyab, II, 5, 2¹; vâñîb,
 III, 1, 6¹; 7, 1¹; hotrâñi, III,
 4, 5²; priksâsab, III, 4, 7¹;
 viprâb, III, 7, 7; IV, 2, 15¹;
 hóttri-bhih, III, 10, 4¹; priyâsab,
 IV, 1, 12; dhâma-bhih, IV, 7,
 5¹; râtñâ, V, 1, 5;—trib saptâ,
 I, 72, 6¹; IV, 1, 16¹.
 saptâ-rañmi, having seven rays (or
 reins), I, 146, 1¹.
 saptâ-siva: saptâ-sivâsu, read: saptâ
 sivâsu, I, 141, 2³.
 saptâ-sirshan, seven-headed, III, 5, 5³.
 saptâ-hotri, the god of the seven
 Hotris, III, (10, 4¹); 29, 14.
 sâpti, racer: âtyam ná sâptim, III,
 22, 1¹.
 saprâthab-tama, most widely ex-
 tended, I, 45, 7²; most widely-
 sounding, I, 75, 1¹; most wide-
 reaching, I, 94, 13.
 sa-prâthas, widely extended: járma
 sa-prâthab, a big shelter, I, 142,
 5;—V, 13, 4.
 sabab-dûgha, juice-yielding, III, 6, 4⁴.
 sâbandhu, bound in kinship, III, 1,
 10.
 sa-bâdh, pressing: sa-bâdhab ā ka-
 kruh, III, 27, 6¹.
 sa-bâdhas, urgent, V, 10, 6.
 sabhâ-vat, with (brilliant) assemblies,
 IV, 2, 5.
 sám, together: yajâsab sám hí pûr-
 vîb, many glorious ones have
 come together, III, 1, 11³.
 sama, every, V, 24, 3.
 samád, contest: tveshâb samât-su, I,
 66, 6; 70, 11.
 sâ-manas, one-minded, V, 3, 2.
 samanâ, alike, IV, 5, 7.
 sám-antam, in the neighbourhood
 of, V, 1, 11.
 sa-manyû, concordant, IV, 1, 1.
 samâyâ, through the midst, I, 73, 6.
 sa-maryâ, assembly, III, 8, 5;—con-
 test, V, 3, 6.
 samânâ, companion, I, 69, 8¹;—
 common, I, 127, 8, &c.; samâ-
 nám ártam, I, 144, 3².
 sám-iti, meeting, I, 95, 8.
 sam-ithâ, battle, I, 73, 5;—assembly,
 III, 1, 12.
 sam-îdh, log of wood, fuel, I, 95, 11;
 II, 6, 1; III, 1, 2; 10, 3; IV,
 4, 15; V, 1, 1; 4, 4; 6, 4²;
 tistrâb sam-îdhab, III, 2, 9;
 samît-samit, log by log, III,
 4, 1¹.
 samudrá, ocean, I, 71, 7; 95, 3¹.
 sám-riti, battle, I, 31, 6;—onslaught,
 I, 127, 3³; V, 7, 2¹.
 sám-okas, dwelling together, I, 144, 4.
 sam-gâmana, assembler, I, 96, 6.
 sám-tarutra, victorious, III, 1, 19.
 sam-drîs, the shine (of the sun), I,
 66, 1;—appearance, aspect, II,
 1, 12; III, 5, 2; IV, 1, 6;
 6, 6.
 sám-drîshtri, aspect, I, 144, 7; II, 4,
 4; IV, 10, 5.
 sam-bhûga, enjoyment, (II, 1, 4¹).
 sám-misla, united, III, 26, 4².
 samyâñk, turned towards each other:
 samîkñî íti sam-îkñî, I, 69, 1; 96,
 5²; II, 3, 6; III, 1, 7¹;—united:

- sam-*īkīb*, III, 29, 13; sam-*yāñkam*, V, 7, 1.
 sam-yāt: *kshāpab* sam-yātab, on continuous nights, II, 2, 2³.
 sam-rāg, the Sovereign, I, 188, 5; III, 10, 1.
 sam-rāgat, king: sam-rāgantam, I, 27, 1.
 sam-vāt, space, V, 15, 3.
 sam-sād, companionship, I, 94, 1;—assembly, IV, 1, 8.
 sam-stīr, laid together: sam-stīrab *vi-stīrab*, I, 140, 7¹.
 sam-sthā, abode, V, 3, 8.
 sam-hāt, a compact mass, III, 1, 7.
 sayāvan, accompanying, I, 44, 13.
 sā-yoni, having the same origin, III, 1, 6.
 sarany, to speed: saranyān, III, 1, 19.
 sa-rātham, on one chariot with, I, 71, 6³; III, 4, 11; 6, 9; V, 11, 2.
 Sarāmā, I, 72, 8.
 Sārasvatī, N. of a goddess, I, 13, 9¹; 142, 9; 188, 8; II, 1, 11¹, 2; 3, 8; III, 4, 8; V, 5, 8;—N. of a river, III, 23, 4.
 sārīman, swift course, III, 29, 11².
 sārga, rush: *vātasya sārgab*, III, 29, 11²;—the letting loose, IV, 3, 12.
 sārga-prataкта, urged forward, I, 65, 6.
 sarpīb-āsuti, drinking butter, II, 7, 6; V, 7, 9; 21, 2.
 sarpīs, butter, I, 127, 1; V, 6, 9.
 sarvā-tāti, health and wealth, I, 94, 15.
 sāvana, libation, III, 1, 20; *trītiye sāvane*, III, 28, 5; *mādhyaṇdine sāvane*, III, 28, 4.
 sā-vayas, of the same age, I, 144, 3¹; 4.
 Savitrī, I, 36, 13; 44, 8; 73, 2; 95, 7¹; II, 1, 7; III, 20, 5; IV, 6, 2; 13, 2; 14, 2.
sak, see *sak*.
 saśkāt, hindrance, III, 9, 4¹.
 sasā, herbs, III, 5, 6²; IV, 5, 7¹; 7, 7¹; V, 21, 4².
 sasahl, victorious, III, 16, 4.
 sāsni, victorious, III, 15, 5.
 sa-srūt, flowing, I, 141, 1.
 sah, to overcome, be victorious: *sahvān*, III, 11, 6; *sāhasva*, III, 24, 1; *āsahanta*, III, 29, 9; *sasāha*, V, 25, 6;—*abhi sasāhat*, it may prevail, V, 23, 1;—*nib-sāhamānab*, conquering, I, 127, 3;—*pra-sākshat*, victorious, IV, 12, 1.
 sahab-*krīta*, produced by strength, I, 45, 9; III, 27, 10; V, 8, 1.
 sahab-gā, strength-begotten, I, 58, 1.
 sahab-*vrīdh*, augments of strength, I, 36, 2; III, 10, 9.
 sāhan-tama, mightiest, I, 127, 9.
 sahintya, conqueror, I, 27, 8.
 sāhamāna, victorious, IV, 6, 10.
 sāhas, strength: *sahasab yaho iti*, I, 26, 10¹; 74, 5¹; 79, 4; *sūno iti sahasab*, I, 58, 8; 127, 1; 143, 1; III, 1, 8; 11, 4; 24, 3; 25, 5; 28, 3; 5; IV, 2, 2; 11, 6; V, 3, 9; 4, 8; *sāhasā gāya-mānab*, I, 96, 1¹; *sāhasab yātab gāni*, I, 141, 1; *sahasab yuvan*, O young (son) of strength, I, 141, 10; *sāhasab putrāb*, II, 7, 6; III, 14, 1; 4; 6; 16, 5; 18, 4; V, 3, 1; 6; 4, 6; 11, 6;—*sāhab*, (Agni our) strength, I, 36, 18;—*sāhasā*, strongly, I, 98, 2;—*might, power*, I, 127, 9; 10; V, 1, 8; *devāsya sāhasā*, V, 3, 10; *abhi-māti sāhab dadhē*, V, 23, 4¹;—*violence*, V, 12, 2.
 sahasānā, mighty, strong, I, 189, 8; II, 10, 6; V, 25, 9.
 sāhasā-vat, mighty, strong, I, 189, 5; III, 1, 22; V, 20, 4.
 sahasin, strong, IV, 11, 1.
 sahasya, strong, I, 147, 5; II, 2, 11; V, 22, 4.
 sahasra, thousand: *sahasrāni jāṭā dāra*, II, 1, 8; *sahasrāt yūpāt*, V, 2, 7; *darā-bhiḥ sahasraib*, V, 27, 1³.
 sahasra-akshā, thousand-eyed, I, 79, 12.
 sahasra-git, conqueror of thousand-fold wealth, I, 188, 1; V, 26, 6.
 sahasram-bharā, bringing thousand-fold gain, II, 9, 1.
 sahasra-retas, with thousandfold sperm, IV, 5, 3.
 sahasra-vat, thousandfold, III, 13, 7.
 sahasra-valsa, with a thousand branches, III, 8, 11.
 sahasra-vira, blessing with a thousand men, I, 188, 4¹.
 sahasra-*śrīga*, with a thousand horns, V, 1, 8.

- sahasra-sā, a winner of thousandfold bliss, I, 188, 3.
 sahasra-sātama, the greatest winner of thousandfold wealth, III, 13, 6.
 sabasrin, thousandfold, I, 31, 10; 188, 2; II, 2, 7.
 sāhasvat, mighty, strong, I, 97, 5; 127, 10; 189, 4; III, 14, 2; 4; V, 7, 1; 9, 7; 23, 2.
 sāhīyas, mightier, I, 71, 4.
 sāhūti, joint invocation, I, 45, 10.
 sahvāt, strong, I, 58, 5.
 sâ: sîsāsantab, wishing to acquire, I, 146, 4.
 sâ: ānava-syantab ārtham, never losing their object, IV, 13, 3;—
 vî syatu, may he pour forth, I, 142, 10; pra-gām vî syatu, may he deliver a son, II, 3, 9; vî syasva, send forth, III, 4, 9; vî sâhi, disclose, IV, 11, 2.
 sâtî, acquirement (of wealth), success, I, 36, 17; 143, 6; V, 5, 4; 9, 7.
 sātu, womb, mother (?), IV, 6, 7¹.
 sâdh, to prosper (intr.): sâdhati, I, 94, 2;—sâdhate matib, the prayer goes straight to him, I, 141, 1²; sâdhan, straightway, III, 1, 17;—to prosper (tr.), further: sâdhāya, I, 94, 3; pra-tarām sâdhaya, I, 94, 4; sâdhan, I, 96, 1;—to accomplish, perform: sâdhayantî dhīyam, II, 3, 8; sâdhan, III, 1, 18; 5, 3.
 sâdhat-ishî, accomplishing the oblations, III, 2, 5; 3, 6.
 sâdhana, performer: yagñāsya (vidāthasya) sâdhanam, I, 44, 11; III, 3, 3; 27, 2; 8;—giver, V, 20, 3.
 sâdhishîba, best, I, 58, 1.
 sâdhû, good, I, 67, 2;—going straight (to his aim), I, 70, 11; straight-forward, I, 77, 3; III, 18, 1;—real, IV, 10, 2; efficacious, V, 1, 7.
 sâdhu-yâ, straightway, V, 11, 4.
 sânasî, successful, winning (booty), I, 75, 2; IV, 15, 6.
 sânu, ridge, I, 128, 3; divāb nâ sânu, I, 58, 2; ādhi sânushu trishû, II, 3, 7;—surface, I, 146, 2;—top, III, 5, 3.
 sâman, song: ritāsya sâman, I, 147, 1⁴;—the Sâman, IV, 5, 3.
 sām-rāgya, sovereignty, I, 141, 13.
 sārathi, charioteer (Agni), I, 144, 3⁴.
 sârasvatâ, beings belonging to Sarasvatî, III, 4, 8.
 Sâha-devyâ, Sahadeva's son, IV, 15, 7-10.
 simhâ, lion, I, 95, 5; III, 9, 4; 11; 26, 5; V, 15, 3.
 sîk, wing (of an army): sîkau, I, 95, 7².
 si(ñ)k: nî-siktam, poured down, I, 71, 8;—pâri-sikta, poured, IV, 1, 19.
 sitâ, bound: padî sitām, IV, 12, 6.
 sidh, to scare away: sedhati, I, 79, 12.
 sidhrâ, successful, I, 142, 8; effective, V, 13, 2.
 sîndhu, river, stream, I, 27, 6; 72, 10; 73, 6; 97, 8; 99, 1; 143, 3; 146, 4³; III, 5, 4; V, 4, 9; gāmib sîndhûnâm, I, 65, 7; pl., the Rivers, I, 140, 13;—the river Sindhu, I, 44, 12¹; 94, 16; 95, 11; 98, 3; V, 11, 5; sîndhub nâ kshôdab, I, 65, 6¹; 10.
 simâ, self, I, 95, 7³; 145, 2¹.
 sîv, see syû.
 su, to bear. See sû.
 su, to press Soma: sunvatâb, I, 94, 8; sunavâma, I, 99, 1; sunvaté, I, 141, 10; V, 26, 5; sômam sutâm, III, 22, 1.
 su-agnî, possessed of a good Agni (fire): su-agnâyab, I, 26, 7; 8 (bis).
 su-ânâ, fleet, IV, 6, 9.
 su-adhvarâ, best performer of worship, I, 44, 8; 127, 1; II, 2, 8; III, 2, 8; 9, 8; V, 9, 3; 28, 5;—receiving good sacrifices, I, 45, 1¹;—yagñé su-adhvaré, at the decorous service of the sacrifice, I, 142, 5;—splendid worship, III, 6, 6; 29, 12; V, 17, 1.
 su-anîka, with beautiful face, II, 1, 8; IV, 6, 6.
 su-apatyâ, with good offspring, I, 72, 9³; II, 2, 12; 4, 8; 9, 5;—blessed with offspring, III, 3, 7; consisting in offspring, III, 16, 1;—good offspring, III, 19, 3.
 su-âpas, good worker, IV, 2, 19; V, 2, 11.
 su-apasyâ, great skill, III, 3, 11.

su-apâka, most skilful, IV, 3, 2³.
 su-arâks, endowed with beautiful light, II, 3, 2.
 su-ârtha, pursuing a good aim, I, 95, 1;—well-employed, I, 141, 11.
 su-âvas, giving good help, V, 8, 2.
 su-ârva, with good horses, IV, 2, 4;—rich in horses, IV, 4, 8; 10.
 su-ârva, abundance in horses, II, 1, 5; III, 26, 3.
 su-âdhî, of a good mind, kind, well-wishing, I, 67, 2; 70, 4²; 71, 8;—with good intentions, I, 72, 8; IV, 3, 4;—full of pious thoughts, III, 8, 4;—longing, V, 14, 6.
 su-âbhû, truly helpful: râyé su-âbhûvam, V, 6, 3¹.
 su-âsa, whose mouth is beautiful, IV, 6, 8.
 sú-âhuta, best receiver of offerings, I, 44, 4; 6; III, 27, 5.
 su-uktâ, well-spoken (prayer), I, 36, 1; 70, 5; II, 6, 2.
 su-upâyanâ, easy of access, I, 1, 9.
 su-kârman, well performing the acts (of worship), IV, 2, 17.
 su-kîrtî, beautiful praise, I, 60, 3;—glory, V, 10, 4.
 su-krit, well-doing: su-krite sukrî-taraâ, I, 31, 4; righteous, I, 128, 6; who has done good deeds, I, 147, 3²; virtuous, well-doer, IV, 13, 1; V, 4, 8; 11.
 su-kritâ, good works, III, 29, 8.
 su-keîû, bright, III, 7, 10.
 su-krâtu, highly wise, I, 12, 1; 128, 4; III, 1, 22; IV, 4, 11; V, 11, 2; 20, 4; 25, 9;—full of good-will, I, 141, 11; 144, 7; III, 3, 7.
 sukratu-yâ, high wisdom, I, 31, 3.
 su-kshîtî, with fine dwellings, V, 6, 8.
 su-kshetriyâ, desire for rich fields, I, 97, 2.
 su-khâ, easy-going, V, 5, 3.
 sukhâ-tama, easy-moving: sukhâ-tame (râthe), I, 13, 4.
 su-gâ, a good path, I, 94, 9;—going well, I, 94, 11.
 sugâtu-yâ, desire for a free path, I, 97, 2.
 su-gârhapatyâ, with a good household, V, 4, 2¹.
 su-ândrâ, resplendent, I, 74, 6; IV, 2, 19; V, 6, 5; 9.

su-keîunâ, through thy kindness, I, 79, 9¹; benignantly, I, 127, 11.
 sú-gâta, well born, I, 65, 4; 72, 3¹; II, 1, 15; 2, 11; 6, 2; III, 15, 2; 23, 3; V, 6, 2; 21, 2.
 su-gihvâ, with beautiful tongue(s), I, 13, 8; 142, 4.
 su-gûrni, glowing, IV, 6, 3.
 su-gyôti, rich in light, III, 20, 1.
 sutâ, the pressed (Soma), III, 12, 1; 2.
 sutâ-vat, rich in pressed (Soma), III, 25, 4.
 sutâ-soma, having pressed Soma, I, 44, 8; 45, 8; 142, 1; IV, 2, 13.
 su-tûka, quick, I, 149, 5.
 su-dâmsas, endowed with wonderful power, II, 2, 3.
 su-dâksha, highly dexterous, II, 9, 1; III, 4, 9; 23, 2; V, 11, 1.
 sudârja-tara, more visible, I, 127, 5².
 su-dânu, giving good rain, I, 44, 14; 45, 10; 141, 9; III, 26, 1; 5; 29, 7;—blessed with good rain, IV, 4, 7.
 su-dâvan, good giver, I, 76, 3.
 su-dîna, auspicious day, IV, 4, 6; 7.
 sudîna-tvâ, auspiciousness of days, III, 8, 5; sudîna-tvé âhnâm, III, 23, 4.
 su-dîditi, with fine splendour, III, 9, 1².
 su-dîti, resplendent, III, 2, 13; 17, 4; 27, 10; V, 25, 2;—glorious splendour, V, 8, 4.
 sudûgha, flowing with plenty, II, 3, 6; su-dûghâb usrâb, IV, 1, 13.
 su-drîs, full of beauty, III, 17, 4; V, 3, 4¹.
 su-drîsika, beautiful to behold, V, 4, 2.
 sudrîsika-rûpa, with his shape beautiful to behold, IV, 5, 15.
 su-devâ, a friend of the gods, I, 74, 5.
 su-dôgha, rich in milk, III, 15, 6.
 su-dyût, brilliant, I, 140, 1; 143, 3.
 su-dyumnâ, splendid, III, 19, 2.
 su-dyôtman, brilliant, I, 141, 12; II, 4, 1.
 su-dravînas, possessor of beautiful wealth, I, 94, 15.
 sú-dhita, well-composed (prayer), I, 140, 11;—blissful gift, III, 11, 8;—well-preserved, III, 23, 1; lying safe, III, 29, 2;—well-ordered, IV, 2, 10;—well-placed,

- IV, 6, 3; well-established, IV, 6, 7³; V, 3, 2.
 su-dhī, wise, IV, 2, 14.
 su-dhūr, well-harnessed: rāyāb su-dhūrāb, I, 73, 10¹; hārī īti su-dhūrā, well-yoked, V, 27, 2.
 sunib-māth, skilful rubbing, III, 29, 12.
 su-nidhā, skilful establishing, III, 29, 12.
 su-nīthā, the best leader, II, 8, 2; III, 8, 8.
 su-pātha, good path, I, 189, 1.
 su-parā, beautifully-winged, I, 79, 2.
 su-pānī, with graceful hands, I, 71, 9².
 su-putrā, with noble sons, III, 4, 11.
 sú-pūta, well-clarified, V, 12, 1.
 su-péśas, wearing beautiful ornaments, I, 13, 7; 142, 7¹; 188, 6.
 supra-ayanā, easily passable, II, 3, 5; V, 5, 5.
 supra-avyā, ready, I, 60, 1.
 su-prātika, whose face is beautiful, I, 94, 7; 143, 3; III, 29, 5; V, 5, 6.
 su-prātūrti, gloriously advancing, III, 9, 1.
 su-prānīti, a good guide, I, 73, 1; III, 1, 16; 15, 4; IV, 2, 13.
 su-prayās, receiver of good offerings, II, 2, 1; 4, 1.
 su-bāndhu, well-allied, III, 1, 3.
 su-barhīs, possessor of good sacrificial grass, I, 74, 5.
 su-bhāga, blessed, I, 36, 6; III, 1, 4; 13; 9, 1²; 16, 6; 18, 5; IV, 1, 6; 4, 7; V, 8, 3.
 su-bhāra, rich in gain, II, 3, 4; 9.
 sú-bhrīta, well kept, II, 1, 12.
 sú-makha, martial, IV, 3, 7; 14¹.
 su-māt, together, I, 142, 7²;—see sumāt-yūtha.
 su-matī, favour, I, 31, 18, &c.; III, 4, 1²; V, 27, 3¹; kindness: su-matī, IV, 1, 2².
 sumāt-yūtha, together with the herd: sumāt-yūtham (conj. for sumāt yūthām), V, 2, 4¹.
 sumāt-ratha, on his chariot, III, 3, 9.
 su-mānas, gracious, kind-hearted, I, 36, 2, &c.;—joyous, IV, 4, 9.
 su-mānman, rich in good thoughts, III, 2, 12.
 su-mahas, very great, IV, 11, 2.
 sú-miti, skilful erection, III, 8, 3.
 su-mrīṣikā, merciful, IV, 1, 20; 3, 3.
 su-méka, well-established, I, 146, 3¹; III, 6, 10²; 15, 5³; IV, 6, 3.
 su-medhās, wise, II, 3, 1; III, 15, 5.
 sumná, blessing, III, 2, 5; 3, 3;—favour, grace, V, 3, 10; 24, 4;—pleasant, III, 14, 4.
 sumna-yú, desirous of favour, I, 79, 10; III, 27, 1; V, 8, 7.
 su-yág, excellent sacrificer, V, 8, 3.
 su-yagñā, skilled in sacrifice, III, 17, 1.
 su-yāma, well-manageable, III, 7, 3; (4²); V, 28, 3¹.
 su-yāvasa, good pasture: suyāvasā-iva, conj. for svāsya-iva, II, 4, 4¹.
 su-yāmā, easily directing, III, 7, 9¹.
 su-yúg, well-yoked, IV, 14, 3.
 su-rāna, joyous, III, 3, 9; 29, 14.
 su-rātha, with good chariot: su-rāthasya (conj. su-ratha asya), III, 14, 7¹;—IV, 2, 4;—rich in chariots, IV, 4, 8.
 surabhī, sweet-smelling, V, 1, 6.
 su-rādhas, rich in wealth, IV, 2, 4; 5, 4.
 su-rukma, adorned with gold, I, 188, 6.
 su-rút, with beautiful splendour, II, 2, 4; III, 2, 5; 7, 5; 15, 6; IV, 2, 17.
 su-rétas, fertile, III, 1, 16.
 su-várkas, full of fine splendour, I, 95, 1.
 su-vák, adorned with fine speech, III, 1, 19;—well-spoken, III, 7, 10.
 su-vākas, fine-voiced, I, 188, 7.
 su-vāsas, well-clothed, III, 8, 4; IV, 3, 2.
 suvitā, welfare, I, 141, 12; 189, 3; II, 2, 6; III, 2, 13; IV, 14, 3; V, 11, 1.
 su-vidātra, bounteous, II, 1, 8; 9, 6.
 su-vīra, rich in heroes, in valiant men, I, 31, 10; II, 1, 16; 3, 4; 5; 4, 9; III, 29, 9;—giving valiant offspring, III, 8, 2.
 su-vīrya, abundance in heroes, bliss of valiant offspring, I, 36, 6; 17, &c.; I, 127, 11¹;—host of heroes, III, 16, 4.
 su-vrīktī, praised with beautiful praise, II, 4, 1¹;—beautiful prayer, or praise, III, 3, 9; V, 25, 3¹.
 su-véda, easily to be found, IV, 7, 6.

su-*jāmsa*, kind-spoken, I, 44, 6.
 su-*jārman*, well-protecting, III, 15, 1; V, 8, 2.
 su-*ṣastī*, best praise, III, 26, 6.
 su-*ṣipra*, strong-jawed, V, 22, 4².
 sū-*ṣiṣvi*, fine child, I, 65, 4.
 su-*ṣéva*, propitious, I, 27, 2; kind, gracious, II, 1, 9; III, 29, 5; IV, 4, 12; V, 15, 1.
 su-*śoka*, with pure splendour, I, 70, 1.
 su-*śrī*, in great beauty, III, 3, 5.
 sū-*samṣita*, well-sharpened, V, 19, 5.
 su-*sanitri*, best gainer, III, 18, 5.
 su-*samdris*, beautiful to behold, I, 143, 3.
 sū-*samidha*, well-kindled, I, 13, 1; V, 5, 1.
 su-*samīdh*, good fuel, V, 8, 7.
 su-*sū*, well-bearing, V, 7, 8.
 sū-*sūta*, well-born, II, 10, 3.
 sū-*stuta*, highly praised, V, 27, 2.
 su-*stutī*, rich in perfect praise, III, 19, 3.
 su-*hāva*, easy to invoke, readily hearing (our) call, I, 58, 6; III, 6, 8; 15, 1; IV, 1, 5.
 su-*havis*, offering good oblations, IV, 2, 4.
 su-*havyā*, giver of good oblations, I, 74, 5.
 su-*hiranyā*, rich in gold, IV, 4, 10.
 sū, to give birth: sūvāte *īti*, they give birth, V, 1, 4; —*āsūta*, V, 2, 2; 7, 8.
 sū, a progenitor, I, 146, 5.
 sūktā, see su-*uktā*.
 sūd, to further: sūdāyat, I, 71, 8; sūsūdab, I, 73, 8; —to shape: *āsūdayanta*, I, 72, 3; —to make ready: *susūdati*, I, 142, 11²; V, 5, 2; —*sūdayāti*, III, 4, 10; —*sūdaya*, accomplish, IV, 4, 14; —*sūdayāti* *prā*, may he make ready, II, 3, 10.
 sūnū, son, I, 1, 9, &c.; I, 59, 4¹; III, 1, 12²; sūno *īti* *sahasab*, I, 58, 8; 127, 1; III, 1, 8; 11, 4; *nityab* *sūnūb*, I, 66, 1.
 sūnu-*māt*, rich in sons, III, 24, 5.
 sūn-*rītā-vat*, rich in loveliness, I, 59, 7.
 sūra, Sun, I, 71, 9; 141, 13; 149, 3; III, 15, 2.
 sūrī, the rich man, liberal lord or patron, I, 31, 7, &c.; I, 73, 5¹; 141, 8².
 sūrya, the sun, or Sun, I, 59, 3; 98,

1; 146, 4⁴; III, 14, 4; IV, 1, 17; 13, 1-4; 14, 2; V, 1, 4; 4, 4; *kāranam* *sūryasya*, III, 5, 5; *rokanē* *sūryasya*, III, 22, 3; *divī* *sūryam-iva* *agāram*, V, 27, 6.
sri, to run: *sasrānāb*, I, 149, 2; *sasrivāmsam-iva*, III, 9, 5; —*prā* *sarsrāte* *īti*, they go forth, III, 7, 1; *prā* *sirsrate*, they stream forward, V, 1, 1; *pra-sārsrānasya*, advancing, V, 12, 6; —*vī* *sasruḥ*, they have broken through with their floods, I, 73, 6.
srig, to let loose: *sēnā-iva* *srishṭā*, like an army that is sent forward, I, 66, 7; 143, 5¹; *srigāt* *didyūm* *asmai*, he shot an arrow at him, I, 71, 5; *srishṭāb*, I, 72, 10; —*āva* *sriga*, let go, I, 13, 11; *ava-srigān*, letting go (the sacrificial food to the gods), I, 142, 11; II, 3, 10; *mā* *āva* *srigab*, do not deliver, I, 189, 5; —*ūpa* *sriga*, yield up, I, 188, 10; *upa-srigānti*, they pour out, II, 1, 16; —*vī* *srigā*, emit, I, 36, 9; —*sām* *nab* *sriga*, let us be united, I, 31, 18; III, 16, 6.
Srīṅgaya, son of Devavāta, IV, 15, 4¹.
srīni, sickle: *srīnyā*, I, 58, 4².
sriprā, mighty (?), III, 18, 5¹.
sriprā-dānu, bestower of mighty rain (?), I, 96, 3².
sēnā, army, I, 66, 7; *sēnā-iva* *srishṭā*, I, 143, 5¹.
sōtri, presser (of Soma), IV, 3, 3.
sōma, Soma (juice), I, 44, 14; 45, 10; 99, 1¹; III, 12, 3; 22, 1; 29, 16; *sōmasya* *tavāsam*, III, 1, 1¹; *sōmāb*, IV, 14, 4; V, 27, 5¹; —*Soma*, the god, I, 65, 10; II, 8, 6.
sōma-āhuta, fed with Soma, I, 94, 14.
Sōmaka, Sahadeva's son, IV, 15, 9.
sōma-pati, lord of Soma (Indra), I, 76, 3.
sōma-piti, drinking of Soma: *sōma-pitaye*, I, 44, 9.
soma-péya, drink of Soma, I, 45, 9; III, 25, 4.
somyā, one who offers Soma, I, 31, 16.
saūbhaga, prosperity, delight, happiness, I, 36, 17; III, 8, 2; 3; 11; 15, 4; 16, 1; V, 28, 3.

- saubhaga-tvá, happiness, I, 94, 16.
 saumanasá, graciousness, I, 76, 2 ;
 kindness, III, 1, 21.
 skambhá, pillar, IV, 13, 5.
 stan, to thunder : stanáyan, I, 58, 2 ;
 140, 5 ; stanáyanti abhrá, I, 79,
 2 ; prá stanayanti, IV, 10, 4.
 stabhu-yámāna, firmly fixed, III,
 7, 4.
 sta(m)bh, to uphold : tastāmbha, I,
 67, 5 ;—út astambhī, he has
 upheld, III, 5, 10 ;—úpa stabhā-
 yat, he supports, IV, 5, 1 ;
 stabhāyat úpa dyām, he has
 reared ... up to the sky, IV, 6, 2.
 stāyam, stealthily : úpa stāyam karati,
 conj., (I, 145, 4³).
 stu, to praise : stāvānab, praised, I,
 12, 11 ; 31, 8, &c.
 stubh : pra-stubhānāb, incited by
 shouting, IV, 3, 12.
 stúbhvan, uttering (sacred) shouts,
 I, 66, 4.
 stri, to strew : strimīta, I, 13, 5 ;
 strinānāsab barhīb, I, 142, 5.
 strī, star : pipēra nākam strībhib, I,
 68, 10 ; dyaúb ná strī-bhib, II,
 2, 5 ; IV, 7, 3.
 stená, thief, V, 3, 11.
 stoká, drop, III, 21, 1-5.
 stotrí, praiser, I, 58, 8 ; II, 1, 16 ;
 III, 5, 2.
 stóma, praise, song of praise, I, 12,
 12, &c. ; stómaib (conj. stó-
 mam), IV, 10, 1⁸.
 stómavāhas, (I, 127, 8¹).
 sthā, to stand : ūrdhvāb tīshība, I,
 36, 13 ;—abhī tīshība, set thy
 foot on, V, 28, 3 ;—ā tasthūb,
 they have assumed, I, 72, 9² ;—
 úpa sthāt, he has approached,
 I, 68, 1 ; see upa-sthāyam ;—
 prá-sthītā, ready, III, 4, 4³ ;—
 abhī prá asthāt, he gains ad-
 vantage, I, 74, 8¹ ;—with ví,
 to spread : ví tīshībate, I, 58, 4 ;
 ví tasthe, I, 72, 9 ; ví ásthāt, I,
 65, 8 ; 141, 7 ; ví ásthiran, they
 are scattered, I, 94, 11 ; ví
 tīshībase, V, 8, 7.
 sthātú, what stands : sthātúb kará-
 tham, what is movable and im-
 movable, I, 58, 5² ; 68, 1² ; 70,
 7² ; (72, 6²).
 sthātri, that which stands : sthātām
 karáthām, I, 70, 3 ; what re-
 mains steadfast : sthāt-rñ, I,
 72, 6².
 sthirá, solid : sthirá kit ánnā, IV,
 7, 10.
 sthūnā, a column : sthūnā-iva upa-
 mīt, I, 59, 1⁸.
 snīhiti ? I, 74, 2².
 snēhiti, (I, 74, 2²).
 spár, spy, IV, 4, 3 ;—observer :
 spājam vísvasya gágatab, IV,
 13, 3.
 spārhá, desirable, lovely, I, 31, 14 ;
 II, 1, 12 ; IV, 1, 6 ; 7 ; 12.
 spri : aspar íty aspaḥ, thou hast
 freed, V, 15, 5 ;—áva spridhi,
 protect, V, 3, 9.
 spris, to touch : sprisanti, I, 36, 3.
 sprīhayát-vara, having the appear-
 ance of one eagerly striving, II,
 10, 5.
 sphātī, increase, I, 188, 9.
 sphur, to sparkle : práti sphura, IV,
 3, 14.
 smát-ūdhni, with full udders, I, 73, 6.
 smi, to smile, laugh : smāyamānābhib,
 I, 79, 2⁴ ; smāyamānab (dyaúb),
 II, 4, 6³ ; smayete íti, III,
 4, 6.
 syū : syūtām, well-stitched, I, 31, 15.
 syona-krít, making comfortable, I,
 31, 15.
 syona-śī, comfortably resting, I,
 73, 1².
 sravát, river : sravátasaptá yāhvīb,
 I, 71, 7.
 sravátha, streaming, III, 1, 7.
 sridh : ásrēdhantaḥ, without fail,
 III, 29, 9.
 srídth, failure, I, 36, 7 ; III, 9, 4 ;
 10, 7.
 sru, to flow : srúvat (conj. for srú-
 vat), it melts away, I, 127, 3⁴.
 srúk, sacrificial ladle, I, 144, 1 ; V,
 14, 3 ; 21, 2.
 srótas, stream, I, 95, 10¹.
 svá : tanvāb krinvata svāb, I, 72, 5² ;
 svāsyā-iva, conj. suyávasā-iva,
 II, 4, 4¹.
 svab-drīś, of sun-like aspect, I, 44,
 9 ; III, 2, 14 ; V, 26, 2.
 svāb-nara, the solar hero, II, 2, 1 ;—
 realm of the Sun, V, 18, 4.
 svāb-vat, together with the sun, I,
 59, 4 ; V, 2, 11.
 svab-víd, finding the sun, I, 96, 4 ;
 III, 3, 5 ; 10 ; 26, 1.

svá-gúrta, delightful by their own nature, I, 140, 13.
 svá-geṇya, noble by his own nature, V, 7, 5.
 svá-tavat, self-strong, IV, 2, 6.
 svad, to taste : svadante, II, 1, 14 ; asvadayat, II, 4, 7 ;—to make relishable, savoury : sisvadat, I, 188, 10 ; svada, III, 14, 7.
 svá-dharman, following his own ordinances, III, 21, 2.
 svadhā, inherent power : svadhābhiḥ, by one's self, by the power of his own nature, I, 95, 4 ; III, 26, 8 ; svadhāyā, according to their wont, II, 3, 8 ; III, 4, 7 ; by himself, III, 17, 5 ; by his own power, IV, 13, 5 ;—svadhāb adhayat, he drank the draughts, I, 144, 2^a.
 svadhā-vat, self-dependent, I, 36, 12 ; 144, 7 ; 147, 2 ; III, 20, 3 ; IV, 5, 2 ; 10, 6 ; 12, 3 ; V, 3, 2 ; 5 ; moving according to one's wont, I, 95, 1^a ; moving by his own strength, I, 95, 4.
 svá-dhiti, axe, III, 2, 10 ; 8, 6 ; 11 ; V, 7, 8¹.
 svan, to resound : svāñt, II, 4, 6.
 svanā, noise, I, 94, 11.
 sva-patyā, a man's own dominion : sva-patyāni (conj. for su-apatyāni), I, 72, 9^a.
 svāyasa-b-tara, highly brilliant by oneself, V, 17, 2¹, 2.
 svá-yasa, endowed with his own splendour, I, 95, 2 ; 5 ; 9.
 sva-yú, free, II, 4, 7.
 svár, sun, or Sun : sūrab ná sam-drík, I, 66, 1 ; svāb drísike, I, 66, 10^a ; 69, 10 ; svāb (loc.), I, 70, 8¹ ; 9¹ ; svāb vividub, I, 71, 2 ; svāb ná, I, 148, 1 ; II, 2, 7 ; 8 ; 10 ; 8, 4 ; svāb mahát, III, 2, 7 ; sūré, IV, 3, 8 ; āvib svāb abhavat, IV, 3, 11^a ; sūrab várnena, IV, 5, 13 ; svāb ná gyótib, IV, 10, 3¹ ; āvindat gāb apāb svāb, V, 14, 4¹.
 sva-rāg, king, I, 36, 7.
 sva-rāgya, royalty, II, 8, 5².
 sváru, sacrificial post, III, 8, 6¹ ; 9 ; 10 ; IV, 6, 3.
 svarṇri, sun-hero : svarṇab (?), (I, 70, 9¹).
 svārtha, see su-ārtha.

svásara, fold, II, 2, 2.
 svásri, sister, I, 65, 7 ; II, 5, 6¹ ; svásarab, I, 71, 1^a ; tisráb, II, 5, 5¹ ; dára, III, 29, 13² ; dvib páñka, IV, 6, 8¹ ; apási svásrínām, III, 1, 3^a ; 11.
 svastí, happiness, welfare, I, 1, 9, &c. ; svastí-bhiḥ, safely, I, 189, 2 ;—with welfare, happily, II, 9, 6 ; IV, 11, 6 ; V, 4, 11.
 svādana, sweetener, V, 7, 6.
 svādu-kshādman, having sweet food, I, 31, 15.
 svādman, sweetness, I, 69, 3¹.
 svāná, roaring, V, 2, 10 ; 25, 8 ;—thundering, V, 10, 5.
 svāñin, tumultuous, III, 26, 5.
 svāhā, the word Svāhā, I, 13, 12 ; III, 4, 11 ; V, 5, 11 ; svāhā havyām kartana, pronounce the Svāhā over the offering, I, 142, 12.
 svāhā-kṛta, (offerings) over which the Svāhā has been pronounced, I, 142, 13 ; II, 3, 11.
 svāhā-kṛti, pronouncing Svāhā, I, 188, 11.
 svid, to sweat : sisvidānāb, IV, 2, 6.
 svēda, sweat, V, 7, 5.
 hamsā, swan, I, 65, 9 ; III, 8, 9.
 han, to kill, slay : hāmsi, I, 31, 6 ; gīghāmsatab, I, 36, 15 ; āhan (without an object), I, 69, 8¹ ;—vī gahi, smite, I, 36, 16.
 har : hāryamāna, longed for, III, 6, 4 ;—prāti harya, accept graciously, I, 144, 7 ; prāti hāryāb, thou acceptest, V, 2, 11.
 hāri, golden, I, 95, 1 ;—bay horse, fallow steed : hāri-bhyām, I, 76, 3 ; IV, 15, 7¹ ; hāri ſti, IV, 15, 8 ; V, 27, 2.
 hāri-keśa, whose hair is golden, III, 2, 13.
 harít, pl., the golden horses, IV, 6, 9¹ ; haritab saptā yāhvib, the seven young fallow mares, IV, 13, 3.
 hāri-vrata, whose every law is golden, III, 3, 5¹.
 haryatā, delightful, III, 5, 3.
 hāva, invocation, I, 45, 3.
 havib-āda, eating the oblation, V, 1, 11 ; 4, 4.
 havib-kṛt, preparer of the sacrificial food, I, 13, 3.

II. LIST OF THE MORE IMPORTANT PASSAGES QUOTED IN THE NOTES.

RIG-VEDA.

	PAGE		PAGE
I, 1, 8	260	I, 61, 4.	110
6, 10.	312	62, 5.	106
10, 2.	262	62, 9.	18
11, 5.	400	64, 1.	203
15, 12	260, 306	64, 5.	105
19, 3.	192	64, 9.	90, 269
22, 10	122, 156	64, 14	19
24, 9.	251	66, 2.	243
26, 10	86	66, 4.	380
27, 10	327	69, 2.	65
29, 4.	71	69, 5.	380
30, 7.	257	70, 7.	76
31, 8.	224	70, 10	78
32, 14	73	71, 1.	294
33, 4.	162	71, 3.	65
33, 14	408	71, 4.	174
34, 2.	306	72	66
34, 3.	69	72, 5.	66
34, 6.	28, 272	72, 8.	66
34, 9.	269	76, 5.	319
34, 10	112	80, 4.	177
37, 3.	305	81, 5.	257
37, 12	172	84, 18	3
38, 13	195	88, 3.	84
42, 7.	257	89, 1.	134
44, 4.	211	89, 10	59
47, 1.	44	92, 3.	359
48, 9.	359	92, 8.	101
48, 10	40	95, 1.	168
51, 3.	243	95, 3.	27
51, 8.	183	95, 9.	150
52, 1.	286	95, 10	63
52, 6.	312	96, 3.	101
53, 7.	63	96, 5.	168
60, 1.	231	100, 7.	84
61, 3.	155, 203	100, 16	380

	PAGE		PAGE
I, 102, 1	122	I, 164, 6	62
102, 8	257	164, 35	66
104, 4	324	164, 51	117, 144, 250
105, 2	78	166, 2	58
105, 12	152, 162	166, 11	294
105, 14	156	166, 12	84
109, 3	121, 122	167, 4	274
109, 4	150	168, 6	312
111, 1	25	169, 5	265
112, 15	35	171, 1	112
113, 2	124	171, 2	53
113, 3	168	171, 6	112
113, 15	359	173, 1	177
115, 1	338	173, 6	184
116, 1	7	179, 1	81
116, 4	312	184, 2	155
116, 5	134	184, 4	111
116, 6	59	185, 2	58
118, 9	59	186, 4	69
119, 3	62	186, 10	311
119, 10	59	188, 4	224
120, 1	79	188, 5	239
120, 2	46	II, 1, 1	71
122, 14	71	1, 2	111
123, 9	250	1, 4	27
127, 5	192	1, 11	156
128, 1	327	1, 12	91
129, 5	98, 133	2, 2	76
129, 11	133	2, 3	312
130, 3	242	2, 6	319
130, 4	132	2, 8	319
130, 5	162	3, 9	156
130, 6	286, 370	3, 11	143, 238
132, 5	223	4, 1	90
134, 1	144	5, 1	91, 381
134, 5	58	5, 2	168
135, 4	133	5, 5	76
138, 3	310	5, 7	71
139, 1	223	11, 12	71
139, 2	35	14, 2	132
139, 4	269	14, 11	216
142, 7	239	16, 1	214
143, 5	97	16, 3	402
143, 7	184	17, 4	315
144, 1	245	17, 7	145
146, 1	207	18, 1	191
147, 3	334	19, 7	111
148, 1	78	24, 1	210
151, 1	152	24, 8	347
151, 4	224	24, 15	398
152, 6	321	26, 3	272
158, 5	368	34, 4	295
159, 5	107	35, 2	53
163, 4; 5	365	36, 2	294
164, 3	314	37, 6	25

	PAGE		PAGE
II, 39, I	210	III, 53, 16	380
40, 4	156	54, 3	48
41, 5	246	54, 19	113
III, 1, 6	19	54, 22	376
2, I	122	55, 3	223
2, 3	286	55, 4	78
2, 5	327	55, 6	25
2, 7	286	55, 11	76
2, 14	305	55, 12	226
3, 4	421	55, 21	90
4, 3	223	56, 5	312
4, 10	201	56, 7	81
5, 6	134	56, 8	312
5, 8	118	58, 7	44
6, I	161, 224	58, 9	144
6, 2	168	59, 2	65
6, 6	319	61, 3	162
6, 7	224, 272	62, 3	156
6, 9	201	IV, 1, 4	112
6, 10	269	1, 5	40
7, I	225	1, 6	383
7, 9	25	1, 9	365
8, I; 3; 6; II .	12	1, 11	106, 329
8, 10	35	1, 12	329
8, 11	12	1, 12 seq. . . .	80
10, 5	234	2, 3	246
11, 8	14	2, 5	91
12, 2	210	2, 9	274
14, 4	169	2, 15	314
15, 2	40	4, 15	210
15, 5	223	5, I	44, 50
16, 4	151	5, 7	242, 243
18, 2	214	5, 8	242
24, I	254	5, 10	145
27, I	294	5, 11	105
27, 3	91, 207	5, 13	152
27, 7	161	6, 3	255, 280
28, 4	27	6, 8	76
29, 3	29, 218	6, 9	319
29, 11	10	6, 11	27, 373
29, 13	76	7, 4	78
29, 14	260	7, 7	171, 243
30, 7	134	7, 9	48
30, 11	272	7, 10	133
30, 13	123	7, 11	295
30, 15	29	9, 6	78
31, I	323	11, 6	254
31, I-5	80	14, 2	80
31, 16	225	15, 6	118
34, 3	246	16, 4	315
38, I	286	16, 15	204
39, I	155	17, 14	106, 312
43, I	269	17, 18	298
43, 5	30	18, 4	59
49, 4	5, 41	19, 8	272

	PAGE		PAGE
IV, 19, 10	69	V, 56, 6	87
20, 4	329	57, 2	29
23, 4	105, 394	57, 5	65
23, 8	65, 77, 171	58, 6	25
23, 10	322	59, 8	25
24, 3	84	64, 2	136
29, 3	116	68, 1	234
33, 3	19	68, 3	216
33, 10	204	70, 4	330
34, 9	86	76, 1	255
35, 3	191	83, 1	105
36, 3	151	VI, 1, 2	400
37, 3	134	1, 9	26
37, 5	411	2, 8	381, 388
37, 7	390	2, 9	388
40, 2	357	3, 5	139
42, 1	65	4, 5	158
44, 2	79	5, 2	262
50, 4	243	5, 4	214
50, 11	71	6, 2	214
51, 4	243	6, 6	178
52, 2; 3	314	8, 1	27, 149
54, 3	355	8, 7	159
55, 5	210	10, 2	383
V, 1, 4	59	11, 2	98
1, 10	73	11, 4	328
3, 4	342	12, 2	328
3, 6	27	13, 1	270
4, 4	127	15, 5	305
6, 9	226	16, 2	25
7, 2	132	16, 9	98
7, 6	68	16, 15	35
11, 4	73, 78	16, 22	267
12, 2	63	16, 27	71
12, 3	105	16, 42	90
14, 3	3	16, 46	327
21, 4	243, 345	17, 15	210
25, 1	136	19, 3	123, 323
28, 1	3, 224	19, 4	400
29, 15	370	19, 10	216
30, 10	400	20, 5	93
30, 14	381	20, 11	36
31, 1	323	21, 4	97
31, 11	112	21, 12	272
34, 6	394	24, 2	190
42, 13	53	27, 7	361
42, 17	226	31, 3	69
43, 7	224	34, 1	270
44, 1	184	35, 5	184, 185
45, 2	314	37, 3	46
47, 5	226	38, 4	72
48, 4	383	39, 4	272
53, 11	295	45, 14	111
53, 16	140	46, 10	274
56, 2	411	46, 12	400

	PAGE		PAGE
VI, 47, 16 . . .	319	VII, 48, 3 . . .	71
48, 4 . . .	25	51, 3 . . .	200
48, 5 . . .	71, 189	56, 4 . . .	116
48, 21 . . .	84	56, 6 . . .	294
51, 2 . . .	27, 203, 322	56, 16 . . .	320
51, 8 . . .	251	57, 4 . . .	355
59, 8 . . .	274	58, 5 . . .	112
59, 9 . . .	107, 216	59, 2 . . .	97
61, 1 . . .	84	61, 5 . . .	116
61, 2 . . .	203	63, 2 . . .	286
61, 7 . . .	192	66, 10 . . .	205
63, 4 . . .	341	66, 11 . . .	27, 208
64, 2 . . .	359	77, 2 . . .	314
66, 1 . . .	329	77, 3 . . .	59
66, 5 . . .	112	82, 4 . . .	216
67, 10 . . .	134	82, 5 . . .	159
68, 9 . . .	95	83, 5 . . .	216
70, 1 . . .	127	83, 9 . . .	203
70, 4 . . .	3	86, 7 . . .	312
71, 6 . . .	190	87, 3 . . .	101
VII, 1, 21 . . .	272	87, 4 . . .	314
2, 3 . . .	218	90, 5 . . .	79
2, 5 . . .	239	91, 2 . . .	4
2, 6 . . .	200	91, 3 . . .	86
2, 7 . . .	11	95, 4 . . .	411
2, 8-11 . . .	239	96, 1 . . .	203
3, 3 . . .	214	97, 4 . . .	257
3, 4 . . .	345	97, 9 . . .	71, 203
3, 5 . . .	320	97, 10 . . .	216
4, 3 . . .	58	98, 2 . . .	222
7, 2 . . .	246	101, 1 . . .	105, 260
9, 3 . . .	63, 118	104, 21 . . .	132
9, 5 . . .	40	VIII, 1, 29 . . .	258
10, 5 . . .	72	5, 16 . . .	35
11, 1 . . .	50	5, 21 . . .	196
16, 9 . . .	98	5, 25 . . .	35
17, 4 . . .	210	5, 33 . . .	43
18, 2 . . .	81	6, 24 . . .	381
18, 18 . . .	84	7, 30 . . .	107
18, 25 . . .	274	8, 22 . . .	203
22, 8 . . .	46	12, 11 . . .	225
24, 5 . . .	135, 286	12, 32 . . .	161
31, 11 . . .	203	13, 1 . . .	225
32, 27 . . .	184, 185	13, 6 . . .	207
36, 1 . . .	105	13, 14 . . .	154
36, 6 . . .	226	15, 10 . . .	86
38, 8 . . .	408	17, 15 . . .	404
39, 1 . . .	238	19, 1 . . .	140
39, 3 . . .	373	19, 2 . . .	299
40, 3 . . .	18	19, 4 . . .	257
42, 1 . . .	177, 200	19, 22 . . .	212
42, 4 . . .	90	19, 31 . . .	41, 106
43, 2 . . .	238	21, 2; 9 . . .	257
43, 4 . . .	63	22, 12 . . .	174
43, 5 . . .	411	23, 23 . . .	171

	PAGE		PAGE
VIII, 23, 28 . . .	84	IX, 8, 4 . . .	162
24, 1 . . .	320	11, 5 . . .	150
24, 14 . . .	152	12, 9 . . .	380
25, 5 . . .	123	15, 8 . . .	162
26, 13 . . .	272	16, 6 . . .	353
27, 10 . . .	190	18, 4 . . .	140
31, 9 . . .	274	19, 1 . . .	216
31, 14 . . .	204	22, 3 . . .	234
32, 10 . . .	123, 278	33, 5 . . .	362
35, 19 . . .	44	38, 5 . . .	362
38, 2 . . .	265	39, 2 . . .	146
39, 1 . . .	201	40, 2 . . .	246
39, 2 . . .	71	43, 5 . . .	286
39, 9 . . .	210	47, 4 . . .	118
40, 1 . . .	133	50, 1 . . .	41
41, 3 . . .	208	53, 2 . . .	210
41, 10 . . .	62	59, 2 . . .	122
43, 2 . . .	53	62, 17 . . .	225
43, 31 . . .	258	63, 11 . . .	106
44, 19 . . .	260	64, 10 . . .	207
47, 16 . . .	406	65, 12 . . .	234
49, 2 . . .	56	66, 1 . . .	3
50, 2 . . .	56	67, 12 . . .	383
50, 8 . . .	183	68, 3 . . .	312
51, 4 . . .	242, 295	68, 8 . . .	200
52, 8 . . .	280	69, 5 . . .	264
53, 6 . . .	225	70, 3 . . .	245
59, 6 . . .	158	71, 1; 3 . . .	264
60, 3 . . .	132	71, 3 . . .	234
61, 7 . . .	210	71, 5 . . .	111
67, 3 . . .	191	71, 7 . . .	272
71, 12 . . .	255	73, 6 . . .	313
71, 15 . . .	136	74, 1 . . .	404
72, 3 . . .	243, 327, 404	74, 4 . . .	264
73, 12 . . .	190	75, 3 . . .	161, 180
74, 6 . . .	3	76, 4 . . .	65, 77
76, 9 . . .	44	81, 1 . . .	314
76, 12 . . .	212	82, 2 . . .	286
82, 3 . . .	97	83, 5 . . .	264
84, 1 . . .	195	85, 5 . . .	286
84, 4 . . .	97	85, 11 . . .	324
87, 4 . . .	156	86, 3 . . .	286
88, 1 . . .	195	86, 4 . . .	139
96, 10 . . .	203	86, 14 . . .	264
96, 13 . . .	93	87, 1 . . .	312, 365
98, 6 . . .	183	87, 2 . . .	90
101, 16 . . .	19	92, 5 . . .	183
102, 11 . . .	258	93, 1 . . .	162
102, 12 . . .	361	96, 10 . . .	93
102, 22 . . .	40	96, 20 . . .	286
103, 7 . . .	118, 171	97, 21 . . .	264
103, 8 . . .	35	97, 34 . . .	65, 77
103, 13 . . .	29	97, 48 . . .	90
IX, 5, 3 . . .	3	97, 57 . . .	162
5, 10 . . .	12	98, 1 . . .	410

	PAGE
IX, 100, 3 . . .	216
102, 1; 8 . . .	323
103, 3 . . .	225
106, 14 . . .	210
107, 18 . . .	344
111, 2 . . .	65, 77
111, 3 . . .	116, 127
X, 1, 2 . . .	78
2, 6 . . .	136
3, 2 . . .	225 seq.
3, 3 . . .	98
4, 3 . . .	162
4, 7 . . .	134
5, 1 . . .	408
6, 1 . . .	136
7, 5 . . .	171
8, 1 . . .	150
8, 2 . . .	306
9, 1 . . .	224
11, 5 . . .	196, 204
11, 6 . . .	234
12, 3 . . .	338
13, 3 . . .	242
14, 10; 11 . . .	29
15, 6 . . .	355
16, 5 . . .	225
17, 2 . . .	122
21, 1 . . .	258
21, 2 . . .	390
23, 7 . . .	80
26, 4 . . .	149
27, 4 . . .	184, 185
27, 7 . . .	402
27, 13 . . .	224
30, 6 . . .	122
31, 5 . . .	124
31, 7 . . .	272
32, 6 . . .	370
33, 2 . . .	254
33, 7 . . .	36
39, 4 . . .	19
39, 10 . . .	59
39, 14 . . .	58, 272
40, 2 . . .	100
41, 1 . . .	203
44, 1 . . .	86
44, 4 . . .	48
45, 1 . . .	189
45, 2 . . .	78
45, 10 . . .	59
46, 2 . . .	204
46, 8 . . .	171
46, 10 . . .	226
47, 6 . . .	243
47, 7 . . .	155, 245

	PAGE
X, 48, 2 . . .	384
49, 6 . . .	36
50, 1 . . .	267
52, 6 . . .	258
53, 1 . . .	200
53, 2 . . .	3, 73
53, 3 . . .	225
53, 6 . . .	43
61, 4 . . .	398
61, 7 . . .	80
61, 8 . . .	79
61, 13 . . .	323
61, 14 . . .	73
61, 21 . . .	165
63, 5 . . .	231
63, 8 . . .	251
64, 4 . . .	203
64, 11 . . .	163
64, 15 . . .	417
65 . . .	250
65, 6 . . .	250
65, 8 . . .	250
65, 10 . . .	11, 218
66, 12 . . .	224
66, 13 . . .	11
67, 1 . . .	242
70, 7 . . .	11
70, 10 . . .	12
73, 5 . . .	35
74, 3 . . .	324
76, 3 . . .	69
79, 2 . . .	270
79, 3 . . .	242, 243
79, 5 . . .	345
80, 4 . . .	78
80, 7 . . .	203
81, 1 . . .	264
82, 6 . . .	62
83, 4 . . .	414
84, 7 . . .	216
85, 18 . . .	116
85, 19 . . .	27
85, 23 . . .	424
87, 9 . . .	224
87, 18 . . .	20
87, 20 . . .	214
89, 7 . . .	132
89, 10 . . .	274
89, 11 . . .	267
90, 15 . . .	85
91, 1 . . .	191
91, 7 . . .	345
91, 10 . . .	189
92, 1 . . .	196
93, 4 . . .	106

	PAGE
X, 93, 6	177
93, 10	19
94, 7 ; 8	314
94, 11	77
96, 10	286
97, 1	144
99, 6	234
100, 8	417
101, 7	58, 380
103, 3	29
104, 8	330
106, 5	320
108, 3	90
108, 7	339
110	180
110, 3	238
110, 4	224
110, 9	238
110, 10	180
113, 8	345
114, 9	207
115, 3	98
115, 8 ; 9	35
118, 3	3

	PAGE
X, 118, 5	257
119, 13	257
121, 2	151
122, 3	380
122, 4	392
123, 4	65
125, 1	200
126, 8	355
132, 5	90
133, 3	71
138, 6	27
139, 2	90
139, 3	124
147, 1	69
148, 3	71, 421
150, 1	257
159, 5	19 seq.
164, 3	93
168, 3	306
172, 1	145
172, 1 ; 4	250
172, 2	267
176, 3	94
190, 2	27

ATHARVA-VEDA.

IV, 1, 2	195	XI, 2, 13	168
V, 4, 3	11	7, 5	295
28, 7	11	XII, 2, 45	376
VI, 43, 3	30	4, 6 ; 12 ; 26	20
VII, 90, 3	408	XV, 12, 6 ; 10	20
VIII, 2, 7	353	XIX, 39, 6-8	11

VÂGASANĒYI-SAMHITÂ.

V, 17	224	XX, 44	328
VI, 26	121	XXII, 2	171
35	121	XXIII, 57	27
IX, 4	369	XXVIII, 7	11
XVII, 54	254	XXXVIII, 20	411

MAITRÂYANÎYA-SAMHITÂ.

II, 4, 2	333
------------------	-----

TAITTIRÎYA-SAMHITÂ.

I, 3, 6, 1	12, 254	III, 1, 6, 2	369
5, 3, 2	168	IV, 1, 8, 3	156
6, 6, 1	20	2, 4, 2	286
7, 8, 2	408	V, 7, 8, 1	295
II, 4, 11, 4	20		

AITAREYA-BRĀHMAṆA.

	PAGE		PAGE
II, 2	253	III, 34	80
40	267	VII, 34	361

SATAPATHA-BRĀHMAṆA.

I, 6, 3, 38	86	IV, 6, 6, 5	189
7, 4, 4	80	VII, 1, 1, 22 seq.	285
II, 1, 1, 8	306	XII, 4, 4, 2	386
4, 4, 4	361	5, 2, 15	144
III, 4, 1, 20	304 seq.	XIV, 3, 1, 9	411
4, 1, 21	306	9, 4, 3	19
9, 4, 18	121		

TAITTIRĪYA-BRĀHMAṆA.

I, 2, 1, 13	305	III, 7, 3, 5	386
2, 1, 20	376		

PAÑKAVIMSA-BRĀHMAṆA.

XIII, 3, 12	358	XXV, 7, 4	180
-----------------------	-----	---------------------	-----

TAITTIRĪYA-ĀRANYAKA.

IV, 11, 4	411	V, 9, 7	411
23	93		

ĀSVALĀYANA-SRAUTASŪTRA.

III, 1, 8 seq.	253	IV, 8, 20	286
4, 1	284	V, 7, 3	197
12, 4	5	XII, 11, 1	102

SĀṆKHĀYANA-SRAUTASŪTRA.

V, 15, 2 seq.	253	VIII, 21	20
VIII, 16	267		

KĀTYĀYANA-SRAUTASŪTRA.

IV, 8, 16	306	IX, 8, 11	189
VI, 3, 17	255	XII, 6, 10	44
IX, 8, 8 seq.	189	XXIV, 3, 42	44

SĀṆKHĀYANA-GR/HYASŪTRA.

II, 2, 1	200	V, 5, 4	5
--------------------	-----	-------------------	---

MANU.

VIII, 44	168
--------------------	-----


MAHĀBHĀRATA.

XIV, 280	224
--------------------	-----

CONSONANTS.	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zand.	Pehlvi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.	
	I Class.	II Class.	III Class.								
Gutturales.											
1 Tenuis	k			क	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	k	
2 " aspirata	kh			ख	𐬖	𐬖	𐬖	𐬖	𐬖	kh	
3 Media	g			ग	𐬗	𐬗	𐬗	𐬗	𐬗		
4 " aspirata	gh			घ	𐬘	𐬘	𐬘	𐬘	𐬘		
5 Gutturo-labialis	q			𐬙							
6 Nasalis	h (ng)			ङ	{ 𐬚 (ng) 𐬛 (N) 𐬜 (ng/hv)						
7 Spiritus asper	h			ह						h, hs	
8 " lenis	,										
9 " asper faucalis	'h										
10 " lenis faucalis	'h										
11 " asper fricatus	. . .	'h									
12 " lenis fricatus	. . .	'h									
Gutturales modificatae (palatales, &c.)											
13 Tenuis	k			𐬠	𐬡	𐬡	𐬡	𐬡	𐬡	k	
14 " aspirata	kh			𐬢	𐬣	𐬣	𐬣	𐬣	𐬣	kh	
15 Media	g			𐬤	𐬥	𐬥	𐬥	𐬥	𐬥		
16 " aspirata	gh			𐬦	𐬧	𐬧	𐬧	𐬧	𐬧		
17 " Nasalis	𐬨			𐬩	𐬪	𐬪	𐬪	𐬪	𐬪		

CONSONANTS (continued).	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pehlvi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	I Class.	II Class.	III Class.							
18 Semivocalis	y	. . .		य	𐬨 ^{init.} 𐬨𐬨𐬨	𐬨	𐬨	𐬨	י	y
19 Spiritus asper	. . .	(y)		. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
20 " lenis	. . .	(y)		. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
21 " asper assibilatus	. . .	s		श	𐬨𐬨𐬨	𐬨𐬨𐬨	𐬨𐬨𐬨	𐬨𐬨𐬨	. . .	z
22 " lenis assibilatus	. . .	z		. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
Dentales.										
23 Tenuis	t	. . .		त	𐬨𐬨𐬨	𐬨𐬨𐬨	𐬨𐬨𐬨	𐬨𐬨𐬨	ת	t
24 " aspirata	th	. . .		थ	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	ת	th
25 " assibilata	. . .	. . .	TH	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
26 Media	d	. . .		द	𐬨𐬨𐬨	𐬨𐬨𐬨	𐬨𐬨𐬨	𐬨𐬨𐬨	. . .	. . .
27 " aspirata	dh	. . .		. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
28 " assibilata	. . .	. . .	DH	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
29 Nasalis	n	. . .		न	𐬨𐬨𐬨	𐬨𐬨𐬨	𐬨𐬨𐬨	𐬨𐬨𐬨	נ	n
30 Semivocalis	l	. . .		ल	𐬨𐬨𐬨	𐬨𐬨𐬨	𐬨𐬨𐬨	𐬨𐬨𐬨	ל	l
31 " mollis 1	. . .	l		. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
32 " mollis 2	. . .	. . .	L	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
33 Spiritus asper 1	s	. . .		ष	𐬨𐬨𐬨	𐬨𐬨𐬨	𐬨𐬨𐬨	𐬨𐬨𐬨	ש	s
34 " asper 2	. . .	ss	s (s)	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
35 " lenis	z	. . .	z (z)	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	z
36 " asperimus 1	. . .	. . .	z (z)	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	zh
37 " asperimus 2	. . .	. . .	z (z)	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .

VOWELS.	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pehlvi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	I Class.									
	I Class.	II Class.	III Class.							
1 Neutralis	o			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
2 Laryngo-palatalis	ē			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
3 " labialis	ō			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
4 Gutturalis brevis	a			अ	av	fin.	...	...	...	...
5 " longa	ā	(a)		आ	au	av init.	...	...	...	...
6 Palatalis brevis	i			इ	...	...	...	...	...	...
7 " longa	ī	(i)		ई	...	...	...	...	...	...
8 Dentalis brevis	ē			ए	...	...	...	...	...	...
9 " longa	ē			ऐ	...	...	...	...	...	...
10 Lingualis brevis	ri			र	...	...	...	...	...	...
11 " longa	ri			रि	...	...	...	...	...	...
12 Labialis brevis	u			उ	...	...	...	...	...	...
13 " longa	ū	(u)		ऊ	...	...	...	...	...	...
14 Gutturo-palatalis brevis	e			ए	...	...	...	...	...	...
15 " longa	é (ai)	(e)		ऐ	...	...	...	...	...	...
16 Diphthongus gutturo-palatalis	āi	(ai)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
17 " "	ei (ēi)			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
18 " "	oi (ōu)			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
19 Gutturo-labialis brevis	o			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
20 " longa	āu	(o)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
21 Diphthongus gutturo-labialis	eu (ēu)	(au)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
22 " "	ou (ōu)			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
23 " "	ū			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
24 Gutturalis fracta	ī			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
25 Palatalis fracta	ū			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
26 Labialis fracta	ō			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
27 Gutturo-labialis fracta	ō			...	...	...	...	...	...	...



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CONSONANTS.	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zand.	Pahlavi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	I Class.	II Class.								
		III Class.								
Gutturales.										
1 Tenuis	k	.	.	क	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	k
2 " aspirata	kh	.	.	ख	𐬖	𐬖	𐬖	𐬖	𐬖	kh
3 Media	g	.	.	ग	𐬗	𐬗	𐬗	𐬗	𐬗	.
4 " aspirata	gh	.	.	घ	𐬘	𐬘	𐬘	𐬘	𐬘	.
5 Gutturo-labialis	q	.	.	𐬙	𐬙	𐬙	𐬙	𐬙	𐬙	.
6 Nasalis	h (ng)	.	.	𐬚	{ 3 (ng) } { 𐬛 (x) }	.	.	.	.	h, 𐬛
7 Spiritus asper	h	.	.	𐬛	𐬛	.	.	.	.	.
8 " lenis	,	.	.	𐬜	𐬜	.	.	.	.	.
9 " asper faucalis	th	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
10 " lenis faucalis	h	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
11 " asper fricatus	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
12 " lenis fricatus	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Gutturales modificatae (palatales, &c.)										
13 Tenuis	.	.	.	𐬝	𐬝	𐬝	𐬝	𐬝	𐬝	k
14 " aspirata	kh	.	.	𐬞	𐬞	𐬞	𐬞	𐬞	𐬞	kh
15 Media	g	.	.	𐬟	𐬟	𐬟	𐬟	𐬟	𐬟	.
16 " aspirata	gh	.	.	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	.
17 " Nasalis	g	.	.	𐬡	𐬡	𐬡	𐬡	𐬡	𐬡	.

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CONSONANTS (continued).	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pehlevi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	I Class.	II Class.	III Class.							
18 Semivocalis	y			य	𐬨	𐬨	𐬨	ي	י	y
19 Spiritus asper		(y)								
20 " lenis		(y)								
21 " asper assibilatus		s		श	𐬰	𐬰	𐬰	س		s
22 " lenis assibilatus		z								
Dentales.										
23 Tenuis	t			त	𐬢	𐬢	𐬢	ت	ת	t
24 " aspirata	th									th
25 " assibilata			TH							
26 Media	d			द	𐬤	𐬤	𐬤	د		
27 " aspirata	dh									
28 " assibilata			DH							
29 Nasalis	n			न	𐬨	𐬨	𐬨	ن	נ	n
30 Semivocalis	l			ल	𐬌	𐬌	𐬌	ل	ל	l
31 " mollis 1		l								
32 " mollis 2			L							
33 Spiritus asper 1	s			स	𐬰	𐬰	𐬰	س	ס	s
34 " asper 2			s (S)							
35 " lenis	z							ز	ז	z
36 " asperimus 1			z (z)							
37 " asperimus 2			z (z)							

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VOVELS.	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pehlvi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	I Class.	II Class.	III Class.							
1 Neutralis	0			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
2 Laryngo-palatalis	ē			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
3 " labialis	ō			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
4 Gutturalis brevis	a			अ	...	...	...	...	...	...
5 " longa	ā	(a)		आ	...	...	...	...	...	...
6 Palatalis brevis	i			इ	...	...	...	...	...	...
7 " longa	ī	(i)		ई	...	...	...	...	...	...
8 Dentalis brevis	h			ह	...	...	...	...	...	...
9 " longa	h			ह	...	...	...	...	...	...
10 Lingualis brevis	ri			रि	...	...	...	...	...	...
11 " longa	rī			रि	...	...	...	...	...	...
12 Labialis brevis	u			उ	...	...	...	...	...	...
13 " longa	ū	(u)		ऊ	...	...	...	...	...	...
14 Gutturo-palatalis brevis	e			ए	...	...	...	...	...	...
15 " longa	ē (ai)	(e)		ऐ	...	...	...	...	...	...
16 Gutturo-palatalis	āi	(ai)		ई	...	...	...	...	...	...
17 " "	ei (ēi)			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
18 " "	oi (ōu)			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
19 Gutturo-labialis brevis	o			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
20 " longa	ō (au)	(o)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
21 Diphthongus gutturo-labialis	āu	(au)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
22 " "	eu (ēu)			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
23 " "	ou (ōu)			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
24 Gutturalis fracta	ā			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
25 Palatalis fracta	ī			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
26 Labialis fracta	ū			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
27 Gutturo-labialis fracta	ō			...	...	...	...	...	...	...

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VOL. XLVII

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
PAHLAVI TEXTS

TRANSLATED BY

E. W. WEST

PART V

MARVELS OF ZOROASTRIANISM



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CONTENTS.

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	ix
Abbreviations used in this volume	xlviii

MARVELS OF ZOROASTRIANISM.

DÎNKARD, BOOK VII.

CHAP.		
1.	Descent of the glorious destiny	3
2.	Parentage of Zaratûst	17
3.	His birth, childhood, and youth till his conference	35
4.	His missions to the Karaps, and Vistâsp's conversion	50
5.	Events in the last thirty-five years of his life	73
6.	Further events till the death of Vistâsp	77
7.	„ „ till end of Sâsânian monarchy	82
8.	„ „ till end of Zaratûst's millennium	94
9.	Aûshêdar's millennium	107
10.	Aûshêdar-mâh's millennium	112
11.	Sôshâns and the renovation	116

DÎNKARD, BOOK V.

1.	Kaî-Loharâsp at Jerusalem, and descent of the religion	119
2.	Parentage, birth, and life of Zaratûst. Future apostles	122
3.	Events after Vistâsp's conversion and in later times	126
4.	Descent of the Irânians. The tribe having a Gyêmarâ	127

SELECTIONS OF ZÂD-SPARAM.

12.	Two old legends of Spendarmad and of the hero Srtô	133
13.	Parentage of Zaratûst	138
14.	Demons try to injure him before and at his birth	140
15.	Five Karap brothers opposed to Zaratûst and his four brothers	143
16.	One Karap tries to kill Zaratûst five times	144

CHAP.	PAGE
17. Another foretells his glorious destiny	147
18. His father disagrees with him	148
19. And he disagrees with his father and the chief Karap .	149
20. Legends indicative of his good disposition	151
21. His going to confer with Aŭharmazd	154
22. His conferences with the archangels	159
23. Dates of conversions, births, and deaths	163
24. Five dispositions of priests and ten admonitions . . .	167
INDEX	171
ERRATUM	182

Transliteration of Oriental Alphabets adopted for the Trans-	
lations of the Sacred Books of the East	183

INTRODUCTION.

1. IN the summary account of the *Spend Nask*, given in the eighth book of the *Dīnkard*, chapter XIV, it is stated in § 4 (see S. B. E., vol. xxxvii, p. 32) that many marvels, owing to Zaratûst, are published therein, 'just as there are some which, collected and selected, are noticed by the *Dīnkard* manuscript.' This statement evidently refers to the seventh book of the *Dīnkard*, which contains the legendary history of Zaratûst and his religion, related as a series of marvels extending from the creation to the resurrection of mankind. A much briefer account of some of the same details occurs at the beginning of the fifth book of the *Dīnkard*, and appears to have been abridged from a compilation which was either derived partially from a foreign source, or prepared for the use of foreign proselytes. A third compilation of similar legends is found among the Selections of *Zād-spāram*. And a careful translation of these three Pahlavi Texts constitutes the *Marvels of Zoroastrianism* contained in this volume.

2. As the extent of Dk. VII is about 16,000 Pahlavi words (without allowing for one folio lost), it probably contains about four-fifths of the details included in the *Spend Nask*, the Pahlavi version of which has been estimated, in S. B. E., vol. xxxvii, p. 469, to extend to 20,500 words. It says very little about Zaratûst's conferences with the sacred beings (mentioned in Dk. VIII, xiv, 5, 6), and gives no description of the other world and the way thither (as reported *ibid.* 8). But it probably contains many verbatim extracts from other parts of the Pahlavi version of the *Spend Nask*, which appear, however, to have been previously collected in the *Exposition of the Good Religion*, an older MS. than the *Dīnkard*, which is quoted as an authority in Dk. VII, i, 2.

3. This seventh book commences with a detailed statement of the descent of the glorious ruling dynasty from the primeval man *Gâyômarđ*, through his descendants, the *Pêsdâdian* and *Kayânian* rulers, to *Kaî-Vistâsp*. Among the individuals, rarely mentioned elsewhere, are the sacred being *Hadish* (the protector of homesteads in the *Visperad*), *Vâêgered* the brother of king *Hôshâng*, *Pâta-khsrôbô* king of the Arabs, and *Aôshnar* the chancellor of *Kaî-Ûs*. *Zaratûst* and the three millennial apostles are also mentioned, but the contents of this first chapter are probably derived from the *Kitradâđ Nask* (see Dk. VII, xiii, 20) and from Yt. XIX, 25-93.

4. Chapter II begins the legendary history of *Zaratûst* with the descent of his glory, from the presence of *Aûharmazd* to the house in which *Zaratûst*'s mother was about to be born; and, alarmed at her radiance, the *Kaviğs* and *Karaps*, or ruling priests of the district, oblige her father to send her away to another valley, where *Pôrú-shâspô* resided, to whom she was afterwards married; and several legends are related, in which both the archangels and archdemons are active agents, which lead on to the birth of *Zaratûst*, thirty years before the end of the ninth millennium of the universe, and his complete genealogy is given.

5. Chapter III begins with his laughing at birth, and describes the ill-will of the *Karaps*, or priests of those times, and their many attempts to destroy him during his childhood, till he openly defied them at the age of seven. At the end of the ninth millennium, when he was thirty years old, as he was bringing *Hôm*-water out of the fourth effluent of the *Dâîtî* river, he met the archangel *Vohûmanô* who had come to invite him to a conference with *Aûharmazd*, about which no details are given.

6. Chapter IV, however, proceeds to mention that, in two years, he returned from his first conference, by order of *Aûharmazd*, to preach his religion to the *Kîgs* and *Karaps* in the presence of their ruler, *Aûrvâtâ-dang* the *Tûr*. They seem to have listened attentively till he advocated *Khvêtûkdas*, when they demanded his death, and

were supported by the Tûr's brother ; but the Tûr's son, who presided, remonstrated with them, and Aûrvâtâ-dang himself protected him, but refused to be converted. Zaratûst was afterwards sent to demand slaves and horses from Vêdvoist, a rich Karap, who refused them arrogantly ; he also went to Parshad-gau in Sagastân and cured his bull with Hôm-water, whereupon Parshad-gau joined him in worship, but not in public. Zaratûst repulsed the demons as in Vd. XIX, 1-4 ; he is then tempted by a Karap in the form of Spendarmad, whom he also repulses. And he is finally sent to the court of Vistâsp, where he is relentlessly opposed by the Kîgs and Karaps who obtained his imprisonment, during which he is saved from starvation by a miracle ; then some of the sacred beings arrive to assist him, and Vistâsp is at last converted, twelve years after the coming of the religion when Zaratûst went to his first conference with Aûharmazd.

7. Chapter V refers to the marvels of the last thirty-five years of Zaratûst's life, after Vistâsp's conversion, but says nothing about his own death, except that he departed to the best existence at the age of seventy-seven. It mentions the establishment of ordeals of thirty-three kinds, the victory of Vistâsp over Argâsp the Khyôn, the useful works and advice of Zaratûst, the compilation of the Avesta, and the birth of Pêshyôtan, the immortal ruler of Kangdæ.

8. Chapter VI continues this account of marvels till the death of Vistâsp, which occurred forty-three years later. The legends related are about the presentation of a heavenly chariot to Vistâsp by the soul of an old hero Sritô who had been killed about 350 years before ; and regarding the coming of two high-priests from the southern regions of the earth, ten years after the departure of Zaratûst, to enquire about the religion.

9. Chapter VII relates the marvels occurring after the death of Vistâsp until the end of the sovereignty of Irân ; mentioning king Vohûmanô who was a grandson of Vistâsp, the high-priest Sênôv who lived throughout the second century of the religion, the devastator Alexander the Great, the four successive high-priests who restore ortho-

doxy in the fifth and sixth centuries of the religion, the apostate Rashn-rêsh of about the same period, king Artakhshatar the founder of the Sāsānian dynasty, his chancellor Tanvasar, Âtûrpâd-i Mâraspendân and his son surnamed Avarethrabau, with an anonymous arch-apostate of their time, and then king Khûsrô Anôshêrvân. Finally, it condemns the proceedings of the devastators in later times, whose names are not mentioned.

10. Chapter VIII deals with the ninth and tenth centuries of the religion, which bring the millennium of Zarâtûst to a close. After a bitter lamentation over the anarchy in religion and government—in which parts of §§ 34 and 36 are taken from the Varstmânsar commentary on Yas. XXXII in Dk. IX, xxxii, 17, 20—it refers to the arrival of Kitrô-mêhônö, ‘him of the racial home,’ a title of Pêshyôtanö, son of Vistâsp, and immortal ruler of Kangdez, who arrives with 150 disciples to restore the religion and destroy the wicked, including the Turkish demons, the Arabs, and the ecclesiastical Shêdâspô¹ (Theodosius?). In the thirtieth year before the end of this tenth millennium Aûshêdar, the Developer of Righteousness, is born, and confers with the archangels at the end of the millennium, when the sun stands still for ten days and nights.

11. Chapter IX describes the eleventh millennium, that of Aûshêdar, who produces much prosperity and progress which continue until the fifth century. Then the wizard Mahrkûs appears for seven years, and produces awful winters in four of them, in which most of mankind and animals perish, till he is himself destroyed by the Dâhmân Âfrîn. Afterwards, Yim’s enclosure is opened to replenish the earth with animals and men who then begin to subsist more upon the milk of cattle, which is plentiful; and Ashavahistô interferes to diminish the slaughter of cattle. At the end of the fifth century two-thirds of the Irânians have become righteous, and in the thirtieth year before the end of this eleventh millennium Aûshêdar-mâh, the Developer

¹ This name can be read Shêdâsfar in Byt. III.

of Worship, is born, and confers with the archangels at the end of the millennium, when the sun stands still for twenty days and nights.

12. Chapter X describes the twelfth millennium, that of *Aûshêzar-mâh*, during which mankind continue to improve, are better supplied, and have fewer wants, while deaths occur only through old age and the executioner. During the last fifty-three years, they leave off eating meat and subsist upon vegetables and milk, for which latter they substitute water for the last three years. But the old tyrant *Dahâk* breaks loose, and *Kerêsâspô* has to be roused to smite him. In the thirtieth year before the end of this twelfth millennium *Sôshâns*, the Triumphant Benefiter, is born; *Kaî-Khûsrô* and his companions afterwards arrive to assist him, and the sun stands still for thirty days and nights.

13. Chapter XI describes how *Sôshâns* and his assistants destroy all the evil remaining in the world, during the course of fifty-seven years, while mankind subsist for seventeen years on vegetables, thirty years on water, and ten years on spiritual food. And, at the end of these fifty-seven years, *Aharman* and the fiend are annihilated, and the renovation for the future existence occurs.

14. Several of the details described in Dk. VII are briefly mentioned in Dk. V, i-iv, where they are introduced by a statement of the siege of Jerusalem by *Nebuchadnezzar* (*Bûkht-Narsîh*) assisted by *Kaî-Lôharâsp*, father of *Vistâsp*. Excepting this account of the siege, in which the Jews are evidently called 'a congregation or tribe' (*ram*), and some remarks about the same 'tribe' at the end of Chapter IV, all the other details which are mentioned have reference only to *Irânians*; but they are said to be the sayings of *Âtûr-farnbag* as to the MS. which that tribe call really their *Gyêmarâ* (Chaps. I, 2, 3; IV, 8), as the name can be most plausibly read. Most of the strictly *Irânian* details have manifestly been derived from the same sources as were consulted by the writer of Dk. VII, that is, from the *Pahlavi* versions of the *Spend* and *Kîtradâd* Nasks. It would probably be hazardous to suppose that the Jewish compilers of the *Gemara* could have had access to these

sources, and it might be preferable to assume that *Ātūr-farnbag* was himself compiling a record of Zoroastrian traditions for the use of some converts from Judaism, to take the place of the *Gemara* of their former faith.

15. The *Zaratûst-nâmak* of *Zâd-spâram* is contained in the latter half (Zs. XII-XXIII) of the first series of his Selections, the former half of which, being a paraphrase of the first half of the *Bundahis*, has been translated in S. B. E., vol. v, pp. 155-186. In Chapter XII *Zâd-spâram* relates two of the earliest legends referring to *Mazda*-worship, which he had found in old MSS. The first of these describes the appearance of the archangel *Spendarmad*, wearing a golden sacred girdle, at the court of king *Mânûskîhar*, 428¹ years before the coming of the religion to *Zaratûst* when he went to his conference with the sacred beings. The other is the legend of the warrior *Sritô*, the seventh brother, who was sent by *Kaî-Ûs* to kill the frontier-settling ox which threatened him, 300 years before the coming of the religion, with future execration by *Zaratûst*.

16. Chapter XIII refers to the descent of *Zaratûst*'s glory upon his mother at her birth, and the combination of his spiritual and worldly natures; also detailing his genealogy. Chapter XIV describes the attempts of the demons to destroy him before and at his birth, when *Vohûmanô* entered his reasoning powers and made him laugh with delight and utter one form of the *Ahunavair* formula. Chapter XV is about the five *Karap* brothers, with their first cousins the *Āûsikhshes*, all descended from the demon of Wrath and a sister of king *Mânûskîhar*; also about the four brothers of *Zaratûst* who seem to be unmentioned elsewhere.

17. Chapter XVI details the attempts of one of the *Karaps* to destroy *Zaratûst* during his infancy, and the means by which he is preserved; it also explains who *Râgh* and *Nôdar* were. In Chapter XVII one of the *Karaps* foretells the future success of *Zaratûst*. In Chapter XVIII

¹ The MSS. have 528, but this would be twenty-eight years before the accession of *Mânûskîhar*, see the synopsis in § 55.

his father hears him accused of folly, and takes him to a Karap to be cured. In Chapter XIX the chief Karap comes to the house of Zaratûst's father, and is invited to consecrate the food set before him; but Zaratûst objects and a quarrel ensues, which so much disturbs the Karap that he leaves the house, and drops dead from his horse on the road home. In Chapter XX instances are given of Zaratûst's righteous desires, his compassionate assistance of people fording a river, his liberal disposition, his abandoning worldly desires, his pity for dogs, his wish for a good-looking wife, and his acceptance of progress even from the wicked, during his youth.

18. Chapter XXI relates that, at thirty years of age, on his way to the festival of spring, he saw in a vision all mankind following Mêdyômâh, his first cousin, into his presence. He then went on to the bank of the Dâtîh, and crossed its four channels, when he met Vohûmanô who led him to the assembly of the archangels, where he received instruction from Aûharmazd and saw the omniscient wisdom; the archangels also subjected him to various ordeals.

19. Chapter XXII refers to his conferences with the seven archangels, each at a different place, and extending over ten years. In Chapter XXIII, Mêdyômâh is converted at the end of these ten years. The next two years are spent on the conversion of Vistâsp, in which Zaratûst is assisted by some of the sacred beings, and the narrative ends by giving the dates of several other conversions, births, and deaths. But after its 300th year the religion is disturbed and the monarchy contested; referring, no doubt, to the effects of Alexander's conquest of Persia.

20. These three narratives appear to be the only connected statements of the Zoroastrian legend that remain extant in Pahlavi, and all three seem to be chiefly derived from the Sâsânian Pahlavi version of the Spend Nask, with some probable additions from the similar version of the *Kitradâd* Nask, as may be gathered from the summary accounts of the contents of these Nasks given in Dk. VIII, xiii, 20-xiv, 15, and translated in S. B. E., vol. xxxvii, pp. 31-34. There are, however, allusions to other legends

regarding Zaratûst to be found scattered about in Pahlavi literature, to which we shall return after mentioning the manuscript authorities for the texts translated in this volume.

21. The chief existing authority for the Pahlavi text of the *Dînkard*, Books III-IX, and the only independent one for Book VII, is the MS. B in Bombay, which has been fully described in S. B. E., vol. xxxvii, pp. xxxiii-xxxvii; it will therefore be sufficient here to give a short statement of the information which was there detailed at full length. This MS., written in 1659, was an unbound quarto volume of 392 folios when it was brought from Irân to Surat in 1783; after which time 70 folios became detached from various parts of the MS., but nearly all these had been discovered more than twenty years ago.

22. The writer of the MS. not only recorded the date of his own work, but also copied two previous colophons of his predecessors, with dates corresponding to A. D. 1516 and 1020, and it appears that there had been an intermediate copy about 1355. The MS. of 1020 had been copied at Bakdâd, possibly from the original MS. of the last editor of the *Dînkard*, which must have been completed about A. D. 900.

23. For the text of Dk. V we have a second authority, independent of B, in the MS. K43 at Copenhagen (see S. B. E., vol. xxxvii, pp. xxxvii-viii), written shortly after 1594 and also descended from the MS. of 1020.

24. The Selections of *Zâd-spam* are found in some of the old MSS., which also contain the *Dâdistân-î Dînik* (see S. B. E., vol. xviii, pp. xv-xvii). Of the two MSS. used for the text of *Zâd-spam*'s *Zaratûst-nâmak*, K35 was brought from Irân to Copenhagen in 1843. It has lost many folios, both at the beginning and end; but, before it was so mutilated, a copy (BK) of it was made, which is now in Bombay and contains a copy of its colophon, the date of which corresponds to A. D. 1592. For the text of Zs. xxii, 4-xxiv, 19, which has been lost from K35, the translator is indebted to this old copy. The other MS. authority T, belonging to Ervad Tehmuras in Bombay

(a copy of which has been used), is dated two generations earlier.

25. Regarding the period of *Zād-spāram's* career we are well informed by the date of the third Epistle of *Mānūskihar*, corresponding to A.D. 881, at which time *Zād-spāram* was probably in the prime of life; but his Selections were certainly compiled as late as A.D. 900, or about the same time as the completion of the *Dīnkard*. So that the Pahlavi texts, from which these three narratives of the Zoroastrian legends have been translated, were no doubt all written about A.D. 900, and the information they contain was nearly all derived from the Pahlavi versions of two of the Nasks.

26. We have reason to believe that the Pahlavi versions of Avesta texts were completed in the fourth century and revised in the sixth, after the downfall of the heretic Mazdak. This may not only be clearly inferred from the traditional account of the compilation and restorations of the Avesta and Zand, preserved in Dk. IV, 21-36, and translated in S. B. E., vol. xxxvii, pp. 412-418; but is also in accordance with the actual condition of the Pahlavi versions of the liturgical Avesta texts. With the exception of a few interpolated passages, the whole of these Pahlavi versions might have been written, or revised, in the time of king Shahpūhar II (A.D. 309-379). And the exceptional passages mention no persons or events of a later date than the reign of king Khūsrō I (A.D. 531-578); being merely references to such persons as Mazdak, the heretic, and certain commentators who lived about that time.

27. If we examine the Zoroastrian legends, translated in this volume, we shall also find it difficult to discover a passage that clearly alludes to any historical personage of later date than Khūsrō I, who is named in Dk. V, iii, 3; VII, vii, 26, although the compiler of the *Dīnkard* had the traditions of 250 years of Arab rule to draw upon for facts, if he had been disposed to continue the statements of the Pahlavi Spend Nask down to his own time. No doubt, these traditions may have intensified his denunciations of

the devastators in Dk. VII, vii, 29-38; viii, 4-9, but, like most Pahlavi writers, he is careful not to mention Muhammadanism. Dk. VII, vii, 33, 34 seem to refer to some particular individual of this later time; but the references to Kaisar and Khâkân, the Turkish demons with dishevelled hair, the Arab, and Shedâspô (Theodosius?) of Arûm, may all have been taken from a Pahlavi version revised in the time of Khûsrô I.

28. That the original Pahlavi version was translated from an Avesta text, though many Pahlavi commentaries were intermingled, appears certain. Apart from the numerous quotations from revelation (dênô), which may be safely assumed to have had an Avesta original, there are many passages interspersed with glosses, such as the Pahlavi translators habitually used, as well as numerous sentences beginning with a verb, an Avesta peculiarity which generally disappears in an English translation. Regarding the age of this Avesta text it would be hazardous to speculate without further information than we yet possess.

29. The principal details connected with the Zoroastrian legends which have been noticed in other Pahlavi and Pâzand texts, with references to the passages where they occur, are as follows :—

Gôsûrvan informed of the future coming of Zaratûst in Bd. IV, 4. Z.'s genealogy and family in Bd. XXXII, 1-10.

Summary account of Z. and Zoroastrianism, from the creation to the resurrection, in Dk. VIII, xiv, 1-15.

The abode of Z.'s father, when Z. was born, was on the bank of the Dârega river (Bd. XX, 32; XXIV, 15).

150 demons were prevented from destroying Z., before his birth, by the presence of a fire in his father's house (Sls. X, 4; XII, 11; Sd. XVI, 3).

Detailed account of the birth of Z. in Dk. IX, xxiv, 1-18.

When Z. first saw the archangels, he thought they were arch-demons (Ep. I, x, 9).

Omniscient wisdom temporarily conferred upon Z., and what he then saw (Dk. IX, viii, 1-6; Byt. I, 1-5; II, 5-22).

He saw the soul of Davâns tormented in hell, excepting one foot (AV. XXXII, 1-6; Sls. XII, 29; Sd. IV, 3-11).

He also saw a mortal with children and an immortal without any, and preferred the former (Dd. XXXVII, 43).

And he beheld the terrible condition of Keresâsp's soul (Dk. IX, xv, 1-4).

Advice of Aôharmanas'd to Zaratûst (Sd. XXV, 6-9; LXXXI, 2-16).

The demon Envy (Aresh) converses with Z. in Dk. IX, xxxi, 6-11.

Aharman tempts Z. with the promise of 1000 years dominion, in Mkh. LVII, 24-29.

About Maîdôk-mâh, in Dk. IX, xlv, 19.

Z. coming to preach to king Vistâsp, in Sg. X, 64-68.

Archangels assist Z. in converting Vistâsp, also the war with Argâsp, in Dk. VIII, xi, 2-4.

The war of the religion with Argâsp mentioned in Bd. XII, 33.

The families of Zaratûst, Hvôv, and Vistâsp mentioned in Dk. VIII, xxix, 25.

About Frashôstar and Gâmâsp in Dk. VIII, xxxviii, 68; IX, xlii, 8, 9; xlv, 17, 18.

About Kaî-Vistâsp, Frashôstar, Porûtâst, Gâmâsp, and Hûtôs in Dk. IX, xlv, 3-5.

Brâd-rûkhsh, or Brâdrô-rêsh the Tûr, mentioned as destroying the righteous man, in Dd. LXXII, 8; Sd. IX, 5; Dk. VIII, xxxv, 13; IX, x, 3.

The last millenniums mentioned in Dk. IX, xxxix, 18; xli, 6-8.

Events in the last two millenniums, in Byt. II, 22-III, 62.

The resurrection described in Bd. XXX.

30. Beyond the frequent occurrence of the names of the chief actors in the traditions, there are not many references to the Zoroastrian legends in the extant Avesta. This is owing to the fact that three-fourths of the Avesta texts, including the Nasks specially devoted to these legends, have been lost. The chief references to them that still survive in the Avesta are as follows:—

The passing on of the kingly glory from ruler to ruler, from Haoshyang,ha to Kava-Haosrava, from Zarathustra to Kava-Vistâspa and the Saoshyant, in Yt. XIX, 25-90.

The terror of the demons on hearing of the birth of Z., in Vd. XIX, 43-47.

Z. mentioned as son of Pourushaspa in Yt. V, 18.

Verethraghna gives Z. strength, health, vigour, and keenness of sight (Yt. XIV, 33).

References to Z.'s conference with Ahura Mazda, and his rejection of the demons, in Yas. XII, 5, 6.

The demons attempt to destroy Z., and to tempt him, but are repelled by recitations, in Vd. XIX, 1-10.

Commentary on the Ahunavair, in Yas. XIX.

Z. converses with Haoma, in Yas. IX, 1-16.

Fate of the soul after death revealed to Z., in Vd. XIX, 26-34.

Z. is taught various spells, in Yt. XIV, 34-38.

He prays that he may convert the queen Hutaosa, in Yt. IX, 26; XVII, 46.

References to the battle with Aregad-aspa, in Yt. V, 109, 113, 116, 117; IX, 30; XVII, 50, 51.

Z.'s reply to Frashaostra regarding the ritual, in Yas. LXXI, 1-11.

There are also other references to Kava-Vîstâspa, Frashaostra, Gâmâspa, Pouruîstâ, Maidhyômau, the Haêkadaspas, Spitamas, and Saoshyants. And the Fravashis of all the righteous persons receive homage in Yt. XIII. Of the unbelievers, the Karapans and Kavis are mentioned several times in the Gâthas and Yasts, including the Hôma Yast; and the Usikshsh once in the Gâthas.

31. So far as these references in the Avesta extend, they agree with the Pahlavi versions of the legends, and occasionally state some further particulars. We may, therefore, safely conclude that these Pahlavi versions present a fairly complete view of the Zoroastrian legends current in Sâsânian times. But we have another means of testing this conclusion more fully in the Persian Zartust-nâmah, translated by Eastwick in the Appendix to *The Parsi Religion, as contained in the Zand-Avasta*, by John Wilson, D. D. (Bombay: 1843).

32. This Zartust-nâmah contains 1570 Persian couplets, composed by Zartust Bahrâm Pazdû, apparently at the ancient city of Raî, and finished on August 12, 1278. But Eastwick's English translation was made from a good MS. of this poem, written by Dastûr Barzû Qiyâmu-d-dîn (= Kâmdîn) in 1636, belonging to the Wilson Collection and now in the library of Lord Crawford at Wigan. Zartust Bahrâm relates how a priest of Raî, named Kaî-Kâûs, son of Kaî-Khusrô, showed him an old Pahlavi MS.

narrating the history of Zartust, and offered to interpret it, if he would undertake to paraphrase it, in Persian verse, for the information of others.

33. After mentioning Z.'s grandfather and father, descended from king Frêdûn, a frightful dream of his mother is related, in which she sees herself attacked by wild beasts eager for the destruction of her son, who drives them away. She relates her dream to an astrologer, who prognosticates a wonderful career for the unborn child ; but this dream is an addition to the Pahlavi texts.

34. The child is born, and laughs at birth, exciting admiration among the women and dismay among the magicians. Dûrânsarûn, their chief, comes to see the child, and tries to kill him with a dagger ; but his hand is withered, and the magicians carry off the child, who is exposed to death from fire, oxen, horses, and wolves, but all in vain, as his mother brings him home safe on each occasion. Another magician, named Bartarûsh, then foretells that Z. cannot be destroyed, and will establish a new religion ; and he repeats this to the child's father, naming Gustâsp as his future protector. This narrative corresponds with Dk. VII, iii, 2-31 ; but then follows the addition that he was confided to the care of an old man, named Barzînkârûs, till he completed his seventh year.

35. Then Dûrânsarûn and Bartarûsh went together to see him, and tried their magic arts upon him in vain (*ibid.* 32, 33). Afterwards, when Z. was sick, Bartarûsh supplied him with filthy drugs, but he threw them on the ground, which seems to be another version of Zs. XVIII, 5, 6. Then follows a paraphrase of Dk. VII, iii, 34-48, and Zs. XX, 4, 5 ; XXI, 1-20, 23-27, with some additional remarks about worship and the Avesta being taught to Z. The conferences with the six archangels are more detailed than in Zs. XXII, and more ritualistic in their tendency.

36. When Z. returns to the earth, he is met by the demons and magicians, who oppose him, but are killed or dispersed by the utterance of an Avesta text ; in which account we have an extreme condensation of Dk. VII, iv, 36-46, 57-62. He then goes to the court of king Gustâsp,

where he is hospitably received by the king, surrounded by his princes and wise men. With the latter Z. enters into argument, and overcomes them all successively. This is repeated, till all the learned of the realm are vanquished in argument, in the course of three successive days.

37. Then Z. produces the Avesta and Zand, and reads a chapter ; but the king hesitates to accept it, until he learns more about it ; and Z. retires to his lodgings. In the meantime, the wise men form a conspiracy to ruin Z., by secreting in his lodgings, with the connivance of his doorkeeper, many of the impure things used by sorcerers. The next day, while the king and Z. are examining the Avesta, the wise men denounce Z. as a sorcerer ; his lodgings are searched, and the impurities are brought to the king, who becomes angry and commits Z. to prison.

38. Now the king had a magnificent black horse, and when Z. had been a week in prison, this horse fell sick, and was found with its four feet drawn up to its belly. When the king was informed, he summoned his wise men, but they could suggest no remedy ; so the king and all his people remained fasting all day and lamenting, and the jailer forgot to take any food to Z. till the evening, when he told Z. about the state of the black horse.

39. Z. requested the jailer to inform the king that he could cure the horse ; and the king, on hearing this the next day, releases Z., who undertakes to restore the horse's limbs to their natural state, on receiving four solemn promises, one for the cure of each leg. Three of these promises are that the king, his son Isfendyâr (= Spend-dâd), and the queen, should each undertake to accept his religion and never forsake it ; and the fourth promise is that the false accusation of sorcery, made by the wise men, should be investigated.

40. After each promise Z. prays vehemently, and each limb is restored to use. While, on the confession of Z.'s doorkeeper, the wise men are convicted of fraudulent deceit, and are sent to execution. The Persian version is here a highly embellished paraphrase of Dk. VII, iv, 64-70, especially in the horse episode.

41. King Gustâsp next asks Z. to pray for information as to the king's future position in the other world, also that he may become invulnerable, omniscient as to worldly affairs, and immortal ; but Z. tells him that he must be satisfied with the first wish for himself, and the remaining three for other persons. The next day, while the king is sitting in court with Z. present, horsemen arrive, who are the archangels Bahman and Ardabahist, with the spirits of the Khûrdâd and Gusâsp fires. They are sent to testify the truth of Z.'s mission, and to urge the king to accept the religion ; this he does, and they then depart ; when Z. informs the king that his four wishes will be granted, as he will soon see. For some of these details see Dk. VII, iv, 74-82.

42. Zartust then performs the Darun ceremony, having provided wine, perfume, milk, and a pomegranate. After reciting prayers from the Avesta, he gives the wine to the king to drink, who then falls into a trance and sees his own future position in heaven, and those of others. His son Peshôtan receives the milk which makes him immortal. The perfume, or incense, is given to Gâmâsp who obtains knowledge of all events till the resurrection. And Isfendyâr, the warlike son of Gustâsp, eats one grain of the pomegranate and becomes invulnerable. The Pahlavi versions are silent about the king's four wishes and their fulfilment, except such hints as may be conveyed in Dk. VII, iv, 84-86. Afterwards, Z. reads the Avesta to the king and comments upon it ; concluding with praises of the creator.

43. To this narrative Zartust Bahrâm adds a further episode of Z. asking for immortality, at the time when he went with Bahman to confer with the creator. His request is refused, but the creator gives him a drop of liquid to drink, like honey, and he sees everything in both worlds, as in a vision. When he wakes up, he relates what he saw in heaven and hell ; and also describes a tree with seven branches of gold, silver, copper, brass, lead, steel, and mixed iron, respectively, overshadowing the world. The creator explains that these seven branches represent seven

powerful personages who arise in successive ages of the world. The golden branch is Z. himself, the silver is Gustâsp, the copper is an Askânian king, the brass is Ardashîr the Sâsânian, the lead is king Bahrâm (Gôr), the steel is Nôshêrvân who destroys the heretic Mazdak, and the mixed iron is the malicious monarch who upsets the true faith. Then follow many details of the lamentable evils which then occur; and when the Hazârahs¹ appear, the condition of Irân becomes still worse, as described in Byt. II, III, until the arrival of king Bahrâm the Hamâvand from India, and Peshôtan from Kangdiz, who restore the Irânian monarchy and religion.

44. This additional narrative is evidently a paraphrase of the Pahlavi Bahman Yast, translated in S. B. E., vol. v, pp. 191-235; and that Pahlavi text appears to be merely an enlarged edition of Fargard VII of the *Sûzkar Nask*, of which a short summary is given in Dk. IX, viii.

45. From the foregoing epitome of the Persian Zartust-nâmah, it will be evident that its author's information was a combination of the statements still surviving in Dk. VII and Zs. XII-XXIII, so far as they suited his fancy and convenience. Many statements are omitted, others either condensed, or greatly elaborated; but very few novelties can be detected, excepting such as are clearly due to the writer's own imagination. Whether any small residuum of these novelties can be attributed to other sources than the Persian writer's fancy, must remain doubtful until some older authority for such details is discovered.

46. With regard to Z.'s vision of heaven and hell, which is mentioned in Zartust Bahrâm's final episode, his immediate informant was certainly Byt. II, 11-13; but the original authority was the Spēnd Nask, as summarized in Dk. VIII, xiv, 7, 8, although Dk. VII omits this incident, and Zs. XXI, 21, 22 merely mentions the bodily appearance of the omniscient wisdom, without referring to Z.'s vision. The details of the conferences with the six archangels,

¹ Those specially belonging to the latter millenniums, probably meaning the people who were expected to make most of the last two centuries intolerably wicked.

which are summarized in Dk. VIII, xiv, 9, as having existed in the Spēd Nask, are also omitted in Dk. VII, though briefly stated in Zs. XXII.

47. It is worthy of notice that Z. was first sent to offer his religion to the Kîgs and Karaps and their sovereign, Aûrvâtâ-dang the Tûr (see Dk. VII, iv, 2-20), who seem to have received his doctrines favourably, excepting his advocacy of Khvêtûk-das¹, which led to their rejection of his proposal. He was next sent to the Karap Vêdvôist (ibid. 21-28), whom Aûharmazd had hitherto befriended; but this Karap was rejected for illiberality and arrogance. Z. then went to Parshad-tôrâ in Sagâstân (ibid. 31-35), taking some Hô-m-water with him, to cure an infirm bull belonging to this chieftain, as soon as the latter had accepted the religion in public; the chieftain assented to the religion, though only privately, but this was sufficient to obtain the cure of his bull. It was only after these three trials that the conversion of king Vistâp was attempted.

48. There is some difficulty in understanding the exact difference between the primeval religion and that taught by Zaratûst. When Dk. VII, i, 9-11 speaks of Aûharmazd talking with Masyê and Masyâôî; or Hadish tells them of Aûharmazd, the archangels, and the Ahunavair (ibid. 12, 13); or the sacred beings are said to have taught them the primitive arts (ibid. 14); or we are told of the existence of demons in the times of Hôshâng and Tâkhmôrup (ibid. 18, 19); or of Ashavahistô in the time of king Pâtakhsrôbô (ibid. 34); it may be urged that the mention of these beings in connection with the men of those times is no proof that their existence was known then. Because it only shows that the old writers, being satisfied that these beings existed in their own time and were immortal, only logically assumed that they must have existed in former times. The really weak point in their argument being the assumption of the existence of such beings in their own time.

49. Safer conclusions may be formed by noticing the

¹ For the meaning of this term, as defined by the texts which use it, see S. B. E., vol. xviii, pp. 389-430.

dogmas that Zaratûst most strongly advocates and reprobates. When he goes to his first conference (Dk. VII, iii, 56-62) he goes in search of righteousness. When he went to Aûrvâtâ-dang, as mentioned above, he advocated the praise of righteousness, scorn of the demons, and the observance of ceremonies; but it was only his scorn of the demons, which took the form of Khvétûk-das, that the Karaps really rejected. In Dk. VII, iv, 14, he says, 'worldly righteousness is the whole worship of the demons, and the end of the *Mazda*-worship of Z.' Though the Hôrn plant was sacred before Z.'s birth (ibid. ii, 22-47), the Hôrn-water (ibid. iv, 29-35) seems to have been a distinctive token of Z.'s religion; also chanting the Ahunavair (ibid. iv, 38, 41, 42, 56, 61) and the Avesta in general (ibid. 63). The perverted religion and demonizing of the Kîgs and Karaps appear to have been the worst faults he had to find with them (ibid. 64, 67). And the archangels tell Vistâsp that the world requires the good religion which proceeds through Z.'s recitation, so he should chant the Ahunavair and Ashem-vohû, and not worship the demons (ibid. 79, 80). Again, when Dûrâsrôb and Brâzrôk-rêsh partake of food with Pôrûshâspô and Zaratûst (ibid. iii, 34, 38), the latter does not object to the form of worship proposed, but to the person selected to conduct it; and he then proclaims his own reverence for the righteous and the poor.

50. From these statements we may conclude that the old writers, who have handed down these legends from ancient times, were of opinion that Zaratûst was not so much the founder of a totally new religion, as he was a reformer who retained as much of the prior religion as was not seriously objectionable. While strongly insisting upon the necessity of reverencing all good spirits, he strictly prohibited all propitiation of evil spirits. His law was to resist and destroy all that is evil and injurious to man, and to respect and honour all that is good and beneficial to him. According to the legends, he seems to have found little gross idolatry, in the form of image-worship, to reprobate. From the times of the idol-worship encouraged by Dahâk in Bâpêl (Dk. VII, iv, 72), and of the destruction of the

celebrated idol-temple on the shore of Lake *Kêkast* by *Kaî-Khûsrôî* (ibid. i, 39; *Mkh.* ii, 95), we find nothing in the legends about this form of idolatry, till 'the oppressiveness of infidelity and idol-worship,' shortly after the downfall of the *Sâsânians*, is lamented (*Dk.* VII, viii, 6). Demon-worship (ibid. iii, 35; iv, 30; vii, 17, 36, 37; viii, 7, 34), although a term sometimes applied to idolatry, seems to be often used in its literal sense of 'worship of evil spirits,' one form of which is described by *Zarâtûst* (ibid. iv, 47-53).

51. Another interesting study, for which these Zoroastrian legends supply materials, is the traditional chronology which they contain; and how far it will be found, upon examination, to harmonize with the system stated in *Bd.* XXXIV, or to explain the manifest inaccuracies of that system. The matter is rather complicated, but the Zoroastrian system can be connected with the European system of chronology with some degree of probability.

52. The epoch of Zoroastrian chronology is 'the coming of the religion,' but it has long been doubtful whether this event was the birth of *Zarâtûst*, or his going to conference with the sacred beings, or the acceptance of the religion by *Vistâsp*. Any doubt, however, as to the meaning of the phrase, has now been removed by the statement in *Dk.* VII, viii, 51, that the first century of the religion is that from the time when *Zarâtûst* came forth to his conference, which event happened when he was thirty years old (ibid. iii, 51, 60, 62). It is also stated, in *Bd.* XXXIV, 7, that *Vistâsp* reigned thirty years before the coming of the religion, that is, before *Zarâtûst* went to his conference. From these data it is evident that the traditional Zoroastrian chronology makes the birth of *Zarâtûst* coincide with the accession of *Vistâsp*.

53. The nearest date to these events, which is well defined in both the Zoroastrian and European systems of chronology, is that of the death of Alexander, near mid-summer in B.C. 323, which *Bd.* XXXIV, 7, 8, places 272 years after the coming of the religion, that is, after the thirtieth year of *Vistâsp*'s reign. And if this were the first

year of the religion, the death of Alexander must have occurred in its 273rd year, according to the Bundahis.

54. But this has to be reconciled with the statement in Zs. XXIII, 12, that, after its 300th year, 'the religion is disturbed and the monarchy is contested;' which statement is expressed more definitely by AV. I, 2-6, when it asserts that the religion remained in purity for 300 years, but then Alexander came to Irân and destroyed the monarchy. If these statements be accepted literally, they imply that Alexander invaded Irân either in the 300th year of the religion, or shortly after that date, but certainly not before it. We cannot place Alexander's invasion of Irân itself at a later date than the battle of Gaugamela (B.C. 331); and if this were the 300th year of the religion, the death of Alexander (B.C. 323) must have occurred in its 308th, instead of its 273rd year, and the coming of the religion would have to be put back thirty-five years. This may be done with some plausibility by assuming an omission of thirty-five years between the reigns of Hûmâi and Dârâi, where the Bundahis passes from traditional to historical personages. Alexander's invasion must also have been a good and sufficient reason for the dissolution of the hundred-discipledom, or priestly college, established by Sênô, which lasted only till the 300th year, as Zs. XXIII, 11 informs us.

55. If we now adopt the abbreviations A. R. for '*anno religionis*' and B. R. for '*before the religion*,' we are prepared to compile the following synopsis of Zoroastrian Chronology according to the millennial system of the Bundahis, extended to the end of time, but dealing only with traditional matters, combined with the European dates of the same events, deduced from the synchronism of A. R. 300 with B. C. 331, as stated above in § 54:—

B. R. 9000, B. C. 9630. Beginning of the first millennium of Time; and formation of the Fravashis, or primary ideas of the good creations, which remain insensible and motionless for 3000 years (Bd. I, 8; XXXIV, 1).

„ 6000, B. C. 6630. Beginning of the fourth millennium, when the spiritual body of Zaratûst is framed together, and remains 3000 years with the archangels (Dk. VII, ii, 15, 16), while

the primeval man and ox exist undisturbed in the world, because the evil spirit is confounded and powerless (Bd. I, 20, 22; III, 1, 3, 5; XXXIV, 1).

- B. R. 3000, B. C. 3630. Beginning of the seventh millennium, when the evil spirit rushes into the creation on new-year's day, destroys the primeval ox, and distresses Gâyômarđ, the primeval man (Bd. I, 20; III, 10-20, 24-27; XXXIV, 2). Z. appears to remain with the archangels for 2969 years longer.
- „ 2970, B. C. 3600. Gâyômarđ passes away (Bd. III, 21-23; XXXIV, 2).
- „ 2930, B. C. 3560. Masyê and Masyâôi had grown up (Bd. XV, 2; XXXIV, 3).
- „ 2787, B. C. 3417. Accession of Hôshâng (Bd. XXXIV, 3).
- „ 2747, B. C. 3377. Accession of Tâkhmôrup (ibid. 4).
- „ 2717, B. C. 3347. Accession of Yim (ibid.).
- „ 2000, B. C. 2630. Beginning of the eighth millennium. Accession of Dahâk (ibid. 4, 5).
- „ 1000, B. C. 1630. Beginning of the ninth millennium. Accession of Frêđûn (ibid. 5, 6).
- „ 500, B. C. 1130. Accession of Mânûskîhar (ibid. 6).
- „ 428, B. C. 1058. Spendarmad comes to Mânûskîhar at the time of Frâsiyâv's irrigation works (Zs. XII, 3-6). The MSS. have B. R. 528, but to bring this date into the reign of Mânûskîhar would be inconsistent with the millennial arrangement; while to assume a clerical error of one century is a probable explanation, as it makes the date more consistent with the allusion to Frâsiyâv, whose irrigation works, mentioned in Bd. XX, 34; XXI, 6, must have been carried out in the latter part of Mânûskîhar's reign.
- „ 380, B. C. 1010. Accession of Aûzôbbô (Bd. XXXIV, 6).
- „ 375, B. C. 1005. Accession of Kaî-Kqbâd (ibid. 6, 7).
- „ 360, B. C. 990. Accession of Kaî-Ûs (ibid. 7).
- „ 300, B. C. 930. Zaratûst first mentioned by the ox that Srtô killed (Zs. XII, 7-20).
- „ 210, B. C. 840. Accession of Kaî-Khûsrôî (Bd. XXXIV, 7).
- „ 150, B. C. 780. Accession of Kaî-Loharâsp (ibid.).
- „ 45, B. C. 675. The Glory descends from heaven at the birth of Dûkdak (Zs. XIII, 1).
- „ 30, B. C. 660. Accession of Kaî-Vistâsp (Bd. XXXIV, 7). Vohûmanô and Ashavahistô descend into the world with a stem of Hôm (Dk. VII, ii, 24). Zaratûst is born (ibid. v 1).

- B. R. 23, B. C. 653. Z. is seven years old when two Karaps visit his father, and Dûrâsrôbô dies (Dk. VII, iii, 32, 34, 45).
- „ 15, B. C. 645. Z. is fifteen years old when he and his four brothers ask for their shares of the family property (Zs. XX, 1).
- „ 10, B. C. 640. Z. leaves home at the age of twenty (ibid. 7).
- A. R. I, B. C. 630. Beginning of the tenth millennium. Z. goes forth to his conference with the sacred beings on the 45th day of the 31st year of Vistâsp's reign (Dk. VII, iii, 51-62; viii, 51; Zs. XXI, 1-4).
- „ 3, B. C. 628. Z. returns from his first conference in two years, and preaches to Aûrvâtâ-dang and the Karaps without success (Dk. VII, iv, 2-20).
- „ 11, B. C. 620. After his seventh conference, in the tenth year he goes to Vistâsp; Mêdyômâh is also converted (ibid. 1, 65; Zs. XXI, 3; XXIII, 1, 2, 8).
- „ 13, B. C. 618. Twelve years after Z. went to conference, Vistâsp accepts the religion, though hindered for two years by the Karaps (Dk. VII, v, 1; Zs. XXIII, 5, 7).
- „ 20, B. C. 611. A Kavîg, son of Kûndah, is converted (Zs. XXIII, 8).
- „ 30, B. C. 601. Defeat of Argâsp and his Khyons (ibid.).
- „ 40, B. C. 591. Vohûnêm is born (ibid.). About this time the Avesta is written by Gâmâsp from the teaching of Z. (Dk. IV, 21; V, iii, 4; VII, v, 11).
- „ 48, B. C. 583. Z. passes away, or is killed, aged seventy-seven years and forty days, on the 41st day of the year (Dk. V, iii, 2; VII, v, 1; Zs. XXIII, 9).
- „ 58, B. C. 573. Arrival of the religion is known in all regions (Dk. VII, vi, 12).
- „ 63, B. C. 568. Frashôstar passes away (Zs. XXIII, 10).
- „ 64, B. C. 567. Gâmâsp passes away (ibid.).
- „ 73, B. C. 558. Hangâûrûsh, son of Gâmâsp, passes away (ibid.).
- „ 80, B. C. 551. Asmôk-khanvatô passes away, and Akht the wizard is killed (ibid.).
- „ 91, B. C. 540. Accession of Vohûman, son of Spend-dâd (Bd. XXXIV, 7, 8).
- „ 100, B. C. 531. Sênô is born (Dk. VII, vii, 6).
- „ 200, B. C. 431. Sênô passes away (ibid.; Zs. XXIII, 11).
- „ 203, B. C. 428. Accession of Hûmâf (Bd. XXXIV, 8).

[Here ends the fragment of the old millennial system preserved in the Bundahis which omits thirty-five years in

this place, as explained in § 54, with the effect of postponing the end of the millennium. It then proceeds to finish the chronology in its own fashion; mentioning only three historical names, which are here added; the thirty-five omitted years being also inserted.]

- A. R. 268, B. C. 363. Accession of Dārâi (ibid.).
 „ 280, B. C. 351. Accession of Dārâi, descendant of Dārâi (ibid.).
 „ 294, B. C. 337. Accession of Alexander¹ (ibid.).
 „ 300, B. C. 331. Invasion by Alexander. Sênô's hundred-discipledom ends, the religion is disturbed, and the monarchy contested (Zs. XXIII, 11, 12; AV. I, 2-6).
 „ 308, B. C. 323. Death of Alexander (Bd. XXXIV, 8).
 „ 400, B. C. 231. Benightedness arises (Dk. VII, vii, 9).
 „ 440-560, B. C. 191-71². Orthodoxy is still upheld by four successive high-priests (Dk. VII, vii, 8-10).
 „ 800-950, A. D. 170-320. The ninth and tenth centuries are represented as very evil and miserable (ibid. viii, 2-45, 61).
 „ 971, A. D. 341. Aûshêðar is born (ibid. 55-57).
 „ 1001, A. D. 371. Beginning of the eleventh millennium, when the sun stands still for ten days, and Aûshêðar is thirty years old and confers with the sacred beings (ibid. 58-60).
 „ 1400-1500, A. D. 770-870. In this century the wizard Mahrkûs produces seven awful winters successively, in which most of mankind and animals perish, including himself (ibid. ix, 3).
 „ 1971, A. D. 1341. Aûshêðar-mâh is born (ibid. 18-20).
 „ 2001, A. D. 1371. Beginning of the twelfth millennium, when the sun stands still for twenty days, and Aûshêðar-mâh is thirty years old and confers with the sacred beings (ibid. 21-23).
 „ 2971, A. D. 2341. Sôshâns is born (ibid. x, 15-18).
 „ 3001, A. D. 2371. Beginning of the preparation for the Renovation, when the sun stands still for thirty days, and Sôshâns is thirty years old (ibid. 19); but another passage (ibid. xi, 2) implies that this is the date of his birth.
 „ 3028, A. D. 2398. The renovation of the universe occurs at the end of the fifty-seventh year of Sôshâns (ibid. 4, 7).

¹ He became king of Macedon B. C. 336, and of Persia in 331.

² The erroneous dates in the Bundahis chronology (see § 57) alter this period to B. C. 156-36.

56. We must suppose that the millennial chronology, which the Bundahis discontinues in the middle of the tenth millennium, was originally completed to the end of Time, as attempted in this synopsis, in accordance with the statements in Byt. and Dk. But the allusions to future events and denunciations of coming evils were, no doubt, of a mythological or general character, such as those still surviving in Dk. VII, vii, 29-32; viii, 40, 41, 44-46, 48-60; ix-xi. Whenever we meet with seemingly prophetic descriptions and denunciations, which clearly allude to historical events, such as those in Dk. VII, vii, 3-28; viii, 2, 10, 23, 32-36, 42, 43, 47, 61, they must, of course, be treated as interpolations of a later date than the events themselves. And there are several passages that may belong to either class.

57. It has been already shown, in § 54, that the death of Alexander, which the Bundahis places in A. R. 273, must have occurred in A. R. 308 according to other traditional records. If this error of thirty-five years stood alone, it might be considered accidental; but when we find that the Bundahis supplies only 284 years for the Askânians, to fill up the whole interval of 548 years between Alexander and Ardashîr, son of Pâpak, we must conclude that these two errors were intended for the purpose which they both fulfil, that of postponing the end of the tenth millennium. On the other hand, the Sâsânians who ruled for 425 years, are allowed 460 years in the Bundahis, which just counter-balances the thirty-five years omitted after the time of Hûmâî. This third error may be considered unintentional, as it probably arose from counting the year of each succession twice over, first in the reign of the deceased king, and again in that of his successor.

58. The extent to which the Bundahis chronology is distorted, by these three errors, will be better understood on inspection of the following tabular statement than from any description of the results, merely observing that the year of the religion (A. R.) is given according to Bundahis dates in the first column, and according to real dates in the second. Several intermediate events have been inserted,

for the sake of illustration, and each of their Bundahis dates includes its proper proportion of the errors¹:—

Bd. date. A. R.	Real date. A. R.		Real date. B. C.	Bd. date. B. C.
265,	300.	Invasion by Alexander . . .	331,	331.
273,	308.	Death of Alexander . . .	323,	323.
321,	400.	Real date of A. R. 400 . . .	231,	275.
400,	553.	Bd. date of A. R. 400 . . .	78,	196.
528,	800.	Real date of A. R. 800 . . .	A. D. 170,	68.
557,	856.	Accession of Ardashîr . . .	226,	39.
605,	900.	Real date of A. R. 900 . . .	270, A. D.	10.
647,	939.	Accession of Shahpûhar II . . .	309,	52.
713,	1000.	Real date of A. R. 1000 . . .	370,	118.
786,	1068.	Accession of Yazdakarđ II . . .	438,	191.
800,	1081.	Bd. date of A. R. 800 . . .	451,	205.
841,	1118.	Accession of Kavâd . . .	488,	246.
884,	1158.	Execution of the Mazdakites . . .	528,	289.
887,	1161.	Accession of Khûsrô I . . .	531,	292.
900,	1173.	Bd. date of A. R. 900 . . .	543,	305.
951,	1220.	Accession of Khûsrô II . . .	590,	356.
1000,	1265.	Bd. date of A. R. 1000 . . .	635,	405.
1017,	1281.	Death of Yazdakarđ III . . .	651,	422.

59. The object of preparing this statement has been to ascertain the reason for the intentional errors in the Bundahis chronology, and the probable period at which they were introduced. It has been mentioned, in § 57, that the effect of both the errors, which are not accidental, has been to postpone the end of the tenth millennium, but they also postpone the dates of some other events which are mentioned in the Zoroastrian legends.

60. Thus, we are told in Dk. VII, vii, 9, that benightedness arises after A.R. 400, which is postponed by the errors from B. C. 231 to 78, but both of these times seem to have been equally unpropitious to the Zoroastrians. Then we learn (*ibid.* 10, 11) that in the fifth and sixth centuries, say A.R. 440–560, orthodoxy is still upheld by four successive high-priests. This period is postponed by the errors from B. C. 191–71 to 156–36 (see p. xxxi, n. 2), and Zoroastrianism was probably flourishing the whole time. So far, no reason for the alterations can be discovered, as the vague description of events, supplied by the old writer, appears to be

¹ The basis of calculation is the real date of each event and real century, but the Bd. date of each Bd. century. The only Bd. data are 284 years from the death of Alexander to the accession of Ardashîr, and 460 years from the latter to the death of Yazdakarđ III, as stated in § 57.

just as applicable to the original periods as to the altered ones.

61. We are further informed (Dk. VII, viii, 2-45) that much evil and misery occur in the ninth and tenth centuries (A.R. 800-1000), at all events until the birth of Aûshêdar (ibid. 55-57) in A.R. 971; and such events as war, invasion, fall of monarchy, oppression, persecution, infidelity, and apostasy are mentioned. Aûshêdar confers with the arch-angels in A.R. 1001 (ibid. 58-60), and the evils afterwards pass away till A.R. 1400-1500 (ibid. ix, 3), when frightful winters occur. The evil period A.R. 800-971 was originally A.D. 170-341, or from the middle of the reign of Vologeses III to the middle of that of Shahpûhar II. But the Bundahis postpones this period to A. D. 451-608, or from the time of the Armenian revolt in the reign of Yazdakard II, to that of the first total defeat of a Persian army by the Arabs near Dhû-Qâr in the reign of Khûsrô II. The evil times were probably expected to continue till the end of the millennium, or later, as in the case of Zaratûst himself; for Aûshêdar does not go to his conference till A.R. 1001, and might not be expected to begin to preach till A.R. 1011. These dates, originally A.D. 371-381, comprising the remainder of the reign of Shahpûhar II, would be altered by Bd. to A. D. 636-645, a period which includes the last two great battles with the Arabs, that decided the downfall of the Sâsânian dynasty, though king Yazdakard III lived some six years longer as a fugitive¹.

62. It is hardly possible that king Ardashîr (A.D. 226-241) and his chancellor Tanvasar, when collecting and revising their sacred books, would have compiled the original traditional system of chronology, however general might have been the terms in which the evils were described by the records they possessed, because it would have been a voluntary confession that they had no power to remedy

¹ The authorities consulted, for Persian historical facts and dates, have been Nöldeke, *Aufsätze zur persischen Geschichte*; and A. von Gutschmid, *Geschichte Irans und seiner Nachbarländer von Alexander dem Grossen bis zum Untergang der Arsaciden*: edited by Nöldeke.

the evils of their own time. But if they found the system in an ancient document, they might have been quite willing to admit that evils existed, owing to their enemies, which would have become much worse if they had not been mitigated by their own exertions. In fact, an old document prophesying evil which actually occurred at the time specified, could be used as evidence of the truth of their religion, and would therefore be carefully preserved. And it is quite certain that, if they had altered the chronology of an old document which foretold the time of the downfall of the monarchy, they could not have correctly guessed that time before the downfall occurred. For these reasons we must conclude that the original system of chronology, handed down by the Bundahis, was neither compiled nor altered in the time of Ardashîr.

63. For the long reign of Shahpûhar II (A.D. 309-379) the original tradition predicted not only a continuation of evil times, but also the birth and education of a new apostle, *Aûshêdar*, for the next millennium, who was expected to put an end to evil for about four centuries. His birth was to take place in A. D. 341, and his conference was to commence in 371. These dates are so well defined that, if we could discover any important religious teacher to whom they could refer, we might be justified in believing that the original chronology was compiled in his time. Unfortunately, we know very little of the internal history of Persia during this reign; there was war with the Romans in 337-350 and 358-363, and on the eastern frontiers in the intervening period; also a persecution of the Christians, beginning about 339; all of which fairly represent the predicted evils.

64. Regarding the priesthood and religious history of the reign, we have only the traditions handed down in Pahlavi texts to guide us. In these we are told that *Âtûrpâd*, son of *Mâraspend* (Dk. VII, vii, 19), was born in the steel period (Dk. IX, viii, 4), and lived in the reign of king Shahpûhar II, son of *Aûhar mazd* (AV. p. 145 n), being high-priest over the religion (Dd. XXXVII, 36). He also collected and preserved the Nasks (Dk. VIII, i, 22),

and, after he had proved his orthodoxy by ordeal (Sg. X, 70, 71), the king proclaimed his intention of not allowing any more heterodoxy (Dk. IV, 27¹). In his old age he obtained a son, after devout prayer, and named him Zarātûst (Pandnâmak, 1); but this son also bore the Avesta title of Avarethrabau (Dk. VII, vii, 20, 21; VIII, xiii, 18), who is called the son of Râstare-vaghent in Yt. XIII, 106, showing that this latter Avesta title was adopted by Âtûrpâd himself. Finally, we meet with another Âtûrpâd, son of Zarātûst, described in Peshotan's Dk. III, cxxxvii, 2, as high-priest in the reign of Yazdakard I (A.D. 399-420), son of Shahpûhar, and also mentioned in Pahl. Yas. p. 120, ll. 14, 15 Sp. (translated in Dk. VIII, i, 7 n).

65. We have here, evidently, three successive high-priests, father, son, and grandson, and all celebrated men. The father had been employed in collecting and revising, or probably translating, some of the sacred books, and then, after a religious discussion, submitted himself to the ordeal of melted metal, as a test of his orthodoxy. The king was convinced, and his proclamation meant persecution of the heterodox, such as was commenced about A.D. 339, as regards the Christians. So that we may safely assume that Âtûrpâd's ordeal took place shortly before this date, and probably shortly after 337, when the Roman war commenced. As we must also certainly assume that the original chronology could not have come into existence at a much later date than 341, when so remarkable an event as the birth of a new apostle was fixed by it to occur, we have to consider who this apostle could have been; and whether it may not have been intended to identify him with Âtûrpâd's own son.

66. In the first place, is such a suspicion consistent with known dates? To represent Aûshêdar, according to the original chronology, the son must have been born A.D. 341 (§ 63); and we may suppose that the time of Aûshêdar's conference (371) would represent the time of Âtûrpâd's

¹ See S. B. E., vol. xxxvii, p. 415.

death, when his son succeeded him in the high-priesthood. If Âtûrpâd were aged eighty-one at his death, he would have been fifty-one at the birth of his son, or approaching old age; and he would have been born in 290, or nineteen years before the king. His grandson may have been born in 365, when his father Zaratûst was twenty-four, and may have succeeded that father in the high-priesthood about 400, the second year of king Yazdakard I. As all these dates are reasonably consistent with the few facts that are known, there seems to be no impossibility in the hypothesis that the original chronology of Aûshêdar's birth may have had some connection with the date of the birth of Âtûrpâd's son. The dates assumed, with regard to these three high-priests, which may be slightly varied, are as follows:—

Âtûrpâd,	born	290,	high-priest	320,	died	371.
Zaratûst,	"	341,	"	371,	"	400.
Âtûrpâd,	"	365,	"	400,	"	420, or later.

67. On the other hand, we must recollect that the time of the birth of Aûshêdar was not an isolated date which could be varied at pleasure, to suit any circumstances that might arise; but it was intimately connected with the dates of birth of three other apostles, which were each placed at the same distance from the ends of three other millenniums. It would perhaps be more difficult to suit a new millennial system of chronology, to the accidental year of a particular child's birth, than to have the child born in a particular year of an old system already existing. And, if so, it may be safer to assume that Âtûrpâd, knowing the year of the expected birth, took measures to secure the fulfilment of the prophecy, so far as the birth was concerned. If the child did not turn out so capable of regenerating the world as had been expected, that was a matter for posterity to explain. Under such circumstances of merely seeming fulfilment of a single particular, fraudulently obtained, the original prediction might be of any age.

68. It does not appear that the priestly councillors assembled by Khûsrô I (Byt. I, 7), made any alteration in

the original chronology, although they slightly revised the Pahlavi Vendidad. In fact, the priests, who must have been long expecting the end of Zarātûst's millennium, were probably looking forward for the approaching downfall of the Sâsânian monarchy, which might readily be understood, as the surest sign of the termination of this period, from such statements as those in Dk. VII, viii, 1, 2. At any rate, the alterations in the chronology, for the purpose of postponing the end of the tenth millennium till A.D. 635, would not have been made till some time after the termination of the monarchy in 651, but probably long before the compilation of the Bundahis about 900. The effects of these alterations upon the dates of the evil ninth and tenth centuries, and upon those of the birth, conference, and preaching of Aûshêdar, have been already stated in § 61. And their object has evidently been to adapt the old predictions as much as possible to real events; for which purpose also, the predictions themselves have probably been often made more definite than they were originally.

69. It follows, from the foregoing investigation, that the original chronology must have existed A.D. 341, and, in fact, we have found no sufficient reason for supposing that it was compiled as late as Sâsânian times. While the alterations, we find in the Bundahis, could have hardly been made till after 651.

70. Regarding the age in which Zarātûst lived, the dates stated in the synopsis of traditional chronology (§ 55), are B.C. 660–583, while the reign of Vistâsp, which extends to the fabulous length of 120 years, or 660–540, evidently represents a short dynasty, including Hystaspes and his next four forefathers, if we accept the traditional identification of Vistâsp with the father of Darius I. But the names of those four forefathers, which are known on the unimpeachable authority of the Behistûn inscription of Darius himself, render it almost impossible to accept this traditional identification, as they differ totally from those of the forefathers of Vistâsp in the Avesta. The two dynasties are as follows:—

Behistûn : Hakhâmanis	Avesta : Kavi Kavâta
Kaispis	Kava Usa
Ariyârâmna	Kava Husrava
Arshâma	Aurvadâspa
Vistâspa	Kava Vistâspa ¹

Unless it can be shown that these two series of names have the same meaning in two different languages, there seems little chance of proving the identity of the two dynasties. We may, however, quote the instances of the high-priest Âtûrpâd = Âtare-pâta and his son Zaratûst = Zarathustra being called Râstare-vaghent and Avarethra-bau, respectively, in the Avesta (see § 64); but these latter names seem more like titles than translations.

71. The date of Zoroaster and his religion has formerly been fully discussed by Windischmann² and others, and the question has been lately re-examined by Williams Jackson³. He divides the ancient statements, that have been made on the subject, into three classes: those which declare that Zaratûst lived before B.C. 6000, those which associate his name with Ninus and Semiramis, and the native tradition which, as we have seen, places his life in the period B.C. 660-583. Singularly enough, the oldest writers, those who lived only two to four centuries after the traditional period of the lifetime of Zaratûst, are those who report that he lived some 6000 years before that period. Pliny the Elder (Nat. Hist. XXX, 2) quotes Eudoxus (B.C. 368) as stating that Zaratûst existed 6000 years before the death of Plato, that is, B.C. 6347, which is also confirmed by Aristotle. And he quotes Hermippus (about B.C. 250) as placing him 5000 years before the Trojan war, that is, B.C. 6184. A third mode of describing this period

¹ These were the reigning sovereigns, but the last two are descended from a collateral branch, and their actual pedigree is as follows:—Kavi Kavâta, Kavi Aipivanghu, Kavi Pisanangh, Manus, Uzava, Aurvadâspa, Kava Vistâspa (Bd. XXXI, 28, 29).

² *Zoroastrische Studien*, von Fr. Windischmann, edited by Spiegel, 1863; pp. 121-165, 260-313.

³ *On the date of Zoroaster*, by A. V. Williams Jackson; Journal of American Oriental Society, vol. xvii, pp. 1-22.

seems to have been used by Xanthus of Lydia (B.C. 500–450)¹ who stated that Zaratûst lived 6000 years before Xerxes, as quoted by Diogenes Laertius, that is, B.C. 6485.

72. Three or four other classical writers mention similar statements, and Jackson points out that these extravagant dates are probably owing to the European writers misunderstanding Persian statements with reference to the pre-existence of Zaratûst's Fravashi. It will, in fact, be seen from the synopsis (§ 55) that the traditional account is that the spiritual body of Zaratûst was framed together as early as the beginning of the fourth millennium, which occurred B.C. 6630, and this may be accepted as a close approximation to the three dates, B.C. 6347, 6184, and 6485, indicated by the ancient writers, considering that their statements are made in even thousands of years.

73. Pliny also mentions, on the authority of other writers who are not named, that another Zoroaster, a Proconnesian, lived a little before the time of Osthanes who accompanied Xerxes to Greece (B.C. 480). And, so far as time is concerned, this Zoroaster might have been the traditional Zaratûst who died 103 years before this journey of Osthanes.

74. The old statements about Zoroaster or Oxyartes, the Magian king of Bactria in the time of Ninus and Semiramis, can hardly refer to the traditional Zaratûst who is never represented as a king, although the supreme Zarathustra of the Avesta was apparently a ruling priest. The time in which this Bactrian lived is also very uncertain, for though Semiramis has recently been placed about B.C. 800, her position in Albîrûnî's tables is certainly 1200 years earlier.

75. It seems, therefore, that the ancient statements, regarding the date of Zaratûst, reported by Pliny and corroborated by a few other classical writers, can be fully explained from the traditional system of chronology used in Pahlavi texts, by identifying the classical Zoroaster of the seventh millennium B.C. with the traditional Zaratûst

¹ There are some doubts as to the correctness of these dates.

in his ante-natal spiritual state, after he had ceased to be a mere Fravashi, or primary idea, and had become an intelligent, moving, and personal existence, but still a spirit. While the later Zoroaster of Pliny, who flourished before the fifth century B.C., must have lived about the same time as the same traditional Zaratûst after he came into the worldly existence, and may reasonably be identified with him, although Pliny had little information to give about him.

76. It will be noticed that this explanation depends entirely upon the peculiarly artificial system of the traditional chronology, in which the whole of time is assumed to consist of twelve millenniums devoted to different purposes; and if this particular system had not been in use at the time the statements, quoted by Pliny and Diogenes Laertius, were made, those statements could not have been explained as referring to the same individual. But if they do not refer to the same individual, we have only the options of rejecting all the statements, or believing an impossible date to be literally correct; neither of which decisions would be altogether satisfactory to a judicious mind. The only reasonable conclusion seems to be that the chronology based upon the twelve millenniums was in use in the fifth century B.C., about which time the earliest quoted statement seems to have been made.

77. It will also be observed that this millennial chronology is inextricably associated with the idea of the primeval existence of all good creations in the state of Fravashis. These are described as spiritual existences who remained three millenniums unthinking, unmoving, and intangible (Bd. I, 8); and the next three millenniums they still remained undisturbed by evil, mankind being represented, for that period, by Gâyômarô in the world (Bd. XXXIV, 1) and by the spiritual form of Zaratûst in heaven (Dk. VII, ii, 15), while the animals were symbolized by the primeval ox for the same period. Six millenniums, which are half the duration of time, were thus appropriated to Fravashis, spiritual and embodied, probably before the birth of Plato, if we may rely upon classical statements; and it must have

been before this date that the series of millenniums was arranged for all future history, till Time was expected to merge once more into Eternity at the renovation of the universe.

78. As we have seen that Zoroastrian tradition is very consistent in fixing the date of Zaratûst's activity about the end of the seventh century B.C., it may be asked, why have Avesta scholars so strongly insisted upon its greater antiquity? They may have had several reasons, but three, at least, were important. First, they had the classical statements which, as we have seen (§ 71), generally placed Zaratûst as far back as the seventh millennium B.C., on the testimony of persons who lived from two to four centuries after the traditional date of Zaratûst's death. No one, of course, could believe in the literal accuracy of the number of millenniums, which referred, as we have seen, to an imaginary period of spiritual existence, but this number was considered merely as an exaggeration which might be reduced to any amount that seemed reasonable. At the same time, this evidence for antiquity was quite sufficient, in the second place, to discredit the traditional date, of which these old authorities seemed ignorant, though it was a period then comparatively recent. And, if this discredit had not been sufficient to shake the faith of Avesta scholars in the traditional date of Zaratûst, they still had a third reason for their scepticism, when they discovered that the language of the Avesta was not merely a sister of Sanskrit, but that a large portion of it was sister to the oldest Sanskrit with which they were acquainted, and which appeared to them certainly older than the time of Gautama Buddha, who lived about one generation later than the traditional Zaratûst.

79. How far Avesta scholars were justified in their conclusions must be left for future ages to determine; at present we have no really historical information about the origin of Zoroastrianism, and must still consider it as decidedly prehistoric; though, it may be admitted that the Parsi calendar, as used in Persia, so far agrees with tradition, that it still bears witness to its own original institution in

the reign of Darius Hystaspes, as will be seen from the following details.

80. The Parsi year consists of twelve months, each consisting of thirty days, with five additional days added at the end of the year, and the total number of 365 days never varies, so that, whenever a leap-year occurs in our calendar, the beginning of the Parsi year retreats one day in the Christian calendar. In this manner, the total number of days which the beginning of the Parsi year has retreated, since the institution of their calendar, records the number of leap-years which would have occurred in the same period of Christian years, if the regular leap-years had existed the whole time; and four times the number of leap-years would be the total number of years. But as leap-years have not been used the whole time, we have to calculate from astronomical data.

81. In the first place, we want to know at what season the Parsi year originally began, and we learn this from Bd. XXV, 7, 20, where we are told that the winter of the rectified year ends with the five extra days, and the spring begins with the first month; which means that the rectified year begins with the vernal equinox. We also have to observe that, retreating at the rate of one day every four years, the beginning of the year retreats all round the year in 1460 years; and we know from general history that the period, with which we have to deal, is much more than 1460 years and less than 2920. Then we have to ascertain the exact length of the tropical year, which astronomers say is 365.2422 days, with an infinitesimal decrement, quite inappreciable in the period we have in view.

82. We may calculate back from any vernal equinox which occurs not too far from noon, say that of March 22, 1865, when the beginning of the Parsi year, according to Persian reckoning, had retreated to August 24, 1864, or 210 days, in addition to a previous retreat of a whole year of 365 days, or altogether 575 days since the establishment of the calendar. So that the difference between the Parsi year of 365 days and the correct tropical year of 365.2422 days had then accumulated to a total of 575 days. Divid-

ing the accumulated error of 575 days by the annual increment of 0.2422 of a day, we obtain a quotient of 2374 years, including A.D. 1865, as the time in which this error had accumulated, and this carries us back to B.C. 510 as an approximate date of the establishment of the Parsi calendar, with the first day of the year coinciding with the vernal equinox.

83. This date is, however, liable to some modifications for errors of observation on the part of the ancient astronomers, one of which errors, being constantly in one direction, must be taken into account. These old observers were not aware of the effect of refraction, which always makes the night seem somewhat shorter than it is in reality ; and this would lead them to antedate the vernal equinox by rather more than a day ; so that they would observe an apparent equinox in B.C. 505 on the same day in the Parsi year as that on which the real equinox occurred in B.C. 510. The most probable date of the establishment of the Parsi calendar is therefore B.C. 505, with a margin of four to eight years in either direction for *accidental* errors of observation.

84. A few years before this period we know, from the cuneiform inscriptions of Behistûn, that Darius Hystaspes used an older calendar, when recording his early victories over insurgents, which consolidated his empire. It was a time when he was introducing many reforms in the government, and, being a believer in Auramazdâ, his most influential advisers would probably be Zoroastrian priests. If they thought it necessary to reform the old calendar, the adoption of strictly Zoroastrian names for the new months and days in the Parsi calendar would be fully explained.

85. But, besides this ordinary civil calendar, in which new-year's day was constantly retreating, the Persians had a rectified calendar for religious purposes, which intercalated an extra month from time to time, for the purpose of bringing new-year's day forward again to the vernal equinox, and restoring the festivals to their proper seasons. It is this calendar which is used in Bd. XXV, and its days

and months are distinguished by the epithet *vəhîkākîg* (*veh + îk + ak + îg*), 'belonging to what is really good,' or *vehîkāk*, 'belonging to the really good,' which, in this connection, may be best expressed by the word 'rectified.'

86. This intercalation is described by Albîrûnî in various passages¹ which inform us that, after the new-year's day had retreated more than a month from the vernal equinox, the king would order the priests to arrange for the solemn proclamation of an extra month to be intercalated, between the last month of the year and the five extra days, by merely moving those five days from the end of the twelfth month to the end of the first month of the next year. The effect of this was to put an extra month into the earlier year which, beginning with the first month, would also end with the first month augmented by the five extra days as the usual termination of the year. All following years would begin with the second month, and end with the first month and the five extra days, until the second intercalation, when a year of thirteen months and five days would be again obtained, by merely moving the five extra days to the end of the second month which would thus become the last month of the year, while the third month would begin the year until the third intercalation. By these means, any number of intercalations could be made without any additional month being named, and the position of the five extra days always indicated the end of the rectified year, and that the rectified first month, which followed them, was to become the last month of the preceding year at the next rectification, or intercalation.

87. If the Parsi calendar, as used in Persia, were established B.C. 505, as we have calculated, it ought to have been rectified by an intercalation of one month about each of the following years:—B.C. 381, 257, 133, 10, A.D. 115, 239, 363, 487, 610. Albîrûnî (p. 121), however, has recorded only one intercalation of two months in the time of Yazdakard I (A.D. 399–420), son of Shahpûhar, when the

¹ Sachau's *Albîrûnî's Chronology of Ancient Nations*, pp. 12, 13, 38, 53–56, 121, 184, 185, 220, 221.

five extra days were removed to the end of the original eighth month Âbân, where they remained until Albîrûnî's own time (Alb. p. 56), about A.D. 1000. The reason for intercalating two months at once, was because the time for the seventh intercalation (A.D. 363) was already long past; so the eighth was added three or four score years in advance, being due in 487.

88. All that Albîrûnî says about this double intercalation is quite in accordance with the original establishment of the calendar by Darius Hystaspes, and would render any date more than thirty-seven years later than his reign impossible¹. With regard to the earlier intercalations (which must have occurred to account for the movement of the five extra days) that of A.D. 115 was neither in the reign of Vologeses I, nor in that of Vologeses III, one of whom must have been the Askânian renovator of the Avesta. That of A.D. 239, if carried out punctually, would have been at the extreme end of the reign of Ardashîr; but the intercalations seem to have been usually delayed, as in the case of that of 363 which was delayed for thirty to fifty years, although it ought to have been carried out under the direction of one of those ultra-orthodox high-priests, Âtûrpâd son of Mâraspend, or his son Zaratûst, in the reign of Shahpûhar II.

89. It is worthy of notice that the names of both the days and months, which have come down to us in this calendar of Darius, include the names of the six Amesha-spentas, which, according to Darmesteter's hypothesis, were not invented till the time of Vologeses I, in the first century A.D. We have positive evidence that the calendar of twelve months of thirty days each, with five extra days to complete the year, must have been established in the time of Darius. This fact being recorded mechanically by the extent of the retreat of the Persian Parsis' new-year's day down to the present time, and by the number of months intercalated in their religious calendar down to the fifth

¹ If the calendar had been established thirty-eight years after the death of Darius, the seventh intercalation would not have been due till one year after the death of Yazdakard I.

century A.D., being known from the position of the five extra days in the rectified calendar. We have no evidence of any change of names having been made in this calendar at any time ; and only positive and indisputable evidence could be admitted, because reformers of calendars are hardly ever satisfied with mere change of names, and the calendar itself is a permanent witness that no alteration can have been made in any other particular, since the time of Darius.

90. Darmesteter's theory of a late origin for the Avesta having been mentioned, it may be allowable to add, that the likelihood of this theory does not increase upon closer examination. It is a brilliant hypothesis, very carefully prepared to meet ordinary criticism ; but it does not appear to convince Avesta scholars in general, for want of sufficient evidence, as it is very necessary to distinguish carefully between possibilities and probabilities ; the former being not admissible as evidence, unless corroborated by positive facts. Its chief use has been in checking the tendency to exaggerate the age of the Avesta, but it seems itself to be an exaggeration in the opposite direction, a returning swing of the ever-restless pendulum of judgment. On the other hand, the traditional age of the religion cannot be fairly considered as exaggerated, for the chief difficulty in accepting it as sufficiently old, is that the nearer our researches penetrate to that time the less real light we obtain.

E. W. WEST.

April, 1897.

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS VOLUME.

A. D. for Anno Domini; Alb. for Albîrûnî's Chronology of Ancient Nations, translated by Sachau; A. R. for Anno Religionis; Ar. for Arabic; A. V. for the Book of Ardâ-Vîrâf; Av. for Avesta; B for Bombay MS. of Dînkard, brought from Irân in 1783; B. C. for Before Christ; Bd. for Bundahis (S. B. E. v, 1-151), and Band (volume); Beh. for Behistûn inscription; BK for an old copy of K35, made when this MS. was more complete than it is now; B. R. for Before the Religion; Byt. for Bahman Yast (S. B. E. v, 189-235); Chald. for Chaldee; Chap. for chapter; Chaps. for chapters; Dd. for Dâdistân-î Dînik (S. B. E. xviii, 1-276); Dk. for Dînkard (S. B. E. xxxvii, 1-397, 406-418, and this volume); ed. for editor or edition; Ep. for Epistles of Mânûskîhar (S. B. E. xviii, 277-366); Études irân. for Études irâniennes; Farh. Oîm for Farhang-i Oîm-aêvak; gen. for genitive case; Gesch. der Sas. for Geschichte der Perser und Araber zur Zeit der Sâsâniden; Gf. for the Tale of Gôst-î Fryânô; Heb. for Hebrew; Ibid. for ibidem; Ind. vers. for Indian version; J. for Jâmâsp's old MS.; K for University Library at Kopenhagen; L for India Office Library at London; l. for line; ll. for lines; Mkh. for Mainyô-i Khirad (S. B. E. xxiv, 1-113); MS. for manuscript; MSS. for manuscripts; n. for footnote; nom. for nominative case; p. for page; Pahl. for Pahlavi; Pers. for Persian; pp. for pages; Pt. for Peshotan's old MS.; S. B. E. for Sacred Books of the East; Sd. for Sad-dar (S. B. E. xxiv, 253-361); Sg. for Sikand-gumânîk Vigâr (S. B. E. xxiv, 115-251); Sls. for Shâyast-lâ-shâyast (S. B. E. v, 237-406); Sp. for Spiegel's edition; T for Tehmuras's MS. of Dd., Zs., &c.; Vd. for Vendidad, ed. Geldner; Vig. for Vigîrkard-î Dînik; Visp. for Visperad, ed. Geldner; vol. for volume; Westerg. Frag. for Westergaard's Fragments; Yas. for Yasna, ed. Geldner; Yt. for Yast, ed. Geldner; YZ. for Geiger's Yâtkâr-i Zarîrân; Z. for Zaratûst; Zs. for Selections of Zâd-spam, first series.

MARVELS OF ZOROASTRIANISM

AS STATED IN

THE SEVENTH AND FIFTH BOOKS

OF THE

DĪNKARD

AND IN THE

SELECTIONS OF *ZÂD-SPARAM*

CHAPTERS XII-XXIV.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. For all divisions into chapters and sections the translator is chiefly responsible, as the stops found in the manuscripts are not used systematically.

2. Italics are used for any English words which are not expressed, or fully understood, in the original text, but are added to complete the sense of the translation.

3. Italics occurring in Oriental words, or names, represent certain peculiar Oriental letters (see the 'Transliteration of Oriental Alphabets' at the end of this volume), or certain abbreviated modes of writing Pahlavi letters. Italic *a, ā, b, d, e, ē, h, i, ī, k, l, p, r, sh, u, v, zd* indicate no change of pronunciation; but *g* should be sounded like *j*, *hv* like *wh*, *k* like *ch* in 'church,' *s* like *sh*, and Avesta *z* like French *j*.

4. In the translation words in parentheses are merely explanatory of those that precede them, and often translate Pahlavi glosses in the original text.

5. For the meaning of the abbreviations, used in the notes, see the explanatory list after the Introduction.

6. The manuscripts used for the *Dīnkard* are :—

B (written A.D. 1659), the only independent authority for Book VII; it was brought from Irān to Surat in 1783, and one folio, at the end of Chap. iv, appears to be missing.

K 43 (written A.D. 1594 and later), No. 43 in the University Library at Kopenhagen, which contains another independent authority for Book V in its later portion.

7. The manuscripts used for the Selections of *Zād-spāram* are :—


K 35 (probably written A.D. 1572), No. 35 in the same library, which was brought from Irān by Prof. Westergaard in 1843, along with No. 43.

T, a copy of a MS. about fifty years older, belonging to Ervad Tehmuras Dinshawji Ankalesaria of Bombay.

MARVELS OF ZOROASTRIANISM.

DĪNKARD.—BOOK VII.

CHAPTER I.



1. *For* the gratification *of* the creator Aûharmazd, even through the complete superiority of the Mazda-worshipping religion, adorned by omniscience, in the world.

2. The seventh *book* is about the marvellousness of the greatest reminder of the Mazda-worshipping religion, Zaratûst¹ of the Spitâmas; also of the mindfulness of that illustrious *one* by Aûharmazd, and *of* his religion, arisen through the word of Aûharmazd, being blessed among those of the region of king Vistâsp; from the Exposition of the Good Religion².

3. But, before that, *there* is purposely written whatever *was* the progress of the character and effect of the good religion and its first acceptor in the spiritual and worldly *existences*; and, after that,

¹ Nearly always spelt Zaratûkhsht in the MS., the counterpart of the Persian form Zaratuhsht or Zaraduhsht.

² This Nikêzô-î Vêh-dênô was evidently the name of an older book, from which the Dînkard quotes much of its information on religious matters.

the prophets, apostles, *and* upholders in the period as far as Zaratûst, *whose* guardian spirit is revered, and their religion, which is this, due to the utterance and splendour with which they have been blessed with prophecy among mankind ¹.

4. According to the *Mazda*-worshipping religion *and* the Exposition of the Good Religion, it is the nature of Aûharmazd's disposition and his knowledge as to the complete obtainment of the first creature, the archangel Vohûmanô, and the first progress spiritually among the archangels *and* the other sacred beings of the spiritual *and* worldly existences, and materially in Gâyômarô, the first man, through concurrent *and* complete acceptance from the creator Aûharmazd, and the needful atonement in his own period through meditation, and the smiting thereby of the fiend of that period and the opposition thereof, by thinking of the creator's teaching, *that constitute* the whole of that first utterance ² of the religion of Aûharmazd.

5. According to the declaration of the good religion about the production of existence, which is the praise of him who *was* the causer of existence and creator, the beneficent spirit, the first craving among mankind *was* this, that 'we be happy and *be* the creation of Aûharmazd;' and the last, as regards the preservation of a remedy for mankind, is *this*, *that* 'the best is this, that the formation of lives *be* perfect now, though rendered sickly by him; and the spiritual existences of mankind *be so* now, though the destroyer *has* come to the creatures.' 6. *For*

¹ This preliminary matter occupies the whole of Chap. I.

² The Yathâ-ahû-vairyô, or most sacred religious formula of the Parsis.

human beings of the lineage of Gâyômarđ this is the one thing good, when they shall perform their duty and good works; and one's work is to smite one's own opposing fiend; an instance presentable to *any* of the lineage, that it is important *for* every one of you to smite his own opposing fiend, is the freedom from molestation which occurs thereby, and the non-contamination of the creatures by the destroyer; and it is that effect which the creator *of* creation *has* produced for it.

7. And this, too, is declared by the good religion, that through a true-spoken statement Gâyômarđ attained to the good spiritual lordship¹ of the arch-angels (that is, *he was* fit for the supreme heaven²).

8. And after Gâyômarđ, at various periods until the ever-favouring³ Zaratûst of the Sptâmas, *whose* guardian spirit is revered; much also *was* his acquaintance with knowledge, and *his* work *was* the preservation of the mankind of that time in which he came into notice; moreover he became requisite for conference with the creator; and because of *their* superior carrying on of destiny⁴, by command of the

¹ Reading hû-ahûîh, Av. hvanghevi. This section is one of the numerous quotations from the Pahlavi version of a lost Avesta text. When we are furnished with a complete Pahl.-Av. vocabulary, it will be possible to recover much of the original Avesta of such quotations, with some degree of certainty.

² Pahl. garôdmânîg. Such glosses and comments, inserted by the Pahlavi translator, are always marked as parenthetical.

³ Pahl. hamâî-bâhar; it might be read hamâî-bîdâr, 'ever vigilant.'

⁴ Reading vakhsh (= Pers. bakhsh), which is usually expressed by its Zvâris equivalent gadđ (traditionally gadman), and this means both 'destiny' and 'the star, or glory, of destiny' (Av. hvarenô, Pers. khura). Here the first letter of vakhsh is omitted, and this error converts the word into khayâ, the Zvâris of gân, 'life.'

creator, *it is* declared in the good religion, *that* the combined titles of prophet (vakhshvar), acceptor, *and* promoter *are* enumerated of them.

9. As Gâyômarđ passed away, *it*¹ *came* to Masyê and Masyâôi², the second of worldly beings who *were* the progeny of Gâyômarđ the first; *and it is* declared, by the word of Aûharmazd, that he spoke to them, when they had been produced by him, thus: 'You are the men I produce, you are the parents of the parents of all embodied existence; and so do you men not worship the demons, for the possession of complete mindfulness is the best *thing* produced by me for you, so that you *may* fully observe duty and ordinances with complete mindfulness.' 10. And the bountifulness of Aûharmazd *was* extolled by them, and they went on with their own duty; they also performed the will of the creator, enjoyed the advantage of the many duties of the world, *and* practised next-of-kin marriage for procreation, union, and the complete progress of the creations in the world, which are the best good works of mankind. 11. The creator showed them the sowing of corn, as declared in the words of Aûharmazd thus: 'This is thine, O Masyê! which is an ox; thine, too, is this corn; and thine those other appliances; henceforth thou shouldst know *them* well.'

This must have also occurred twice in a previous copy of the MS. in § 28, where the word is written *gân*, 'life,' in the MS. B. In S. B. E., vol. xxxvii, Dk. VIII, xiii, 20, vakhsh has been erroneously translated 'word.'

¹ The glorious destiny. §§ 9 and 10 have been previously translated in S. B. E., vol. xviii, pp. 411, 412.

² Literally 'man and woman' who grew up as plants from the earth fertilized by Gâyômarđ, the prototype of the human race; see Bd. XV, 1-5.

12. This, too, is declared by the good religion, that Aûharmazd spoke to Hadish¹, one of the sacred beings thoroughly worthy through righteousness, thus: 'O Hadish, who *art* thoroughly worthy through righteousness! thou shouldst proceed to Masyê and Masyâôî, thou shouldst procure thy² corn *and* bread from Masyê and Masyâôî, *and* shouldst bless theirs thus: "This corn comes up owing to you, *and*, as it came unto you from Aûharmazd and the archangels, may the corn extend from you unto your descendants without disturbance from the demons;" *and* two Ahunavairs³ are to be recited for the staying away *of* the demon and fiend.' 13. And Hadish, the thoroughly worthy through righteousness, went to Masyê and Masyâôî, and he procured his corn and bread from Masyê and Masyâôî, and *it was* given by them; he also blessed them thus: 'May this corn come up from you, as from the archangels! as it came unto you *from* Aûharmazd *and* the archangels, may it extend from you unto your descendants, without disturbance from the demons;' and two Ahunavairs *were* recited by him, for the staying away of the demon *and* fiend.

14. And, owing to the explanation of the sacred beings, Masyê and Masyâôî attained also to the manufacture of clothing, the tending of sheep, house-building, and primitive carpentry, the agriculture *and* husbandry of the ancients, and the memory of their original state; and *these* proceeded from them through *their* lineage, presenting an example and

¹ Mentioned in Visp. i, 9 : ii, 11 : ix, 5, and recognized as a spirit in Pahl. Visp. i, 31 (Sp.). The spirit who assists the husbandman, see Études irân. ii, 201.

² The MS. has 'his,' as in § 13, by mistake.

³ Two of the sacred Yathâ-ahû-vairyô formulas.

spreading *in* the world, to artificers among the plenitude of artificers.

15. And after that, the destiny to be carried on came to Sâmak¹, who *was* their son, and the descent of *their* collateral descendants *was* on to each region and each quarter of the world, *to* that extent which the creator chose for that region and quarter; *and* thereby *there* was a completion of the progress and spreading of mankind into the various regions *and* quarters.

16. At another time it came to Vâêgered and Hôshâng² of the early law (*pês-dâd*), for providing in the world the law of husbandry, *or* cultivation of the world, and *of* sovereignty *or* protection of the world. 17. And through their companionship and united force, given by religion, the sovereignty and cultivation *of* the world *were* prepared through progress and a succession of provisions *of* Aûharmazd's creatures, *as well as* the religion appointed by Aûharmazd. 18. And through that glory *of* destiny (*gadâ*) two-thirds of the demons of Mâzanô³ *and* the seven evil-instructed *ones*⁴ of Aêshm *were* destroyed by Hôshâng.

19. After that it came to Tâkhmôrup⁵ the well-armed, and through that glory the demon and evil mankind, the wizard and witch, *were* smitten by him; idolatry *was* also cast out by him, and he propagated in *his* time the reverence *and* service of the creator; the evil spirit, converted into the shape of a horse, *was* also carrying him *for* thirty winters.

¹ See Bd. XV, 24-26.

² Grandsons of Sâmak, see Bd. XV, 28, and Sachau's *Albirûnî's Chronology of Ancient Nations*, pp. 206, 212.

³ The idolators of Mâzandarân. See Yt. XIX, 26.

⁴ Called 'seven powers' in Bd. XXVIII, 15.

⁵ See Bd. XXXI, 2, and Yt. XIX, 28, 29.

20. And it came, at another time, for the conference with Aûharmazd, to Yim¹ the splendid, the son of Vîvangha; and owing to his accepting the four classes of the religion, *which* are priesthood, warriorship, husbandry, and artisanship, *there* are the four classes which are priesthood, warriorship, husbandry, and artisanship, and thereby the world *was* improved, extended, and developed; he also rendered even the creatures, in a measure, immortal, undecaying, hungerless, thirstless, plentiful, and fully-settled. 21. And in the good religion² *it* is declared, by the word of the creator Aûharmazd to Yim, thus: 'Then do thou widen my world! (that is, make up *its* measure more), then do thou extend my world! (that is, make *it* up larger), and then thou shouldst accept from me the protection, nourishment, and chieftainship of the world; and do thou effect such watchfulness over *it*, *that* no one shall be able to occasion the wounding or injury of another.'

22. And *this was* accepted and done by Yim, as Aûharmazd commanded him; and through the same glory he widened the earth three-thirds larger than that *which* it was theretofore. 23. And, in that realm of his, the cattle and men of the realm *were* made immortal by him, and the other creations, water, vegetation, and the various foods, imperishable.

24. And this, too, is declared by the good religion, that the world *was* made by him like the supreme heaven in pleasantness; also the enclosure made by Yim, constructed by him according to all the commands of the creator³, about guarding the creatures from perishing through the winter of

¹ See Bd. XXXI, 3-5, and Yt. XIX, 31-33.

² In Vd. II, 4.

³ As detailed in Vd. II, 22-31, 40, 41.

Mahrkûs, and likewise many other wonders are reported by the good religion.

25. And it came, at another time, by command of the creator, to Frêdûn the Âspîgân ¹ when he was in the pregnant womb, owing to the share of husbandry *in* the avocations of the religion, through allotment from the glory of Yim, and through its triumphant splendour. 26. And Frêdûn, through that triumphant splendour, became a responder to Dahâk ² from the pregnant womb, and that degraded fiend *was* averted and paralysed by him; *having* come to nine years of age, he proceeded about his destruction, and through that victory Dahâk *was* smitten by him ³, the creatures *were* saved and relieved thereby, those of Mâzandar and Mâda *were* smitten, their ravage and mischief *were* removed from the region of Khvanîras, and the region of Khvanîras *was* preserved *for his* three sons. 27. And owing to his husbandry, which is the third avocation of the religion, pestilence and disease *were* disturbed *by* the medical treatment even of pestilence itself, and he exhibited to mankind also many other wonders produced and useful occupation for the world.

28. And, in the life-time of Frêdûn, the same destiny came to Atrik ⁴, son of Frêdûn, owing to introduction *by* the creator, and *was* diffused in him, and he practised humility; the life ⁵ which is perfect is brought through a prayer from *his* father Frêdûn,

¹ See Bd. XXXI, 7, 8, and Yt. XIII, 131; XIX, 36.

² The Arab usurper, or usurping dynasty, that conquered Yim in his old age; see Bd. XXXI, 5, 6.

³ See Yt. XIX, 37.

⁴ See Bd. XXXI, 9, 10.

⁵ Probably 'destiny;' the initial letter of vakhsh, 'destiny,' has been omitted, and this blunder converts the word into khayâ, 'life.'

and that life ¹ came to him from the creator through the blessing of Frêdûn.

29. And it came, through *his* mother, to a descendant of Frêdûn *and* descendant of Aîrlê; it proceeded with the angel Nêryôsang to Mânûskîhar ², and its entire progress was in the lineage of Aîrlê. 30. And it came to Mânûskîhar, the monarch of Irân, and through it many wonder-wrought actions *were* performed by him; he smote Salm and Tûg in revenge for Aîrlê ³, he was a responder *to* the superfluities of foreign countries, he arranged the realm of Irân, improved and fertilised the land of Irân, and made the country of Irân victorious over foreigners.

31. At another time it came to Aûzôbô, son of Tûmâsp ⁴, a descendant of Mânûskîhar the monarch of Irân; *and*, through that destiny and glory combined, the new-born came to mature activity and the proportions of a man during childhood, through agriculture; he disclosed *his* lamenting mother to the countries of Irân, he marched on to the destruction of foreigners, to drive out *and* make *them* outcast from the land of Irân; he also defeated the village-terrifier of the country of Irân, the wizard who frightened his father *and* fellow-immortals, Frangrâsiyâk of Tûr ⁵; and he developed *and* ferti-

¹ See note 5 on preceding page.

² Here spelt Nêresang and Mânûsr. The former is the usual spiritual messenger of Aûharmazd; and for the lineage of the latter see Bd. XXXI, 9-14. It appears that the glorious destiny was preserved by the angel Nêryôsang for some generations, and he conveyed it to the grandfather of Mânûskîhar (see Chap. II, 70).

³ The three sons of Frêdûn, among whom he divided his dominions, with the usual result of triumvirates.

⁴ See Bd. XXXI, 23; XXXIV, 6.

⁵ See Yt. XIX, 56-64, 77, 82, 93, and Bd. XXXI, 14, 15, 18, 21, 22, 35; XXXIV, 6; where the Av. form Frangrasyan is further

lised the country of Irân, and increased the many streams *and* cultivated lands in the country of Irân.

32. At another time it came to Kerêšaspô the Sâman¹, owing to the share of warriorship which is the second avocation of the religion, through allotment from the glory of Yim²; and, through it, the serpent Srôbôvar which *was* swallowing horses *and* swallowing men, the golden-heeled demon Gandarepô, and much other production *of* adversity *by* the demon and the fiend—the murderess of the creatures—*were* destroyed by him.

33. At another time it came to Kaš-Kobâd³, the progenitor of the Kayâns; through it he arranged the realm of Irân, he united the sovereignty with himself in the Kayân race, *and* he thereby occasioned much splendour *and* actions of advantage *to* the creatures.

34. And it came to Pâtakhsrôbô⁴, son of Aîryêshvâ⁵, son of Tâz, who *was* king of the Arabs, through the mindfulness of the archangel Ashavahistô, and his enquiry about it from its own tribe⁶—*for* the demon of greediness (*âzô*), with *one* similarly

corrupted into Frâšyâv, as it is also hereafter in Chap. II, 68; Zs. XII, 3.

¹ A famous hero whose exploits, like those of Hercules, have given birth to many legends; see S. B. E., vol. xviii, pp. 369–382.

² Compare § 25.

³ See Yt. XIX, 71; Bd. XXXI, 24, 25, 28; XXXIV, 7.

⁴ Or Pâtâsrôbô, spelt Pâtsrôbô in Pahl. Vd. XX, 4 (Sp.).

⁵ Or Aîryêshnîg; evidently the same as Virafsang in Bd. XXXI, 6, which is spelt Avirafshanêg and Âirafshanig in two MSS. of the Irânian Bundahis. Hence we may conclude that Pâtakhsrôbô was a brother of Zâînîgâv, and a great-uncle of Dahâk; but how his daughters could have been married to the three sons of Frêdûn, as stated in the *Kîtrâdâd Nask* (see Dk. VIII, xiii, 9), is a chronological difficulty that throws doubt upon this identification.

⁶ The people of the primitive faith, who are supposed to have

destined, had rushed for the destruction of him who *was* very gentle to that tribe ¹—*as he had* a full inclination for the ascendancy of the portion whose guidance to the lofty priestly master *was* owing to the archangel Ashavahistô, just as the fish image ² of that *other* portion *was* for falling into the river ; and *it is* declared *that* he came to the ceremonial of Zarâtûst.

35. At another time it came to Kat-Arsh *and his* brothers ³, the descendants of Kobâd ; through it they have been all-experienced and powerful, heedful and performing wonders ; and the eldest brother of them, Kat-Ûs, seized upon the sovereignty of the seven regions, *and* became very illustrious *and* full of glory. 36. *At* the same time it came to Aôshnar ⁴ who became fully sagacious (pûr-zîr), owing to the glory of Yim, when he was in *his* mother's womb, and many wonders *were* taught by him to *his* mother, through speaking from the mother's womb ; also at his birth he vanquished the maleficent spirit by uttering answers *to* the questions *of* the deadly Frâkîh the demon-worshipper. 37. He also attained to the chancellorship (farmâdârîh) of Kat-Ûs, and became administrator (râyintâr) in his realm *of* the seven regions ; the frontier speech (vîmand-gôbisnîh) *was* also explained *and* taught by him,

already practised most of the duties upheld by Zarathustra before his appearance as a reformer.

¹ Indicating that the Arab subjects of the king had revolted, because he favoured those of the primitive faith who, no doubt, gained further favour by putting down the rebellion.

² Or it may be 'fish priest,' as karapô, 'a heathen priest,' and kerpô, 'shape, image,' are written alike in Pahlavi letters.

³ See Yt. XIX, 71 ; Bd. XXXI, 25.

⁴ See Yt. XIII, 131 ; Dd. XLVIII, 33.

and much other learning of advantage *to* mankind *who* are unaffected by the utterance of replies of a foreigner; he *also* advised the Irânian country with the best-instructed counsel.

38. And *its* coming to Kaī-Sīyāvakhsh¹ the illustrious, through the wondrous-formed Kangdez *being* held by him for the retention *of* protection *for* the much splendour *and* suitable glory of the religion, from which the restoration of time, the re-arrangement of the realm of Irân, *and* the reunion of power *and* triumph with the religion of Aûharmazd are manifest.

39. It came to Kaī-Khûsrôī², son of Sīyāvakhsh, *and* through it he smote and vanquished Frangrâstyâk³ *of* Tûr, the wizard, and his fellow-miscreation Kêrsêvazd⁴ of those of Vakgir⁵, and many other very evil devastators of the world; he also joined in the destruction of that idol-temple which *was* on the shore of Lake Kêkast⁶, *and* demolished that fiendishness which *was* awful. 40. On account of the desirableness of means for the renovation *of the universe*, *he is also* on a throne (namêkô), which is assuredly selected by that destiny, at a secret place where *there* is an immortal preserver for his body until the renovation, through the will of the creator.

41. And it came from him, after Zaratûst of the Spîtâmas came to the conference of the creator

¹ See Yt. XIX, 71, 77; Bd. XXXI, 25; Byt. III, 25, 26.

² See Yt. XIX, 74, 77, 93; Bd. XXXI, 25.

³ See § 31.

⁴ Brother of Frangrâstyâk, see Yt. XIX, 77; Bd. XXXI, 15.

⁵ Reading Vakgiragânô, probably the inhabitants of the Bakyîr mountain, mentioned in Bd. XII, 2, 20 as a stronghold of Frâsiyâv (= Frangrâstyâk).

⁶ See Bd. XVII, 7; Mkh. II, 95.

Aûharmazd, and accepted from the omniscient creator Aûharmazd unmixed freedom from pollution, the comprehensive and also recited acquaintance with the knowledge *and* work of priesthood, warriorship, husbandry, and artisanship, *and* the separate portions of the Mazda-worshipping revelation (dênô) brought to king Kai-Vistâsp by command of the creator, illuminated by the great splendour in that supreme sovereign of the sacred beings, *and* propagated *by* the learned of the region, in the regions which *are* seven, through the good eloquence which is owing to the succession of creatures until the renovation *of the universe*. 42. And through its production by those who *will be his* sons, Aûshêdar, Aûshêdar-mâh, and Sôshâns¹, the renovation in the existence of the creatures of Aûharmazd is immortal; and a more remindful statement of its splendour, glory, *and* marvellousness is a statement *that* is written and found below².

43. And *there* have also been others before Zarâtûst, the prophet (vakhshvar) of desired fame in the Mazda-worshipping religion; for it is declared that, at times, some came from the spiritual *beings* to him who *was* more of a leader, *and* mankind have become as captivated by the solicitation *and* interrogation of that affair, as now by the solicitation *and* interrogation of the religion; the necessity for that period is not now necessary, because all mankind

¹ The Pahlavi transcripts of the Avesta names, Ukhshyad-ereta, Ukhshyad-nemangh, and Saoshyâs, of the three apostles expected to revive and renovate the Parsi religion in successive millenniums. According to the imperfect chronology of the Bundahis, the millennium of Aushêdar-mâh has now nearly one-fourth elapsed.

² See Chap. XI, 7-11.

are made acquainted with the religion, and Zaratûst of the Spîtâmas, *whose* guardian spirit is righteous, is to be revered.

44. Now, that which is declared in the world is written, about the splendour, glory, and marvellousness of the prophet of the Mazda-worshipping religion, the best of creations, *whose* guardian spirit is revered, Zaratûst of the Spîtâmas; and ten chapters are published here, as to the information from the Avesta, and *in* benediction of the religion of Aûharmazd¹.

45. That of it which is before the birth of that glorious *one* from *his* mother *in* the present world.

46. That of it which is from the birth of that illustrious *one* onwards, *till* his coming to a conference *with* Aûharmazd.

47. That of it which is from the conference onwards, till his pre-eminence over prophecy in the world, *and* the acceptance of the religion *by* the exalted Kaî-Vistâsp.

48. That of it which is onwards from that, till the departure (vîkhêzô) of that pure soul to the existence which is best.

49. That of it which is also successively after that, in the reign of the obedient king Kaî-Vistâsp.

50. That of it which is after that, until the collapse (angâvisnô) of the sovereignty of Irân.

51. That of it which is also after that, until the end of the millennium of Zaratûst *and* the arrival of Aûshêdar.

52. That of it which is also after that, until *the* end of the millennium of Aûshêdar *and* the arrival of Aûshêdar-mâh.

¹ Then follow the headings of these ten Chapters (II to XI).

53. That of it which is also after that, until the end of the millennium of Aûshêdar-mâh and the arrival of Sôshâns.

54. *And* that of it from the arrival of the Triumphant Benefiter, *until* the wonder *of* the renovation *and* future existence; a statement of them each separately.

CHAPTER II.

1. About the marvellousness of the manifestations before ¹ the birth of that most auspicious of offsprings from *his* mother ².

2. One *marvel* is this which is declared, that the creator passed on that glory of Zaratûst through the material existences of the creatures ³ to Zaratûst; when the command arose from Aûhar-mazd, the coming of that glory from the spiritual *existence* to the worldly, and *to* the material substance (mâdîyâtö) of Zaratûst, is manifested as a great wonder to the multitude (val kabadânö).

3. *Just* as revelation mentions *it* thus: 'Thereupon, when Aûharmazd had produced the material (dahisnö) of Zaratûst, the glory then, in the

¹ The MS. has patas for pês.

² The contents of this chapter are thus mentioned in the summary of the Spend Nask (Dk. VIII, xiv, 1 in S.B.E., vol. xxxvii, p. 31):—'The Spend *contains* particulars about the origin *and* combination *of* the material *existence*, guardian spirit, *and* soul (or glory) of Zaratûst; how the creation of each one *occurred* in the spiritual *existence*, and *in* what mode *it was* produced for the worldly *existence*; how their connection with the parents *arose*, the coming of the parents together, the combination in the mother, and the birth from the mother; *and* whatever is on the same subject.'

³ The writer uses two Arabic words: mâdîyâtö-i 'halqö.'

presence of Aûharmazd, fled on *towards* the material of Zaratûst, on to that germ; from that germ it fled on, on *to the light which is endless*¹; from the light which is endless² it fled on, on to that of the sun; from that of the sun it fled on, on *to* the moon; from that moon it fled on, on to those stars; from those stars it fled on, on to the fire which *was* in the house of Zôis³; *and* from that fire it fled on, on to the wife of Frâhîmravanâ-zôis⁴, when she brought forth that girl who became the mother of Zaratûst.

4. Of that splendour, escaped at the same time into the earth *and* into the sky, the father-in-law's ignorance is declared, so that it is said by those in the village of the more instructed and invoking Zôis⁵, as to the self-combustion *which* burns the fire, that fuel is not necessary for its use. 5. Then they went on to the governor (kêdö), and he explained *to* them concerning that same (that is, he spoke to them) thus: 'The full glory of embodied existence

¹ Perplexed by the repetitions, some copyist has evidently omitted this phrase by mistake.

² Pahl. anagar, a transcript of Av. anaghra which is always translated by Pahl. asar, 'endless.' The 'endless light' is the abode of Aûharmazd, see Bd. I, 2.

³ Written in Pâzand.

⁴ Also written in Pâzand. In Bd. XXXII, 10, it is stated that 'the name of the father of the mother of Zaratûst was Frâhimravâ' (or Fereâhimruvânâ in the Irânian version); but very little reliance can be placed on such Pâzand readings of names originally written in Pahlavi.

⁵ Here written in Pahlavi letters which can also be read Zandîh. In the text, the two preceding adjectives, farhakhtar va-khvân, might be read Farâkht-ruvânân as the beginning of the name. But, as it stands, the text implies that Zôis, the father-in-law of his son Frâhîm-ravanâ's wife, was the master of the house, which is the usual oriental arrangement.

is the glory of life *apart* from the body, so that all diligence devoid of this is only movement.'

6. And *it is* declared that the demons, on account of their defeat by that glory in maintaining¹ adversity for the girl, *were* bringing on to that district three armaments (hênô), winter, the demon of pestilence, and oppressive enemies; and *a suspicion was* cast by them into the minds of those of the district, that this harm happened to the district owing to the witchcraft of this girl; so that those of the district quarreled dreadfully with the parents, as to the witchcraft of antagonism *in* the girl, and about putting *her* out from that district.

7. And the father of that girl spoke even these *words* to those of the district, with much reason, about the unjust assertion of witchcraft relative to the girl, that is: 'When this girl *was* brought forth among those of mine, her whole destiny (vakhsh) *was* afterwards set forth *by* that manifest radiance of fire, where it brought out radiance from all over her in the dark night. 8. When this girl sits in the interior of the house, wherein there is no fire, *and* in the chamber (sarâ1) of fire they increase *its* intensity (bûrzô), it is lighter there, where *and* when this girl sits, than there where they increase the intensity of the fire; *one* is dazzled by the radiance from her body, *and* that of a wizard *would not have* been so glorious.'

9. Even then, owing to the influence (sârtnisnô) of the demons, and the Kavîg and Karap² of the

¹ Reading dêrîh, but it may be gârîh for kârîh, 'producing.'

² The Karaps were apparently idolatrous priests, especially those before the conversion of Vistâsp by Zaratûst; one being called 'a wizard' in Chap. III, 5, 42-44, another 'unsanctified' in IV, 24,

district, they did not become satisfied; so the father ordered the girl to go to Padīragtarâspô¹, the father of a family in the country (matâ) of the Spîtâmas, in the district (rûdastâk) of Alâk; and the girl obeyed the command of *her* father. 10. That disturbance which the demons caused, with evil intention, for the expatriation of that girl, the sacred beings assiduously made the reason for the coming of the girl for marriage to Pôrûshâspô, the father of Zaratûst, through *her* father sending the girl to the dwelling of Padīragtarâspô, the father of Pôrûshâspô.

11. One *marvel*² is this which is declared, that when that girl, in going to that family, stood on the loftiest place in the country of the Spîtâmas, and *it* is surveyed by her, a great wonder is manifested to the girl, *just* as revelation mentions: 'It is their³

a third is 'deadly' in IV, 67, and a demon himself is a Karap in IV, 61, and has Karaps under his control in II, 45. The following Karaps are named in the time of Zaratûst:—Dûrâsrôbô mentioned in Chap. III, 4-41; Brâdrôk-rêsh in III, 20-34, who is called a Tûrânian in III, 28; Vaêdvôist in IV, 21-24; and Zâk in IV, 67. Some others are named by other writers. The Kavîgs, Kaîs, or Kîgs are mentioned with the Karaps in Chaps. II, 9; III, 50; IV, 2, 6, 14, 64, 67; VIII, 26, 40, as equally objectionable, but their avocation as officials is not defined. Both classes seem to have held official rank, but whether their titles were tribal or official is uncertain. The Avesta calls them Karapan and Kavi; the latter word being also the royal title of the Kayân dynasty, of which Vistâsp was a member. Compare Zs. XV, 1-4; XXIII, 8.

¹ So also in §§ 13, 70. In Bd. XXXII, 1, 2, the two old MSS. of the Irânian Bundahis have Padtarâsp thrice and Pîrtarâsp once; K 20 has Spîtarasp and Paitiresp; K 20 b has Padirtarâspô and Paitirispô; and M6 has Padirtarâsp and Paitiresp. Zs. XIII, 6, has Purtarâspô.

² One of the marvellous manifestations mentioned in § 1.

³ Probably we should read: 'It is the voice of those sacred beings' who are mentioned in § 10. As the word *yazdân*, 'sacred beings,' is exactly similar, in Pahlavi, to *shân* (in *valdshân*, 'their'

voice is carried away to her from them; "do thou proceed to that village which is theirs; it is very depressed in height and very wide in breadth, in which he who is living and the cattle mostly walk together; besides, for thy assistance that village is divinely fashioned *and* compassionate." 12. Thereupon that damsel stopped, and also fully observed that *their* recital seems *to be* for the conveyance of this statement, that my action *should be* such *as was* ordered me *by* my father also. 13. Then that damsel thoroughly washed *her* hands, and proceeded from them to that village which was Padīragtarâspô's, and the glory came to Pôrûshâspô, the son of Padīragtarâspô.

14. One *marvel* is this which is declared, that the creator Aûharmazd passed on the guardian spirit (fravâhar) of Zaratûst, to the parents of Zaratûst, through (le-*k*adôn) Hôm¹, by a marvel produced by cultivation. 15. Again, too, revelation says that, when the separation (burînô) of the third millenium occurred, at the end of the 3,000 years of spiritual existence without a destroyer, (after the creatures *were* in spiritual existence, *and* before the arrival of the fiend); then the archangels framed Zaratûst together, *and* they seated the guardian spirit within, having a mouth, having a tongue, and the proclaimer *of* the celestial mansions.

or 'those'), a copyist would be liable to the blunder of leaving out the final word in writing valēshân yasdân. Or the original writer himself may not have quoted enough of the text he was reading, to make his meaning clear.

¹ A sacred and mythical tree, described in Bd. XVIII, 1-3, and often personified as a sacred being. It is now represented, in Parsi ceremonies, by twigs of a particular plant brought from Persia.

16. Then the three millenniums of Zaratûst¹ *were* the number manifest to them through observation by the eye, *and* it seemed that he became just like an archangel through bodily contact with (ham-kerpîh)² the archangels. 17. And when the separation of the third millennium occurred, after the framing of Zaratûst together, and before the conveying of Zaratûst down to the worldly *state*, at the end of the 3,000 years *of* worldly existence with a destroyer, then Aûharmazd argued with Vohûmanô *and* Ashavahistô³ thus: 'Is his mother beheld by you, so that we may produce Zaratûst?'

18. And Ashavahistô spoke *in* reply thus: 'Thou art aware even of that, *O* propitious *one*! about the Zaratûst we *shall* produce, *and* thou and we have produced, thou knowest, *O* Aûharmazd! *and to us* who are the other archangels do thou announce the place, because its appearance thou knowest, *thou* propitious spirit Aûharmazd!'

19. Then Aûharmazd argued with Vohûmanô and the reminding by Ardavahistô⁴, Shatraver, Spendarmad, Khûrdad, *and* Amûrdad⁵, *saying*:

¹ Meaning the period of Zaratûst's existence merely as a guardian spirit, the first period of the destroyer (§ 17) who then remained powerless in confusion (see Bd. I, 22).

² Or 'sheltering with' (ham-karîkîh).

³ The personifications of the Avesta phrases for 'good thought' and 'perfect rectitude,' who are two of the seven that hold a superior position among sacred beings, somewhat similar to that of archangels. When a Parsi speaks of Aûharmazd as the first of the Ameshaspendas, or archangels, he does not put him on an equality with the rest, any more than we put a commander-in-chief on an equality with his troops when we call him a good soldier.

⁴ Another pronunciation of Ashavahistô.

⁵ These last four archangels are personifications of the Avesta

'The conveying of Zaratûst down does not seem to *be for* me, because, having a mouth *and* having a tongue, *he will be* a proclaimer to the world of embodied beings. 20. If we convey Zaratûst down on to the world of embodied beings, having a mouth *and* having a tongue, *as* a proclaimer *of* the celestial mansion, this is evident: they *will* say, concerning the origin *of* him who is my righteous man, *that we* frame him together with the water, with the land, with the plants, *and* with the animals¹. 21. Therefore we *will* carry off there, to the village of Pôrûshâspô, him whom they *will* call Zaratûst of good lineage of both natures, both *of* Nêryôsang² who is of the archangels, and *of* Yim who is of mankind.'

22. Then the archangels framed together a stem of Hôm the height of a man, excellent in colour, *and* juicy where fresh; also to carry off the guardian spirit of Zaratûst to that stem of theirs, the archangels made it go forth thither from that endless light, and gave it up there also to the instinctive intellect (âsnô vîr). 23. Likewise their carrying off *was* manifest around, and a wall *was* openly displayed round them, but a restless one; the Hôm *was* constantly provided with a mouth, where it was suitable, *and* sap constantly oozed from the Hôm where it was moist.

24. And when thirty³ years of the 3,000 years of

phrases for 'desirable dominion, bountiful devotion, completeness or health, and immortality.'

¹ That is, as an inferior and irresponsible being.

² Here spelt Nêrôsang; see Chaps. I, 29; II, 70; and Zs. XIII, 6, for this angel's influence on the royal race.

³ The MS. has 330 years, but the time intended is evidently that shortly before the birth of Zaratûst, and this third 3,000 years

well-disturbed¹ worldly existence remained, Vohûmanô and Ashavahistô then associated their pre-eminence together, *and* turned off into the embodied existence ; there they came up to where two birds had settled in quest of progeny, *and* seven years before the serpents devoured the inexperienced progeny. 25. For their *own* designs, Vohûmanô *and* Ashavahistô went on, and those birds consulted *them* thus: 'We have to offer homage, and our want is that Hô̄m.'

26. The circumstances of those associated together in pre-eminence and the request of these *for* that Hô̄m *were* a double marvel ; Vohûmanô seized one of those *birds* by both legs, and the other *by* one ; he also brought them that Hô̄m, and gave it up to them there, on that tree within *their* nest. 27. And they uncovered above the serpents, that have gone up to the progeny of the birds ; then that guardian spirit of Zaratûst started up, and the serpents on the tree rushed also from them away towards the demons ; *but* that guardian spirit of Zaratûst smote them on the jaws, *and* the serpents fell down *and* expired, which *events* have also occurred among them till now, *having* been requisite as regards a depriver of life (*gân-gîr*) and *any* one of that species. 28. And that Hô̄m *was* connected with that tree ; and on the summit of that tree, there

ended either when Vistâspô accepted the religion, in Zaratûst's forty-second year, or when Zaratûst received the religion in his thirtieth year, but this earlier date is the more likely.

¹ This word, hû-aîbigadîg, is written in Pahlavi precisely like an-aîbigadîg, 'without a destroyer,' though its meaning is the reverse, which is an unexpected cause of perplexity to a cursory reader.

where the nest of the birds was, it grew constantly fresh and golden-coloured¹.

29. After the coming of her who bore Zaratûst, to Pôrûshâspô for marriage, Vohûmanô *and* Arda-vahistô, thus associated together in their pre-eminence, came up there to Pôrûshâspô in the cattle-pasture of the Spîtâmas, and their thoughts *were* confined to that Hôm brought by them. 30. Then Pôrûshâspô walked forth, with spiritual desire, up to the water of the Dâit², because the requirement of the spirits is the spiritual knowledge³ that spirits are ever-beneficial; and that Hôm *was* also seen by him, when it had grown on that tree, on the inside of the nest. 31. Then Pôrûshâspô thought thus: 'It is for me, really (madam-îk-am) to proceed and, even as *there* is no reaching by me up to that Hôm, that tree must be cut down, for apart from that, O Hôm of Aûharmazd! thou seemest fresh, so that the benefit of something from thee *will be* advantageous.'

32. Then Pôrûshâspô walked on and washed their clothes acquiescently (patâstg), and here a great wonder was manifest to Pôrûshâspô. 33. About this it says that, all the while that Pôrûshâspô washed their clothes, Vohûmanô then proceeded from the uppermost third of the tree unto the middle of it, whereon *it was* the desire of Pôrû-

¹ Or it may be 'verdant.'

² Av. Dâitya, a mythic river in Afrân-vêg (Bd. XX, 13); a favourite place for religious rites, see Yt. V, 17, 104, 112; IX, 25, 29; XVII, 45, 49, 61. Or it may be merely mayâ-f shêd, 'brilliant water.'

³ Reading mainôg-dânisnîh, but the MS. has mainôg dênô-dânîh which might be translated 'spiritual knowledge of religion,' though the latter Pahlavi word is unusual.

shâspô to be conveyed. 34. Then Pôrûshâspô, *having* washed the clothes, walked up to it and, thereupon gathering up the whole of that *Hôm*, all of it *was* then also appropriated by him through assistance like that of that *archangel*, *just* as what thou offerest for the food-sustenance of a friend's son of two years *or* three years *of age*; and it seemed to him that *archangel's* joyful payment.

35. Carrying off their *Hôm*, Pôrûshâspô spoke of it to *his* noble (mas) wife thus: 'So thou, *O Dûk-dâûb*! shouldst keep their *Hôm* in custody, all the while that their *Hôm* fulfils duty and routine.'

36. One *marvel* is this *which* is declared, that the coming of the nature (gôhar) of the body of Zaratûst, through water *and* vegetation, to the bodies of *his* parents, is manifested *as* a great wonder of the creator to the multitude. 37. As revelation mentions *it thus*: 'Thereupon, when Aûharmazd had produced the material (dahisnô) of Zaratûst¹, the nature of *his* body then, in the presence of Aûharmazd, fled on *towards* the material of Zaratûst.'

38. About Khûrdad and Mûrdad² bringing the cloud-water down in a compassionate manner ever anew, drop by drop, *and* completely warm, for the delight of sheep and men, *and—with* as much seed as the roving of two rampant bulls *would* thereby *cast* upon the plants *which* have grown, all of every species—*they are* casting *it* upon those other plants at that time, even upon the dry *ones*; and the

¹ Compare § 3.

² These two archangels have special charge of water and vegetation (see Sls. XV, 25-29), and here they are represented as acting in a manner usually ascribed to Tistar, the Dog-star.

nature of Zaratûst came from that water to those plants.

39. One *marvel* is this *which* is declared, that, in order that the nature of Zaratûst shall come unto *his* parents, after¹ the mounting of the archangels Pôrûshâspô drives six white cows, with yellow ears, up to those plants. 40. And here is manifested a great wonder, *such* as revelation mentions thus: Two² of those cows, unimpregnated, *had* become full of milk, and the nature of Zaratûst came from the plants to those cows, and is mingled with the cows' milk; it is owing thereto *that* Pôrûshâspô drove those cows back. 41. And Pôrûshâspô spoke to Dûkdâûb thus: 'O Dûkdâûb! in two of those cows, *which* are unimpregnated and have not calved, milk *has* appeared; do thou milk those cows, which are the splendour and glory of the cows and of any embodied existence whatever.' 42. And Dûkdâûb arose and, taking that pail of hers which had a four-fold capacity, she also milked from them the milk which *was* in them, and a great *part* of what they gave up to her she had to throw away; and the nature of Zaratûst was in that milk.

43. One *marvel* is this which is manifested in the struggle of the adversary for concealing and spoiling that milk, *just* as revelation mentions thus: Thereupon, at that time, the demons formed *themselves* into an assembly, and the demon of demons growled thus: 'You demons become quite unobservant: that food is really supplied fresh, so that the formation is settled which *will* extend as far as to that

¹ Reading akhar instead of adên, 'then.'

² In some places the singular number is used, in others the plural.

man who *will be* the righteous Zaratûst; which of you *will* undertake his destruction, all the while that he exists for mankind, so as to make *him* more contemptibly impotent?' 44. *Kêshmâk*¹, astute in evil, growled thus: 'I *will* undertake his destruction.' 45. Astute in evil, he rushed away with thrice fifty *of* the demons who are Karaps of *Kêshmâk*; and that village *was* partly uprooted and partly destroyed² by him, fellow-workers *were* ruined, and the number of fellow-eaters of broken victuals, attending the great, *was* not broken up, among whom was he that had repelled his authority.

46. *It is* declared that, afterwards, Pôrûshâspô asked again *for* that Hô^m from Dûkdâûb, and he pounded it, and with that cows' milk³, into which the nature of the body of Zaratûst had come, he here mingled the guardian spirit of Zaratûst, and the nature of the body came at once into union with it.

47. One *marvel* is this *which is* declared, that Pôrûshâspô and Dûkdâûb drank up that Hô^m and milk, when they were mingled together and announced to Aûharmazd; and here occurred a combination of the glory, guardian spirit, and bodily nature of Zaratûst into a *manchild*. 48. And a great wonder is manifested to both of them, through that which revelation mentions thus: Thereupon, both have embraced the first *time*⁴ with desire

¹ The whirlwind demon; see Bd. XXVIII, 24. Compare Chap. IV, 61.

² The usual effects of a hurricane.

³ The mingling of milk with pounded Hô^m still constitutes part of the Parsi ceremonial; see Haug's Essays, 3rd ed., p. 405.

⁴ Pahl. 'koâ 2 lââ fratûm vapidâv havând.'

for a son, *and* the demons shouted out unto them, in the villainous speech *of* sinfulness, thus: 'Why shouldst thou act like this, vile¹ Pôrûshâspô?' whereupon they started up like people who *are* ashamed. 49. A second *time* they have embraced, and the demons shouted out unto them, in villainous speech; whereupon they started up like people who *are* ashamed. 50. A third *time* they have embraced thus, with desire for a son; and the demons shouted out unto them, in villainous speech; whereupon they started up like people who *are* ashamed. 51. And they spoke with one another about *it*, *and* continued at this duty, and accomplished it², *saying*: 'We will not so stop without accomplishing something, not *even* though both Râk and Nôdar *should* arrive here together³.' 52. Then that *manchild* who *was* the righteous Zaratûst became complete, and here *below there* came together the nature of the body, the guardian spirit, and the glory of Zaratûst in the womb *of his* mother.

53. One *marvel* is this which is declared, that, after the combination of Zaratûst in the womb *of his* mother, the demons strove anew wonderfully

¹ Reading anâg, but it may be intended for hanâ=aê, 'O.'

² Pahl. 'afshân madam hâr suftô, aêghshânô pavan akôsh frâz vaîdûntô.'

³ Evidently an old proverb, implying a fixed determination whatever catastrophe may happen, even if one's ancestors of the eleventh or twelfth generation shall appear. Nôdar (Av. Naotara) was a son of King Mânûsîhar (Bd. XXXI, 13, 23), and Râk was a nephew of Nôdar (Bd. XXXI, 31), doubtless the same as Ragan (Bd. XXXII, 1; XXXIII, 3) which seems to be a Pâzand misreading of Aîrikô, or Êrikô, see Zs. XVI, 11-13, and compare the genealogies in Chap. II, 70 and Zs. XIII, 6. The proverb is used again in Chap. III, 19, and the names are mentioned in III, 39.

to cause the death of Zaratûst in *his* mother's womb, and she who bore him *was* rendered sickly by them through the sharpest of sharp and afflictive pain, until she wished to ask the wizard physicians for a desirable remedy. 54. And here is manifested a great wonder, just as revelation says: 'It is then a voice of theirs is carried away there to her from the higher region, from Aûharmazd and from the archangels, thus: "Thou damsel who goest! do not proceed thither, because anything *of* theirs is destruction through wizard medical treatment; *for* healthfulness wash *thy* hands thoroughly, *and* those hands shall take firewood, and upon it thou shalt offer meat for the sake of the infant, thou shalt offer up cows' butter *to* the fire for his sake; thou shalt likewise heat *it* at the fire for his sake, and shalt quaff (pâimês) *it* off at the *proper* time for his sake, and thou *will* become well."' 55. Then at once that damsel washed *her* hands thoroughly, and she did just as *she had* heard, and became well¹.

56. One *marvel* is this which is manifested to the multitude when three days remained to his coming² *forth*; in the manner of the sun, at the approach of *its* uprising, when its first advancing twilight is diffused, *his* body is then announced as revelation says: 'It is then when in those last three nights during which Zaratûst was in the womb, where he still subsisted three days till afterwards born, *that* the village of Pôrûshâspô became all luminous. 57. Then spoke the horse-owners and cattle-owners of the Spîtâmas, in running away, thus: "It is requisite *to be* forgiven³; the village of Pôrûshâspô, on which

¹ Compare Zs. XIV, 2-5.

² Literally 'going.'

³ Apparently an appeal for mercy.

that fire¹ is in every crevice, is disturbed by confusion²." 58. Then, on running together again, they said: "It is not fully forgiven for the village of Pôrûshâspô; fire is on it in every crevice *and* it is disturbed by confusion; unto him is born, at his house, a brilliant *manchild*."

59. This, too, is one of the wonders, when the report of the marvellousness of the birth *of* that *manchild and of his* great glory, is due to statements of Yim and also others, brilliant in carrying on the destiny which had entered them from the sacred beings. 60. Wherein Yim spoke to the demons thus: 'Here *below* the pure *and* righteous Zaratûst *will* be born, who *will* produce for you who are demons that absence of intercession which is prepared for you (that is, he *will* produce for you a thoroughly-harassed actual inactivity, an absence of intercession so that you are not able to pray on your own account, *and* no one prays for you).'

61. *It is* declared that the report about the birth of Zaratûst, and concerning his prophesying, is explained (avazandî-hastô) only by the illustrious, *such* as Yim and Frêdûn *and* many learned people; but the sacred beings are also heard through the tongues of the animals scattered in the world, in order that even that witness shall arise as regards his prophesying. 62. *Just* like that which is declared, that in the reign of Kat-Ûs *there* was an ox, and a splendour had come to his body from the sacred beings; and whenever a dispute as to the frontier arose between Irân and Tûrân, that ox *was* brought, and the boundary between Irân and Tûrân

¹ Assuming that nîram stands for nîrâ, a variant of nûrâ.

² Or 'terrified with fear.'

was truly shown by him. 63. And because, when an Irânian *had* to seek a decision as to a Tûrânian in a dispute *and* lies occurred, the Tûrânians were constantly convicted through the showing of the boundary *by* the ox, and happened to be defeated by the Irânians—*and*, besides that, their envy also *arose* as to Kat-Ûs, even of *his* ownership—therefore, on account of *his* possession of that wonder, the Tûrânians proceeded about the smiting and destruction of that ox, and through their sorcery and witchcraft the mind of Kat-Ûs *was* disturbed about that ox, and he went to a warrior, *whose* name *was* Sritô¹, *and* ordered him to kill that ox; so that man came to smite the ox. 64. And here is manifested a wonder of importance by that ox, *such* as revelation mentions thus: 'To him spoke the ox, in grave words, thus: "Thou shouldst not murder me, O Sritô! thou seventh² of those of this race; you *will* atone *for this* malice when Zaratûst, the most desirous of righteousness among the existences, arrives and proclaims thy bad action in revelation; and the distress in thy soul becomes such as is declared by that passage where *it* says: 'As death occurs to him, that of Vadak³ and the like occurs.'"' 65. *It* is declared that that man, when this wonder *was* thus seen by him *proceeding* from the ox, did not kill *it*, but went back to Kat-Ûs *and* told *him* what he *had* seen. 66. Kat-Ûs then still, on account of the amazing deceitfulness of the demons *and* wizards, ordered the same man to smite that ox;

¹ This legend is also told, with further details, in Zs. XII, 7-25.

² Compare Zs. XII, 10.

³ The mother of Dahâk, who first committed adultery in an aggravated form (see Dd. LXXII, 5; LXXVIII, 2).

and that man proceeded also again to the ox, *and* though *it was* carrying *on* still much *of* that talk, he did not lend an ear to *it*, *but* killed *it*.

67. Regarding the sole-created ox¹, too, *it* is declared that, *on* meeting its destruction by the evil spirit, it bellowed thus: 'Though thou thinkest it as to us, *O* evil spirit, astute in evil! that thou art *in* every way a winner by destruction, *it is* not to our destruction thou art even then an attainer *in* every way (that is, *it* is not possible for thee so to annihilate that we *shall* not arise again); even now I proclaim that that man, Zaratûst of the Spîtâmas, *will* arrive in that last revolution, who *will* produce distress for the demons, the assistants of the demon, and also the wicked who are bipeds.'

68. Likewise the marvellousness of Zaratûst's defeat of the demons, owing to his glory and by means of his sagacity, even before he had come into the world by birth; when Frâsîyâv² the wizard is amazingly distressed through seeking that glory of his by desire of the demons, just as revelation³ mentions thus: 'Thereupon Frâsîyâv, the very powerful Tûrânian, rushed away, *O* Zaratûst of the Spîtâmas! to the wide-formed ocean a first, a second, and a third time; and he wished to obtain that glory which is specially for those *of* the countries of Irân, *for* the born and the unborn, and which is *for* the righteous *one*; *but* he did not attain to that glory.'

¹ Pahl. tôrâ-î aêvak-dâdô, the primeval ox, from whom the animals and plants have all descended (see Bd. III, 14, 17, 18; IV, 1-5; X, 1; XIV, 1-3; XXVII, 2).

² The same person as Frangrâsîyâk of Chaps. I, 31, 39; II, 69; XI, 3.

³ In Yt. XIX, 56-62; V, 42.

69. And this, too, *is mentioned*, that to all the seven regions the villain Frangrâstyâk rushed away, and the glory of Zaratûst *was sought by him* ¹.

70. Here is an enumeration *of* the worthy lineage of Zaratûst ²:—Zaratûst *was son of* Pôrûshâspô, *son of* Pađragtarâspô, of Urugadhasp*, of Haêkadâspô*, of Kikhshnus*, of Paêtrasp*, of Aregadharsn*, of Hardhar*, of Spîtâm, of Vaêdist*, of Nayâzem* ³, of Atrîk ³, of Dûrâsrôbô, of Mânûskêihar monarch of Irân, of Mânûs-khûrnar, of Mânûs-khûrnâk whom Nêrôksang implanted in ⁴ Vîzak*, *daughter of* Airyak*, *son of* Thritak*, of Bitak*, of Frazûsak*, of Zûsak*, of Fragûzak* ⁵, of Gûzak* ⁶, *daughter of* Atrîk, *son of* Frêdûn monarch of Khvanîras, *son of* Pûr-tôrâ the Âspîgân, of Nêvak-tôrâ the Âspîgân, of Sôg-tôrâ the Âspîgân, of Bôr-tôrâ the Âspîgân, of Kardâr-tôrâ ⁷ the Âspîgân, of Siyah-tôrâ the Âspîgân, of Spêtô-tôrâ the Âspîgân, of Gêfar-tôrâ the Âspîgân, of Ramak-tôrâ ⁸ the Âspîgân, of Vanô-fravîsn the Âspîgân, of Yim monarch of the seven

¹ See Yt. XIX, 82.

² Compare the genealogy in Zs. XIII, 6 ; Bd. XXXII, 1, and that quoted there from the Vigîrkard-i Dênîg. The names marked here with an asterisk are written in Pâzand, or partly so.

³ Ayazem, of Ragan, in Bd. The latter name is Ragîsn in Vig., but Êrîkô in Zs. XVI, 13.

⁴ This wants confirmation, but varzîd bên can hardly be a name as assumed in Vig., where it is altered to Varzîd-dên.

⁵ The g is of the old form like s.

⁶ The G is omitted, but see Bd. XXXI, 14.

⁷ Or Kûtâl-tôrâ ; this generation is omitted both in the Vigîrkard and Bundahis.

⁸ This generation is interlined in the MS. of the Dînkard. The Bundahis, XXXI, 7, also omits Nêvak-tôrâ ; and the Vigîrkard omits Bôr-tôrâ, Siyah-tôrâ, Spêtô-tôrâ, and Ramak-tôrâ. The termination tôrâ is merely the Zvâris equivalent of gau. In Irânian MSS. the Pahlavi t and û are practically written alike in most cases.

regions, *son* of Vîvangha, of Ayang, *had**, of Anang, *had**, *son* of Hôshâng the Pêsdâdian monarch of the seven regions, *son* of Fravâk, of Sîyâmak, of Masyâ, of Gâyômarđ the first man.

CHAPTER III.

1. About the marvellousness which is manifested after the birth of that most auspicious of offsprings from *his* mother, till his coming to a conference *with* Aûharmazd¹.

2. One *marvel* is this *which* is declared, that on being born he laughed outright; the seven midwives (*dayah*)², who sat around him, were quite frightened thereby; and those terrified ones spoke thus: 'What was this, on account of grandeur or contempt? when, like the worthy man whose pleasure is due to activity, the man's child so laughs at the birth owing to him.' 3. Pôrûshâspô also spoke thus: 'Bring out this *manchild* to the *sheepskin* clothing which is soft; the affair *was* owing to thee, owing to the virtue of thee who art Dûkdâûb, that the advent of glory and coming of radiance to this *manchild* *was* openly seen when he laughed outright at his birth.'

4. One *marvel* is this which is declared, that Pôrûshâspô afterwards went to a Karap, Dûrásrôbô *by* name, who was the most renowned for witchcraft in that district, and informed him of the birth of Zaratûst *and* the wonders which were manifested

¹ The contents of this chapter refer chiefly to 'the rearing of Zaratûst.' For the other matters mentioned in Dk. VIII, xiv, 2, see Zs. XIV, 6-12.

² Sls. X, 15 prescribes 'ten women.' Zs. XIV, 13 mentions 'seven wizards (*yâtûkô*).'

therein; he *also* brought *him* to the house for the purpose of seeing Zaratûst. 5. That wizard, owing to the coming *on* of vexation at that glory in Zaratûst, desired with evil intention a really mischievous deceit (shêdö), to compress with *his* paws (gôv) the tender head of that full-glorious child, to cause *his* death. 6. And here is manifested a great wonder to the multitude, just as revelation mentions *it* thus: 'Thereupon the paws of that deadly *one* (mar) *are* driven back to behind him (that is, reversed (aûskûn) backwards); nor ever after *did* that deadly *one* become again a devourer of meat with *his* jaws by means of those paws.' 7. That Karap also, besides that, examined the marks *and* evil specks on Zaratûst¹; and Pôrûshâspô, *in* awful alarm as to the dispersion *of* the emanation of splendour (âp-dihîh) from Zaratûst, hastened (sârîniâ) to make Zaratûst invisible.

8. One *marvel* is this *which is* declared, that the Karap Dûrâsrôbô, through witchcraft, cast such fear of Zaratûst into the mind *of* Pôrûshâspô, *and* so injured the mind of Pôrûshâspô, that, owing only to that very fear as regards himself, he asked the Karap for the death of Zaratûst. 9. Also about² the mode of putting to death for which Pôrûshâspô, owing to the distraction (vishôpisnô) by which he becomes helpless, asks Dûrâsrôbô; and that Karap is bringing much firewood together, and to shelter (nipâyîdanô) Zaratûst amid that firewood, to stir up a fire, and to make *it* blaze with the wood were the remedy he arranged (vîrâstô); and Pôrûshâspô acted accord-

¹ Compare Zs. XVI, 1-3.

² Pahl. madam-mâ, where mâ=ki, 'what? whatever,' is used for -ik, 'also,' as often happens.

ingly. 10. And here is manifested a great wonder to the multitude, just as revelation mentions it thus : 'Neither *was* fire among the vegetation on a tree (that is, it does not come on), nor *has* fire seized upon plants ; *but* on rushed, at dawn ¹, that son-loving mother, and she came forth to him intelligently (hûshûmônd), and seizing him, thereby removed him with *her* right hand aloft as he sat ².'

11. One *marvel* is this which is declared, that after Pôrûshâspô spoke to the Karap Dûrâsrôbô about the fire not burning *the child*, he asked anew about putting Zaratûst to death ; *then* to ensconce (nipâyîdanô) Zaratûst in a narrow path, and despatch many oxen on that path, so that he *may* be trampled on *by* the feet of the oxen *at* night, were the remedy that Karap proposed (girâyîdô) to Pôrûshâspô ; and Pôrûshâspô acted accordingly. 12. Here also is manifested a wonder of grandeur to the multitude, just as revelation mentions : 'It *was* that ox walked on which *had* become sorrowful (that is, its sorrow was great owing to another ox) and *it was* aged and walked before that *one* (before the leading ox), it *also* hastened before that *other* (that is, it stood up before Zaratûst), *and* he *was* greatly pitied by it for the whole day, so that it kept away the oxen from him, *being* the first *that* walked thither *and* the last *that* walked away ; on rushed at dawn that son-loving mother, forth to *him* she came intelli-

¹ Reading pavan aûsh, but it might be pavan hûsh, 'with sense,' here and in § 14, where there is nothing to indicate that the child was out all night, but in §§ 12, 18 he is evidently rescued the next morning.

² Pahl. 'madam pavan aûstakô.' Compare Zs. XVI, 7.

gently, and seizing him, thereby removed him with *her* right hand aloft as he sat¹.

13. One *marvel* is this which is declared, that Pôrûshâspô came a second time (īdanō) to that Karap also about the oxen not trampling on Zaratûst, *and* asked anew about the mode of putting Zaratûst to death; *then* to ensconce Zaratûst near a drinking-pool (āvkhûr) in the domain (gêhân), and to drive many horses to that drinking-pool, so that he may be trampled on by the hoofs of the horses, were the substituted² remedy that Karap proposed; *and* Pôrûshâspô acted accordingly. 14. And here is manifested a great wonder to the multitude, just as revelation mentions thus: 'That horse walked on which *had* become fully-hoofed (that is, its hoofs were very thick); *it is* yellow-eared and it walks before that *one* (before the leading horse), and it hastens before that *other* (that is, it stood up before Zaratûst), and *was* the first *that* walked on thither, *and* the last *that* walked away; on rushed at dawn that son-loving mother, forth to him she came intelligently, and seizing him, thereby removed him with *her* right hand aloft as he sat³.'

15. One *marvel* is this *which is* declared, that Pôrûshâspô *came* again to that Karap, spoke also about the horses, too, not trampling on Zaratûst, and asked anew as to what *may be* the mode of putting

¹ Compare Zs. XVI, 5.

² Possibly 'supplementary' or 'gratuitous.' The word is nîrmatō which, as a noun, means the gratuity or honorarium paid to a priest for acting as a substitute for another. Its etymology is obscure, unless it be an abbreviation of nîrūmandī, 'strength,' used in the legal sense of 'refresher.'

³ Compare Zs. XVI, 6.

Zaratûst to death ; *then* to have Zaratûst carried off into the den (sûrâk) where a wolf's cubs (hûnûskân) *are* slaughtered, so that when the wolf arrives *and* sees the slaughtered cubs, she *will* wrathfully growl *and* mangle Zaratûst in revenge for those cubs, was the remedy that Karap proposed ; and Pôrûshâspô acted accordingly. 16. *And* here is manifested a great wonder to the multitude, just as revelation mentions : ' It is when that wolf came on, several Yûgyâsts¹, towards Zaratûst, the wolf *was* struck dumb by the assistance of the sacred beings, so that its mouth *was* down *at* the cubs, one with the other.'

17. One *marvel* is this which is declared, that Srôsh² the righteous *and* Vohûmanô proceeded to him, and a woolly (kûrûsak) *sheep* was brought by them unto him ; the nurses (dâyagân)³ also *were* terrified, apart from him, the whole night. 18. *Then* on rushed at dawn that son-loving mother, forwards from the position *of* that woolly *sheep* she walked, and she, the mistress of the domain (zan-î gehân), spoke thus : ' Thou runnest on violently (ûtayûtô) in excess ;' for she considered in this *way*, that ' the wolf is so much better to that son than thou art⁴ good to me, when I shall show *his*⁵ bone or blood in thy sight⁶.' 19. Forwards to him has she come

¹ The Yûgyâst is a distance of sixteen Roman miles of a thousand paces each (see Dk. VIII, xx, 19, note). But the writer of the scripture here quoted could have had no idea of the distance he was mentioning.

² A sacred being who personifies 'obedience,' and is a special protector of man, particularly at night.

³ It may also be read dehîgân, 'the country-folk.'

⁴ Or '*she* would be.'

⁵ Or '*they* show *my*.'

⁶ This seems to be a bitter reproach addressed to her husband ; but the ambiguity of the Pahlavi makes its exact meaning rather uncertain.

intelligently and, seizing him, she thereby removed him, through the grace (dahisnō) of the sacred beings, aloft as he sat; and she, the mistress of the domain, spoke thus: 'I *shall* not give thee up again, *my* son, not *even* though both Râk and Nôdar *should* arrive here together¹.'

20. And *it* is declared that, afterwards, the Karap Dûrâsrôbô, with a malicious disciple, came to the same district and noticed about the advancement of Zaratûst; and they saw no means for injuring *or* putting *him* to death, but his condition (mindavam) *was* a marvel as full of vigour as this which is declared, that Brâdrôk-rêsh, the Karap, growled thus:—21. 'Then I, *who* am the most far-seeing of the people in that district of ours as to witchcraft, see upon their district that well-directing (that is, he understands good commands) produce *of* development (that is, the increase which continually becomes more, which *has* come and which *will* arrive), with good flocks (that is, he understands to keep good sheep), with good herds (that is, he understands to keep a herd which is better *than* another's), the well-exerting (that is, he understands to do work which is better *than* another's), well-fighting (that is, he understands to do battle well), and perfectly liberal (that is, he understands to exercise beneficial liberality) bantling (hûnûskō) of Pôrûshâspô², in the three nights while he was begotten out of

¹ See Chap. II, 51. Compare Dk. V, ii, 4; Zs. XVI, 8-13.

² The Pahlavi version of an Avesta text, here translated, is a fair specimen of the complication produced by appending a gloss to every epithet. It is useful as a combination of translation and lexicon, but it is apt to be perplexing, unless all the glosses are carefully omitted by the reader who can dispense with a lexicon.

his parents. 22. Unto him *will* Vohûmanô come in the embodied world (that is, Vohûmanô *will* come unto Zaratûst), and conducting him unto a conference, his good religion *will* extend into the seven regions *of* the earth; and so I *shall* not even let him produce in *his* mind (that is, he *will* not know) where *and* how I *shall* murder him; and a token of this matter, that *one* speaks truly, is this, that I state *it* beforehand, promptly after the full hearing of the statement of the matter, when you heard this statement.'

23. Pôrûshâspô advanced, conveyed in a four-in-hand chariot¹; then, on hearing that statement, *and* when they had heard that statement, Pôrûshâspô started forth, conveyed in that four-in-hand chariot.

24. And Pôrûshâspô spoke to Brâdrôk-rêsh, the Karap, thus: 'Brâdrôk-rêsh, *thou* Karap! whatever men they shall behold, cry out when at birth; even the offspring of that secluded person they behold in death, cry out when at birth²; *but* what *was* that which *they* beheld *at* the birth of my son?' 25. When at birth he laughed outright; *was* that also beheld *in* thy son, when at birth did he laugh outright?

26. When Vohûmanô comes unto him, into *this* embodied existence, *it* is also said by him on *his* return: "O Pôrûshâspô! where is thy servant³?" So, O Karap! concerning him who is my son, *it* is beheld that *he* *was* seen sagaciously by thee.'

For restoring the original Avesta, the Pahlavi translation, without the glosses, is usually the best guide.

¹ Pahl. 4-ayûgîsnô râê (Av. *kathruiyukhta* and *ratha*).

² This seems to be the meaning of Pahl. 'zag-*fk* tanô armêstô-dahîsnîh pavan frâz khadîtund margîh, amat pavan zerkhûnîsnô, barâ bekhûnd.'

³ Pahl. 'Pôrûshâspô! aêghat bandakô?'

27. And ¹ when Pôrûshâspô enquired of him thus : 'What was the *matter* with thee when, through bringing thee unto that son of mine, *he was* thereby offered ; and thou lookedst long up away from him in height, and thou lookedst long down away from him in depth, and thou lookedst long out away from him in different directions?' 28. The Tûrânian, Brâdrôk-rêsh the Karap, spoke *in* reply thus : 'When through bringing me unto that son *was thy* offering of him, and I ² looked long up away from him in height, then the radiance *and* glory out of him kept together up to the sun, *and* through him ³ I have accompanied *them* on the boundary of *its* radiance *and* glory ; so that I saw this, that mankind through speaking to the soul may attain to the firmament of the sun ; *but* this, namely, how the routine (dâdistânô) is in the supreme heaven, *was* not seen by me. 29. When through bringing me unto that son of thine *was thy* offering of him, and I looked long down in depth away from *thy* offering of him, then the radiance and glory out of him kept together unto the sky which is below this earth, and through him ⁴ to the boundary of *its* radiance and glory ; *but* this, namely, how the routine is in that sky, *was* not seen by me. 30. And when through bringing me unto that son of thine *was thy* offering of him, and I looked long out away from him in different directions, then the radiance *and* glory from him kept together for adorning this earth, *and*

¹ The first five words of § 28 are here inserted in the MS., so as to combine the two sentences in a perplexing manner.

² The MS. has *afat* for *afam* by mistake.

³ Or 'that.'

⁴ The differences of form in §§ 28-30 are probably due to errors of copyists.

through him I have accompanied *them* on the boundary of *its* radiance *and* glory ; so that I saw this, that only from the action of this *one* the future existence *will* arise ; but the routine of the future existence *was* not seen by me. 31. This son of thine thinks thus : “ I *will* make a grander material existence than that of *any* other ; ” so he *will* also make thy spiritual *one*, where thou goest : *and* this son of thine *will* remain in the great protection of Vistâsp, not in thine.’

32. One *marvel* is this which is declared, that when Zaratûst was seven years old, that Dûrâsrôbô being joined by Brâdrôk-rêsh the Karap at the village of Pôrûshâspô, on account of the little previous seeing of Zaratûst *by the latter*, they saw Zaratûst in that neighbourhood when a hut (kâdâkô) was constructed by him with the children ; and they sat with evil intention to injure the mind of Zaratûst through witchcraft, and for that reason fear and terror *were* cast by them upon the children. 33. Here a great wonder became manifest to them, owing to the powerful intellect, cautiousness, and practice of Zaratûst, just as revelation mentions thus : ‘ When the other children were excessively terrified at their own silliness of speech, Zaratûst did not quite close the eye in his mind as regards them.’

34. One *marvel* is this *which is* declared, that when these two Karaps came to the dwelling of Pôrûshâspô, he ordered the preparation of food for their eating ; and his prepared food is chewed up (frâz khayâi-alt), *with* a gobletful (pûr dôlakô) of mare’s milk. 35. He also spoke to Dûrâsrôbô thus : ‘ Thou art the most spirit-worshipping¹ of mankind

¹ Literally ‘ demon-worshipping ; ’ it is not clear that idolatry is

in our district; do thou worship this of mine.' 36. A great marvel, owing to the sagacity of Zaratûst at a childish age, is just as revelation mentions that Zaratûst spoke thus: 'I worship this, *O* father! *it* is not that which it is necessary for me to worship *that* he should worship.' 37. And Pôrûshâspô spoke thus: '*It* is not that of mine thou worshipping, *and* it is that of mine he should worship.' 38. As many as three times those persons (gabrâân) carried on those assertions; *when* up stood Zaratûst and spoke concerning them, and he broke forth with that eternal statement¹, namely: 'The righteous I reverence, men *or* women; the poor I reverence, men *or* women; *not* the wicked, men or women; when any one whatever shall join Pôrûshâspô, where he shall be celebrating worship, the worship shall then be suitable to the worshippers, that is, he shall worship that which it is necessary to worship.'

39. One *marvel* is this which is declared, that afterwards Dûrâsrôbô the Karap shouted to Zaratûst thus: 'Evil was thy reckoning² which, owing to the conduct of fate (bâhar), I, the foremost of the existences embodied in Râk and Nôdâr³, bring to thee; I am made further worthy where thy fate is carried away from me; now is the joy (parkân) which I convey to him⁴ through bringing *it* on, and this

intended, but rather some form of worship antecedent to Zoroastrian Mazda-worship which latter had not yet been established. The author of this legend must have supposed that it differed very little from the religion of Pôrûshâspô.

¹ Reading sakhûn-i leyalmin which is written in Pahlavi exactly like dashinô rigelð, 'the right foot.'

² Pahl. marakð, possibly for marg, 'death.'

³ See Chap. II, 51, note.

⁴ Probably referring to his companion Brâzrôk-rêsh who, accord-

will occur, so that I *may* observe he *will* kill thee with the evil eye in the house.' 40. And here is a great wonder which became manifest about Zaratûst, in the sagacity of *his* reply to that deadly *one* at that childish age, which *was* just like this which revelation mentions, that Zaratûst spoke thus : 'Without the joy of a murderer I observe, with propitiousness and complete mindfulness, that it is thee I notice in that house which is thine ¹.'

41. One *marvel* is that which, after this reply of Zaratûst to Dûrâsrôbô, became manifest in that Karap, just as revelation mentions thus : 'The deadly *one* became disabled and stupefied as long as the milking of ten mares *in* milk whose milker is *only one*.'

42. One *marvel* is this *which is* declared, that when that wizard emerged from *that* stupefaction, he then shouted again to Zaratûst *in* the same manner, Zaratûst uttered that same reply, *and* the deadly *one* became anew disabled and stupefied as long as the milking of twenty mares full of milk whose milker *is only one*.

43. One *marvel* is this which is declared, that again when that wizard emerged from *that* stupefaction, he then shouted to Zaratûst *in* the same manner, Zaratûst uttered that same reply, *and* the deadly *one* becomes anew disabled and stupefied as long as the milking of thirty mares full of milk whose milker *is only one*.

44. One *marvel* is this *which is* declared, that when that wizard emerged from that stupefaction, he

ing to most accounts, was the murderer of Zaratûst in his old age. This tradition is mentioned in Dk. VII only here and in § 22.

¹ Alluding to Dûrâsrôbô's own fate, see § 45.

then grumbled thus : ‘ Do ye have the horse driven for us, and turn round the chariot wherein you harness *it* ; for really this smiting *one* (ganâk) *will* destroy me through the arrival of the *sacred* text *and* through *his* possession of authority.’ So they had the horse driven, and *it was* harnessed to the chariot by them.

45. And here is manifested a great wonder to the multitude, just as revelation mentions thus : ‘ When he *had* proceeded several Yûgyâsts¹ in driving, he stopped in his distress through being terrified, *and* this occurred which I mention for a warning², his semen *was* expelled, so that it arose in his skin and burst it³, and *his* loin thereby broke from *his* thigh ; he then died outright, then his progeny, and then the offspring of his progeny.’

46. One *marvel* is this which is declared that, even before the coming of *Zarathûst* to a conference⁴, *there* is manifested in him a mind which is more capacious than the whole world, *and* more exalted than every worldly possession, with an understanding whose strength is perfectly selected, an intellect of all-acquiring power, and a sagacity of all-deciding ability ; also with the much heedfulness of the kingly glory, and the full desire for righteousness, the efficacious diligence and authority, and even the superiority in mightiness and grandeur of the priestly glory. 47. Also the handsomeness of body *and* completeness of strength which are in the character of these four classes of his, which are priesthood,

¹ See § 16 n.

² Pahl. ‘avô pêš yemale/ûnam.’

³ Or ‘in his back and broke it,’ if we suppose that pôst, ‘skin,’ stands for pôst, ‘back.’ Compare the same legend in Zs. XIX, 1-8.

⁴ With the sacred beings.

warriorship, husbandry, and artisanship; *besides* a perfect friendship for the sacred beings *and* the good, *and* an awful enmity for the demons *and* the vile. 48. That is the nature by which the habits (dâdōh) of mankind *and* bipeds, the perfection and completeness of the sacred beings through the creativeness of Aûharmazd, and its *own* commemoration *of them* are provided. 49. So that the sacred beings shall bring a report, as to his superiority, from every one of those who are *and* were *and* will be, *and* of his coming for reminding *us* of Aûharmazd and of the lord-and-mastership (ahû-va-radîh) of the world, *also* of the preservation of the creations therein (ayîpö-dahisnân), from the destroyer, by the tongue of the many-mannered (kabad-sarâdakö) sage, the fully-virtuous *one* of the age producing no harm (avazand-dahîg) in the world. 50. And the demons on this *account*, that this is *he* whom many Kîts¹ *and* Karaps *have* to influence the good to confound *and* destroy, then also kept *their* promise and practised friendship.

51. And on the completion of thirty years beyond his birth², the archangel Vohûmanô came on in commemoration of Aûharmazd, when *he was* bringing his Hô-m-water (mayâ-i Hô-mîgân)³ from the

¹ See Chap. II, 9 n.

² The remaining contents of this and the following chapter are thus summarized in Dk. VIII, xiv, 3, 4:—‘His attainment on maturity, at thirty years *of age*, to a conference *with* Aûharmazd; and the occurrence of seven conferences in ten years. Many marvels, owing to him are published therein, just as there are *some* which, collected *and* selected, are noticed by the Dînkard manuscript,’ that is, in this seventh book, in which, however, the details of the seven conferences do not occur; but some are mentioned in Zs. XXI, 8-XXII, 13.

³ See Visp. XI, 2.

river Aêvatâk¹, just as this which revelation mentions thus: 'When Zaratûst came forth to the third effluent (*barâ-tagisnîh*), that of the good Dâiti, he further proceeded through that; and when he marched onwards from that, a man *was* seen by him, who marched from the southern quarter. 52. That was Vohûmanô, and it seemed *to him* *that* Vohûmanô *was* of early form (so that he is more discerning as to a person) and foreseeing (that is, he was beforehand in everything); it seemed *to him* *that* Vohûmanô *was* as much *in* height as three men's spears; and it seemed *to him*, *as to* Vohûmanô that a glossy twig (*arûs tâk*) *was* brought by him in *his* hand, through carrying off which branch the plant *was* not injured by him; that became the spiritual twig of the religion, and this *was* indicated by it, that it is necessary to proceed as uninjuriously by the religion. 53. There is *some one* who says that it became a reminder of the spiritual *existence*, and this *was* indicated by it, that it is necessary to proceed as uninjuriously in the world, so that peace may exist with every one.

54. When he came onward to the fourth effluent, as far as the Aûshân-rûd of the good Dâiti (which was the name of it) and *he was* in it, Zaratûst *was* bringing the Hôm-water from the middle of it; and on the ascent Zaratûst, bringing his right foot out of the Aûshân-rûd, covered *himself* with his clothes, and upon that Vohûmanô, advancing, joined him in front.

¹ Literally 'single-flowing.' In Bd. XXIX, 4, 5, it is Nâivtâk which has been translated as 'navigable' in Bd. XX, 34, and as 'flowing in a channel' in Dk. VIII, xxxvii, 38, 42; IX, xvi, 16.—From § 54 it appears to have been a channel of the good Dâiti river which flows from Aîrân-vêg (see Bd. XX, 13).

55. And that man enquired of him thus: 'Who art thou; from whom of them art thou¹?' *He replied*: 'I am Zaratûst² of the Spîtâmas.'

56. The words of Vohûmanô *were*: 'O Zaratûst of the Spîtâmas! about what is thy foremost distress (that is, for what is thy need when thou becomest quite distressed); about what is thy foremost endeavour; and for what is the tendency of thy desire (lak kâmakô-dahisnth)?' 57. The reply of Zaratûst *was* thus: 'About righteousness, I consider *my* foremost distress; about righteousness *my* foremost endeavour; and for righteousness the tendency of my desire (that is, my need is for that thing, and I am a distressed seeker of righteousness).'

58. The words of Vohûmanô *were*: 'O Zaratûst of the Spîtâmas! that which is righteousness is existing (that is, a real thing is, as *it were*, that which is righteousness), so that whatever is that which is righteousness is thus what is one's own.' 59. And Zaratûst spoke thus: 'That which is righteousness exists, and concerning that I am completely clear and aware; *but* where *and* how is that radiance which is that whose arrival is through Vohûmanô.'

60. And Vohûmanô spoke to him thus: 'O Zaratûst of the Spîtâmas! deposit this one garment which thou carriest, so that we *may* confer with him *by*

¹ See Pahl. Yas. XLII, 7 c (Sp.).

² According to the numbering of the folios in the old Bombay MS., written in 1659, nine folios were here separated from it last century. They contained the text as far as the end of Chap. IV, and the first eight of them were found at Naosâri about twenty years ago and copied. But all Indian copies, written before that time, omit this mislaid text. See S. B. E., vol. xxxvii, pp. xxxvi, xxxvii.

whom thou art produced *and by* whom I am produced, who is the most propitious of spirits, who is the most beneficent of existences, and who is he *that* I, who am Vohûmanô, am testifying (that is, I am a reminder of him).'

61. Thereupon, Zaratûst thought thus: 'Good is he who is the creator, who is better than this reminder.' 62. Then they proceeded in company, Vohûmanô and Zaratûst; Vohûmanô *first and* Zaratûst after.

CHAPTER IV.

1. About the marvellousness which is manifested from the first conference onwards till the end of the seventh conference which occurred within the duration of ten years, also his pre-eminence in prophecy in the world, *and* the acceptance of the religion *by* the exalted Kai-Vistâsp, as *happened* after the ten years of conference.

2. In *the first* two years, one *marvel* is this which is declared, that when he was back from the first conference, he then, by the first command of the lord *and* creator Aûharmazd, recited the unique formula (âyînô) in an assemblage (ram) of Kîgs and Karaps, the prophecy of his Mazda-worshipping religion and commemoration of Aûharmazd, as he chanted with a loud voice, *and* invited mankind to the religion of Aûharmazd. 3. Just as this *passage* of revelation mentions thus: 'Thereupon, the thorough inspection for this material existence of those with a *sacred* girdle, provided with dwellings *and* provided with cattle, *was* altogether arranged by Zaratûst.'

4. And when their announcement (nivêdisnô) for

speaking to be heard *was* issued¹, then Zaratûst, on becoming exalted, called out unto the embodied world of righteousness to extol righteousness and to scorn the demons². 5. 'The homage of the Mazda-worship of Zaratûst, *and* the ceremonial and obeisance for the archangels *are* the best for you I assert; and of deprecation (ayazisnîh) for the demons next-of-kin marriage is really the best intimation, so that, from the information which is given *as to* the trustworthiness of a good work, the greatest are the most intimate of them, *those of* father *and* daughter, son *and* she who bore *him*, and brother *and* sister.'

6. *It is* declared that, upon those words, innumerable demon-worshipping Kîgs and Karaps have rushed upon Zaratûst and strove for his death, just like this which revelation states:—'It is then a number (mar) have run away who have sat in the vicinity of Tûr's progeny (hûnûskö)³, the arbitrator; and the shame of the brother of Tûr arose, like *that of* a person whose shame *was* that they spoke of his next-of-kin marriage so that he might contract it.'

7. This Tûr *was* Aûrvâtâ-dang⁴ the Tûr, the scanty giver, *who* was like a great sovereign of that

¹ From this point §§ 4-8 and 11 have been already translated in S. B. E., vol. xviii, pp. 412, 413, in illustration of the meaning of Khvêtûk-das in Sasanian times and later.

² Av. staomî ashem; nâismî daêvô (Yas. XI, 19; XII, 1).

³ An opprobrious term for the progeny of evil beings and animals, also used by a Karap when speaking of Zaratûst in Chap. III, 21.

⁴ As this name has not been found in the extant Avesta, its correct reading is uncertain. In Zs. XX, 8, it can be read Aûrvâtô-dih, in which dih is the Pahl. translation of Av. dang, hu, of which dang is a Pahl. transliteration; and the whole name may mean 'friendly to the province,' which seems suitable to this particular ruler. The MS. appears to have deng.

quarter; many troops and *much* power *were* also maintained by him, and the multitude (*mar*) told him they would seize the great *one* from *him* who is little.

8. *But* the progeny of Aûrvâtâ-dang the Tûr, the scanty giver, *spoke* thus: 'Should we for that *speech* destroy him, this great *one* who mingles together those propitious words *for* us—where we are thus without doubt *as to* one thing therein, *such* as next-of-kin marriage, that it is not necessary to contract *it*—it would make us ever doubtful whether it *might* be necessary to contract it.'

9. And Aûrvâtâ-dang the Tûr, the scanty giver, spoke thus: 'Thou shalt not destroy that man whom mine eyes *have* seen *as* the most loving-eyed of the whole embodied existence; he *will* attain strength, for it *has* not seemed to me, when thou destroyest him on this account, *that* wisdom *has* arisen *for* a long time; so that no rule (*âhankö*) of wisdom *will* arise, in this earth, which is so counselling (*hanga-manig*) as this *one* is (that is, when they destroy a man who is counselling, wisdom *will* not arise *for* a long while).'

10. Aûrvâtâ-dang the Tûr, the scanty giver to his own *people*, also spoke thus: 'For me thou art a pure *man* who is counselling.'

11. And Zaratûst spoke thus: 'I *shall* not always be that quiet speaker, by¹ whom that I *have* mentioned is the most propitious *thing* to be obtained; and of interfering² speaking and managing the temper *there* is a next-of-kin marriage, and the high-

¹ Or 'from.'

² It may be 'parenthetical or ambiguous.'

priest *who has contracted* ¹ *it* is to perform the ceremonial.'

12. And here the good spiritual lordship and mightiness of glory of Zaratûst, those which are provided for commemoration *of* the supreme lord and creator Aûharmazd, are manifested *as* a great wonder to the multitude, *and there* is rendered visible the great pre-eminence which is in him *as* a prophet *of* the creatures, which for the baseness (nankth) of the deceitful Agash ², the secret-moving and deceiving-natured, is the concealed control of a good disposition. 13. Then idleness, like even the habit of fear and nature of apostasy, is an attractor of every one of the multitude, when it extends to much length; little by little, too, that guide and combatant becomes a petitioner for greatness, *and it is* manifest through that compassion (tang-libbemâth) and superior mindfulness of his, *and* through the glory of that stout champion, *there are* much fame *and* treasure.

14. The nobles of Aûrvâtâ-dang the Tûr, the ruler of the land, *were* angry and clamourers for Zaratûst's death; but he invited the Kîgs and Karaps to the religion of Aûharmazd, just as this *passage* of revelation states that Zaratûst also spoke thus: 'Worldly righteousness, O Aûrvâtâ-dang, *thou* Tûr *and* scanty giver! is the whole *of the worship of* the demons and the termination of the Mazda-worship of Zaratûst.' 15. And Aûrvâtâ-dang the Tûr, the scanty giver, spoke thus: 'O Zaratûst of the Spîtâmas! thou shalt not attract me to this evil in which thou really art.'

¹ Or, perhaps, 'celebrated.'

² The demon of the evil eye (see Bd. XXVIII, 33); Av. Ag-hashî, Vd. XX, 3, 7, 9.

16. Zaratûst also spoke thus: 'Aûharmazd' enquired of me thus: "O Zaratûst! when thou hast come away to us, among the spiritual lords, who of the people in thy material existence *was* the protector of the powerful men who *are* warriors, *that was* most seeking benefit, most seeking cattle, most extensively associating, most fully-supplying (that is, he gives out most things), and most hospitable¹ (*that is, one saw the door of a prince's (khidîvö) treasury*)?" I replied to him thus: "Aûrvâitâ-dang the Tûr, the scanty giver."

17. 'And he spoke *in* reply to me thus: "Him, O Zaratûst! thou shalt attract, first of the men *who are* warriors, to thinking about, speaking about, and acting about this religion which is Aûharmazd's and Zaratûst's. 18. If you attract him, O Zaratûst! and he believes in it and also gives currency to this *religion* of thine, and sits before *thee* in discipleship, this that *one* calls discipleship of thine he shall undertake, and the religion he hears fully he shall propagate (rûbâk va bîdûnyên); he is also ever after, O Zaratûst! the first of the men *who are* warriors, the *one* most seeking benefit, most seeking cattle, most extensively associating, and most hospitable of those who have yet been born *and* who *will* henceforth be born. 19. And if you do not attract him, O Zaratûst! and he does not believe in it, nor gives currency to this *religion* of thine, nor hears *it*, nor even sits before thee, nor would sit before thee, so that *it* is obvious to me that *he* is not attracted, thou shalt speak unto him thus, O Zaratûst: 'Thou art a stricken supplicant for righteousness, and a producer of lamentation for the souls of Tanâpûhar sinners

¹ Literally 'most many-doored.'

worthy of death;' for even so it is, and for this reason he becomes worthy of death, because the existence of the religion is known to him." 20. What I tell thee, *O Aûrvâltâ-dang, thou Tûr and scanty giver!* is that thou art a stricken supplicant *for* righteousness, a producer of lamentation for the souls of *Tanâpûhar* sinners worthy of death.'

21. One prodigy of the demons is specified, who *was* the enemy of whatever sacred beings *there are*, a *Karap, Vaêdvôist* ¹ *by name, of those unsanctified (ayastân) by Aûharmazd* ². 22. And *Aûharmazd* spoke thus: 'I so befriend that man, *O Zaratûst!* who is put forward by me over the creatures, whom thou shalt invite (*khvânês*), I *who* am *Aûharmazd*, because I am through righteousness opposed to harm (that is, through virtue I keep harm away from the creatures), *and* the archangels are opposed to harm. 23. Therefore do thou proceed, *O Zaratûst!* *and* thou shalt demand from him for me (that is, keep as my property) a hundred youths of vigour (*tôsh tal*) ³, girls, and teams of four horses; so do thou speak to him thus: "*O Vêdvôist! Aûharmazd* demands from thee a hundred youths of vigour, girls, *and* teams of four horses; if thou givest *them*

¹ Here written in Pâzand, but the Pahlavi form, *Vêdvôist*, occurs in §§ 23, 24.

² Or '*of the non-worshippers of Aûharmazd.*'

³ For an instance of gifts of slaves see the Pahlavi inscription on an engraved stone from Baghdâd, in *Indian Antiquary*, vol. xi, p. 224, ll. 2, 3 of inscription: '*kevan bîdûn va-kanîgakô . . . lakhvâr . . . shedrûnam . . . va-zak shibâ rîdô va-shibâ kanîgakôân shedrûnt:*'—'Now . . . I send back a slave-boy and slave-girl . . . and those seven slave-boys and seven slave-girls are sent.' This inscription was probably engraved in the seventh century, judging from the forms of the letters.

to him, splendour and glory are thine through that giving; and if thou dost not give to him, evil destiny is thine through that not-giving.”

24. Then Zaratûst walked on to that Vêdvoist of those unsanctified, and spoke to him thus: ‘*O Vêdvoist of the unsanctified! that which Aûharmazd demands from thee is a hundred youths of vigour, girls, and teams of four horses; if thou givest them to him, splendour and glory are thine through that giving; and if thou dost not give to him, evil destiny is thine through that not-giving.*’ 25. And that Karap shouted in reply to Zaratûst thus: ‘For me *there* is no more from thee (that is, there is no opulence for me from thy action), nor from Aûharmazd; I am more of a divinity (bagtar) and am more forward in opulence than even Aûharmazd; many droves of a thousand swine are also acquired by me.’

26. On went Zaratûst, up to Aûharmazd and up to the archangels, and Zaratûst spoke thus: ‘*O Aûharmazd, propitious spirit, creator of the world of embodied beings, thou righteous one!* thus spoke he *in* reply to me: “For me *there* is no more from thee, nor from Aûharmazd; I am more of a divinity than thee *or* even Aûharmazd, and many droves of a thousand swine are acquired by me.”’

27. And Aûharmazd spoke thus: ‘Owing to the splendour and glory of those which are ours, *O Zaratûst!* that man has acquired arrogance (that is, the cattle we produced are the many cattle of his arrogance). 28. This *will be* his retribution for it then, however, when he does not reach further alive at the end of the third night¹; in that third night

¹ Apparently the third night after death, on the passing away of

they *will* have stood aloof from alongside his life (that is, they *will* have stood away from assisting it); those seven of them who are radiant and bright-eyed (*spêdō dōtsar*) make him rush up on high, and up there on high *he* shall be fed upon mouldy bread (*parnân*).'

29. One *marvel* is the great healthfulness owing to the Hô-m-water *and* the bringing of this *by* Zaratûst from the river Dâtî, which is manifested when Vohûmanô *was* conveying *him* to the conference.

30. Just as is declared in the words of Aûharmazd to Zaratûst thus: 'For them is the Hô-m-water which thou bringest, *O* Zaratûst! not for those demon-worshipping people *who* worship the demons, or for a satisfier of courtezans (*gêh-vigâr*); they shall sprinkle it on to that bull thou shalt bring forward, who is a four-year-old of exhausted vigour, black-haired and useful; *on* drinking up the water, that bull *will* become quite sound from that infirmity.'

31. Thereupon, Zaratûst went on first into the embodied existence, on which dwelt, at the end of Sagâstân¹, that same Parshad *whose* title was Tôrâ (*the Bull*). 32. Parshad-tôrâ² also spoke to him

which the soul is supposed to have its destination determined, until the resurrection (see Hâdôkht Nask, II, 18; III, 17). If the seven sacred beings who stand aloof from him be the archangels, they treat Vêdvoist very leniently; but this legend treats of a period which it assumes to be earlier than the laws of Zaratûst.

¹ The modern Sîstân, bordering upon Afghânistân and Bulûkistân.

² Av. Parshad-gau, mentioned twice in Yt. XIII, 96, 127, but it is not certain that both allusions refer to the same individual. The name also occurs in Bd. XXIX, 5, but only in one old MS.; in all others another name is given, though the locality appears to be

thus: 'O Zaratûst of the Spîtâmas! give me this Hô-m-water which thou bringest.' 33. And Zaratûst spoke thus: 'Do thou praise righteousness, O Parshad-tôrâ! and scorn the demons; *also* utter the profession¹ of the Mazda-worship of Zaratûst among the iniquitous.' 34. *It was* praised by Parshad-tôrâ, and the demons were scorned by him; yet he did not speak among the iniquitous as to his accepting the Mazda-worship of Zaratûst. 35. Forward to him *came* Zaratûst at that praise of righteousness, for him *was* that Hô-m-water which Zaratûst brought; not for those demon-worshipping people *who* have worshipped the demons, *but* for that bull of his *which* Zaratûst brought forward, a four-year-old of exhausted vigour, black-haired and useful; owing to that bringing forward of the water, the bull became quite sound from that infirmity.

36. One *marvel* is that which is declared regarding the rushing of the evil spirit for the slaughter of Zaratûst, just as revelation² mentions thus: 'From the northern quarter forth rushed the deadly evil spirit, and thus shouted he, astute in evil, the deadly evil spirit: "Rush on, O fiend! and destroy the righteous Zaratûst."' 37. On to him they rushed, the fiend, the demon Bûd, and secret-moving Pestilence, the deceiver. 38. Zaratûst chanted aloud the Ahunavair; the fiend *was* confounded at that, *and* away they rushed, the demon Bûd and secret-moving Pestilence, the deceiver. 39. And the fiends shouted thus: "Thou art scornfully observing, O evil spirit! (that is, anything to the purpose thou

nearly the same. In § 31 the first part of the name is here written Parshêd.

¹ The Fravarânê, Yas. XI, 16.

² Pahl. Vd. XIX, 1-4.

dost not thoroughly observe, and what thou orderest *us* to do is not possible); the death of him who is Zarâtûst of the Spîtâmas is not contemplated by us."

40. Owing to the full glory of the righteous Zarâtûst, he perceived in *his* mind thus: "The wicked demons, astute in evil, consult together about my death;" and up stood Zarâtûst, forth went Zarâtûst.'

41. Here is manifested a great wonder to the multitude, in that which is mentioned thus: 'And a stone *was* put forth by the righteous Zarâtûst, *that* was held in *his* hand, and the size of a hut, *and* which was obtained by him from the creator Aûharmazd, the spiritual Yathâ-ahû-vairyô ¹.'

42. And one *marvel* is this which is manifested not only in the country of Irân to Irânians, but in every land and to every race: the shattering of the demons' bodies *through* the chanting of the Ahunavair aloud *by* Zarâtûst. 43. Just as that which *a passage*² mentions thus: 'I worship the resources of the Kayân glory, with which the righteous Zarâtûst was associated in thinking about, speaking about, *and* acting about the religion which was, of all embodied existences, the most righteous in righteousness, the most lordly in sovereignty, the most radiant in radiance, and the most glorious in glory. 44. At *his* appearance³ the demons have fallen before him, at *his* appearance their semen (mâyagân) also drops, at *his* appearance the courtesan is also withdrawn by them from mankind;

¹ The first three words of the Ahunavair formula.

² See Yt. XIX, 78-81.

³ Reading *vênâv*dahakih, but the first letter is omitted in all three occurrences of the word.

on hearing¹ him *they* lamented, very violently is it lamented by the demons. 45. By the Ahunavair, which the righteous Zaratûst chanted aloud to them, all the demons are seized *and* buried in the earth, where the complete shattering of their bodies is manifest.' 46. So that, after the shattering of their bodies, it became evident to those in the world *that* they were not able to do mischief in the bodily form of a demon, and they have been declared of the nature of sacred beings to mankind, *but* mankind fully understood that they are not sacred beings, but demons.

47. Zaratûst revealed (gushâftô) to mankind by the word of Aûharmazd, how in this religion *the latter* tells in words to Zaratûst where *and* how, in the embodied existence, mankind consider a demon as exalted *or* as a high-priest, because they are where they say that they must consider *some one* as high-priest. 48. So Aûharmazd spoke to Zaratûst thus: 'How do they who are good people, O Zaratûst! consider a demon as exalted? and how are they that even tell a demon thus: "We should accept you," because the demons speak thus: "It *will* happen to you"?''

49. And Zaratûst spoke thus: 'Only for the *reason*, O Aûharmazd! *that* people hasten on to that which is a jungly plain without dwellings, where no one resides from the departure of light until sun-

¹ If the word be Pahlavi, it is probably intended for snâyân, 'hearing'; but it may be merely an approximate transcript of Av. snaodhentis, which word, if this be the case, must have puzzled Sasanian scholars as much as it does those of the present time. As a transcript, the word might be read snôdîyân, and we might guess the meaning of the phrase to be 'thereupon weeping *they* lamented.'

rise arrives, when *it is* two Hâsars¹ of night, and again silently (agôp) from sunset until their returning together when the two Hâsars of night are gone, they hear that no work, no men, and no voices of dogs are there. 50. Then they say as to that, on arriving back, thus: "We have consulted with the demons there; when we request (zâêm) monarchy (sâstârîh) *and* leadership from them, they give them to us; when we request the possession of flocks and opulence from them, they give them to us."

51. *Then Aûharmazd spoke thus*: 'How can they do such a thing for them, *O Zaratûst!* (that is, how does it happen *that it is* continually given by them *for* those that speak thus: "It happened to us")?'

52. And Zaratûst spoke thus: 'They speak variously, *O Aûharmazd!* as to that generosity; there is *one* who speaks thus: "I have ever after been possessing more flocks, so long as I am *in* consultation with the demons;" and there is *another* who speaks thus: "I have ever after been worse and more ill-fated, so long as we are *in* consultation with those demons;" according as they possess a full subsistence for *themselves* from the demons (that is, when they diversely subsist fully *on* whatever they bespeak from the demons).' 53. Zaratûst also spoke thus: 'So they speak about it, *O Aûharmazd!* thus: "Observe further, where any one of us returns *he* is either shrunk together (that is, he holds *his* head down to *his* chest), or shrunk away (that is, he looks quite aside), or is only pleasantly

¹ Av. hâthra, which, as a measure of time, varies from one to two hours (see Farh. Oîm, p. 43, ll. 1-3).

cast down and, owing to acquiescence in him, the demons tempt (nes,hünd) *him* away out of mankind.”’

54. And Aûharmazd spoke thus: ‘According to thy wish, do thou, *O Zaratûst!* fully observe thy existence, upwards from the head, downwards from the sole¹ of the foot, and afar *on* various sides; and thou shouldst beseech before and behind and *in* every direction, for we *are* not as to thee as the demons *are* as to mankind, we give away everything only in invisibility; but the demons, through close connection, when they rush out, tempt only with pleasantness. 55. Even unto thee, *O Zaratûst!* a fiend *will* rush, a female, golden-bodied *and* full-bosomed (so that she wears a bodice), and she rushes to request companionship from thee; a female, golden-bodied *and* full-bosomed, to request conversation from thee, to request co-operation from thee. 56. *But* thou shouldst not grant her companionship, nor conversation, nor shalt thou prescribe *any* conduct for her; afterwards, to revert her downwards, thou shalt utter aloud that triumphant saying the Yathâ-ahû-vairô.’

57. Zaratûst proceeded to the habitable *and* friendly world, for the purpose of fully observing that beaten track (khâpisnô) of the embodied existence; then that fiend came forward when he sat in the vicinity of a garment—that garment² which, when Vohûmanô *was* conveying *him* to the conference, *was* deposited by him—a female, golden-bodied *and* full-bosomed, and companionship, con-

¹ Assuming that lêlyâ stands for zêrih; the only difference, in Pahlavi writing, being in the first letter.

² See Chap. III, 60.

versation, and co-operation *were* requested by her from him; she also whined (dandīdō): 'I am Spendarmad¹.'

58. And Zarātūst spoke thus: 'She who is Spendarmad *was* fully observed by me in the light of a cloudless day, and that Spendarmad appeared *to* me fine behind and fine before and fine all round (that is, *in* all positions she was handsome); do thou turn *thy* back, and I *shall* know if thou art Spendarmad.'

59. And the fiend spoke to him thus: 'O Zarātūst of the Spītāmas! where we are, those who are females are handsome in front, *but* frightfully hideous behind; *so* do not make a demand for my back.' 60. After she *had* protested a third *time*, the fiend turned *her* back, and she *was* seen by Zarātūst behind in the groin; and when matter was exuded, *it was* full of serpents, toads, lizards, centipedes, and frogs.

61. And that triumphant saying, the Yathâ-ahû-vairyô, was uttered aloud by Zarātūst; then that fiend *was* annihilated, and Kêshmāk² the Karap rushed forth. 62. And he grumbled in leaving, thus: 'The misery which is here *below* is such as I have obtained, because, owing to thee, I thought that thy sacred beings *were* more joyful than any heroes who through defeat go to hell; I proceed more joyfully *than* the sacred beings, as regards the life in the body, so that I fully deceive the life in thy body, and thou art fully deceived by me as regards thine.'

¹ The female archangel Bountiful Devotion, in whose special charge are the earth and virtuous women; see Sls. XV, 5, 20-24.

² See Chap. II, 44, 45.

63. Zaratûst also revealed (gushûftö) this secret to mankind, and their knowledge *how* to test a demon is manifested therein, even by a great wonder of the same nature to mankind: the visible rushing of the demons into the world before Zaratûst, *and* their bodies *being* afterwards shattered by the loud chanting of revelation *by* Zaratûst from the Avesta announced, which *was* the acceptance of *its* truth by the ruler Vistâsp and the people of that time; and if this *had* not been so, *and* Vistâsp *and* those of *his* time *were* not accepting the Avesta which *was* announced by Zaratûst *in* this fashion, through *their* considering *it* false, it would not have reached unto us.

64. One *marvel* is this, with which, too, he who *was* Zaratûst became aware from revelation, about the vileness *and* perverted religion of Zâk of the deadly Karaps of Vistâsp and many other Kals and Karaps who *were* at the residence of Vistâsp, their combination for the death of Zaratûst, the preparation for severe abuse of him to Vistâsp, and influencing Vistâsp for his death by command of Vistâsp, *which* extends to awful imprisonment and punishment. 65. Afterwards, too, his knowledge about *his* preservation therefrom, the manifestation of his wondrousness, and the evidence concerning *his* attainment unto prophesying; *also* after the continuance of the last questioning *of* the ten years of conference, *his* departure alone, by the advice *and* command of Aûharmazd, to the residence of Vistâsp and the precinct (var) of that terrible conflict. 66. *His* uttering, on the horse-course (aspânvar) of Vistâsp, a reminder of the power and triumph of Aûharmazd over himself, *as* he invited Vistâsp to

the religion of Aûharmazd ; and with great wisdom Vistâsp heard the words of Zaratûst, on account of his own complete mindfulness and spiritual knowledge of ritual, *and* would have asked for an outpouring of prophecy.

67. *But* thereupon, too—before the words of Zaratûst *were fully* heard by him, *and* he could have understood the character of Zaratûst—owing to the demonizing of the deadly Zâk and the rest of those Kîgs *and* Karaps, *spoken* out with slanderous knowledge *and* perverse actions to Vistâsp about Zaratûst, *there then occurred* his consignment of Zaratûst to that confinement *and* punishment as stated in the words of Zaratûst thus : ‘I have spoken about their three enquiries, and I am bound by thirty of them, I with thirty-three fetters of murderers, wicked ones, and demon-worshippers¹. 68. But the hunger of manhood’s inclination² violently affected the strength of my legs, but the hunger of manhood’s inclination violently affected the force of my arms, but the hunger of manhood’s inclination violently affected the hearing of my ears, but the hunger of manhood’s inclination violently affected the sight of my eyes, and it would force away my bosom up to *my* back (so that it³ would stay behind at my back) through the continuance of that deadly hunger of manhood’s inclination.’

69. And here, through the mightiness of Zaratûst—*who* proceeded alone to the terrible combat *with*

¹ Compare Zs. XXIII, 5.

² Reading gûsn-girâth ; but it might be dûs-vîrâth, ‘bad provision.’ He was left to starve to death in prison.

³ The bosom. The idea of the writer appears to have been that in case of utter starvation the chest would totally collapse, so that the breast bone would touch the spine.

evil, where *there* became manifest, in the mode which is written, the descent of his life into so much punishment, due to hunger and thirst, heavy fetters, *and* other misery unto which the strength of human nature is attaining, *but* unto which *it* is not destined — is manifested a great wonder to king Vistâsp and his officials, when *his* full-glorious person *was* found by them alive in awfulness, imprisonment, and those other transformations (*padgastakîh*) of long-continued starvation.

70. One *marvel* is this, that the sacred beings contrived, for the sake of (*va/ vahân-i*) his preservation from that awfulness, a body possessing life, *and* on his account it became lifeless and imperceptible; afterwards, in the great session of Vistâsp and the assembly of the world, Zaratûst, through the strength and blessedness of the true word, restored the same body anew, like that which is issuing in the statement of the wonder about the splendid horse of Vistâsp¹.

71. One *marvel* is *his* telling and disclosing the thoughts of king Vistâsp and *of* those of the realm, and many other concealed matters, through spiritual perception.

72. One *marvel* is several matters of evil deceit (*vad gamâs*) which Dahâk had done in Bâpêl²

¹ This very slight allusion to the cure of Vistâsp's horse by Zaratûst is sufficient to show that this legend existed in the ninth century; but the writer of the *Dînkard* seems inclined to trace it back to a tale that he vaguely relates in the earlier part of this section, and which he evidently found in older writings; this tale, however, does not mention a horse, but only an animated body. The Persian Zaratûst-nâma develops the legend of the sick horse, whose legs are drawn up to its belly, into 160 couplets.

² Babylon; see Yt. V, 29-31; XV, 19-21.

through witchcraft, *and* mankind had come to idol-worship through that seduction, *and its* increase was the destruction of the world; *but* through the triumphant words of the religion, which Zaratûst proclaimed opposing it, that witchcraft is all dissipated and disabled.

73. One *marvel* is this which is manifested, with wonders owing to Zaratûst, in controversy about the religion with the famous learned of the realm, among whom, known for learning *in* the world, *are* the investigators (girâyagânö) of the words of speech; *and* among those *things* which *are* more surprisingly controversial *are* those later (sibastar) words which *are* to save their creatures by a later religion. 74. Also to proclaim its truth intelligibly, and to make king Vistâsp *and* those previously learned *men* without doubt as to the truth of the religion, the creator Aûharmazd sends some *spirits*, Vohûmanô, Ashavahistô, and the propitious fire¹, as a reminder to Vistâsp about the true prophesying of Zaratûst, *and* the desire of Aûharmazd for the acceptance of the religion *of* Mazda-worship *by* Vistâsp *and* *for its* propagation in the world.

75. The wondrousness which is manifested to Vistâsp *and* those of the realm—both through the travelling (vâzîdanö) of those archangels down from the sky to the earth, and in *their* travelling to the abode of Vistâsp—*was* like this which revelation mentions thus: ‘Then he who is the creator Aûharmazd spoke *to* them, to Vohûmanô, Ashavahistô, and also the fire of Aûharmazd, the propitious, thus: “Proceed! you *who* are archangels, unto the

¹ Compare Zs. XXIII, 7.

abode of Vistâsp, whose resources (*afzâr*) are cattle *and* who is far *and* widely famed, with a view to *his* reliance upon this religion (that is, till he shall stand up for this religion); and, as regards the answering words of the righteous Zaratûst of the Spîtâmas, to approve the nature (*zag sân*) of those words." 76. The archangels proceeded unto the abode of Vistâsp, whose resources are cattle *and* *who* is far *and* widely famed; their radiance, in that lofty residence, seemed to him, that Vistâsp, a heaven *of* complete light, owing to their great power and triumph; this *was* so that, when he thus looked upon it, the exalted Kaî-Vistâsp trembled, all his courtiers (*pêsakô*) trembled, all his chieftains (*padô*) were confused, *and* he of the superior class *was* like the driver of a chariot-horse.

77. 'And the fire of Aûharmazd spoke, in the words of heroes, thus: "Fear not, for *there* is no fearing for thee, *thou* exalted Kaî-Vistâsp! they have not come for alarming thy abode, *as* a reminder of the deputed envoys of Argâsp¹; *there* have not come, for alarming thy abode, the two Khyôns of

¹ Av. Aregad-aspa, king of the *Hvyaonas* (Pahl. Khyôns), mentioned in Yt. V, 109, 113, 116; XVII, 50; XIX, 87. His war with Vistâsp, for the purpose of compelling the latter to abjure his new religion, is described in the *Yâdkâr-i Zarîrân* (see Geiger in *Sitzungsberichten der p.-p. und h. Classe der k. bayer. Akad. der Wiss.* 1890, Bd. II, pp. 43-84). Argâsp sends two envoys, Vîdrafs the wizard and Nâmkhvâst of the Hazârs, to demand Vistâsp's submission; this is refused defiantly by advice of Zarîr, the king's brother; and both nations prepare for war. When the Irânians meet the Khyôns, Vistâsp consults his vazîr Gâmâsp, who prognosticates prodigious slaughter. And, after losing most of their chieftains (including twenty-three brothers and sons of Vistâsp), the Irânians utterly annihilate the Khyôn army. This war is called the 'war of the religion' in Bd. XII, 33; Byt. III, 9.

Argâsp who demand tribute and revenue (sâk va-bâzö); and *there has* not come, for alarming thy abode, the all-overpowering thief who is an injurer, *or* the dog who is a highwayman. 78. We are three who have come over (taristö) to thy abode, Vohû-manô, Ashavahistô, and also the fire of the propitious lord; of these thy knowledge is most wisely most just. 79. If thou helpst vision, so that it becomes wisdom for thee, the worldly *existence* requires the good religion of the Mazda-worshippers, which proceeds purely through the recitation which Zaratûst of the Spîtâmas *teaches*. 80. Do thou chant the Ahunavair, do thou praise perfect righteousness¹, and utter no worship² for the demons! because the desire of Aûharmazd, as regards thee, is *for thy* reliance upon this religion; *it* is also the desire *of* the archangels, and the desire, as regards thee, *of* the other sacred beings who are beneficent (sapîrdahakö) *and* righteous.

81. "And as the recompense in this life, if you praise the good *and* pure religion of the righteous Zaratûst of the Spîtâmas, we *will* give unto thee a long reign and sovereignty, and the long lifetime of a life of 150 years; we *will* give unto thee Good Integrity and Rectitude³ which is long-continued in desire for constantly assisting, good for assistance

¹ That is, recite the Yathâ-ahû-vairyô and the Ashem-vohû formulas.

² Pahl. a-aîzîsnîh, literally, a 'non-worship,' which may mean something worse than 'no worship;' but 'execration or malediction' is usually expressed by gazîsn, 'cursing,' which is written exactly like yazîsn, 'worship.'

³ Pahl. Aharîsvang and Râē-astîsnîh, the equivalents of Av. Ashis-vanguhi and Rasāstât who are spiritual personifications of the qualities mentioned in the text.

through constantly assisting, and not passing away ; and we *will* give unto thee a son, Pêshyôtan¹ is *his* name, he is immortal, *and* so is undecaying, hungerless, and thirstless, living and predominant in both existences, *those* of the embodied *beings* and of the spirits. 82. *But*, as the recompense in this life, if you do not praise the good *and* pure religion of the righteous Zaratûst of the Spîtâmas, we *will* not convey thee up on high, and we *will* order thine end ; the vultures which *are* mindful of decay *will* see *and* eat up those *and* these of thine, thy blood *will* reach the ground, and the waters *will* not reach thy body.”

83. One *marvel* is that *connected* with the confidence (vâvari-hastanö) of Vistâsp in the religion, even through that occurrence of the speech of the archangels ; and, afterwards, the obedience (patya-sâi?) *of* his thoughts in the case of the delays through the bloodshed owing to Argâsp² the Khyôn and his attendant heroes (pas-gurdânö) throughout the same Khyôns, because of the acceptance of the religion. 84. Also, for the sake of daily *and* visibly showing to Vistâsp the certified victory over Argâsp and the Khyôns, and his own superior position, unceasing rule, splendour, and glory, the creator Aûhar Mazda sends, at the same time, the angel Nêryôsang³ to the abode of Vistâsp, as a reminder for the archangel Ashavahistô to give to Vistâsp to drink of that fountain of life, for looking

¹ Written Pêshyâtanö, both here and in Chap. V, 12. He is the immortal priestly ruler of Kangdez, who was expected to come to restore the religion in Irân in the time of Aûshêdar, see Bd. XXIX, 5 ; Byt. III, 25-32, 36-42, 51, 52.

² Here written Argadâspô ; see § 77.

³ Written Nêrôksang here and in § 85.

into the existence of the spirits, the enlightening food by means of which great glory *and* beauty *are* seen by Vistâsp.

85. Just as this *passage* of revelation mentions thus: 'And he who is the creator Aûharmazd spoke to the angel Nêryôsang thus: "Proceed *and* travel, O Nêryôsang the assembler¹! unto the abode of Vistâsp, whose resources are cattle *and* who is far *and* widely famed, and thou shalt say this to Ashavahistô, thus: 'O Ashavahistô! do thou authoritatively take this fine saucer (tastô), which is fully finer than the other saucers that *are* made (that is, the cup (gâm) is as fine *as* is possible to make for royalty), *and* carry up to Vistâsp the Hôm and Vars² (mûi) which are for us; and do thou give it³ unto the ruler Vistâsp to drink up, by whose word it is accepted.'" 86. Ashavahistô authoritatively taking the fine saucer from him, also, thereupon, gave it unto the exalted ruler Kai-Vistâsp to drink *from*⁴; and the ruler of the country (dîh), the exalted Kai-Vistâsp, lay down when divested of *his* robes, and he spoke to Hûtôs⁵ thus: "You, O Hûtôs! are *she*

¹ Compare Vd. XXII, 7.

² A lock of three, five, or seven hairs from the tail of a white bull, that is tied to a metal thumb-ring which is put into the Hôm-strainer when the Hôm-juice is about to be poured through it. See Haug's Essays, 3rd ed., pp. 397-403. This ring and lock of hair may be the relic of a hair-sieve that may have been used for straining the Hôm-juice in former times.

³ The saucer, or cup, of strained Hôm-juice.

⁴ The foregoing twenty-six words, excepting two, have been here repeated by the writer of the old Bombay MS., after turning over a folio.

⁵ Av. Hutaosa, wife of Vistâsp and descendant of Nôdar (Av. Naotara); see Yt. XV, 35, 36. According to the later authority of the Yâdkar-i Zarîân, § 48, she was also a sister of Vistâsp.

whom the prompt ability (*têzō hûnar*) of Zaratûst of the Spîtâmas should reach; *and* through the diligence of the prompt ability of Zaratûst of the Spîtâmas, you¹ would expound the religion of Aûharmazd and Zaratûst.”’

87. One *marvel* is this which is declared; that when Vistâsp, accepting the religion, praises righteousness, the demons in hell are disabled, and the demon Aeshm² rushes to the country of the Khyôns *and to* Argâsp, the deadly *one* of the Khyôns, because he was the mightiest of the tyrants at that time; and the *most* hideous of all, of so many of them in the country of the Khyôns, are poured out by him for war.

88. And here, too, is manifested a great wonder also to the host (*ram*) of Irân who have been coming there, unto the residence of Argâsp the Khyôn, like this which revelation mentions thus: ‘Then, just at the time his legion is separately displayed, Aeshm the unredeemable (*tanâpûharak*) adheres (*gêrevêdō*) to him, as *being himself* without escort (*agurôh*), and quite opposes (*barâ sperêzêdō*) him, because: “You, who are a Khyôn, *have* become unlucky through want of success after you engage *in conflict*.”’ 89. Henceforth, it is not that the victory of Irân *has* come over foreigners *and* Khyôns—through companionship at the abode of that man who is mightier by the birth of Zaratûst

The similarity of her name to that of Atossa, the wife and sister of Cambyses, whom Darius afterwards married, is striking.

¹ As the verbal forms of the present third person singular and second person plural are alike in Pahlavi, it is doubtful which personal pronoun to use.

² The demon of Wrath; see Bd. XXVIII, 15-17.

of the Spîtâmas—when that hideous sovereignty of Argâsp, the deadly Khyôn, is swallowed up by him (*Vistâsp*), for the confusion of the deadly species (that is, *they are* further smitten by him, one through the other; and are swallowed together by him, mutually struggling and through mutually devouring). 90. And apart from him, that bitter *and* well-hardened Khyôn that is quite disabled by him the good *Vistâsp*, that deadly *fiend* is disturbed about him of eloquent abilities (*Zaratûst*); and so he grumbled at the hideous sovereignty thus: ‘Prompt ability comes into existence *and* the Khyôn came; thereupon prompt ability comes into existence *and* the Irânian has come ¹.’

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CHAPTER V.

1. About the marvellousness which is manifested from the acceptance of the religion *by* Vistâsp onwards till the departure (*vîkhêzô*) of Zaratûst, *whose* guardian spirit is revered, to the best existence, when seventy-seven years² had elapsed onwards from *his* birth, forty-seven onwards from

¹ According to the numbering of the folios of the old MS. of 1659 (brought from Persia to India in 1783) one folio, numbered 313 in Persian words, is here missing. It has not yet been found in India, and, owing to folio 312 apparently completing a sentence, and folio 314 evidently beginning a new chapter, the loss of text is hardly perceptible. It would have filled the next two pages.

² The MS. has ‘57 years,’ through ۵۰ ‘50’ being written instead of ۷۰ ‘70’; but see Chap. III, 51 which states the interval of thirty years between his birth and conference.

his conference, and thirty-five years onwards from the acceptance of the religion *by* Vistâsp¹.

2. One *marvel* is this *which* is declared that, when Zaratûst chanted revelation in the abode of Vistâsp, *it was* manifest *to* the eye that it is danced *to with* joyfulness, both by the cattle *and* beasts of *burden*, and *by* the spirit of the fires which *are* in the abode. 3. By *which*, too, a great wonder is proclaimed, like this *which* revelation mentions thus: 'There seemed a righteous joyfulness of all the cattle, beasts of *burden*, and fires of the place, and there seemed a powerfulness of every kind of well-prepared spirits and of those quitting the abode (mân-hishânö), "that will make us² henceforth powerful through religion," when they fully heard those words which *were* spoken by the righteous Zaratûst of the Spîtâmas.'

4. And one *marvel* is the provision, *by* Zaratûst, of the achievement of ordeal, that indicator of the acquitted *and* incriminated for sentence *by* the judge, in obscure legal proceedings; *of* which *it* is said in revelation *there are* about (k'igûn) thirty-three kinds. 5. These, too, the disciples of Zaratûst kept in use, after that *time*, until the collapse of the monarchy of Irân; and the custom *of* one of them is that of pouring melted metal on the breast, as in the achievement of the saintly (hû-fravardö) Âtûrpâd son of Mâraspend, through whose preservation a know-

¹ The contents of this chapter and the next, as far as VI, 11, may be connected with the following summary in Dk. VIII, xiv, 9:—'Information also *as to* many other things which are marvellous, and *as to* a summary of the statements of these seven enquiries, which is *derived* from knowledge of every kind.' For the seven enquiries, see Zs. XXII.

² Or, perhaps, 'make the abode.'

ledge about the religion *was* diffused in the world ; and of the manifestation, too, through that great wonder, this is also said, on the same subject, in the good religion, that of those many, when they behold that rite of ordeal, it convinces the wicked ones ¹.

6. One *marvel* is that which is afterwards manifested, after the former captivity of Zaratûst ² and his speaking about the religion to Vistâsp and those of the realm ³, *such* as the acceptance of the religion *by* Vistâsp *and* that which Zaratûst said to him at *his* original arrival, as regards the declaration of a ruler's religion, thus : 'Thine is this disposition, *and* this religion which is calling (khrôsakô) is a property *of* that description *which* thou putttest together, O Kai-Vistâsp ! so that *if* thou wilt accept this disposition of thine, thou wilt possess this religion which exists (that is, the learning of learnings), *and be* the ruler that shall cause *its* progress ; thou *will* possess in this disposition of thine, as *it were*, a new support (stûnakô), *and* any one *will* uphold *thee* by upholding *it*, as thou art the possessor of the support of this religion.' 7. Also the victory of Vistâsp over Argâsp the Khyôn and other foreigners in that awful battle ⁴, just as Zaratûst explained unto Vistâsp in revelation ; *and* much which is declared by revelation.

8. One *marvel* is the disclosure by Zaratûst, in complete beneficence, medical knowledge, acquaintance with character, and other professional retentiveness (ptshakô-gîrûkîh), secretly *and* completely, of *what* is necessary for legal knowledge and spiritual

¹ §§ 4, 5 are already translated in AV. p. 145.

² See Chap. IV, 67-69.

³ See Chap. IV, 73.

⁴ See Chap. IV, 88-90.

perception ; also the indication, by revelation, of the rites for driving out pestilence (*sēgō*), overpowering the demon and witch, and disabling sorcery and witchcraft. 9. The curing *of* disease, the counter-action of wolves *and* noxious creatures, the liberating of rain, *and* the confining of hail, spiders, locusts, and other terrors of corn *and* plants *and* adversaries of animals, *by* the marvellous rites which are also relating to the worship of Khûrdad *and* Amûrdad¹, and many other rites which *were* kept in use until the collapse of the monarchy of Irân ; and there are *some* which have remained even *till* now², *and* are manifested with a trifle of marvellousness by the sacred fires. 10. And the disclosure to mankind *of* many running waters from marvellous streams (*ardâyâ*), and remedies for sickness which *are* mixed (*fargardakō*) by well-considering physicians ; many *are* spiritual and celestial, gaseous (*vâyīg*) and earthy ; and the worldly advantage of others, too, is the praise (*lāfō*) which ought to come to one for angelic³ wisdom.

11. One is the marvel of the Avesta itself, which, according to all the best reports *of* the world, is a compendium of all the supremest statements of wisdom.

12. One *marvel* is the coming of this also to

¹ These two archangels personify health and immortality, respectively (see Chap. II, 19), and are supposed to have special charge of water and plants.

² The ninth century, unless this phrase be copied from one of the sources of the Dînkard.

³ The MS. has *yazdânō-khirađōîh* which has the meaning given in the text ; but this word can also be read *gehânō-khirađōîh*, 'worldly wisdom,' though *gehânō* is the more usual orthography.

Vistâsp, which the archangels announced as a recompense for accepting the religion ¹, as he saw Pêshyôtan the happy ruler, that immortal and undecaying son, not wanting food, large-bodied, completely strong, fully glorious, mighty, victorious, and resembling the sacred beings; the unique splendour of Pêshyôtan for the sovereignty of Kangdez *in yonder world*, as allotted to him *by* the creator Aûharmazd, is manifested even through that great wonder to the multitude ².

CHAPTER VI.

1. About the marvellousness which is manifested after the departure (vîkhêzô) of Zaratûst, whose guardian spirit is revered, to the best existence, *and in the lifetime* of Vistâsp.

2. One *marvel* is this which is declared by revelation, about the provision of a chariot ³ by Srîtô ⁴ of the Vîsraps ⁵; this is through a famous wonder and

¹ See Chap. IV, 81.

² It is singular that nothing is stated here about the death or departure of Zaratûst, which event, according to § 1, ought to have concluded this chapter. But in Chap. III, 39, Dûrâsrôb evidently foretells that Zaratûst will be killed by the evil eye of Brâdrôk-rêsh. In Dk. V, iii, 2, the killing of Zaratûst by Brâdrô-rêsh the Tûr is merely mentioned. In Zs. XXIII, 9, it is stated that Zaratûst passes away (vidîrêdô) forty-seven years after his conference and preaching to Vistâsp. While the modern Persian Zaratûst-nâma does not mention his death, though it speaks of Bartarûsh as his chief enemy in his younger days. But compare Chap. III, 22.

³ Pahl. rāē which is written exactly like the Pahlavi ciphers for twenty-two and, no doubt, stands for Av. ratha.

⁴ So spelt ten times in §§ 2-11, but here Srâtô. It is also Srîtô in Dk. V, iii, 2.

⁵ Pahl. Vîsrapân in §§ 9, 11 and Dk. V, iii, 2; but here it is

the coming of a report about the marvellousness of that chariot to Vistâsp, Vistâsp's begging that chariot from Sṛitô, and Sṛitô *saying* in reply to Vistâsp: 'That chariot is for a righteous man, *in* which the soul of Sṛitô in the *lifetime* of Sṛitô's body¹, *and* that of that man in the *lifetime* of his body, come visibly together once in the worldly existence.' 3. And the soul of Sṛitô, through the generosity of that Sṛitô, presents that chariot to the eyesight of that man of righteousness; thereby it becomes evident he had seen *it*, and is told not to act in another manner. 4. The exalted Kai-Vistâsp, as becoming from revelation more particularly aware of this marvel about the future at that time, and for the sake of this marvel being published to the worldly existence (gêhânîgîh), and of *his* becoming

Visrapân, and in § 7 the first letter is omitted, leaving only îsrapân. In Pahl. Vd. XX, 11 (Sp.) we have Sṛit-î, 𐭪𐭫𐭮𐭩 (in L₄), which latter name may also be îsrapânô, though more likely to be read Sêrzânô when considered by itself. It is almost certain that the person mentioned in Pahl. Vd. XX, 11 is intended to be the same as that named here in the text. But it is doubtful if this person be the Av. Thrîta son of Sâyuzdri (or Sâizdri) of Yt. V, 72; XIII, 113. As the legend in the text appears to refer to the soul of Sṛitô, or Thrîta, revisiting the world to meet Vistâsp, this Sṛitô may have been the warrior Sṛitô, the seventh brother, employed by Kai-Ûs, about 350 years earlier, to kill the frontier-settling ox of that time, but there seem to be no means of so identifying him with absolute certainty.

¹ This is the literal meaning of the Pahl. 'mûn rūbân-î Sṛitô pavan zîndagîh-î Sṛitô tanô,' but it is not quite consistent with Sṛitô's return to the earth as a spirit. The Indian copyists seem to have observed this, as they have omitted several words, so as to alter the meaning to the following:—'That chariot is for a man of the righteous, *with* whom Sṛitô in the *lifetime* of that *man's* body comes visibly together, &c.' But the sentence is not quite grammatical.

more invoking *for* the supremacy of the Mazda-worshipping religion, became discernible by those of the realm, is sought for, *and* is most attended.

5. A great wonder became manifest to Vistâsp and those of the world, just as revelation mentions thus: 'Thereupon the archangels are letting forth the soul of that *Srîtô* from the light of the supreme heaven, from the light on to the earth created by *Aûharmazd*; *and* the soul of Vistâsp proceeded from him into the light to meet *it*. 6. Vistâsp proceeded on to the propitious south (*rapîtvinô*); he *was* producing more gain than the gainers, and he *was* more inquisitive than the inquisitive; to all whom he saw he spoke, and unto such as spoke he listened; when he gazed at them looking simultaneously they stood up, *and* obeisance *was* offered by them unto the soul *and* person of Vistâsp.'

7. Immediately upon that no delay occurred until *there* came on at a run—*besides* the soul of *Srîtô* of the *Vîsraps*—the most horrid (*agrandtûm*) of demons, from the horrid northern quarter of the horrid destroyer (*zadâr*), that was himself black, and his deeds, too, were very black. 8. And as he comes himself, so also he grumbles *to* the soul of *Srîtô* thus: 'Give a maintenance (*khvârag*) *to* Vistâsp who is thy driver¹, for the sake of good fellowship and service, and for that, righteousness is suitable unto a pure *one*; do not *give it* as a thing which is protective (that is, do not *give it* for the sake of worldly gratuity), *but* for love of the righteousness which is owing to the perfect existences.'

9. When those words were fully heard by *Srîtô* of

¹ This speech seems intended as veiled irony.

the Vīsraps, the early bestower (levīnō-vakhsh), he stood still and so he spoke in words thus: 'For righteousness I give thee, *O* mighty Kaī-Vistāsp! this chariot which is without a driver, only for love of the righteousness which is owing to the perfect existences.' 10. As much for righteousness as is best for righteousness, and as much for the soul as is best for the soul, the gift of the whole *was* secured (that is, its acceptance *was* announced as often as three times).

11. Then that chariot became two chariots, one spiritual and the other worldly; in the worldly *one* the exalted Kaī-Vistāsp travelled forth unto the village of the Nōdars¹ in the joyfulness of good thoughts, and in the spiritual *one* the soul of Sritō of the Vīsraps travelled forth unto the best existence.

12. One *marvel* is this which is declared that in fifty-seven years onwards from the acceptance of the religion by Zaratūst², the arrival of the religion is published in the seven regions³; and within the lifetime of Vistāsp, the circumstance (aêdûnōh) is manifested by the coming of *some* from *other* regions to Frashōstar of the Hvōbas⁴ for enquiry about the

¹ Nōdar (Av. Naotara) was a son of king Mânûskīhar (Bd. XXXI, 13) and an ancestor of king Vistāsp. Vistāsp being a descendant of Kaī-Kavâd (Bd. XXXI, 28, 29) who was the adopted son of Aûzōbō (Bd. XXXI, 24) a son of Zâgh, son of Masvâk, son of Nōdar (Bd. XXXI, 23 corrected from XXXIII, 5). Hûtôs, the wife of Vistāsp, was also of the village of the Nōdars (Yt. XV, 35).

² That is fifty-seven years after the conference of Zaratūst (see Chap. V, 1).

³ See the summary in Dk. VIII, xiv, 10:—'Likewise, about the communication of Zaratūst's knowledge of the Mazda-worshipping religion to the world, his attracting mankind to the religion, and the ages, after Zaratūst, until the renovation of the universe.'

⁴ Av. Ferashaostrō Hvōgvō (Yas. LI, 17); he was a brother

religion, *even* as revelation mentions thus: 'Two whose names are thus, Spītōis¹ and Arezrâspô², who have hastened unto Frashôstar of the Hvôbas in search of wisdom.'

13. Thus much splendour and wonder *of* Vistâsp *and* those of the realm regarding Zaratûst³, and thus much due to the coming of the archangels from the sky to the earth before Vistâsp, as evidence about the true prophesying *of* Zaratûst⁴; and that, too, about Pêshyôtan⁵, the chariot of Sritô⁶, and other subjects seen written above, *are* declared by the Avesta, which is the same that they accepted from Zaratûst, as the culmination⁷ (*avarîgânîh*) of Aûharmazd's words. 14. And if this splendour, glory, *and* wonder that *are* written above as regards *what* those learned *men* of the realm saw—which *are* in the statement revealed by the Avesta—*had* not occurred, king Vistâsp *and* those learned *men* of the realm would not have seen what this Avesta had revealed to them—which *was* thus much splendour *and* wonder reported by it to them—and not one word about leaving *its* preservation to us would be annexed.

of Gâmâsp (Dk. V, ii, 12 ; iii, 4 ; Zs. XXIII, 10), and the father of Zaratûst's wife Hvôvi. The Hvôvas (Pahl. Hvôbas) were a numerous family.

¹ Av. gen. Spītōis (Yt. XIII, 121). He was high-priest of Fradaḍafsh, the south-east region.

² Av. Ereẓrâspa (ibid.) He was high-priest of Vîdaḍafsh, the south-west region (see Bd. XXIX, 1). These foreign envoys were brothers, each being a son of Uspâsnu.

³ See Chap. IV, 73.

⁴ See Chap. IV, 74-82.

⁵ See Chap. V, 12.

⁶ See §§ 2-11.

⁷ See Chap. V, 11.

CHAPTER VII.

1. About the marvellousness which is manifested after *the time of* Vistâsp until the collapse (hangaf-tanö) of the sovereignty of Irân.

2. There is marvellousness *which* is manifested after Vistâsp until the collapse of the sovereignty of Irân, apart from the blessedness of ordeal, the accomplishment of other Avestic rites, the great power over the sacred fires, *and* many other religious observances *which* were connected with the disciples of Zaratûst.

3. Even after the devastation which happened owing to Alexander, those who *were* rulers after him brought back much to the collection from a scattered state¹; *and* there are *some* who *have* ordered the keeping of it in the treasury of Shapân².

4. Likewise there is to be brought *forward* what *there is* concerning the names of rulers *and* high-priests, *such* as arrive for it at times *and* periods, which *are* each consecutive, as organizers of the religion and the world; also of the tyrant *or* apostate, who is manifest at various periods, for the disturbance of the religion *and* monarchy and the penance of the world, *with* the coming of the penitential one.

¹ Referring to king Valkhas the Askânian (probably Vologeses I, see S. B. E., vol. xxxvii, p. 413); possibly also to Ardashir Pâpakân.

² So here, but usually written Shapîgân, and sometimes Shas-pîgân. It was no doubt a royal treasury, and Dk. V, iii, 4, calls it so, but uses the words gangö-î khûdâyân, in which Gâmâsp is said to have deposited the Avesta and Zand written in gold upon ox-hides. If Shapîgân be a corruption of shâyagân, 'royal,' it is singular that some copyist has not corrected the spelling.

5. *Such* as Vohûmanô, son of Spend-dâd¹, of the rulers, about whom it says even this in the Avesta, that *he is* Vohûmanô, the just, who is the most efficient of the assembly of Mazda-worshippers.
 6. And Sênôv² of the high-priests, as about him it says even this: 'The religion becomes a hundred years *old* when Sênôv is born, and two hundred years when he passes away; he was also the first Mazda-worshipper *with* a life of a hundred years, and who walks forth upon this earth with a hundred disciples.'

7. Also Alexander of the devastators, as it says even this of him in revelation³, that *in* those three winters, which *are* of like purpose (ham-ayâzakô), that Aeshm⁴ would set up a deadly king in the impenitent world, who is the evil-destined Alexander.

8. And of the high-priests *are* Arezvâk⁵, the interpretation of whose name is 'the pure word;'
 Srûtvôk-spâdâk⁶, the interpretation of whose name is 'the propitious recitation;'
 Zrayanghau⁶, the interpretation of whose name is 'the ocean existence;'
 and Spentô-khratvau⁶, the interpretation of

¹ Av. Spentô-dâta of Yt. XIII, 103, a son of Vistâsp, with whom Avesta dynastic history ends. He was the Persian Isfendiyâr, and his son Vohûmanô is unknown to the Avesta. The *Kitradâd* Nask (Dk. VIII, xiii, 18) mentions a 'Namûn, son of Spend-shêd,' which probably stands for 'Vohûmanô, son of Spend-dâd,' but this appears to have been in a Pahlavi supplement compiled in Sasanian times. He is also mentioned in Bd. XXXIV, 8, a chapter 'about the computation of years by the Arabs,' according to the Irânian Bundahis.

² Av. Saêna of Yt. XIII, 97, where the last clause of the passage here translated from the Avesta occurs. Compare Zs. XXIII, 11.

³ Not in the extant Avesta.

⁴ The demon of Wrath.

⁵ Av. gen. Erezvau and Srûtvô-spâdau in Yt. XIII, 115.

⁶ These two names are written in their Av. gen. forms, as they occur in Yt. XIII, 115.

whose name is 'the propitious wisdom.' 9. Because it says even this about them, namely: 'I mention thy manifestation, *and* also the tokens of its publicity when this religion of thy Mazda-worshippers becomes four hundred years *old*¹; in this law benightedness (lêlyâîh) arises, *and* the embodied existences see the manifestation through calculation *of* the planets and also the stars; and whoever, too, *are* mine are *so* for a century, through the average opinion *of* thirty medium winters for a man²; *and* the righteous Arezvâk and those three others are they of the most righteous existences, over whom they *are* the most masterly *and* most authoritative in that time.' 10. And this, too, that they who glorify the religion of the Mazda-worshippers in the fifth and sixth centuries *are* they; *and* no persons save *their* souls, except *those* who remain for the arrival of the four³ interpretations that *arise* through the authority of these four individuals, Arezvâk, Srûtô-spâdhau⁴, Zrayang, hau, *and* Spentô-khratvau who, all four of them, seek *their* thoughts, words, *and* deeds in the *sacred* text (mânsar).

11. Also Rashn-rêsh⁵ is the apostate of that

¹ If the chronology in Bd. XXXIV, 7, 8 were correct, the interval between the first revelation of the religion and the death of Alexander would be 272 years, and this would make the 400th year of the religion coincide with B. C. 195.

² That is, for a generation. The meaning appears to be, that these four successive high-priests insure the continuance of orthodox religion for more than a century, or well into the sixth century of the religion, as mentioned in § 10.

³ The MS. has the cipher for 'three,' by mistake.

⁴ Here written in Avesta characters.

⁵ In Dk. III, cxcviii, 2, this apostate is said to have been an

time, as *some one*¹ says unto Rashn, *one* of the sacred beings, and about many besides this *one*, thus: 'All who are creatures of the beneficent spirit are distressed by their persecution, *but* put trust in those men, *Arezvâk and* those three others.'

12. And of the organizers of the period is Artakhshatar², son of Pâpak, as it says even this about him, namely: 'Which is that ruler who is powerful, more striving than the Kayâns, *and* mighty, an embodiment of the *sacred* commandments and awfully armed³; in whose abode Aharisvang⁴, the virtuous *and* radiant, walks forth in maiden form, beneficent and very strong, well-formed, high-girded, *and* truthful, of illustrious race *and* noble?

13. Whoever it is that, on the occurrence of strife, seeks prosperity for *himself* with his own arm; whoever it is that, on the occurrence of strife, encounters the enemies with his own arm.'

14. Tanvasar⁵ is also for his assistance, as it says

associate (ham-pâfgar) of the Christian ecclesiastic Akvân, and yells out ten admonitions contradicting those of the righteous Sênôv who is mentioned in § 6 (see Peshotan's edition, vol. v, pp. 239, 311). It does not follow that he was a contemporary of Sênôv, and here he seems to be placed fully two centuries later.

¹ Probably Aûharmazd.

² The founder of the Sâsânian dynasty, who reigned as king of the kings of Persia, A.D. 226-241.

³ Most of these qualities are applied to the angel Srôsh, the personification of obedience (see Yas. LVII, 1); also to Kavi Vistâspa and Karsna, son of Zbaurvant, in Yt. XIII, 99, 106.

⁴ Av. Ashis vanguhi, 'good rectitude,' personified as a female angel; her description is given in Yt. XIII, 107, and is similar to that of Anâhita in Yt. V, 64.

⁵ So spelt here and in §§ 17, 18, thrice in all; it is also thrice spelt Tansar, in Dk. III, last chapter, 7; IV, 25, 25, and this mis-spelling has led to the mis-pronunciation Tôsar. It appears, however, that Tanvasar is a transposition of Tanvars, 'hairy-

this, too, about them : ‘ Zaratûst asked again thus : “ Who is he who is the most salutary *for* a country, which the demons *have* exhausted of everything virtuous, over which his authority is brought and *which* is wicked and teaching falsehood ? ” 15. Âû-harmazd spoke thus : “ An autocrat (sâstâr), to cure a country, who *has* not gone *mad* (that is, he does not annoy the good) and is well-directing (that is, he gives virtuous commands), who is *also* of noble race, and likewise a priest who is acquainted with war, of a famous province, *and* righteous, are most salutary *for* that country. 16. And I tell thee this, that the apostasy of destruction is *just* like the four-legged wolf which the world gives up to running astray (vardak-takhshishnîh) (that is, owing to its action *they are* leading *it* off as astray; which is so that even he who is not opulent is rendered sickly, that they (*the apostates*) may take away his things by the hand of the assassin (khûnyân); and they shall lead the world, the dwelling for *his* residence, into wandering. 17. But that wicked (avârûnô) strife descended upon that country, besides that wicked demon-worship, besides that wicked slander; and not even that wicked strife, nor that wicked demon-worship, nor that wicked slander, is dissipated from

bodied,’ because we are told that Tansar, or Tanvasar, was so called on account of all his limbs being covered with hair (vars). This statement occurs in the introduction to Tanvasar’s letter to Gushnaspsâh (Ar. Gasnasf-shâh), king of Paðashkhvârgar (Ar. Farshvâdgar) and Tabaristân; and is made on the authority of an old Pahlavi copyist, Bahrâm Khûrzâd, whose Pahlavi was translated into Arabic by Ibn al-Muqaffa in the middle of the eighth century, and that into Persian early in the thirteenth century (see Darmesteter’s edition in *Journal Asiatique* for 1894, pp. 185-250, 502-555).

that country until *the time* when they attach the grant of approval to him, the spiritual leader, the eloquent (pûr-gûftâr), truthful-speaking, *and* righteous Tanvasar. 18. And it is when they grant approval to the spiritual leader, the truthful speaker of eloquence, the righteous Tanvasar, that those *of* the country obtain redress (bêshâzagânih) when they seek *it*, and no deviation (anâyûînakôih) from the religion of Zaratûst.”’

19. As to the nature of the questions *and* statements of the organizer of the religion, Âtûrpâd¹ son of Mâraspend, about the connection of the glory with the race, it also says this, that ‘though righteousness *may* arise from the statements and prosperity of the Tûrânians when extracted by questions, *it is* said that its acceptance occurs there through complete mindfulness²; they benefit the embodied world of righteousness, and produce distress for the fiend; in like manner, they rely upon Vohûmanô, *and* Zaratûst is their delight through the report *of* the birth *of* Zaratûst from us who are archangels. 20. This liberality for thee is *from* us who are archangels, *and* Âtûrpâd, the very best well-destined *man* arose; and this, too, do thou say about him, that it is the steel age in which that man, the organizer of development *and* organizer of righteousness, Âtûrpâd son of Mâraspend, of the convocation, begets Avarethrabau³.’

¹ A high-priest who was prime minister of king Shahpûhar II (A.D. 309-379). He is often mentioned in Pahlavi writings, but in the Avesta he is only alluded to, apparently, by the title Râstarevaghent in Yt. XIII, 106.

² A translation of Av. spenta-ârmaiti, the archangel Spendârmad.

³ So written, all three times in Pâzand. He is the Avarethra-

21. This Avarethrabau, too, is an organizer whose righteous guardian spirit we reverence, and *in* memory of Mânûskîhar, the well-destined, and a progenitor of Âtûrpâd¹, it says that 'only from him comes Avarethrabau;' and *then also arises* this one of the adversaries of the religion, the apostate of apostates, whom they have even called the Mazdag-like (Mazdagîg-iê)². 22. As it says this, too, about them, namely: 'This religion of mine thou dost survey with thoughts of spiritual life, thou dost very thoroughly inspect *it*, O Zaratûst! when many, aware of apostates, call the performance of righteousness and even the priesthood innocence, and few are frank and practising *it*.' 23. In the revelation of the Mazda-worshippers is this, namely: 'Thoroughly look into revelation, and seek a remedy for them and any whatever of them who have become disturbing in the embodied existence, and uncaptivated *by* the orthodox (âyîn-a û mînd) righteousness which is owing to the perfect existences; and so they divide the religion of the Mazda-worshippers through division of race, they speak regarding the action *of* their own *followers*, and give the endowment to their own. 24. They grant supplies of food, so that they *may* say the food is proportional to the hunger; they speak of procreation, *and* say that they say lineage is through the mothers; and they approve of wolfishness, so that they would act something like

bangh, son of Râstare-vaghent of Yt. XIII, 106, better known as Zaratûst, son of Âtûrpâd in his old age, for whom the Andar'z-î Âtûrpâd-î Mâraspendân was written.

¹ Whose pedigree is traced back to Mânûskîhar in Bd. XXXIII, 3.

² Probably some disciple of Mânih, the heretic who had been put to death A.D. 276-7. Mazdag was put to death A.D. 528. See S.B.E., vol. xxxvii, pp. 257 n, 278 n.

wolves *in* the performance of gratifying their desires, like that of the wolf's progeny behind the mother. 25. Moreover, they form their lineage through the mothers; buying their women *as* sheep, they shall carry off for profit even that son *or* brother who is the progeny, those that we have produced for your companionship; you are not predominant, but *have* remained in companionship; you do not even believe them, *but* you do not establish an ordeal, although *it is* evident that you will be acquitted; they lie even to *their* children, so that the advance of the promise-breaker is through them, and even in their own persons¹.

26. Here it speaks about the organization of the religion *by* the glorified² Khûsrô, son of Kavâd, thus: 'Upon their lingering behind, a man is produced who is righteous, the Glorified *one*², an approver (khênîdâr) of speech who is wise, whom the convocation, on hearing the words that he utters, speaks *of* as a high-priest; that is when he gives out penance (srôshîgîh), so that he may effect the punishment of sinners. 27. The constant outpouring of perplexity (pêk shâridan) *by* the perverters is the fear of that hero, as regards that

¹ This quotation, from a Pahlavi version of an Avesta text, would probably be very applicable to the state of the Persian people at many periods in the fourth and fifth centuries, when heresy was prevalent and orthodox Zoroastrianism was by no means universal. Some of the evils mentioned are inseparable from slavery at all times.

² Literally 'immortal-souled,' Anôshak-rûbân, the usual title of king Khûsrô I, who reigned A.D. 531-578. Before he became king, A.D. 528 or 529, he had summoned an assembly of priests to condemn the heretic Mazdag, when the last important revision of the Pahlavi versions of the Avesta probably took place (see Byt. I, 6-8, and Nöldeke's *Gesch. der Sas.* pp. 463-466).

convocation, when he casts *them forth* by expulsion from the vicinity, so that he may make *them* extinguished very quickly; owing to that, they, *whose* producer is even he who is a person destroying the righteous man, become gloomy on account of the Glorified *one*, through *his* smiting the spiritual life of apostasy; *just* as now, when he who is gloomy, *and* of scattered intellect, is gloomy owing to you *of* the Spitâmas.' 28. This, too, it states, namely: 'In every way, I tell thee, *O* Zarâtûst of the Spitâmas! that their time is mistrustful (*avâvar*) as to him who is an open friend, *and* most deceitful both *to* the wicked and the righteous; the Glorified *one* is a controller (*ayûkhtâr*) exalting the creatures, *and* whoever is possessing the creatures of the righteous *ones*¹, so that he remains again at work in the doings of the Glorified *one*, is *he* who is a combiner *of* the actions *and* an utterer of the true replies *of* that Glorified *one*.'

29. And about the occurrence of a symptom of the devastators of the sovereignty *and* religion of the country of Irân one wonder, which is associated with the religion, is even this *which* it mentions thus: 'Thereupon, when the first symptom of a ravager *of* the country occurs, *O* righteous Zarâtûst! then the more aggressive and more unmerciful *in* malice becomes the tyrant of the country, and through him, too, they ravage (*rêshênd*) the house, through him the village, through him the community, through him the province, *and* through him even the whole *of* that manifestation *in* the country *of* any teaching whatever that occurs *through* the ravager *of* the country; and so the country should

¹ Of the good spirits.

keep a man who is observant *and* learned on the watch, because information is in his mind. 30. *Thereupon, when the second symptom of a ravager of the country occurs, &c.*¹

31. Thereupon, when the third symptom *of* a ravager *of* the country occurs, the priestly people are disturbing the tradition, so that they speak nothing wisely; it is even on this account they do not accept them, and it is not when *one* speaks truly *that* the ravager *of* the country believes them, and through him, too, they ravage the house, through him the village, *through him the community*, through him the province, and through him even the whole *of* that manifestation *in* the country *of* any teaching whatever *that* occurs *through* the ravager *of* the country; and so, too, the country should keep a man who is observant *and* learned on the watch, because information is in his mind. 32. Thereupon, when the fourth symptom of a ravager *of* the country occurs, it upsets the replenishment of the fires, and upsets those men of the righteous, so that they shall not undertake the care of them; and thus they shall not convey the holy-water to him who is a priestly authority, so that they may not produce the seizing upon the stipend *of* the priestly authorities *by* him who is the ravager *of* the country; through him, too, they ravage the house, through him the village, through him the community, through him *the province*, and *through him* even the whole *of* that

¹ The whole of this section is omitted in the old MS., evidently by mistake. Perhaps the second symptom of devastation was connected with the evil deeds of the warrior class, but this is very uncertain. Passages of four or five words are also omitted by the MS. in §§ 31, 32.

manifestation *in* the country *of* any teaching whatever *that* occurs *through* the ravager *of* the country; *and* so, too, the country should keep a man who is observant *and* learned on the watch, because information is in his mind.'

33. About the collapse of the sovereignty of Irân, it also states this, namely: 'That very villain (*mar*), *O* Zaratûst! brings those provinces on to running astray, so that he may make those quite dissevered which constitute the existence of that powerful sovereignty; and then he is a thorough assailant *of* the righteous, then he is an assailant *of* the righteous with eagerness. 34. That same deadly *one* (*mar*), *O* Zaratûst! does not continue living long afterwards; moreover his offspring disappear (that is, they perish utterly); but his soul falls to the bottom of the gloomy existence which is horrible hell, and upon their bodies every kind *of* unseemly unhappiness comes from themselves, owing to their own actions when they give approval to the imprisonment of a guardian of spiritual *affairs* who is eloquent, true-speaking, *and* righteous. 35. Against that deadly *one* he contends, *O* Zaratûst! for the spiritual lordship *and* priestly authority that I approve *as* good *for* the whole embodied existence; also against the preparation of a decree to produce evil decisions, *and* against the dismissal of litigants, whether heterodox or orthodox, who are of a family of serfs of a far-situated village and are making petitions.'

36. 'And *as to* the land, too, over which he wanders, the evil spirit utterly devastates their country through pestilence and other misery; and, moreover, strife which is tormenting falls upon that

country, besides demon-worship which is iniquitous, *and* besides slander which is iniquitous. 37. And the strife which is iniquitous is not to be dissipated (*apâst-aitanö*) from that country, nor the demon-worshippers who *are* iniquitous, nor the slander which is iniquitous, before the *time* when they give approval to him, to the priest who is a guardian of spiritual *affairs*, who is eloquent, true-speaking, and righteous; and it is when they give him approval, that they obtain healthfulness *for* their country when they pray *for it*, and not irregularly from him, *O Zaratûst!*'

38. And this which is recounted is a statement that is execrated (*nafrîg-aitö*) by many, details from the Avesta as to occurrences *that will* arise after Vistâsp until the dispersion (*angâvisnö*) of the sovereignty of Irân from the country of Irân; *it is also* declared that this which is written happened to the knowledge of those of the world. 39. This, too, is about the evidence of the above:—'And if this which is declared from the Avesta, as to *what* happens after Kaî-Vistâsp until the end of the sovereignty of Irân, should not have happened, and *it being* the pre-eminence of the Avesta which really became this present treasure, it thereby ensues, owing to its position in that *former*¹, and the manifest absence of the destruction of those rulers *and* high-priests from Vistâsp onwards in this *latter*², that it could not be connected with us³.'

¹ The above declaration from the Avesta.

² The present Avesta itself.

³ Meaning perhaps that, for some good reason, it could not be communicated to us in the extant Avesta. If § 39 be not a later addition to this chapter, it implies that the prophetic quotations from the Avesta, regarding the history of the religion after the time

CHAPTER VIII.

1. About the marvellousness which is manifested and is openly specified after the collapsing of the sovereignty of Irân *and* the country of Irân; *also* the end of the millennium of Zaratûst and the arrival of Aûshêdar the descendant of Zaratûst¹.

2. There is this marvellousness, really over-throwing the blessedness of the knowledge of former government, revealed by the Avesta about the ninth and tenth centuries, that which is an indicator of circumstances (aêdûnôih) now visible, *such* as the dispersion of the sovereignty of Irân from the country of Irân, the disturbance of just law *and* custom, the predominance of *those with* dishevelled hair², *and* the haughty profession of ecclesiastics³.

3. Also the collection and even connection of all their four systems of belief (vâvarî-hastanô)⁴ to-

of Vistâsp, were no more extant in the Avesta, when the Dînkard was compiled, than they are now.

¹ The contents of Chaps. VII–XI have some connection with the following summary in Dk. VIII, xiv, 11, 12:—‘*And* about the nature of the advancement of the people of the period, the separation of centuries and millenniums, *and* the signs, wonders, and perplexity which are manifested in the world at the end of each millennium in the world. Also as to the birth *and* arrival of Aûshêdar, son of Zaratûst, at the end of the first millennium, and a report of him and his time, *and* of the many destroyers of the organizers of the period between Zaratûst’s millennium and the coming of Aûshêdar.’

² This meaning for vigârđō-vars is chiefly based upon the use of vigârđ in AV. XXXIV, 5, for a woman’s hair being ‘combed.’ These invaders of Irân from the east, at the end of the first millennium of the religion, are mentioned in Byt. II, 22, 24, 28; III, 1, 6, 13. They are called ‘Turkish demons’ in § 47.

³ The Byzantine Christians.

⁴ Zoroastrianism, Muhammadanism, Christianity, and either Judaism or Idolatry.

gether for the upper rank; the coming of *one* working with the sacred beings to the inferior, the transient, and the captive of the period; and the dispersion and downfall of dependent and public men in their time.

4. The disappearance of a disposition for wisdom from the foreigners *in* the countries of Irân, which is an indication of shame *at* the truth of the religion, and *at* the praise, peace, liberality, *and* other goodness whose provision *has* lodgement in a disposition for wisdom. 5. Also the abundance *of* the decisions of apostasy, the falsehood, deceit, slander, quarrel-

someness, fraudulence, ingratitude, discord, stinginess, and other vileness whose real connection is a disposition to devour, neglecting heedfulness for the archangels of fire, water, and worldly *existence*¹.

6. The oppressiveness of infidelity *and* idol-worship, the scarcity *of* freedom, the extreme predominance of avarice in the individuals (tanö) of mankind, the plenitude of different opinions about witchcraft, *and* the much inclination of many for paralyzing the religion of the sacred beings.

7. The annihilation of the sovereignty of mankind one over the other, the desolation of localities and settlements by severe actual distress, and the evil foreign potentates who *are*, one after the other, scattering the valiant; the destruction among cattle *and* the defilement *of* the spirit of enjoyment, owing to the lodgement of lamentation and weeping *in* the countries of Irân, the clamour of the demon-worshipper in the country, *and* the unobtainable stature, non-existent strength, blighted destiny, and short

¹ Ashavahistô, Khûrdad, and Spendarmad.

life of mankind. 8. Also the abundance of ordinances (âyinö)¹ of various descriptions, the approval of the apostate among tyrants and the non-approval of the Zoti² who is well-disposed and wise, the coming of the Zoti to want, *and* all the other adversity, disruption, and running astray which *are* overpowering even in districts *and* localities of the countries of Irân.

9. The maintenance of no ritual (apandth) of the religion of the sacred beings; the weakness, suffering, and evil habits *of* those of the good religion; the lamentation and recantation (khûstûkth) of the upholders of the religion; *and* the wickedness and extermination of good works in most of the countries of Irân. 10. Also much other misery in these two centuries is recounted in the Avesta, which passed away with them and is also now so visible therein, and manifestly occurs in them.

11. This, too, is a statement (nisang-1) as to them, *which* revelation mentions thus: 'That is the age mingled with iron (that is, from every side they perceive *it is* of iron) in which they bring forth into life him who is a sturdy praying apostate. 12. This is their sturdiness, that their approval is unobservant of both doctrines (âinakö); and this is their praying, that whenever *it is* possible for them they shall cause misery to others; *also* when an old man publicly advances into a crowd (galakö) of youths, owing to the evil times in which that man who is learned is born, they are unfriendly *to him* (that is, they are no friends of the high-priests of the priestly assembly). 13. They are freely speaking (that is,

¹ Or it may be hênô, 'squadrons.'

² The chief officiating priest in religious ceremonies.

they utter phrases smoothly), they are wicked and are fully maliciously talking, so that they shall make the statements of priests and high-priests useless; they also tear asunder the spiritual lordship *and* priestly authority, and shall bring the ruler *and* priestly authority into evil behaviour as vicious, but they bring together those *who are* singular. 14. Anything they say is always mischief (agîh), and that district which had a judge they cast into the smiting precinct, into hell; it is misery without any intermission they shall inflict therein, till they attain unto damnation (darvandîh) through the recitation they persevere in, *both* he who is the evil progeny disseminated by the apostate *and* he who is the villainous wolf full of disaster *and* full of depravity.'

15. 'Here *below* they fight, the friend with him who is a friend, they also defraud (zivênd) him of his own work (that is, whenever *it is* possible for them, they shall seize upon his property), and they give it to him from whom they obtain prosperity in return; if not, they seek him who is acting as a confederate (nishîn-gûn), and they make that other *one* defraud the poor *man* (so that they shall seize upon his property); they also cheat him when he shall make complaint. 16. I *shall* not again produce such for thee, no friend here for him who is a friend, no brother for him who is a brother, no son for him who is a father, nor yet a father *for* him who is a son; admonished, *but* not convinced, they become the abode of the will of the place, so that they subsist in every single place where it is necessary for them *to be*, in each that is necessary for them they march on together, and on the way they reflect upon the path of blessedness and the

manifold learning they utter owing to knowledge of me¹.'

17. 'These three, our increase, learning, *and* reward, we fully understand through the ascendancy of him who is ignoble, *and* through the downfall of him who is noble *and* superior to him of little thorough instruction who, in every thing, *will* be at the foot of the tyrant. 18. Thinking of a priest *one* becomes spiritual, thinking of a tyrant *one* becomes a Kavīg²; a demon *in* disposition is an incipient demon, a Kavīg *in* disposition is himself attracted towards a youth.'

19. Then, when character and wisdom recede from the countries of Irân (that is, they depart), so *that* destitution and also winter, produced by demons who are worshipping the demon, rush together from the vicinity of disaster (vôighn) on to the countries of Irân, where even rain becomes scanty and pestilence is secretly advancing and deceiving, so that deaths become numerous; thus even *he* of perverted wisdom, who is wicked, and the apostate also, who is unrighteous, rush together in companionship. 20. As what *one* says they *all* exclaim thus: 'Consume and destroy, *O* ruler! for *it* is to be consumed and destroyed by thee; destroy even the fire, consume even as food those who are the protection of the association enforcing *religious* obedience, and those leading on the poor *man* of the righteous dispensation by their guidance.' 21. So that they shall make him thoroughly detached and smite him;

¹ So far, this statement (§§ 11-16) seems to be ascribed to Aṭharmazd; but what follows (§§ 17, 18, 20) appears to represent the sentiments of some Irânians of those later times.

² See Chap. II, 9 n.

likewise wisdom is the wealth they bring him, *and* it is when property is being carried off by them, *that* the wisdom conveyed by them arises.

22. 'And in that age, *O* righteous *one* of the Sptâmas! the coming of my desire is not purely for thee, nor is a thorough belief of the departure of life, so that the bringing *and* conducting of a speaker of promises (*mitragôv*) is not necessary; those of the perfect apostate injure this discourse of thine, the Avesta and Zand, so that they shall make *it* thoroughly weak; *and* those of the perfect apostate harass their own souls, for love of the wealth which he produced.'

23. And about the ninth and tenth centuries this also it says, that, '*as* that age proceeds, this is what occurs, *O* Zaratûst of the Sptâmas! when many apostates utter the righteousness of priestly instruction and authority, *which* is wickedness towards me, they cause begging for water, they wither vegetation, and they put down all excellence which is due to the manifestation of righteousness.'

24. Again Zaratûst enquired of him thus: 'What do they so produce by that, *O* Aûharmazd! when they cause begging for water, they wither vegetation, and they put down all excellence due to the manifestation of righteousness?' 25. And Aûharmazd spoke thus: 'They so produce those *things* among them, *O* Zaratûst! when they mention a greater reward for bantlings *and* relations than that of their own souls (that is, they talk more concerning their allowance, where it is that for their own). 26. Moreover, they give to the Kîgs *and* Karaps, for some repute *with* the shepherd people of the husbandman, and with the swift-horsed people *of* the warrior, as

though they would provide us¹ here *below* with a large share of meat, that they would make our privilege, just as we¹ here supply him with meat whom we render greatly precious. 27. The property of even a wicked *man* here *below*, O Zaratûst! in the average opinion among the disorganized (anârâstânö) is a dignified provision (that is, we form a strong opinion, the approval of *which* is more to be asserted as *being* the opinion of a poor righteous *man*, about a worthy righteous *man* whose manifest righteousness is a homage (franâmisnö) to duty and good works).'

28. Again he enquired of him thus: 'Is there so perfect a manifestation here *below*, in the age of the worldly existence of the religion of the Mazda-worshippers (that is, is there a lodgement of the religion of the Mazda-worshippers in any one)?' 29. And Aûharmazd spoke thus: 'It is so, among those men of mine², O Zaratûst! for here *below there* are priests who are eloquent, and they, too, are men voluble and requisite in the embodied existence, all-beneficent and producing the destruction of harm and the wizard; the people of the wicked tyrant say also regarding them, *that*, excepting thee, O Zaratûst! they rightly practise righteousness more largely, more powerfully, and more volubly. 30. Blind are those of the fiend, who are consulting with thee and are unaware of the tyrant; and observant are also those of the fiend who consult with them and think of *their* intelligence, and oppose the imbecile (anâkâsîh-aûmônd) apostate who is near them, so that

¹ The archangels.

² Reading minam, instead of madam which is unintelligible here.

they say¹ this, namely: "*As to* this which thou tellest us, *it* is evidently not so as thou sayest," of which they speak thus: "This duty of thy man is not mine (that is, it is not necessary for me to perform) nor thine (that is, it is not necessary even *for* thee to perform), because *it* is not this which is righteousness (that is, not a good work)." 31. For this *one* is produced for these words *and* thoughts of thine, *of* whom thou, too, art aware, he who is whatever is here *below* of Aûshêdar² of thoughtful controversy, *O* Zaratûst of the Spîtâmas! for he brings into notice, through the intermingling of his own soul, *him* who is righteous, or has not become *so*.'

32. This, too, he says, namely: '*Of* those, *O* Zaratûst of the Spîtâmas! who come in the ninth and tenth centuries, I tell thee that they are *of* the fiend *of* Greed (Âzi); it is in *her* womb that they are to be fashioned, they who assist those who would be vicious, through pre-eminence in leadership, or through excellence in subserviency.'

33. And this, too, it says about them: 'Those men are much to be destroyed;' so it is said by Aûharmazd that 'these who are righteous, who carry away a corpse in this world, distress their fire, according to every high-priest³, and even long-flowing water; their bodies, which are really cess-pools⁴ of a terrible character, become very assisting for the tormentors whose corpses are grievously wicked. 34. Concerning them I tell thee, *O* Zara-

¹ To the apostate.

² See §§ 55-60 and Chap. I, 42 n. Here spelt Aûkhshêdar.

³ Reading dastûr, instead of vastûr.

⁴ Pahl. mayâ-vakhdûn = Pers. âb-gîr.

tûst of the Spîtâmas! that, in the ninth and tenth centuries, *there* come those who are the brood of the fiend and the wound-producer (reshgâr)¹ of the evil spirit; even one of them is more to be destroyed than ten demon-worshippers²; they also produce extermination for these who are mine, for these of my religion, whom they call a provision for destruction (that is, when it is possible to live in our way, and *ours* are wicked, they diminish in superiority).

35. Even the iniquity that they shall commit in leadership and subserviency, the sin which is smiting thee, they call a trifle (khalakö), *O* pure *one* of the Spîtâmas! and the smiter, they say, is *he* whom these of thy religion of Mazda-worshippers smite.

36. Besides thee, *O* Zaratûst! they distress those *duties*, too, which *are* to be acquired *by* thy people (lagânö); they think scornfully of this ceremonial of thine, scornfully of *thy* worship, *O* Zaratûst! and they think scornfully of both the two blessed utterances³, the Avesta and Zand, which *were* proclaimed to thee *by* me who am the most propitious of spirits.

37. They foster villainous outrage, *and* they say the best work for mankind is immoderate fighting whose joyfulness is due to actions that are villainous; those, too, *that* they exterminate are the existences *due* to the spirits, they exterminate their own souls, they exterminate the embodied existences *of* the world; *and* they produce lamentation for the soul, *and* even the religion, as regards what is the mode of controlling orthodox people *together* with the iniquitous of the same period.'

38. And this, too, it says, that Zaratûst enquired

¹ Or it may be riyâgâr, 'hypocrite.'

² Or 'idolators.'

³ Pahl. vâfrîgânîh = Av. urvâtâ.

of Aûharmazd thus: 'So what *shall* we prescribe for those who are not capable, through *being* poor (that is, they have no means), nor have they troops, nor a protector over *them*, and they have many persecutors?' 39. *And* Aûharmazd spoke thus: 'The strong-minded¹ man, through understanding, is a token of the development of those who, not being in the army, are capable; their persecutors also are many, and the passing over of authority is owing to the iniquitous of the same period.'

40. This, too, it says, that Zaratûst enquired thus: 'Is he, *O* Aûharmazd! who is a Kaî or a Karap, or he who is a most evil ruler in authority, mingled again with the good?' 41. *And* Aûharmazd spoke thus: 'Even he².'

42. Zaratûst *also* enquired thus: 'Is he, too, *O* Aûharmazd! who is *one of* those of the good sovereignty, mingled again with the good; or these, *such as* the Kaisar and Khâkân³?' 43. *And* Aûharmazd spoke thus: 'Even that *former*, *O* Zaratûst!'

44. About the same iniquitous⁴ this, too, he says, namely: 'When they are aware and understand about the sayings (galimakö) due to righteousness, they are pleased, so that a bribe seems better to them than duty and good works; they love the darkness *rather* than light, the existence they love

¹ Assuming that tôshtö-mînisnô is a miswriting of toshînô-mînisnô.

² That is, after expiating his misdeeds by his allotted punishment. The last thirteen Pahlavi words of §§ 42, 43 are also added here by mistake in the MS.

³ The Byzantine emperor and the sovereign Khân of the invaders from the east.

⁴ Mentioned in §§ 37, 39.

is the worst existence *rather* than the best existence, *and* they promote difficulty. 45. Concerning them, too, I tell thee that they are more to be destroyed than the leaping (shasṗō) serpent which is like a wolf *or* a lion, and they ever advance in malice *and* persecution from that *time* till when that man arrives who is *Kitrô-mêhônō*¹ the righteous, with the victorious club. 46. He *has* marched with fifty triplets of men² who are disciples, powerful and tall, looking after duties and ordinances, wide-shouldered, stout-armed, *and* very hairy (kabad-milth), so that their appearance is rough and of a black colour³, wherefore the demon and the iniquity *proceeding* from him fear them. 47. He also smites the evil spirit, *together* with *his* creatures; *and* those three manifest branches, that worship the fiend with simultaneous worship, are really these who march for eminent service on horses, even the Turkish demons with dishevelled hair, the Arab, and also Shedâspô⁴ the ecclesiastical Arûman.

¹ So spelt here, but in Dk. IX, xli, 6, it is *Kitrâg-mêhônō*, and other slight variations occur in the best MSS. of Bd. XX, 7, 31; XXIX, 5; Byt. III, 25, 26; Dd. XC, 3; but they can all be traced to an original *Kitrô-mêhan* = Av. *Kithrô-maêthanem*, 'of the racial home,' a title applied both to the river and the immortal sacerdotal ruler of Kangdez. The latter is supposed to be Pêshyôtanō, a son of king Vistâsp, who is expected to restore religious rites in Irân and throughout the world.

² With 150 disciples, as stated in Byt. III, 27, 29, 42. Here it is written *levatē 50 3-gabrâân*.

³ Byt. III, 27, 29, 42, states that they wear black marten fur.

⁴ In Byt. III, 3, 5, 8, 21, this name is written *Shêdâspth* which can also be read *Shêdâsfas*, and is probably a corrupt pronunciation of the name of some Byzantine emperor or general (such as Theodosius) who had signally defeated the Persians some time in the fifth to seventh century, in which period Zaratûst's millennium probably ended.

48. 'And he *has* then to attract men, contented and discontented, mostly through the incentive of duty; he who is not contented (that is, not agreeing with what he says) contentedly pays respect to him, *O Zaratûst!* (so that he brings him into the religion). 49. Likewise, through that club, he makes *one* press in the same manner; so that *one* is distressed by his hand to hold *others in* contempt, through the valiant arm and through the youthful bodily organs. 50. And he attaches power and triumph to his religion of *Aûharmazd*, and through that power and triumph they become ever respected thenceforth, when those arrive who are the sons of Zaratûst, who shall produce the renovation in an existence undecaying *and* immortal, hungerless and thirstless, the long-continued perpetuity including all.'

51. And about the separation (*burînakö*) of the ten centuries in the one millennium of Zaratûst, *and* the tidings of *Aûshêdar*¹, son of Zaratûst, it says also this, namely: 'When that century fully elapses which is the first of the religion of the Mazda-worshippers, from *the time when* Zaratûst came forward to *his* conference, what is the separation of *this* first century?' 52. And *Aûharmazd* spoke thus: 'The sun conceals *itself*.' 53. 'What is the separation after the second, third, fourth, *fifth*, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, *or* tenth century?' 54. And *Aûharmazd* spoke thus: 'The sun conceals *itself*.'

55. Then, when thirty winters of the tenth century are unelapsed (that is, thirty winters *are* remaining) a maiden, who is Shemig-abû², walks up

¹ See Chap. I, 42.

² 'Having a renowned father,' the Zvâris of Av. Srûta*d*-fedhri, Yt. XIII, 141.

to the water ; she that is the mother of that famous Aūshêdar, and her former lineage is from Vôhû-rôkô-i Frahânyân¹ in the family of Îsadvâstar, the son of Zaratûst *that* is brought forth by Arang. 56. Then she sits in that water *and* drinks *it*, and ~~she~~ kindles in a high degree those germs which were the third *of* the last that the righteous Zaratûst *was* dropping forth originally, and they introduce that son whose name is the Developer *of* Righteousness². 57. Though *she* is fifteen years old, the girl (kanîg) *has* not before that associated with men³ ; nor afterwards, when she becomes pregnant, *has she done so* before the time when she gives birth.

58. When that man becomes thirty years old, the sun stands still in the zenith (bâlistô) of the sky *for* the duration of ten days *and* ten nights, and it arrives again at that place where it *was* first appointed by allotment, where it occupies one finger-breadth out of the four finger-breadths, and it shines over all the regions which are seven. 59. So, too, O Zaratûst ! of them themselves, their declaration is thus, that they know that the separation of the millennium, which this religion *has* heard about by listening, is thus ; *and* of those who do not even then know, that it is something which is different.

60. Then, when that man becomes thirty years old, he confers with the archangels, the good rulers *and* good providers ; *on* the morrow, in the daylight of the day, *it is* moreover manifest, when the *embodied* existence is thus undistressed—without

¹ See Yt. XIII, 97.

² The Pahlavi interpretation of Aūshêdar which is an imperfect transcript of the Av. Ukhshyad-ereta of Yt. XIII, 128.

³ Pahl. 'levatô gabrâânô barâ vepayîdô.'

a Kai and without a Karap (that is, not deaf and blind to the affairs of the sacred beings), and is to be appropriated (that is, has not made its own self apart *from* the affairs of the sacred beings), and is produced full of life—that it has become extending (vâlân), and remains again great *in* various places in Aîrân-vêg where the good Dâitt¹ *is*.

61. These are the characteristics as regards the two centuries which are the ninth and tenth; the accuracy of what *was* to come has continued *and* this has happened, and both are declared as regards the accuracy which is stated on evidence as to what *will* happen.

CHAPTER IX.

1. About the marvellousness which is after the end of the millennium of Zaratûst and the arrival of Aûshêdar, until the end of the millennium of Aûshêdar and the arrival of Aûshêdar-mâh; and as to tidings of the same period.

2. The marvellousness of Aûshêdar as to birth², glory of person, sayings and actions; the standing of the sun ten days amid the sky³; the perishing of the fiend of the four-legged race; the production of a three-spring cloudless influence⁴ for vegetation; the weakening of superfluity *and* destitution; the extreme strengthening of alliance; the gratification *due to* the good friendship of foreigners; the great increase of the wisdom of religion; and the praise

¹ See Chap. III, 51, 54; Bd. XX, 13. It is the name of a river.

² See Chap. VIII, 55-57.

³ See Chap. VIII, 58.

⁴ Pahl. '3-zaremde an-avargarh.'

of Aûshêdar's smiting *with* a serpent-scurge of several kinds *in* the religion of the Mazda-worshippers.

3. The mightiness of the resources in the fifth century of the same millennium; the manifestation of the wizard Mahrkûs¹ for seven years, in the year which is reported in all the regions which are seven; the coming on *and* arrival of the winter of Mahrkûs, the perishing of most *of* mankind *and* animals within three winters and in the fourth, through the awfulness *of* those winters *and* the witchcraft of Mahrkûs; and the dying away of Mahrkûs of scanty progeny (gasûkô-zahisnô), during the fourth winter, through the Dâhmân Âfrîn². 4. The opening of the enclosure made by Yim, the coming of mankind *and* animals therefrom, *and* the complete progress of mankind and animals again, arising specially from them.

5. After those winters, the abundant and great increase in the milk of cattle, and the abundant nourishment *of* mankind by milk; the less distress of body *in* cattle, the fullness and prosperity *of* the world, the celebrity of assembled mankind, *and* the great increase of liberality. 6. Also the feebleness

¹ Av. Mahrkûsha of Westergaard's Fragment VIII, 2, who is evidently a wizard or fiend; according to Pahl. Vd. II, 49 (Sp.) the evil winter which was foretold to Yim is called the winter of Markûs. In later times this name has been understood as Heb. Malkôš, 'autumnal rain;' so the idea of the fatal freezing winter of Mahrkûs, the intender of death, was abandoned for that of the deluging rain of Malkôš, as in Mkh. XXVII, 28. In Dd. XXXVII, 94, both snow and rain are mentioned as produced by Mahrkûs or Markûs (as it is always written in Pahlavi), and in Sd. IX, 5 only his name is stated. The most complete account of him is given in our text.

² The Âfrîn of the Ameshâspends.

of poverty among mankind, *just* like what revelation mentions thus: 'Even so he, *O* Zarātūst! though he be more unfortunate than he who is accepting *from him*, is like the creator whose bounty of permanent liberality does thus, in the embodied existence, remain in his dwelling.'

7. And this, too, it says, namely: 'When that winter passes away, *of* which *it is* said that *it is* boisterous and destructive¹, then a wild beast, black and wide-travelling, walks up to the Mazda-worshippers, and thus it thinks, that they *who* worship Mazda *will* therefore not finally hate us more than him who is their own progeny, the son whom they thus bring up *as* a Mazda-worshipper here *below*, in fondness *and* freedom from malice towards well-yielding cattle.

8. 'Then Ashavahistô calls out to the Mazda-worshippers from the upper region, *and* thus he speaks: "You are for the worship of Mazda; let no one *of you* become such a slaughterer of cattle as the slaughterers you have been before. 9. Recommend increase in gifts, recommend neighbourliness in person; are you worshipping Mazda? do you slaughter cattle? do you slaughter those of them which give you assistance, which speak to you thus: 'On account of your helpfulness *one* tells you that you are worshipping Mazda *and* you *may* eat?' I *am* in neighbourliness before that, until *the time* when you exclaim: 'Mine *are* the serpent and toad.'

10. "'And you recommend increase, you recommend neighbourliness, *and* the Mazda-worshippers slaughter cattle, even those of them who give them

¹ The Pahlavi version of Av. 'stakhrahê meretô zaya' in Westerg. Frag. VIII, 2.

assistance, so that you are worshipping *Mazda* and you eat; I *am* in neighbourliness before that, until *the time* when you exclaim: 'Mine *are* the serpent and toad.'

11. "Contentedly the *Mazda*-worshippers slaughter cattle, contentedly the cattle of the *Mazda*-worshippers let *them* butcher¹, and contented are the cattle when they do not butcher *them*; contentedly the *Mazda*-worshippers eat cattle, and contented *are the cattle* when they eat them. 12. And then, when *there* are spirits, the slaughterers and whatever they slaughter, the butchers and whatever they butcher, and the eaters and whatever they eat *are* alike watched by *them*."

13. And this, too, it says, namely: 'When that century fully elapses, which is the fifth in the second millennium as regards the religion of the *Mazda*-worshippers, then of all those who *are* upon the earth, the existences which are both wicked and righteous, two-thirds *in* the land of Irân are righteous and one-third wicked; and so likewise the Tûrânians and those who *are* around Irân remain non-Irânian around Irân; the chief increase in dwellings here below, of those in the embodied existence, remains just as now.'

14. And this, too, it says, namely: 'When that millennium *has* fully elapsed, which is the first of the religion of the *Mazda*-worshippers, what is the separation after the first century?' 15. And Aûhar-mazd spoke thus: 'The sun conceals *itself*.' 16. 'And what is the separation after the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, or tenth

¹ Assuming that bū'r'zâva and stands for bū'r'nēnd which occurs in § 12.

century?' 17. And Aûharmazd spoke thus: 'The sun conceals *itself*.'

18. Then, when thirty winters of the tenth century *are* unelapsed (arânakō), a maiden, who is Shapîr-abû¹, walks up to the water; *she* that is the mother of that good Aûshêdar-mâh², and her former lineage is from Vôhû-rôkô-i Frahânyân³ in the family of Îsadvâstar, the son of Zaratûst *that* is brought forth by Arang. 19. Then she sits in that water *and* drinks *it*, *and* she kindles in a high degree those germs which were the second *of* the last that the righteous Zaratûst *was* dropping forth originally, and they introduce that son whose name is the Developer *of* Worship⁴ (that is, he augments liberality). 20. Though fifteen years old, the damsel (zihânakō) *has* not before that associated with men; nor yet afterwards, when she becomes pregnant, *has she done so* before the time when she gives birth⁵.

21. When that man becomes thirty years old, the sun stands still in the zenith of the sky *for* the duration of twenty days *and* nights⁶, *and* it shines over all the regions which are seven. 22. So, too, the declaration of them themselves is that they know

¹ 'Having a good father,' the Zvâris of Av. Vanghu-fedhri, Yt. XIII, 142.

² See Chap. I, 42.

³ See Chap. VIII, 55-57.

⁴ The Pahlavi interpretation of Aûshêdar-mâh which is an imperfect transcript of the Av. Ukhshyad-nemangh of Yt. XIII, 128.

⁵ Compare the summary in Dk. VIII, xiv, 13, as follows:— 'The arrival of Aûshêdar-mâh, son of Zaratûst, at the end of the second millennium; information *about* him and his time, *and* the destroyers *of* the organizers who *were* within the millennium *of* Aûshêdar.'

⁶ The MS. omits a clause here, which occurs in Chap. VIII, 58, possibly by mistake, as part of it is given in Chap. X, 19.

that the separation of the millennium, which this religion *has* heard about by listening, is even thus; *and* of those who do not even then know, that it is something which is different.

23. When that man becomes thirty years old, he confers with the archangels, the good rulers *and* good providers; *on* the morrow, in the daylight of the day, *it is* moreover manifest, when the embodied existence is *thus* undistressed—without a Kaī and without a Karap (that is, not blind *and* not deaf to the affairs of the sacred beings), and is to be appropriated (that is, has not made its own self apart *from* the affairs of the sacred beings), and is produced full of life—that it has become extending, and is again great *in* various places in Aīrân-vêg where the good Dâitī *is*.

CHAPTER X.

1. About the marvellousness which is after the end of the millennium of Aûshêdar and the arrival of Aûshêdar-mâh, until the end of the millennium of Aûshêdar-mâh and the arrival of Sôshâns; *and* as to tidings *of* the same period.

2. The marvellousness of Aûshêdar-mâh as to birth¹, glory of person, sayings, and actions; the standing of the sun amid the sky twenty days long²; and the increase of the milk of cattle arrives at a maximum (*avartûm*), *just* as what it says, that *one* milks only one mature cow (*tôrâ az*) for a thousand men, *and* that he brings as much milk as a thousand men *require*; also the feebleness of

¹ See Chap. IX, 18-20.

² See Chap. IX, 21.

hunger and thirst is *just* as it says, that by only a single ration *one* becomes satisfied *for* three nights, *and* whoever eats a leg *of* mutton *has* plenty for himself *for* three days *and* nights. 3. The diminution *of* decay and extension (vêshth) of life, the increase of humility and peace, *and* the perfection *of* liberality and enjoyment in the world.

4. Like this which revelation states, that, when the first ten winters in the last millennium pass away, the Mazda-worshippers then make enquiry together thus: '*Are* we really more hairy-headed (sar-vars-ik-tar) than occurred before, owing to the well-yielding cattle, so that food and clothing are less necessary for us? Has affection come to us more completely, owing to those cattle, than it was ours before? *Have* we grown up less deteriorated in the hair, by old age, than *those* grown up before? *Are* the thoughts, words, *and* deeds *of* our women and children more instructed than they were before?'

5. And *has* this thing occurred, that he is classed as disqualified who in training a child has become quite retrogressive (pas-ûruzd), and is *his* penalty arranged? Does the fiend think of the Karap class, and *are they* utterly destroyed by her through those whose thoughts are most evil, devoid of righteousness, *and* devoid of a liking for righteousness? 6. Near here, in the disturbance of the existences, does that happen as heard by us from the ancients, when listening *to* the true proclaimers of the Mazda-worshippers? And now, even when our numbers *are* so greatly maintaining this dispensation, do we sanctify (aharâytnem) righteousness (that is, do we perform duty and good works) more vociferously *and* more strenuously?'

7. This, too, it says, even that no one passes away in the last millennium, other than those whom they smite with a scaffold weapon¹, and *those* who pass away from old age. 8. When fifty-three years of that millennium of his have remained, the sweetness and oiliness in milk *and* vegetables are so completed that, on account of the freedom of mankind from wanting meat, they shall leave off the eating of meat, and their food becomes milk and vegetables. 9. When three years have remained, they shall leave off even the drinking of milk, and their food *and* drink become water and vegetables.

10. And in his millennium *are* the breaking (lānakō) of the fetters of Dahāk², the rousing of Kerēsāspō³ for the smiting of Dahāk, the arrival of Kai-Khūsrō⁴ and his companions for the assistance of Sōshāns in the production of the renovation *of the universe*, and the provision of most *of* mankind with the Gāthic disposition and law; also the occurrence of many other wonders and marvels is manifest in that millennium of his.

11. And this, too, it says, namely: 'When that millennium *has* fully elapsed, which is the second of the religion *of* the Mazda-worshippers, what is the separation after the first century?' 12. And Aūharmazd spoke thus: 'The sun conceals *itself*.' 13. 'And what is the separation after the second,

¹ Reading pavan dār snesh, as in some modern copies; but the old MS. of 1659 has run the last two words together, so as to produce pavan dārêgūsh, 'as destitute,' which must be wrong.

² For details see Byt. III, 55-57; Bd. XXIX, 9; Dd. XXXVII, 97; Dk. IX, xv, 2. It may be noticed that this release of the demoniacal tyrant is expected to follow the triumph of strict vegetarianism.

³ See further Byt. III, 59-61; Bd. XXIX, 7, 8.

⁴ See Mkh. XXVII, 59-63; LVII, 7; Dd. XXXVI, 3.

third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, *or* tenth century?' 14. And Aûharmazd spoke thus : 'The sun conceals *itself*.'

15. And when thirty winters of the tenth century *are* unelapsed, that maiden, who is Gôbâk-abû¹, walks up to the water; she that is the mother of that testifying Sôshâns who is the guide to conveying away the opposition of the destroyer, and her former lineage is from Vôhû-rôkô-î Frahânyân² in the family of Îsadvâstar, the son of Zaratûst *that* is brought forth by Arang. 16. 'That maiden whose title is All-overpowerer is thus all-overpowering, because through giving birth she brings forth him who overpowers all, both the affliction owing to demons, and also that owing to mankind³.' 17. Then she sits in that water, when she is fifteen years old, *and* it introduces *into* the girl him 'whose name is the Triumphant Benefiter, and *his* title is the Body-maker; such a benefiter as benefits (savînêdô) the whole embodied existence, and such a *body*-maker, alike possessing body and possessing life, as petitions about the disturbance of the embodied existences *and* mankind⁴.' 18. Not before that *has she* associated with men; nor yet afterwards, when she becomes pregnant, *has she done so* before the time when she gives birth⁵.

¹ 'Having a testifying father,' the Pahlavi of Av. Eredad-fedhri, Yt. XIII, 142.

² See Chap. VIII, 55-57.

³ The Pahlavi version of Yt. XIII, 142, latter clause.

⁴ From the Pahlavi version of Yt. XIII, 129.

⁵ Compare the summary in Dk. VIII, xiv, 14, 15, as follows:— 'The coming and arrival of Sôshâns, son of Zaratûst, at the end of the third millennium, the destroyers *of* the organizers who *were* within the millennium of Aûshêdar-mâh, the arrival of Sôshâns,

19. When that man becomes thirty years old, the sun stands still in the zenith of the sky *for* the duration of thirty days *and* nights, and it arrives again at that place where it *was* appointed by allotment.

CHAPTER XI.

1. About the marvellousness which is after the end of the millennium of Aûshêdar-mâh and the arrival of the Triumphant Benefiter, until the end of the fifty-seventh year of Sôshâns and the production of the renovation among the existences.

2. Concerning the marvellousness of Sôshâns as to splendour *and* glory of person, it says that 'when the coming of the last rotation of those rotations of the seasons of Aûshêdar-mâh *occurs*, the man Sôshâns is born¹ whose food is spiritual *and* body sunny (that is, his body is as radiant as the sun);' also this, that 'he looks on all sides with six-eyed power (6-dôtsarîh), *and* sees the remedy for persecution by the fiend.'

3. This, too, that with him is the triumphant Kayân glory 'which the mighty Frêdûn² bore when Az-î Dahâk³ *was* smitten by him; also Kaî-Khûsrôî⁴ *was* bearing it when the Tûr Frangrâstîyâk⁵ *was* smitten by him; also Frangrâstîyâk bore it when the Drvê Zênîgâk⁶ *was* smitten by him; *and* Kaî-

and information about Sôshâns and his time. Also, as to the renovation of the universe and the future existence, *it* is declared that they arise in his time.'

¹ The date here indicated seems to be about twenty-eight years later than that intended in Chap. X, 15-19.

² See Chap. I, 25.

³ See Chap. I, 26.

⁴ See Chap. I, 39.

⁵ See Chap. I, 31, 39.

⁶ Av. Drvau Zainigâus, an Arab chieftain who invaded Irân

Vistâsp¹ shall bear it when you fully attract him to righteousness, *and* through it he shall carry off the fiend *from* the concerns of the world of righteousness².

4. And this, too, that in fifty-seven *of* his years *there* occur the annihilation of the fiendishness of the two-legged race *and* others, and the subjugation of disease and decrepitude, *of* death and persecution, and *of* the original evil *of* tyranny, apostasy, and depravity; *there* arise a perpetual verdant growth of vegetation *and* the primitive gift *of* joyfulness; *and there* are seventeen years *of* vegetable-eating, thirty years *of* water-drinking, *and* ten years *of* spiritual food.

5. And all the splendour, glory, and power, which *have* arisen in all those possessing splendour, glory, *and* power, *are* in him on whom they arrive together and for those who are his, when many inferior human beings are aroused splendid *and* powerful; and through their power and glory all the troops of the fiend are smitten. 6. And all mankind remain of one accord in the religion of Aûharmazd, owing to the will of the creator, the command *of* that *apostle*, and the resources of his companions.

7. At the end of the fifty-seven years the fiend *and* Aharman are annihilated, the renovation *for* the future existence occurs, *and* the whole of the good creation is provided with purity *and* perfect

in early times and killed many with his evil eye, till the Irânians invited Frangrâstiyâk to destroy him (see Darmesteter's French translation of part of Chap. XLI of Irânian Bundahis in Annales du Musée Guimet, vol. xxii, p. 401).

¹ See Chap. I, 41.

² From a Pahlavi version of Yt. XIX, 92, 93, with the second and third clauses transposed.

splendour. 8. *Just* as revelation states thus: 'When that millennium *has* fully elapsed, which is the third of the religion of the Mazda-worshippers, that Mazda-worshipper whose name is so Triumphant¹ then marches forward from the water Kanyisâ² with a thousand companions and also maidens *of* restrained disposition and blindly-striving behaviour³; and he smites the wicked people who *are* tyrannical, and annihilates them.'

9. Then those Mazda-worshippers smite, and none are smiting them. 10. Then those Mazda-worshippers produce a longing for a renovation among the existences, *one* ever-living, ever-beneficial, and ever desiring a Lord. 11. 'Then I, who am Aûharmazd, produce the renovation according to the longing among the existences, *one* ever-living, ever-beneficial, *and ever* desiring a Lord.'

¹ See Chap. X, 17.

² Reading the name as Pâzand; if it were Pahlavi it would have to be read Kân-mâsâf, because Irânian Pâz. yi is very like Pahl. mâ. It is Kyânsih in Bd. XIII, 16; XX, 34; XXI, 6, 7, and represents Av. Kâsava, the brackish lake or sea of Sagastân.

³ Reading 'va-bigar-ik-i vand khîm va-kûr-kakhô râs,' and assuming that bigar is Ar. bikr, as an Arabic word is occasionally used in the Dînkard (see Chap. II, 2 n) though very rarely. Bd. XXX, 17, mentions 'fifteen men and fifteen damsels' as assisting Sôshâns at the time of the renovation of the universe.

DĪNKARD.—BOOK V.

CHAPTER I.

1. The triumph of the creator Aûharmazd, and glory of complete wisdom, is the divine (ahûtg) religion of Mazda-worship.

2. The fifth *book* is about the sayings of the saintly Âtûr-farnbag¹, son of Farukhzâd, *who* was the leader of the orthodox, even as to the manuscript which is called Gyêmarâ². 3. The collected replies of Âtûr-

¹ He was the leader of the orthodox about A.D. 815-835, and held a religious disputation with the heretic Abâlis in the presence of the Khalîfah Al-Mâmûn (A.D. 813-833), as detailed in the *Mâdgân-i Gugastak Abâlis*. He was also the first compiler of the *Dînkard*, probably of its first two Books, which are not yet discovered, as well as of some of the materials for the other Books. (See S. B. E., vol. xxxvii, p. 411, n. 1.)

² The name of this MS. can be only guessed. It occurs three times in each of the two MS. authorities, B and K₄₃, and the simplest reading of five of these six occurrences would be Sîmrâ, so that the remaining one (Sarmâ) may be neglected as a corruption. A final â in Pahlavi is a very certain indication of a Semitic word, for if a final of similar form occurs in an Irânian word, it represents either h or kh; so if the name were Irânian, its most probable reading would be Sîmurkh. But, in § 3, it is intimated that the MS. belonged to an ancient tribe, or congregation (ram); it also seems, from Chap. IV, 8, 9, that the religion of this tribe was not so inconsistent with Zoroastrianism as to prevent its members being taught that orthodox faith; and §§ 4, 5 of the present chapter appear to quote from that MS. some

farnbag, son of Farukhzâd, the leader of the orthodox, about several significant questions that *are* the wonder of the moderns, which *are* like the friendly words, spoken by him *as to* those of the ancient tribe¹ (kâd mon-ramân) who call *it* really their Gyêmarâ, which *are* obtaining² a like wonder for them openly accessible to him³.

4. About the unswerving *and* co-operating chieftainship of those forefathers who went in mutually-friendly command of troops, *and* the complete enclosure of that tribe within the military control of Bûkht-Narsîh⁴. 5. About the disabling of vicious habits and evil deeds, which are entirely connected, and of the heinous demon-worship and mischief which

particulars regarding the siege of Jerusalem by Nebuchadnezzar. From these circumstances we may suspect that Âtûr-farnbag, while collecting materials for his *Dînkard*, had asked some Jewish friends what information their MSS. contained regarding the old Persians, as the two peoples had been in contact, more or less, ever since the time of the Achaemenian dynasty. If he did so enquire, the Jews would naturally search in the Talmud, in which references to the Persians still survive, though the text is no longer complete. The question is, therefore, whether the MS., whose name has been provisionally read Sîmrâ, can have had any connection with the Talmud. It will be at once evident to any Pahlavi student that Pahl. sî may be read gyê equally well, and that we have no better reason for reading Sîmrâ than for the Gyêmarâ, which has been put into the text, as a suggestion that Âtûr-farnbag was really referring to the Gemarâ of the Jews, the supplement to their commentary upon Scripture. Whether this can be clearly proved remains to be seen, and positive evidence seems scanty.

¹ Or 'congregation.'

² Or 'including (vandîg).'

³ Pahl. 'mûnsânō ham-shkûp-vindîg frâs aûbas yehamtûnisîg.' From which it appears as if there had been a mutual interchange of information between him and his Jewish friends.

⁴ The Pahlavi form of Bu'ht-i-najar, or Nebuchadnezzar.

are owing to them, through the ruler Kaî-Loharâsp¹ being sent, with Bûkht-Narsih, from the country of Irân to Bêtâ-Makdis² of Arûm, and *their* remaining *in* that quarter. 6. And the orthodox belief in the rude particulars *of* religious custom in the mutual deliberation of those of the tribe, the acquaintance with religion of a boor (durûstakö-1), the difficult arrangements, and the enquirer doubtful of the religion after the many controversial, deliberative, and cause-investigating questions and answers adapted to the importunities of that wordy disciple³.

7. About how the accepting of this religion *by* the prophets before Zaratûst *occurred*⁴, how the pure *and* saintly Zaratûst of the Spîtâmas came⁵, and who *will* afterwards come *as* bringers of the same pure *and* good religion *hereafter*⁶. 8. That is, of the prophets, apostles, and accepters of the religion, *there were they* who accepted *it* concisely *and* completely *such* as Gâyômarâd was, from whom *came* irregularly (durûstakö) *such* as Masyê and Styâmak, Hâôshâng, Tâkhmôrup, Yim, Frêdûn, Mânûskêthar, the Sâmân, the Kayân, and also many other leaders in *those* times⁷. 9. And their acceptance expressly at various times is produced for action, and thereby the adversity of the creatures is removed, benefit

¹ The father of Kaî-Vistâsp (see Bd. XXXI, 28, 29; XXXIV, 7). His expedition to Jerusalem is mentioned in Pahl. Mkh. XXVII, 67, and by some Arab writers.

² 'The holy place,' a title of Jerusalem.

³ Not identified. From this point to Chap. IV, 7, Âtûr-farnbag must have used the same authorities as the writer of Dk. VII; but he returns to the Gyêmarâ in Chap. IV, 8.

⁴ Dk. VII, i, 7-40.

⁵ Ibid. 41.

⁶ Ibid. 42.

⁷ See the details in Dk. VII, i, 7-40. §§ 1-8 have been already translated in Grundriss der iranischen Philologie, ii, 93-94.

and prosperity *are* sought, the world is controlled, and the creator and good creations are propitiated.

CHAPTER II.

1. In the pure light *and* equal to the archangels—collected together and reckoned together, since the original creation, *and* completely unmixed—Zarātūst was spiritually fashioned and provided und defectively for the acceptance and propagation of the religion in the world¹. 2. And when he is sent for the manifestation of restrained saintliness (môkîh) and bodily substance, great glory and radiance become as much discernible in *him* as the same *had* come into the posterity of Yim who are Pôrûshâspô², his father, *and* Dûkdâûb³ who is his mother; and also while *he* is *being* born and *for* the duration of life, he produced a radiance, glow, and brilliance from the place of his own abode, that issued intensely and strongly, like the splendour of fire, to distant lands⁴.

3. Also *about* the wizards and witches, tyrants, Kîgs, and Karaps, and other miscreants who have produced outrage for him during his birth and childhood, with desire for his destruction; who *have* manifestly come about *his* death *or* disablement, and even so far as *those* who *have* come into the visible assembly *about* the destruction of *his* glory and other *causes* of helplessness⁵. 4. And also including the wolves *and* other wild beasts, to whom *he* was

¹ Dk. VII, ii, 1, 2, 14-21, 36-42, 46, 47; Zs. XIII, 4.

² Ibid. 13.

³ Ibid. 3-8; Zs. XIII, 1-3.

⁴ Ibid. 56-58; Zs. XIV, 7.

⁵ Dk. VII, iii, 5-14; Zs. XVI, 1-7.

cast forth by those of Pôrûshâspô's kinsmen who *were* wizards, *and* the kindred of those frequenting demon-worship, but only as a test ¹.

5. *In* like manner *it* is declared *that*, on account of Vohûmanô *being* welcome to him, he laughed outright at birth ². 6. His coming for conference *with* Aûharmazd ³, and owing to *his* accepting the religion, Aharman and many demons and fiends have come to him with exhibition of fear, offering of service, and the argument and entreaty of supplicants ; and all these have returned from him disapprovingly, defeatedly, and confusedly, through the pure proclamation of his Avesta, the unique perfection of Aûharmazd's will ⁴, and the indication of a prepared armament (vîrâstô-zênih), a declared reward, a powerful sovereignty, and a way of injury *to* the destroyer.

7. Also the triumph of the sacred beings *in* the end, and the peculiarity *of* the joint control *of* the demons ; how, before that, they rushed openly into the world *and* have dwindled, *their* bodily forms *are* shattered ⁵, and they are so converted into secret decay, that *their* supplicants, deceived and deceivers, became awful disputants through confession of it.

8. And when, through completely accepting the religion from Aûharmazd, he came to the obedient king Kai-Vistâsp to attract those of the world, he exhibited glorious actions of many kinds and the

¹ Dk. VII, iii, 15-19 ; Zs. XVI, 8-11.

² Ibid. 2 ; Zs. XIV, 12, 13.

³ Ibid. 60-iv, 1 ; Zs. XXI, 11-XXII, 13.

⁴ Dk. VII, iv, 36-41, 61, 62.

⁵ Ibid. 42. 44-46, 63.

smiting of demons and fiends ; and *he* openly spoke the thoughts of king Vistâsp and many of the multitude *about* hidden matters¹, *thus* : ' A person is possessing life only by destiny, and without his body, *but with* a like destiny, the person possessing life is restored ;' *he was* also opposing many wizards, demon-worshippers, demon-consulters, *and* those seduced *by*² deceivers who are awful disputants.

9. And this *was* the utterance of those twelve stars whose names *are those* of the twelve zodiacal constellations, and the primitive learned of Bâpêl³, that have come to these, who *are* asking questions of the chief rulers of Khvanîras, *have* to justify *it*, in the controversy, with the spiritual and material customs and rude observances which are diversely manifested, onwards from *the time of* Yim the splendid and the evidence of it, discernible with him, *was that of* Vohûmanô, Ashavahistô, the fire, and some other good spirits⁴.

10. Afterwards, too, the estimating and weighing of the whole utterance of the religion of Aûharmazd *were* held out by him to Vistâsp and those of the world, as very accountably a wonder ; and further, too, he remained as *it were* more conflicting with fellow-disputants than his own words opposing the fellow-disputants.

11. Also when, through the effect of glory and the struggle *for being* saved, every class of apostles and prophets and manifestation of tokens and such-like *were*, with certain *and* striking evidence, casting down blessings, even thereupon the obedient king

¹ Dk. VII, iv, 65, 71.

² B has ' and demon-separatists (va-shêdâ-gvîdakân).'

³ Dk. VII, iv, 72.

⁴ Ibid. 74, 85 ; Zs. XXIII, 7.

Kaī-Vistâsp's fear of the adversary of religion, and also other causes, arose, on account of which he *was* then accepting the propagation of the religion¹, when its great glory *and* beauty² *were* seen by him. 12. At first, Zarīr³, Spend-dâd⁴, Frashôstar, and Gâmâsp⁵, several of the realm *who were* noble, conspicuous, and well-acting, the good *and* princes of mankind, beheld visibly the will and desirableness of Aûharmazd and the archangels, and the progressive religion of the creatures, fit for those completely victorious (hûktragântg).

13. Lastly, the seizure and capturing (gīrīnīšnō) by the demons *are* beheld *and* watched; *and* they have remained opposing, owing to the number of idolators competing wranglingly. 14. And much conflict and slaughter occurred, which arose purely, so that the mingling of the religion in the world proceeded⁶.

15. *There* are also his pure new bringers and complete controllers of the same religion, Aûshêdar⁷, Aûshêdar-mâh⁸, and Sôshâns⁹; and through the complete progress of this religion of Aûharmazd, all the good creatures become without disturbance and all-radiant¹⁰.

¹ Dk. VII, iv, 87.

² K43 has varâzō; but B, omitting the first letter, has lāfō, 'praise.'

³ A brother and commander-in-chief of Vistâsp, killed in the battle with Argâsp, see Bd. XXXI, 29; YZ. 54-56.

⁴ A son of Vistâsp; see Dk. VII, vii, 5; YZ. 82-85.

⁵ Two brothers, see Chap. III, 4; Dk. VII, vi, 12; Zs. XXIII, 10.

⁶ See Chap. III, 1.

⁷ Dk. VII, viii, 55-ix, 13.

⁸ Dk. VII, ix, 18-x, 10.

⁹ Dk. VII, x, 15-xi, 5.

¹⁰ Dk. VII, xi, 6-11.

CHAPTER III.

1. About that which is manifested as regards the propitiousness, forward intellect, and complete virtue of Zaratûst, it is openly declared that, according to his explaining statements, *there occurred such events* as the victory of Kai-Vistâsp and the Irânians over Argâsp¹ and an army of Khyôns and other foreigners *of* innumerable kinds, *and* details on that subject; also other assistance of Vistâsp and those of the realm in other necessities.

2. The killing of Zaratûst himself *by* Brâdrô-rêsh² the Tûr; the provision of a chariot *by* Srtô³ of the Visraps; and whatever is on those subjects.

3. Also, specially, matters in the times to come, each consecutively, *when* therein arrive devastators *such* as Alexander⁴, and the killer of Akre-khiradô⁵, Mahrkûs⁶, Dahâk⁷, and other devastators; extenders of belief (vîravîsn-vâlân) *such* as the Messiah (Mashikh), Mânih⁸, and others; periods *such* as the steel age⁹, *that* mingled with iron, and others; and organizers, restorers, *and* introducers of religion, *such*

¹ Dk. VII, iv, 77, 83, 84, 87-90; v, 7; this victory occurred in the thirtieth year of the religion, see Zs. XXIII, 8.

² Dk. VII, v, 12 n.

³ Dk. VII, vi, 2-11.

⁴ Dk. VII, vii, 7.

⁵ Or Aghrêrad (Av. Aghraêratha), killed by his brother Frâsîyâv or Frangrâsîyâk of Tûr, see Bd. XXIX, 5; XXXI, 15, 20-22.

⁶ Dk. VII, i, 24; ix, 3.

⁷ Ibid. i, 26.

⁸ A heretic who flourished A.D. 216-242; see Dk. IX, xxxix, 13 n.

⁹ According to Byt. II, 21, 22, the steel age was the time of Khûsrô Anôshêrvân, and that mingled with iron at the end of Zaratûst's millennium.

as Artakhshatar ¹, Âtûrpâd ², Khûsrôï ³, Pêshyôtan ⁴, Aûshêdar, Aûshêdar-mâh, Sôshâns ⁵, and others.

4. The formation of custom, and the indications which *have* come to manifestation and *will* arrive at various periods; and the proclamation of these, too, by Gâmâsp ⁶, from the teaching of Zaratûst, is what he wrote, together with the Avesta and Zand, upon oxhides, and it was written *with* gold, and kept in the royal treasury ⁷. 5. And it was from it the high-priests of the rulers made many copies; and afterwards, too, it is from it that it happened, both to the less intelligent and the corrupters, that *they* were introducing different opinions *and* different views.

CHAPTER IV.

1. About the selectness and perfection of the race of Irân, that is, how the destroyer and the mingling of defects came into the creation, first into the distribution of the race [of mankind] ⁸ from the children of Sîyâmak ⁹, *and* good intellect, good disposition,

¹ Ardâshîr Pâpakân (A.D. 226-241), the founder of the Sâsânian dynasty.

² Son of Mâraspend, and prime minister of Shahpûhar II (A.D. 309-379).

³ Anôshêrvân (A.D. 531-578).

⁴ A son of Vistâsp and immortal ruler of Kangdez, see Dk. VII, iv, 81.

⁵ See Chap. II, 15.

⁶ See Chap. II, 12.

⁷ This was the original Avesta prepared by order of Vistâsp, as stated in the last chapter of Dk. III, § 3 (see S. B. E., vol. xxxvii, p. xxxi).

⁸ B omits the words in brackets.

⁹ Son of Masyê, called Sâmak in Dk. VII, i, 15.

proper affection, proper praise, proper modesty, observance of hope, liberality, truth, generosity, good friendship, *and* other capability, glory, and proper duty are more particularly included for Fravâk¹, and again altered for frontier peoples.

2. Such-like goodness and glory, again, through selection from a promiscuous origin—even till the coming on of various new contaminations, from the demons, among the children of Fravâk—*were* for Hâôshâng and Vâêgered², as Hâôshâng through superior glory *was* ruler of the world, and Vâêgered³ through provincial government (dahyûkânih) became the cultivator and cherisher of the world; and their well-destined descendants³ aggrandized the race of the monarchs among the well-born provincial governors (dahyûkân).

3. In union, such-like glory and goodness proceeded, mutually connected, in various ages as settled by the annals (mâdîgân), and the frontiers of Atûr⁴ are penetrated; also in various annals *there* were in succession *such men* as Tâkhmôrup, Yim, Frêdûn the Âspîgân, and Aîrîk of Irân, the progenitor of Mânûs, Mânûs-khvârnar, and Mânûs-kîhar⁵.

4. And, besides including this one, who *was* a monarch of superior glory, and other monarchs *such* as *are* also in the same race⁶, the Kayâns⁷ *were*

¹ Son of Sîyâmak; he was progenitor of the fifteen undeformed races of mankind (see Bd. XV, 25, 30, 31).

² Dk. VII, i, 16-18.

³ K43 has 'children.'

⁴ Probably Assyria; but it is possible to read atval as Ar. a/val, and to translate 'ancient frontiers.'

⁵ For the foregoing names see Dk. VII, i, 19-30; ii, 70.

⁶ Such as Âûzôbô in Dk. VII, i, 31.

⁷ From Kaî-Kobâd to Kaî-Khûsrô, as stated in Dk. VII, i, 33-40.

chosen. 5. Even thus, as regards the Kayâns, the annals *have* always to consider him who is monarch as the right *one*, who is a fellow-descendant *of* the lineage, and in whom the glory is residing.

6. The creator Aôharmazd has informed Nêryô-sang¹, his own reminder, *that* a similar instance is the supreme Zaratûstship, and the glory of the religion due to the same; also many other reasons, which *are* recountable, *are* declared in the Avesta, indications known only *to* an Irânian person of the best lineage. 7. And this, too, he has said, namely: 'Great glory and goodness of this description *are* appropriatable by the same race, and *are* even now² visibly manifest.'

8. About what *are* the requirements of the tribe of those who call *this* really their Gyêmarâ and how *they are* effected by our acquaintance with revelation, that is, *by* much recitation of it; only, several occasions (yâvar 1-*k*and) are necessary in these times. 9. Also action and precaution *are* possible for them, and among the actions and precautions *one* is to assume more especially law and custom, and whatever *was* perverted by us and again made true; and, as to those taught, several persons who *are* intellectual, seeking means, and friends of the soul, *have* come to teach complete delusions to them; also for the same tribe and whomever it is proper to teach, when it is necessary for them, even a worldly

¹ The usual messenger of Aôharmazd, see Dk. VII, iv, 84, 85.

² B has 'even anew,' by writing kevan backwards, which converts the word into navak. From Chap. I, 7 to this point, the compiler could have found very little of his materials in a Jewish MS., excepting such as had been recently obtained from Persian sources.

priestly authority is guiding for *that* same tribe, because he has come¹.

¹ It would seem that the tribe professed a different religion, but one that bore some resemblance to the Parsi faith in certain essential particulars. The remaining five-sixths of Dk. V are devoted to a miscellaneous collection of religious subjects, resembling a Rivâyat.

SELECTIONS OF ZÂD-SPARAM.

SELECTIONS OF ZÂD-SPARAM¹.

CHAPTER XII.

1. About the coming of the religion at a *given* time *being* a resemblance such-like as the birth of a child through two united powers, which are the reception of semen *by* females in procreation, and delivering *it* back to the fathers, and a period of struggling and intermingling, especially by two means: a monarchy with ² religion of the same tenets (ham-vâk-dênôih), and the existence of similar tenets to *those of* the monarchy *in* the custom *of* the religion. 2. The religion *of* the Mazda-worshippers, when the period of material

¹ Zâd-sparam was Dastûr of Sîrkân, about thirty parasangs south of Kirmân, in A. D. 881. At a later date, probably about A. D. 900, he compiled three series of Selections, from religious texts then extant, and these have been preserved by the Parsis in the same MSS. as contain the Dâdistân-î Dînk (see the Introduction). The first eleven chapters of this first series of Selections have been already translated in S. B. E., vol. v, pp. 155-186, as they refer to some of the subjects detailed in the Bundahis. The remaining chapters are here translated, except the last which refers to the Nasks and Gâthas, and will be found in S. B. E., vol. xxxvii, pp. 401-405. The MS. authorities for the text are K35 and T (see p. 2 and Introduction).

² T has 'devoid of.'

organization is being converted again into a spiritual nature, became manifest on the earth, first through Spendarmâd¹ and afterwards through Aûharmâzd, like the reception of a child *by* mothers and delivering *it* back to the fathers.

3. The manifestation of the religion through Spendarmâd was at that time when Frâsiyâv² kept back the water from the country of Irân, and brought the water again; in damsel form she was a speaker for *its* manifestation, *in* reply to foreigners, at the house of Mânûskêhar³, the monarch of the country of Irân. 4. She *was* also dressed, and wore radiant clothing which shone out on all sides *for* the length of a Hâsar⁴, which is *a distance*, like a Parasang; and, tied on her waist, she wore a golden *sacred* girdle which was the religion of the Mazda-worshippers itself.

5. As to the belt of the religion, it is *that* to which are connected the thirty-three fetters upon the thirty-three sins⁵, according to which all sin is divided; so that (kû) the damsels, by whom the tied *sacred* girdle of Spendarmâd *was* seen, have become impetuous (taftlgö) after that for a tied girdle, on account of *its* seeming beautiful.

6. And this was the motherhood which is supplied through Spendarmâd, as a gift, in the year 528

¹ The female archangel who has special charge of the earth and virtuous women (see Dk. VII, ii, 19 n).

² See Dk. VII, i, 31; and regarding his irrigation canals, see Bd. XX, 17, 34; XXI, 6.

³ See Dk. VII, i, 29.

⁴ A thousand steps of the two feet, or Roman mile; see Bd. XXVI, 1.

⁵ Thirty sins are detailed in Mkh. XXXVI, and thirty-three good works in XXXVII (see S. B. E., vol. xxiv, pp. 71-75).

before Zaratûst came out to *his* conference¹, which is *one of* their statements from the annals of the religion *in* a manuscript of the ancients.

7. The name of Zaratûst is also cited on the earth at 300 years before his conference². 8. For Irân, at the supplication even of the priests in the land, and for the sake of the pacification of a dispute arisen, Aûharmazd produced a great ox, by whom the boundary of Irân next to Tûrân was intimated by pawing with *his* hoofs, and he was kept in a jungle. 9. Whenever contention arose, the boundary was fully made known by that ox, until it was the wish of Kaî-Ûs to take, fully covetously, a portion of the land of Tûrân back *into* Irân, and he saw that the ox is *about* to act very ill-naturedly, because it *was* not besought with *forms* which were prescribed for it, where a boundary was intimated by it³.

10. *There* were seven brothers, and he who was

¹ If this coming to conference with the spirits be 'the coming of the religion,' in the thirtieth year of Vistâsp's reign, then, according to Bundahis chronology, these 528 years will carry us back to twenty-eight years before the accession of Mânûskîhar. As any alteration in the date of Mânûskîhar's accession would disturb the millennial arrangement of Bd. XXXIV, it is probable that some copyist has miswritten the ciphers, and we ought to read 428. This legend appears not to occur elsewhere.

² According to Bd. XXXIV, 7, Kaî-Ûs reigned from 360 to 210 years before 'the coming of the religion.' At this point a dislocation of the text occurs in all existing MSS., owing to the misplacement of a loose folio in some unknown copy written before 1530; the contents of this folio, §§ 8-16, are found in the existing MSS. three folios further on (after Chap. XIV, 14), and are here restored to their original position, as determined by the meaning of the text.

³ T has 'by that ox.' This legend is also told in Dk. VII, ii, 62-66.

the seventh was called Sritô¹ the Seventh, the largest in body *and* chief in strength, belonging to those instructed in many subjects for Kai-Ûs, and he was among his princes. 11. Kai-Ûs summoned *him* into *his* presence and ordered *him* thus: 'Go and kill that ox in the jungle!'

12. Sritô went, *and* the ox whom he wished to kill expostulated with him, in human words, thus: 'Do not kill me! for though thou canst kill me, he whose guardian spirit is in the Hôm, the death-dispeller, *will* also become manifest on the earth, *he* whose name is Zaratûst of the Spîtâmas², and *will* proclaim thy bad action in the world. 13. And the distress in thy soul becomes such as is declared in revelation thus: "As it occurs to him, *so* it *does* to Vadak³, when they mention his iniquity," and thy death becomes the like and, owing to death, it is mixed up with hers (that is, owing even to hers is the death of Sritô).'

14. When those words *were* heard by him, Sritô turned back, *and* went again to Kai-Ûs; also by his manner, and even apart from this, he stated⁴ what the ox *had* spoken with awfulness, *and also* thus:

¹ Sritô, the seventh son (compare Dk. VII, ii, 64), is not easy to identify. He could not have been Thrîta the father of Keresâspa, because this Thrîta the Sâmân is said to have been a third son in Pahl. Yas. IX, 30 (Sp.). He may have been Sritô of the Vîsraþs, whose soul visited Vistâsp in the latter part of his reign, about 350 years later, regarding which a legend is related in Dk. VII, vi, 2-11, and again mentioned in Dk. V, iii, 2; but there is a want of corresponding details for identification.

² This is the citation of his name mentioned in § 7.

³ The mother of Dahâk, whose iniquity is considered as equal to that of the evil spirit, see Dd. LXXII, 5; Dk. IX, x, 3.

⁴ T has 'also by his manner he intimated *and* separately stated.'

'I *am* more desirous *than* any one who is in the earth *created by* righteousness, *that* you *should* now order destruction for the ox.'

15. And Kaî-Ûs uttered *his* will, with the conviction of superior wisdom, thus: 'It is not certain whether he whose guardian spirit is in the Hôm, the death-dispeller, is himself, or not; and if he be, and be born ¹, *whether* he *will* become manifest, or not;' and he commanded with severity, thus: 'Go and kill it!'

16. *And* Sritô spoke thus: '*It is* not that I am without strength to kill, because *its* reprieve by me *was* owing to its remonstrance, mentioned to me, that a high-priest is to arise ².'

17. So *it* is declared thus, *in* another revelation (dênô zagâi) ³, when the Tûrânians *were* backward *in* heart, Kaî-Ûs spoke thus: 'Go out to a certain jungle, in which dwell many chiefs of the witches, and they *will* cut thee up without *any* striving of heart.'

18. And Sritô went up to the jungle, *where* many witches saw him, who kept their jaws open, and they *spoke* about the handsome *man* thus: 'Slay *and* do not spare!' 19. And compassion *having* gone out of his heart, he went back to the *other* jungle and, with his fist, he broke the back of the ox in three places; and the ox, awfully convulsed (skiftö barhamakö), kept *up* an outcry.

20. After the slaughter of the ox, owing to its convulsed state which *was* heard by him, the

¹ T omits 'and be born.'

² The misplaced folio, which begins with § 8, ends here, but it is not quite certain that a few lines of text are not still missing.

³ T has 'at another *time* (dên zagâi).'

remembrance of it then became grievous to Sritô ; and he went back to Kat-Ûs, and informed him how it was, and begged him that he *should* finish off by slaying him¹, because his life was not desirable.

21. Kat-Ûs spoke thus : '*Shall* I slay thee, for it *was* not designed by thee?'

22. *And* Sritô spoke thus : 'If thou wilt not slay me, then I *shall* slay thee.'

23. *Again* Kat-Ûs spoke thus : 'Do not thou slay me, for I am the monarch of the world.'

24. Sritô continued *his* discontent, until Kat-Ûs ordered him thus : 'Go out to a certain jungle, because a witch in the shape of a dog is in it, and she will slay thee.'

25. *Then* Sritô went out to that jungle, and that witch in the shape of a dog *was* seen by him ; after he smote the witch, she became two ; and he constantly smote *them* till *they* became a thousand, and the host (girdô) of them slew Sritô on the spot.

CHAPTER XIII.

1. About the glory of Zaratûst becoming manifest even before *his* birth, *it* is thus declared, that forty-five years before *the time* when Zaratûst came out to his conference², when Frênö gave birth to the mother of Zaratûst³, whom they called Dûkâak, it

¹ T has 'that he *should* command the slaying of him.'

² That is, forty-five years before he was thirty years old (see Chap. XXI, 1-14).

³ It is necessary to translate in this manner, to agree with Dk. VII, ii, 3, but the text, which is ambiguous, runs as follows:—
'amat Frênög (Frênö-î?) Zaratûst am, zyarân Dûkâakög karîuntô,

came down from the endless light, in the manner of fire, *and* mingled with the fire which was before her; *and* from the fire it mingled with the mother of Zaratûst¹.

2. For three nights it was manifest, to all passers-by, as a species of fire *in* the direction of the house, *and* passers *on* the road always saw great radiance.

3. Also when she became fifteen years old, the radiance of that glory which *was* in her, *was* even such *that*, on the path she was walking *along*, its brightness *was* then shed by her².

4. About the combination of Zaratûst, *whose* guardian spirit is revered; that is, his guardian spirit, in the Hôm, and his glory are given the cow's milk, by his father and mother drinking *it* up³, *and* *his* spiritual life (ahvô) came into the combination, as was proclaimed *by* his statements in the manuscript about the Guidance of the Ceremonial⁴.

5. About the backward connection of Zaratûst with Aûharmazd, through the two who *are* Yim, the best of the worldly existences, and Nêryôsang of the spirits. 6. The enumeration of the lineage of Zaratûst is Zaratûst, *son of* Pôrûshaspô⁵, of Purtarâspô,

zerkhûntô;’ which might also be translated thus: ‘when Frênô, the mother of Zaratûst, whom they called Dûkzâk, was born.’ This Frênô, whether mother or daughter, does not seem to correspond with any Frêni mentioned in the Avesta.

¹ See Dk. VII, ii, 2, 3.

² Ibid. 7, 8.

³ Ibid. 46, 47.

⁴ Not identified, but probably like the Nîrangistân.

⁵ This genealogy was, no doubt, derived originally from the same source as that in Dk. VII, ii, 70, but there are several variations, especially in orthography, which are here preserved, unless clearly copyist's blunders. The names marked with an asterisk are written in Pâzand.

of Ahûrvadâspô, of Hâêkadâspô, of Kîkhshnûs, of Paîtiraspô, of Aregadarst*, of Kharedhar*, of Spîtâmân, of Vaêdîstô, of Ayazem, of Fris, of Arig*, of Dûrasrôbô, of Mânûskîhar, of Mânûs-khûrnar, of Mânûs-khûrnâk, whom Nêryôsang the messenger of Aûharmazd brought, and whose mother was Vîzag, daughter of Aryag, of Sritak, of Bitak, of Frazûsak, of Zûsak, of Fragûzag, of Gûzag, daughter of Airtê, son of Frêdûn of the Âspigâns to the total of ten Âspigâns, of Yim, of the Vîvang, has, of the Ayang, has, of the Anang, has, of Hôshâng, of Fravâk, of Siyâmak, of Masiyâ, of Gâyômarz.

CHAPTER XIV.

1. About the wonderful striving of the fiend for the destruction of Zaratûst. 2. When it became near to his birth, the Fever demon, the Pain demon, and the Wind demon of Aharman, each one with 150 demons, have come out to kill Zaratûst, and from his spirit they have gone forth to *his* mother. 3. And she is hurried from there by Fever, Pain, and Wind; and at *the distance of* one league (para-sang) *there* was a wizard, Impudent (Storkö) *by* name, who was the most medical of wizards; in hope of practice he stood up from his seat, *as* she stopped in her progress.

4. A messenger *of* Aûharmazd uttered a cry thus: 'Do not go to a wizard! for they are not healing (bêshazintdâr) for thee; but go back to the house, wash *thy* hands on the morrow with cow's butter held over the fire, also burn (tâpö) ¹ firewood

¹ T has 'consume (viddzö).'

and incense for thy own self *and thy* progeny which is in thy womb.' 5. And she acted accordingly and became well¹; *and* the co-operators of the demon, *and* those of equal power, who *had* not obtained their remedy from her body, are again exposed², and spoke thus: 'On account of the existence of fire from all sides we have not succeeded; *it is* a help for every one who is her friend more than opponent; therefore it was not for us, because of the power within her.'

6. The same night as she gave birth, Aharman selected commanders and arrayed his champions (gûrd); there are *some* who *are* with one thousand demons, and there are *some* who *are* with two thousand demons; pursuing *and* attacking they have contended. 7. The opposing stand *of* the sacred beings³, especially of the glory itself at the family⁴ fire, was manifest at that birth; and for its splendour and brightness (padrôkô), settled opposite a distant place, they have then found no remedy.

8. At last, Aharman sends Akômanô⁵ on, and spoke to him thus: 'Thou canst be very spiritual, who canst be most intimate; thou canst go with deceit into the mind of Zaratûst, and make him turn

¹ Compare Dk. VII, ii, 53-55.

² T has '*and* all the co-operators *who had* entered her body, *and* those of equal power *who had* reached them, returned helpless from them.'

³ Thus summarized in Dk. VIII, xiv, 2:—'Also about the arrival of both spirits, the good *one* for developing, and the evil *one* for destroying; the victory *of* the good spirit, and the rearing of Zaratûst.' The 'rearing' is continued in Chaps. XV-XX.

⁴ Assuming that 𐬔𐬀𐬎𐬌 stands for 𐬔𐬀𐬎𐬌 dûdak.

⁵ The archdemon of 'evil thought' (Bd. XXVIII, 7) and special opponent of Vohûmanô, the archangel of 'good thought.'

his mind to us who are demons.' 9. And Aûharmazd sends Vohûmanô on against him; Akômanô advanced to the front, *and* had come forward to the door, *and* wished to go inside.

10. Vohûmanô schemingly (*êârakögarîhâ*) turned¹ back, and exclaimed to Akômanô thus: 'Go inside!' 11. Akômanô imagined thus: '*There* is nothing to be accomplished by me of what *was* mentioned to me, for Vohûmanô has gone back.' 12. And Vohûmanô went inside, *and* mingled with the reason (*vârôm*) of Zaratûst, *and* Zaratûst laughed outright², for Vohûmanô is a gratifying spirit.

13. Also seven wizards³ were seated before him, *and* owing to the light in the dwelling, his *having* laughed at birth was conveniently seen, which is opposed to the *habit* of the rest of mankind who cry out at birth *and* are quite terrified.

14. Also, at the same time of birth, he authoritatively accepted the religion from Aûharmazd, as it is stated in revelation, that he spoke at birth thus: 'As is the will of the spiritual lord (*ahvô*) mayst thou be who art the officiating priest (*zôtô*) (that is, mayst thou be the leader of the creatures)⁴.'

15. As Zaratûst, on account of his worldly body, spoke with a worldly voice, Aûharmazd spoke *in* reply to him, on account of the spirits, thus: 'So

¹ Assuming that *stô* stands for *vastô*.

² Compare Dk. VII, iii, 2; V, ii, 5. This laughing is not mentioned in Dk. IX, xxiv.

³ 'Seven midwives' are mentioned in Dk. VII, iii, 2.

⁴ This is one form of the Pahlavi Ahunavair (see Dk. IX, xxiv, 4). At this point the text in the MSS. is interrupted by the erroneous insertion of Chap. XII, 8-16, the contents of a loose folio in some former copy, which have been restored to their original position in this translation.

mayst thou be the priestly authority (*rad' shâe*), and so mayst thou be virtuous, owing to whatsoever righteousness *occurs*; and I confidently proclaim *thee* righteous (that is, I am thy controller) ¹.'

16. Another day, Pôrûshaspô went and enquired of the wizards who kept in front at the place, thus: 'What is the *cause* when infants cry out at birth, beyond that *which occurs* when they laugh outright ²?' 17. And they replied thus: 'Because *those who* are made to cry *have* seen mortality as *their* end, and *those* having laughed *have* seen their own righteousness.'

CHAPTER XV.

1. About the brothers who *were* a band of opponents of Zaratûst. 2. The Karaps and Aûsikhshes ³ *were* brothers' sons, and have become the devastation (*gâstâragîh*) of the Irânians; the devastators of the Irânians (*Êrânân*) *were* from Kôkharêd ⁴, and Kôkharêd *was* born from Aêshm and Mânûsak, the sister of Mânûskêthar ⁵. 3. At the place where Zaratûst *was* born, five brothers have been, whose names were Brâd-rûkhsh, Brâd-rôyisn, Brâd-rêsh the Tûr, Hazân, and Vadast ⁶. 4. Their

¹ Compare Dk. IX, xxiv, 4. ² Compare Dk. VII, iii, 24, 25.

³ Av. 'Karapâ Usikhsh-kâ' of Yas. XLIV, 20 c; the Kavâ, a third class of pre-Zoroastrian priests, is also mentioned *ibid.* 20 d. Compare Dk. VII, ii, 9 n.

⁴ Av. *Kahvaredha*, Yas. LX, 6, 7 (Sp.) where it is translated by *kâstâr*, 'diminisher, devastator,' of whom it is here said to be the father; see also Yt. III, 9, 12, 16.

⁵ Compare the legend of the descent of the ape and bear from a demon and Yimak, sister of Yim, in Bd. XXIII, 1.

⁶ As these names do not occur in the Avesta, their pronunciation

brotherhood of five—of which the middle *one was* Brâd-rêsh the Tûr, who became more of an adversary of Zaratûst—*was* a semblance *of* the brotherhood of five who *were* sons of Pôrûshaspô, of whom the middle *one was* Zaratûst.

5. Of the four brothers *of* Zaratûst, the names of the two before Zaratûst *were* Ratûstar and Rangûstar, and of the two after *him* Nodarigâ and Nivêdis¹.

6. The middle position of Zaratûst is for the reason that he is so produced at that time, as an inter-medium of the early narrators and the later narrators, that three millenniums came before him and three after. 7. So that he *has* prescribed to the creatures in what manner he would teach the ancients as to what *had* occurred, and *in* what manner *it* is also to be done as regards what *will* occur; as is stated in the Gâthas² thus: 'Both those I ask of thee, O Aûharmazd! even whatever *has* happened till now, *and* whatever shall happen henceforth?'

CHAPTER XVI.

1. About the trials (aûzmâyisnô) which occurred

has to be guessed so as to give a probable meaning to the Pahlavi spelling. The writing of the last name is complicated; it is written  and  in the two MS. authorities, which forms can be most obviously read Vasam and Saman, but Saman can also be read as the Zvâris yadâ=dast, 'a hand;' this leads to the conclusion that the original name underlies the form Vadast, and this is confirmed by the name of the Karap Vaêdvôist written at full length in Dk. VII, iv, 21-24. See *ibid.* ii, 9 n.

¹ These brothers seem unmentioned elsewhere, and the existence of the elder two would imply another mother. The pronunciation of the names is guessed.

² Pahl. Yas. XXXI, 14 a.

to him whose practice *was* lawful, and the signs of prophecy *that* are seen therein, *it* is thus declared, namely; 'Another day, when *the child had* been born, Pôrûshaspô called one of those five brothers of the race of Karaps, and spoke thus: "Fully observe the marks *and* specks of my son Zaratûst."' "

2. *The Karap* went and sat down before Zaratûst, and the head of Zaratûst *was* thereupon severely twisted by him, in order that he should be killed; *but* he, being fearless, watched the wizards whose terror *was* distressing¹. 3. As *it was* in those ten nights for hospitality, Aûharmazd sent Spendarmad, Arêdvisûr, and Ardâi-fravard² down to the earth, by way of female *care*; thereupon no variation occurred to *the child*, and, further, the hand of that Karap *was* withered³, and that wizard demanded the life⁴ of Zaratûst from Pôrûshaspô for the harm from him, which sprang *upon* himself from his own action.

4. *At* the same time Pôrûshaspô took Zaratûst, and gave him to the Karap, that he might do with him according to his own will. 5. He seized him and threw him out, at the feet of the oxen who were going on a path to the water; the leader of that drove of oxen stood still in *his* vicinity, and 150 oxen, which walked behind it, *were* kept away from him thereby; *and* Pôrûshaspô took *him*, and carried him back to the house⁵.

6. Also the second day, *the Karap* threw *him* out

¹ Assuming that vôshîg stands for vêshîg=bêshîg.

² The three female spirits that represent the earth, pure water, and guardian spirits, respectively.

³ Compare Dk. VII, iii, 4-7.

⁴ Assuming that the MS. dênô stands for gân.

⁵ Compare Dk. VII, iii, 11, 12.

at the feet of the horses; and the leader of the horses stood still in the vicinity of Zaratûst, and 150 horses, which walked behind it, *were* kept away from him thereby; *and* Pôrûshaspô took *him*, and carried him back to the house ¹.

7. Also the third day, firewood is gathered together by *the Karap*, and Zaratûst is deposited on *it* by him, the fire is stirred up by him, yet *with* the same result (*ham-bûn-ik*), the *child* is not burnt by it, and those marks, which existed *and were* made upon him, *were* a preservation from it ².

8. And the fourth day, he is thrown by *the Karap* into the lair (*âshyânakö*) of a wolf; the wolf was not in the lair, *and* when it wished to go back to the den (*sûrâkö*), it stopped when it came in front of some radiance, *in* the manner of a mother, at the place *where its* cub was. 9. In the night, Vohûmanô *and* Srôsh the righteous brought a woolly (*kûrû-sakö*) sheep *with* udder *full* of milk into the den, and it gave milk to Zaratûst, in digestible draughts (*guvârakö guvârakö*), until daylight ³.

10. In the dawn, the mother of Zaratûst went to that place, in the expectation that it *would* be necessary to bring a skeleton out of the den, and the woolly *sheep* came out *and* ran away; his mother supposed that it was the wolf, and she spoke thus: 'Thou *hast* devoured to repletion; mayst thou endure for ever without it!' 11. She went farther, *and* when she saw Zaratûst quite safe, she then took him up and spoke thus: 'I *will* not give *thee* to any one during life, not though both the provinces of Râgh and Nôdar *should* arrive here together ⁴.'

¹ Compare Dk. VII, iii, 13, 14.

² Ibid. 9, 10.

³ Ibid. 15-17; V, ii, 4.

⁴ Ibid. 18, 19.

12. Because these *princes were* among the spiritual from two provinces which *are* in Âtûr-pâdakân, such as *are* at sixty leagues (parasang) from Kîst; Zaratûst arose from Râgh, and Vistâsp from Nôdar.

13. And of these two provinces, Râgh was according to the name of Êrikö, *son* of Dûrêsrôbô, *son* of Mânûskêthar¹, from whom arose the race of Zaratûst; and Nôdar *was* according to the name of Nôdar, *son* of Mânûskêthar, from whom arose the race of Vistâsp.

CHAPTER XVII.

1. These were his tokens at birth:—One day, one of those five brothers of the Karaps saw Zaratûst, and he looked a long while upwards, downwards, *and* on all sides around².

2. Pôrûshaspô enquired thus: 'What *was* there when thou lookedst upwards, what when *thou* lookedst downwards, *and* what when thou lookedst on all sides?'³

3. And he replied thus, namely: 'When I looked upwards, it *was* for this reason, when I saw that our souls³ *that* go up to the sky, *will* go up to the best

¹ Compare Chap. XIII, 6; Dk. VII, ii, 70.

² Compare Dk. VII, iii, 27-30.

³ Assuming that the MS. gad, 'glory, or destiny,' has lost an initial n, with which it was originally nismd = Chald. נִשְׁמָה 'the soul;' as the copyists have not been aware of the existence of this Zvâris equivalent for rûbân, 'the soul,' for some centuries, it has been altered into gad, by the omission of its first letter, in nearly all but the very oldest existing MSS., such as K20 and M6 in Bd. XV, 3-5, and even there the medial m is really missing, though apparently existing in the final d; the irregularity of using s for sh is common in Pahlavi.

*existence*¹, owing to the words of this soul of mankind. 4. When I looked downwards, I saw that, owing to the action of this *one*, the demon and fiend, the wizard and witch become buried below the earth, *and* fall paralyzed back to hell. 5. And when I looked on all sides, I saw that the words of this *one will* extend through the whole earth; and when *they have* become as the law of the seven regions, each person is kept clothed *with* a robe (kapâh) of seven skins, in which the glory of the seven archangels *has* arisen.'

6. And Brâd-rûkhsh the Tûr went forth; when he went to the right side (arakö), Zaratûst hastened away to the left, and when he went to the left side, Zaratûst hastened to the right, and he is thereby concealed from Brâd-rûkhsh the Tûr, *who* has not met with him.

CHAPTER XVIII.

1. About his diverse want of participation (gvîd akhvêsth) with *his* parents this also is declared, that the demons, at an assembly of wizards, produced an outcry *for* a conference (ham-vâkô lâyisnô) thus: 'That son of Pôrûshaspô is senseless and foolish *and* secretly corrupted; no one, man *or* woman, *will* consider *or* accept *him as* exalted.'

2. The tidings came to Pôrûshaspô, and Pôrûshaspô spoke unto Zaratûst thus: 'I thought that I *had* begotten a son who *would* become a priest, a warrior, and a husbandman, and now thou

¹ The ordinary heaven; see Dd. XX, 3.

wouldst be foolish and secretly corrupted; thou shouldst proceed to the Karaps, so that they may cure *thee*.'

3. Zaratûst gave answer thus: 'I *am* *he* that is thy son, a priest, warrior, and husbandman.' 4. And, by command of Pôrûshaspô he harnessed two horses to a chariot (*vardînô*), and he went with Pôrûshaspô.

5. When they came to the place according to the decision of Pôrûshaspô, into the presence of one Karap of those said five brethren, that wizard took a cup and made water, and spoke thus: 'This he should drink who is a son of thine, so that he *may* become well;' and he acted with this conviction, that so he would change to the same nature as theirs.

6. Zaratûst spoke to Pôrûshaspô thus: 'Thou mayst give *it* back to him who is thy protector *and* high-priest;' and he arose (*âkhêgîd*)¹ and went back to *their* place.

7. On the way, Zaratûst gave *their* two horses water, on account of *their* thirst; and he thought thus: 'Unprofitable was my going to the residence of the Karaps, except *in* this manner, when, through giving water to the horses, my soul *was* then expanded.'

CHAPTER XIX.

1. About his interfering talk (*andarg-gôbisnôth*) with the iniquitous, this also is declared, that one

¹ T has 'he saluted (*nîyâyîd*).'¹ This legend has not yet been found elsewhere.

day Dûrêsrôbô¹ the Karap, as *it were* from the same five brethren, came out to the house of Pôrûshaspô; and Pôrûshaspô placed a bowl (*gâmakö*) of mare's milk before *him*, and spoke to him thus: 'Consecrate *it*.'

2. Zaratûst expostulated with Pôrûshaspô thus: 'I *will* consecrate *it*.' 3. Pôrûshaspô spoke thus: 'He should consecrate, and the grace is to be offered up by you²;' and as many as three times *they* mutually disputed.

4. *Then* up stood Zaratûst, and his right foot struck at the bowl and emptied it, and he spoke thus: 'I reverence righteousness, I reverence the righteous and the poor, men and women; do thou, O Pôrûshaspô! prepare a portion for him in whom *there* is worthiness.'

5. And Dûrêsrôbô spoke unto Zaratûst thus: 'As *some* of my portion of daily food was first thrown away by thee, it is I who *will* bring *it* on both thy lives, and *will* utterly destroy thee.' 6. Zaratûst spoke interruptingly³ thus: 'With complete mindfulness I *will* look upon thee with both eyes, and *will* utterly destroy thee.'

7. And, for a long time, they constantly looked, one at the other, with unshrinking gaze; *but* the divine nature of Zaratûst is victorious over the witchcraft of that *wizard*, and Dûrêsrôbô is further disturbed; he also asked for *his* horse and spoke thus: 'On account of this *boy*, *it* is impossible for me to stay.'

¹ So spelt in Zs., but Dûrâsrôbô in Dk.; also the former has always Pôrûshaspô, but the latter Pôrûshâspô. Compare the same legend in Dk. VII, iii, 34-45.

² Pahl. 'valâ aê yazêdô, alêd vâg dahisnô.'

³ Or 'inwardly.'

8. He sat upon the horse, *and* when he had gone a little *way*, he fell off from the horse, through severe distress, and died ; and the children of his children's children have died upon the same spot ¹.

CHAPTER XX.

1. About the righteousness of his desires *it* is thus declared, that when he became fifteen years old, the sons of Pôrûshaspô demanded a portion from *their* father, and their portions are allotted out by him. 2. Among the clothes *there* was a girdle, the width of which *was* four finger-breadths; and of the four ² portions around and the girdle, which it was possible to bring forth, Zaratûst selected *the latter* and tied *it* on himself. 3. This was owing to the precepts (parvânakân) of Vohûmanô who came into his reason at birth ; as to whatever is not the custom *his* mind *was* now quite closed, and in that which is the custom *it was* impetuously exercised by him.

4. About *his* compassionate disposition and the streams of the Arag province ³, this also is declared,

¹ Probably meaning that he died childless.

² The MSS. have 'three,' but there were five sons (Chap. XV, 5), and the numbers are written in ciphers which are very easily corrupted.

³ Pahl. 'Aragistân ôdhâvô (T dhâ)' = 'ôdhâ-î Arangîstânô' of P. Vd. I, 77 (Sp.); compare Av. 'upa aodhaêshu Rang, hayau,' of Vd. I, 19; Yt. XII, 18. In the Irânian Bd. XX, 8 we are told that 'the Arang river is that of which *it* is said that it comes out from Albûrz in the land of Sûrak, which they call also Sham (Shâm); and it passes on through the land of Êgiptôs, which they call also Misr, and there they call it the swift river Êgiptôdis.' It is

that *there* was a river, *and* from them the body of a naked woman floated, for the reason that, on account of the strength and swiftness of the river, a woman, except when she was quite naked while she *was* in it, was not able to pass; and an old person, such as he who is of seventy years *and* is called in revelation a Hânô¹, for want of power (*apâdîyâvandîh râî*), was not able to go back through it by his own strength. 5. Zaratûst came on to the bank of the water, *and* of women *and* old people seven persons had come, and are passed on by him, *in* the manner of a bridge²; it was an emblem of the *spiritual* performers³ of bridging work, that is, of those providing a passage to heaven.

6. About his liberal disposition *it* is declared, that the fodder of Pôrûshaspô, which was stored for the beasts of *burden*, *was* not *only* for the beasts of Pôrûshaspô in a scarcity, but *also* for distribution among the beasts of others, which, owing to their hunger on account of the scarcity, then constantly ate off the tails of each other; *and it was* given to them plentifully.

7. About his abandoning worldly desire, *and* his laying hold of righteousness of way, this, too, is declared, that when he became twenty years old, without the consent (*bên akâmakîh*) of *his* father and mother, he wandered forth *and* departed from

one of the two mythical rivers which were supposed to bound the Irânian world, and seems to represent the Aras as a northern and the Nile as a western boundary. Arang often becomes Arag in Pahlavi, just as sang becomes sag.

¹ Av. hanô in Vd. III, 19, 20; &c.

² Probably holding each other's hands.

³ The sacred beings who assist the righteous souls to pass over the *Kinvad* bridge.

their house, and openly enquired thus: 'Who is most desirous of righteousness *and* most nourishing the poor?' 8. And they spoke thus: 'He who is the youngest (kêhistô) son of Aûrvaitô-dih¹ the Tûr, who every day gives an iron caldron (*gâmak*), which is the height of a horse, full of bread and milk *and* other food, unto the poor.' 9. Zaratûst went on to that place, and with his co-operation, for the nourishment of the poor, some of the chief men performed duty by carrying forth food for the poor.

10. About his compassion, not only upon mankind, but also his other creatures, this, too, is declared, that a bitch *was* seen by him, which had given birth to five² puppies, and it was three days then that she *had* not obtained food³. 11. Whom-ever she saw, she then advanced her mouth towards him, and became as it were prostrated; Zaratûst provided a remedy, *by* swiftly bringing up bread for her, *but* when *he was* bringing it she had expired.

12. About his own desire for the good quality⁴ of a wife, on account also of the will of *his* parents, *and his* not mingling his own seed before a suitable obtainment, this, too, is declared, that when his father sought a wife for him, Zaratûst argued with the bride (nêshâ) thus: 'Show me thy face, so that I may find out (barkhâm) its kind of appearance, *and* this, too, whether its appearance *be* undesirable, or shall not be gratifying;' and the bride turned away her face from him. 13. And Zaratûst spoke thus:

¹ See Dk. VII, iv, 7 n.

² T has 'seven,' but this difference may have arisen from an erroneous mode of writing the ciphers in T.

³ T has 'a bone for food.'

⁴ T has 'good child-bearing.'

‘Whoever takes away a sight from me, does not practise respect for me.’

14. About his *having* accepted progress even from the iniquitous, *that* listened sinfully desirous, who accepted so much advantageousness as *was* manifest, this, too, is declared, that he came into an assembly who were well known in the place for much knowledge, and he enquired of them thus: ‘What is most favourable for the soul?’ 15. And they spoke thus: ‘To nourish the poor, to give fodder to cattle, to bring firewood to the fire, to pour Hô-m-juice into water, and¹ to worship many demons with words, with the words which are called revelation (dênô).’ 16. Then Zaratûst nourished the poor, foddered the cattle, brought firewood to the fire, and squeezed Hô-m into water, *but* never are any demons whatever worshipped with words *by* Zaratûst.

CHAPTER XXI.

1. About his coming to thirty years of age *it is* thus declared, that *on* the lapse of thirty years onwards from *his* appearance, *on* the day Anêrân of the month Spendarmad², he had proceeded in that direction *in* which *there* occurred the so-called festival of spring (*gasnô-i vahâr*)³, forty-five days beyond

¹ T inserts ‘not’ here, which is clearly wrong, and must have been introduced by some copyist who did not observe that the assembly, though learned, was sinful; and that the object of the anecdote is to exhibit Zaratûst’s ability to distinguish between good works and sin, when still untaught by the sacred beings.

² On the last day of the twelfth Parsi month.

³ The Maidhyôzaremayâ season-festival, held on the fifteenth day of the second Parsi month.

new-year's day, *at* a place become specially noted, where people went, from many quarters, out to the place of festival (*gasnōkâr*).

2. When Zaratûst, for the sake of going off to the festival place, halted on the way in walking, he chanced upon a solitary (*aêvatâk*) plain, and he saw, in a vision, that mankind and a much-adorned worldly *existence were* kept away to the north, so that all the people in the earth have become fully manifest in the north. 3. And he at the head (*pavan têkh*) of them *was* Mêdyômâh, son of Ârâstâi¹, *even* as Ârâstâi was brother of Pôrûshaspô²; Mêdyômâh *was* the leader of all mankind *who* have gone out to the presence of Zaratûst, and he became *their* guide, so that first Mêdyômâh *and* afterwards the whole material existence are attracted.

4. And about his coming out to the conference, *on* the lapse of those forty-five days, *at* the place of festival *at* dawn *on* the day Dadvô³-pavan-Mitrô of the month *Ardavahistô*. 5. And Zaratûst, for the purpose of squeezing the Hôm, went forth to the bank of the water of the Dâltih, because it is the river⁴ of the conference for the supremacy (*patih*) of Zaratûst, *and* is the water of *Âvân*⁵ which has consisted of four channels (*bêtâ*). 6. Zaratûst also

¹ See Yt. XIII, 95.

² So Mêdyômâh was first cousin of Zaratûst, and became his first convert; see also Chap. XXIII, 1.

³ The Pahlavi letters represent Av. *dadhvau*, 'creator'; compare the Khvârizmian name ددو of the fifteenth day of the month in Sachau's *Albîrûnî*, p. 57, l. 35. The date here given is the fifteenth of the second month, as in § 1.

⁴ Assuming that *rud* stands for *rûd*.

⁵ Probably Anâhita, the female spirit of pure water, mentioned by her title *Arêdvisûr* in Chap. XVI, 3.

passed on through it; and its first *channel* was up to the ankle¹, the second up to the knee, the third up to the parting of the two thighs, and the fourth up to the neck. 7. This was an indicator that his religion comes four times to supremacy; the manifestations of which are through Zaratûst, Aûshêdar, Aûshêdar-mâh, and Sôshâns².

8. When he came up from the water, and put on his clothes, he then saw the archangel Vohûmanô³ in the form (âyûtnakô) of a man, handsome, brilliant, and elegant, who wore his hair curve-tailed⁴, because the curved tail is an indication of duality; *who* had put on *and* wore a dress like silk, than which *there* was no making anything superior, for it was light itself; and his height was nine *times* as much as *that* of Zaratûst.

9. He also enquired of Zaratûst⁵ thus: 'Who mayst thou be, and from whom of them mayst thou be? also what is mostly thy desire, and the endeavour in thy existence?' 10. And he replied thus: 'I am Zaratûst of the Spîtâmas; among the existences righteousness is more *my* desire, and my wish is that I *may* become aware *of* the will of the sacred beings, and *may* practise so much righteousness as they exhibit to me in the pure existence.'

11. And Vohûmanô directed Zaratûst⁶ thus: 'Do

¹ Literally 'up to the leg (zang).'

² The past and future apostles of Zoroastrianism. For the last three, see Dk. VII, ix-xi.

³ Compare Dk. VII, iii, 51-54.

⁴ Assuming that vagdumak is a variant of the usual gagdûmak. The scorpion (vagdum) would be a sign of duality, as, being a noxious creature, it was produced by the evil spirit Aharman.

⁵ Compare Dk. VII, iii, 55-59.

⁶ Compare *ibid.* iii, 60-62.

thou proceed to an assembly of the spirits!’ 12. As much as Vohûmanô walked on in nine steps, Zaratûst *did* in ninety steps, and when he had gone ninety steps farther than him, he saw the assembly of the seven archangels. 13. When he came within twenty-four feet of the archangels, he then did not see his own shadow on the ground, on account of the great brilliancy of the archangels; the position of the assembly was in Irân, and in the direction of the districts on the bank of the water of the Dâîtth. 14. Zaratûst offered homage, and spoke thus: ‘Homage to Aûharmazd, and homage to the archangels!’ *and* he went forward *and* sat down in the seat of the enquirers.

15. As to the asking of questions by Zaratûst, he enquired of Aûharmazd thus: ‘In the embodied world which is the first of the perfect ones, which the second, *and* which the third?’ 16. And Aûharmazd replied thus: ‘The first perfection is good thoughts, the second good words, *and* the third good deeds.’

17. Zaratûst also enquired thus: ‘Which *thing* is good, which is better¹, and which is the best of all habits?’ 18. *And* Aûharmazd replied thus: ‘The title² of the archangels is good, the sight of them is better, and carrying out their commands is the best of all habits.’

19. Afterwards he demonstrated the duality of the original evolutions (bûn gastânô)³, and the divergence in each control, *and* spoke thus: ‘Of those spirits, he who *was* wicked preferred the

¹ Both MSS. have ‘worse’ here.

² This title, ameshaspenta, is ‘immortal benefactor.’

³ The two prime movers in creation.

practice which is iniquitous (Aharman's desire was *for* the practice which is iniquitous), *and* the spirit of righteousness, the propitious (Aûharmazd) prefers righteousness¹. 20. Specially he demonstrated the divergence in each control of the exhibitors of light, and he spoke thus: 'Neither our thoughts², nor desires, nor words, nor deeds, nor religion, nor spiritual faculties *agree*³; *he* who is loving light, his place is with the luminaries; *and he* who is loving darkness is with the dark ones⁴.'

21. On the same day also, his omniscient wisdom appeared three times: as regards the same first questions, it pointed out the sky in great light and splendour, and in its exhibition *of* the prevention *of* darkness, at the sight of which *it becomes* an opposing existence as regards that darkness. 22. And it exhibited its own appearance proportionally *to* the sky, when it kept its head at the summit of the sky, *its* feet at the bottom of the sky, and *its* hands reached to both sides of the sky; the sky also kept *it* covered, in the manner of a garment.

23. The six archangels⁵ were manifest by their similar stature (ham-basnîh), in such manner that it is obvious each one successively is apparently one finger's *breadth* shorter than the other. 24. The archangels exhibited three kinds *of* achievement

¹ Quoted from Pahl. Yas. XXX, 5 ab. The words in parentheses are glosses inserted by the Pahlavi translator.

² Both MSS. have 'spirits' by inserting a stroke in the middle of the Pahlavi word.

³ An imperfect quotation, omitting glosses, from Pahl. Yas, XLIV, 2 cde (Sp.).

⁴ A similar idea is expressed in Vd. XIX, 30, but the Pahlavi version of half of it is lost,

⁵ Apart from Aûharmazd, their president.

(pasâkhtan)¹ for the religion; first, *by* means of fires, and Zaratûst walked three steps on *them*, with *the words*, 'good thoughts, good words, and good deeds,' and *was* not burnt; and secondly, hot metal is poured on to *his* chest, cooled thereby, and, grasping *it* with *his* hand, he held *it* for the archangels. 25. Aûharmazd spoke thus: 'After *the establishment* of the pure religion, when a dispute occurs in the religion, those who are thy disciples *will* pour *it* on to a spiritual lord, they *will* take *it* up with the hand, and *will* thoroughly believe in him who is over the whole embodied existence.' 26. The third *was* cutting with a knife, *and* the vital parts (ahvôn) becoming visible, which are inside the abdomen, *with* a flowing forth of blood; and, after the hands are rubbed over *it*, it became healed. 27. And this is pointed out, namely: 'Thy and thy correlative religionists' accepting of the pure religion is, as to the steadfast *in* other religions, such that, through such-like burning of fire, pouring of hot metal, and through an operation with a sharp instrument, *there* is no perversion from the good religion.'

CHAPTER XXII.

1. About the seven questionings (7-frasnôth), with reference to religion, of the seven archangels, *which* occurred in seven places².

2. For the occurrence of the first questioning³, that of Aûharmazd, the person of Zaratûst, who *was*

¹ By way of ordeal, a relic of the old faith in incantation.

² Compare Dk. VIII, xiv, 5, 6, 9.

³ This has been narrated in the preceding chapter.

the upholder of Aûharmazd, came out to a conference on the bank of the water of Dâtîh¹.

3. For the occurrence of the second, *which* is Vohûmanô's, five animals out of the five species² which are the worldly tokens of Vohûmanô, have come with Zaratûst to a conference on Hûgar and Aûsind³; and on that day also, before their coming out to the conference, *their* tongues are fully liberated *and* spoke with human words. 4. And among the rest⁴ is a fish of one species, Arzuvâ⁵ *by* name; of those in burrows (khanôlgânô) *are* the white ermine *and* white marten; of the flying creatures (vâyan-dagân) *is* the Karsipt⁶, a bird like a species of water-fowl; of the wide-travellers (farâkhvô-raftârânô) *is* the hare which is showing wild beasts the way to the water; and of those suitable for grazing (karakô-argânlgân) *is* the white ass-goat; with human words they also accepted the religion from Aûharmazd. 5. With the chieftainship of the five species they are intrusted, so that the like animals also, with their own voices, *and* as much as their knowledge is capable, shall recount the powerfulness *of* the religion.

¹ See Dk. VII, iii, 51, 54.

² These species, which are named in § 4, are those mentioned in the Avesta, Visp. I, 1.

³ Av. Hukairya of Yt. XII, 24, and Us-hindu of Yt. VIII, 32, described in Bd. XII, 5, 6, as two neighbouring mountains, for the pure water of Arêdvisûr falls from the summit of Hûgar to Aûsind which stands in the circumambient ocean.

⁴ The remainder of K 35, the MS. brought by Westergaard from Kirmân, is lost; but an old copy of it (BK, see the Introduction) exists in Bombay, which supplies the missing text, as an authority independent of T.

⁵ See Bd. XIV, 26; apparently the same as the Ariz, or Kar, the chief of fish, *ibid.* XVIII, 3, 5; XXIV, 13.

⁶ See Bd. XIV, 23; XIX, 16; XXIV, 11.

6. And freedom from assault, exemption from persecution, and proper maintenance of the five species of animals, *were* prescribed by him ¹ to Zaratûst with seemingly very awful admonition.

7. For the occurrence of the third questioning, which is *Ardavahistô's*, the spirits of the fires have come out with Zaratûst to a conference at the Tôgân water ²; and, in that questioning, care for the proper maintenance of the Varahrân fire ³, and the propitiation of all fires, is explained to him.

8. For the occurrence of the fourth questioning, which is *Shatvêr's*, the spirits of the metals have come with Zaratûst to a conference at Sarâî ⁴, a settlement on the Mîvân ⁴; *and he was* fully admonished about various proper preservations of the metals, *and as to* not producing warlike accoutrements of gold.

9. For the occurrence of the fifth questioning, which is *Spendarmad's*, the spirits of the regions, frontiers, stations (aûstâmân), settlements (rûdastâkân), and districts, as many as were desirable, have come out with Zaratûst to a conference *where* there is a spring (khânîgô-aê) which comes out from the Asnavad mountain ⁵, *and* goes into the Dâitîh, like those of Satavês who is blowing the Pâîrîgs ⁶. 10. And *Zaratûst was* also thus ad-

¹ By Vohûmanô, as the protector of useful animals.

² Possibly the Tegend river, the Zend or Zôndak of Bd. XX, 7, 15.

³ The Bahrâm, or sacred fire at places of worship.

⁴ Names not clearly identified, and readings uncertain.

⁵ In Âtûr-pâtakân, and the Gûsnasp, fire was established upon it (see Bd. XII, 2, 26; XVII, 7).

⁶ Pahl. 'Satavês-i Pâîrîg damânô ânô kîgûn.' Referring probably to Yt. VIII, 8, 9. Satavês is the *southern* chieftain of the stars, as correctly stated in the Irânian Bûndahis (compare Bd. II, 7; XIII, 12); and the Pâîrîgs are meteors.

monished by her, about the care and propitiation of the earth: that each district is *to be* intrusted *to* a faithful testifier (*gôkâs-i vâvar*), each settlement *to* a judge acquainted with the law, *each* station *to* an officiating priest (*magôpatô*) of just intentions, *and* each frontier *to* a pure priestly authority (*radô*); over all is proclaimed the councillor of the spirits, the supreme priest (*magôpatânô magôpatô*), and through him the sovereignty of *Aûhar mazd* is provided.

11. For the occurrence of the sixth questioning, which is *Khûrdad's*, the spirits of seas *and* rivers have come with *Zaratûst* to a conference at the *Asnavad* mountain¹, and he *was* told about the care and propitiation of water.

12. For the occurrence of the seventh questioning, which is *Amûrdad's*, the spirits of plants have come out with *Zaratûst* to a conference on the precipitous bank of the *Darega*², on the bank (*bâr*) of the water of *Dâtîth*, and different places; and he *was* informed about the care *and* propitiation of plants.

13. The seven questionings are explained within the length of these winters, which are *of* five months, *and* within ten years³.

¹ See § 9.

² Pahl. 'pavan Daregân zbâr' = Av. 'Dregya paiti zbarahi' of Vd. XIX, 4; a mythical river in *Aîrân-vêg*, where *Pôrûshaspô* resided (Bd. XX, 32).

³ The Pahlavi is rather vague, but it is clear that *Zaratûst* starts for his conference at thirty years of age (Chap. XXI, 1), returns from it ten years later (Chap. XXIII, 1), and the conversion of *Vistâsp* occupies two years longer (Chap. XXIII, 5), occurring when *Zaratûst* was forty-two years old and thirty-five years before his passing away at the age of seventy-seven (Chap. XXIII, 9).

At this point another dislocation of text occurs in all existing

CHAPTER XXIII.

1. On the completion of revelation, that is, at the end of the ten years, Mēdyômâh, son of Ârâstâl, became faithful to Zaratûst.

2. Afterwards, on *having* obtained *his* requests¹, he came back to the conference of Aûharmazd, and he spoke thus: 'In ten years *only* one man *has been* attracted by me.' 3. And Aûharmazd spoke thus: '*There will be* days when so few *are* not attracted by you, who *are* themselves the occasion of the resurrection of the world; when, apart from Dahâk², the beneficence of the formation of the renovation *of the universe* attracts every one besides, and the impenitence of Dahâk is destroyed.'

4. When he came out from the presence of Aûharmazd, with the same paradox, he thereby indicated his religion *as* complete to Spendarmad through *his* intelligence.

5. In the two years after that³, the Kavigs *and*

MSS., owing to the accidental interpolation of three loose folios of another text, between this chapter and the next, in some unknown copy written before 1530. In the MSS. the text is written continuously, without division into chapters. But the connection of this chapter with the next one, which is here restored to its proper position, is clearly shown by the reference to the 'ten years' of conference, with which this chapter ends, and the next one begins. The accidentally interpolated text is here classified as Chaps. XXIV and XXV, but its real connections have not yet been traced.

¹ That is, the replies of the archangels to his enquiries.

² See Dk. VII, i, 26. He was chained by Frêdûn in Mount Dimâvand, to escape in the latter days, to be slain by Keresâsp, and to be specially punished at the resurrection (Bd. XII, 31; XXX, 16; Byt. III, 55-61).

³ See Dk. VII, iv, 2.

Karaps of Vistâsp, *in* the manner of opponents (hamêstarânîh), propounded thirty-three enquiries (khvâstakö)¹ to him, so that *by* command of Vistâsp he became the explainer of those thirty-three enquiries. 6. Of the thirty-three habits² of iniquity, come for opposition to the religion of the sacred beings; of the declaration, by revelation, of those thirty-three indications of fetters³; *and* of the restraint of the thirty-three iniquitous practices by the thirty-three best good works, *there are* statements in revelation. 7. Including the acceptance of the religion *by* Vistâsp from Zaratûst, after the redemonstration of its judicially multiform prophecy and spiritual character, which are looked into through the evidence of three speakers about *them*, the archangels who, with worldly manifestation, have become apparent unto Vistâsp and *his* councillors *and* mighty ones; *they* are Vohûmanô, Arda-vahistô, and the Bûrzîn-Mitrô fire⁴.

8. About the reward which *existed* before the beneficence of Zaratûst, and *its* being seen how, through guidance by Aûharmazd, *it* is demonstrated by him to those of the world, so that Mêdyômâh is attracted in the tenth year in the forest of reedy hollows (kanyâstânö⁵ vêsakö) which is the haunt of swine of the wild-boar *species* (khazûrâ-î varâzö gâs); in the twentieth year the Kavîg who is son

¹ See Dk. VII, iv, 67.

² Reading sôn = Pers. sân; but the MSS. have dênô, 'religions.' The thirty sins and thirty-three good works, detailed in Mkh. XXXVI, XXXVII, are certainly referred to at the end of this section.

³ Compare Chap. XII, 5, and Dk. VII, iv, 67.

⁴ See Dk. VII, iv, 74.

⁵ Hybrid Zvâris of Pers. nayistân.

of Kûndah¹ is attracted; in the thirtieth year the Khyôns² arrive, who make an incursion (*vardakö*) into the countries of Irân, owing to the Kavîgs, those who *are* more of their own race; and in the fortieth year Vohûnêm, son of Avarôstar³, is born.

9. In the forty-seventh year Zaratûst passes away, who attains seventy-seven years and forty days in the month *Ardavahistô*, *on* the day Khûr⁴; *and* for eight rectified (*vêhikakö*) months, till the month Dadvô and day Khûr, he should be brought *forward* as to be revered.

10. *In* the same month *Ardavahistô*, in the sixty-third⁵ year, Frashôstar⁶ passed away, and in the sixty-fourth *year* Gâmâsp⁷, *the same* as became the priest of priests after Zaratûst; in the seventy-third year Hangâûrûsh, son of Gâmâsp⁸; in the eightieth year Asmôk-khanvatô⁹, and *also* in the eightieth

¹ Or Kûnîh which is the name of a demon (see Sg. XVI, 13, 16, 18, 19); but such an identification is uncertain.

² Av. *Hvyaona* of Yt. IX, 30, 31; XVII, 50, 51. Compare Dk. VII, iv, 77, 83, 84, 87-90; v, 7.

³ Av. gen. 'Vohu-nemang,hô Avâraostrôis' of Yt. XIII, 104.

⁴ The eleventh day of the second month.

⁵ T has 43d, and the date is lost in the other MS. authority. But 43d is highly improbable for two reasons: first, it would make this date the only one out of chronological order in the series here given; secondly, it would render it inconsistent with the statement, in Dk. VII, vi, 12, that two priests came, from other regions, to ask Frashôstar about the religion, fifty-seven years after it had been accepted by Zaratûst. By substituting 63d (the Pahlavi cipher most likely to be corrupted into 43d) both these inconsistencies are removed.

⁶ See Dk. VII, vi, 12; V, ii, 12.

⁷ See Dk. V, ii, 12; iii, 4.

⁸ Av. gen. 'Hang,haurushô Gâmâspanahê' of Yt. XIII, 104.

⁹ Av. gen. 'Asmô-hvanvatô' of Yt. XIII, 96, and Westergaard's Yt. XXII, 37.

year Kabad-ûs-spâê¹, who is called also Akht the wizard, is killed.

11. Of the six great upholders of the religion there are the two daughters of Zaratûst, whose names are Frênö and Sritö², *with* Aharûbö-stôtö, *son* of Mêdyômâh³, and another three, who *are* renowned for their religion for a hundred years, who are Vohûnêm⁴ that is born in the fortieth year of the religion, Sênô⁵ is *afterwards* born and passes away in the two-hundredth year, *and* as to his hundred-discipledom⁶, it exists day and night till the three-hundredth year. 12. Afterwards the religion is disturbed and the monarchy is contested (*gangt-aîtö*).

13. About the three customs (*dâdö*) which Zaratûst prescribed as the best:—The first of them is this: 'Do not go without others, except with magisterial authority (*apatkâr radîhâ*);' the second is: 'Though they shall proceed unlawfully as to you, consider *your* actions lawfully beforehand;' *and* the third is: 'Next-of-kin marriage, for the

¹ As kabad is Zvâris for 'many,' we may assume that kabad-ûs = Av. nom. *pourus* which usually becomes *pouru* in compounds; so that the compound name, or title, in the text, probably represents Av. *Pouruspâdha* (Yt. X, 109, 111), 'having many troops,' a suitable title for Akht the wizard (Av. *Akhtya* of Yt. V, 82) who is said, in Gf. I, 2, to have invaded a district with an army of seven myriads. He was killed, in Zoroastrian fashion, by the recital of a religious formula.

² There was a third daughter, *Pôrukîst* (see Bd. XXXII, 5), but she may not have survived her father.

³ Av. gen. 'Ashastvô Maidhyôî-maung,hôis' of Yt. XIII, 106.

⁴ See § 8.

⁵ He was born in the 100th year; see Dk. VII, vii, 6.

⁶ This seems to be the sixth upholder of the religion, the third of those lasting about a century.

sake of the pure progress of *your* race, is the best *of* the actions of the living, which *are* provided for the proper begetting of children ¹.'

CHAPTER XXIV.

1. About the five dispositions of priests, and the ten admonitions with which all instruction as to religion is connected ².

2. Of those five dispositions the first is innocence.

3. The second is discrimination among³ thoughts, words, and deeds; [to fully distinguish the particulars of destruction from indestructiveness, *such* as

¹ This chapter ends the first series of Selections of Zâd-spāram, and is immediately followed in the MSS. by a second series. It is evident from the extent of this chapter, as compared with the amount of text contained in the three misplaced folios (see p. 162, n. 3), that this chapter could have occupied only about one folio and a half in the dislocated MS., so that the second series must have commenced on the same folio as contained the end of this chapter, and that Chaps. XXIV, XXV cannot have belonged to this series. The three misplaced folios contain two distinct texts; the first (Chap. XXIV) is an Irânian version of the Five Dispositions of priests and the Ten Admonitions, and is here translated; the second (Chap. XXV) contains some details about the Nasks and Gâthas, and has been already translated in S.B.E., vol. xxxvii, pp. 401-405.

² This Irânian version of the Dispositions and Admonitions is more complete than the Indian version, which, like the Bundahis, was brought from Irân five or six centuries ago, and is found in two MSS. (Pt. and J) written in India about 500 years ago, and now in the libraries of Dastûrs Dr. Peshotan and Dr. Jâmâsp, respectively. Passages which occur only in the Irânian version are here enclosed in brackets, and other differences between the two versions are mentioned in the notes.

³ The Indian version has 'of.'

noxious creatures from cattle ; and of production from unproductiveness, *such* as the righteous *and* worthy from the wicked *and* unworthy].

4. The third is authoritativeness, because that priestly master is always wiser and speaking more correctly who is taught wisely and teaches with more correct words.

5. The fourth is to¹ [understand *and* consider the ceremonial as the ceremonial of Aûharmazd, *and* the essentials with all goodness, beneficence, *and* authority; to be steadfast in his religion, and to consider the indications of protection (sâyag)² which are established for his religion. 6. To maintain the reverence of the luminaries prayerfully, *also* the reverence of the emanations³ *from* the six⁴ *archangels*, be they fire, be they earth, *or* be they of bodily form, and of the creatures *which* are formed by them ; also the pure cleansing from dead matter, menstruation, bodily refuse, and other hurtfulness ; this is in order that they *may* be characterised, and thereby constituted, *as* better-principled, more sensible⁵, and purer, and they *may* become less faulty. 7. The reverence of mankind is to consider authoritatively about knowledge *and* property ; the reverence of cattle is *about* fodder, little hardship, and moderate maintenance ; the reverence of plants is *about* sowing and ripening for the food of the worthy. 8. The ceremonial which is glorifying all

¹ Ind. vers. has only: 'to celebrate the ceremonial of the sacred beings with the correct words, inward prayers, and complete mastery of the text (narm-nasgîhâ) in the ritual.' It omits §§ 6-8 altogether.

² T has 'limit (kûstak).'

³ T has 'issue.'

⁴ T has 'seven.'

⁵ Or 'more fragrant ;' hû-bôdtar has both meanings.

the sacred beings, praises the luminaries *and* worldly creations improperly, and is antagonistic to them, because complete glorification is proper through complete recitation of the ritual; and the ceremonial of any one whatever is his own proper duty professionally, so long as it is possible to keep proceeding with very little sinfulness].

9. The fifth is to struggle prayerfully¹, day and night, with *your* own fiend², *and all* life long not to depart from steadfastness, nor allow *your* proper duty³ *to go* out of *your* hands.

10. And the first of those ten admonitions is to proceed with good repute, for the sake of occasioning approving remarks *as to*⁴ the good repute of *your* own guardian *and* teacher, high-priest *and* master⁵.

11. The second is to become awfully refraining from evil repute, for the sake of evil repute not occurring *to* relations and guardians.

12. The third is not to beat *your* own teacher with a snatched-up stick, and not to bring scandal upon his name, for the sake of annoying him, by *uttering* that which *was* not heard from *your* own teacher.

13. The fourth is *that* whatever is taught liberally by *your* own teacher, *you have* to deliver back to the worthy, for the sake of not extorting a declaration of renown from the righteous⁶.

14. The fifth is *that* the reward of doers of good

¹ Ind. vers. has: 'to remain in diligence intelligently.'

² Ind. vers. has: 'opponent.'

³ Ind. vers. has: 'steadfastness in religion, and to be diligent in *your* proper duty.' But it omits the rest of the sentence.

⁴ Ind. vers. has: 'for the sake of the appropriateness of.'

⁵ Or 'father.'

⁶ T has: 'not extracting the purity of the righteous.'

works *and* the punishment of criminals *have to be* established by law, for the sake of progress¹.

15. The sixth is to keep the way of the good open to *your* house, for the sake of making² righteousness welcome in *your* own abode.

16. The seventh is *that*, for the sake of not developing the fiend insensibly in *your* reason, *you are* not to keep *it* with the religion of the good³, nor to remain in impenitence of sin.

17. The eighth⁴ is *that*, for the sake of severing the fiend from the reason, *you have* to force malice *away* from *your* thoughts, and to become quickly repentant of sin.

18. The ninth is to fully understand the forward movement⁵ of the religion, also to keep the advancing of the religion further forwards, and to seek *your* share of duty therein; and on a backward movement, when adversity happens to the religion, to have the religion back again, and to keep *your* body in the continence (makavadîh) of religion.

19. The tenth is *that there is* to be a period of obedience (Srôshdârîh) towards the ruler and priestly authority, the high-priesthood of the religious⁶.

¹ Ind. vers. adds: 'of religion.'

² Ind. vers. inserts: 'a token of;,' and T has: 'making the righteousness of the sacred beings in writing welcome.'

³ Ind. vers. has: 'not to maintain malice with the good,' which is more probable, and kênô, 'malice,' is easily corrupted into dênô, 'religion,' in Pahlavi writing.

⁴ This eighth admonition is omitted in the Irânian MSS.

⁵ Ind. vers. adds: 'and backward movement.'

⁶ Chapter XXV, about the three divisions of revelation, is translated in S. B. E., vol. xxxvii, pp. 401-405.

INDEX.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. The references, in this index, are to books, chapters, and sections ; the chapters being denoted by the larger ciphers.

2. Though different forms of the same name may occur in the text, only one form is usually given in the index, to which the references to all forms are attached ; except when the forms differ so much as to be widely separated in the index.

3. Pâzand forms are printed in italics, as their orthography is usually corrupt. In all such italicised names any letters which would elsewhere be italic are printed in roman type.

4. Abbreviations used are :—Av. for Avesta, Dk. for *Dînkard*, Int. for Introduction, m. for mountain, meas. for measure, MS. for manuscript, n. for footnote, Pahl. for Pahlavi, patron. for patronymic, r. for river, Zs. for Selections of *Zâd-spâram*.

INDEX.

- Abâliş, heretic, Dk. V, 1, 2 n.
 Âbân, month, Int. 87.
 Aeshm, demon, Dk. VII, 1, 18; 4, 87, 88; 7, 7.
 Aêvatâk, r., Dk. VII, 3, 51.
 Agash, demon, Dk. VII, 4, 12.
 Aharişvang, angel, Dk. VII, 7, 12.
 Aharman, demon, Int. 13, 29; Dk. VII, 11, 7; V, 2, 6; Zs. 14, 6, 8; 21, 8 n, 19.
 Aharûbô-stôtô, man, Zs. 23, 11.
 Ahunavair, Int. 16, 30, 48, 49; Dk. VII, 1, 12, 13; 4, 38, 42, 45, 80.
 Ahûrvadâspô, man, Zs. 13, 6.
 Âîrân-vêg, land, Dk. VII, 2, 30 n; 8, 60; 9, 23.
 Âîrîk, man, Dk. VII, 2, 70; Zs. 13, 6;—prince, Dk. VII, 1, 28-30; 2, 70; V, 4, 3; Zs. 13, 6.
Airyak, man, Dk. VII, 2, 70; Zs. 13, 6.
 Âiryêfshnîg, man, Dk. VII, 1, 34 n.
 Âiryêfshvâ, man, Dk. VII, 1, 34.
 Akhrê-khiradô, prince, Dk. V, 3, 3.
 Akht, wizard, Int. 55; Zs. 23, 10.
 Akômanô, demon, Zs. 14, 8-11.
 Akvân, Christian priest, Dk. VII, 7, 11 n.
 Alâk or Arâk, district, Dk. VII, 2, 9.
 Albîrûnî, Int. 74, 86-88.
 Albûrz, m., Zs. 20, 4 n.
 Ameshaspentas, Int. 89.
 Amûrdad, angel, Dk. VII, 2, 19; 5, 9; Zs. 22, 12.
 Anâhita, angel, Zs. 21, 5 n.
Anang, bad, man, Dk. VII, 2, 70; Zs. 13, 6.
 Anêrân, day, Zs. 21, 1.
 Aôshnar, priest, Int. 3; Dk. VII, 1, 36.
 Arabs, Int. 10; Dk. VII, 1, 34; 8, 47.
 Arab victories, Int. 61.
 Arag, land, Zs. 20, 4.
 Arang, r., Zs. 20, 4 n.
 Arang, woman, Dk. VII, 8, 55; 9, 18; 10, 15.
 Ârâstâi, man, Zs. 21, 3; 23, 1.
 Archangels, Int. 4, 10, 11, 15, 18, 19, 29, 35, 48, 49, 55, 61; Dk. VII, 1, 4, 7, 12, 13, 34; 2, 16, 18, 21, 22, 34, 39, 54; 3, 51; 4, 5, 22, 26, 75, 76, 80, 83; 5, 12; 6, 5, 13; 7, 19, 20; 8, 5, 26 n, 60; 9, 23; V, 2, 1, 12; Zs. 17, 5; 21, 8, 12-14, 18, 23, 24; 22, 1; 23, 2 n, 7.
 Archdemons, Int. 4, 29.
 Ardâi-fravard, angel, Zs. 16, 3.
 Ardashîr the Sāsānian, Int. 43, 57, 58, 62, 88.
 Ardavahistô, angel, Int. 41; Dk. VII, 2, 19, 29; Zs. 22, 7; 23, 7; month, Zs. 21, 4; 23, 9, 10.
 Arêdvisûr, angel, Zs. 16, 3; 21, 5 n.
 Aregad-aspa, king, Int. 30.
Aregadbarsn, man, Dk. VII, 2, 70; Zs. 13, 6.
 Aresh, demon, Int. 29.
 Arezrâspô, priest, Dk. VII, 6, 12.
 Arezvâk, priest, Dk. VII, 7, 8-11.
 Argâsp, king, Int. 7, 29, 55; Dk. VII, 4, 77, 83, 84, 87-89; 5, 7; V, 2, 12 n; 3, 1.
 Aristotle, Int. 71.
 Ariyârâmma, ruler, Int. 70.
 Ariz, fish, Zs. 22, 4 n.
 Armenian revolt, Int. 61.
 Arshâma, ruler, Int. 70.
 Artakhshatar, king, Int. 9; Dk. VII, 7, 12; V, 3, 3.
 Arûm = Asia Minor, Dk. V, 1, 5.
 Arûman, nation, Dk. VII, 8, 47.
 Arzuva, fish, Zs. 22, 4.
 Ashavahistô, angel, Int. 11, 48, 55; Dk. VII, 1, 34; 2, 17, 18, 24, 25; 4, 74, 75, 78, 84-86; 8, 5 n; 9, 8; V, 2, 9.
 Ashem-vohû, Int. 49; Dk. VII, 4, 80 n.

- Ashir-vanguhi, angel, Dk. VII, 4, 81 n.
- Askânian, dynasty, Int. 43, 57.
- Asnavad, m., Zs. 22, 9, 11.
- Āspigân, patron., Dk. VII, 1, 25; 2, 70; V, 4, 3; Zs. 13, 6.
- Assyria, land, Dk. V, 4, 3 n.
- Atossa, queen, Dk. VII, 4, 86 n.
- Ātûr, land, Dk. V, 4, 3.
- Ātûr-farnbag, priest, Int. 14; Dk. V, 1, 2, 3.
- Ātûrpâd, priest, Int. 9, 64-67, 70, 88; Dk. VII, 5, 5; 7, 19-21; V, 3, 3.
- Ātûrpâdakân, land, Zs. 16, 12; 22, 9 n.
- Aûharmazd, Int. 4-6, 18, 29, 30, 47, 48; Dk. VII, 1, 1, 2, 4, 5, 9-13, 17, 20-22, 38, 41, 42, 44, 46; 2, 2, 3, 14, 17-19, 31, 37, 47, 54; 3, 1, 48, 49, 51; 4, 2, 12, 14, 16, 17, 21-27, 30, 41, 47-49, 51-54, 65, 66, 74, 75, 77, 80, 84-86; 5, 12; 6, 5, 13; 7, 15; 8, 16 n, 24, 25, 29, 33, 38-43, 50, 52, 54; 9, 15, 17; 10, 12, 14; 11, 6, 11; V, 1, 1; 2, 6, 8, 10, 12, 15; 4, 6; Zs. 12, 2, 8; 13, 5, 6; 14, 4, 9, 14, 15; 15, 7; 16, 3; 21, 14-16, 18, 19, 23 n, 25; 22, 2, 4, 10; 23, 2-4, 8; 24, 5.
- king, Int. 64.
- Auramazdâ, Int. 84.
- Aurvadaspa, king, Int. 70.
- Āurvâtâ-dang, king, Int. 6, 47, 49, 55; Dk. VII, 4, 7-10, 14-16, 20.
- Āurvâtô-dih, king, Zs. 20, 8.
- Āûshân-rûd, r., Dk. VII, 3, 54.
- Āûshêdar, apostle, Int. 10, 11, 55, 61, 63, 66-68; Dk. VII, 1, 42, 51, 52; 4, 81 n; 8, 1, 31, 51, 55; 9, 1, 2; 10, 1; V, 2, 15; 3, 3; Zs. 21, 7.
- Āûshêdar-mâh, apostle, Int. 11, 12, 55; Dk. VII, 1, 42, 52, 53; 9, 1, 18; 10, 1, 2; 11, 1, 2; V, 2, 15; 3, 3; Zs. 21, 7.
- Āûsikshh, Int. 16; Zs. 15, 2.
- Āûsind, m., Zs. 22, 3.
- Āûzôbb, king, Int. 55; Dk. VII, 1, 31; 6, 11 n; V, 4, 4 n.
- Āwân, angel, Zs. 21, 5.
- Avarethrabau, priest, Int. 9, 64, 70; Dk. VII, 7, 20, 21.
- Avarôtar, man, Zs. 23, 8.
- Avesta, Int. 7, 30, 36, 37, 42, 49, 55, 64, 70, 78, 90; Dk. VII, 1, 44; 4, 63; 5, 11; 6, 13, 14; 7, 5, 38, 39; 8, 2, 10, 22, 36; V, 2, 6; 4, 6.
- Avesta scholars, Int. 78, 79, 90.
- Avestic rites, Dk. VII, 7, 2.
- Avirafshanêg, man, Dk. VII, 1, 34 n.
- Āyang, bad, man, Dk. VII, 2, 70; Zs. 13, 6.
- Āyazem, man, Dk. VII, 2, 70 n; Zs. 13, 6.
- Az-i Dahâk, king, Dk. VII, 11, 3.
- Babylon, Dk. VII, 4, 72, n.
- Bactria, Int. 74.
- Bahman, angel, Int. 41, 43.
- Bahman Yast, MS., Int. 44.
- Bahrâm Gôr, king, Int. 43.
- Bahrâm-i Hamâvand, king, Int. 43.
- Bahrâm Khûrzâd, copyist, Dk. VII, 7, 14 n.
- Bakyîr, m., Dk. VII, 1, 39 n.
- Bâpêl, city, Int. 50; Dk. VII, 4, 72; V, 2, 9.
- Bartârûsh, karap, Int. 34, 35; Dk. VII, 5, 12 n.
- Barzînkârûs, man, Int. 34.
- Barzû Kâmdîn, dastûr, Int. 32.
- Behistûn inscription, Int. 70, 84.
- Bêtâ-Makdis = Jerusalem, Dk. V, 1, 5.
- Bitak, man, Dk. VII, 2, 70; Zs. 13, 6.
- Bôr-tôrâ, man, Dk. VII, 2, 70.
- Brâd-rêsh = Brâdrôk-rêsh, Int. 29; Zs. 15, 3.
- Brâdrôk-rêsh, karap, Int. 49; Dk. VII, 2, 9 n; 3, 20, 24, 28, 32, 39 n; 5, 12 n; V, 3, 2.
- Brâd-rôyisn, karap, Zs. 15, 3.
- Brâd-rukshh, karap, Zs. 15, 3; 17, 6.
- Bûd, demon, Dk. VII, 4, 37, 38.
- Buddha, Int. 78.
- Bûkht-Narsîh = Nebuchadnezzar, Int. 14; Dk. V, 1, 4, 5.
- Bundahis, MS., Int. 15, 53-59, 61, 62, 68, 69.
- Bûrzîn-Mitrô, fire, Zs. 23, 7.
- Cambyes, king, Dk. VII, 4, 86 n.
- Ch in Oriental words is printed K.
- Christian persecution, Int. 63, 65.
- Chronology, Int. 51-89.
- Creator, Dk. VII, 1, 4-6, 8, 10, 11, 15, 19, 21, 24, 25, 28, 41; 2, 2;

- 3, 61; 4, 2, 12, 41, 74, 75, 84, 85; 5, 12; 9, 6; 11, 6; V, 1, 1, 9; 2, 1; 4, 6.
- Dâdistân-i Dînîk, MS., Int. 24; Zs. 12, o n.
- Dadvô, month, Zs. 23, 9.
- Dadvô-pavan-Mitrô, day, Zs. 21, 4.
- Dahâk, king, Int. 12, 50, 55; Dk. VII, 1, 26, 34 n; 4, 72; 10, 10; V, 3, 3; Zs. 12, 13 n; 23, 3.
- Dâhmân *Âlîrîn*, ritual, Int. 11; Dk. VII, 9, 3.
- Dâit, r., Dk. VII, 2, 30.
- Dâitî, r., Int. 5, 18; Dk. VII, 3, 51, 54; 4, 29; 8, 60; 9, 23; Zs. 21, 5, 13; 22, 2, 9, 12.
- Dârâi, king, Int. 54, 55.
- Darega, r., Int. 29; Zs. 22, 12.
- Darius Hystaspes, Int. 70, 79, 84, 88, 89; Dk. VII, 4, 86 n.
- Darmesteter's hypothesis, Int. 89, 90.
- Darun, rite, Int. 42.
- Davâns, man, Int. 29.
- Demons, Int. 30, 36, 48, 49; Dk. VII, 1, 9, 12, 13, 18, 19, 34; 2, 6, 9, 10, 43, 45, 48-50, 53, 60, 66-68; 3, 47, 50; 4, 4, 5, 14, 33-35, 40, 42, 44-48, 50, 52-54, 63, 80, 87; 5, 8; 6, 7; 7, 14; 8, 46; V, 2, 6, 8, 13; Zs. 14, 2, 5, 6; 17, 4; 18, 1.
- Demon-worship, Int. 50; Dk. VII, 4, 30, 35, 67; 7, 17, 36; V, 1, 5; 2, 4.
- Demon-worshipper, Dk. VII, 1, 36; 7, 37; 8, 7, 34; V, 2, 8.
- Destroyer, Dk. VII, 1, 5, 6; V, 2, 6.
- Dhû Qâr, defeat at, Int. 61.
- Dimâvand, m., Zs. 23, 3 n.
- Dînkard, MS., Int. 1, 2, 21-23; Dk. V, 1, 2 n.
- Diogenes Laertius, Int. 71, 76.
- Dk. V, i-iv, contents, Int. 14.
- Dk. VII, Int. 2; contents, Int. 3-13.
- Dûkâûb, woman, Int. 55; Dk. VII, 2, 35, 41, 42, 46, 47; 3, 3; V, 2, 2; Zs. 13, 1.
- Dûrânsarûn, karap, Int. 34, 35.
- Dûrâsrôbô, karap, Int. 49, 55; Dk. VII, 2, 9 n; 3, 4, 8, 9, 11, 20, 32, 35, 39, 41; 5, 12 n; Zs. 19, 1, 5, 7.
- prince, Dk. VII, 2, 70; Zs. 13, 6; 16, 13.
- Drvê Zênigâk, chief, Dk. VII, 11, 3.
- Eastwick's translation of the Zartust nâmah, Int. 31, 32.
- Êgiptos, land, Zs. 20, 4 n.
- Enclosure made by Yim, Dk. VII, 1, 24.
- Epistle of Mânûsîhar, Int. 25.
- Êrikô, man, Dk. VII, 2, 70 n; Zs. 16, 13.
- Eudoxus, Int. 71.
- Evil spirit, Int. 55; Dk. VII, 1, 19; 2, 67; 4, 36, 39; 8, 47.
- Exposition of the good religion, MS., Int. 2; Dk. VII, 1, 2, 4.
- Farukhzâd, priest, Dk. V, 1, 2, 3.
- Fiend, Int. 13; Dk. VII, 1, 6, 12, 13, 26, 32; 4, 36-39, 55, 57, 59-61; 8, 30, 32; 9, 2; 10, 5; 11, 7; V, 2, 6, 8; Zs. 17, 4.
- Five dispositions of priests, MS., Zs. 24, 1-9.
- Fradadafsh, region, Dk. VII, 6, 12 n.
- Fragûzak*, man, Dk. VII, 2, 70; Zs. 13, 6.
- Frahânyân, patron., Dk. VII, 8, 55; 9, 18; 10, 15.
- Frâhîmravânâ, man, Dk. VII, 2, 3.
- Frâkîh, heretic, Dk. VII, 1, 36.
- Frangrâsîyâk, king, Dk. VII, 1, 31, 39; 2, 69; 11, 3.
- Frashôstar, priest, Int. 29, 30, 55; Dk. VII, 6, 12; V, 2, 12; Zs. 23, 10.
- Frâsiyâv = Frangrâsîyâk, Int. 55; Dk. VII, 1, 39 n; 2, 68; V, 3, 3 n; Zs. 12, 3.
- Fravâk, man, Dk. VII, 2, 70; V, 4, 1, 2; Zs. 13, 6.
- Fravashis, spirits, Int. 30, 55, 72, 75, 77.
- Frazûsak*, man, Dk. VII, 2, 70; Zs. 13, 6.
- Frêdûn, king, Int. 33, 55; Dk. VII, 1, 25, 26, 28, 29, 34 n; 2, 61, 70; 11, 3; V, 1, 8; 4, 3; Zs. 13, 6; 23, 3 n.
- Frênô, woman, Zs. 13, 1; another, 23, 11.
- Frîr, man, Zs. 13, 6.
- Gandarepô, monster, Dk. VII, 1, 32.
- Gâthas quoted, Zs. 15, 7.
- Gaugamela, battle, Int. 54.
- Gâyômarz, man, Int. 3, 55, 77; Dk. VII, 1, 4, 6-9; 2, 70; V, 1, 8; Zs. 13, 6.

- Gêfar-tôrâ, man, Dk. VII, 2, 70.
 Gôbâk-abû, woman, Dk. VII, 10, 15.
 Good works, Dk. VII, 1, 6.
 Gôûrvan, Int. 29.
 Gushnasphâh, king, Dk. VII, 7, 14 n.
 Gûnasp fire, Int. 41; Zs. 22, 9 n.
 Gustâsp, king, Int. 34, 36, 41-43.
Gûzak, princess, Dk. VII, 2, 70; Zs. 13, 6.
 Gyêmarâ, Int. 14; Dk. V, 1, 2, 3; 4, 8.
 Gâmâsp, priest, Int. 29, 30, 42, 55; Dk. VII, 4, 77 n; 6, 12 n; 7, 3 n; V, 2, 12; 3, 4; Zs. 23, 10.
 Hadish, angel, Int. 3, 48; Dk. VII, 1, 12, 13.
 Haêkadâspas, family, Int. 30.
 Haêkadâspô, man, Dk. VII, 2, 70; Zs. 13, 6.
 Hakhâmanîs, ruler, Int. 70.
 Hangâûrûsh, priest, Int. 55; Zs. 23, 10.
 Hânô, septuagenarian, Zs. 20, 4.
 Haoma, angel, Int. 30.
 Haoshyangha, king, Int. 30.
Hardbar, man, Dk. VII, 2, 70; Zs. 13, 6.
 Hâsar of length, Zs. 12, 4.
 — time, Dk. VII, 4, 49.
 Hazân, karap, Zs. 15, 3.
 Hazârâhs, Int. 43.
 Heaven (best existence), Dk. VII, 6, 1, 11.
 — (supreme), Dk. VII, 1, 7, 24.
 Hercules, Dk. VII, 1, 32 n.
 Hermippus, Int. 71.
 Hôrn-juice, Dk. VII, 4, 85; Zs. 20, 15.
 Hôrn plant, Int. 49, 55; Dk. VII, 2, 14, 22, 23, 25, 26, 28-31, 34, 35, 46; 4, 85; Zs. 12, 12, 15; 13, 4; 20, 16; 21, 5.
 Hôrn-strainer, Dk. VII, 4, 85.
 Hôrn-water, Int. 5, 6, 47; Dk. VII, 3, 51, 54; 4, 29, 30, 32, 35.
 Hôshâng, king, Int. 3, 48, 55; Dk. VII, 1, 16, 18; 2, 70; V, 1, 8; 4, 2; Zs. 13, 6.
 Hûgar, m., Zs. 22, 3.
 Hûmâi, queen, Int. 54, 55, 57.
 Hundred-discipledom, Int. 54, 55.
 Hûtôs, queen, Int. 29, 30; Dk. VII, 4, 86; 6, 11 n.
 Hvôbas, tribe, Int. 29; Dk. VII, 6, 12.
 Hvôvi, woman, Dk. VII, 6, 12 n.
 Hvyâonas, nation, Dk. VII, 4, 77 n.
 Hystaspes, king, Int. 70.
 Idolators, Dk. VII, 1, 18 n.
 Idolatry, Int. 50; Dk. VII, 1, 19; 4, 72.
 Idol-temple, Int. 50; Dk. VII, 1, 39.
 India, Int. 43.
 Irân, land, Int. 9, 43, 54; Dk. VII, 1, 30, 31, 33, 38, 50; 2, 62, 68; 4, 42, 81 n, 88, 89; 5, 5, 9; 7, 1, 2, 29, 33, 38, 39; 8, 1, 2, 4, 7-9, 19; 9, 13; V, 1, 5; 4, 1, 3; Zs. 12, 3, 8, 9; 21, 13; 23, 8.
 Irânian, Int. 14; Dk. VII, 2, 63, 70 n; 4, 90; V, 4, 6.
 Irânian Bundahîs, Dk. VII, 1, 34 n; 2, 9 n; 7, 5 n; Zs. 22, 9 n.
 — country, Dk. VII, 1, 37.
 — monarchy, Int. 43.
 Irânians, Int. 11, 14; Dk. VII, 2, 63; 4, 42, 77 n; 8, 16 n; 11, 3 n; V, 3, 1; Zs. 15, 2.
 Îsadvâstar, man, Dk. VII, 8, 55; 9, 18; 10, 15.
 Isfendyâr, prince, Int. 39, 42; Dk. VII, 7, 5 n.
 J in Oriental words is printed G.
 Jerusalem, Int. 14; Dk. V, 1, 2 n.
 Jews, Int. 14; Dk. V, 1, 2 n.
 Kabad-ûr-spâê, wizard, Zs. 23, 10.
 Kaî=Kavig, Dk. VII, 4, 64; 8, 40, 60; 9, 23.
 Kaî-Arsh, prince, Dk. VII, 1, 35.
 Kaî-Kâûs, priest, Int. 32.
 Kaî-Khûsrôî, king, Int. 12, 50, 55; Dk. VII, 1, 39; 10, 10; 11, 3; V, 4, 4 n.
 Kaî-Kobâd, king, Int. 55; Dk. VII, 1, 33; 6, 11 n; V, 4, 4 n.
 Kaî-Loharâsp, king, Int. 14, 55; Dk. V, 1, 5.
 Kaîsar, Int. 27; Dk. VII, 8, 42.
 Kaî-Siyâvakhsh, prince, Dk. VII, 1, 38.
 Kaî-Ûs, king, Int. 3, 15, 55; Dk. VII, 1, 35, 37; 2, 62, 63, 65, 66; 6, 2 n; Zs. 12, 9-11, 14, 15, 17, 20, 21, 23, 24.
 Kaî-Vistâsp, king, Int. 3, 29, 55; Dk. VII, 1, 41, 47, 49; 4, 1, 76, 77, 86; 5, 6; 6, 4, 9, 11; 7, 39; 11, 3; V, 1, 5 n; 2, 8, 11; 3, 1.
 Kangdez, fortress, Int. 7, 10, 43;

- Dk. VII, 1, 38; 4, 81 n; 5, 12; V, 3, 3 n.
 Kanyisâ, lake, Dk. VII, 11, 8.
 Kar, fish, Zs. 22, 4 n.
 Karap, Int. 4-6, 16, 17, 47, 49, 55; Dk. VII, 2, 9, 45; 3, 4, 7-9, 11, 13, 15, 20, 24, 26, 28, 32, 34, 39, 41, 50; 4, 2, 6, 14, 21, 25, 61, 64, 67; 8, 26, 40, 60; 9, 23; 10, 5; V, 2, 3; Zs. 15, 2; 16, 1-4, 6-8; 17, 1; 18, 2, 5, 7; 19, 1; 23, 5.
 Karapans, Int. 30.
 Kardâr-tôrâ, man, Dk. VII, 2, 70.
 Karvîpt, bird, Zs. 22, 4.
 Karsna, man, Dk. VII, 7, 12 n.
 Kavâd, king, Int. 58; Dk. VII, 7, 26.
 Kava Husrava, king, Int. 30, 70.
 — Kavâta, king, Int. 70.
 — Usa, king, Int. 70.
 Kavîg, Int. 4, 55; Dk. VII, 2, 9; 8, 18; Zs. 23, 5, 8.
 Kavis, Int. 30.
 Kavi Vistâspa, king, Int. 30, 70; Dk. VII, 7, 12 n.
 Kayân glory, Dk. VII, 4, 43; 11, 3.
 Kayâns, Int. 3; Dk. VII, 1, 33; 2, 9 n; 7, 12; V, 1, 8; 4, 4, 5.
 Kerêsâspô, hero, Int. 12, 29; Dk. VII, 1, 32; 10, 10; Zs. 23, 3 n.
 Kêrsêvazd, prince, Dk. VII, 1, 39.
 Khâkân, Int. 27; Dk. VII, 8, 42.
 Khalîfah, Al-Mâmûn, Dk. V, 1, 2 n.
 Khûr, day, Zs. 23, 9.
 Khûrdad, angel, Dk. VII, 2, 19, 38; 5, 9; 8, 5 n; Zs. 22, 11.
 Khûrdâd fire, Int. 41.
 Khûsrô I, king, Int. 9, 26, 27, 58, 68; Dk. VII, 7, 26; V, 3, 3.
 — II, king, Int. 58, 61.
 Khvanîras, region, Dk. VII, 1, 26; 2, 70; V, 2, 9.
 Khvêtûkdas, Int. 6, 47, 49; Dk. VII, 4, 4 n.
 Khyôns, nation, Int. 7, 55; Dk. VII, 4, 77, 83, 84, 87-90; 5, 7; V, 3, 1; Zs. 23, 8.
 Kîg, Int. 6, 47, 49; Dk. VII, 2, 9 n; 3, 50; 4, 2, 6, 14, 67; 8, 26; V, 2, 3.
 Kirmân, town, Zs. 12, 0 n.
 Kobâd, king, Dk. VII, 1, 35.
 Kôkharêd, Zs. 15, 2.
 Kûndah, Int. 55; Zs. 23, 8.
 Kûtâl-tôrâ, man, Dk. VII, 2, 70 n.
 Kaispîr, ruler, Int. 70.
 Kêkast, lake, Int. 50; Dk. VII, 1, 39.
 Kêshmak, demon, Dk. VII, 2, 44, 45; 4, 61.
 Kikbîshnus, man, Dk. VII, 2, 70; Zs. 13, 6.
 Kinvad bridge, Zs. 20, 5 n.
 Kîst, Zs. 16, 12.
 Kitradâd nask, Int. 3, 14, 20; Dk. VII, 1, 34 n; 7, 5 n.
 Kitrô-mêhônô, prince, Int. 10; Dk. VII, 8, 45.
 Macedon, Int. 55 n.
 Mâda, land, Dk. VII, 1, 26.
 Mâdigân-î Gugastak Abâlis, MS., Dk. V, 1, 2 n.
 Mahrkûs, wizard, Int. 11, 55; Dk. VII, 1, 24; 9, 3; V, 3, 3.
 Maidhyôzaremayâ, festival, Int. 18; Zs. 21, 1 n.
 Mânih, heretic, Dk. VII, 7, 21 n; V, 3, 3.
 Mânûrak, princess, Zs. 15, 2.
 Mânûsir, for Mânûsîhar, Dk. VII, 1, 29 n.
 Mânûs-khûrnâk, man, Dk. VII, 2, 70; V, 4, 3; Zs. 13, 6.
 Mânûs-khûrnar, man, Dk. VII, 2, 70; V, 4, 3; Zs. 13, 6.
 Mânûsîhar, king, Int. 15, 16, 55; Dk. VII, 1, 29-31; 2, 51 n, 70; 6, 11 n; 7, 21; V, 1, 8; 4, 3; Zs. 12, 3; 13, 6; 15, 2; 16, 13.
 Mâraspend, priest, Int. 64, 88; Dk. VII, 5, 5; 7, 19, 20.
 Marvels of Zoroastrianism, Int. 1.
 Marvâk, man, Dk. VII, 6, 11 n.
 Masyâôî, woman, Int. 48, 55; Dk. VII, 1, 9, 12-14.
 Masyê, man, Int. 48, 55; Dk. VII, 1, 9, 11-14; 2, 70; V, 1, 8; 4, 1 n; Zs. 13, 6.
 Mâzandar, land, Dk. VII, 1, 26.
 Mâzandarân, land, Dk. VII, 1, 18 n.
 Mâzanô, demons of, Dk. VII, 1, 18.
 Mazda, Dk. VII, 9, 7-10.
 Mazdag, heretic, Int. 26, 43; Dk. VII, 7, 21, 26 n.
 Mazdakites, sect, Int. 58.
 Mazda-worship, Int. 15, 49; Dk. VII, 1, 1, 2, 4, 41, 43, 44; 3, 35 n; 4, 2, 5, 14, 33, 34, 74, 79; 6, 4, 12 n; V, 1, 1.
 Mazda-worshippers, Dk. VII, 7, 5, 6, 9, 10, 23; 8, 28, 35, 51; 9, 2, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14; 10, 4, 6, 11; 11, 8-10; Zs. 12, 2, 4.

- Mêdyômâh, man, Int. 18, 19, 29, 30, 55; Zs. 21, 3; 23, 1, 8, 11.
 Messiah, Dk. V, 3, 3.
 Millennial apostles, Int. 3.
 Misr, land, Zs. 20, 4 n.
 Mivân, river (?), Zs. 22, 8.
 Mûrdað, angel, Dk. VII, 2, 38.
 Nâmkhvâst of the Hazârs, Dk. VII, 4, 77 n.
 Nasks, Int. 64.
Nayâzem, man, Dk. VII, 2, 70.
 Nebuchadnezzar, king, Int. 14; Dk. V, 1, 2 n.
 Nêresang, for Nêryôsang, Dk. VII, 1, 29 n.
 Nêrôksang, for Nêryôsang, Dk. VII, 2, 21 n, 70; 4, 84 n.
 Nêryôsang, angel, Dk. VII, 1, 29; 2, 21; 4, 84, 85; V, 4, 6; Zs. 13, 5, 6.
 Nêvak-tôrâ, man, Dk. VII, 2, 70.
 Next-of-kin marriage, Dk. VII, 1, 10; 4, 5, 6, 8, 11; Zs. 23, 13.
 Ninus, king, Int. 71, 74.
 Nîrangistân, MS., Zs. 13, 4 n.
 Nîvêdir, man, Zs. 15, 5.
 Nôdar, man, Int. 17; Dk. VII, 2, 51; 3, 19, 39; 4, 86 n; 6, 11 n; Zs. 16, 11-13.
 Nôdarigâ, man, Zs. 15, 5.
 Nôdars, tribe, Dk. VII, 6, 11.
 Non-Îrânian, Dk. VII, 9, 13.
 Nôshêrvân, king, Int. 43.
 Numûdârih-i Yazisnô, MS., Zs. 13, 4.
 Oldest dates explained, Int. 72.
 Ordeal, Int. 7, 18, 64, 65; Dk. VII, 5, 4, 5; 7, 2; Zs. 21, 24-27.
 Osthane, Int. 73.
 Ox, frontier-settling, Dk. VII, 2, 62-66; Zs. 12, 8-25.
 — sole-created, Int. 55, 77; Dk. VII, 2, 67.
 Oxyartes, king, Int. 74.
 Padashkhvârgar, land, Dk. VII, 7, 14 n.
 Paðiragtarâspô, man, Dk. VII, 2, 9, 10, 13, 70.
Paêtrasp=Paitiraspo, man, Dk. VII, 2, 70; Zs. 13, 6.
 Pâirigs, meteors, Zs. 22, 9.
 Pâpak, prince, Dk. VII, 7, 12.
 Parshad-tôrâ, man, Int. 6, 47; Dk. VII, 4, 31-34.
 Parsi calendar, Int. 79-89; how rectified, Int. 85.
 Pâtakhsrôbô, king, Int. 3, 48; Dk. VII, 1, 34.
 Persia, Int. 55 n, 63, 79.
 Pêrdâdian, Int. 3; Dk. VII, 2, 70.
 Pêshyôtan, prince, Int. 7, 10, 42, 43; Dk. VII, 4, 81; 5, 12; 6, 13; V, 3, 3.
 Pestilence, demon, Dk. VII, 4, 37, 38.
 Plato, Int. 71, 77.
 Pliny the Elder, Int. 71, 73, 75, 76.
 Pôrûkâst, woman, Int. 29, 30.
 Pôrûshâspô, man, Int. 4, 30, 49; Dk. VII, 2, 10, 13, 21, 29-35, 39-41, 46-48, 56-58, 70; 3, 3, 4, 7-11, 13, 15, 21, 23, 24, 26, 27, 32, 34, 37, 38; V, 2, 2, 4; Zs. 13, 6; 14, 16; 15, 4; 16, 1, 3-6; 17, 2; 18, 1, 2, 4-6; 19, 1-4; 20, 1, 6; 21, 3.
 Pouruspâdha, wizard, Zs. 23, 10 n.
 Proconnesian Zoroaster, Int. 73.
 Purtarâspô, man, Zs. 13, 6.
 Pûr-tôrâ, man, Dk. VII, 2, 70.
 Ragan, man, Dk. VII, 2, 51 n, 70 n.
 Ragîun, man, Dk. VII, 2, 70 n.
 Râi, city, Int. 32.
 Râk, man, Dk. VII, 2, 51; 3, 19, 39; or Râgh, Int. 17; Zs. 16, 11-13.
 Ramak-tôrâ, man, Dk. VII, 2, 70.
 Rangûstar, man, Zs. 15, 5.
 Rasâstât, angel, Dk. VII, 4, 81 n.
 Rashn, angel, Dk. VII, 7, 11.
 Rashn-rêsh, apostate, Int. 9; Dk. VII, 7, 11.
 Râstare-vaghent, priest, Int. 64, 70; Dk. VII, 7, 19 n.
 Ratûstar, man, Zs. 15, 5.
 Renovation of the universe, Int. 13, 55, 77; Dk. VII, 1, 41, 42, 54; 10, 10; 11, 10, 11; Zs. 23, 3.
 Romans, Int. 63, 65.
 Sacred beings, Int. 6, 15, 19, 48, 52, 55; Dk. VII, 1, 4, 12, 14, 41; 2, 10, 61, 62; 3, 47-49; 4, 21, 46, 62, 70, 80; 5, 12; 8, 6, 60; V, 2, 7; Zs. 14, 7; 21, 10.
 Sacred fires, Dk. VII, 7, 2.
 Sagastân, land, Int. 6, 47; Dk. VII, 4, 31.
 Salm, prince, Dk. VII, 1, 30.
 Sâmak, man, Dk. VII, 1, 15.

- Sâmân, patron., Dk. VII, 1, 32; V, 1, 8.
 Sanskrit, Int. 78.
 Saoshyant, apostle, Int. 30.
 Sarâi, town, Zs. 22, 8.
 Sâsânian, Int. 9, 31, 50, 57, 68, 69.
 Satavêš, star, Zs. 22, 9.
 Selections of Zâd-spâram, Int. 1, 15, 24.
 Semiramis, queen, Int. 71, 74.
 Shahpûhar II, king, Int. 26, 58, 61, 63, 64, 88; Dk. VII, 7, 19 n.
 — III, king, Int. 64, 87.
 Sham = Shâm, land, Zs. 20, 4 n.
 Shapân, Dk. VII, 7, 3.
 Shapigân or Shaspigân, Dk. VII, 7, 3 n.
 Shapîr-abû, woman, Dk. VII, 9, 18.
 Shatraver, angel, Dk. VII, 2, 19.
 Shatvêr, angel, Zs. 22, 8.
 Shêdâsfar (Theodosius?), Int. 10, 27; Dk. VII, 8, 47 n.
 Shedâspô, Dk. VII, 8, 47.
 Shemîg-abû, woman, Dk. VII, 8, 55.
 Sirkân, town, Zs. 12, 0 n.
 Siyah-tôrâ, man, Dk. VII, 2, 70.
 Siyâmak, man, Dk. VII, 2, 70; V, 1, 8; 4, 1; Zs. 13, 6.
 Siyâvakhsh, prince, Dk. VII, 1, 39.
 Sôg-tôrâ, man, Dk. VII, 2, 70.
 Sôshâns, apostle, Int. 12, 13, 55; Dk. VII, 1, 42, 53; 10, 10, 15; 11, 1, 2; V, 2, 15; 3, 3; Zs. 21, 7.
 Spendarmad, angel, Int. 6, 15, 55; Dk. VII, 2, 19; 4, 57, 58; 8, 5 n; Zs. 12, 2, 3, 5, 6; 16, 3; 22, 9; 23, 4.
 — month, Zs. 21, 1.
 Spend-dâd, prince, Int. 39, 55; Dk. VII, 7, 5; V, 2, 12.
 Spend nask, Int. 1, 2, 14, 20, 27, 46; Dk. VII, 2, 1 n.
 Spentô-khratvau, priest, Dk. VII, 7, 8, 10.
 Spêtô-tôrâ, man, Dk. VII, 2, 70.
 Spîtâm, man, Dk. VII, 2, 70; Zs. 13, 6.
 Spîtâmas, tribe, Int. 30; Dk. VII, 2, 9, 11, 29, 57; 7, 27; 8, 22, 35.
 Spîtôir, priest, Dk. VII, 6, 12.
 Sritak = Thritak, man, Zs. 13, 6.
 Sritô, hero, Int. 8, 15, 55; Dk. VII, 2, 63, 64; 6, 2, 3, 5, 7-9, 11, 13; Zs. 12, 10, 12-14, 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 25.
 Sritô, woman, Zs. 23, 11.
 Srôbôvar, snake, Dk. VII, 1, 32.
 Srôsh, angel, Dk. VII, 3, 17; Zs. 16, 9.
 Sritûvôk-spâdâk, priest, Dk. VII, 7, 8, 10.
 Sûdkar nask, Int. 44.
 Sûrak, land, Zs. 20, 4 n.
 Sênôv, priest, Int. 9, 54, 55; Dk. VII, 7, 6; Zs. 23, 11.
 Tabaristân, land, Dk. VII, 7, 14 n.
 Tâkhmôrup, king, Int. 48, 55; Dk. VII, 1, 19; V, 1, 8; 4, 3.
 Talmud, MS., Dk. V, 1, 2 n.
 Tanâpûhar, sin, Dk. VII, 4, 19, 20.
 Tanvasar, priest, Int. 9, 62; Dk. VII, 7, 14, 17, 18.
 Tâx, man, Dk. VII, 1, 34.
 Tegend, r., Zs. 22, 7 n.
 Ten admonitions, MS., Zs. 24, 10-19.
 Thritak, man, Dk. VII, 2, 70.
 Tistar, star, Dk. VII, 2, 38 n.
 Tôgân, r., Zs. 22, 7.
 Trojan war, Int. 71.
 Tôg, prince, Dk. VII, 1, 30.
 Tûmâsp, prince, Dk. VII, 1, 31.
 Tûr, land, Dk. VII, 1, 31, 39.
 — = Tûrânian, Int. 6, 47; Dk. VII, 4, 6-10, 14-16, 20; 5, 12 n; 11, 3; V, 3, 2; Zs. 15, 3, 4; 17, 6; 20, 8.
 Tûrân, land, Dk. VII, 2, 62; Zs. 12, 8, 9.
 Tûrânian, Dk. VII, 2, 9 n, 63, 68; 3, 28; 7, 19; 9, 13; Zs. 12, 17.
 Turkish demons, Dk. VII, 8, 47.
 Urugadbasp, man, Dk. VII, 2, 70.
 Usikhsh, Int. 30.
 Uspâsnu, man, Dk. VII, 6, 12 n.
 Vadak, woman, Dk. VII, 2, 64; Zs. 12, 13.
 Vadast = Vaêdvôirt, Zs. 15, 3.
 Vaêdist, man, Dk. VII, 2, 70; Zs. 13, 6.
 Vaêdvôirt, karap, Int. 6, 47; Dk. VII, 2, 9 n; 4, 21, 23, 24.
 Vâêgered, prince, Int. 3; Dk. VII, 1, 16; V, 4, 2.
 Vakgir, land, Dk. VII, 1, 39.
 Vanôfravîm, man, Dk. VII, 2, 70.
 Varahrân fire, Zs. 22, 7.
 Vars, hair, Dk. VII, 4, 85.

- Varstmânsar nask, Int. 10.
 Verethraghna, angel, Int. 30.
 Vîdadafsh, region, Dk. VII, 6, 12 n.
 Vidrafr, wizard, Dk. VII, 4, 77 n.
 Vigîrkard-i Dênig, MS., Dk. VII, 2, 70 n.
Virafsang, man, Dk. VII, 1, 34 n.
 Visperad, MS., Int. 3.
 Visraps, tribe, Dk. VII, 6, 2, 7, 9, 11; Zs. 12, 10 n.
 Virtâsp, king, Int. 6-10, 14, 19, 29, 47, 49, 52, 55, 70; Dk. VII, 1, 2; 2, 9 n; 3, 31; 4, 63-67, 69-71, 74-76, 83-85, 89, 90; 5, 1, 2, 6, 7, 12; 6, 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 11 n, 12-14; 7, 1, 2, 5 n, 38, 39; V, 2, 8, 10; 3, 1; Zs. 16, 12, 13; 23, 5, 7.
 Vivangha, man, Dk. VII, 1, 20; 2, 70; Zs. 13, 6.
Vîzak, woman, Dk. VII, 2, 70; Zs. 13, 6.
 Vohûmanô, angel, Int. 5, 16, 55; Dk. VII, 1, 4; 2, 17, 19, 24-26, 29, 33; 3, 17, 22, 26, 51, 52, 54, 56, 58-60, 62; 4, 29, 57, 74, 75, 78; 7, 19; V, 2, 5, 9; Zs. 14, 9-12; 16, 9; 20, 3; 21, 8, 11, 12; 22, 3, 6 n.
 — king, Int. 9, 55; Dk. VII, 7, 5.
 Vohûnêm, man, Int. 55; Zs. 23, 8, 11.
 Vohû-rôkô, man, Dk. VII, 8, 55; 9, 18; 10, 15.
 Vologeses I, king, Int. 88, 89.
 — III, king, Int. 61, 88.
 Wilson's Parsi Religion, Int. 31.
 Witch, Dk. VII, 1, 19; 5, 8; V, 2, 3; Zs. 17, 4.
 Witchcraft, Dk. VII, 2, 6, 7, 63; 3, 4, 8; 4, 72; 5, 8; 8, 6.
 Wizard, Dk. VII, 1, 19, 31, 39; 2, 8, 53, 54, 66; 3, 5, 42-44; 8, 29; V, 2, 3, 4, 8; Zs. 14, 3, 13, 16; 16, 2, 3; 17, 4; 18, 1, 5.
 Wrath, demon, Int. 16.
 Xanthus of Lydia, Int. 71.
 Xerxes, king, Int. 71, 73.
 Yâdkâr-i Zarîrân, MS., Dk. VII, 4, 77 n, 86 n.
 Yathâ-ahû-vairiyô, Dk. VII, 1, 4 n, 12 n; 4, 41, 56, 61.
 Yazdakard I, king, Int. 64, 66, 87, 88 n.
 — II and III, kings, Int. 58, 61.
 Yim, king, Int. 55; Dk. VII, 1, 20-22, 24, 25, 26 n, 32, 36; 2, 21, 59-61, 70; 9, 4; V, 1, 8; 2, 2, 9; 4, 3; Zs. 13, 5, 6; 15, 2 n.
 Yimak, princess, Zs. 15, 2 n.
 Yim's enclosure, Int. 11.
 Yûgyâst, meas., Dk. VII, 3, 16, 45.
 Zâd-sparam, priest, Int. 15, 25; Zs. 12, 0 n.
 Zâgh, man, Dk. VII, 6, 11 n.
 Zâinîgâv, prince, Dk. VII, 1, 34 n.
 Zâk, karap, Dk. VII, 2, 9 n; 4, 64, 67.
 Zand, Int. 37; Dk. VII, 8, 22, 36; V, 3, 4.
 Zarathustra, apostle, Int. 30; Dk. VII, 1, 34 n.
 Zaratûst, apostle, Int. 1-4, 6-8, 10, 15-17, 19, 20, 29, 32-43, 46-50, 52, 55, 61, 70-75, 77, 78; Dk. VII, 1, 3, 34, 43, 51; 2, 2, 3, 9 n, 10, 14, 15-22, 24 n, 27, 29, 36-40, 42, 43, 46, 47, 52, 53, 56, 60, 61, 64, 68-70; 3, 1 n, 4, 5, 7-9, 11-16, 20, 22, 32, 33, 36, 38-43, 46, 51, 54, 57, 59, 61, 62; 4, 3-6, 11, 12, 14, 16-19, 22-27, 29-31, 33-36, 38, 40-43, 45, 47-49, 51-55, 57, 58, 60, 61, 63, 64, 66, 67, 69, 70, 72-74, 86, 90; 5, 1, 2, 4-8; 6, 1, 12, 13; 7, 2, 14, 18, 19, 22, 29, 33-35, 37; 8, 1, 24, 25, 27, 29, 36, 38, 40, 42, 43, 48, 50, 51, 55, 56, 59; 9, 1, 6, 18, 19; 10, 15; V, 1, 7; 2, 1; 3, 1, 2, 4; Zs. 12, 6, 7; 13, 1, 4-6; 14, 1, 2, 8, 12, 15; 15, 1, 3, 4-6; 16, 1-4, 6, 7, 9-13; 17, 1, 6; 18, 2, 3, 6, 7; 19, 2, 4-7; 20, 2, 5, 9, 11-13, 16; 21, 2, 3, 5-9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 24; 22, 2, 3, 6-12, 13 n; 23, 1, 7-11, 13.
 Zaratûst of the Spîtamâs, Dk. VII, 1, 2, 8, 41, 43, 44; 2, 67, 68; 3, 55, 56, 58, 60; 4, 15, 32, 39, 59, 75, 79, 81, 82, 86, 89; 5, 3; 7, 28; 8, 23, 31, 32, 34; V, 1, 7; Zs. 12, 12; 21, 10.
 Zaratûst, priest, Int. 64, 66, 70, 88.
 Zaratûst-nâmak of Zs., contents, Int. 15-19; MSS., Int. 24.

-
- Zarâtûstship, Dk. V, 4, 6.
 Zarîr, prince, Dk. VII, 4, 77 n; V, 2, 12.
 Zartust Bahrâm Pazdû, writer, Int. 32, 43, 46.
 Zartust-nâmah, Persian, Int. 31, 45, 46; Dk. VII, 4, 70 n; 5, 12 n; contents, Int. 32-44.
 Zbaurvant, man, Dk. VII, 7, 12 n.
 Zend, r., Zs. 22, 7 n.
 Zôis, man, Dk. VII, 2, 3, 4.
 Zôndak, r., Zs. 22, 7 n.
 Zoroaster, Int. 74, 75.
 Zoroastrian epoch, Int. 52.
 — legends, Int. 14, 2c, 27, 51, 59; scattered in other Pahl. texts, Int. 29; in Av., Int. 30, 31.
 Zôti, priest, Dk. VII, 8, 8.
 Zrayang, hau, priest, Dk. VII, 7, 8, 10.
 Zûsak, man, Dk. VII, 2, 70; Zs. 13, 6.
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ERRATUM.

P. 20, l. 4. The name of the district of Alâk should probably be read Arâk, as the province is called Râgh in Zs. XVI, 13.

TRANSLITERATION OF ORIENTAL ALPHABETS ADOPTED FOR THE TRANSLATIONS
OF THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST.

CONSONANTS.	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zend.	Phoen.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.	
	I Class.		III Class.								
	I Class.	II Class.	III Class.								
Gutturales.											
1 Tenuis	k			क	𐬕	𐤊	𐬑	𐤊	𐤊	k	
2 " aspirata	kh			ख	𐬖	𐤋	𐬒	𐤋	𐤋	kh	
3 Media	g			ग	𐬗	𐤌	𐬓	𐤌	𐤌		
4 " aspirata	gh			घ	𐬘	𐤍	𐬔	𐤍	𐤍		
5 Gutturo-labialis	q			ङ	𐬙	𐤎	𐬕	𐤎	𐤎		
6 Nasalis	h (ng)			𑖅	{ 𐬚 (ng) 𐬛 (N) 𐬜 (ng/ko)						
7 Spiritus asper	h			ह	𐬞	𐤏	𐬖	𐤏	𐤏	h, hs	
8 " lenis	,			𑖆							
9 " asper faucalis	'h			𑖇							
10 " lenis faucalis	'h			𑖈							
11 " asper fricatus	. . .	'h		𑖉							
12 " lenis fricatus	. . .	'h		𑖊							
Gutturales modificatae (palatales, &c.)											
13 Tenuis	k			𑖋	𐬟	𐤐	𐬗	𐤐	𐤐	k	
14 " aspirata	kh			𑖌	𐬠	𐤑	𐬘	𐤑	𐤑	kh	
15 Media	g			𑖍	𐬡	𐤒	𐬓	𐤒	𐤒		
16 " aspirata	gh			𑖎	𐬢	𐤓	𐬔	𐤓	𐤓		
17 " Nasalis	ṅ			𑖏	𐬣	𐤔	𐬕	𐤔	𐤔		

CONSONANTS (continued).	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pehlevi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	I Class.	II Class.	III Class.							
18 Semivocalis	y	...	...	य	𐬨 ^{init.} 𐬩𐬪	𐬨	ي	ي	י	y
19 Spiritus asper	...	(y)	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
20 " lenis	...	(y)	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
21 " asper assibilatus	...	s	...	श	𐬯𐬰	𐬯	ش	ش	ש	z
22 " lenis assibilatus	...	z	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Dentales.										
23 Tenuis	t	...	...	त	𐬢	𐬢	ت	ت	ת	t
24 " aspirata	th	...	...	थ	𐬣	𐬣	تھ	تھ	ת	th
25 " assibilata	...	...	TH	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
26 Media	d	...	...	द	𐬤	𐬤	د	د	ד	...
27 " aspirata	dh	...	...	ध	𐬥	𐬥	दھ	دھ	ד	...
28 " assibilata	...	...	DH	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
29 Nasalis	n	...	...	न	𐬦	𐬦	ن	ن	נ	n
30 Semivocalis	l	...	...	ल	𐬧	𐬧	ل	ل	ל	l
31 " mollis 1	...	l	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
32 " mollis 2	...	...	L	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
33 Spiritus asper 1	s	...	...	स	𐬳	𐬳	س	س	ס	s
34 " asper 2	...	s	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
35 " lenis	z	...	s (f)	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
36 " asperimus 1	...	...	z (g)	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
37 " asperimus 2	...	...	z (3)	...	...	...	...	...	...	...

Dentales modificatæ (linguales, &c.)

- 38 Tenuis
39 " aspirata
40 Media
41 " aspirata
42 Nasalis
43 Semivocalis
44 " fricata
45 " diacritica
46 Spiritus asper
47 " lenis

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Labiales.

- 48 Tenuis
49 " aspirata
50 Media
51 " aspirata
52 Tenuissima
53 Nasalis
54 Semivocalis
55 " aspirata
56 Spiritus asper
57 " lenis
58 Anuvāra
59 Visarga

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VOWELS.	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.				Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pehlvi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	I Class.		III Class.								
	II Class.										
1 Neutralis	0				...	...	...	...	...	...	...
2 Laryngo-palatalis	ē				...	...	...	...	...	...	...
3 " labialis	ō				...	...	...	...	...	...	...
4 Gutturalis brevis	a				...	...	...	...	...	...	...
5 " longa	ā		(a)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
6 Palatalis brevis	i				...	...	...	...	...	...	...
7 " longa	ī		(i)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
8 Dentalis brevis	u				...	...	...	...	...	...	...
9 " longa	ū				...	...	...	...	...	...	...
10 Lingualis brevis	ri				...	...	...	...	...	...	...
11 " longa	rī				...	...	...	...	...	...	...
12 Labialis brevis	u				...	...	...	...	...	...	...
13 " longa	ū		(u)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
14 Gutturo-palatalis brevis	e				...	...	...	...	...	...	...
15 " longa	ē (ai)				...	...	...	...	...	...	...
16 Diphthongus gutturo-palatalis	āi				...	...	...	...	...	...	...
17 " " " "	ei (ēi)				...	...	...	...	...	...	...
18 " " " "	oi (ōu)				...	...	...	...	...	...	...
19 Gutturo-labialis brevis	o				...	...	...	...	...	...	...
20 " longa	ō (au)				...	...	...	...	...	...	...
21 Diphthongus gutturo-labialis	āu		(au)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
22 " " " "	eu (ēu)				...	...	...	...	...	...	...
23 " " " "	ou (ōu)				...	...	...	...	...	...	...
24 Gutturalis fracta	ā				...	...	...	...	...	...	...
25 Palatalis fracta	ī				...	...	...	...	...	...	...
26 Labialis fracta	ū				...	...	...	...	...	...	...
27 Gutturo-labialis fracta	ō				...	...	...	...	...	...	...



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Contents.

	PAGE
I. Literature and Philology	1-54
§ 1. Dictionaries, Grammars, &c.	1-5
§ 2. Anglo-Saxon and English	6
§ 3. European Languages, Mediaeval and Modern	17
1. French, Italian, &c.	17
2. German, &c.	20
3. Scandinavian	23
§ 4. Classical Languages	24
1. Latin	24
2. Greek	32
§ 5. Oriental Languages	45
§ 6. <i>Anecdota Oxoniensia</i> Series	52
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E. English Theology	65
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V. Philosophy, Logic, &c.	80
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VIII. Palaeography	92

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
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CONTENTS.

VEDÂNTA-SÛTRAS WITH THE COMMENTARY OF RÂMÂNUGA.

INTRODUCTION	PAGE ix
ADHYÂYA I.	
Pâda I	3
Pâda II	255
Pâda III	296
Pâda IV	354
ADHYÂYA II.	
Pâda I	408
Pâda II	480
Pâda III	532
Pâda IV	568
ADHYÂYA III.	
Pâda I	584
Pâda II	601
Pâda III	629
Pâda IV	686
ADHYÂYA IV.	
Pâda I	715
Pâda II	728
Pâda III	744
Pâda IV	755
INDEXES BY DR. M. WINTERITZ:—	
Index of Quotations	773
Index of Sanskrit Words	782
Index of Names and Subjects	789
Corrigenda	796
Transliteration of Oriental Alphabets adopted for the Translations of the Sacred Books of the East . . .	797

INTRODUCTION.

IN the Introduction to the first volume of the translation of the 'Vedānta-Sûtras with Saṅkara's Commentary' (vol. xxxiv of this Series) I have dwelt at some length on the interest which Rāmānuga's Commentary may claim—as being, on the one hand, the fullest exposition of what may be called the Theistic Vedānta, and as supplying us, on the other, with means of penetrating to the true meaning of Bādarāyaṇa's Aphorisms. I do not wish to enter here into a fuller discussion of Rāmānuga's work in either of these aspects; an adequate treatment of them would, moreover, require considerably more space than is at my disposal. Some very useful material for the right understanding of Rāmānuga's work is to be found in the 'Analytical Outline of Contents' which Messrs. M. Rāṅgātārya and M. B. Varadarāga Aiyāṅgār have prefixed to the first volume of their scholarly translation of the Sribhāshya (Madras, 1899).

The question as to what the Sûtras really teach is a critical, not a philosophical one. This distinction seems to have been imperfectly realised by several of those critics, writing in India, who have examined the views expressed in my Introduction to the translation of Saṅkara's Commentary. A writer should not be taxed with 'philosophic incompetency,' 'hopeless theistic bias due to early training,' and the like, simply because he, on the basis of a purely critical investigation, considers himself entitled to maintain that a certain ancient document sets forth one philosophical view rather than another. I have nowhere expressed an opinion as to the comparative philosophical value of the systems of Saṅkara and Rāmānuga; not because I have no definite opinions on this point, but because to introduce them into a critical enquiry would be purposeless if not objectionable.

The question as to the true meaning of the Sûtras is

no doubt of some interest; although the interest of problems of this kind may easily be over-estimated. Among the remarks of critics on my treatment of this problem I have found little of solid value. The main arguments which I have set forth, not so much in favour of the adequacy of Rāmānuga's interpretation, as against the validity of Saṅkarācārya's understanding of the Sūtras, appear to me not to have been touched. I do not by any means consider the problem a hopeless one; but its solution will not be advanced, in any direction, but by those who will be at the trouble of submitting the entire body of the Sūtras to a new and detailed investigation, availing themselves to the full of the help that is to be derived from the study of all the existing Commentaries.

The present translation of the Sribhāshya claims to be faithful on the whole, although I must acknowledge that I have aimed rather at making it intelligible and, in a certain sense, readable than scrupulously accurate. If I had to rewrite it, I should feel inclined to go even further in the same direction. Indian Philosophy would, in my opinion, be more readily and widely appreciated than it is at present, if the translators of philosophical works had been somewhat more concerned to throw their versions into a form less strange and repellent to the western reader than literal renderings from technical Sanskrit must needs be in many passages. I am not unaware of the peculiar dangers of the plan now advocated—among which the most obvious is the temptation it offers to the translator of deviating from the text more widely than regard for clearness would absolutely require. And I am conscious of having failed in this respect in more than one instance. In other cases I have no doubt gone astray through an imperfect understanding of the author's meaning. The fact is, that as yet the time has hardly come for fully adequate translations of comprehensive works of the type of the Sribhāshya, the authors of which wrote with reference—in many cases tacit—to an immense and highly technical philosophical literature which is only just beginning to be studied, and comprehended in part, by European scholars.

It gives me great pleasure to acknowledge the help which I have received from various quarters in preparing this translation. *Pandit Gaṅgādhara Sāstrin*, C. I. E., of the Benares Sanskrit College, has, with unwearying kindness and patience, supplied me throughout with comments of his own on difficult sections of the text. *Pandit Svāmin Rāma Misra Sāstrin* has rendered me frequent assistance in the earlier portion of my task. And to Mr. A. Venis, the learned Principal of the Benares Sanskrit College, I am indebted for most instructive notes on some passages of a peculiarly technical and abstruse character. Nor can *I conclude* without expressing my sense of obligation to *Colonel G. A. Jacob*, whose invaluable 'Concordance to *the Principal Upanishads*' lightens to an incalculable *degree the task* of any scholar who is engaged in work *bearing on the Vedānta*.

VEDÂNTA-SÛTRAS
WITH
RÂMANUGA'S SRÎBHÂSHYA.

FIRST ADHYĀYA.

FIRST PĀDA.

MAY my mind be filled with devotion towards the highest Brahman, the abode of Lakshmi; who is luminously revealed in the Upanishads; who in sport produces, sustains, and reabsorbs the entire Universe; whose only aim is to foster the manifold classes of beings that humbly worship him.

The nectar of the teaching of Parāśara's son (Vyāsa),—which was brought up from the middle of the milk-ocean of the Upanishads—which restores to life the souls whose vital strength had departed owing to the heat of the fire of transmigratory existence—which was well guarded by the teachers of old—which was obscured by the mutual conflict of manifold opinions,—may intelligent men daily enjoy that as it is now presented to them in my words.

The lengthy explanation (*vṛtti*) of the Brahma-sūtras which was composed by the Reverend Bodhāyana has been abridged by former teachers; according to their views the words of the Sūtras will be explained in this present work.

1. Then therefore the enquiry into Brahman.

In this Sūtra the word 'then' expresses immediate sequence; the word 'therefore' intimates that what has taken place (*viz.* the study of the karmakāṇḍa of the Veda) constitutes the reason (of the enquiry into Brahman). For the fact is that the enquiry into (*lit.* 'the desire to know') Brahman—the fruit of which enquiry is infinite in nature and permanent—follows immediately in the case of him who, having read the Veda together with its auxiliary

disciplines, has reached the knowledge that the fruit of mere works is limited and non-permanent, and hence has conceived the desire of final release.

The compound 'brahmagigñāsā' is to be explained as 'the enquiry of Brahman,' the genitive case 'of Brahman' being understood to denote the object; in agreement with the special rule as to the meaning of the genitive case, Pāṇini II, 3, 65. It might be said that even if we accepted the general meaning of the genitive case—which is that of connexion in general—Brahman's position (in the above compound) as an object would be established by the circumstance that the 'enquiry' demands an object; but in agreement with the principle that the direct denotation of a word is to be preferred to a meaning inferred we take the genitive case 'of Brahman' as denoting the object.

The word 'Brahman' denotes the highest Person (puruṣottama), who is essentially free from all imperfections and possesses numberless classes of auspicious qualities of unsurpassable excellence. The term 'Brahman' is applied to any things which possess the quality of greatness (*brīhattva*, from the root 'brīh'); but primarily denotes that which possesses greatness, of essential nature as well as of qualities, in unlimited fulness; and such is only the Lord of all. Hence the word 'Brahman' primarily denotes him alone, and in a secondary derivative sense only those things which possess some small part of the Lord's qualities; for it would be improper to assume several meanings for the word (so that it would denote primarily or directly more than one thing). The case is analogous to that of the term 'bhagavat'.¹ The Lord only is enquired into, for the sake of immortality, by all those who are afflicted with the triad of pain. Hence the Lord of all is that Brahman which, according to the Sūtra, constitutes the object of enquiry. The word 'gigñāsā' is a desiderative formation meaning 'desire to know.' And as in the

¹ 'Bhagavat' denotes primarily the Lord, the Divinity; secondarily any holy person.

case of any desire the desired object is the chief thing, the Sūtra means to enjoin knowledge — which is the object of the desire of knowledge. The purport of the entire Sūtra then is as follows: 'Since the fruit of works known through the earlier part of the Mīmāṃsā is limited and non-permanent, and since the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman—which knowledge is to be reached through the latter part of the Mīmāṃsā—is unlimited and permanent; for this reason Brahman is to be known, after the knowledge of works has previously taken place.'—The same meaning is expressed by the Vṛttikāra when saying 'after the comprehension of works has taken place there follows the enquiry into Brahman.' And that the enquiry into works and that into Brahman constitute one body of doctrine, he (the Vṛttikāra) will declare later on 'this Sāriraka-doctrine is connected with Gaimini's doctrine as contained in sixteen adhyāyas; this proves the two to constitute one body of doctrine.' Hence the earlier and the later Mīmāṃsā are separate only in so far as there is a difference of matter to be taught by each; in the same way as the two halves of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā-sūtras, consisting of six adhyāyas each, are separate¹; and as each adhyāya is separate. The entire Mīmāṃsā-sāstra—which begins with the Sūtra 'Now therefore the enquiry into religious duty' and concludes with the Sūtra '(From there is) no return on account of scriptural statement'—has, owing to the special character of the contents, a definite order of internal succession. This is as follows. At first the precept 'one is to learn one's own text (svādhyāya)' enjoins the apprehension of that aggregate of syllables which is called 'Veda,' and is here referred to as 'svādhyāya.' Next there arises the desire to know of what nature the 'Learning' enjoined is to be, and how it is to be done. Here there come in certain injunctions such as

¹ The first six books of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā-sūtras give rules for the fundamental forms of the sacrifice; while the last six books teach how these rules are to be applied to the so-called modified forms.

‘Let a Brāhmaṇa be initiated in his eighth year’ and ‘The teacher is to make him recite the Veda’; and certain rules about special observances and restrictions—such as ‘having performed the upākarmaṇ on the full moon of Śrāvaṇa or Praushṭhapaḍa according to prescription, he is to study the sacred verses for four months and a half’—which enjoin all the required details.

From all these it is understood that the study enjoined has for its result the apprehension of the aggregate of syllables called Veda, on the part of a pupil who has been initiated by a teacher sprung from a good family, leading a virtuous life, and possessing purity of soul; who practises certain special observances and restrictions; and who learns by repeating what is recited by the teacher.

And this study of the Veda is of the nature of a *samskāra* of the text, since the form of the injunction ‘the Veda is to be studied’ shows that the Veda is the object (of the action of studying). By a *samskāra* is understood an action whereby something is fitted to produce some other effect; and that the Veda should be the object of such a *samskāra* is quite appropriate, since it gives rise to the knowledge of the four chief ends of human action—viz. religious duty, wealth, pleasure, and final release—and of the means to effect them; and since it helps to effect those ends by itself also, viz. by mere mechanical repetition (apart from any knowledge to which it may give rise).

The injunction as to the study of the Veda thus aims only at the apprehension of the aggregate of syllables (constituting the Veda) according to certain rules; it is in this way analogous to the recital of mantras.

It is further observed that the Veda thus apprehended through reading spontaneously gives rise to the ideas of certain things subserving certain purposes. A person, therefore, who has formed notions of those things immediately, i. e. on the mere apprehension of the text of the Veda through reading, thereupon naturally applies himself to the study of the *Mīmāṃsā*, which consists in a methodical discussion of the sentences constituting the text of the

Veda, and has for its result the accurate determination of the nature of those things and their different modes. Through this study the student ascertains the character of the injunctions of work which form part of the Veda, and observes that all work leads only to non-permanent results; and as, on the other hand, he immediately becomes aware that the Upanishad sections—which form part of the Veda which he has apprehended through reading—refer to an infinite and permanent result, viz. immortality, he applies himself to the study of the Sāriraka-Mīmāṃsā, which consists in a systematic discussion of the Vedānta-texts, and has for its result the accurate determination of their sense. That the fruit of mere works is transitory, while the result of the knowledge of Brahman is something permanent, the Vedānta-texts declare in many places—‘And as here the world acquired by work perishes, so there the world acquired by merit perishes’ (*Kh. Up.* VIII, 1, 6); ‘That work of his has an end’ (*Bṛi. Up.* III, 8, 10); ‘By non-permanent works the Permanent is not obtained’ (*Ka. Up.* I, 2, 10); ‘Frail indeed are those boats, the sacrifices’ (*Mu. Up.* I, 2, 7); ‘Let a Brāhmaṇa, after he has examined all these worlds that are gained by works, acquire freedom from all desires. What is not made cannot be gained by what is made. To understand this, let the pupil, with fuel in his hand, go to a teacher who is learned and dwells entirely in Brahman. To that pupil who has approached him respectfully, whose mind is altogether calm, the wise teacher truly told that knowledge of Brahman through which he knows the imperishable true Person’ (*Mu. Up.* I, 2, 12, 13).—‘Told’ here means ‘he is to tell.’—On the other hand, ‘He who knows Brahman attains the Highest’ (*Taitt. Up.* II, 1, 1); ‘He who sees this does not see death’ (*Kh. Up.* VII, 26, 2); ‘He becomes a self-ruler’ (*Kh. Up.* VII, 25, 2); ‘Knowing him he becomes immortal here’ (*Taitt. Ār.* III, 12, 7); ‘Having known him he passes over death; there is no other path to go’ (*Svet. Up.* VI, 15); ‘Having known as separate his Self and the Mover, pleased thereby he goes to immortality’ (*Svet. Up.* I, 6).

But—an objection here is raised—the mere learning of the Veda with its auxiliary disciplines gives rise to the knowledge that the heavenly world and the like are the results of works, and that all such results are transitory, while immortality is the fruit of meditation on Brahman. Possessing such knowledge, a person desirous of final release may at once proceed to the enquiry into Brahman; and what need is there of a systematic consideration of religious duty (i. e. of the study of the Pûrva Mīmāṃsā)?—If this reasoning were valid, we reply, the person desirous of release need not even apply himself to the study of the Sârîraka Mīmāṃsā, since Brahman is known from the mere reading of the Veda with its auxiliary disciplines.—True. Such knowledge arises indeed immediately (without deeper enquiry). But a matter apprehended in this immediate way is not raised above doubt and mistake. Hence a systematic discussion of the Vedânta-texts must be undertaken in order that their sense may be fully ascertained.—We agree. But you will have to admit that for the very same reason we must undertake a systematic enquiry into religious duty!

THE SMALL PŪRVAPAKSHA.

But—a further objection is urged—as that which has to precede the systematic enquiry into Brahman we should assign something which that enquiry necessarily presupposes. The enquiry into the nature of duty, however, does not form such a prerequisite, since a consideration of the Vedânta-texts may be undertaken by any one who has read those texts, even if he is not acquainted with works.—But in the Vedânta-texts there are enjoined meditations on the Udgîtha and the like which are matters auxiliary to works; and such meditations are not possible for him who is not acquainted with those works!—You who raise this objection clearly are ignorant of what kind of knowledge the Sârîraka Mīmāṃsā is concerned with! What that sâstra aims at is to destroy completely that

wrong knowledge which is the root of all pain, for man, liable to birth, old age, and death, and all the numberless other evils connected with transmigratory existence—evils that spring from the view, due to beginningless Nescience, that there is plurality of existence; and to that end the śāstra endeavours to establish the knowledge of the unity of the Self. Now to this knowledge, the knowledge of works—which is based on the assumption of plurality of existence—is not only useless but even opposed. The consideration of the Udgītha and the like, which is supplementary to works only, finds a place in the Vedānta-texts, only because like them it is of the nature of knowledge; but it has no direct connexion with the true topic of those texts. Hence some prerequisite must be indicated which has reference to the principal topic of the śāstra.—Quite so; and this prerequisite is just the knowledge of works; for scripture declares that final release results from knowledge with works added. The Sūtra-writer himself says further on ‘And there is need of all works, on account of the scriptural statement of sacrifices and the like’ (Ve. Sū. III, 4, 26). And if the required works were not known, one could not determine which works have to be combined with knowledge and which not. Hence the knowledge of works is just the necessary prerequisite.—Not so, we reply. That which puts an end to Nescience is exclusively the knowledge of Brahman, which is pure intelligence and antagonistic to all plurality. For final release consists just in the cessation of Nescience; how then can works—to which there attach endless differences connected with caste, āśrama, object to be accomplished, means and mode of accomplishment, &c.—ever supply a means for the cessation of ignorance, which is essentially the cessation of the view that difference exists? That works, the results of which are transitory, are contrary to final release, and that such release can be effected through knowledge only, scripture declares in many places; compare all the passages quoted above (p. 7).

As to the assertion that knowledge requires sacrifices and other works, we remark that—as follows from the

essential contrariety of knowledge and works, and as further appears from an accurate consideration of the words of scripture—pious works can contribute only towards the rise of the desire of knowledge, in so far namely as they clear the internal organ (of knowledge), but can have no influence on the production of the fruit, i. e. knowledge itself. For the scriptural passage concerned runs as follows: 'Brāhmaṇas desire to know him by the study of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts,' &c. (*Bṛi. Up. XI, 4, 22*).

According to this passage, the desire only of knowledge springs up through works; while another text teaches that calmness, self-restraint, and so on, are the direct means for the origination of knowledge itself. (Having become tranquil, calm, subdued, satisfied, patient, and collected, he is to see the Self within the Self (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 23*.)

The process thus is as follows. After the mind of a man has been cleaned of all impurities through works performed in many preceding states of existence, without a view to special forms of reward, there arises in him the desire of knowledge, and thereupon—through knowledge itself originated by certain scriptural texts—'Being only, this was in the beginning, one only without a second' (*Kh. Up. VI, 1, 2*); 'Truth, Knowledge, the Infinite, is Brahman' (*Taitt. Up. II, 1*); 'Without parts, without actions, calm, without fault, without taint' (*Svet. Up. VI, 19*); 'This Self is Brahman' (*Bṛi. Up. II, 5, 19*); 'Thou art that' (*Kh. Up. VI, 9, 7*), Nescience comes to an end. Now, 'hearing,' 'reflection,' and 'meditation,' are helpful towards cognising the sense of these Vedic texts. 'Hearing' (*śravaṇa*) means the apprehension of the sense of scripture, together with collateral arguments, from a teacher who possesses the true insight, viz. that the Vedānta-texts establish the doctrine of the unity of the Self. 'Reflection' (*mananam*) means the confirmation within oneself of the sense taught by the teacher, by means of arguments showing it alone to be suitable. 'Meditation' (*nididhyāsanam*) finally means the constant holding of that sense before one's mind, so as to dispel thereby the antagonistic beginningless imagination of plurality. In the case of him who

through 'hearing,' 'reflection,' and meditation,' has dispelled the entire imagination of plurality, the knowledge of the sense of Vedānta-texts puts an end to Nescience; and what we therefore require is a statement of the indispensable prerequisites of such 'hearing,' 'reflection,' and so on. Now of such prerequisites there are four, viz. discrimination of what is permanent and what is non-permanent; the full possession of calmness of mind, self-restraint and similar means; the renunciation of all enjoyment of fruits here below as well as in the next world; and the desire of final release.

Without these the desire of knowledge cannot arise; and they are therefore known, from the very nature of the matter, to be necessary prerequisites. To sum up: The root of bondage is the unreal view of plurality which itself has its root in Nescience that conceals the true being of Brahman. Bondage itself thus is unreal, and is on that account cut short, together with its root, by mere knowledge. Such knowledge is originated by texts such as 'That art thou'; and work is of no help either towards its nature, or its origination, or its fruit (i. e. release). It is on the other hand helpful towards the desire of knowledge, which arises owing to an increase of the element of goodness (sattva) in the soul, due to the destruction of the elements of passion (ragas) and darkness (tamas) which are the root of all moral evil. This use is referred to in the text quoted above, 'Brāhmaṇas wish to know him,' &c. As, therefore, the knowledge of works is of no use towards the knowledge of Brahman, we must acknowledge as the prerequisite of the latter knowledge the four means mentioned above.

THE SMALL SIDDHĀNTA.

To this argumentation we make the following reply. We admit that release consists only in the cessation of Nescience, and that this cessation results entirely from the knowledge of Brahman. But a distinction has here to be made regarding the nature of this knowledge which

the Vedānta-texts aim at enjoining for the purpose of putting an end to Nescience. Is it merely the knowledge of the sense of sentences which originates from the sentences? or is it knowledge in the form of meditation (upāsana) which has the knowledge just referred to as its antecedent? It cannot be knowledge of the former kind; for such knowledge springs from the mere apprehension of the sentence, apart from any special injunction, and moreover we do not observe that the cessation of Nescience is effected by such knowledge merely. Our adversary will perhaps attempt to explain things in the following way. The Vedānta-texts do not, he will say, produce that knowledge which makes an end of Nescience, so long as the imagination of plurality is not dispelled. And the fact that such knowledge, even when produced, does not at once and for every one put a stop to the view of plurality by no means subverts my opinion; for, to mention an analogous instance, the double appearance of the moon—presenting itself to a person affected with a certain weakness of vision—does not come to an end as soon as the oneness of the moon has been apprehended by reason. Moreover, even without having come to an end, the view of plurality is powerless to effect further bondage, as soon as the root, i. e. Nescience, has once been cut. But this defence we are unable to admit. It is impossible that knowledge should not arise when its means, i. e. the texts conveying knowledge, are once present. And we observe that even when there exists an antagonistic imagination (interfering with the rise of knowledge), information given by competent persons, the presence of characteristic marks (on which a correct inference may be based), and the like give rise to knowledge which sublates the erroneous imagination. Nor can we admit that even after the sense of texts has been apprehended, the view of plurality may continue owing to some small remainder of beginningless imagination. For as this imagination which constitutes the means for the view of plurality is itself false, it is necessarily put an end to by the rise of true knowledge. If this did not take place, that imagination would never come to an end, since there is no

other means but knowledge to effect its cessation. To say that the view of plurality, which is the effect of that imagination, continues even after its root has been cut, is mere nonsense. The instance of some one seeing the moon double is not analogous. For in his case the non-cessation of wrong knowledge explains itself from the circumstance that the cause of wrong knowledge, viz. the real defect of the eye which does not admit of being sublated by knowledge, is not removed, although that which would sublimate wrong knowledge is near. On the other hand, effects, such as fear and the like, may come to an end because they can be sublated by means of knowledge of superior force. Moreover, if it were true that knowledge arises through the dispelling of the imagination of plurality, the rise of knowledge would really never be brought about. For the imagination of plurality has through gradual growth in the course of beginningless time acquired an infinite strength, and does not therefore admit of being dispelled by the comparatively weak conception of non-duality. Hence we conclude that the knowledge which the Vedânta-texts aim at inculcating is a knowledge other than the mere knowledge of the sense of sentences, and denoted by 'dhyâna,' 'upâsanâ' (i. e. meditation), and similar terms.

With this agree scriptural texts such as 'Having known it, let him practise meditation' (*Bri. Up. IV, 4, 21*); 'He who, having searched out the Self, knows it' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1*); 'Meditate on the Self as Om' (*Mu. Up. II, 2, 6*); 'Having known that, he is freed from the jaws of death' (*Ka. Up. I, 3, 15*); 'Let a man meditate on the Self only as his world' (*Bri. Up. I, 4, 15*); 'The Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be reflected on, to be meditated on' (*Bri. Up. IV, 5, 6*); 'That we must search out, that we must try to understand' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1*).

(According to the principle of the oneness of purport of the different *sâkhâs*) all these texts must be viewed as agreeing in meaning with the injunction of meditation contained in the passage quoted from the *Bri. Up.*; and what they enjoin is therefore meditation. In the first and second passages quoted, the words 'having known' and

'having searched out' (*vigñāya* ; *anuvīdya*) contain a mere reference to (not injunction of) the apprehension of the meaning of texts, such apprehension subserving meditation; while the injunction of meditation (which is the true purport of the passages) is conveyed by the clauses 'let him practise meditation' (*pragñām kurvīta*) and 'he knows it.' In the same way the clause 'the Self is to be heard' is a mere *anuvāda*, i.e. a mere reference to what is already established by other means; for a person who has read the Veda observes that it contains instruction about matters connected with certain definite purposes, and then on his own account applies himself to methodical 'hearing,' in order definitely to ascertain these matters; 'hearing' thus is established already. In the same way the clause 'the Self is to be reflected upon' is a mere *anuvāda* of reflection which is known as a means of confirming what one has 'heard.' It is therefore meditation only which all those texts enjoin. In agreement with this a later Sūtra also says, 'Repetition more than once, on account of instruction' (Ve. Sū. IV, 1, 1). That the knowledge intended to be enjoined as the means of final release is of the nature of meditation, we conclude from the circumstance that the terms 'knowing' and 'meditating' are seen to be used in place of each other in the earlier and later parts of Vedic texts. Compare the following passages: 'Let a man meditate on mind as Brahman,' and 'he who knows this shines and warms through his celebrity, fame, and glory of countenance' (*Kh. Up. III, 18, 1* ; 6). And 'He does not know him, for he is not complete,' and 'Let men meditate on him as the Self' (*Bṛi. Up. I, 4, 7*). And 'He who knows what he knows,' and 'Teach me the deity on which you meditate' (*Kh. Up. IV, 1, 6* ; 2, 2).

'Meditation' means steady remembrance, i.e. a continuity of steady remembrance, uninterrupted like the flow of oil; in agreement with the scriptural passage which declares steady remembrance to be the means of release, 'on the attainment of remembrance all the ties are loosened' (*Kh. Up. VII, 26, 2*). Such remembrance is of

the same character (form) as seeing (intuition); for the passage quoted has the same purport as the following one, 'The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved, and all the works of that man perish when he has been seen who is high and low' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8). And this being so, we conclude that the passage 'the Self is to be seen' teaches that 'Meditation' has the character of 'seeing' or 'intuition.' And that remembrance has the character of 'seeing' is due to the element of imagination (representation) which prevails in it. All this has been set forth at length by the Vākyakāra. 'Knowledge (vedana) means meditation (upāsana), scripture using the word in that sense'; i. e. in all Upanishads that knowledge which is enjoined as the means of final release is Meditation. The Vākyakāra then propounds a pūrvapaksha (primā facie view), 'Once he is to make the meditation, the matter enjoined by scripture being accomplished thereby, as in the case of the prayāgas and the like'; and then sums up against this in the words 'but (meditation) is established on account of the term meditation'; that means—knowledge repeated more than once (i.e. meditation) is determined to be the means of Release.—The Vākyakāra then goes on 'Meditation is steady remembrance, on the ground of observation and statement.' That means—this knowledge, of the form of meditation, and repeated more than once, is of the nature of steady remembrance.

Such remembrance has been declared to be of the character of 'seeing,' and this character of seeing consists in its possessing the character of immediate presentation (pratyakshatā). With reference to remembrance, which thus acquires the character of immediate presentation and is the means of final release, scripture makes a further determination, viz. in the passage Ka. Up. II, 23, 'That Self cannot be gained by the study of the Veda ("reflection"), nor by thought ("meditation"), nor by much hearing. Whom the Self chooses, by him it may be gained; to him the Self reveals its being.' This text says at first that mere hearing, reflection, and meditation do not suffice to gain the Self, and then declares, 'Whom the Self chooses, by him

it may be gained.' Now a 'chosen' one means a most beloved person; the relation being that he by whom that Self is held most dear is most dear to the Self. That the Lord (bhagavān) himself endeavours that this most beloved person should gain the Self, he himself declares in the following words, 'To those who are constantly devoted and worship with love I give that knowledge by which they reach me' (Bha. Gī. X, 10), and 'To him who has knowledge I am dear above all things, and he is dear to me' (VII, 17). Hence, he who possesses remembrance, marked by the character of immediate presentation (sākshātkāra), and which itself is dear above all things since the object remembered is such; he, we say, is chosen by the highest Self, and by him the highest Self is gained. Steady remembrance of this kind is designated by the word 'devotion' (bhakti); for this term has the same meaning as upāsana (meditation). For this reason scripture and smṛiti agree in making the following declarations, 'A man knowing him passes over death' (Svet. Up. III, 8); 'Knowing him thus he here becomes immortal' (Taitt. Ār. III, 12, 7); 'Neither by the Vedas, nor by austerities, nor by gifts, nor by sacrifice can I be so seen as thou hast seen me. But by devotion exclusive I may in this form be known and seen in truth, O Arguna, and also be entered into' (Bha. Gī. XI, 53, 54); 'That highest Person, O Pārtha, may be obtained by exclusive devotion' (VIII, 22).

That of such steady remembrance sacrifices and so on are means will be declared later on (Ve. Sū. III, 4, 26). Although sacrifices and the like are enjoined with a view to the origination of knowledge (in accordance with the passage 'They desire to know,' Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 22), it is only knowledge in the form of meditation which—being daily practised, constantly improved by repetition, and continued up to death—is the means of reaching Brahman, and hence all the works connected with the different conditions of life are to be performed throughout life only for the purpose of originating such knowledge. This the Sūtrakāra declares in Ve. Sū. IV, 1, 12; 16; III, 4, 33, and other places. The Vākyakāra also declares that

steady remembrance results only from abstention, and so on; his words being 'This (viz. steady remembrance= meditation) is obtained through abstention (viveka), freeness of mind (vimoka), repetition (abhyāsa), works (kriyā), virtuous conduct (kalyāṇa), freedom from dejection (anavasāda), absence of exultation (anuddharsha); according to feasibility and scriptural statement.' The Vākyakāra also gives definitions of all these terms. Abstention (viveka) means keeping the body clean from all food, impure either owing to species (such as the flesh of certain animals), or abode (such as food belonging to a *Kāṇḍāla* or the like), or accidental cause (such as food into which a hair or the like has fallen). The scriptural passage authorising this point is *Kh. Up. VII, 26*, 'The food being pure, the mind becomes pure; the mind being pure, there results steady remembrance.' Freeness of mind (vimoka) means absence of attachment to desires. The authoritative passage here is 'Let him meditate with a calm mind' (*Kh. Up. III, 14, 1*). Repetition means continued practice. For this point the *Bhāṣya-kāra* quotes an authoritative text from *Smṛiti*, viz.: 'Having constantly been absorbed in the thought of that being' (*sadā tadbhāvabhāvitaḥ*; *Bha. Gṛ. VIII, 6*).—By 'works' (*kriyā*) is understood the performance, according to one's ability, of the five great sacrifices. The authoritative passages here are 'This person who performs works is the best of those who know Brahman' (*Mu. Up. III, 1, 4*); and 'Him *Brāhmaṇas* seek to know by recitation of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts, by penance, by fasting' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 22*).—By virtuous conduct (*kalyāṇāni*) are meant truthfulness, honesty, kindness, liberality, gentleness, absence of covetousness. Confirmatory texts are 'By truth he is to be obtained' (*Mu. Up. III, 1, 5*), and 'to them belongs that pure Brahman-world' (*Pr. Up. I, 16*).—That lowness of spirit or want of cheerfulness which results from unfavourable conditions of place or time and the remembrance of causes of sorrow, is denoted by the term 'dejection'; the contrary of this is 'freedom from dejection.' The relevant scriptural passage is 'This Self cannot be obtained by one lacking in strength' (*Mu. Up. III, 2, 4*).

—‘Exultation’ is that satisfaction of mind which springs from circumstances opposite to those just mentioned; the contrary is ‘absence of exultation.’ Overgreat satisfaction also stands in the way (of meditation). The scriptural passage for this is ‘Calm, subdued,’ &c. (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 23*).—What the Vākyakāra means to say is therefore that knowledge is realised only through the performance of the duly prescribed works, on the part of a person fulfilling all the enumerated conditions.

Analogously another scriptural passage says ‘He who knows both knowledge and non-knowledge together, overcoming death by non-knowledge reaches the Immortal through knowledge’ (*Īs. Up. II*). Here the term ‘non-knowledge’ denotes the works enjoined on the different castes and āśramas; and the meaning of the text is that, having discarded by such works death, i.e. the previous works antagonistic to the origination of knowledge, a man reaches the Immortal, i.e. Brahman, through knowledge. The non-knowledge of which this passage speaks as being the means of overcoming death can only mean that which is other than knowledge, viz. prescribed works. The word has the same sense in the following passage: ‘Firm in traditional knowledge he offered many sacrifices, leaning on the knowledge of Brahman, so as to pass beyond death by non-knowledge’ (*Vi. Pu. VI, 6, 12*).—Antagonistic to knowledge (as said above) are all good and evil actions, and hence—as equally giving rise to an undesirable result—they may both be designated as evil. They stand in the way of the origination of knowledge in so far as they strengthen the elements of passion and darkness which are antagonistic to the element of goodness which is the cause of the rise of knowledge. That evil works stand in the way of such origination, the following scriptural text declares: ‘He makes him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds do an evil deed’ (*Ka. Up. III, 8*). That passion and darkness veil the knowledge of truth while goodness on the other hand gives rise to it, the Divine one has declared himself, in the passage ‘From goodness springs knowledge’ (*Bha. Gī. XIV, 17*). Hence, in order that

knowledge may arise, evil works have to be got rid of, and this is effected by the performance of acts of religious duty not aiming at some immediate result (such as the heavenly world and the like); according to the text 'by works of religious duty he discards all evil.' Knowledge which is the means of reaching Brahman, thus requires the works prescribed for the different âśramas; and hence the systematic enquiry into works (i. e. the Pûrva Mîmâṃsâ)—from which we ascertain the nature of the works required and also the transitoriness and limitation of the fruits of mere works—forms a necessary antecedent to the systematic enquiry into Brahman. Moreover the discrimination of permanent and non-permanent things, &c. (i. e. the tetrad of 'means' mentioned above, p. 11) cannot be accomplished without the study of the Mîmâṃsâ; for unless we ascertain all the distinctions of fruits of works, means, modes of procedure and qualification (on the part of the agent) we can hardly understand the true nature of works, their fruits, the transitoriness or non-transitoriness of the latter, the permanence of the Self, and similar matters. That those conditions (viz. nityânityavastuviveka, sama, dama, &c.) are 'means' must be determined on the basis of viniyoga ('application' which determines the relation of principal and subordinate matters—āṅgin and āṅga); and this viniyoga which depends on direct scriptural statement (sruti), inferential signs (liṅga), and so on, is treated of in the third book of the Pûrva Mîmâṃsâ-sûtras. And further we must, in this connexion, consider also the meditations on the Udgîtha and similar things—which, although aiming at the success of works, are of the nature of reflections on Brahman (which is viewed in them under various forms)—and as such have reference to knowledge of Brahman. Those works also (with which these meditations are connected) aim at no special results of their own, and produce and help to perfect the knowledge of Brahman: they are therefore particularly connected with the enquiry into Brahman. And that these meditations presuppose an understanding of the nature of works is admitted by every one.

THE GREAT PŪRVAPAKSHA.

The only Reality is Brahman.

Brahman, which is pure intelligence and opposed to all difference, constitutes the only reality; and everything else, i. e. the plurality of manifold knowing subjects, objects of knowledge, and acts of knowledge depending on those two, is only imagined on (or 'in') that Brahman, and is essentially false.

'In the beginning, my dear, there was that only which is, one only without a second' (*Kh. Up. VI, 2, 1*); 'The higher knowledge is that by which the Indestructible is apprehended' (*Mu. Up. I, 1, 5*); 'That which cannot be seen nor seized, which has no eyes nor ears, no hands nor feet, the permanent, the all-pervading, the most subtle, the imperishable which the wise regard as the source of all beings' (*Mu. Up. I, 1, 6*); 'The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman' (*Taitt. Up. II, 1*); 'He who is without parts, without actions, tranquil, without fault, without taint' (*Svet. Up. VI, 19*); 'By whom it is not thought, by him it is thought; he by whom it is thought knows it not. It is not known by those who know it, known by those who do not know it' (*Ke. Up. II, 3*); 'Thou mayest not see the seer of sight; thou mayest not think the thinker of thought' (*Bri. Up. III, 4, 2*); 'Bliss is Brahman' (*Taitt. Up. III, 6, 1*); 'All this is that Self' (*Bri. Up. IV, 5, 7*); 'There is here no diversity whatever' (*Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19*); 'From death to death goes he who sees any difference here' (*Ka. Up. II, 4, 10*); 'For where there is duality as it were, there one sees the other'; 'but where the Self has become all of him, by what means, and whom, should he see? by what means, and whom, should he know?' (*Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15*); 'the effect is a name merely which has its origin in speech; the truth is that (the thing made of clay) is clay merely' (*Kh. Up. VI, 1, 4*); 'for if he makes but the smallest distinction in it there is fear for him' (*Taitt. Up. II, 7*);—the two following Vedānta-sūtras: III, 2, 11; III, 2, 3—the following passages from the Vishṇu-purāṇa :

'In which all difference vanishes, which is pure Being, which is not the object of words, which is known by the Self only—that knowledge is called Brahman' (VI, 7, 53); 'Him whose essential nature is knowledge, who is stainless in reality'; 'Him who, owing to erroneous view, abides in the form of things' (I, 2, 6); 'the Reality thou art alone, there is no other, O Lord of the world!—whatever matter is seen belongs to thee whose being is knowledge; but owing to their erroneous opinion the non-devout look on it as the form of the world. This whole world has knowledge for its essential nature, but the Unwise viewing it as being of the nature of material things are driven round on the ocean of delusion. Those however who possess true knowledge and pure minds see this whole world as having knowledge for its Self, as thy form, O highest Lord!' (Vi. Pu. I, 4, 38 ff.).—'Of that Self, although it exists in one's own and in other bodies, the knowledge is of one kind, and that is Reality; those who maintain duality hold a false view' (II, 14, 31); 'If there is some other one, different from me, then it can be said, "I am this and that one is another"' (II, 13, 86); 'As owing to the difference of the holes of the flute the air equally passing through them all is called by the names of the different notes of the musical scale; so it is with the universal Self' (II, 14, 32); 'He is I; he is thou; he is all: this Universe is his form. Abandon the error of difference. The king being thus instructed, abandoned the view of difference, having gained an intuition of Reality' (II, 16, 24). 'When that view which gives rise to difference is absolutely destroyed, who then will make the untrue distinction between the individual Self and Brahman?' (VI, 7, 94).—The following passages from the Bhagavad-Gītā: 'I am the Self dwelling within all beings' (X, 20); 'Know me to be the soul within all bodies' (XIII, 2); 'Being there is none, movable or immovable, which is without me' (X, 39).—All these and other texts, the purport of which clearly is instruction as to the essential nature of things, declare that Brahman only, i. e. non-differenced pure intelligence is real, while everything else is false.

The appearance of plurality is due to avidyā.

‘Falsehood’ (mithyātva) belongs to what admits of being terminated by the cognition of the real thing—such cognition being preceded by conscious activity (not by mere absence of consciousness or knowledge). The snake, e. g. which has for its substrate a rope or the like is false; for it is due to an imperfection (dosha) that the snake is imagined in (or ‘on’) the rope. In the same way this entire world, with its distinctions of gods, men, animals, inanimate matter, and so on, is, owing to an imperfection, wrongly imagined in the highest Brahman whose substance is mere intelligence, and therefore is false in so far as it may be sublated by the cognition of the nature of the real Brahman. What constitutes that imperfection is beginningless Nescience (avidyā), which, hiding the truth of things, gives rise to manifold illusions, and cannot be defined either as something that is or as something that is not.—‘By the Untrue they are hidden; of them which are true the Untrue is the covering’ (*Kh. Up. VIII, 3, 1*); ‘Know Māyā to be Prakṛiti, and the great Lord him who is associated with Māyā’ (*Svet. Up. IV, 10*); ‘Indra appears manifold through the Māyās’ (*Bṛi. Up. II, 5, 19*); ‘My Māyā is hard to overcome’ (*Bha. Gī. VII, 14*); ‘When the soul slumbering in beginningless Māyā awakes’ (*Gau. Kā. I, 16*).—These and similar texts teach that it is through beginningless Māyā that to Brahman which truly is pure non-differenced intelligence its own nature hides itself, and that it sees diversity within itself. As has been said, ‘Because the Holy One is essentially of the nature of intelligence, the form of all, but not material; therefore know that all particular things like rocks, oceans, hills and so on, have proceeded from intelligence¹. But when, on

¹ In agreement with the use made of this passage by the Pūrva-pakshin, *vigñāna* must here be understood in the sense of *avidyā*. *Vigñānasabdēna vividham gñāyate = neneti karaṇavyutpattiyā = vidyā = bhidhīyate. Sru. Pra.*

the cessation of all work, everything is only pure intelligence in its own proper form, without any imperfections; then no differences—the fruit of the tree of wishes—any longer exist between things. Therefore nothing whatever, at any place or any time, exists apart from intelligence: intelligence, which is one only, is viewed as manifold by those whose minds are distracted by the effects of their own works. Intelligence pure, free from stain, free from grief, free from all contact with desire and other affections, everlastingly one is the highest Lord—Vāsudeva apart from whom nothing exists. I have thus declared to you the lasting truth of things—that intelligence only is true and everything else untrue. And that also which is the cause of ordinary worldly existence has been declared to you' (Vi. Pu. II, 12, 39, 40, 43-45).

Avidyā is put an end to by true Knowledge.

Other texts declare that this Nescience comes to an end through the cognition of the essential unity of the Self with Brahman which is nothing but non-differenced intelligence. 'He does not again go to death'; 'He sees this as one'; 'He who sees this does not see death' (*Kh. Up.* VI, 27); 'When he finds freedom from fear and rest in that which is invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported, then he has obtained the fearless' (*Taitt. Up.* II, 7); 'The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved and all his works perish when he has been beheld who is high and low' (*Mu. Up.* II, 2, 8); 'He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman only' (*Mu. Up.* III, 2, 9); 'Knowing him only a man passes over death; there is no other path to go' (*Svet. Up.* III, 8). In these and similar passages, the term 'death' denotes Nescience; analogously to the use of the term in the following words of Sanatsugāta, 'Delusion I call death; and freedom from delusion I call immortality' (*Sanatsug.* II, 5). The knowledge again of the essential unity and non-difference of Brahman—which is ascertained from decisive texts such as 'The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman' (*Taitt. Up.* II, 1); 'Knowledge, bliss is

Brahman' (*Bri. Up. III, 9, 28*)—is confirmed by other passages, such as 'Now if a man meditates on another deity, thinking the deity is one and he another, he does not know' (*Bri. Up. I, 4, 10*); 'Let men meditate upon him as the Self' (*Bri. Up. I, 4, 7*); 'Thou art that' (*Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7*); 'Am I thou, O holy deity? and art thou me, O holy deity?'; 'What I am that is he; what he is that am I.'—This the Sūtrakāra himself will declare 'But as the Self (scriptural texts) acknowledge and make us apprehend (the Lord)' (*Ve. Sū. IV, 1, 3*). Thus the Vākya-kāra also, 'It is the Self—thus one should apprehend (everything), for everything is effected by that.' And to hold that by such cognition of the oneness of Brahman essentially false bondage, together with its cause, comes to an end, is only reasonable.

Scripture is of greater force than Perception.

But, an objection is raised—how can knowledge, springing from the sacred texts, bring about a cessation of the view of difference, in manifest opposition to the evidence of Perception?—How then, we rejoin, can the knowledge that this thing is a rope and not a snake bring about, in opposition to actual perception, the cessation of the (idea of the) snake?—You will perhaps reply that in this latter case there is a conflict between two forms of perception, while in the case under discussion the conflict is between direct perception and Scripture which is based on perception. But against this we would ask the question how, in the case of a conflict between two equal cognitions, we decide as to which of the two is refuted (sublated) by the other. If—as is to be expected—you reply that what makes the difference between the two is that one of them is due to a defective cause while the other is not: we point out that this distinction holds good also in the case of Scripture and perception being in conflict. It is not considerations as to the equality of conflicting cognitions, as to their being dependent or independent, and so on, that determine which of the two sublates the other; if that were

the case, the perception which presents to us the flame of the lamp as one only would not be sublated by the cognition arrived at by inference that there is a succession of different flames. Wherever there is a conflict between cognitions based on two different means of knowledge we assign the position of the 'sublated one' to that which admits of being accounted for in some other way; while that cognition which affords no opening for being held unauthoritative and cannot be accounted for in another way, is the 'sublating one'¹. This is the principle on which the relation between 'what sublates' and 'what is sublated' is decided everywhere. Now apprehension of Brahman—which is mere intelligence, eternal, pure, free, self-luminous—is effected by Scripture which rests on endless unbroken tradition, cannot therefore be suspected of any, even the least, imperfection, and hence cannot be non-authoritative; the state of bondage, on the other hand, with its manifold distinctions is proved by Perception, Inference, and so on, which are capable of imperfections and therefore may be non-authoritative. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the state of bondage is put an end to by the apprehension of Brahman. And that imperfection of which Perception—through which we apprehend a world of manifold distinctions—may be assumed to be capable, is so-called Nescience, which consists in the beginningless wrong imagination of difference.—Well then—a further objection is raised—let us admit that Scripture is perfect because

¹ The distinction is illustrated by the different views Perception and Inference cause us to take of the nature of the flame of the lamp. To Perception the flame, as long as it burns, seems one and the same: but on the ground of the observation that the different particles of the wick and the oil are consumed in succession, we infer that there are many distinct flames succeeding one another. And we accept the Inference as valid, and as sublating or refuting the immediate perception, because the perceived oneness of the flame admits of being accounted for 'otherwise,' viz. on the ground of the many distinct flames originating in such rapid succession that the eye mistakes them for one. The inference on the other hand does not admit of being explained in another way.

resting on an endless unbroken tradition; but must we then not admit that texts evidently presupposing the view of duality, as e.g. 'Let him who desires the heavenly world offer the *Gyotishṭoma*-sacrifice'—are liable to refutation?—True, we reply. As in the case of the *Udgātri* and *Pratihatri* breaking the chain (not at the same time, but) in succession¹, so here also the earlier texts (which refer to duality and transitory rewards) are sublated by the later texts which teach final release, and are not themselves sublated by anything else.

The texts which represent Brahman as devoid of qualities have greater force.

The same reasoning applies to those passages in the Vedānta-texts which inculcate meditation on the qualified Brahman, since the highest Brahman is without any qualities.—But consider such passages as 'He who cognises all, who knows all' (*Mu. Up. I, 1, 9*); 'His high power is revealed as manifold, as essential, acting as force and knowledge' (*Svet. Up. VI, 8*); 'He whose wishes are true, whose purposes are true' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 1, 5*); how can these passages, which clearly aim at defining the nature of Brahman, be liable to refutation?—Owing to the greater weight, we reply, of those texts which set forth Brahman as devoid of qualities. 'It is not coarse, not fine, not short, not long' (*Bṛi. Up. III, 8, 8*); 'The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' (*Taitt. Up. II, 1*); 'That which is free from qualities,' 'that which is free from stain'—these and similar texts convey the notion of Brahman being changeless, eternal intelligence devoid of all difference; while the other texts—quoted before—teach the qualified Brahman. And there being a conflict between the two sets of passages, we—according to the *Mīmāṃsā* principle referred to above—decide that the texts referring to Brahman as devoid of qualities are of greater force, because they are later in

¹ The reference is to the point discussed Pū. Mī. Sū. VI, 5, 54 (*Gaim. Nyā. Mālā Vistara*, p. 285).

order¹ than those which speak of Brahman as having qualities. Thus everything is settled.

The text Taitt. Up. II, 1 refers to Brahman as devoid of qualities.

But—an objection is raised—even the passage ‘The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman’ intimates certain qualities of Brahman, viz. true being, knowledge, infinity!—Not so, we reply. From the circumstance that all the terms of the sentence stand in co-ordination, it follows that they convey the idea of one matter (sense) only. If against this you urge that the sentence may convey the idea of one matter only, even if directly expressing a thing distinguished by several qualities; we must remark that you display an ignorance of the meaning of language which appears to point to some weakmindedness on your part. A sentence conveys the idea of one matter (sense) only when all its constitutive words denote one and the same thing; if, on the other hand, it expresses a thing possessing several attributes, the difference of these attributes necessarily leads to a difference in meaning on the part of the individual words, and then the oneness of meaning of the sentence is lost.—But from your view of the passage it would follow that the several words are mere synonyms!—Give us your attention, we reply, and learn that several words may convey one meaning without being idle synonyms. From the determination of the unity of purport of the whole sentence² we conclude that the several words, applied to one thing, aim at expressing what is opposite in nature to whatever is contrary to the meanings of the several words, and that thus they have meaning and unity of meaning and yet are not mere synonyms. The details

¹ The texts which deny all qualities of Brahman are later in order than the texts which refer to Brahman as qualified, because denial presupposes that which is to be denied.

² The unity of purport of the sentence is inferred from its constituent words having the same case-ending.

are as follows. Brahman is to be defined as what is contrary in nature to all other things. Now whatever is opposed to Brahman is virtually set aside by the three words (constituting the definition of Brahman in the Taittiriya-text). The word 'true' (or 'truly being') has the purport of distinguishing Brahman from whatever things have no truth, as being the abodes of change; the word 'knowledge' distinguishes Brahman from all non-sentient things whose light depends on something else (which are not self-luminous); and the word 'infinite' distinguishes it from whatever is limited in time or space or nature. Nor is this 'distinction' some positive or negative attribute of Brahman, it rather is just Brahman itself as opposed to everything else; just as the distinction of white colour from black and other colours is just the true nature of white, not an attribute of it. The three words constituting the text thus *have* a meaning, have *one* meaning, and are non-synonymous, in so far as they convey the essential distinction of one thing, viz. Brahman from everything else. The text thus declares the one Brahman which is self-luminous and free from all difference. On this interpretation of the text we discern its oneness in purport with other texts, such as 'Being only this was in the beginning, one only, without a second.' Texts such as 'That from whence these beings are born' (Taitt. Up. III, 1); 'Being only this was in the beginning' (Kṛ. Up. VI, 2, 1); 'Self alone was this in the beginning' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 1), &c., describe Brahman as the cause of the world; and of this Brahman the Taittiriya passage 'The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' gives the strict definition.

In agreement with the principle that all sâkhâs teach the same doctrine we have to understand that, in all the texts which speak of Brahman as cause, Brahman must be taken as being 'without a second,' i.e. without any other being of the same or a different kind; and the text which aims at defining Brahman has then to be interpreted in accordance with this characteristic of Brahman, viz. its being without a second. The statement of the Kṛândogya

as to Brahman being without a second must also be taken to imply that Brahman is non-dual as far as qualities are concerned ; otherwise it would conflict with those passages which speak of Brahman as being without qualities and without stain. We therefore conclude that the defining Taittirīya-text teaches Brahman to be an absolutely homogeneous substance.

But, the above explanation of the passage being accepted, it follows that the words 'true being,' 'knowledge,' &c., have to be viewed as abandoning their direct sense, and merely suggesting a thing distinct in nature from all that is opposite (to what the three words directly denote), and this means that we resort to so-called implication (implied meaning, *lakṣhaṇā*)!—What objection is there to such a proceeding? we reply. The force of the general purport of a sentence is greater than that of the direct denotative power of the simple terms, and it is generally admitted that the purport of grammatical co-ordination is oneness (of the matter denoted by the terms co-ordinated).—But we never observe that all words of a sentence are to be understood in an implied sense!—Is it then not observed, we reply, that *one* word is to be taken in its implied meaning if otherwise it would contradict the purport of the whole sentence? And if the purport of the sentence, which is nothing but an aggregate of words employed together, has once been ascertained, why should we not take two or three or all words in an implied sense—just as we had taken one—and thus make them fit in with the general purport? In agreement herewith those scholars who explain to us the sense of imperative sentences, teach that in imperative sentences belonging to ordinary speech all words have an implied meaning only (not their directly denotative meaning). For, they maintain, imperative forms have their primary meaning only in (Vedic) sentences which enjoin something not established by other means ; and hence in ordinary speech the effect of the action is conveyed by implication only. The other words also, which form part of those imperative sentences and denote matters connected with the action, have their primary meaning

only if connected with an action not established by other means; while if connected with an ordinary action they have a secondary, implied, meaning only¹.

**Perception reveals to us non-differenced
substance only.**

We have so far shown that in the case of a conflict between Scripture and Perception and the other instruments of knowledge, Scripture is of greater force. The fact, however, is that no such conflict is observed to exist, since Perception itself gives rise to the apprehension of a non-differenced Brahman whose nature is pure Being.—But how can it be said that Perception, which has for its object things of various kinds—and accordingly expresses itself in judgments such as ‘Here is a jar,’ ‘There is a piece of cloth’—causes the apprehension of mere Being? If there were no apprehension of difference, all cognitions would have one and the same object, and therefore would give rise to one judgment only—as takes place when one unbroken perceptive cognition is continued for some time.—True. We therefore have to enquire in what way,

¹ The theory here referred to is held by some of the Mīmāṃsakas. The imperative forms of the verb have their primary meaning, i.e. the power of originating action, only in Vedic sentences which enjoin the performance of certain actions for the bringing about of certain ends: no other means of knowledge but the Veda informing us that such ends can be accomplished by such actions. Nobody, e.g. would offer a soma sacrifice in order to obtain the heavenly world, were he not told by the Veda to do so. In ordinary life, on the other hand, no imperative possesses this entirely unique originative force, since any action which may be performed in consequence of a command may be prompted by other motives as well: it is, in technical Indian language, established already, apart from the command, by other means of knowledge. The man who, e.g. is told to milk a cow might have proceeded to do so, apart from the command, for reasons of his own. Imperatives in ordinary speech are therefore held not to have their primary meaning, and this conclusion is extended, somewhat unwarrantably one should say, to all the words entering into an imperative clause.

in the judgment 'here is a jar,' an assertion is made about being as well as some special form of being. These implied judgments cannot both be founded on perception, for they are the results of acts of cognition occupying different moments of time, while the perceptive cognition takes place in one moment (is instantaneous). We therefore must decide whether it is the essential nature of the jar, or its difference from other things, that is the object of perception. And we must adopt the former alternative, because the apprehension of difference presupposes the apprehension of the essential nature of the thing, and, in addition, the remembrance of its counterentities (i. e. the things from which the given thing differs). Hence difference is not apprehended by Perception; and all judgments and propositions relative to difference are founded on error only.

Difference—bheda—does not admit of logical definition.

The Logicians, moreover, are unable to give a definition of such a thing as 'difference.' Difference cannot in the first place be the essential nature (of that which differs); for from that it would follow that on the apprehension of the essential nature of a thing there would at once arise not only the judgment as to that essential nature but also judgments as to its difference from everything else.—But, it may be objected to this, even when the essential nature of a thing is apprehended, the judgment 'this thing is different from other things' depends on the remembrance of its counterentities, and as long as this remembrance does not take place so long the judgment of difference is not formed!—Such reasoning, we reply, is inadmissible. He who maintains that 'difference' is nothing but 'essential nature' has no right to assume a dependence on counterentities since, according to him, essential nature and difference are the same, i. e. nothing but essential nature: the judgment of difference can, on his view, depend on counterentities no more than the judgment of essential nature does. His view really implies that the two words 'the jar' and 'different' (in the judgment 'the jar is different') are

synonymous, just as the words 'hasta' and 'kara' are (both of which mean 'hand').

Nor, in the second place, can 'difference' be held to be an attribute (dharma). For if it were that, we should have to assume that 'difference' possesses difference (i.e. is different) from essential nature; for otherwise it would be the same as the latter. And this latter difference would have to be viewed as an attribute of the first difference, and this would lead us on to a third difference, and so in infinitum. And the view of 'difference' being an attribute would further imply that difference is apprehended on the apprehension of a thing distinguished by attributes such as generic character and so on, and at the same time that the thing thus distinguished is apprehended on the apprehension of difference; and this would constitute a logical seesaw.—'Difference' thus showing itself incapable of logical definition, we are confirmed in our view that perception reveals mere 'Being' only.

Moreover, it appears that in states of consciousness such as 'Here is a jar,' 'There is a piece of cloth,' 'The jar is perceived,' 'The piece of cloth is perceived,' that which constitutes the things is Being (existence; *sattā*) and perception (or 'consciousness'; *anubhūti*). And we observe that it is pure Being only which persists in all states of cognition: this pure Being alone, therefore, is *real*. The differences, on the other hand, which do not persist, are unreal. The case is analogous to that of the snake-rope. The rope which persists as a substrate is real, while the non-continuous things (which by wrong imagination are superimposed on the rope) such as a snake, a cleft in the ground, a watercourse, and so on, are unreal.

But—our adversary objects—the instance is not truly analogous. In the case of the snake-rope the non-reality of the snake results from the snake's being sublated (*bādhita*) by the cognition of the true nature of the substrate 'This is a rope, not a snake'; it does not result from the non-continuousness of the snake. In the same way the reality of the rope does not follow from its persistence, but from the fact of its being not sublated (by another

cognition). But what, we ask, establishes the non-reality of jars and pieces of cloth?—All are agreed, we reply, that we observe, in jars and similar things, individual difference (*vyāvṛtti*, literally 'separation,' 'distinction'). The point to decide is of what nature such difference is. Does it not mean that the judgment 'This is a jar' implies the negation of pieces of cloth and other things? But this means that by this judgment pieces of cloth and other things are sublated (*bādhita*). Individual difference (*vyāvṛtti*) thus means the cessation (or absence), due to sublation, of certain objects of cognition, and it proves the non-reality of whatever has non-continuous existence; while on the other hand, pure Being, like the rope, persists non-sublated. Hence everything that is additional to pure Being is non-real.—This admits of being expressed in technical form. 'Being' is real because it persists, as proved by the case of the rope in the snake-rope; jars and similar things are non-real because they are non-continuous, as proved by the case of the snake that has the rope for its substrate.

From all this it follows that persisting consciousness only has real being; it alone is.

Being and Consciousness are one. Consciousness is *svayamprakāśa*.

But, our adversary objects, as mere Being is the object of consciousness, it is different therefrom (and thus there exists after all 'difference' or 'plurality').—Not so, we reply. That there is no such thing as 'difference,' we have already shown above on the grounds that it is not the object of perception, and moreover incapable of definition. It cannot therefore be proved that 'Being' is the object of consciousness. Hence Consciousness itself is 'Being'—that which is.—This consciousness is self-proved, just because it is consciousness. Were it proved through something else, it would follow that like jars and similar things it is not consciousness. Nor can there be assumed, for consciousness, the need of another act of consciousness (through which its knowledge would be established); for

it shines forth (*prakāśate*) through its own being. While it exists, consciousness—differing therein from jars and the like—is never observed not to shine forth, and it cannot therefore be held to depend, in its shining forth, on something else.—You (who object to the above reasoning) perhaps hold the following view:—even when consciousness has arisen, it is the object only which shines forth—a fact expressed in sentences such as: the jar is perceived. When a person forms the judgment ‘This is a jar,’ he is not at the time conscious of a consciousness which is not an object and is not of a definite character. Hence the existence of consciousness is the reason which brings about the ‘shining forth’ of jars and other objects, and thus has a similar office as the approximation of the object to the eye or the other organs of sense (which is another condition of perceptive consciousness). After this the existence of consciousness is inferred on the ground that the shining forth of the object is (not permanent, but) occasional only¹. And should this argumentation be objected to on the ground of its implying that consciousness—which is essentially of the nature of intelligence—is something non-intelligent like material things, we ask you to define this negation of non-intelligence (which you declare to be characteristic of consciousness). Have we, perhaps, to understand by it the invariable concomitance of existence and shining forth? If so, we point out that this invariable concomitance is also found in the case of pleasure and similar affections; for when pleasure and so on exist at all, they never are non-perceived (i. e. they exist in so far only as we are conscious of them). It is thus clear that we have no consciousness of consciousness itself—just as the tip of a finger, although touching other things, is incapable of touching itself.

All this reasoning, we reply, is entirely spun out of your own fancy, without any due consideration of the power of consciousness. The fact is, that in perceiving colour and

¹ Being not permanent but occasional, it is an effect only, and as such must have a cause.

other qualities of things, we are not aware of a 'shining forth' as an attribute of those things, and as something different from consciousness; nor can the assumption of an attribute of things called 'light,' or 'shining forth,' be proved in any way, since the entire empirical world itself can be proved only through consciousness, the existence of which we both admit. Consciousness, therefore, is not something which is inferred or proved through some other act of knowledge; but while proving everything else it is proved by itself. This may be expressed in technical form as follows—Consciousness is, with regard to its attributes and to the empirical judgments concerning it, independent of any other thing, because through its connexion with other things it is the cause of their attributes and the empirical judgments concerning them. For it is a general principle that of two things that which through its connexion with the other is the cause of the attributes of—and the empirical judgments about—the latter, is itself independent of that other as to those two points. We see e.g. that colour, through its conjunction with earth and the like, produces in them the quality of visibility, but does not itself depend for its visibility on conjunction with colour. Hence consciousness is itself the cause of its own 'shining forth,' as well as of the empirically observed shining forth of objects such as jars and the like.

Consciousness is eternal and incapable of change.

This self-luminous consciousness, further, is eternal, for it is not capable of any form of non-existence—whether so-called antecedent non-existence or any other form. This follows from its being self-established. For the antecedent non-existence of self-established consciousness cannot be apprehended either through consciousness or anything else. If consciousness itself gave rise to the apprehension of its own non-existence, it could not do so in so far as 'being,' for that would contradict its being: if it is, i. e. if its non-existence is not, how can it give rise to the idea of its non-existence? Nor can it do so if not being; for if consciousness itself is not, how can it furnish

a proof for its own non-existence? Nor can the non-existence of consciousness be apprehended through anything else; for consciousness cannot be the object of anything else. Any instrument of knowledge proving the non-existence of consciousness, could do so only by making consciousness its object—'this is consciousness'; but consciousness, as being self-established, does not admit of that objectivation which is implied in the word 'this,' and hence its previous non-existence cannot be proved by anything lying outside itself.

As consciousness thus does not admit of antecedent non-existence, it further cannot be held to originate, and hence also all those other states of being which depend on origination cannot be predicated of it.

As consciousness is beginningless, it further does not admit of any plurality within itself; for we observe in this case the presence of something which is contrary to what invariably accompanies plurality (this something being 'beginninglessness' which is contrary to the quality of having a beginning—which quality invariably accompanies plurality). For we never observe a thing characterised by plurality to be without a beginning.—And moreover difference, origination, &c., are objects of consciousness, like colour and other qualities, and hence cannot be attributes of consciousness. Therefore, consciousness being essentially consciousness only, nothing else that is an object of consciousness can be its attribute. The conclusion is that consciousness is free from difference of any kind.

The apparent difference between Consciousness and the conscious subject is due to the unreal ahaṁkāra.

From this it further follows that there is no substrate of consciousness—different from consciousness itself—such as people ordinarily mean when speaking of a 'knower.' It is self-luminous consciousness itself which constitutes the so-called 'knower.' This follows therefrom also that consciousness is not non-intelligent (*gāḍa*); for non-intelligence invariably accompanies absence of Selfhood (*anātmavā*);

hence, non-intelligence being absent in consciousness, consciousness is not non-Self, that means, it is the Self.

But, our adversary again objects, the consciousness which expresses itself in the judgment 'I know,' proves that the quality of being a 'knower' belongs to consciousness!—By no means, we reply. The attribution to consciousness of this quality rests on error, no less than the attribution, to the shell, of the quality of being silver. Consciousness cannot stand in the relation of an agent toward itself: the attribute of being a knowing agent is erroneously imputed to it—an error analogous to that expressed in the judgment 'I am a man,' which identifies the Self of a person with the outward aggregate of matter that bears the external characteristics of humanity. To be a 'knower' means to be the agent in the action of knowing; and this is something essentially changeful and non-intelligent (*gāda*), having its abode in the *ahamkāra*, which is itself a thing subject to change. How, on the other hand, could such agency possibly belong to the changeless 'witness' (of all change, i. e. consciousness) whose nature is pure Being? That agency cannot be an attribute of the Self follows therefrom also that, like colour and other qualities, agency depends, for its own proof, on seeing, i. e. consciousness.

That the Self does not fall within the sphere (is not an object of), the idea of 'I' is proved thereby also that in deep sleep, swoon, and similar states, the idea of the 'I' is absent, while the consciousness of the Self persists. Moreover, if the Self were admitted to be an agent and an object of the idea of 'I,' it would be difficult to avoid the conclusion that like the body it is non-intelligent, something merely outward ('being for others only, not for itself') and destitute of Selfhood. That from the body, which is the object of the idea of 'I,' and known to be an agent, there is different that Self which enjoys the results of the body's actions, viz. the heavenly word, and so on, is acknowledged by all who admit the validity of the instruments of knowledge; analogously, therefore, we must admit that different from the knower whom we understand by the term 'I,' is the 'witnessing' inward Self. The non-

intelligent ahaṁkāra thus merely serves to manifest the nature of non-changing consciousness, and it effects this by being its abode ; for it is the proper quality of manifesting agents to manifest the objects manifested, in so far as the latter abide in them. A mirror, e. g., or a sheet of water, or a certain mass of matter, manifests a face or the disc of the moon (reflected in the mirror or water) or the generic character of a cow (impressed on the mass of matter) in so far as all those things abide in them.—In this way, then, there arises the erroneous view that finds expression in the judgment ‘I know.’—Nor must you, in the way of objection, raise the question how self-luminous consciousness is to be manifested by the non-intelligent ahaṁkāra, which rather is itself manifested by consciousness ; for we observe that the surface of the hand, which itself is manifested by the rays of sunlight falling on it, at the same time manifests those rays. This is clearly seen in the case of rays passing through the interstices of network: the light of those rays is intensified by the hand on which they fall, and which at the same time is itself manifested by the rays.

It thus appears that the ‘knowing agent,’ who is denoted by the ‘I,’ in the judgment ‘I know,’ constitutes no real attribute of the Self, the nature of which is pure intelligence. This is also the reason why the consciousness of Egoity does not persist in the states of deep sleep and final release : in those states this special form of consciousness passes away, and the Self appears in its true nature, i. e. as pure consciousness. Hence a person who has risen from deep, dreamless sleep reflects, ‘Just now I was unconscious of myself.’

Summing up of the pūrvapakṣa view.

As the outcome of all this, we sum up our view as follows.—Eternal, absolutely non-changing consciousness, whose nature is pure non-differenced intelligence, free from all distinction whatever, owing to error illusorily manifests itself (vivarttate) as broken up into manifold distinctions—knowing subjects, objects of knowledge, acts of knowledge.

And the purpose for which we enter on the consideration of the Vedānta-texts is utterly to destroy what is the root of that error, i.e. Nescience, and thus to obtain a firm knowledge of the oneness of Brahman, whose nature is mere intelligence—free, pure, eternal.

THE GREAT SIDDHĀNTA.

This entire theory rests on a fictitious foundation of altogether hollow and vicious arguments, incapable of being stated in definite logical alternatives, and devised by men who are destitute of those particular qualities which cause individuals to be chosen by the Supreme Person revealed in the Upanishads; whose intellects are darkened by the impression of beginningless evil; and who thus have no insight into the nature of words and sentences, into the real purport conveyed by them, and into the procedure of sound argumentation, with all its methods depending on perception and the other instruments of right knowledge. The theory therefore must needs be rejected by all those who, through texts, perception and the other means of knowledge—assisted by sound reasoning—have an insight into the true nature of things.

There is no proof of non-differenced substance.

To enter into details.—Those who maintain the doctrine of a substance devoid of all difference have no right to assert that this or that is a proof of such a substance; for all means of right knowledge have for their object things affected with difference.—Should any one, taking his stand on the received views of his sect, assert that the theory of a substance free from all difference (does not require any further means of proof but) is immediately established by one's own consciousness; we reply that he also is refuted by the fact, warranted by the witness of the Self, that all consciousness implies difference: all states of consciousness have for their object something that is marked by some difference, as appears in the case of judgments like 'I saw this.' And should a state of consciousness—although directly

apprehended as implying difference—be determined by some fallacious reasoning to be devoid of difference, this determination could be effected only by means of some special attributes additional to the quality of mere Being ; and owing to these special qualities on which the determination depends, that state of consciousness would clearly again be characterised by difference. The meaning of the mentioned determination could thus only be that of a thing affected with certain differences some other differences are denied ; but manifestly this would not prove the existence of a thing free from all difference. To thought there at any rate belongs the quality of being thought and self-illuminatedness, for the knowing principle is observed to have for its essential nature the illumining (making to shine forth) of objects. And that also in the states of deep sleep, swoon, &c., consciousness is affected with difference we shall prove, in its proper place, in greater detail. Moreover you yourself admit that to consciousness there actually belong different attributes such as permanency (oneness, self-luminousness, &c.), and of these it cannot be shown that they are only Being in general. And even if the latter point were admitted, we observe that there takes place a discussion of different views, and you yourself attempt to prove your theory by means of the differences between those views and your own. It therefore must be admitted that reality is affected with difference well established by valid means of proof.

Sabda proves difference.

As to sound (speech ; sabda) it is specially apparent that it possesses the power of denoting only such things as are affected with difference. Speech operates with words and sentences. Now a word (pada) originates from the combination of a radical element and a suffix, and as these two elements have different meanings it necessarily follows that the word itself can convey only a sense affected with difference. And further, the plurality of words is based on plurality of meanings ; the sentence therefore which is an aggregate of words expresses some special combination of things (meanings of words), and hence has no power to

denote a thing devoid of all difference.—The conclusion is that sound cannot be a means of knowledge for a thing devoid of all difference.

Pratyaksha—even of the nirvikalpaka kind—proves difference.

Perception in the next place—with its two subdivisions of non-determinate (nirvikalpaka) and determinate (savikalpaka) perception—also cannot be a means of knowledge for things devoid of difference. Determinate perception clearly has for its object things affected with difference; for it relates to that which is distinguished by generic difference and so on. But also non-determinate perception has for its object only what is marked with difference; for it is on the basis of non-determinate perception that the object distinguished by generic character and so on is recognised in the act of determinate perception. Non-determinate perception is the apprehension of the object in so far as destitute of some differences but not of all difference. Apprehension of the latter kind is in the first place not observed ever to take place, and is in the second place impossible: for all apprehension by consciousness takes place by means of some distinction 'This is such and such.' Nothing can be apprehended apart from some special feature of make or structure, as e.g. the triangularly shaped dewlap in the case of cows. The true distinction between non-determinate and determinate perception is that the former is the apprehension of the first individual among a number of things belonging to the same class, while the latter is the apprehension of the second, third, and so on, individuals. On the apprehension of the first individual cow the perceiving person is not conscious of the fact that the special shape which constitutes the generic character of the class 'cows' extends to the present individual also; while this special consciousness arises in the case of the perception of the second and third cow. The perception of the second individual thus is 'determinate' in so far as it is determined by a special attribute, viz. the extension, to the perception, of the generic character of a class—manifested in a certain

outward shape—which connects this act of perception with the earlier perception (of the first individual); such determination being ascertained only on the apprehension of the second individual. Such extension or continuance of a certain generic character is, on the other hand, not apprehended on the apprehension of the first individual, and perception of the latter kind thence is ‘non-determinate.’ That it is such is not due to non-apprehension of structure, colour, generic character and so on, for all these attributes are equally objects of sensuous perception (and hence perceived as belonging to the first individual also). Moreover that which possesses structure cannot be perceived apart from the structure, and hence in the case of the apprehension of the first individual there is already perception of structure, giving rise to the judgment ‘The thing is such and such.’ In the case of the second, third, &c., individuals, on the other hand, we apprehend, in addition to the thing possessing structure and to the structure itself, the special attribute of the persistence of the generic character, and hence the perception is ‘determinate.’ From all this it follows that perception never has for its object that which is devoid of all difference.

The bhedābheda view is untenable.

The same arguments tend to refute the view that there is difference and absence of difference at the same time (the so-called bhedābheda view). Take the judgment ‘This is such and such’; how can we realise here the non-difference of ‘being this’ and ‘being such and such’? The ‘such and such’ denotes a peculiar make characterised, e.g. by a dewlap, the ‘this’ denotes the thing distinguished by that peculiar make; the non-difference of these two is thus contradicted by immediate consciousness. At the outset the thing perceived is perceived as separate from all other things, and this separation is founded on the fact that the thing is distinguished by a special constitution, let us say the generic characteristics of a cow, expressed by the term ‘such and such.’ In general, wherever we cognise the relation of distinguishing attribute and thing distinguished

thereby, the two clearly present themselves to our mind as absolutely different. Some things—e.g. staffs and bracelets—appear sometimes as having a separate, independent existence of their own; at other times they present themselves as distinguishing attributes of other things or beings (i.e. of the persons carrying staffs or wearing bracelets). Other entities—e.g. the generic character of cows—have a being only in so far as they constitute the form of substances, and thus always present themselves as distinguishing attributes of those substances. In both cases there is the same relation of distinguishing attribute and thing distinguished thereby, and these two are apprehended as absolutely different. The difference between the two classes of entities is only that staffs, bracelets, and similar things are capable of being apprehended in separation from other things, while the generic characteristics of a species are absolutely incapable thereof. The assertion, therefore, that the difference of things is refuted by immediate consciousness, is based on the plain denial of a certain form of consciousness, the one namely—admitted by every one—which is expressed in the judgment 'This thing is such and such.'—This same point is clearly expounded by the Sûtrakâra in II, 2, 33.

Inference also teaches difference.

Perception thus having for its object only what is marked by difference, inference also is in the same case; for its object is only what is distinguished by connexion with things known through perception and other means of knowledge. And thus, even in the case of disagreement as to the number of the different instruments of knowledge, a thing devoid of difference could not be established by any of them since the instruments of knowledge acknowledged by all have only one and the same object, viz. what is marked by difference. And a person who maintains the existence of a thing devoid of difference on the ground of differences affecting that very thing simply contradicts himself without knowing what he does; he is in fact no better than a man who asserts that his own mother never had any children.

Perception does not reveal mere Being.

In reply to the assertion that perception causes the apprehension of pure Being only, and therefore cannot have difference for its object; and that 'difference' cannot be defined because it does not admit of being set forth in definite alternatives; we point out that these charges are completely refuted by the fact that the only objects of perception are things distinguished by generic character and so on, and that generic character and so on—as being relative things—give at once rise to the judgment as to the distinction between themselves and the things in which they inhere. You yourself admit that in the case of knowledge and in that of colour and other qualities this relation holds good, viz. that something which gives rise to a judgment about another thing at the same time gives rise to a judgment about itself; the same may therefore be admitted with regard to difference¹.

For this reason the charge of a regressus in infinitum and a logical seesaw (see above, p. 32) cannot be upheld. For even if perceptive cognition takes place within one moment, we apprehend within that moment the generic character which constitutes on the one hand the difference of the thing from others, and on the other hand the peculiar character of the thing itself; and thus there remains nothing to be apprehended in a second moment.

Moreover, if perception made us apprehend only pure Being, judgments clearly referring to different objects—such as 'Here is a jar,' 'There is a piece of cloth'—would be devoid of all meaning. And if through perception we did not apprehend difference—as marked by generic character, &c., constituting the structure or make of a thing—why should a man searching for a horse not be satisfied with finding a buffalo? And if mere Being only were the object of all our cognitions, why should we not remember,

¹ Colour reveals itself as well as the thing that has colour; knowledge reveals itself as well as the object known; so difference manifests itself as well as the things that differ.

in the case of each particular cognition, all the words which are connected with all our cognitions? And further, if the cognition of a horse and that of an elephant had one object only, the later cognition would cause us to apprehend only what was apprehended before, and there being thus no difference (of object of cognition) there would be nothing to distinguish the later state of cognition from remembrance. If on the other hand a difference is admitted for each state of consciousness, we admit thereby that perception has for its objects things affected with difference.

If all acts of cognition had one and the same object only, everything would be apprehended by one act of cognition; and from this it would follow that there are no persons either deaf or blind!

Nor does, as a matter of fact, the eye apprehend mere Being only; for what it does apprehend is colour and the coloured thing, and those other qualities (viz. extension, &c.), which inhere in the thing together with colour. Nor does feeling do so; for it has for its objects things palpable. Nor have the ear and the other senses mere Being for their object; but they relate to what is distinguished by a special sound or taste or smell. Hence there is not any source of knowledge causing us to apprehend mere Being. If moreover the senses had for their object mere Being free from all difference, it would follow that Scripture which has the same object would (not be originative of knowledge but) perform the function of a mere anuvāda, i.e. it would merely make statements about something, the knowledge of which is already established by some other means. And further, according to your own doctrine, mere Being, i.e. Brahman, would hold the position of an object with regard to the instruments of knowledge; and thus there would cling to it all the imperfections indicated by yourself—non-intelligent nature, perishableness and so on.—From all this we conclude that perception has for its object only what is distinguished by difference manifesting itself in generic character and so on, which constitute the make or structure of a thing. (That the generic character of a thing is nothing else but its particular structure follows) from the

fact that we do not perceive anything, different from structure, which could be claimed as constituting the object of the cognition 'that several individuals possess one and the same general form. And as our theory sufficiently accounts for the ordinary notions as to generic character, and as moreover even those who hold generic character to be something different from structure admit that there is such a thing as (common) structure, we adhere to the conclusion that generic character is nothing but structure. By 'structure' we understand special or distinctive form; and we acknowledge different forms of that kind according to the different classes of things. And as the current judgments as to things being different from one another can be explained on the basis of the apprehension of generic character, and as no additional entity is observed to exist, and as even those who maintain the existence of such an additional thing admit the existence of generic character, we further conclude that difference (bheda) is nothing but generic character (gāti).—But if this were so, the judgment as to difference would immediately follow from the judgment as to generic character, as soon as the latter is apprehended!—Quite true, we reply. As a matter of fact the judgment of difference is immediately formulated on the basis of the judgment as to generic character. For 'the generic character' of a cow, e.g., means just the exclusion of everything else: as soon as that character is apprehended all thought and speech referring to other creatures belonging to the same wider genus (which includes buffaloes and so on also) come to an end. It is through the apprehension of difference only that the idea of non-difference comes to an end.

Plurality is not unreal.

Next as to the assertion that all difference presented in our cognition—as of jars, pieces of cloth and the like—is unreal because such difference does not persist. This view, we maintain, is altogether erroneous, springs in fact from the neglect of distinguishing between persistence and non-persistence on the one hand, and the relation between what sublates and what is sublated on the other hand. Where

two cognitions are mutually contradictory, there the latter relation holds good, and there is non-persistence of what is sublated. But jars, pieces of cloth and the like, do not contradict one another, since they are separate in place and time. If on the other hand the non-existence of a thing is cognised at the same time and the same place where and when its existence is cognised, we have a mutual contradiction of two cognitions, and then the stronger one sublates the other cognition which thus comes to an end. But when of a thing that is perceived in connexion with some place and time, the non-existence is perceived in connexion with some other place and time, there arises no contradiction; how then should the one cognition sublate the other? or how can it be said that of a thing absent at one time and place there is absence at other times and places also? In the case of the snake-rope, there arises a cognition of non-existence in connexion with the given place and time; hence there is contradiction, one judgment sublates the other and the sublated cognition comes to an end. But the circumstance of something which is seen at one time and in one place not persisting at another time and in another place is not observed to be invariably accompanied by falsehood, and hence mere non-persistence of this kind does not constitute a reason for unreality. To say, on the other hand, that what is is real because it persists, is to prove what is proved already, and requires no further proof.

Being and Consciousness are not one.

Hence mere Being does not alone constitute reality. And as the distinction between consciousness and its objects—which rests just on this relation of object and that for which the object is—is proved by perception, the assertion that only consciousness has real existence is also disposed of.

The true meaning of Svayamprakāśatva.

We next take up the point as to the self-luminousness of consciousness (above, p. 33). The contention that consciousness is not an object holds good for the knowing Self at the

time when it illumines (i. e. constitutes as its objects) other things; but there is no absolute rule as to all consciousness never being anything but self-luminous. For common observation shows that the consciousness of one person may become the object of the cognition of another, viz. of an inference founded on the person's friendly or unfriendly appearance and the like, and again that a person's own past states of consciousness become the object of his own cognition—as appears from judgments such as 'At one time I knew.' It cannot therefore be said 'If it is consciousness it is self-proved' (above, p. 33), nor that consciousness if becoming an object of consciousness would no longer be consciousness; for from this it would follow that one's own past states, and the conscious states of others—because being objects of consciousness—are not themselves consciousness. Moreover, unless it were admitted that there is inferential knowledge of the thoughts of others, there would be no apprehension of the connexion of words and meaning, and this would imply the absolute termination of all human intercourse depending on speech. Nor also would it be possible for pupils to attach themselves to a teacher of sacred lore, for the reason that they had become aware of his wisdom and learning. The general proposition that consciousness does not admit of being an object is in fact quite untenable. The essential nature of consciousness—or knowledge—consists therein that it shines forth, or manifests itself, through its own being to its own substrate at the present moment; or (to give another definition) that it is instrumental in proving its own object by its own being¹.

¹ The comment of the *Sru. Pra.* on the above definitions runs, with a few additional explanations, as follows: The term 'anu-bhūti' here denotes knowledge in general, not only such knowledge as is not remembrance (which limited meaning the term has sometimes). With reference to the 'shining forth' it might be said that in this way jars also and similar things know or are conscious because they also 'shine forth' (viz. in so far as they are known); to exclude jars and the like the text therefore adds 'to its own substrate' (the jar 'shines forth,' not to itself, but to the

Now these two characteristics are established by a person's own state of consciousness and do not vanish when that consciousness becomes the object of another state of consciousness; consciousness remains also in the latter case what it is. Jars and similar things, on the other hand, do not possess consciousness, not because they are objects of consciousness but because they lack the two characteristics stated above. If we made the presence of consciousness dependent on the absence of its being an object of consciousness, we should arrive at the conclusion

knowing person). There are other attributes of the Self, such as atomic extension, eternity, and so on, which are revealed (not through themselves) but through an act of knowledge different from them; to exclude those the text adds 'through its own being.' In order to exclude past states of consciousness or acts of knowledge, the text adds 'at the present moment.' A past state of consciousness is indeed not revealed without another act of knowledge (representing it), and would thus by itself be excluded; but the text adds this specification (viz. 'at the present moment') on purpose, in order to intimate that a past state of consciousness can be represented by another state—a point denied by the opponent. 'At the present moment' means 'the connexion with the object of knowledge belonging to the present time.' Without the addition of 'to its own substrate' the definition might imply that a state of consciousness is manifest to another person also; to exclude this the clause is added. This first definition might be objected to as acceptable only to those who maintain the *svayam-prakāśatva*-theory (which need not be discussed here); hence a second definition is given. The two clauses 'to its own substrate' and 'at the present moment' have to be supplied in this second definition also. 'Instrumental in bringing about' would apply to staffs, wheels, and such like implements also; hence the text adds 'its own object.' (Staffs, wheels, &c. have no 'objects.') Knowledge depending on sight does not bring about an object depending on hearing; to exclude this notion of universal instrumentality the text specifies the object by the words 'its own.' The clause 'through its own being' excludes the sense organs, which reveal objects not by their own being, but in so far as they give rise to knowledge. The two clauses 'at the present moment' and 'to its own substrate' have the same office in the second definition as in the first.

that consciousness is not consciousness ; for there are things—e. g. sky-flowers—which are not objects of consciousness and at the same time are not consciousness. You will perhaps reply to this that a sky-flower's not being consciousness is due not to its not being an object of consciousness, but to its non-existence!—Well then, we rejoin, let us say analogously that the reason of jars and the like not being contradictory to Nescience (i. e. of their being *gaḍa*), is their not being of the nature of consciousness, and let us not have recourse to their being objects of consciousness!—But if consciousness is an object of consciousness, we conclude that it also is non-contradictory of Nescience, like a jar!—At this conclusion, we rejoin, you may arrive even on the opposite assumption, reasoning as follows: 'Consciousness is non-contradictory of Nescience, because it is not an object of consciousness, like a sky-flower! All which shows that to maintain as a general principle that something which is an object of consciousness cannot itself be consciousness is simply ridiculous.'

Consciousness is not eternal.

It was further maintained by the *pūrvapakshin* that as consciousness is self-established it has no antecedent non-existence and so on, and that this disproves its having an origin. But this is an attempt to prove something not proved by something else that is equally unproved ; comparable to a man blind from birth undertaking to guide another blind man! You have no right to maintain the non-existence of the antecedent non-existence of consciousness on the ground that there is nothing to make us apprehend that non-existence ; for there is something to make us apprehend it, viz. consciousness itself!—But how can consciousness at the time when it is, make us apprehend its own previous non-existence which is contradictorily opposed to it?—Consciousness, we rejoin, does not necessarily constitute as its objects only what occupies the same time with itself ; were it so it would follow that neither the past nor the future can be the object of consciousness. Or do you mean that there is an absolute rule that the

antecedent non-existence of consciousness, if proved, must be contemporaneous with consciousness? Have you then, we ask, ever observed this so as to be able to assert an absolute rule? And if it were observed, that would prove the existence of previous non-existence, not its negation!—The fact, however, is that no person in his senses will maintain the contemporaneous existence of consciousness and its own antecedent non-existence. In the case of perceptive knowledge originating from sensation, there is indeed this limitation, that it causes the apprehension of such things only as are actually present at the same time. But this limitation does not extend to cognitions of all kinds, nor to all instruments of knowledge; for we observe that remembrance, inference, and the magical perception of Yogis apprehend such things also as are not present at the time of apprehension. On this very point there rests the relation connecting the means of knowledge with their objects, viz. that the former are not without the latter. This does not mean that the instrument of knowledge is connected with its object in that way that it is not without something that is present at the time of cognition; but rather that the instrument of knowledge is opposed to the falsehood of that special form in which the object presents itself as connected with some place and time.—This disposes also of the contention that remembrance has no external object; for it is observed that remembrance is related to such things also as have perished.—Possibly you will now argue as follows. The antecedent non-existence of consciousness cannot be ascertained by perception, for it is not something present at the time of perception. It further cannot be ascertained by the other means of knowledge, since there is no characteristic mark (*liṅga*) on which an inference could be based: for we do not observe any characteristic mark invariably accompanied by the antecedent non-existence of consciousness. Nor do we meet with any scriptural text referring to this antecedent non-existence. Hence, in the absence of any valid instrument of knowledge, the antecedent non-existence of consciousness cannot be established at all.—If, we reply, you thus,

altogether setting aside the force of self-provedness (on which you had relied hitherto), take your stand on the absence of valid means of knowledge, we again must request you to give in; for there is a valid means of knowledge whereby to prove the antecedent non-existence of consciousness, viz. valid non-perception (anupalabdhi).

Moreover, we observe that perceptual knowledge proves its object, be it a jar or something else, to exist only as long as it exists itself, not at all times; we do not, through it, apprehend the antecedent or subsequent existence of the jar. Now this absence of apprehension is due to the fact that consciousness itself is limited in time. If that consciousness which has a jar for its object were itself apprehended as non-limited in time, the object also—the jar—would be apprehended under the same form, i. e. it would be eternal. And if self-established consciousness were eternal, it would be immediately cognised as eternal; but this is not the case. Analogously, if inferential consciousness and other forms of consciousness were apprehended as non-limited in time, they would all of them reveal their objects also as non-limited, and these objects would thus be eternal; for the objects are conform in nature to their respective forms of consciousness.

There is no Consciousness without object.

Nor is there any consciousness devoid of objects; for nothing of this kind is ever known. Moreover, the self-luminousness of consciousness has, by our opponent himself, been proved on the ground that its essential nature consists in illumining (revealing) objects; the self-luminousness of consciousness not admitting of proof apart from its essential nature which consists in the lighting up of objects. And as moreover, according to our opponent, consciousness cannot be the object of another consciousness, it would follow that (having neither an object nor itself being an object) it is something altogether unreal, imaginary.

Nor are you justified in maintaining that in deep sleep, swoon, senselessness and similar states, pure consciousness, devoid of any object, manifests itself. This view is nega-

tived by 'valid non-perception' (see above, p. 52). If consciousness were present in those states also, there would be remembrance of it at the time of waking from sleep or recovery from swoon; but as a matter of fact there is no such remembrance.—But it is not an absolute rule that something of which we were conscious must be remembered; how then can the absence of remembrance prove the absence of previous consciousness?—Unless, we reply, there be some cause of overpowering strength which quite obliterates all impressions—as e.g. the dissolution of the body—the absence of remembrance does necessarily prove the absence of previous consciousness. And, moreover, in the present case the absence of consciousness does not only follow from absence of remembrance; it is also proved by the thought presenting itself to the person risen from sleep, 'For so long a time I was not conscious of anything.'—Nor may it be said that even if there was consciousness, absence of remembrance would necessarily follow from the absence (during deep sleep) of the distinction of objects, and from the extinction of the consciousness of the 'I'; for the non-consciousness of some one thing, and the absence of some one thing cannot be the cause of the non-remembrance of some other thing, of which there had been consciousness. And that in the states in question the consciousness of the 'I' does persist, will moreover be shown further on.

But, our opponent urges, have you not said yourself that even in deep sleep and similar states there is consciousness marked by difference?—True, we have said so. But that consciousness is consciousness of the Self, and that this is affected by difference will be proved further on. At present we are only interested in denying the existence of your pure consciousness, devoid of all objects and without a substrate. Nor can we admit that your pure consciousness could constitute what we call the consciousness of the Self; for we shall prove that the latter has a substrate.

It thus cannot be maintained that the antecedent non-existence of consciousness does not admit of being proved, because consciousness itself does not prove it. And as we have shown that consciousness itself may be an object of

consciousness, we have thereby disproved the alleged impossibility of antecedent non-existence being proved by other means. Herewith falls the assertion that the non-origination of consciousness can be proved.

Consciousness is capable of change.

Against the assertion that the alleged non-origination of consciousness at the same time proves that consciousness is not capable of any other changes (p. 36), we remark that the general proposition on which this conclusion rests is too wide: it would extend to antecedent non-existence itself, of which it is evident that it comes to an end, although it does not originate. In qualifying the changes as changes of 'Being,' you manifest great logical acumen indeed! For according to your own view Nescience also (which is not 'Being') does not originate, is the substrate of manifold changes, and comes to an end through the rise of knowledge! Perhaps you will say that the changes of Nescience are all unreal. But, do you then, we ask in reply, admit that any change is real? You do not; and yet it is only this admission which would give a sense to the distinction expressed by the word 'Being' ¹.

Nor is it true that consciousness does not admit of any division within itself, because it has no beginning (p. 36). For the non-originated Self is divided from the body, the senses, &c., and Nescience also, which is avowedly without a beginning, must needs be admitted to be divided from the Self. And if you say that the latter division is unreal, we ask whether you have ever observed a real division invariably connected with origination! Moreover, if the distinction of Nescience from the Self is not real, it follows that Nescience and the Self are essentially one. You further have yourself proved the difference of views by means of the difference of the objects of knowledge as established by non-refuted knowledge; an analogous case

¹ The Sāṅkara is not entitled to refer to a distinction of real and unreal division, because according to his theory all distinction is unreal.

being furnished by the difference of acts of cleaving, which results from the difference of objects to be cleft. And if you assert that of this knowing—which is essentially knowing only—nothing that is an object of knowledge can be an attribute, and that these objects—just because they are objects of knowledge—cannot be attributes of knowing; we point out that both these remarks would apply also to eternity, self-luminousness, and the other attributes of 'knowing,' which are acknowledged by yourself, and established by valid means of proof. Nor may you urge against this that all these alleged attributes are in reality mere 'consciousness' or 'knowing'; for they are essentially distinct. By 'being conscious' or 'knowing,' we understand the illumining or manifesting of some object to its own substrate (i. e. the substrate of knowledge), by its own existence (i. e. the existence of knowledge) merely; by self-luminousness (or 'self-illuminatedness') we understand the shining forth or being manifest by its own existence merely to its own substrate; the terms 'shining forth,' 'illumining,' 'being manifest' in both these definitions meaning the capability of becoming an object of thought and speech which is common to all things, whether intelligent or non-intelligent. Eternity again means 'being present in all time'; oneness means 'being defined by the number one.' Even if you say that these attributes are only negative ones, i. e. equal to the absence of non-intelligence and so on, you still cannot avoid the admission that they are attributes of consciousness. If, on the other hand, being of a nature opposite to non-intelligence and so on, be not admitted as attributes of consciousness—whether of a positive or a negative kind—in addition to its essential nature; it is an altogether unmeaning proceeding to deny to it such qualities, as non-intelligence and the like.

We moreover must admit the following alternative: consciousness is either proved (established) or not. If it is proved it follows that it possesses attributes; if it is not, it is something absolutely nugatory, like a sky-flower, and similar purely imaginary things.

**Consciousness is the attribute of a permanent
Conscious Self.**

Let it then be said that consciousness is proof (siddhi) itself. Proof of what, we ask in reply, and to whom? If no definite answer can be given to these two questions, consciousness cannot be defined as 'proof'; for 'proof' is a relative notion, like 'son.' You will perhaps reply 'Proof to the Self'; and if we go on asking 'But what is that Self?' you will say, 'Just consciousness as already said by us before.' True, we reply, you said so; but it certainly was not well said. For if it is the nature of consciousness to be 'proof' ('light,' 'enlightenment') on the part of a person with regard to something, how can this consciousness which is thus connected with the person and the thing be itself conscious of itself? To explain: the essential character of consciousness or knowledge is that by its very existence it renders things capable of becoming objects, to its own substrate, of thought and speech. This consciousness (anubhūti), which is also termed *gñāna*, *avagati*, *samvid*, is a particular attribute belonging to a conscious Self and related to an object: as such it is known to every one on the testimony of his own Self—as appears from ordinary judgments such as 'I know the jar,' 'I understand this matter,' 'I am conscious of (the presence of) this piece of cloth.' That such is the essential nature of consciousness you yourself admit; for you have proved thereby its self-luminousness. Of this consciousness which thus clearly presents itself as the attribute of an agent and as related to an object, it would be difficult indeed to prove that at the same time it is itself the agent; as difficult as it would be to prove that the object of action is the agent.

For we clearly see that this agent (the subject of consciousness) is permanent (constant), while its attribute, i.e. consciousness, not differing herein from joy, grief, and the like, rises, persists for some time, and then comes to an end. The permanency of the conscious subject is proved by the fact of recognition, 'This very same thing was formerly apprehended by me.' The non-permanency of conscious-

ness, on the other hand, is proved by thought expressing itself in the following forms, 'I know at present,' 'I knew at a time,' 'I, the knowing subject, no longer have knowledge of this thing.' How then should consciousness and the conscious subject be one? If consciousness which changes every moment were admitted to constitute the conscious subject, it would be impossible for us to recognise the thing seen to-day as the one we saw yesterday; for what has been perceived by one cannot be recognised by another. And even if consciousness were identified with the conscious subject and acknowledged as permanent, this would no better account for the fact of recognition. For recognition implies a conscious subject persisting from the earlier to the later moment, and not merely consciousness. Its expression is 'I myself perceived this thing on a former occasion.' According to your view the quality of being a conscious agent cannot at all belong to consciousness; for consciousness, you say, is just consciousness and nothing more. And that there exists a pure consciousness devoid of substrate and objects alike, we have already refuted on the ground that of a thing of this kind we have absolutely no knowledge. And that the consciousness admitted by both of us should be the Self is refuted by immediate consciousness itself. And we have also refuted the fallacious arguments brought forward to prove that mere consciousness is the only reality.—But, another objection is raised, should the relation of the Self and the 'I' not rather be conceived as follows:—In self-consciousness which expresses itself in the judgment 'I know,' that intelligent something which constitutes the absolutely non-objective element, and is pure homogeneous light, is the Self; the objective element (yushmad-artha) on the other hand, which is established through its being illumined (revealed) by the Self is the *I*—in 'I know'—and this is something different from pure intelligence, something objective or external?

By no means, we reply; for this view contradicts the relation of attribute and substrate of attribute of which we are directly conscious, as implied in the thought 'I know.'

Consider also what follows.—‘If the *I* were not the Self, the inwardness of the Self would not exist; for it is just the consciousness of the *I* which separates the inward from the outward.

“May I, freeing myself from all pain, enter on free possession of endless delight?” This is the thought which prompts the man desirous of release to apply himself to the study of the sacred texts. Were it a settled matter that release consists in the annihilation of the *I*, the same man would move away as soon as release were only hinted at. “When I myself have perished, there still persists some consciousness different from me;” to bring this about nobody truly will exert himself.

‘Moreover the very existence of consciousness, its being a consciousness at all, and its being self-luminous, depend on its connexion with a Self; when that connexion is dissolved, consciousness itself cannot be established, not any more than the act of cutting can take place when there is no person to cut and nothing to be cut. Hence it is certain that the *I*, i. e. the knowing subject, is the inward Self.’

This scripture confirms when saying ‘By what should he know the knower?’ (*Bṛi. Up.* II, 4, 15); and *Smṛiti* also, ‘Him who knows this they call the knower of the body’ (*Bha. Gī.* XIII, 1). And the *Sūtrakāra* also, in the section beginning with ‘Not the Self on account of scriptural statement’ (II, 3, 17), will say ‘For this very reason (it is) a knower’ (II, 3, 18); and from this it follows that the Self is not mere consciousness.

What is established by consciousness of the ‘*I*’ is the *I* itself, while the not-*I* is given in the consciousness of the not-*I*; hence to say that the knowing subject, which is established by the state of consciousness, ‘*I* know,’ is the not-*I*, is no better than to maintain that one’s own mother is a barren woman. Nor can it be said that this ‘*I*,’ the knowing subject, is dependent on its light for something else. It rather is self-luminous; for to be self-luminous means to have consciousness for one’s essential nature. And that which has light for its essential nature does not depend for its light on something else. The case is

analogous to that of the flame of a lamp or candle. From the circumstance that the lamp illumines with its light other things, it does not follow either that it is not luminous, or that its luminousness depends on something else; the fact rather is that the lamp being of luminous nature shines itself and illumines with its light other things also. To explain.—The one substance *tegas*, i.e. fire or heat, subsists in a double form, viz. as light (*prabhâ*), and as luminous matter. Although light is a quality of luminous substantial things, it is in itself nothing but the substance *tegas*, not a mere quality like e.g. whiteness; for it exists also apart from its substrates, and possesses colour (which is a quality). Having thus attributes different from those of qualities such as whiteness and so on, and possessing illumining power, it is the substance *tegas*, not anything else (e.g. a quality). Illumining power belongs to it, because it lights up itself and other things. At the same time it is practically treated as a quality because it always has the substance *tegas* for its substrate, and depends on it. This must not be objected to on the ground that what is called light is really nothing but dissolving particles of matter which proceed from the substance *tegas*; for if this were so, shining gems and the sun would in the end consume themselves completely. Moreover, if the flame of a lamp consisted of dissolving particles of matter, it would never be apprehended as a whole; for no reason can be stated why those particles should regularly rise in an agglomerated form to the height of four fingers' breadth, and after that simultaneously disperse themselves uniformly in all directions—upwards, sideways, and downwards. The fact is that the flame of the lamp together with its light is produced anew every moment and again vanishes every moment; as we may infer from the successive combination of sufficient causes (viz. particles of oil and wick) and from its coming to an end when those causes are completely consumed.

Analogously to the lamp, the Self is essentially intelligent (*âid-rûpa*), and has intelligence (*âaitanya*) for its quality. And to be essentially intelligent means to be

self-luminous. There are many scriptural texts declaring this, compare e. g. 'As a mass of salt has neither inside nor outside but is altogether a mass of taste, thus indeed that Self has neither inside nor outside but is altogether a mass of knowledge' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 6, 12*); 'There that person becomes self-luminous, there is no destruction of the knowing of the knower' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 3, 14; 30*); 'He who knows, let me smell this, he is the Self' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 4*); 'Who is that Self? That one who is made of knowledge, among the *prāṇas*, within the heart, the light, the person' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 3, 7*); 'For it is he who sees, hears, smells, tastes, thinks, considers, acts, the person whose Self is knowledge' (*Pr. Up. IV, 9*); 'Whereby should one know the knower' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 5, 15*). 'This person knows,' 'The seer does not see death nor illness nor pain' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 26, 2*); 'That highest person not remembering this body into which he was born' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 3*); 'Thus these sixteen parts of the spectator that go towards the person; when they have reached the person, sink into him' (*Pr. Up. VI, 5*); 'From this consisting of mind, there is different an interior Self consisting of knowledge' (*Taitt. Up. II, 4*). And the *Sūtrakāra* also will refer to the Self as a 'knower' in II, 3, 18. All which shows that the self-luminous Self is a knower, i. e. a knowing subject, and not pure light (non-personal intelligence). In general we may say that where there is light it must belong to something, as shown by the light of a lamp. The Self thus cannot be mere consciousness. The grammarians moreover tell us that words such as 'consciousness,' 'knowledge,' &c., are relative; neither ordinary nor Vedic language uses expressions such as 'he knows' without reference to an object known and an agent who knows.

With reference to the assertion that consciousness constitutes the Self, because it (consciousness) is not non-intelligent (*gada*), we ask what you understand by this 'absence of non-intelligence.' If you reply 'luminousness due to the being of the thing itself (i. e. of the thing which is *agada*)'; we point out that this definition would wrongly include lamps also, and similar things; and it would more-

over give rise to a contradiction, since you do not admit light as an attribute, different from consciousness itself. Nor can we allow you to define *agadātva* as 'being of that nature that light is always present, without any exception,' for this definition would extend also to pleasure, pain, and similar states. Should you maintain that pleasure and so on, although being throughout of the nature of light, are non-intelligent for the reason that, like jars, &c., they shine forth (appear) to something else and hence belong to the sphere of the not-Self; we ask in reply: Do you mean then to say that knowledge appears to itself? Knowledge no less than pleasure appears to some one else, viz. the 'I': there is, in that respect, no difference between the judgment 'I know,' and the judgment 'I am pleased.' Non-intelligence in the sense of appearingness-to-itself is thus not proved for consciousness; and hence it follows that what constitutes the Self is the non-*gaḍa* 'I' which is proved to itself by its very Being. That knowledge is of the nature of light depends altogether on its connexion with the knowing 'I': it is due to the latter, that knowledge, like pleasure, manifests itself to that conscious person who is its substrate, and not to anybody else. The Self is thus not mere knowledge, but is the knowing 'I.'

The view that the conscious subject is something unreal, due to the *ahamkāra*, cannot be maintained.

We turn to a further point. You maintain that consciousness which is in reality devoid alike of objects and substrate presents itself, owing to error, in the form of a knowing subject, just as mother o' pearl appears as silver; (consciousness itself being viewed as a real substrate of an erroneous imputation), because an erroneous imputation cannot take place apart from a substrate. But this theory is indefensible. If things were as you describe them, the conscious 'I' would be cognised as co-ordinate with the state of consciousness 'I am consciousness,' just as the shining thing presenting itself to our eyes is judged to be silver. But the fact is that the state of consciousness presents itself as something apart, constituting a distin-

guishing attribute of the I, just as the stick is an attribute of Devadatta who carries it. The judgment 'I am conscious' reveals an 'I' distinguished by consciousness; and to declare that it refers only to a state of consciousness—which is a mere attribute—is no better than to say that the judgment 'Devadatta carries a stick' is about the stick only. Nor are you right in saying that the idea of the Self being a knowing agent, presents itself to the mind of him only who erroneously identifies the Self and the body, an error expressing itself in judgments such as 'I am stout,' and is on that account false; for from this it would follow that the consciousness which is erroneously imagined as a Self is also false; for it presents itself to the mind of the same person. You will perhaps rejoin that consciousness is not false because it (alone) is not sublated by that cognition which sublates everything else. Well, we reply, then the knowership of the Self also is not false; for that also is not sublated. You further maintain that the character of being a knower, i. e. the agent in the action of knowing, does not become the non-changing Self; that being a knower is something implying change, of a non-intelligent kind (*gada*), and residing in the *ahamkāra* which is the abode of change and a mere effect of the Unevolved (the *Prakṛiti*); that being an agent and so on is like colour and other qualities, an attribute of what is objective; and that if we admit the Self to be an agent and the object of the notion of the 'I,' it also follows that the Self is, like the body, not a real Self but something external and non-intelligent. But all this is unfounded, since the internal organ is, like the body, non-intelligent, an effect of *Prakṛiti*, an object of knowledge, something outward and for the sake of others merely; while being a knowing subject constitutes the special essential nature of intelligent beings. To explain. Just as the body, through its objectiveness, outwardness, and similar causes, is distinguished from what possesses the opposite attributes of subjectiveness, inwardness, and so on; for the same reason the *ahamkāra* also—which is of the same substantial nature as the body—is similarly distinguished. Hence the *ahamkāra* is no more

a knower than it is something subjective ; otherwise there would be an evident contradiction. As knowing cannot be attributed to the *ahamkāra*, which is an object of knowledge, so knowership also cannot be ascribed to it ; for of that also it is the object. Nor can it be maintained that to be a knower is something essentially changing. For to be a knower is to be the substrate of the quality of knowledge, and as the knowing Self is eternal, knowledge which is an essential quality of the Self is also eternal. That the Self is eternal will be declared in the Sūtra, II, 3, 17 ; and in II, 3, 18 the term '*gñā*' (knower) will show that it is an essential quality of the Self to be the abode of knowledge. That a Self whose essential nature is knowledge should be the substrate of the (quality of) knowledge—just as gems and the like are the substrate of light—gives rise to no contradiction whatever.

Knowledge (the quality) which is in itself unlimited, is capable of contraction and expansion, as we shall show later on. In the so-called *kshetragñā*-condition of the Self, knowledge is, owing to the influence of work (*karman*), of a contracted nature, as it more or less adapts itself to work of different kinds, and is variously determined by the different senses. With reference to this various flow of knowledge as due to the senses, it is spoken of as rising and setting, and the Self possesses the quality of an agent. As this quality is not, however, essential, but originated by action, the Self is essentially unchanging. This changeful quality of being a knower can belong only to the Self whose essential nature is knowledge ; not possibly to the non-intelligent *ahamkāra*. But, you will perhaps say, the *ahamkāra*, although of non-intelligent nature, may become a knower in so far as by approximation to intelligence it becomes a reflection of the latter. How, we ask in return, is this becoming a reflection of intelligence imagined to take place ? Does consciousness become a reflection of the *ahamkāra*, or does the *ahamkāra* become a reflection of consciousness ? The former alternative is inadmissible, since you will not allow to consciousness the quality of being a knower ; and so is the latter since, as explained

above, the non-intelligent ahaṁkāra can never become a knower. Moreover, neither consciousness nor the ahaṁkāra are objects of visual perception. Only things seen by the eye have reflections.—Let it then be said that as an iron ball is heated by contact with fire, so the consciousness of being a knower is imparted to the ahaṁkāra through its contact with Intelligence.—This view too is inadmissible; for as you do not allow real knowership to Intelligence, knowership or the consciousness of knowership cannot be imparted to the ahaṁkāra by contact with Intelligence; and much less even can knowership or the consciousness of it be imparted to Intelligence by contact with the essentially non-intelligent ahaṁkāra. Nor can we accept what you say about ‘manifestation.’ Neither the ahaṁkāra, you say, nor Intelligence is really a knowing subject, but the ahaṁkāra manifests consciousness abiding within itself (within the ahaṁkāra), as the mirror manifests the image abiding within it. But the essentially non-intelligent ahaṁkāra evidently cannot ‘manifest’ the self-luminous Self. As has been said ‘That the non-intelligent ahaṁkāra should manifest the self-luminous Self, has no more sense than to say that a spent coal manifests the Sun.’ The truth is that all things depend for their proof on self-luminous consciousness; and now you maintain that one of these things, viz. the non-intelligent ahaṁkāra—which itself depends for its light on consciousness—manifests consciousness, whose essential light never rises or sets, and which is the cause that proves everything! Whoever knows the nature of the Self will justly deride such a view! The relation of ‘manifestation’ cannot hold good between consciousness and the ahaṁkāra for the further reason also that there is a contradiction in nature between the two, and because it would imply consciousness not to be consciousness. As has been said, ‘One cannot manifest the other, owing to contradictoriness; and if the Self were something to be manifested, that would imply its being non-intelligent like a jar.’ Nor is the matter improved by your introducing the hand and the sunbeams (above, p. 38), and to say that as the sunbeams, while manifesting the hand, are at the

same time manifested by the hand, so consciousness, while manifesting the *ahamkāra*, is at the same time itself manifested by the latter. The sunbeams are in reality not manifested by the hand at all. What takes place is that the motion of the sunbeams is reversed (reflected) by the opposed hand; they thus become more numerous, and hence are perceived more clearly; but this is due altogether to the multitude of beams, not to any manifesting power on the part of the hand.

What could, moreover, be the nature of that 'manifestation' of the Self consisting of Intelligence, which would be effected through the *ahamkāra*? It cannot be origination; for you acknowledge that what is self-established cannot be originated by anything else. Nor can it be 'illumination' (making to shine forth), since consciousness cannot—according to you—be the object of another consciousness. For the same reason it cannot be any action assisting the means of being conscious of consciousness. For such helpful action could be of two kinds only. It would either be such as to cause the connexion of the object to be known with the sense-organs; as e.g. any action which, in the case of the apprehension of a species or of one's own face, causes connexion between the organ of sight and an individual of the species, or a looking-glass. Or it would be such as to remove some obstructive impurity in the mind of the knowing person; of this kind is the action of calmness and self-restraint with reference to scripture which is the means of apprehending the highest reality. Moreover, even if it were admitted that consciousness may be an object of consciousness, it could not be maintained that the 'I' assists the means whereby that consciousness is effected. For if it did so, it could only be in the way of removing any obstacles impeding the origination of such consciousness; analogous to the way in which a lamp assists the eye by dispelling the darkness which impedes the origination of the apprehension of colour. But in the case under discussion we are unable to imagine such obstacles. There is nothing pertaining to consciousness which obstructs the origination of the knowledge of con-

sciousness and which could be removed by the *ahamkāra*.—There is something, you will perhaps reply, viz. Nescience! Not so, we reply. That Nescience is removed by the *ahamkāra* cannot be admitted; knowledge alone can put an end to Nescience. Nor can consciousness be the abode of Nescience, because in that case Nescience would have the same abode and the same object as knowledge.

In pure knowledge where there is no knowing subject and no object of knowledge—the so-called ‘witnessing’ principle (*sākshin*)—Nescience cannot exist. Jars and similar things cannot be the abode of Nescience because there is no possibility of their being the abode of knowledge, and for the same reason pure knowledge also cannot be the abode of Nescience. And even if consciousness were admitted to be the abode of Nescience, it could not be the object of knowledge; for consciousness being viewed as the Self cannot be the object of knowledge, and hence knowledge cannot terminate the Nescience abiding within consciousness. For knowledge puts an end to Nescience only with regard to its own objects, as in the case of the snake-rope. And the consequence of this would be that the Nescience attached to consciousness could never be destroyed by any one.—If Nescience, we further remark, is viewed as that which can be defined neither as Being nor non-Being, we shall show later on that such Nescience is something quite incomprehensible.—On the other hand, Nescience, if understood to be the antecedent non-existence of knowledge, is not opposed in nature to the origination of knowledge, and hence the dispelling of Nescience cannot be viewed as promoting the means of the knowledge of the Self.—From all this it follows that the *ahamkāra* cannot effect in any way ‘manifestation of consciousness.’

Nor (to finish up this point) can it be said that it is the essential nature of manifesting agents to manifest things in so far as the latter have their abode in the former; for such a relation is not observed in the case of lamps and the like (which manifest what lies outside them). The essen-

tial nature of manifesting agents rather lies therein that they promote the knowledge of things as they really are, and this is also the nature of whatever promotes knowledge and the means thereof. Nor is it even true that the mirror manifests the face. The mirror is only the cause of a certain irregularity, viz. the reversion of the ocular rays of light, and to this irregularity there is due the appearance of the face within the mirror ; but the manifesting agent is the light only. And it is evident that the *ahamkāra* is not capable of producing an irregularity (analogous to that produced by the mirror) in consciousness which is self-luminous.—And—with regard to the second analogous instance alleged by you—the fact is that the species is known through the individual because the latter is its substrate (as expressed in the general principle, ‘the species is the form of the individual’), but not because the individual ‘manifests’ the species. Thus there is no reason, either real or springing from some imperfection, why the consciousness of consciousness should be brought about by its abiding in the *ahamkāra*, and the attribute of being the knowing agent or the consciousness of that cannot therefore belong to the *ahamkāra*. Hence, what constitutes the inward Self is not pure consciousness but the ‘I’ which proves itself as the knowing subject. In the absence of egoity, ‘inwardness’ could not be established for consciousness.

The conscious subject persists in deep sleep.

We now come to the question as to the nature of deep sleep. In deep sleep the quality of darkness prevails in the mind and there is no consciousness of outward things, and thus there is no distinct and clear presentation of the ‘I’ ; but all the same the Self somehow presents itself up to the time of waking in the one form of the ‘I,’ and the latter cannot therefore be said to be absent. Pure consciousness assumed by you (to manifest itself in deep sleep) is really in no better case ; for a person risen from deep sleep never represents to himself his state of consciousness during

sleep in the form, 'I was pure consciousness free from all egoity and opposed in nature to everything else, witnessing Nescience'; what he thinks is only 'I slept well.' From this form of reflection it appears that even during sleep the Self, i. e. the 'I,' was a knowing subject and perceptive of pleasure. Nor must you urge against this that the reflection has the following form: 'As now I feel pleasure, so I slept then also'; for the reflection is distinctly *not* of that kind¹. Nor must you say that owing to the non-permanency of the 'I' its perception of pleasure during sleep cannot connect itself with the waking state. For (the 'I' is permanent as appears from the fact that) the person who has risen from sleep recalls things of which he was conscious before his sleep, 'I did such and such a thing,' 'I observed this or that,' 'I said so or so.'—But, you will perhaps say, he also reflects, 'For such and such a time I was conscious of nothing!'—'And what does this imply?' we ask.—'It implies a negation of everything!'—By no means, we rejoin. The words 'I was conscious' show that the knowing 'I' persisted, and that hence what is negated is only the objects of knowledge. If the negation implied in 'of nothing' included everything, it would also negative the pure consciousness which you hold to persist in deep sleep. In the judgment 'I was conscious of nothing,' the word 'I' clearly refers to the 'I,' i. e. the knowing Self which persists even during deep sleep, while the words 'was conscious of nothing' negative all knowledge on the part of that 'I'; if, now, in the face of this, you undertake to prove by means of this very judgment that knowledge—which is expressly denied—existed at the time, and that the persisting knowing Self did not exist, you may address your proof to the patient gods who give no reply!—But—our opponent goes on to urge—I form the following judgment also: 'I then was not conscious of myself,' and from this I understand that the 'I' did not persist during deep sleep!—You do not know, we rejoin, that this denial of the per-

¹ I. e. the reflection as to the perception of pleasure refers to the past state of sleep only, not to the present moment of reflection.

sistence of the 'I' flatly contradicts the state of consciousness expressed in the judgment 'I was not conscious of myself' and the verbal form of the judgment itself!—But what then is denied by the words 'of myself'?—This, we admit, is a reasonable question. Let us consider the point. What is negated in that judgment is not the knowing 'I' itself, but merely the distinctions of caste, condition of life, &c. which belong to the 'I' at the time of waking. We must distinguish the objects of the several parts of the judgment under discussion. The object of the '(me) myself' is the 'I' distinguished by class characteristics as it presents itself in the waking state; the object of the word 'I' (in the judgment) is that 'I' which consists of a uniform flow of self-consciousness which persists in sleep also, but is then not quite distinct. The judgment 'I did not know myself' therefore means that the sleeper was not conscious of the place where he slept, of his special characteristics, and so on.—It is, moreover, your own view that in deep sleep the Self occupies the position of a witnessing principle with regard to Nescience. But by a witness (*sākshin*) we understand some one who knows about something by personal observation (*sākshāt*); a person who does not know cannot be a witness. Accordingly, in scripture as well as in ordinary language a knowing subject only, not mere knowledge, is spoken of as a witness; and with this the Reverend Pāṇini also agrees when teaching that the word '*sākshin*' means one who knows in person (Pā. Sū. V, 2, 91). Now this witness is nothing else but the 'I' which is apprehended in the judgment 'I know'; and how then should this 'I' not be apprehended in the state of sleep? That which itself appears to the Self appears as the 'I,' and it thus follows that also in deep sleep and similar states the Self which then shines forth appears as the 'I.'

The conscious subject persists in the state of release.

To maintain that the consciousness of the 'I' does not persist in the state of final release is again altogether inap-

propriate. It in fact amounts to the doctrine—only expressed in somewhat different words—that final release is the annihilation of the Self. The 'I' is not a mere attribute of the Self so that even after its destruction the essential nature of the Self might persist—as it persists on the cessation of ignorance; but it constitutes the very nature of the Self. Such judgments as 'I know,' 'Knowledge has arisen in me,' show, on the other hand, that we are conscious of knowledge as a mere attribute of the Self.—Moreover, a man who suffering pain, mental or of other kind—whether such pain be real or due to error only—puts himself in relation to pain—'I am suffering pain'—naturally begins to reflect how he may once for all free himself from all these manifold afflictions and enjoy a state of untroubled ease; the desire of final release thus having arisen in him he at once sets to work to accomplish it. If, on the other hand, he were to realise that the effect of such activity would be the loss of personal existence, he surely would turn away as soon as somebody began to tell him about 'release.' And the result of this would be that, in the absence of willing and qualified pupils, the whole scriptural teaching as to final release would lose its authoritative character.—Nor must you maintain against this that even in the state of release there persists pure consciousness; for this by no means improves your case. No sensible person exerts himself under the influence of the idea that after he himself has perished there will remain some entity termed 'pure light!'—What constitutes the 'inward' Self thus is the 'I,' the knowing subject.

This 'inward' Self shines forth in the state of final release also as an 'I'; for it appears to itself. The general principle is that whatever being appears to itself appears as an 'I'; both parties in the present dispute establish the existence of the transmigrating Self on such appearance. On the contrary, whatever does not appear as an 'I,' does not appear to itself; as jars and the like. Now the emancipated Self does thus appear to itself, and therefore it appears as an 'I.' Nor does this appearance as an 'I' imply in any way that the released Self is subject to

Nescience and implicated in the *Samsâra*; for this would contradict the nature of final release, and moreover the consciousness of the 'I' cannot be the cause of Nescience and so on. Nescience (ignorance) is either ignorance as to essential nature, or the cognition of something under an aspect different from the real one (as when a person suffering from jaundice sees all things yellow); or cognition of what is altogether opposite in nature (as when mother o' pearl is mistaken for silver). Now the 'I' constitutes the essential nature of the Self; how then can the consciousness of the 'I,' i.e. the consciousness of its own true nature, implicate the released Self in Nescience, or, in the *Samsâra*? The fact rather is that such consciousness destroys Nescience, and so on, because it is essentially opposed to them. In agreement with this we observe that persons like the *rishi* Vâmadeva, in whom the intuition of their identity with Brahman had totally destroyed all Nescience, enjoyed the consciousness of the personal 'I'; for scripture says, 'Seeing this the *rishi* Vâmadeva understood, I was Manu and the Sun' (*Bṛi. Up. I, 4, 10*). And the highest Brahman also, which is opposed to all other forms of Nescience and denoted and conceived as pure Being, is spoken of in an analogous way; cp. 'Let me make each of these three deities,' &c. (*Kh. Up. VI, 3, 3*); 'May I be many, may I grow forth' (*Kh. Up. VI, 2, 3*); 'He thought, shall I send forth worlds?' (*Ait. Âr. II, 4, 1, 1*); and again, 'Since I transcend the Destructible, and am higher also than the Indestructible, therefore I am proclaimed in the world and in the Veda as the highest Person' (*Bha. Gî. XV, 18*); 'I am the Self, O *Gûḍâkera*' (*Bha. Gî. X, 20*); 'Never was I not' (*Bha. Gî. II, 12*); 'I am the source and the destruction of the whole world' (*Bha. Gî. VII, 6*); 'I am the source of all; from me proceeds everything' (*Bha. Gî. X, 8*); 'I am he who raises them from the ocean of the world of death' (*Bha. Gî. XII, 7*); 'I am the giver of seed, the father' (*Bha. Gî. XIV, 4*); 'I know the things past' (*Bha. Gî. VII, 26*).—But if the 'I' (*aham*) constitutes the essential nature of the Self, how is it that the Holy One teaches the principle of egoity (*ahamkāra*) to belong to the sphere

of objects, 'The great elements, the ahaṁkāra, the understanding (buddhi), and the Unevolved' (Bha. Gī. XIII, 5)? —As in all passages, we reply, which give information about the true nature of the Self it is spoken of as the 'I,' we conclude that the 'I' constitutes the essential nature of the inward Self. Where, on the other hand, the Holy One declares the ahaṁkāra—a special effect of the Unevolved—to be comprised within the sphere of the Objective, he means that principle which is called ahaṁkāra, because it causes the assumption of Egoity on the part of the body which belongs to the Not-self. Such egoity constitutes the ahaṁkāra also designated as pride or arrogance, which causes men to slight persons superior to themselves, and is referred to by scripture in many places as something evil. Such consciousness of the 'I' therefore as is not sublated by anything else has the Self for its object; while, on the other hand, such consciousness of the 'I' as has the body for its object is mere Nescience. In agreement with this the Reverend Parāśara has said, 'Hear from me the essential nature of Nescience; it is the attribution of Selfhood to what is not the Self.' If the Self were pure consciousness then pure consciousness only, and not the quality of being a knowing subject, would present itself in the body also, which is a Not-self wrongly imagined to be a Self. The conclusion therefore remains that the Self is nothing but the knowing 'I.' Thus it has been said, 'As is proved by perception, and as also results from reasoning and tradition, and from its connexion with ignorance, the Self presents itself as a knowing 'I.' And again, 'That which is different from body, senses, mind, and vital airs; which does not depend on other means; which is permanent, pervading, divided according to bodies—that is the Self blessed in itself.' Here 'not dependent on other means' means 'self-luminous'; and 'pervading' means 'being of such a nature as to enter, owing to excessive minuteness, into all non-sentient things.'

In cases of Scripture conflicting with Perception, Scripture is not stronger. The True cannot be known through the Untrue.

With reference to the assertion (p. 24 ff.) that Perception, which depends on the view of plurality, is based on some defect and hence admits of being otherwise accounted for—whence it follows that it is sublated by Scripture; we ask you to point out what defect it is on which Perception is based and may hence be accounted for otherwise.—‘The beginningless imagination of difference’ we expect you to reply.—But, we ask in return, have you then come to know by some other means that this beginningless imagination of difference, acting in a manner analogous to that of certain defects of vision, is really the cause of an altogether perverse view of things?—If you reply that this is known just from the fact that Perception is in conflict with Scripture, we point out that you are reasoning in a circle: you prove the defectiveness of the imagination of plurality through the fact that Scripture tells us about a substance devoid of all difference; and at the same time you prove the latter point through the former. Moreover, if Perception gives rise to perverse cognition because it is based on the imagination of plurality, Scripture also is in no better case—for it is based on the very same view.—If against this you urge that Scripture, although based on a defect, yet sublates Perception in so far as it is the cause of a cognition which dispels all plurality apprehended through Perception, and thus is later in order than Perception; we rejoin that the defectiveness of the foundation of Scripture having once been recognised, the circumstance of its being later is of no avail. For if a man is afraid of a rope which he mistakes for a snake his fear does not come to an end because another man, whom he considers to be in error himself, tells him ‘This is no snake, do not be afraid.’ And that Scripture *is* founded on something defective is known at the very time of hearing Scripture, for the reflection (which follows on hearing) consists in repeated attempts to cognise the oneness of Brahman—a cognition which is destructive of all the plurality appre-

hended through the first hearing of the Veda.—We further ask, 'By what means do you arrive at the conclusion that Scripture cannot possibly be assumed to be defective in any way, while defects may be ascribed to Perception'? It is certainly not Consciousness—self-proved and absolutely devoid of all difference—which enlightens you on this point; for such Consciousness is unrelated to any objects whatever, and incapable of partiality to Scripture. Nor can sense-perception be the source of your conviction; for as it is founded on what is defective it gives perverse information. Nor again the other sources of knowledge; for they are all based on sense-perception. As thus there are no acknowledged means of knowledge to prove your view, you must give it up.—But, you will perhaps say, we proceed by means of the ordinary empirical means and objects of knowledge!—What, we ask in reply, do you understand by 'empirical'?—What rests on immediate unreflective knowledge, but is found not to hold good when tested by logical reasoning!—But what is the use, we ask, of knowledge of this kind? If logical reasoning refutes something known through some means of knowledge, that means of knowledge is no longer authoritative!—Now you will possibly argue as follows: 'Scripture as well as Perception is founded on Nescience; but all the same Perception is sublated by Scripture. For as the object of Scripture, i.e. Brahman, which is one and without a second, is not seen to be sublated by any ulterior cognition, Brahman, i.e. pure non-differenced Consciousness, remains as the sole Reality.'—But here too you are wrong, since we must decide that something which rests on a defect is unreal, although it may remain unrefuted. We will illustrate this point by an analogous instance. Let us imagine a race of men afflicted with a certain special defect of vision, without being aware of this their defect, dwelling in some remote mountain caves inaccessible to all other men provided with sound eyes. As we assume all of these cave dwellers to be afflicted with the same defect of vision, they, all of them, will equally see and judge bright things, e.g. the moon, to be double. Now in the case of these people there never arises a subsequent cognition sublating their primitive

cognition; but the latter is false all the same, and its object, viz. the doubleness of the moon, is false likewise; the defect of vision being the cause of a cognition not corresponding to reality.—And so it is with the cognition of Brahman also. This cognition is based on Nescience, and therefore is false, together with its object, viz. Brahman, although no sublating cognition presents itself.—This conclusion admits of various expressions in logical form. ‘The Brahman under dispute is false because it is the object of knowledge which has sprung from what is affected with Nescience; as the phenomenal world is.’ ‘Brahman is false because it is the object of knowledge; as the world is.’ ‘Brahman is false because it is the object of knowledge, the rise of which has the Untrue for its cause; as the world is.’

You will now perhaps set forth the following analogy. States of dreaming consciousness—such as the perception of elephants and the like in one’s dreams—are unreal, and yet they are the cause of the knowledge of real things, viz. good or ill fortune (portended by those dreams). Hence there is no reason why Scripture—although unreal in so far as based on Nescience—should not likewise be the cause of the cognition of what is real, viz. Brahman.—The two cases are not parallel, we reply. The conscious states experienced in dreams are *not* unreal; it is only their objects that are false; these objects only, not the conscious states, are sublated by the waking consciousness. Nobody thinks ‘the cognitions of which I was conscious in my dream are unreal’; what men actually think is ‘the cognitions are real, but the things are not real.’ In the same way the illusive state of consciousness which the magician produces in the minds of other men by means of mantras, drugs, &c., is true, and hence the cause of love and fear; for such states of consciousness also are not sublated. The cognition which, owing to some defect in the object, the sense organ, &c., apprehends a rope as a snake is real, and hence the cause of fear and other emotions. True also is the imagination which, owing to the nearness of a snake, arises in the mind of a man though not actually bitten, viz. that he has been bitten; true also is the representation of the imagined

poison, for it may be the cause of actual death. In the same way the reflection of the face in the water is real, and hence enables us to ascertain details belonging to the real face. All these states of consciousness are real, as we conclude from their having a beginning and actual effects.—Nor would it avail you to object that in the absence of real elephants, and so on, the ideas of them cannot be real. For ideas require only *some* substrate in general; the mere appearance of a thing is a sufficient substrate, and such an appearance is present in the case in question, owing to a certain defect. The thing we determine to be unreal because it is sublated; the idea is non-sublated, and therefore real.

Nor can you quote in favour of your view—of the real being known through the unreal—the instance of the stroke and the letter. The letter being apprehended through the stroke (i.e. the written character) does not furnish a case of the real being apprehended through the unreal; for the stroke itself is real.—But the stroke causes the idea of the letter only in so far as it is apprehended as being a letter, and this ‘being a letter’ is untrue!—Not so, we rejoin. If this ‘being a letter’ were unreal it could not be a means of the apprehension of the letter; for we neither observe nor can prove that what is non-existent and indefinable constitutes a means.—Let then the idea of the letter constitute the means!—In that case, we rejoin, the apprehension of the real does not spring from the unreal; and besides, it would follow therefrom that the means and what is to be effected thereby would be one, i.e. both would be, without any distinction, the idea of the letter only. Moreover, if the means were constituted by the stroke in so far as it is *not* the letter, the apprehension of all letters would result from the sight of one stroke; for one stroke may easily be conceived as *not* being *any* letter.—But, in the same way as the word ‘Devadatta’ conventionally denotes some particular man, so some particular stroke apprehended by the eye may conventionally symbolise some particular letter to be apprehended by the ear, and thus a particular stroke may be the cause of the idea of a particular letter!—Quite so,

we reply, but on this explanation the real is known through the real ; for both stroke and conventional power of symbolisation are real. The case is analogous to that of the idea of a buffalo being caused by the picture of a buffalo ; that idea rests on the similarity of picture and thing depicted, and that similarity is something real. Nor can it be said (with a view to proving the *pūrvapakṣa* by another analogous instance) that we meet with a cognition of the real by means of the unreal in the case of sound (*śabda*) which is essentially uniform, but causes the apprehension of different things by means of difference of tone (*nāda*). For sound is the cause of the apprehension of different things in so far only as we apprehend the connexion of sound manifesting itself in various tones, with the different things indicated by those various tones ¹. And, moreover, it is not correct to argue on the ground of the uniformity of sound ; for only particular significant sounds such as 'ga,' which can be apprehended by the ear, are really 'sound.'—All this proves that it is difficult indeed to show that the knowledge of a true thing, viz. Brahman, can be derived from Scripture, if Scripture—as based on Nescience—is itself untrue.

Our opponent may finally argue as follows :—Scripture is not unreal in the same sense as a sky-flower is unreal ; for antecedently to the cognition of universal non-duality Scripture is viewed as something that *is*, and only on the rise of that knowledge it is seen to be unreal. At this latter time Scripture no longer is a means of cognising Brahman, devoid of all difference, consisting of pure Intelligence ; as long on the other hand as it is such a means, Scripture *is* ; for then we judge 'Scripture is.'—But to this we reply that if Scripture is not (true), the judgment 'Scripture is' is false, and hence the knowledge resting on false Scripture being false likewise, the object of that knowledge, i.e. Brahman itself, is false. If the cognition of fire which rests on mist being mistaken for smoke is false, it

¹ And those manifestations of sound by means of various tones are themselves something real.

follows that the object of that cognition, viz. fire itself, is likewise unreal. Nor can it be shown that (in the case of Brahman) there is no possibility of ulterior sublative cognition; for there may be such sublative cognition, viz. the one expressed in the judgment 'the Reality is a Void.' And if you say that this latter judgment rests on error, we point out that according to yourself the knowledge of Brahman is also based on error. And of our judgment (viz. 'the Reality is a Void') it may truly be said that all further negation is impossible.—But there is no need to continue this demolition of an altogether baseless theory.

No scriptural texts teach a Brahman devoid of all difference.

We now turn to the assertion that certain scriptural texts, as e.g. 'Being only was this in the beginning,' are meant to teach that there truly exists only one homogeneous substance, viz. Intelligence free from all difference.—This we cannot allow. For the section in which the quoted text occurs, in order to make good the initial declaration that by the knowledge of one thing all things are known, shows that the highest Brahman which is denoted by the term 'Being' is the substantial and also the operative cause of the world; that it is all-knowing, endowed with all powers; that its purposes come true; that it is the inward principle, the support and the ruler of everything; and that distinguished by these and other good qualities it constitutes the Self of the entire world; and then finally proceeds to instruct Svetaketu that this Brahman constitutes his Self also ('Thou art that'). We have fully set forth this point in the Vedārtha-saṃgraha, and shall establish it in greater detail in the present work also, in the so-called ārambhāṇa-adhikarāṇa.—In the same way the passage 'the higher knowledge is that by which the Indestructible is apprehended, &c.' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 5) first denies of Brahman all the evil qualities connected with Prakṛiti, and then teaches that to it there belong eternity, all-pervadingness, subtilty, omnipresence, omniscience, imperish-

ableness, creativeness with regard to all beings, and other auspicious qualities. Now we maintain that also the text 'True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman,' does not prove a substance devoid of all difference, for the reason that the co-ordination of the terms of which it consists explains itself in so far only as denoting one thing distinguished by several attributes. For 'co-ordination' (*sāmānādhikarānya*, lit. 'the abiding of several things in a common substrate') means the reference (of several terms) to one thing, there being a difference of reason for the application (of several terms to one thing). Now whether we take the several terms, 'True,' 'Knowledge,' 'Infinite,' in their primary sense, i. e. as denoting qualities, or as denoting modes of being opposed to whatever is contrary to those qualities; in either case we must needs admit a plurality of causes for the application of those several terms to one thing. There is however that difference between the two alternatives that in the former case the terms preserve their primary meaning, while in the latter case their denotative power depends on so-called 'implication' (*lakṣhaṇā*). Nor can it be said that the opposition in nature to non-knowledge, &c. (which is the purport of the terms on the hypothesis of *lakṣhaṇā*), constitutes nothing more than the essential nature (of one non-differenced substance; the three terms thus having one purport only); for as such essential nature would be sufficiently apprehended through one term, the employment of further terms would be purposeless. This view would moreover be in conflict with co-ordination, as it would not allow of difference of motive for several terms applied to one thing. On the other hand it cannot be urged against the former alternative that the distinction of several attributes predicated of one thing implies a distinction in the thing to which the attributes belong, and that from this it follows that the several terms denote several things—a result which also could not be reconciled with 'co-ordination'; for what 'co-ordination' aims at is just to convey the idea of one thing being qualified by several attributes. For the grammarians define 'co-ordination' as the application, to one thing, of several words,

for the application of each of which there is a different motive.

You have further maintained the following view :—In the text ‘one only without a second,’ the phrase ‘without a second’ negatives all duality on Brahman’s part even in so far as qualities are concerned. We must therefore, according to the principle that all Sākhās convey the same doctrine, assume that all texts which speak of Brahman as cause, aim at setting forth an absolutely non-dual substance. Of Brahman thus indirectly defined as a cause, the text ‘The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman,’ contains a direct definition ; the Brahman here meant to be defined must thus be devoid of all qualities. Otherwise, moreover, the text would be in conflict with those other texts which declare Brahman to be without qualities and blemish.—But this also cannot be admitted. What the phrase ‘without a second’ really aims at intimating is that Brahman possesses manifold powers, and this it does by denying the existence of another ruling principle different from Brahman. That Brahman actually possesses manifold powers the text shows further on, ‘It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth,’ and ‘it sent forth fire,’ and so on.—But how are we to know that the mere phrase ‘without a second’ is meant to negative the existence of all other causes in general ?—As follows, we reply. The clause ‘Being only this was in the beginning, one only,’ teaches that Brahman when about to create constitutes the substantial cause of the world. Here the idea of some further operative cause capable of giving rise to the effect naturally presents itself to the mind, and hence we understand that the added clause ‘without a second’ is meant to negative such an additional cause. If it were meant absolutely to deny all duality, it would deny also the eternity and other attributes of Brahman which you yourself assume. You in this case make just the wrong use of the principle of all the Sākhās containing the same doctrine ; what this principle demands is that the qualities attributed in all Sākhās to Brahman as cause should be taken over into the passage under discussion also. The same consideration teaches us that also the

text 'True, knowledge,' &c., teaches Brahman to possess attributes; for this passage has to be interpreted in agreement with the texts referring to Brahman as a cause. Nor does this imply a conflict with the texts which declare Brahman to be without qualities; for those texts are meant to negative the evil qualities depending on Prakṛiti. —Those texts again which refer to mere knowledge declare indeed that knowledge is the essential nature of Brahman, but this does not mean that mere knowledge constitutes the fundamental reality. For knowledge constitutes the essential nature of a knowing subject only which is the substrate of knowledge, in the same way as the sun, lamps, and gems are the substrate of Light. That Brahman is a knowing subject all scriptural texts declare; cp. 'He who is all knowing' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); 'It thought' (*Kh.* Up. VI, 2, 3); 'This divine being thought' (*Kh.* Up. VI, 3, 2); 'He thought, let me send forth the worlds' (Ait. Ār. II, 4, 1, 2); 'He who arranges the wishes—as eternal of those who are not eternal, as thinker of (other) thinkers, as one of many' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 13); 'There are two unborn ones—one who knows, one who does not know—one strong, the other weak' (Svet. Up. I, 9); 'Let us know Him, the highest of Lords, the great Lord, the highest deity of deities, the master of masters, the highest above the god, the lord of the world, the adorable one' (Svet. Up. VI, 7); 'Of him there is known no effect (body) or instrument; no one is seen like unto him or better; his high power is revealed as manifold, forming his essential nature, as knowledge, strength, and action' (Svet. Up. VI, 8); 'That is the Self, free from sin, ageless, deathless, griefless, free from hunger and thirst, whose wishes are true, whose purposes are true' (*Kh.* Up. VIII, 1, 5). These and other texts declare that to Brahman, whose essential nature is knowledge, there belong many excellent qualities—among which that of being a knowing subject stands first, and that Brahman is free from all evil qualities. That the texts referring to Brahman as free from qualities, and those which speak of it as possessing qualities, have really one and the same object may be inferred from the last of the

passages quoted above; the earlier part of which—‘free from sin,’ up to ‘free from thirst’—denies of Brahman all evil qualities, while its latter part—‘whose wishes are true,’ and so on—asserts of its certain excellent qualities. As thus there is no contradiction between the two classes of texts, there is no reason whatever to assume that either of them has for its object something that is false.—With regard to the concluding passage of the *Taittiriya*-text, ‘from whence all speech, together with the mind, turns away, unable to reach it’¹, we point out that with the passage ‘From terror of it the wind blows,’ there begins a declaration of the qualities of Brahman, and that the next section ‘one hundred times that human bliss,’ &c., makes statements as to the relative bliss enjoyed by the different classes of embodied souls; the concluding passage ‘He who knows the bliss of that Brahman from whence all speech, together with the mind, turns away unable to reach it,’ hence must be taken as proclaiming with emphasis the infinite nature of Brahman’s auspicious qualities. Moreover, a clause in the chapter under discussion—viz. ‘he obtains all desires, together with Brahman the all-wise’ (II, 1)—which gives information as to the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman clearly declares the infinite nature of the qualities of the highest all-wise Brahman. The desires are the auspicious qualities of Brahman which are the objects of desire; the man who knows Brahman obtains, together with Brahman, all qualities of it. The expression ‘together with’ is meant to bring out the primary importance of the qualities; as also described in the so-called *dahara-vidyā* (*Kh. Up. VIII, 1*). And that fruit and meditation are of the same character (i. e. that in meditations on Brahman its qualities are the chief matter of meditation, just as these qualities are the principal point in Brahman reached by the Devotee) is proved by the text ‘According to what a man’s thought is in this world, so will he be after he has

¹ Which passage appears to refer to a *nirguṇa* brahman, whence it might be inferred that the connected initial passage—‘*Satyam gñānam*,’ &c.—has a similar purport.

departed this life' (*Kh. Up.* III, 14, 1). If it be said that the passage 'By whom it is not thought by him it is thought,' 'not understood by those who understand' (*Ke. Up.* II, 3), declares Brahman not to be an object of knowledge; we deny this, because were it so, certain other texts would not teach that final Release results from knowledge; cp. 'He who knows Brahman obtains the Highest' (*Taitt. Up.* II, 1, 1); 'He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman.' And, moreover, the text 'He who knows Brahman as non-existing becomes himself non-existing; he who knows Brahman as existing, him we know himself as existing' (*Taitt. Up.* II, 6, 1), makes the existence and non-existence of the Self dependent on the existence and non-existence of knowledge which has Brahman for its object. We thus conclude that all scriptural texts enjoin just the knowledge of Brahman for the sake of final Release. This knowledge is, as we already know, of the nature of meditation, and what is to be meditated on is Brahman as possessing qualities. (The text from the *Ke. Up.* then explains itself as follows:—) We are informed by the passage 'from whence speech together with mind turns away, being unable to reach it,' that the infinite Brahman with its unlimited excellences cannot be defined either by mind or speech as being so or so much, and from this we conclude the *Kena* text to mean that Brahman is not thought and not understood by those who understand it to be of a definitely limited nature; Brahman in truth being unlimited. If the text did not mean this, it would be self-contradictory, parts of it saying that Brahman is *not* thought and *not* understood, and other parts, that it *is* thought and *is* understood.

Now as regards the assertion that the text 'Thou mayest not see the seer of seeing; thou mayest not think the thinker of thinking' (*Bri. Up.* III, 5, 2), denies the existence of a seeing and thinking subject different from mere seeing and thinking.—This view is refuted by the following interpretation. The text addresses itself to a person who has formed the erroneous opinion that the quality of consciousness or knowledge does not constitute the essential

nature of the knower, but belongs to it only as an adventitious attribute, and tells him 'Do not view or think the Self to be such, but consider the seeing and thinking Self to have seeing and thinking for its essential nature.'—Or else this text may mean that the embodied Self which is the seer of seeing and the thinker of thinking should be set aside, and that only the highest Self—the inner Self of all beings—should be meditated upon.—Otherwise a conflict would arise with texts declaring the knowership of the Self, such as 'whereby should he know the knower?' (*Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15*).

Your assertion that the text 'Bliss is Brahman' (*Taitt. Up. III, 6, 1*) proves pure Bliss to constitute the essential nature of Brahman is already disposed of by the refutation of the view that knowledge (consciousness) constitutes the essential nature of Brahman; Brahman being in reality the substrate only of knowledge. For by bliss we understand a pleasing state of consciousness. Such passages as 'consciousness, bliss is Brahman,' therefore mean 'consciousness—the essential character of which is bliss—is Brahman.' On this identity of the two things there rests that homogeneous character of Brahman, so much insisted upon by yourself. And in the same way as numerous passages teach that Brahman, while having knowledge for its essential nature, is at the same time a knowing subject; so other passages, speaking of Brahman as something separate from mere bliss, show it to be not mere bliss but a subject enjoying bliss; cp. 'That is one bliss of Brahman' (*Taitt. Up. II, 8, 4*); 'he knowing the bliss of Brahman' (*Taitt. Up. II, 9, 1*). To be a subject enjoying bliss is in fact the same as to be a conscious subject.

We now turn to the numerous texts which, according to the view of our opponent, negative the existence of plurality.—'Where there is duality as it were' (*Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15*); 'There is not any plurality here; from death to death goes he who sees here any plurality' (*Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19*); 'But when for him the Self alone has become all, by what means, and whom, should he see?' (*Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15*) &c.—But what all these texts deny is only plurality in so far as contradicting that unity of the world which depends on its

being in its entirety an effect of Brahman, and having Brahman for its inward ruling principle and its true Self. They do not, on the other hand, deny that plurality on Brahman's part which depends on its intention to become manifold—a plurality proved by the text 'May I be many, may I grow forth' (*Kh. Up.* VI, 2, 3). Nor can our opponent urge against this that, owing to the denial of plurality contained in other passages this last text refers to something not real; for it is an altogether laughable assertion that Scripture should at first teach the doctrine, difficult to comprehend, that plurality as suggested by Perception and the other means of Knowledge belongs to Brahman also, and should afterwards negative this very doctrine!

Nor is it true that the text 'If he makes but the smallest "antaram" (i. e. difference, interval, break) in it there is fear for him' (*Taitt. Up.* II, 7) implies that he who sees plurality within Brahman encounters fear. For the other text 'All this is Brahman; let a man meditate with calm mind on all this as beginning, ending and breathing in it, i. e. Brahman' (*Kh. Up.* III, 14, 1) teaches directly that reflection on the plurality of Brahman is the cause of peace of mind. For this passage declares that peace of mind is produced by a reflection on the entire world as springing from, abiding within, and being absorbed into Brahman, and thus having Brahman for its Self; and as thus the view of Brahman constituting the Self of the world with all its manifold distinctions of gods, men, animals, inanimate matter and so on, is said to be the cause of peace of mind, and, consequently, of absence of fear, that same view surely cannot be a *cause* of fear!—But how then is it that the *Taitt.* text declares that 'there is fear for him'?—That text, we reply, declares in its earlier part that rest in Brahman is the cause of fearlessness ('when he finds freedom from fear, rest, in that which is invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported; then he has obtained fearlessness'); its latter part therefore means that fear takes place when there is an interval, a break, in this resting in Brahman. As the great *Rishi* says 'When Vāsudeva is not meditated on for

an hour or even a moment only ; that is loss, that is great calamity, that is error, that is change.'

The Sūtra III, 2, 11 does not, as our opponent alleges, refer to a Brahman free from all difference, but to Brahman as possessing attributes—as we shall show in its place. And the Sūtra IV, 2, 3 declares that the things seen in dreams are mere 'Mâyâ' because they differ in character from the things perceived in the waking state ; from which it follows that the latter things are real.

Nor do Smṛiti and Purāṇa teach such a doctrine.

Nor is it true that also according to Smṛiti and Purāṇas only non-differenced consciousness is real and everything else unreal.—'He who knows me as unborn and without a beginning, the supreme Lord of the worlds' (Bha. Gī. X, 3) ; 'All beings abide in me, I abide not in them. Nay, the beings abide not in me—behold my lordly power. My Self bringing forth the beings supports them but does not abide in them' (Bha. Gī. IX, 4, 5) ; 'I am the origin and the dissolution of the entire world ; higher than I there is nothing else : on me all this is strung as pearls on a thread' (Bha. Gī. VII, 6, 7) ; 'Pervading this entire Universe by a portion (of mine) I abide' (Bha. Gī. X, 42) ; 'But another, the highest Person, is called the highest Self who, pervading the three worlds supports them, the eternal Lord. Because I transcend the Perishable and am higher than the Imperishable even, I am among the people and in the Veda celebrated as the supreme Person' (Bha. Gī. XV, 17, 18).

'He transcends the fundamental matter of all beings, its modifications, properties and imperfections ; he transcends all investing (obscuring) influences, he who is the Self of all. Whatever (room) there is in the interstices of the world is filled by him ; all auspicious qualities constitute his nature. The whole creation of beings is taken out of a small part of his power. Assuming at will whatever form he desires he bestows benefits on the whole world effected by him. Glory, strength, dominion, wisdom, energy, power and other attributes are collected in him, Supreme of the supreme in whom no troubles abide, ruler over high and

low, lord in collective and distributive form, non-manifest and manifest, universal lord, all-seeing, all-knowing, all-powerful, highest Lord. The knowledge by which that perfect, pure, highest, stainless homogeneous (Brahman) is known or perceived or comprehended—that is knowledge : all else is ignorance' (Vishṇu Purāṇa VI, 5, 82-87).—'To that pure one of mighty power, the highest Brahman to which no term is applicable, the cause of all causes, the name "Bhagavat" is suitable. The letter bha implies both the cherisher and supporter ; the letter ga the leader, mover and creator. The two syllables bhaga indicate the six attributes—dominion, strength, glory, splendour, wisdom, dispassion. That in him—the universal Self, the Self of the beings—all beings dwell and that he dwells in all, this is the meaning of the letter va. Wisdom, might, strength, dominion, glory, without any evil qualities, are all denoted by the word bhagavat. This great word bhagavat is the name of Vāsudeva who is the highest Brahman—and of no one else. This word which denotes persons worthy of reverence in general is used in its primary sense with reference to Vāsudeva only ; in a derived sense with regard to other persons' (Vi. Pu. VI, 5, 72 ff.) ; 'Where all these powers abide, that is the form of him who is the universal form : that is the great form of Hari. That form produces in its sport forms endowed with all powers, whether of gods or men or animals. For the purpose of benefitting the worlds, not springing from work (karman) is this action of the unfathomable one ; all-pervading, irresistible' (Vi. Pu. VI, 7, 69-71) ; 'Him who is of this kind, stainless, eternal, all-pervading, imperishable, free from all evil, named Vishṇu, the highest abode' (Vi. Pu. I, 22, 53) ; 'He who is the highest of the high, the Person, the highest Self, founded on himself ; who is devoid of all the distinguishing characteristics of colour, caste and the like ; who is exempt from birth, change, increase, decay and death ; of whom it can only be said that he ever is. He is everywhere and in him everything abides ; hence he is called Vāsudeva by those who know. He is Brahman, eternal, supreme, imperishable, undecaying ; of one essential nature and ever pure,

as free from all defects. This whole world is Brahman, comprising within its nature the Evolved and the Un-evolved ; and also existing in the form of the Person and in that of time ' (Vi. Pu. I, 2, 10-14) ; ' The Prakṛiti about which I told and which is Evolved as well as Unevolved, and the Person—both these are merged in the highest Self. The highest Self is the support of all, the highest Lord ; as Viṣṇu he is praised in the Vedas and the Vedānta-texts ' (Vi. Pu. VI, 4, 38, 39). ' Two forms are there of that Brahman, one material, the other immaterial. These two forms, perishable and imperishable, are within all things : the imperishable one is the highest Brahman, the perishable one this whole world. As the light of a fire burning in one place spreads all around, so the energy of the highest Brahman constitutes this entire world ' (Vi. Pu. I, 23, 53-55). ' The energy of Viṣṇu is the highest, that which is called the embodied soul is inferior ; and there is another third energy called karman or Nescience, actuated by which the omnipresent energy of the embodied soul perpetually undergoes the afflictions of worldly existence. Obscured by Nescience the energy of the embodied soul is characterised in the different beings by different degrees of perfection ' (Vi. Pu. VI, 7, 61-63).

These and other texts teach that the highest Brahman is essentially free from all imperfection whatsoever, comprises within itself all auspicious qualities, and finds its pastime in originating, preserving, reabsorbing, pervading, and ruling the universe ; that the entire complex of intelligent and non-intelligent beings (souls and matter) in all their different estates is real, and constitutes the form, i.e. the body of the highest Brahman, as appears from those passages which co-ordinate it with Brahman by means of terms such as sarīra (body), rūpa (form), tanu (body), aṃsa (part), śakti (power), vibhūti (manifestation of power), and so on ;—that the souls which are a manifestation of Brahman's power exist in their own essential nature, and also, through their connexion with matter, in the form of embodied souls (kṣhetragṇa) ;—and that the embodied souls, being engrossed by Nescience in the form of good and evil works, do not recognise their

essential nature, which is knowledge, but view themselves as having the character of material things.—The outcome of all this is that we have to cognise Brahman as carrying plurality within itself, and the world, which is the manifestation of his power, as something real.

When now the text, in the sloka 'where all difference has vanished' (Vi. Pu. VI, 7, 53), declares that the Self, although connected with the different effects of *Prakṛiti*, such as divine, human bodies, and so on, yet is essentially free from all such distinctions, and therefore not the object of the words denoting those different classes of beings, but to be defined as mere knowledge and Being; to be known by the Self and not to be reached by the mind of the practitioner of Yoga (*yogayug*); this must in no way be understood as denying the reality of the world.—But how is this known?—As follows, we reply. The chapter of the *Purāṇa* in which that sloka occurs at first declares concentration (Yoga) to be the remedy of all the afflictions of the *Samsāra*; thereupon explains the different stages of Yoga up to the so-called *pratyāhāra* (complete restraining of the senses from receiving external impressions); then, in order to teach the attainment of the 'perfect object' (*subhāsraya*) required for *dhāraṇā*, declares that the highest Brahman, i. e. *Vishṇu*, possesses two forms, called powers (*śakti*), viz. a defined one (*mūrta*) and an undefined one (*amūrta*); and then teaches that a portion of the 'defined' form, viz. the embodied soul (*kshetragñā*), which is distinguished by its connexion with matter and involved in Nescience—that is termed 'action,' and constitutes a third power—is not perfect. The chapter further teaches that a portion of the undefined form which is free from Nescience called action, separated from all matter, and possessing the character of pure knowledge, is also not the 'perfect object,' since it is destitute of essential purity; and, finally, declares that the 'perfect object' is to be found in that defined form which is special to *Bhagavat*, and which is the abode of the three powers, viz. that non-defined form which is the highest power, that non-defined form which is termed embodied soul, and constitutes the secondary (*apara*) power, and

Nescience in the form of work—which is called the third power, and is the cause of the Self, which is of the essence of the highest power, passing into the state of embodied soul. This defined form (which is the ‘perfect object’) is proved by certain Vedānta-texts, such as ‘that great person of sun-like lustre’ (Svet. Up. III, 8). We hence must take the sloka, ‘in which all differences vanish,’ &c., to mean that the pure Self (the Self in so far as knowledge only) is not capable of constituting the ‘perfect object.’ Analogously two other passages declare ‘Because this cannot be reflected upon by the beginner in Yoga, the second (form) of Viṣṇu is to be meditated upon by Yogins—the highest abode.’ ‘That in which all these powers have their abode, that is the other great form of Hari, different from the (material) Viśva form.’

In an analogous manner, Parāśara declares that Brahmā, Kāturmukha, Śaṅkha, and similar mighty beings which dwell within this world, cannot constitute the ‘perfect object’ because they are involved in Nescience; after that goes on to say that the beings found in the Saṃsāra are in the same condition—for they are essentially devoid of purity since they reach their true nature only later on, when through Yoga knowledge has arisen in them—; and finally teaches that the essential individual nature of the highest Brahman, i.e. Viṣṇu, constitutes the ‘perfect object.’ ‘From Brahmā down to a blade of grass, all living beings that dwell within this world are in the power of the Saṃsāra due to works, and hence no profit can be derived by the devout from making them objects of their meditation. They are all implicated in Nescience, and stand within the sphere of the Saṃsāra; knowledge arises in them only later on, and they are thus of no use in meditation. Their knowledge does not belong to them by essential nature, for it comes to them through something else. Therefore the stainless Brahman which possesses essential knowledge,’ &c. &c.—All this proves that the passage ‘in which all difference vanishes’ does not mean to deny the reality of the world.

Nor, again, does the passage ‘that which has knowledge

for its essential nature' (Vi. Pu. I, 2, 6) imply that the whole complex of things different from knowledge is false; for it declares only that the appearance of the Self—the essential nature of which is knowledge—as gods, men, and so on, is erroneous. A declaration that the appearance of mother o' pearl as silver is founded on error surely does not imply that all the silver in the world is unreal!—But if, on the ground of an insight into the oneness of Brahman and the world—as expressed in texts where the two appear in co-ordination—a text declares that it is an error to view Brahman, whose essential nature is knowledge, under the form of material things, this after all implies that the whole aggregate of things is false!—By no means, we rejoin. As our *sāstra* distinctly teaches that the highest Brahman, i. e. Viṣṇu, is free from all imperfections whatsoever, comprises within himself all auspicious qualities, and reveals his power in mighty manifestations, the view of the world's reality cannot possibly be erroneous. That information as to the oneness of two things by means of co-ordination does not allow of sublation (of either of the two), and is non-contradictory, we shall prove further on. Hence also the *sloka* last referred to does not sublimate the reality of the world.

'That from whence these beings are born, by which, when born, they live, into which they enter when they die, endeavour to know that; that is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 1). From this scriptural text we ascertain that Brahman is the cause of the origination, and so on, of the world. After this we learn from a *Purāṇa* text ('He should make the Veda grow by means of Itihāsa and *Purāṇa*; the Veda fears that a man of little reading may do it harm') that the Veda should be made to grow by Itihāsa and *Purāṇa*. By this 'making to grow' we have to understand the elucidation of the sense of the Vedic texts studied by means of other texts, promulgated by men who had mastered the entire Veda and its contents, and by the strength of their devotion had gained full intuition of Vedic truth. Such 'making to grow' must needs be undertaken, since the purport of the entire Veda with all its *Sākhās* cannot be fathomed by one

who has studied a small part only, and since without knowing that purport we cannot arrive at any certitude.

The Vishṇu Purāṇa relates how Maitreya, wishing to have his knowledge of Vedic matters strengthened by the holy Parāśara, who through the favour of Pulastya and Vasishṭha had obtained an insight into the true nature of the highest divinity, began to question Parāśara, 'I am desirous to hear from thee how this world originated, and how it will again originate in future, and of what it consists, and whence proceed animate and inanimate things; how and into what it has been resolved, and into what it will in future be resolved?' &c. (Vi. Pu. I, 1). The questions asked refer to the essential nature of Brahman, the different modes of the manifestation of its power, and the different results of propitiating it. Among the questions belonging to the first category, the question 'whence proceed animate and inanimate things?' relates to the efficient and the material cause of the world, and hence the clause 'of what the world consists' is to be taken as implying a question as to what constitutes the Self of this world, which is the object of creation, sustentation, and dissolution. The reply to this question is given in the words 'and the world is He.' Now the identity expressed by this clause is founded thereon that he (i.e. Brahman or Vishṇu) pervades the world as its Self in the character of its inward Ruler; and is not founded on unity of substance of the pervading principle and the world pervaded. The phrase 'consists of' (-maya) does not refer to an effect (so that the question asked would be as to the causal substance of which this world is an effect), for a separate question on this point would be needless. Nor does the -maya express, as it sometimes does—e.g. in the case of *prāṇa-maya*¹, the own sense of the word to which it is attached; for in that case the form of the reply 'and the world is He' (which implies a distinction between the world and Vishṇu) would be inappropriate; the reply would in that case rather be 'Vishṇu only.' What 'maya' actually denotes here is

¹ 'Prāṇamaya' is explained as meaning 'prāṇa' only.

abundance, prevailingness, in agreement with *Pāṇini*, V, 4, 21, and the meaning is that Brahman prevails in the world in so far as the entire world constitutes its body. The co-ordination of the two words 'the world' and 'He' thus rests on that relation between the two, owing to which the world is the body of Brahman, and Brahman the Self of the world. If, on the other hand, we maintained that the *sāstra* aims only at inculcating the doctrine of one substance free from all difference, there would be no sense in all those questions and answers, and no sense in an entire *sāstra* devoted to the explanation of that one thing. In that case there would be room for one question only, viz. 'what is the substrate of the erroneous imagination of a world?' and for one answer to this question, viz. 'pure consciousness devoid of all distinction!'—And if the co-ordination expressed in the clause 'and the world is he' was meant to set forth the absolute oneness of the world and Brahman, then it could not be held that Brahman possesses all kinds of auspicious qualities, and is opposed to all evil; Brahman would rather become the abode of all that is impure. All this confirms the conclusion that the co-ordination expressed in that clause is to be understood as directly teaching the relation between a Self and its body.—The *sloka*, 'From *Vishṇu* the world has sprung : in him he exists : he is the cause of the subsistence and dissolution of this world : and the world is he' (*Vi. Pu. I, 1, 35*), states succinctly what a subsequent passage—beginning with 'the highest of the high' (*Vi. Pu. I, 2, 10*)—sets forth in detail. Now there the *sloka*, 'to the unchangeable one' (*I, 2, 1*), renders homage to the holy *Vishṇu*, who is the highest Brahman in so far as abiding within his own nature, and then the text proceeds to glorify him in his threefold form as *Hiranyagarbha*, *Hari*, and *Saṅkara*, as *Pradhāna*, Time, and as the totality of embodied souls in their combined and distributed form. Here the *sloka*, 'Him whose essential nature is knowledge' (*I, 2, 6*), describes the aspect of the highest Self in so far as abiding in the state of discrete embodied souls; the passage cannot therefore be understood as referring to a substance free from all difference. If the *sāstra* aimed

at teaching that the erroneous conception of a manifold world has for its substrate a Brahman consisting of non-differenced intelligence, there would be room neither for the objection raised in I, 3, 1 ('How can we attribute agency creative and otherwise to Brahman which is without qualities, unlimited, pure, stainless?') nor for the refutation of that objection, 'Because the powers of all things are the objects of (true) knowledge excluding all (bad) reasoning, therefore there belong to Brahman also such essential powers as the power of creating, preserving, and so on, the world; just as heat essentially belongs to fire¹.' In that case the objection would rather be made in the following form: 'How can Brahman, which is without qualities, be the agent in the creation, preservation, and so on, of the world?' and the answer would be, 'Creation by Brahman is not something real, but something erroneously imagined.'—The purport of the objection as it stands in the text is as follows: 'We observe that action creative and otherwise belongs to beings endowed with qualities such as goodness, and so on, not perfect, and subject to the influence of karman; how then can agency creative, and so on, be attributed to Brahman which is devoid of qualities, perfect, not under the influence of karman, and incapable of any connexion with action?' And the reply is, 'There is nothing unreasonable in holding that Brahman as being of the nature described above, and different in kind from all things perceived, should possess manifold powers; just as fire, which is different in kind from water and all other material substances, possesses the quality of heat and other qualities.' The slokas also, which begin with the words 'Thou alone art real' (Vi. Pu. I, 4, 38 ff.), do not assert that the whole world is unreal, but only that, as Brahman is the Self of the world, the latter viewed apart from Brahman is not real. This the text proceeds to confirm,

¹ The sense in which this sloka has to be taken is 'As in ordinary life we ascribe to certain things (e.g. gems, mantras) certain special powers because otherwise the effects they produce could not be accounted for; so to Brahman also,' &c.

‘thy greatness it is by which all movable and immovable things are pervaded.’ This means—because all things movable and immovable are pervaded by thee, therefore all this world has thee for its Self, and hence ‘there is none other than thee,’ and thus thou being the Self of all art alone real. Such being the doctrine intended to be set forth, the text rightly says, ‘this all-pervasiveness of thine is thy greatness’; otherwise it would have to say, ‘it is thy error.’ Were this latter view intended, words such as ‘Lord of the world,’ ‘thou,’ &c., could not, moreover, be taken in their direct sense, and there would arise a contradiction with the subject-matter of the entire chapter, viz. the praise of the Holy one who in the form of a mighty boar had uplifted in play the entire earth.—Because this entire world is thy form in so far as it is pervaded as its Self by thee whose true nature is knowledge; therefore those who do not possess that devotion which enables men to view thee as the Self of all, erroneously view this world as consisting only of gods, men, and other beings; this is the purport of the next sloka, ‘this which is seen.’—And it is an error not only to view the world which has its real Self in thee as consisting of gods, men, and so on, but also to consider the Selves whose true nature is knowledge as being of the nature of material beings such as gods, men, and the like; this is the meaning of the next sloka, ‘this world whose true nature is knowledge.’—Those wise men, on the other hand, who have an insight into the essentially intelligent Self, and whose minds are cleared by devotion—the means of apprehending the Holy one as the universal Self—, they view this entire world with all its manifold bodies—the effects of primeval matter—as thy body—a body the Self of which is constituted by knowledge abiding apart from its world-body; this is the meaning of the following sloka: ‘But those who possess knowledge,’ &c.—If the different slokas were not interpreted in this way, they would be mere unmeaning reiterations; their constitutive words could not be taken in their primary sense; and we should come into conflict with the sense of the passages, the subject-matter of the chapter, and the

purport of the entire sâstra. The passage, further, 'Of that Self although it exists in one's own and in other bodies, the knowledge is of one kind' (Vi. Pu. II, 14, 31 ff.), refers to that view of duality according to which the different Selves—although equal in so far as they are all of the essence of knowledge—are constituted into separate beings, gods, men, &c., by their connexion with different portions of matter all of which are modifications of primary matter, and declares that view to be false. But this does not imply a denial of the duality which holds good between matter on the one hand and Self on the other: what the passage means is that the Self which dwells in the different material bodies of gods, men, and so on, is of one and the same kind. So the Holy one himself has said, 'In the dog and the low man eating dog's flesh the wise see the same'; 'Brahman, without any imperfection, is the same' (Bha. Gî. V, 18, 19). And, moreover, the clause 'Of the Self although existing in one's own and in other bodies' directly declares that a thing different from the body is distributed among one's own and other bodies.

Nor does the passage 'If there is some other (para) different (anya) from me,' &c. (Vi. Pu. II, 13, 86) intimate the oneness of the Self; for in that case the two words 'para' and 'anya' would express one meaning only (viz. 'other' in the sense of 'distinct from'). The word 'para' there denotes a Self distinct from that of one's own Self, and the word 'anya' is introduced to negative a character different from that of pure intelligence: the sense of the passage thus is 'If there is some Self distinct from mine, and of a character different from mine which is pure knowledge, then it can be said that I am of such a character and he of a different character'; but this is not the case, because all Selves are equal in as far as their nature consists of pure knowledge.—Also the sloka beginning 'Owing to the difference of the holes of the flute' (Vi. Pu. II, 14, 32) only declares that the inequality of the different Selves is owing not to their essential nature, but to their dwelling in different material bodies; and does not teach the oneness of all Selves. The different portions of air, again, passing

through the different holes of the flute—to which the many Selves are compared—are not said to be one but only to be equal in character; they are one in character in so far as all of them are of the nature of air, while the different names of the successive notes of the musical scale are applied to them because they pass out by the different holes of the instrument. For an analogous reason the several Selves are denominated by different names, viz. gods and so on. Those material things also which are parts of the substance fire, or water, or earth, are one in so far only as they consist of one kind of substance; but are not absolutely one; those different portions of air, therefore, which constitute the notes of the scale are likewise not absolutely one. Where the Purāṇa further says ‘He (or “that”) I am and thou art He (or “that”); all this universe that has Self for its true nature is He (or “that”); abandon the error of distinction’ (Vi. Pu. II, 16, 23); the word ‘that’ refers to the intelligent character mentioned previously which is common to all Selves, and the co-ordination stated in the two clauses therefore intimates that intelligence is the character of the beings denoted ‘I’ and ‘Thou’; ‘abandon therefore,’ the text goes on to say, ‘the illusion that the difference of outward form, divine and so on, causes a corresponding difference in the Selves.’ If this explanation were not accepted (but absolute non-difference insisted upon) there would be no room for the references to difference which the passages quoted manifestly contain.

Accordingly the text goes on to say that the king acted on the instruction he had received, ‘he abandoned the view of difference, having recognised the Real.’—But on what ground do we arrive at this decision (viz. that the passage under discussion is not meant to teach absolute non-duality)?—On the ground, we reply, that the proper topic of the whole section is to teach the distinction of the Self and the body—for this is evident from what is said in an early part of the section, ‘as the body of man, characterised by hands, feet, and the like,’ &c. (Vi. Pu. II, 13, 85).—For analogous reasons the sloka ‘When that knowledge which gives rise to distinction’ &c. (Vi. Pu. VI, 7, 94) teaches

neither the essential unity of all Selves nor the oneness of the individual Self and the highest Self. And that the embodied soul and the highest Self should be essentially one, is no more possible than that the body and the Self should be one. In agreement herewith Scripture says, 'Two birds, inseparable friends, cling to the same tree. One of them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1). 'There are two drinking their reward in the world of their own works, entered into the cave, dwelling on the highest summit. Those who know Brahman call them shade and light,' &c. (Ka. Up. I, 3, 1). And in this sâstra also (i. e. the Vishṇu Purāṇa) there are passages of analogous import; cp. the stanzas quoted above, 'He transcends the causal matter, all effects, all imperfections such as the *gunas*' &c.

The Sūtras also maintain the same doctrine, cp. I, 1, 17; I, 2, 21; II, 1, 22; and others. They therein follow Scripture, which in several places refers to the highest and the individual soul as standing over against each other, cp. e. g. 'He who dwells in the Self and within the Self, whom the Self does not know, whose body the Self is, who rules the Self from within' (Bṛi. Up. III, 7, 22); 'Embraced by the intelligent Self' (Bṛi. Up. IV, 3, 21); 'Mounted by the intelligent Self' (IV, 3, 35). Nor can the individual Self become one with the highest Self by freeing itself from Nescience, with the help of the means of final Release; for that which admits of being the abode of Nescience can never become quite incapable of it. So the Purāṇa says, 'It is false to maintain that the individual Self and the highest Self enter into real union; for one substance cannot pass over into the nature of another substance.' Accordingly the Bhagavad Gītā declares that the released soul attains only the same attributes as the highest Self. 'Abiding by this knowledge, they, attaining to an equality of attributes with me, do neither come forth at the time of creation, nor are troubled at the time of general destruction' (XIV, 2). Similarly our Purāṇa says, 'That Brahman leads him who meditates on it, and who is capable of change, towards its own being (*âtmaabhāva*), in the same

way as the magnet attracts the iron' (Vi. Pu. VI, 7, 30). Here the phrase 'leads him towards his own being' means 'imparts to him a nature like his own' (not 'completely identifies him with itself'); for the attracted body does not become essentially one with the body attracting.

The same view will be set forth by the Sūtrakāra in IV, 4, 17; 21, and I, 3, 2. The Vṛtti also says (with reference to Sū. IV, 4, 17) 'with the exception of the business of the world (the individual soul in the state of release) is equal (to the highest Self) through light'; and the author of the *Dramiḍabhāṣya* says, 'Owing to its equality (sāyugya) with the divinity the disembodied soul effects all things, like the divinity.' The following scriptural texts establish the same view, 'Those who depart from hence, after having known the Self and those true desires, for them there is freedom in all the worlds' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 1, 6*); 'He who knows Brahman reaches the Highest' (*Taitt. Up. II, 1*); 'He obtains all desires together with the intelligent Brahman' (*Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1*); 'Having reached the Self which consists of bliss, he wanders about in these worlds having as much food and assuming as many forms as he likes' (*Taitt. Up. III, 10, 5*); 'There he moves about' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 3*); 'For he is flavour; for only after having perceived a flavour can any one perceive pleasure' (*Taitt. Up. II, 7*); 'As the flowing rivers go to their setting in the sea, losing name and form; thus he who knows, freed from name and form, goes to the divine Person who is higher than the high' (*Mu. Up. III, 2, 8*); 'He who knows, shaking off good and evil, reaches the highest oneness, free from stain' (*Mu. Up. III, 1, 3*).

The objects of meditation in all the vidyās which refer to the highest Brahman, are Brahman viewed as having qualities, and the fruit of all those meditations. For this reason the author of the Sūtras declares that there is option among the different vidyās—cp. *Ve. Sū. III, 3, 11*; *III, 3, 59*. In the same way the *Vākyakāra* teaches that the qualified Brahman only is the object of meditation, and that there is option of vidyās; where he says '(Brahman) connected (with qualities), since the meditation refers to its

qualities.' The same view is expressed by the Bhâshya-kâra in the passage beginning 'Although he who bases himself on the knowledge of Being.'—Texts such as 'He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9) have the same purport, for they must be taken in connexion with the other texts (referring to the fate of him who knows) such as 'Freed from name and form he goes to the divine Person who is higher than the high'; 'Free from stain he reaches the highest oneness' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8; III, 1, 3); 'Having approached the highest light he manifests himself in his own shape' (Kh. Up. VIII, 3, 4). Of him who has freed himself from his ordinary name and form, and all the distinctions founded thereon, and has assumed the uniform character of intelligence, it may be said that he is of the character of Brahman.—Our Purâṇa also propounds the same view. The sloka (VI, 7, 91), 'Knowledge is the means to obtain what is to be obtained, viz. the highest Brahman: the Self is to be obtained, freed from all kinds of imagination,' states that that Self which through meditation on Brahman, is freed from all imagination so as to be like Brahman, is the object to be attained. (The three forms of imagination to be got rid of are so-called karma-bhâvanâ, brahma-bhâvanâ and a combination of the two. See Vi. Pu. VI, 7.) The text then goes on, 'The embodied Self is the user of the instrument, knowledge is its instrument; having accomplished Release—whereby his object is attained—he may leave off.' This means that the Devotee is to practise meditation on the highest Brahman until it has accomplished its end, viz. the attainment of the Self free from all imagination.—The text continues, 'Having attained the being of its being, then he is non-different from the highest Self; his difference is founded on Nescience only.' This sloka describes the state of the released soul. 'Its being' is the being, viz. the character or nature, of Brahman; but this does not mean absolute oneness of nature; because in this latter case the second 'being' would be out of place and the sloka would contradict what had been said before. The meaning is: when the soul has attained the nature of

Brahman, i. e. when it has freed itself from all false imagination, then it is non-different from the highest Self. This non-difference is due to the soul, as well as the highest Self, having the essential nature of uniform intelligence. The difference of the soul—presenting itself as the soul of a god, a man, &c.—from the highest Self is not due to its essential nature, but rests on the basis of Nescience in the form of work : when through meditation on Brahman this basis is destroyed, the difference due to it comes to an end, and the soul no longer differs from the highest Self. So another text says, ‘The difference of things of one nature is due to the investing agency of outward works ; when the difference of gods, men, &c., is destroyed, it has no longer any investing power’ (Vi. Pu. II, 14, 33).—The text then adds a further explanation, ‘when the knowledge which gives rise to manifold difference is completely destroyed, who then will produce difference that has no real existence?’ The manifold difference is the distinction of gods, men, animals, and inanimate things: compare the saying of Saunaka: ‘this fourfold distinction is founded on false knowledge.’ The Self has knowledge for its essential nature ; when Nescience called work—which is the cause of the manifold distinctions of gods, men, &c.—has been completely destroyed through meditation on the highest Brahman, who then will bring about the distinction of gods, &c., from the highest Self—a distinction which in the absence of a cause cannot truly exist.—That Nescience is called *karman* (work) is stated in the same chapter of the *Purāṇa* (st. 61—*avidyā karmasamgñā*).

The passage in the *Bhagavad Gītā*, ‘Know me to be the *kshetragñā*’ (XIII, 2), teaches the oneness of all in so far as the highest Self is the inward ruler of all ; taken in any other sense it would be in conflict with other texts, such as ‘All creatures are the Perishable, the unchanging soul is the Imperishable ; but another is the highest Person’ (Bha. Gt. XV, 16). In other places the Divine one declares that as inward Ruler he is the Self of all : ‘The Lord dwells in the heart of all creatures’ (XVIII, 61), and ‘I dwell within the heart of all’ (XV, 15), and ‘I am the

Self which has its abode within all creatures' (X, 20). The term 'creature' in these passages denotes the entire aggregate of body, &c., up to the Self.—Because he is the Self of all, the text expressly denies that among all the things constituting his body there is any one separate from him, 'There is not anything which is without me' (X, 39). The place where this text occurs is the winding up of a glorification of the Divine one, and the text has to be understood accordingly. The passage immediately following is 'Whatever being there is, powerful, beautiful, or glorious, even that know thou to have sprung from a portion of my glory; pervading this entire Universe by a portion of mine I do abide' (X, 41 ; 42).

All this clearly proves that the authoritative books do *not* teach the doctrine of one non-differenced substance; that they do *not* teach that the universe of things is false; and that they do *not* deny the essential distinction of intelligent beings, non-intelligent things, and the Lord.

The theory of Nescience cannot be proved.

We now proceed to the consideration of Nescience.—According to the view of our opponent, this entire world, with all its endless distinctions of Ruler, creatures ruled, and so on, is, owing to a certain defect, fictitiously superimposed upon the non-differenced, self-luminous Reality; and what constitutes that defect is beginningless Nescience, which invests the Reality, gives rise to manifold illusions, and cannot be defined either as being or non-being. Such Nescience, he says, must necessarily be admitted, firstly on the ground of scriptural texts, such as 'Hidden by what is untrue' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 3, 2*), and secondly because otherwise the oneness of the individual souls with Brahman—which is taught by texts such as 'Thou are that'—cannot be established. This Nescience is neither 'being,' because in that case it could not be the object of erroneous cognition (*bhrama*) and sublation (*bādhā*); nor is it 'non-being,' because in that case it could not be the object of apprehension and sublation¹. Hence orthodox Philosophers declare

¹ 'Nescience' is sublated (refuted) by the cognition of Brahman,

that this Nescience falls under neither of these two opposite categories.

Now this theory of Nescience is altogether untenable. In the first place we ask, 'What is the substrate of this Nescience which gives rise to the great error of plurality of existence?' You cannot reply 'the individual soul'; for the individual soul itself exists in so far only as it is fictitiously imagined through Nescience. Nor can you say 'Brahman'; for Brahman is nothing but self-luminous intelligence, and hence contradictory in nature to Nescience, which is avowedly sublated by knowledge.

'The highest Brahman has knowledge for its essential nature: if Nescience, which is essentially false and to be terminated by knowledge, invests Brahman, who then will be strong enough to put an end to it?'

'What puts an end to Nescience is the knowledge that Brahman is pure knowledge!'—'Not so, for that knowledge also is, like Brahman, of the nature of light, and hence has no power to put an end to Nescience.—And if there exists the knowledge that Brahman is knowledge, then Brahman is an object of knowledge, and that, according to your own teaching, implies that Brahman is not of the nature of consciousness.'

To explain the second of these slokas.—If you maintain that what sublates Nescience is not that knowledge which constitutes Brahman's essential nature, but rather that knowledge which has for its object the truth of Brahman being of such a nature, we demur; for as both these kinds of knowledge are of the same nature, viz. the nature of light, which is just that which constitutes Brahman's nature, there is no reason for making a distinction and saying that one knowledge is contradictory of Nescience, and the other is not. Or, to put it otherwise—that essential nature of Brahman which is apprehended through the cognition

and thereby shown to have been the object of erroneous cognition: it thus cannot be 'being,' i.e. real. Nor can it be altogether unreal, 'non-being,' because in that case it could not be the object either of mental apprehension or of sublation.

that Brahman is knowledge, itself shines forth in consequence of the self-luminous nature of Brahman, and hence we have no right to make a distinction between that knowledge which constitutes Brahman's nature, and that of which that nature is the object, and to maintain that the latter only is antagonistic to Nescience.—Moreover (and this explains the third sloka), according to your own view Brahman, which is mere consciousness, cannot be the object of another consciousness, and hence there is no knowledge which has Brahman for its object. If, therefore, knowledge is contradictory to non-knowledge (Nescience), Brahman itself must be contradictory to it, and hence cannot be its substrate. Shells (mistaken for silver) and the like which by themselves are incapable of throwing light upon their own true nature are not contradictory to non-knowledge of themselves, and depend, for the termination of that non-knowledge, on another knowledge (viz. on the knowledge of an intelligent being); Brahman, on the other hand, whose essential nature is established by its own consciousness, is contradictorily opposed to non-knowledge of itself, and hence does not depend, for the termination of that non-knowledge, on some other knowledge.—If our opponent should argue that the knowledge of the falsity of whatever is other than Brahman is contradictory to non-knowledge, we ask whether this knowledge of the falsity of what is other than Brahman is contradictory to the non-knowledge of the true nature of Brahman, or to that non-knowledge which consists in the view of the reality of the apparent world. The former alternative is inadmissible; because the cognition of the falsity of what is other than Brahman has a different object (from the non-knowledge of Brahman's true nature) and therefore cannot be contradictory to it; for knowledge and non-knowledge are contradictory in so far only as they refer to one and the same object. And with regard to the latter alternative we point out that the knowledge of the falsity of the world is contradictory to the non-knowledge which consists in the view of the reality of the world; the former knowledge therefore sublates the latter non-knowledge only, while

the non-knowledge of the true nature of Brahman is not touched by it.—Against this it will perhaps be urged that what is here called the non-knowledge of the true nature of Brahman, really is the view of Brahman being dual in nature, and that this view is put an end to by the cognition of the falsity of whatever is other than Brahman; while the true nature of Brahman itself is established by its own consciousness.—But this too we refuse to admit. If non-duality constitutes the true nature of Brahman, and is proved by Brahman's own consciousness, there is room neither for what is contradictory to it, viz. that non-knowledge which consists in the view of duality, nor for the sublation of that non-knowledge.—Let then non-duality be taken for an attribute (not the essential nature) of Brahman! —This too we refuse to admit; for you yourself have proved that Brahman, which is pure Consciousness, is free from attributes which are objects of Consciousness.—From all this it follows that Brahman, whose essential nature is knowledge, cannot be the substrate of Nescience: the theory, in fact, involves a flat contradiction.

When, in the next place, you maintain that Brahman, whose nature is homogeneous intelligence, is invested and hidden by Nescience, you thereby assert the destruction of Brahman's essential nature. Causing light to disappear means either obstructing the origination of light, or else destroying light that exists. And as you teach that light (consciousness) cannot originate, the 'hiding' or 'making to disappear' of light can only mean its destruction.—Consider the following point also. Your theory is that self-luminous consciousness, which is without object and without substrate, becomes, through the influence of an imperfection residing within itself, conscious of itself as connected with innumerable substrata and innumerable objects.—Is then, we ask, that imperfection residing within consciousness something real or something unreal?—The former alternative is excluded, as not being admitted by yourself. Nor can we accept the latter alternative; for if we did we should have to view that imperfection as being either a knowing subject, or an object of knowledge,

or Knowing itself. Now it cannot be 'Knowing,' as you deny that there is any distinction in the nature of knowing ; and that 'Knowing,' which is the substrate of the imperfection, cannot be held to be unreal, because that would involve the acceptance of the Mādhyaṃika doctrine, viz. of a general void ¹.

And if knowers, objects of knowledge and knowing as determined by those two are fictitious, i. e. unreal, we have to assume another fundamental imperfection, and are thus driven into a *regressus in infinitum*.—To avoid this difficulty, it might now be said that real consciousness itself, which constitutes Brahman's nature, is that imperfection.—But if Brahman itself constitutes the imperfection, then Brahman is the basis of the appearance of a world, and it is gratuitous to assume an additional avidyā to account for the world. Moreover, as Brahman is eternal, it would follow from this hypothesis that no release could ever take place. Unless, therefore, you admit a real imperfection apart from Brahman, you are unable to account for the great world-error.

What, to come to the next point, do you understand by the inexplicability (*anirvāṇīyatā*) of Nescience?—Its difference in nature from that which *is*, as well as that which *is not*!—A thing of such kind would be inexplicable indeed ; for none of the means of knowledge apply to it. That is to say—the whole world of objects must be ordered according to our states of consciousness, and every state of consciousness presents itself in the form, either of something existing or of something non-existing. If, therefore, we should assume that of states of consciousness which are limited to this double form, the object can be something which is neither existing nor non-existing, then anything

¹ If the imperfection inhering in Consciousness is itself of the nature of consciousness, and at the same time unreal, we should have to distinguish two kinds of Consciousness—which is contrary to the fundamental doctrine of the oneness of Consciousness. And if, on the other hand, we should say that the Consciousness in which the imperfection inheres is of the same nature as the latter, i. e. unreal, we are landed in the view of universal unreality.

whatever might be the object of any state of consciousness whatever.

Against this our opponent may now argue as follows:— There is, after all, something, called *avidyâ*, or *agñâna*, or by some other name, which is a positive entity (*bhâva*), different from the antecedent non-existence of knowledge; which effects the obscuration of the Real; which is the material cause of the erroneous superimposition on the Real, of manifold external and internal things; and which is terminated by the cognition of the true nature of the one substance which constitutes Reality. For this *avidyâ* is apprehended through Perception as well as Inference. Brahman, in so far as limited by this *avidyâ*, is the material cause of the erroneous superimposition—upon the inward Self, which in itself is changeless pure intelligence, but has its true nature obscured by this superimposition—of that plurality which comprises the *ahamkâra*, all acts of knowledge and all objects of knowledge. Through special forms of this defect (i. e. *avidyâ*) there are produced, in this world superimposed upon Reality, the manifold special superimpositions presenting themselves in the form of things and cognitions of things—such as snakes (superimposed upon ropes), silver (superimposed on shells), and the like. *Avidyâ* constitutes the material cause of this entire false world; since for a false thing we must needs infer a false cause. That this *avidyâ* or *agñâna* (non-knowledge) is an object of internal Perception, follows from the fact that judgments such as ‘I do not know,’ ‘I do not know either myself or others,’ directly present themselves to the mind. A mental state of this kind has for its object not that non-knowledge which is the antecedent non-existence of knowledge—for such absence of knowledge is ascertained by the sixth means of proof (*anupalabdhi*); it rather is a state which presents its object directly, and thus is of the same kind as the state expressed in the judgment ‘I am experiencing pleasure.’ Even if we admit that ‘absence of something’ (*abhâva*) can be the object of perception, the state of consciousness under discussion cannot have absence of knowledge in the Self for its object. For at the very moment

of such consciousness knowledge exists ; or if it does not exist there can be no consciousness of the absence of knowledge. To explain. When I am conscious that I am non-knowing, is there or is there not apprehension of the Self as having non-existence of knowledge for its attribute, and of knowledge as the counterentity of non-knowledge? In the former case there can be no consciousness of the absence of knowledge, for that would imply a contradiction. In the latter case, such consciousness can all the less exist, for it presupposes knowledge of that to which absence of knowledge belongs as an attribute (viz. the Self) and of its own counterentity, viz. knowledge. The same difficulty arises if we view the absence of knowledge as either the object of Inference, or as the object of the special means of proof called 'abhāva' (i. e. anupalabdhi). If, on the other hand, non-knowledge is viewed (not as a merely negative, but) as a positive entity, there arises no contradiction even if there is (as there is in fact) at the same time knowledge of the Self as qualified by non-knowledge, and of knowledge as the counterentity of non-knowledge ; and we therefore must accept the conclusion that the state of consciousness expressed by 'I am non-knowing,' has for its object a non-knowledge which is a positive entity.—But, a Nescience which is a positive entity, contradicts the witnessing consciousness, whose nature consists in the lighting up of the truth of things!—Not so, we reply. Witnessing consciousness has for its object not the true nature of things, but Nescience ; for otherwise the lighting up (i. e. the consciousness) of false things could not take place. Knowledge which has for its object non-knowledge (Nescience), does not put an end to that non-knowledge. Hence there is no contradiction (between *kāitanya* and *agñāna*).—But, a new objection is raised, this positive entity, Nescience, becomes an object of witnessing Consciousness, only in so far as it (Nescience) is defined by some particular object (viz. the particular thing which is not known), and such objects depend for their proof on the different means of knowledge. How then can that Nescience, which is defined by the 'I' (as expressed e. g. in the judgment, 'I do not

know myself'), become the object of witnessing Consciousness?—There is no difficulty here, we reply. All things whatsoever are objects of Consciousness, either as things known or as things not known. But while the mediation of the means of knowledge is required in the case of all those things which, as being non-intelligent (*gada*), can be proved only in so far as being objects known (through some means of knowledge), such mediation is not required in the case of the intelligent (*agada*) inner Self which proves itself. Consciousness of Nescience is thus possible in all cases (including the case 'I do not know myself'), since witnessing Consciousness always gives definition to Nescience.—From all this it follows that, through Perception confirmed by Reasoning, we apprehend Nescience as a positive entity. This Nescience, viewed as a positive entity, is also proved by Inference—viz. in the following form: All knowledge established by one of the different means of proof is preceded by something else, which is different from the mere antecedent non-existence of knowledge; which hides the object of knowledge; which is terminated by knowledge; and which exists in the same place as knowledge;—because knowledge possesses the property of illumining things not illumined before;—just as the light of a lamp lit in the dark illumines things.—Nor must you object to this inference on the ground that darkness is not a substance, but rather the mere absence of light, or else the absence of visual perception of form and colour, and that hence darkness cannot be brought forward as a similar instance proving Nescience to be a positive entity. For that Darkness must be considered a positive substance follows, firstly, from its being more or less dense, and secondly, from its being perceived as having colour.

To all this we make the following reply. Neither Perception alone, nor Perception aided by Reasoning, reveals to us a positive entity, Nescience, as implied in judgments such as 'I am non-knowing,' 'I know neither myself nor others.' The contradiction which was urged above against the view of non-knowledge being the antecedent non-existence of knowledge, presents itself equally in connexion

with non-knowledge viewed as a positive entity. For here the following alternative presents itself—the inner Reality is either known or not known as that which gives definition to Nescience by being either its object or its substrate. If it be thus known, then there is in it no room for Nescience which is said to be that which is put an end to by the cognition of the true nature of the Inner Reality. If, on the other hand, it be not thus known, how should there be a consciousness of Nescience in the absence of that which defines it, viz. knowledge of the substrate or of the object of Nescience?—Let it then be said that what is contradictory to non-knowledge is the clear presentation of the nature of the inner Self, and that (while there is consciousness of *agñāna*) we have only an obscure presentation of the nature of the Self; things being thus, there is no contradiction between the cognition of the substrate and object of Nescience on the one side, and the consciousness of *agñāna* on the other.—Well, we reply, all this holds good on our side also. Even if *agñāna* means antecedent non-existence of knowledge, we can say that knowledge of the substrate and object of non-knowledge has for its object the Self presented obscurely only; and thus there is no difference between our views—unless you choose to be obstinate!

Whether we view non-knowledge as a positive entity or as the antecedent non-existence of knowledge, in either case it comes out as what the word indicates, viz. non-knowledge. Non-knowledge means either absence of knowledge, or that which is other than knowledge, or that which is contradictory to knowledge; and in any of these cases we have to admit that non-knowledge presupposes the cognition of the nature of knowledge. Even though the cognition of the nature of darkness should not require the knowledge of the nature of light, yet when darkness is considered under the aspect of being contrary to light, this presupposes the cognition of light. And the non-knowledge held by you is never known in its own nature but merely as 'non-knowledge,' and it therefore presupposes the cognition of knowledge no less than our

view does, according to which non-knowledge is simply the negation of knowledge. Now antecedent non-existence of knowledge is admitted by you also, and is an undoubted object of consciousness; the right conclusion therefore is that what we are conscious of in such judgments as 'I am non-knowing,' &c., is this very antecedent non-existence of knowledge which we both admit.

It, moreover, is impossible to ascribe to Brahman, whose nature is constituted by eternal free self-luminous intelligence, the consciousness of Nescience; for what constitutes its essence is consciousness of itself. If against this you urge that Brahman, although having consciousness of Self for its essential nature, yet is conscious of non-knowledge in so far as its (Brahman's) nature is hidden; we ask in return what we have to understand by Brahman's nature being hidden. You will perhaps say 'the fact of its not being illumined.' But how, we ask, can there be absence of illumination of the nature of that whose very nature consists in consciousness of Self, i. e. self-illumination? If you reply that even that whose nature is consciousness of Self may be in the state of its nature not being illumined by an outside agency, we point out that as according to you light cannot be considered as an attribute, but constitutes the very nature of Brahman, it would—illumination coming from an external agency—follow that the very nature of Brahman can be destroyed from the outside. This we have already remarked.—Further, your view implies on the one hand that this non-knowledge which is the cause of the concealment of Brahman's nature hides Brahman in so far as Brahman is conscious of it, and on the other hand that having hidden Brahman, it becomes the object of consciousness on the part of Brahman; and this evidently constitutes a logical see-saw. You will perhaps say¹ that it hides Brahman in so far only as Brahman is conscious of it. But, we point out, if the consciousness of *agñāna* takes place on the part of a Brahman whose nature is not hidden, the whole hypothesis of the 'hiding' of Brahman's nature

¹ Allowing the former view of the question only.

loses its purport, and with it the fundamental hypothesis as to the nature of *agñāna*; for if Brahman may be conscious of *agñāna* (without a previous obscuration of its nature by *agñāna*) it may as well be held to be in the same way conscious of the world, which, by you, is considered to be an effect of *agñāna*.

How, further, do you conceive this consciousness of *agñāna* on Brahman's part? Is it due to Brahman itself, or to something else? In the former case this consciousness would result from Brahman's essential nature, and hence there would never be any Release. Or else, consciousness of *agñāna* constituting the nature of Brahman, which is admittedly pure consciousness, in the same way as the consciousness of false silver is terminated by that cognition which sublates the silver, so some terminating act of cognition would eventually put an end to Brahman's essential nature itself.—On the second alternative we ask what that something else should be. If you reply 'another *agñāna*,' we are led into a *regressus in infinitum*.—Let it then be said¹ that *agñāna* having first hidden Brahman then becomes the object of its consciousness.—This, we rejoin, would imply that *agñāna*—acting like a defect of the eye—by its very essential being hides Brahman, and then *agñāna* could not be sublated by knowledge.—Let us then put the case as follows:—*Agñāna*, which is by itself beginningless, at the very same time effects Brahman's witnessing it (being conscious of it), and Brahman's nature being hidden; in this way the *regressus in infinitum* and other difficulties will be avoided.—But this also we cannot admit; for Brahman is essentially consciousness of Self, and cannot become a witnessing principle unless its nature be previously hidden.—Let then Brahman be hidden by some other cause!—This, we rejoin, would take away from *agñāna* its alleged beginninglessness, and further would also lead to an infinite regress. And if Brahman were assumed to become a witness, without its essential nature being hidden, it could not possess—what yet it is main-

¹ Adopting the latter view only; see preceding note.

tained to possess—the uniform character of consciousness of Self.—If, moreover, Brahman is hidden by avidyā, does it then not shine forth at all, or does it shine forth to some extent? On the former alternative the not shining forth of Brahman—whose nature is mere light—reduces it to an absolute non-entity. Regarding the latter alternative we ask, ‘of Brahman, which is of an absolutely homogeneous nature, which part do you consider to be concealed, and which to shine forth?’ To that substance which is pure light, free from all division and distinction, there cannot belong two modes of being, and hence obscuration and light cannot abide in it together.—Let us then say that Brahman, which is homogeneous being, intelligence, bliss, has its nature obscured by avidyā, and hence is seen indistinctly as it were.—But how, we ask, are we to conceive the distinctness or indistinctness of that whose nature is pure light? When an object of light which has parts and distinguishing attributes appears in its totality, we say that it appears distinctly; while we say that its appearance is indistinct when some of its attributes do not appear. Now in those aspects of the thing which do not appear, light (illumination) is absent altogether, and hence we cannot there speak of indistinctness of light; in those parts on the other hand which do appear, the light of which they are the object is distinct. Indistinctness is thus not possible at all where there is light. In the case of such things as are apprehended as objects, indistinctness may take place, viz. in so far as some of their distinguishing attributes are not apprehended. But in Brahman, which is not an object, without any distinguishing attributes, pure light, the essential nature of which it is to shine forth, indistinctness which consists in the non-apprehension of certain attributes can in no way be conceived, and hence not be explained as the effect of avidyā.

We, moreover, must ask the following question: ‘Is this indistinctness which you consider an effect of avidyā put an end to by the rise of true knowledge or not?’ On the latter alternative there would be no final release. In the former case we have to ask of what nature Reality is. ‘It is of

an essentially clear and distinct nature.' Does this nature then exist previously (to the cessation of indistinctness), or not? If it does, there is no room whatever either for indistinctness the effect of avidyā, or for its cessation. If it does not previously exist, then Release discloses itself as something to be effected, and therefore non-eternal.—And that such non-knowledge is impossible because there is no definable substrate for it we have shown above.—He, moreover, who holds the theory of error resting on a non-real defect, will find it difficult to prove the impossibility of error being without any substrate; for, if the cause of error may be unreal, error may be supposed to take place even in case of its substrate being unreal. And the consequence of this would be the theory of a general Void.

The assertion, again, that non-knowledge as a positive entity is proved by Inference, also is groundless. But the inference was actually set forth!—True; but it was set forth badly. For the reason you employed for proving *agñāna* is a so-called contradictory one (i. e. it proves the contrary of what it is meant to prove), in so far as it proves what is not desired and what is different from *agñāna* (for what it proves is that there is a certain *knowledge*, viz. that all knowledge resting on valid means of proof has non-knowledge for its antecedent). (And with regard to this knowledge again we must ask whether it also has non-knowledge for its antecedent.) If the reason (relied on in all this argumentation) does not prove, in this case also, the antecedent existence of positive non-knowledge, it is too general (and hence not to be trusted in any case). If, on the other hand, it does prove antecedent non-knowledge, then this latter non-knowledge stands in the way of the non-knowledge (which you try to prove by inference) being an object of consciousness, and thus the whole supposition of *agñāna* as an entity becomes useless.

The proving instance, moreover, adduced by our opponent, has no proving power; for the light of a lamp does not possess the property of illumining things not illumined

before. Everywhere illumining power belongs to knowledge only ; there may be light, but if there is not also knowledge there is no lighting up of objects. The senses also are only causes of the origination of knowledge, and possess no illumining power. The function of the light of the lamp on the other hand is a merely auxiliary one, in so far as it dispels the darkness antagonistic to the organ of sight which gives rise to knowledge ; and it is only with a view to this auxiliary action that illumining power is conventionally ascribed to the lamp.—But in using the light of the lamp as a proving instance, we did not mean to maintain that it possesses illumining power equal to that of light ; we introduced it merely with reference to the illumining power of knowledge, in so far as preceded by the removal of what obscures its object!—We refuse to accept this explanation. Illumining power does not only mean the dispelling of what is antagonistic to it, but also the defining of things, i. e. the rendering them capable of being objects of empirical thought and speech ; and this belongs to knowledge only (not to the light of the lamp). If you allow the power of illumining what was not illumined, to auxiliary factors also, you must first of all allow it to the senses which are the most eminent factors of that kind ; and as in their case there exists no different thing to be terminated by their activity, (i. e. nothing analogous to the *agñāna* to be terminated by knowledge), this whole argumentation is beside the point.

There are also formal inferences, opposed to the conclusion of the *pūrvapakshin*.—Of the *agñāna* under discussion, Brahman, which is mere knowledge, is not the substrate, just because it is *agñāna* ; as shown by the case of the non-knowledge of the shell (mistaken for silver) and similar cases ; for such non-knowledge abides within the knowing subject.—The *agñāna* under discussion does not obscure knowledge, just because it is *agñāna* ; as shown by the cases of the shell, &c. ; for such non-knowledge hides the object.—*Agñāna* is not terminated by knowledge, because it does not hide the object of knowledge ; whatever non-knowledge is terminated by knowledge, is such as to hide

the object of knowledge ; as e.g. the non-knowledge of the shell.—Brahman is not the substrate of *agñāna*, because it is devoid of the character of knowing subject ; like jars and similar things.—Brahman is not hidden by *agñāna*, because it is not the object of knowledge ; whatever is hidden by non-knowledge is the object of knowledge ; so e.g. shells and similar things.—Brahman is not connected with non-knowledge to be terminated by knowledge, because it is not the object of knowledge ; whatever is connected with non-knowledge to be terminated by knowledge is an object of knowledge ; as e.g. shells and the like.—Knowledge based on valid means of proof, has not for its antecedent, non-knowledge other than the antecedent non-existence of knowledge ; just because it is knowledge based on valid proof ; like that valid knowledge which proves the *agñāna* maintained by you.—Knowledge does not destroy a real thing, because it is knowledge in the absence of some specific power strengthening it ; whatever is capable of destroying things is—whether it be knowledge or *agñāna*—strengthened by some specific power ; as e.g. the knowledge of the Lord and of Yogins ; and as the *agñāna* consisting in a pestle (the blow of which destroys the pot).—*Agñāna* which has the character of a positive entity cannot be destroyed by knowledge ; just because it is a positive entity, like jars and similar things.

But, it now may be said, we observe that fear and other affections, which are positive entities and produced by previous cognitions, are destroyed by sublative acts of cognition !—Not so, we reply. Those affections are not destroyed by knowledge ; they rather pass away by themselves, being of a momentary (temporary) nature only, and on the cessation of their cause they do not arise again. That they are of a momentary nature only, follows from their being observed only in immediate connexion with the causes of their origination, and not otherwise. If they were not of a temporary nature, each element of the stream of cognitions, which are the cause of fear and the like, would give rise to a separate feeling of fear, and the result would be that there would be consciousness of many distinct

feelings of fear (and this we know not to be the case).—In conclusion we remark that in defining right knowledge as 'that which has for its antecedent another entity, different from its own antecedent non-existence,' you do not give proof of very eminent logical acuteness; for what sense has it to predicate of an entity that it is different from non-entity?—For all these reasons Inference also does not prove an *agñāna* which is a positive entity. And that it is not proved by Scripture and *arthāpatti*, will be shown later on. And the reasoning under Sū. II, 1, 4, will dispose of the argument which maintains that of a false thing the substantial cause also must be false.

We thus see that there is no cognition of any kind which has for its object a Nescience of 'inexplicable' nature.—Nor can such an inexplicable entity be admitted on the ground of apprehension, erroneous apprehension and sublation (cp. above, p. 102). For that only which is actually apprehended, can be the object of apprehension, error and sublation, and we have no right to assume, as an object of these states of consciousness, something which is apprehended neither by them nor any other state of consciousness.—'But in the case of the shell, &c., silver is actually apprehended, and at the same time there arises the sublating consciousness "this silver is not real," and it is not possible that one thing should appear as another; we therefore are driven to the hypothesis that owing to some defect, we actually apprehend silver of an altogether peculiar kind, viz. such as can be defined neither as real nor as unreal.'—This also we cannot allow, since this very assumption necessarily implies that one thing appears as another. For apprehension, activity, sublation, and erroneous cognition, all result only from one thing appearing as another, and it is not reasonable to assume something altogether non-perceived and groundless. The silver, when apprehended, is not apprehended as something 'inexplicable,' but as something real; were it apprehended under the former aspect it could be the object neither of erroneous nor of sublative cognition, nor would the apprehending person endeavour to seize it. For these reasons you (the *anirva-*

kanīyatva-vādin) also must admit that the actual process is that of one thing appearing as another.

Those also who hold other theories as to the kind of cognition under discussion (of which the shell, mistaken for silver, is an instance) must—whatsoever effort they may make to avoid it—admit that their theory finally implies the appearing of one thing as another. The so-called *asatkhyāti*-view implies that the non-existing appears as existing; the *ātmakhyāti*-view, that the Self—which here means ‘cognition’—appears as a thing; and the *akhyāti*-view, that the attribute of one thing appears as that of another, that two acts of cognition appear as one, and—on the view of the non-existence of the object—that the non-existing appears as existing¹.

Moreover, if you say that there is originated silver of a totally new inexplicable kind, you are bound to assign the cause of this origination. This cause cannot be the perception of the silver; for the perception has the silver for its object, and hence has no existence before the origination of the silver. And should you say that the perception, having arisen without an object, produces the silver and thereupon makes it its object, we truly do not know what to say to such excellent reasoning!—Let it then be said that the cause is some defect in the sense-organ.—This, too, is inadmissible; for a defect abiding in the percipient person cannot produce an objective effect.—Nor can the organs of sense (apart from defects) give rise to the silver; for they are causes of cognitions only (not of things cognised). Nor, again, the sense-organs in so far as modified by some defect; for they also can only produce modifications in what is effected by them, i. e. cognition.—And the hypothesis of a beginningless, false *agñāna* constituting the general material cause of all erroneous cognitions has been refuted above.

How is it, moreover, that this new and inexplicable thing

¹ For a full explanation of the nature of these ‘khyātis,’ see A. Venis’ translation of the *Vedānta Siddhānta Muktvāli* (Reprint from the Pandit, p. 130 ff.).

(which you assume to account for the silver perceived on the shell) becomes to us the object of the idea and word 'silver,' and not of some other idea and term, e.g. of a jar?—If you reply that this is due to its similarity to silver, we point out that in that case the idea and the word presenting themselves to our mind should be that of 'something resembling silver.' Should you, on the other hand, say that we apprehend the thing as silver because it possesses the generic characteristics of silver, we ask whether these generic characteristics are real or unreal. The former alternative is impossible, because something real cannot belong to what is unreal; and the latter is impossible because something unreal cannot belong to what is real.

But we need not extend any further this refutation of an altogether ill-founded theory.

All knowledge is of the Real.

'Those who understand the Veda hold that all cognition has for its object what is real; for Sruti and Smṛiti alike teach that everything participates in the nature of everything else. In the scriptural account of creation preceded by intention on the part of the Creator it is said that each of these elements was made tripartite; and this tripartite constitution of all things is apprehended by Perception as well. The red colour in burning fire comes from (primal elementary) fire, the white colour from water, the black colour from earth—in this way Scripture explains the threefold nature of burning fire. In the same way all things are composed of elements of all things. The Vishṇu Purāṇa, in its account of creation, makes a similar statement: "The elements possessing various powers and being unconnected could not, without combination, produce living beings, not having mingled in any way. Having combined, therefore, with one another, and entering into mutual associations—beginning with the principle called Mahat, and extending down to the gross elements—they formed an egg," &c. (Vi. Pu. I, 2, 50; 52). This tripartiteness of the elements the Sūtrakāra also de-

clares (Ve. Sū. III, 1, 3). For the same reason Sruti enjoins the use of Putika sprouts when no Soma can be procured ; for, as the Mīmāṃsakas explain, there are in the Putika plant some parts of the Soma plant (Pū. Mī. Sū.) ; and for the same reason nivāra grains may be used as a substitute for rice grains. That thing is similar to another which contains within itself some part of that other thing ; and Scripture itself has thus stated that in shells, &c., there is contained some silver, and so on. That one thing is called "silver" and another "shell" has its reason in the relative preponderance of one or the other element. We observe that shells are similar to silver ; thus perception itself informs us that some elements of the latter actually exist in the former. Sometimes it happens that owing to a defect of the eye the silver-element only is apprehended, not the shell-element, and then the percipient person, desirous of silver, moves to pick up the shell. If, on the other hand, his eye is free from such defect, he apprehends the shell-element and then refrains from action. Hence the cognition of silver in the shell is a true one. In the same way the relation of one cognition being sublated by another explains itself through the preponderant element, according as the preponderance of the shell-element is apprehended partially or in its totality, and does not therefore depend on one cognition having for its object the false thing and another the true thing. The distinctions made in the practical thought and business of life thus explain themselves on the basis of everything participating in the nature of everything else.'

In dreams, again, the divinity creates, in accordance with the merit or demerit of living beings, things of a special nature, subsisting for a certain time only, and perceived only by the individual soul for which they are meant. In agreement herewith Scripture says, with reference to the state of dreaming, 'There are no chariots in that state, no horses, no roads ; then he creates chariots, horses, and roads. There are no delights, no joys, no bliss ; then he creates delights, joys, and bliss. There are no tanks, no lakes, no rivers ; then he creates tanks, lakes, and rivers.

For he is the maker' (*Bri. Up. IV, 3, 10*). The meaning of this is, that although there are then no chariots, &c., to be perceived by other persons, the Lord creates such things to be perceived by the dreaming person only. 'For he is the maker'; for such creative agency belongs to him who possesses the wonderful power of making all his wishes and plans to come true. Similarly another passage, 'That person who is awake in those who are asleep, shaping one lovely sight after another, that indeed is the Bright, that is Brahman, that alone is called the Immortal. All worlds are contained in it, and no one goes beyond it' (*Ka. Up. II, 5, 8*). — The *Sûtrakâra* also, after having in two *Sûtras* (*III, 2, 1 ; 2*) stated the hypothesis of the individual soul creating the objects appearing in dreams, finally decides that that wonderful creation is produced by the Lord for the benefit of the individual dreamer; for the reason that as long as the individual soul is in the *samsâra* state, its true nature—comprising the power of making its wishes to come true—is not fully manifested, and hence it cannot practically exercise that power. The last clause of the *Katha* text ('all worlds are contained in it,' &c.) clearly shows that the highest Self only is the creator meant. That the dreaming person who lies in his chamber should go in his body to other countries and experience various results of his merit or demerit—being at one time crowned a king, having at another time his head cut off, and so on—is possible in so far as there is created for him another body in every way resembling the body resting on the bed.

The case of the white shell being seen as yellow, explains itself as follows. The visual rays issuing from the eye are in contact with the bile contained in the eye, and thereupon enter into conjunction with the shell; the result is that the whiteness belonging to the shell is overpowered by the yellowness of the bile, and hence not apprehended; the shell thus appears yellow, just as if it were gilt. The bile and its yellowness is, owing to its exceeding tenuity, not perceived by the bystanders; but thin though it be it is apprehended by the person suffering from jaundice,

to whom it is very near, in so far as it issues from his own eye, and through the mediation of the visual rays, aided by the action of the impression produced on the mind by that apprehension, it is apprehended even in the distant object, viz. the shell.—In an analogous way the crystal which is placed near the rose is apprehended as red, for it is overpowered by the brilliant colour of the rose; the brilliancy of the rose is perceived in a more distinct way owing to its close conjunction with the transparent substance of the crystal.—In the same way the cognition of water in the mirage is true. There always exists water in connexion with light and earth; but owing to some defect of the eye of the perceiving person, and to the mysterious influence of merit and demerit, the light and the earth are not apprehended, while the water *is* apprehended.—In the case again of the firebrand swung round rapidly, its appearance as a fiery wheel explains itself through the circumstance that moving very rapidly it is in conjunction with all points of the circle described without our being able to apprehend the intervals. The case is analogous to that of the perception of a real wheel; but there is the difference that in the case of the wheel no intervals are apprehended, because there are none; while in the case of the firebrand none are apprehended owing to the rapidity of the movement. But in the latter case also the cognition is true.—Again, in the case of mirrors and similar reflecting surfaces the perception of one's own face is likewise true. The fact is that the motion of the visual rays (proceeding from the eye towards the mirror) is reversed (reflected) by the mirror, and that thus those rays apprehend the person's own face, subsequently to the apprehension of the surface of the mirror; and as in this case also, owing to the rapidity of the process, there is no apprehension of any interval (between the mirror and the face), the face presents itself as being in the mirror.—In the case of one direction being mistaken for another (as when a person thinks the south to be where the north is), the fact is that, owing to the unseen principle (i. e. merit or demerit), the direction which actually exists in the other direction (for a point

which is to the north of me is to the south of another point) is apprehended by itself, apart from the other elements of direction ; the apprehension which actually takes place is thus likewise true.—Similar is the case of the double moon. Here, either through pressure of the finger upon the eye, or owing to some abnormal affection of the eye, the visual rays are divided (split), and the double, mutually independent apparatus of vision thus originating, becomes the cause of a double apprehension of the moon. One apparatus apprehends the moon in her proper place ; the other which moves somewhat obliquely, apprehends at first a place close by the moon, and then the moon herself, which thus appears somewhat removed from her proper place. Although, therefore, what is apprehended is the one moon distinguished by connexion with two places at the same time—an apprehension due to the double apparatus of vision—yet, owing to the difference of apprehensions, there is a difference in the character of the object apprehended, and an absence of the apprehension of unity, and thus a double moon presents itself to perception. That the second spot is viewed as qualifying the moon, is due to the circumstance that the apprehension of that spot, and that of the moon which is not apprehended in her proper place, are simultaneous. Now here the doubleness of the apparatus is real, and hence the apprehension of the moon distinguished by connexion with two places is real also, and owing to this doubleness of apprehension, the doubleness of aspect of the object apprehended, i.e. the moon, is likewise real. That there is only one moon constituting the true object of the double apprehension, this is a matter for which ocular perception by itself does not suffice, and hence what is actually seen is a double moon. That, although the two eyes together constitute one visual apparatus only, the visual rays being divided through some defect of the eyes, give rise to a double apparatus—this we infer from the effect actually observed. When that defect is removed there takes place only one apprehension of the moon as connected with her proper place, and thus the idea of one moon only arises. It is at the same time

quite clear how the defect of the eye gives rise to a double visual apparatus, the latter to a double apprehension, and the latter again to a doubleness of the object of apprehension.

We have thus proved that all cognition is true. The shortcomings of other views as to the nature of cognition have been set forth at length by other philosophers, and we therefore do not enter on that topic. What need is there, in fact, of lengthy proofs? Those who acknowledge the validity of the different means of knowledge, perception, and so on, and—what is vouched for by sacred tradition—the existence of a highest Brahman—free from all shadow of imperfection, of measureless excellence, comprising within itself numberless auspicious qualities, all-knowing, immediately realising all its purposes—, what should they not be able to prove? That holy highest Brahman—while producing the entire world as an object of fruition for the individual souls, in agreement with their respective good and ill deserts—creates certain things of such a nature as to become common objects of consciousness, either pleasant or unpleasant, to all souls together, while certain other things are created in such a way as to be perceived only by particular persons, and to persist for a limited time only. And it is this distinction—viz. of things that are objects of general consciousness, and of things that are not so—which makes the difference between what is called ‘things sublat-ing’ and ‘things sublated.’—Everything is explained hereby.

**Neither Scripture nor Smṛiti and Purāṇa teach
Nescience.**

The assertion that Nescience—to be defined neither as that which is nor as that which is not—rests on the authority of Scripture is untrue. In passages such as ‘hidden by the untrue’ (*Kh. Up. VIII, 3, 2*), the word ‘untrue’ does not denote the Undefinable; it rather means that which is different from ‘*ṛita*,’ and this latter word—as we see from the passage ‘enjoying the *ṛita*’ (*Ka. Up. III, 1*)—denotes such actions as aim at no worldly end, but only at the propitiation of the highest Person, and thus

enable the devotee to reach him. The word 'anṛita' therefore denotes actions of a different kind, i. e. such as aim at worldly results and thus stand in the way of the soul reaching Brahman; in agreement with the passage 'they do not find that Brahma-world, for they are carried away by anṛita' (*Kh. Up.* VIII, 3, 2). — Again, in the text 'Then there was neither non-Being nor Being' (*Ri. Samh.* X, 129, 1), the terms 'being' and 'non-being' denote intelligent and non-intelligent beings in their distributive state. What that text aims at stating is that intelligent and non-intelligent beings, which at the time of the origination of the world are called 'sat' and 'tyat' (*Taitt. Up.* II, 6), are, during the period of reabsorption, merged in the collective totality of non-intelligent matter which the text denotes by the term 'darkness' (*Ri. Samh.* X, 129, 3). There is thus no reference whatever to something 'not definable either as being or non-being': the terms 'being' and 'non-being' are applied to different modes of being at different times. That the term 'darkness' denotes the collective totality of non-intelligent matter appears from another scriptural passage, viz. 'The Non-evolved (avyaktam) is merged in the Imperishable (akshara), the Imperishable in darkness (tamas), darkness becomes one with the highest divinity.'—True, the word 'darkness' denotes the subtle condition of primeval matter (*prakṛiti*), which forms the totality of non-intelligent things; but this very *Prakṛiti* is called *Māyā*—in the text 'Know *Prakṛiti* to be *Māyā*,' and this proves it be something 'undefinable'!—Not so, we reply; we meet with no passages where the word '*Māyā*' denotes that which is undefinable!—But the word '*Māyā*' is synonymous with 'mithyā,' i. e. falsehood, and hence denotes the Undefinable also!—This, too, we cannot admit; for the word '*Māyā*' does not in all places refer to what is false; we see it applied e.g. to such things as the weapons of Asuras and Rākshasas, which are not 'false' but real. '*Māyā*,' in such passages, really denotes that which produces various wonderful effects, and it is in this sense that *Prakṛiti* is called *Māyā*. This appears from the passage (*Svet. Up.* IV, 9) 'From that the "māyin" creates

all this, and in that the other one is bound up by *mâyâ*. For this text declares that *Prakṛiti*—there called *Mâyâ*—produces manifold wonderful creations, and the highest Person is there called '*mâyin*' because he possesses that power of *mâyâ*; not on account of any ignorance or nescience on his part. The latter part of the text expressly says that (not the Lord but) another one, i. e. the individual soul is bound up by *mâyâ*; and therewith agrees another text, viz. 'When the soul slumbering in beginningless *Mâyâ* awakes' (*Gaud. Kâ.*). Again, in the text 'Indra goes multiform through the *Mâyâs*' (*Ri. Samh. VI, 47, 18*), the manifold powers of Indra are spoken of, and with this agrees what the next verse says, 'he shines greatly as *Tvashtri*': for an unreal being does not shine. And where the text says 'my *Mâyâ* is hard to overcome' (*Bha. Gî. VII, 14*), the qualification given there to *Mâyâ*, viz. 'consisting of the *gunas*,' shows that what is meant is *Prakṛiti* consisting of the three *gunas*.—All this shows that Scripture does not teach the existence of a 'principle called Nescience, not to be defined either as that which is or that which is not.'

Nor again is such Nescience to be assumed for the reason that otherwise the scriptural statements of the unity of all being would be unmeaning. For if the text 'Thou art that,' be viewed as teaching the unity of the individual soul and the highest Self, there is certainly no reason, founded on unmeaningness, to ascribe to Brahman, intimated by the word 'that'—which is all-knowing, &c.—Nescience, which is contradictory to Brahman's nature.—*Itihâsa* and *Purâṇa* also do not anywhere teach that to Brahman there belongs Nescience.

But, an objection is raised, the *Vishṇu Purâṇa*, in the sloka, 'The stars are *Vishṇu*,' &c. (*II, 12, 38*), first refers to Brahman as one only, and comprising all things within itself; thereupon states in the next sloka that this entire world, with all its distinctions of hills, oceans, &c., is sprung out of the '*agñâna*' of Brahman, which in itself is pure '*gñâna*,' i. e. knowledge; thereupon confirms the view of the world having sprung from *agñâna* by referring to the fact that Brahman, while abiding in its own nature, is free

from all difference (sl. 40); proves in the next two slokas the non-reality of plurality by a consideration of the things of this world; sums up, in the following sloka, the unreality of all that is different from Brahman; then (43) explains that action is the root of that *agñāna* which causes us to view the one uniform Brahman as manifold; thereupon declares the intelligence constituting Brahman's nature to be free from all distinction and imperfection (44); and finally teaches (45) that Brahman so constituted, alone is truly real, while the so-called reality of the world is merely conventional.—This is not, we reply, a true representation of the drift of the passage. The passage at the outset states that, in addition to the detailed description of the world given before, there will now be given a succinct account of another aspect of the world not yet touched upon. This account has to be understood as follows. Of this universe, comprising intelligent and non-intelligent beings, the intelligent part—which is not to be reached by mind and speech, to be known in its essential nature by the Self only, and, owing to its purely intelligential character, not touched by the differences due to *Prakṛiti*—is, owing to its imperishable nature, denoted as that which is; while the non-intelligent, material, part which, in consequence of the actions of the intelligent beings undergoes manifold changes, and thus is perishable, is denoted as that which is not. Both parts, however, form the body of *Vāsudeva*, i.e. Brahman, and hence have Brahman for their Self. The text therefore says (37), 'From the waters which form the body of *Vishṇu* was produced the lotus-shaped earth, with its seas and mountains': what is meant is that the entire *Brahma*-egg which has arisen from water constitutes the body of which *Vishṇu* is the soul. This relation of soul and body forms the basis of the statements of co-ordination made in the next sloka (38), 'The stars are *Vishṇu*,' &c.; the same relation had been already declared in numerous previous passages of the *Purāṇa* ('all this is the body of *Hari*,' &c.). All things in the world, whether they are or are not, are *Vishṇu*'s body, and he is their soul. Of the next sloka, 'Because the Lord has knowledge for his

essential nature,' the meaning is 'Because of the Lord who abides as the Self of all individual souls, the essential nature is knowledge only—while bodies divine, human, &c., have no part in it—, therefore all non-intelligent things, bodies human and divine, hills, oceans, &c., spring from his knowledge, i.e. have their root in the actions springing from the volitions of men, gods, &c., in whose various forms the fundamental intelligence manifests itself. And since non-intelligent matter is subject to changes corresponding to the actions of the individual souls, it may be called 'non-being,' while the souls are 'being.'—This the next sloka further explains 'when knowledge is pure,' &c. The meaning is 'when the works which are the cause of the distinction of things are destroyed, then all the distinctions of bodies, human or divine, hills, oceans, &c.—all which are objects of fruition for the different individual souls—pass away.' Non-intelligent matter, as entering into various states of a non-permanent nature, is called 'non-being'; while souls, the nature of which consists in permanent knowledge, are called 'being.' On this difference the next sloka insists (41). We say 'it is' of that thing which is of a permanently uniform nature, not connected with the idea of beginning, middle and end, and which hence never becomes the object of the notion of non-existence; while we say 'it is not' of non-intelligent matter which constantly passes over into different states, each later state being out of connexion with the earlier state. The constant changes to which non-intelligent matter is liable are illustrated in the next sloka, 'Earth is made into a jar,' &c. And for this reason, the subsequent sloka goes on to say that there *is* nothing but knowledge. This fundamental knowledge or intelligence is, however, variously connected with manifold individual forms of being due to *karman*, and hence the text adds: 'The one intelligence is in many ways connected with beings whose minds differ, owing to the difference of their own acts' (sl. 43, second half). Intelligence, pure, free from stain and grief, &c., which constitutes the intelligent element of the world, and unintelligent matter—these two together constitute the

world, and the world is the body of Vāsudeva ; such is the purport of sloka 44.—The next sloka sums up the whole doctrine ; the words ‘true and untrue’ there denote what in the preceding verses had been called ‘being’ and ‘non-being’ ; the second half of the sloka refers to the practical plurality of the world as due to karman.

Now all these slokas do not contain a single word supporting the doctrine of a Brahman free from all difference ; of a principle called Nescience abiding within Brahman and to be defined neither as that which is nor as that which is not ; and of the world being wrongly imagined, owing to Nescience. The expressions ‘that which is’ and ‘that which is not’ (sl. 35), and ‘satya’ (true) and ‘asatya’ (untrue ; sl. 45), can in no way denote something not to be defined either as being or non-being. By ‘that which is not’ or ‘which is untrue,’ we have to understand not what is undefinable, but that which has no true being, in so far as it is changeable and perishable. Of this character is all non-intelligent matter. This also appears from the instance adduced in sl. 42 : the jar is something perishable, but not a thing devoid of proof or to be sublated by true knowledge. ‘Non-being’ we may call it, in so far as while it is observed at a certain moment in a certain form it is at some other moment observed in a different condition. But there is no contradiction between two different conditions of a thing which are perceived at different times ; and hence there is no reason to call it something futile (*tukhka*) or false (*mithyā*), &c.

Scripture does not teach that Release is due to the knowledge of a non-qualified Brahman.—The meaning of ‘tat tvam asi.’

Nor can we admit the assertion that Scripture teaches the cessation of avidyā to spring only from the cognition of a Brahman devoid of all difference. Such a view is clearly negated by passages such as the following : ‘I know that great person of sun-like lustre beyond darkness ; knowing him a man becomes immortal, there is no other

path to go' (Svet. Up. III, 8); 'All moments sprang from lightning, the Person—none is lord over him, his name is great glory—they who know him become immortal' (Mahānā. Up. I, 8-11). For the reason that Brahman is characterised by difference all Vedic texts declare that final release results from the cognition of a qualified Brahman. And that even those texts which describe Brahman by means of negations really aim at setting forth a Brahman possessing attributes, we have already shown above.

In texts, again, such as 'Thou art that,' the co-ordination of the constituent parts is not meant to convey the idea of the absolute unity of a non-differenced substance: on the contrary, the words 'that' and 'thou' denote a Brahman distinguished by difference. The word 'that' refers to Brahman omniscient, &c., which had been introduced as the general topic of consideration in previous passages of the same section, such as 'It thought, may I be many'; the word 'thou,' which stands in co-ordination to 'that,' conveys the idea of Brahman in so far as having for its body the individual souls connected with non-intelligent matter. This is in accordance with the general principle that co-ordination is meant to express one thing subsisting in a twofold form. If such doubleness of form (or character) were abandoned, there could be no difference of aspects giving rise to the application of different terms, and the entire principle of co-ordination would thus be given up. And it would further follow that the two words co-ordinated would have to be taken in an implied sense (instead of their primary direct meaning). Nor is there any need of our assuming implication (*lakṣhanā*) in sentences¹ such as 'this person is that Devadatta (known to me from former occasions)'; for there is no contradiction in the cognition of the oneness of a thing connected with the past on the one hand, and the present on the other, the contradiction that arises from difference of place being removed

¹ Which are alleged to prove that *sāmānādhikarānya* is to be explained on the basis of *lakṣhanā*.

by the accompanying difference of time. If the text 'Thou art that' were meant to express absolute oneness, it would, moreover, conflict with a previous statement in the same section, viz. 'It thought, may I be many'; and, further, the promise (also made in the same section) that by the knowledge of one thing all things are to be known could not be considered as fulfilled. It, moreover, is not possible (while, however, it would result from the absolute oneness of 'tat' and 'tvam') that to Brahman, whose essential nature is knowledge, which is free from all imperfections, omniscient, comprising within itself all auspicious qualities, there should belong Nescience; and that it should be the substrate of all those defects and afflictions which spring from Nescience. If, further, the statement of co-ordination ('thou art that') were meant to sublimate (the previously existing wrong notion of plurality), we should have to admit that the two terms 'that' and 'thou' have an implied meaning, viz. in so far as denoting, on the one hand, one substrate only, and, on the other, the cessation of the different attributes (directly expressed by the two terms); and thus implication and the other shortcomings mentioned above would cling to this interpretation as well. And there would be even further difficulties. When we form the sublative judgment 'this is not silver,' the sublation is founded on an independent positive judgment, viz. 'this is a shell'; in the case under discussion, however, the sublation would not be known (through an independent positive judgment), but would be assumed merely on the ground that it cannot be helped. And, further, there is really no possibility of sublation, since the word 'that' does not convey the idea of an attribute in addition to the mere substrate. To this it must not be objected that the substrate was previously concealed, and that hence it is the special function of the word 'that' to present the substrate in its non-concealed aspect; for if, previously to the sublative judgment, the substrate was not evident (as an object of consciousness), there is no possibility of its becoming the object either of an error or its sublation.—Nor can we allow you to say that, previously to sublation, the substrate was non-con-

cealed in so far as (i.e. was known as) the object of error, for in its 'non-concealed' aspect the substrate is opposed to all error, and when that aspect shines forth there is no room either for error or sublation.—The outcome of this is that as long as you do not admit that there is a real attribute in addition to the mere substrate, and that this attribute is for a time hidden, you cannot show the possibility either of error or sublation. We add an illustrative instance. That with regard to a man there should arise the error that he is a mere low-caste hunter is only possible on condition of a real additional attribute—e.g. the man's princely birth—being hidden at the time; and the cessation of that error is brought about by the declaration of this attribute of princely birth, not by a mere declaration of the person being a man: this latter fact being evident need not be declared at all, and if it is declared it sublates no error.—If, on the other hand, the text is understood to refer to Brahman as having the individual souls for its body, both words ('that' and 'thou') keep their primary denotation; and, the text thus making a declaration about one substance distinguished by two aspects, the fundamental principle of 'co-ordination' is preserved. On this interpretation the text further intimates that Brahman—free from all imperfection and comprising within itself all auspicious qualities—is the internal ruler of the individual souls and possesses lordly power. It moreover satisfies the demand of agreement with the teaching of the previous part of the section, and it also fulfils the promise as to all things being known through one thing, viz. in so far as Brahman having for its body all intelligent and non-intelligent beings in their gross state is the effect of Brahman having for its body the same things in their subtle state. And this interpretation finally avoids all conflict with other scriptural passages, such as 'Him the great Lord, the highest of Lords' (Svet. Up. VI, 7); 'His high power is revealed as manifold' (ibid. VI, 8); 'He that is free from sin, whose wishes are true, whose purposes are true' (Kā. Up. VIII, 7, 1), and so on.

But how, a question may be asked, can we decide, on

your interpretation of the text, which of the two terms is meant to make an original assertion with regard to the other?—The question does not arise, we reply; for the text does not mean to make an original assertion at all, the truth which it states having already been established by the preceding clause, 'In that all this world has its Self.' This clause does make an original statement—in agreement with the principle that 'Scripture has a purport with regard to what is not established by other means'—that is, it predicates of 'all this,' i.e. this entire world together with all individual souls, that 'that,' i.e. Brahman is the Self of it. The reason of this the text states in a previous passage, 'All these creatures have their root in that which is, their dwelling and their rest in that which is'; a statement which is illustrated by an earlier one (belonging to a different section), viz. 'All this is Brahman; let a man meditate with calm mind on this world as beginning, ending, and breathing in Brahman' (*Kh. Up. III, 14, 1*). Similarly other texts also teach that the world has its Self in Brahman, in so far as the whole aggregate of intelligent and non-intelligent beings constitutes Brahman's body. Compare 'Abiding within, the ruler of beings, the Self of all'; 'He who dwells in the earth, different from the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, who rules the earth within—he is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal.—He who dwells in the Self,' &c. (*Bri. Up. III, 7, 3; 22*); 'He who moving within the earth, and so on—whose body is death, whom death does not know, he is the Self of all beings, free from sin, divine, the one God, Nārāyaṇa' (*Subāl. Up. VII, 1*); 'Having created that he entered into it; having entered it he became sat and tyat' (*Taitt. Up. II, 6*). And also in the section under discussion the passage 'Having entered into them with this living Self let me evolve names and forms,' shows that it is only through the entering into them of the living soul whose Self is Brahman, that all things possess their substantiality and their connexion with the words denoting them. And as this passage must be understood in connexion with *Taitt. Up. II, 6* (where the

'sat' denotes the individual soul) it follows that the individual soul also has Brahman for its Self, owing to the fact of Brahman having entered into it.—From all this it follows that the entire aggregate of things, intelligent and non-intelligent, has its Self in Brahman in so far as it constitutes Brahman's body. And as, thus, the whole world different from Brahman derives its substantial being only from constituting Brahman's body, any term denoting the world or something in it conveys a meaning which has its proper consummation in Brahman only: in other words all terms whatsoever denote Brahman in so far as distinguished by the different things which we associate with those terms on the basis of ordinary use of speech and etymology.—The text 'that art thou' we therefore understand merely as a special expression of the truth already propounded in the clause 'in that all this has its Self.'

This being so, it appears that those as well who hold the theory of the absolute unity of one non-differenced substance, as those who teach the doctrine of *bhedābheda* (co-existing difference and non-difference), and those who teach the absolute difference of several substances, give up all those scriptural texts which teach that Brahman is the universal Self. With regard to the first-mentioned doctrine, we ask 'if there is only one substance; to what can the doctrine of universal identity refer?'—The reply will perhaps be 'to that very same substance.'—But, we reply, this point is settled already by the texts defining the nature of Brahman¹, and there is nothing left to be determined by the passages declaring the identity of everything with Brahman.—But those texts serve to dispel the idea of fictitious difference!—This, we reply, cannot, as has been shown above, be effected by texts stating universal identity in the way of co-ordination; and statements of co-ordination, moreover, introduce into Brahman a doubleness of aspect, and thus contradict the theory of absolute oneness.—The *bhedābheda* view implies that owing to Brahman's connexion with limiting adjuncts (*upādhi*) all the imperfections

¹ Such as 'The True, knowledge,' &c.

resulting therefrom—and which avowedly belong to the individual soul—would manifest themselves in Brahman itself; and as this contradicts the doctrine that the Self of all is constituted by a Brahman free from all imperfection and comprising within itself all auspicious qualities, the texts conveying that doctrine would have to be disregarded. If, on the other hand, the theory be held in that form that 'bhedābheda' belongs to Brahman by its own nature (not only owing to an upādhi), the view that Brahman by its essential nature appears as individual soul, implies that imperfections no less than perfections are essential to Brahman, and this is in conflict with the texts teaching that everything is identical with Brahman free from all imperfections.—For those finally who maintain absolute difference, the doctrine of Brahman being the Self of all has no meaning whatsoever—for things absolutely different can in no way be one—and this implies the abandonment of all Vedānta-texts together.

Those, on the other hand, who take their stand on the doctrine, proclaimed by all Upanishads, that the entire world forms the body of Brahman, may accept in their fulness all the texts teaching the identity of the world with Brahman. For as genus (*gāti*) and quality (*guṇa*), so substances (*dravya*) also may occupy the position of determining attributes (*viśeṣaṇa*), in so far namely as they constitute the body of something else. Enunciations such as 'the Self (soul) is, according to its works, born either (as) a god, or a man, or a horse, or a bull,' show that in ordinary speech as well as in the Veda co-ordination has to be taken in a real primary (not implied) sense. In the same way it is also in the case of generic character and of qualities the relation of 'mode' only (in which generic character and qualities stand to substances) which determines statements of co-ordination, such as 'the ox is broken-horned,' 'the cloth is white.' And as material bodies bearing the generic marks of humanity are definite things, in so far only as they are modes of a Self or soul, enunciations of co-ordination such as 'the soul has been born as a man, or a eunuch, or a woman,' are in every way

appropriate. What determines statements of co-ordination is thus only the relation of 'mode' in which one thing stands to another, not the relation of generic character, quality, and so on, which are of an exclusive nature (and cannot therefore be exhibited in co-ordination with substances). Such words indeed as denote substances capable of subsisting by themselves occasionally take suffixes, indicating that those substances form the distinguishing attributes of other substances—as when from *danda*, 'staff,' we form *dandīn*, 'staff-bearer'; in the case, on the other hand, of substances not capable of subsisting and being apprehended apart from others, the fact of their holding the position of attributes is ascertained only from their appearing in grammatical co-ordination.—But, an objection is raised, if it is supposed that in sentences such as 'the Self is born, as god, man, animal,' &c., the body of a man, god, &c., stands towards the Self in the relation of a mode, in the same way as in sentences such as 'the ox is broken-horned,' 'the cloth is white,' the generic characteristic and the quality stand in the relation of modes to the substances ('cow,' 'cloth') to which they are grammatically co-ordinated; then there would necessarily be simultaneous cognition of the mode, and that to which the mode belongs, i. e. of the body and the Self; just as there is simultaneous cognition of the generic character and the individual. But as a matter of fact this is not the case; we do not necessarily observe a human, divine, or animal body together with the Self. The co-ordination expressed in the form 'the Self is a man,' is therefore an 'implied' one only (the statement not admitting of being taken in its primary literal sense).—This is not so, we reply. The relation of bodies to the Self is strictly analogous to that of class characteristics and qualities to the substances in which they inhere; for it is the Self only which is their substrate and their final cause (*prayogana*), and they are modes of the Self. That the Self only is their substrate, appears from the fact that when the Self separates itself from the body the latter perishes; that the Self alone is their final cause, appears from the fact that they exist to

the end that the fruits of the actions of the Self may be enjoyed ; and that they are modes of the Self, appears from the fact that they are mere attributes of the Self manifesting itself as god, man, or the like. These are just the circumstances on account of which words like 'cow' extend in their meaning (beyond the class characteristics) so as to comprise the individual also. Where those circumstances are absent, as in the case of staffs, earrings, and the like, the attributive position is expressed (not by co-ordination but) by means of special derivative forms—such as *dandin* (staff-bearer), *kundalin* (adorned with earrings). In the case of bodies divine, human, &c., on the other hand, the essential nature of which it is to be mere modes of the Self which constitutes their substrate and final cause, both ordinary and Vedic language express the relation subsisting between the two, in the form of co-ordination, 'This Self is a god, or a man,' &c. That class characteristics and individuals are invariably observed together, is due to the fact of both being objects of visual perception ; the Self, on the other hand, is not such, and hence is not apprehended by the eye, while the body is so apprehended. Nor must you raise the objection that it is hard to understand how that which is capable of being apprehended by itself can be a mere mode of something else : for that the body's essential nature actually consists in being a mere mode of the Self is proved—just as in the case of class characteristics and so on—by its having the Self only for its substrate and final cause, and standing to it in the relation of a distinguishing attribute. That two things are invariably perceived together, depends, as already observed, on their being apprehended by means of the same apparatus, visual or otherwise. Earth is naturally connected with smell, taste, and so on, and yet these qualities are not perceived by the eye ; in the same way the eye which perceives the body does not perceive that essential characteristic of the body which consists in its being a mere mode of the Self ; the reason of the difference being that the eye has no capacity to apprehend the Self. But this does not imply that the body does not possess that essential

nature: it rather is just the possession of that essential nature on which the judgment of co-ordination ('the Self is a man, god,' &c.) is based. And as words have the power of denoting the relation of something being a mode of the Self, they denote things together with this relation.—But in ordinary speech the word 'body' is understood to mean the mere body; it does not therefore extend in its denotation up to the Self!—Not so, we reply. The body is, in reality, nothing but a mode of the Self; but, for the purpose of showing the distinction of things, the word 'body' is used in a limited sense. Analogously words such as 'whiteness,' 'generic character of a cow,' 'species,' 'quality,' are used in a distinctive sense (although 'whiteness' is not found apart from a white thing, of which it is the prakāra, and so on). Words such as 'god,' 'man,' &c., therefore do extend in their connotation up to the Self. And as the individual souls, distinguished by their connexion with aggregates of matter bearing the characteristic marks of humanity, divine nature, and so on, constitute the body of the highest Self, and hence are modes of it, the words denoting those individual souls extend in their connotation up to the very highest Self. And as all intelligent and non-intelligent beings are thus mere modes of the highest Brahman, and have reality thereby only, the words denoting them are used in co-ordination with the terms denoting Brahman.—This point has been demonstrated by me in the Vedārthasaṃgraha. A Sūtra also (IV, 1, 3) will declare the identity of the world and Brahman to consist in the relation of body and Self; and the Vākyakāra too says 'It is the Self—thus everything should be apprehended.'

Summary statement as to the way in which different scriptural texts are to be reconciled.

The whole matter may be summarily stated as follows. Some texts declare a distinction of nature between non-intelligent matter, intelligent beings, and Brahman, in so far as matter is the object of enjoyment, the souls the enjoying subjects, and Brahman the ruling principle. 'From that the Lord of Māyā creates all this; in that the other

one is bound up through that Mâyâ' (Svet. Up. IV, 9); 'Know Prakṛiti to be Mâyâ, and the great Lord the ruler of Mâyâ' (10); 'What is perishable is the Pradhâna, the immortal and imperishable is Hara: the one God rules the Perishable and the Self' (Svet. Up. I, 10)—In this last passage the clause 'the immortal and imperishable is Hara,' refers to the enjoying individual soul, which is called 'Hara,' because it draws (harati) towards itself the pradhâna as the object of its enjoyment.—'He is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of him neither parent nor lord' (Svet. Up. VI, 9); 'The master of the pradhâna and of the individual souls' (Svet. Up. VI, 16); 'The ruler of all, the lord of the Selves, the eternal, blessed, undecaying one' (Mahânâr. Up. XI, 3); 'There are two unborn ones, one knowing, the other not knowing, one a ruler, the other not a ruler' (Svet. Up. I, 9); 'The eternal among the non-eternal, the intelligent one among the intelligent, who though one fulfils the desires of many' (Svet. Up. VI, 13); 'Knowing the enjoyer, the object of enjoyment and the Mover' (Svet. Up. I, 12); 'One of them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating' (Svet. Up. IV, 6); 'Thinking that the Self is different from the Mover, blessed by him he reaches Immortality' (Svet. Up. I, 6); 'There is one unborn female being, red, white, and black, uniform but producing manifold offspring. There is one unborn male being who loves her and lies by her; there is another who leaves her after he has enjoyed her' (Svet. Up. IV, 5). 'On the same tree man, immersed, bewildered, grieves on account of his impotence; but when he sees the other Lord contented and knows his glory, then his grief passes away' (Svet. Up. IV, 9).—Smṛiti expresses itself similarly. —'Thus eightfold is my nature divided. Lower is this Nature; other than this and higher know that Nature of mine which constitutes the individual soul, by which this world is supported' (Bha. Gġ. VII, 4, 5). 'All beings at the end of a Kalpa return into my Nature, and again at the beginning of a Kalpa do I send them forth. Resting on my own Nature again and again do I send forth this entire body of beings, which has no power of its own,

being subject to the power of nature' (Bha. Gî. IX, 7, 8); 'With me as supervisor Nature brings forth the movable and the immovable, and for this reason the world ever moves round' (Bha. Gî. IX, 10); 'Know thou both Nature and the Soul to be without beginning' (XIII, 19); 'The great Brahman is my womb, in which I place the embryo, and thence there is the origin of all beings' (XIV, 3). This last passage means—the womb of the world is the great Brahman, i.e. non-intelligent matter in its subtle state, commonly called *Prakṛiti*; with this I connect the embryo, i.e. the intelligent principle. From this contact of the non-intelligent and the intelligent, due to my will, there ensues the origination of all beings from gods down to lifeless things.

Non-intelligent matter and intelligent beings—holding the relative positions of objects of enjoyment and enjoying subjects, and appearing in multifarious forms—other scriptural texts declare to be permanently connected with the highest Person in so far as they constitute his body, and thus are controlled by him; the highest Person thus constituting their Self. Compare the following passages: 'He who dwells in the earth and within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, and who rules the earth within, he is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal,' &c. (*Bṛi. Up.* III, 7, 3-23); 'He who moves within the earth, whose body the earth is, &c.; he who moves within death, whose body death is,' &c. (*Subāla Up.* VII, 1). In this latter passage the word 'death' denotes what is also called 'darkness,' viz. non-intelligent matter in its subtle state; as appears from another passage in the same Upanishad, 'the Imperishable is merged in darkness.' And compare also 'Entered within, the ruler of creatures, the Self of all' (*Taitt. Ār.* III, 24).

Other texts, again, aim at teaching that the highest Self to whom non-intelligent and intelligent beings stand in the relation of body, and hence of modes, subsists in the form of the world, in its causal as well as in its effected aspect, and hence speak of the world in this its double aspect as that which is (the Real); so e.g. 'Being only this was in the beginning, one only without a second—it desired, may

I be many, may I grow forth—it sent forth fire,’ &c., up to ‘all these creatures have their root in that which is,’ &c., up to ‘that art thou, O Svetaketu’ (*Kh. Up.* VI, 2-8); ‘He wished, may I be many,’ &c., up to ‘it became the true and the untrue’ (*Taitt. Up.* II, 6). These sections also refer to the essential distinction of nature between non-intelligent matter, intelligent beings, and the highest Self which is established by other scriptural texts; so in the *Khândogya* passage, ‘Let me enter those three divine beings with this living Self, and let me then evolve names and forms’; and in the *Taitt.* passage, ‘Having sent forth that he entered into it; having entered it he became sat and tyat, knowledge and (what is) without knowledge, the true and the untrue,’ &c. These two passages evidently have the same purport, and hence the soul’s having its Self in Brahman—which view is implied in the *Kh.* passage—must be understood as resting thereon that the souls (together with matter) constitute the body of Brahman as asserted in the *Taitt.* passage (‘it became knowledge and that which is without knowledge,’ i.e. souls and matter). The same process of evolution of names and forms is described elsewhere also, ‘All this was then unevolved; it became evolved by form and name’ (*Bri. Up.* I, 4, 7). The fact is that the highest Self is in its causal or in its ‘effected’ condition, according as it has for its body intelligent and non-intelligent beings either in their subtle or their gross state; the effect, then, being non-different from the cause, and hence being cognised through the cognition of the cause, the result is that the desired ‘cognition of all things through one’ can on our view be well established. In the clause ‘I will enter into these three divine beings with this living Self,’ &c., the term ‘the three divine beings’ denotes the entire aggregate of non-sentient matter, and as the text declares that the highest Self evolved names and forms by entering into matter by means of the living souls of which he is the Self, it follows that all terms whatsoever denote the highest Self as qualified by individual Selves, the latter again being qualified by non-sentient matter. A term which denotes

the highest Self in its causal condition may therefore be exhibited in co-ordination with another term denoting the highest Self in its 'effected' state, both terms being used in their primary senses. Brahman, having for its modes intelligent and non-intelligent things in their gross and subtle states, thus constitutes effect and cause, and the world thus has Brahman for its material cause (upādāna). Nor does this give rise to any confusion of the essential constituent elements of the great aggregate of things. Of some parti-coloured piece of cloth the material cause is threads white, red, black, &c.; all the same, each definite spot of the cloth is connected with one colour only white e.g., and thus there is no confusion of colours even in the 'effected' condition of the cloth. Analogously the combination of non-sentient matter, sentient beings, and the Lord constitutes the material cause of the world, but this does not imply any confusion of the essential characteristics of enjoying souls, objects of enjoyment, and the universal ruler, even in the world's 'effected' state. There is indeed a difference between the two cases, in so far as the threads are capable of existing apart from one another, and are only occasionally combined according to the volition of men, so that the web sometimes exists in its causal, sometimes in its effected state; while non-sentient matter and sentient beings in all their states form the body of the highest Self, and thus have a being only as the modes of that—on which account the highest Self may, in all cases, be denoted by any term whatsoever. But the two cases are analogous, in so far as there persists a distinction and absence of all confusion, on the part of the constituent elements of the aggregate. This being thus, it follows that the highest Brahman, although entering into the 'effected' condition, remains unchanged—for its essential nature does not become different—and we also understand what constitutes its 'effected' condition, viz. its abiding as the Self of non-intelligent and intelligent beings in their gross condition, distinguished by name and form. For becoming an effect means entering into another state of being.

Those texts, again, which speak of Brahman as devoid of

qualities, explain themselves on the ground of Brahman being free from all touch of evil. For the passage, *Kh. Up. VIII, 1, 5*—which at first negatives all evil qualities ‘free from sin, from old age, from death, from grief, from hunger and thirst,’ and after that affirms auspicious qualities ‘whose wishes and purposes come true’—enables us to decide that in other places also the general denial of qualities really refers to evil qualities only.—Passages which declare knowledge to constitute the essential nature of Brahman explain themselves on the ground that of Brahman—which is all-knowing, all-powerful, antagonistic to all evil, a mass of auspicious qualities—the essential nature can be defined as knowledge (intelligence) only—which also follows from the ‘self-luminousness’ predicated of it. Texts, on the other hand, such as ‘He who is all-knowing’ (*Ma. Up. I, 1, 9*); ‘His high power is revealed as manifold, as essential, acting as force and knowledge’ (*Svet. Up. VI, 11, 8*); ‘Whereby should he know the knower’ (*Bri. Up. II, 4, 14*), teach the highest Self to be a knowing subject. Other texts, again, such as ‘The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman’ (*Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1*), declare knowledge to constitute its nature, as it can be defined through knowledge only, and is self-luminous. And texts such as ‘He desired, may I be many’ (*Taitt. Up. II, 6*); ‘It thought, may I be many; it evolved itself through name and form’ (*Kh. Up. VI, 2*), teach that Brahman, through its mere wish, appears in manifold modes. Other texts, again, negative the opposite view, viz. that there is a plurality of things not having their Self in Brahman. ‘From death to death goes he who sees here any plurality’; ‘There is here not any plurality’ (*Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19*); ‘For where there is duality as it were’ (*Bri. Up. II, 4, 14*). But these texts in no way negative that plurality of modes—declared in passages such as ‘May I be many, may I grow forth’—which springs from Brahman’s will, and appears in the distinction of names and forms. This is proved by clauses in those ‘negating’ texts themselves, ‘Whosoever looks for anything elsewhere than in the Self,’ ‘from that great Being there has been breathed forth the *Rig-veda*,’ &c. (*Bri. Up. II, 4, 6, 10*).—

On this method of interpretation we find that the texts declaring the essential distinction and separation of non-sentient matter, sentient beings, and the Lord, and those declaring him to be the cause and the world to be the effect, and cause and effect to be identical, do not in any way conflict with other texts declaring that matter and souls form the body of the Lord, and that matter and souls in their causal condition are in a subtle state, not admitting of the distinction of names and forms while in their 'effected' gross state they are subject to that distinction. On the other hand, we do not see how there is any opening for theories maintaining the connexion of Brahman with Nescience, or distinctions in Brahman due to limiting adjuncts (*upādhi*)—such and similar doctrines rest on fallacious reasoning, and flatly contradict Scripture.

There is nothing contradictory in allowing that certain texts declare the essential distinction of matter, souls, and the Lord, and their mutual relation as modes and that to which the modes belong, and that other texts again represent them as standing in the relation of cause and effect, and teach cause and effect to be one. We may illustrate this by an analogous case from the *Karmakāṇḍa*. There six separate oblations to Agni, and so on, are enjoined by separate so-called originaive injunctions; these are thereupon combined into two groups (*viz.* the new moon and the full-moon sacrifices) by a double clause referring to those groups, and finally a so-called injunction of qualification enjoins the entire sacrifice as something to be performed by persons entertaining a certain wish. In a similar way certain Vedānta-texts give instruction about matter, souls, and the Lord as separate entities ('Perishable is the *pradhāna*, imperishable and immortal Hara,' &c., *Svet. Up.* I, 10; and others); then other texts teach that matter and souls in all their different states constitute the body of the highest Person, while the latter is their Self ('Whose body the earth is,' &c.); and finally another group of texts teaches—by means of words such as 'Being,' 'Brahman,' 'Self,' denoting the highest Self to which the body belongs—that the one highest Self in its causal and

effected states comprises within itself the triad of entities which had been taught in separation ('Being only this was in the beginning'; 'In that all this has its Self'; 'All this is Brahman').—That the highest Self with matter and souls for its body should be simply called the highest Self, is no more objectionable than that that particular form of Self which is invested with a human body should simply be spoken of as Self or soul—as when we say 'This is a happy soul.'

Nescience cannot be terminated by the simple act of cognising Brahman as the Universal Self.

The doctrine, again, that Nescience is put an end to by the cognition of Brahman being the Self of all can in no way be upheld; for as bondage is something real it cannot be put an end to by knowledge. How, we ask, can any one assert that bondage—which consists in the experience of pleasure and pain caused by the connexion of souls with bodies of various kind, a connexion springing from good or evil actions—is something false, unreal? And that the cessation of such bondage is to be obtained only through the grace of the highest Self pleased by the devout meditation of the worshipper, we have already explained. As the cognition of universal oneness which you assume rests on a view of things directly contrary to reality, and therefore is false, the only effect it can have is to strengthen the ties of bondage. Moreover, texts such as 'But different is the highest Person' (Bha. Gī. XV, 17), and 'Having known the Self and the Mover as separate' (Svet. Up. I, 6), teach that it is the cognition of Brahman as the inward ruler different from the individual soul, that effects the highest aim of man, i. e. final release. And, further, as that 'bondage-terminating' knowledge which you assume is itself unreal, we should have to look out for another act of cognition to put an end to it.—But may it not be said that this terminating cognition, after having put an end to the whole aggregate of distinctions antagonistic to it, immediately passes away itself, because being of a merely

Instantaneous nature?—No, we reply. Since its nature, its origination, and its destruction are all alike fictitious, we have clearly to search for another agency capable of destroying that avidyā which is the cause of the fiction of its destruction!—Let us then say that the essential nature of Brahman itself is the destruction of that cognition!—From this it would follow, we reply, that such ‘terminating’ knowledge would not arise at all; for that the destruction of what is something permanent can clearly not originate!—Who moreover should, according to you, be the cognising subject in a cognition which has for its object the negation of everything that is different from Brahman?—That cognising subject is himself something fictitiously superimposed on Brahman!—This may not be, we reply: he himself would in that case be something to be negated, and hence an object of the ‘terminating’ cognition; he could not therefore be the subject of cognition!—Well, then, let us assume that the essential nature of Brahman itself is the cognising subject!—Do you mean, we ask in reply, that Brahman’s being the knowing subject in that ‘terminating’ cognition belongs to Brahman’s essential nature, or that it is something fictitiously superimposed on Brahman? In the latter case that superimposition and the Nescience founded on it would persist, because they would not be objects of the terminating cognition, and if a further terminating act of knowledge were assumed, that also would possess a triple aspect (viz. knowledge, object known, and subject knowing), and we thus should be led to assume an infinite series of knowing subjects. If, on the other hand, the essential nature of Brahman itself constitutes the knowing subject, your view really coincides with the one held by us¹. And if you should say that the terminating knowledge itself and the knowing subject in it are things separate from Brahman and themselves contained in the sphere of what is to be terminated by that knowledge, your statement would be no less absurd than if you were to say ‘everything on the surface of the earth has been cut

¹ According to which Brahman is not *gñānam*, but *gñātri*.

down by Devadatta with one stroke'—meaning thereby that Devadatta himself and the action of cutting down are comprised among the things cut down!—The second alternative, on the other hand—according to which the knowing subject is not Brahman itself, but a knower superimposed upon it—would imply that that subject is the agent in an act of knowledge resulting in his own destruction; and this is impossible since no person aims at destroying himself. And should it be said that the destruction of the knowing agent belongs to the very nature of Brahman itself¹, it would follow that we can assume neither plurality nor the erroneous view of plurality, nor avidyā as the root of that erroneous view.—All this confirms our theory, viz. that since bondage springs from agñāna in the form of an eternal stream of karman, it can be destroyed only through knowledge of the kind maintained by us. Such knowledge is to be attained only through the due daily performance of religious duties as prescribed for a man's caste and āsrama, such performance being sanctified by the accompanying thought of the true nature of the Self, and having the character of propitiation of the highest Person. Now, that mere works produce limited and non-permanent results only, and that on the other hand works not aiming at an immediate result but meant to please the highest Person, bring about knowledge of the character of devout meditation, and thereby the unlimited and permanent result of the intuition of Brahman being the Self of all—these are points not to be known without an insight into the nature of works, and hence, without this, the attitude described—which is preceded by the abandonment of mere works—cannot be reached. For these reasons the enquiry into Brahman has to be entered upon *after* the enquiry into the nature of works.

¹ And, on that account, belongs to what constitutes man's highest aim.

The Vedāntin aiming to ascertain the nature of Brahman from Scripture, need not be disconcerted by the Mīmāṃsā-theory of all speech having informing power with regard to actions only.

Here another *primâ facie* view¹ finally presents itself. The power of words to denote things cannot be ascertained in any way but by observing the speech and actions of experienced people. Now as such speech and action always implies the idea of something to be done (*kârya*), words are means of knowledge only with reference to things to be done; and hence the matter inculcated by the Veda also is only things to be done. From this it follows that the Vedānta-texts cannot claim the position of authoritative means of knowledge with regard to Brahman, which is (not a thing to be done but) an accomplished fact.—Against this view it must not be urged that in the case of sentences expressive of accomplished facts—as e.g. that a son is born to somebody—the idea of a particular thing may with certainty be inferred as the cause of certain outward signs—such as e.g. a pleased expression of countenance—which are generally due to the attainment of a desired object; for the possible causes of joy, past, present, and future, are infinite in number, and in the given case other causes of joy, as e.g. the birth having taken place in an auspicious moment, or having been an easy one, &c., may easily be imagined. Nor, again, can it be maintained that the denotative power of words with regard to accomplished things may be ascertained in the way of our inferring either the meaning of one word from the known meaning of other words, or the meaning of the radical part of a word from the known meaning of a formative element; for the fact is that we are only able to infer on the basis of a group of words known to denote a certain thing to be done, what the meaning of some particular constituent of that group may be.—Nor, again, when a person, afraid of what he thinks to be a snake, is ob-

¹ This view is held by the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas.

served to dismiss his fear on being told that the thing is not a snake but only a rope, can we determine thereby that what terminates his fear is the idea of the non-existence of a snake. For there are many other ideas which may account for the cessation of his fear—he may think, e.g., ‘this is a thing incapable of moving, devoid of poison, without consciousness’—the particular idea present to his mind we are therefore not able to determine.—The truth is that from the fact of all activity being invariably dependent on the idea of something to be done, we learn that the meaning which words convey is something prompting activity. All words thus denoting something to be done, the several words of a sentence express only some particular action to be performed, and hence it is not possible to determine that they possess the power of denoting their own meaning only, in connexion with the meaning of the other words of the sentence.—(Nor must it be said that what moves to action is not the idea of the thing to be done, but the idea of the means to do it; for) the idea of the means to bring about the desired end causes action only through the idea of the thing to be done, not through itself; as is evident from the fact that the idea of means past, future, and even present (when divorced from the idea of an end to be accomplished), does not prompt to action. As long as a man does not reflect ‘the means towards the desired end are not to be accomplished without an effort of mine; it must therefore be accomplished through my activity’; so long he does not begin to act. What causes activity is thus only the idea of things to be done; and as hence words denote such things only, the Veda also can tell us only about things to be done, and is not therefore in a position to give information about the attainment of an infinite and permanent result, such result being constituted by Brahman, which is (not a thing to be done, but) an accomplished entity. The Veda does, on the other hand, actually teach that mere works have a permanent result (‘Imperishable is the merit of him who offers the *kâturmâsya*-sacrifices,’ and so on); and hence it follows that to enter on an

enquiry into Brahman for the reason that the knowledge of Brahman has an infinite and permanent result, while the result of works is limited and non-permanent, is an altogether unjustified proceeding.

To this we make the following reply.—To set aside the universally known mode of ascertaining the connexion of words and their meanings, and to assert that all words express only one non-worldly meaning (viz. those things to be done which the Veda inculcates), is a proceeding for which men paying due attention to the means of proof can have only a slight regard. A child avowedly learns the connexion of words and meanings in the following way. The father and mother and other people about him point with the finger at the child's mother, father, uncle, &c., as well as at various domestic and wild animals, birds, snakes, and so on, to the end that the child may at the same time pay attention to the terms they use and to the beings denoted thereby, and thus again and again make him understand that such and such words refer to such and such things. The child thus observing in course of time that these words of themselves give rise to certain ideas in his mind, and at the same time observing neither any different connexion of words and things, nor any person arbitrarily establishing such connexion, comes to the conclusion that the application of such and such words to such and such things is based on the denotative power of the words. And being taught later on by his elders that other words also, in addition to those learned first, have their definite meaning, he in the end becomes acquainted with the meanings of all words, and freely forms sentences conveying certain meanings for the purpose of imparting those meanings to other persons.

And there is another way also in which the connexion of words and things can easily be ascertained. Some person orders another, by means of some expressive gesture, to go and inform Devadatta that his father is doing well, and the man ordered goes and tells Devadatta 'Your father is doing well.' A by-stander who is acquainted with the meaning of various gestures, and thus knows on what

errand the messenger is sent, follows him and hears the words employed by him to deliver his message: he therefore readily infers that such and such words have such and such a meaning.—We thus see that the theory of words having a meaning only in relation to things to be done is baseless. The Vedānta-texts tell us about Brahman, which is an accomplished entity, and about meditation on Brahman as having an unlimited result, and hence it behoves us to undertake an enquiry into Brahman so as fully to ascertain its nature.

We further maintain that even on the supposition of the Veda relating only to things to be done, an enquiry into Brahman must be undertaken. For 'The Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be reflected on, to be meditated on' (*Bṛi.* Up. II, 4, 5); 'He is to be searched out, him we must try to understand' (*Kṛ.* Up. VIII, 7, 1); 'Let a Brāhmaṇa having known him practise wisdom' (*Bṛi.* Up. XI, 4, 21); 'What is within that small ether, that is to be sought for, that is to be understood' (*Kṛ.* Up. VIII, 1, 1); 'What is in that small ether, that is to be meditated upon' (*Mahānār.* Up. X, 7)—these and similar texts enjoin a certain action, viz. meditation on Brahman, and when we then read 'He who knows Brahman attains the highest,' we understand that the attainment of Brahman is meant as a reward for him who is qualified for and enters on such meditation. Brahman itself and its attributes are thus established thereby only—that they subserve a certain action, viz. meditation. There are analogous instances in the *Karmakāṇḍa* of the Veda. When an arthavāda-passage describes the heavenly world as a place where there is no heat, no frost, no grief, &c., this is done merely with a view to those texts which enjoin certain sacrifices on those who are desirous of the heavenly world. Where another arthavāda says that 'those who perform certain sattra-sacrifices are firmly established,' such 'firm establishment' is referred to only because it is meant as the reward for those acting on the text which enjoins those sattras, 'Let him perform the rātri-sattras' (*Pū. Mī. Sū.* IV, 3, 17). And where a text says that a person threatening a Brāhmaṇa is to be punished with

a fine of one hundred gold pieces, this statement is made merely with reference to the prohibitory passage, 'Let him not threaten a Brāhmaṇa' (Pū. Mī. Sū. III, 4, 17).

We, however, really object to the whole theory of the meaning of words depending on their connexion with 'things to be done,' since this is not even the case in imperative clauses such as 'bring the cow.' For you are quite unable to give a satisfactory definition of your 'thing to be done' (kārya). You understand by 'kārya' that which follows on the existence of action (*kr̥iti*) and is aimed at by action. Now to be aimed at by action is to be the object (*karman*) of action, and to be the object of action is to be that which it is most desired to obtain by action (according to the grammarian's definition). But what one desires most to obtain is pleasure or the cessation of pain. When a person desirous of some pleasure or cessation of pain is aware that his object is not to be accomplished without effort on his part, he resolves on effort and begins to act: in no case we observe an object of desire to be aimed at by action in any other sense than that of its accomplishment depending on activity. The prompting quality (*prerakatva*) also, which belongs to objects of desire, is nothing but the attribute of their accomplishment depending on activity; for it is this which moves to action.—Nor can it be said that 'to be aimed at by action' means to be that which is 'agreeable' (*anukūla*) to man; for it is pleasure only that is agreeable to man. The cessation of pain, on the other hand, is not what is 'agreeable' to man. The essential distinction between pleasure and pain is that the former is agreeable to man, and the latter disagreeable (*pratikūla*), and the cessation of pain is desired not because it is agreeable, but because pain is disagreeable: absence of pain means that a person is in his normal condition, affected neither with pain nor pleasure. Apart from pleasure, action cannot possibly be agreeable, nor does it become so by being subservient to pleasure; for its essential nature is pain. Its being helpful to pleasure merely causes the resolve of undertaking it.—Nor, again, can we define that which is aimed at by action as that to which action is

auxiliary or supplementary (*sesha*), while itself it holds the position of something principal to be subserved by other things (*seshin*); for of the *sesha* and *seshin* also no proper definition can be given. It cannot be said that a *sesha* is that which is invariably accompanied by an activity proceeding with a view to something else, and that the correlate of such a *sesha* is the *seshin*; for on this definition the action is not a *sesha*, and hence that which is to be effected by the action cannot be the correlative *seshin*. And moreover a *seshin* may not be defined as what is correlative to an action proceeding with a view to—i.e. aiming at—something else; for it is just this ‘being aimed at’ of which we require a definition, and moreover we observe that also the *seshin* (or ‘*pradhâna*’) is capable of action proceeding with a view to the *sesha*, as when e.g. a master does something for—let us say, keeps or feeds—his servant. This last criticism you must not attempt to ward off by maintaining that the master in keeping his servant acts with a view to himself (to his own advantage); for the servant in serving the master likewise acts with a view to himself. —And as, further, we have no adequate definition of ‘*kârya*,’ it would be inappropriate to define *sesha* as that which is correlative to *kârya*, and *seshin* as that which is correlative to *sesha*.—Nor, finally, may we define ‘that which is aimed at by action’ as that which is the final end (*prayogana*) of action; for by the final end of an action we could only understand the end for which the agent undertakes the action, and this end is no other than the desired object. As thus ‘what is aimed at by action’ cannot be defined otherwise than what is desired, *kârya* cannot be defined as what is to be effected by action and stands to action in the relation of principal matter (*pradhâna* or *seshin*).

(Let it then be said that the ‘*niyoga*,’ i.e. what is commonly called the *apûrva*—the supersensuous result of an action which later on produces the sensible result—constitutes the *prayogana*—the final purpose—of the action.—But) the *apûrva* also can, as it is something different from the direct objects of desire, viz. pleasure and the cessation of pain, be viewed only as a means of bringing about these

direct objects, and as something itself to be effected by the action; it is for this very reason that it is something different from the action, otherwise the action itself would be that which is effected by the action. The thing to be effected by the action—which is expressed by means of optative and imperative verbal forms such as *yageta*, 'let him sacrifice'—is, in accordance with the fact of its being connected with words such as *svargakāmaḥ*, 'he who is desirous of heaven,' understood to be the means of bringing about (the enjoyment of) the heavenly world; and as the (sacrificial) action itself is transitory, there is assumed an altogether 'new' or 'unprecedented' (*apūrva*) effect of it which (later on) is to bring about the enjoyment of heaven. This so-called '*apūrva*' can therefore be understood only with regard to its capability of bringing about the heavenly world. Now it certainly is ludicrous to assert that the *apūrva*, which is assumed to the end of firmly establishing the independent character of the effect of the action first recognised as such (i. e. independent), later on becomes the means of realising the heavenly world; for as the word expressing the result of the action (*yageta*) appears in syntactical connexion with '*svargakāmaḥ*' (desirous of heaven), it does not, from the very beginning, denote an independent object of action, and moreover it is impossible to recognise an independent result of action other than either pleasure or cessation of pain, or the means to bring about these two results.—What, moreover, do you understand by the *apūrva* being a final end (*prayogana*)?—You will perhaps reply, 'its being agreeable like pleasure.'—Is then the *apūrva* a pleasure? It is pleasure alone which is agreeable!—Well, let us then define the *apūrva* as a kind of pleasure of a special nature, called by that name!—But what proof, we ask, have you for this? You will, in the first place, admit yourself that you do not directly experience any pleasure springing from consciousness of your *apūrva*, which could in any way be compared to the pleasure caused by the consciousness of the objects of the senses.—Well, let us say then that as authoritative doctrine gives us the notion of an *apūrva* as

something beneficial to man, we conclude that it will be enjoyed later on.—But, we ask, what is the authoritative doctrine establishing such an apūrva beneficial to man? Not, in the first place, ordinary, i. e. non-Vedic doctrine; for such has for its object action only which always is essentially painful. Nor, in the next place, Vedic texts; for those also enjoin action only as the means to bring about certain results such as the heavenly world. Nor again the Smṛiti texts enjoining works of either permanent or occasional obligation; for those texts always convey the notion of an apūrva only on the basis of an antecedent knowledge of the apūrva as intimated by Vedic texts containing terms such as svargakāmaḥ. And we, moreover, do not observe that in the case of works having a definite result in this life, there is enjoyment of any special pleasure called apūrva, in addition to those advantages which constitute the special result of the work and are enjoyed here below, as e. g. abundance of food or freedom from sickness. Thus there is not any proof of the apūrva being a pleasure. The arthavāda-passages of the Veda also, while glorifying certain pleasurable results of works, as e. g. the heavenly world, do not anywhere exhibit a similar glorification of a pleasure called apūrva.

From all this we conclude that also in injunctory sentences that which is expressed by imperative and similar forms is only the idea that the meaning of the root—as known from grammar—is to be effected by the effort of the agent. And that what constitutes the meaning of roots, viz. the action of sacrificing and the like, possesses the quality of pleasing the highest Person, who is the inner ruler of Agni and other divinities (to whom the sacrifices are ostensibly offered), and that through the highest Person thus pleased the result of the sacrifice is accomplished, we shall show later on, under Sū. III, 2, 37.—It is thus finally proved that the Vedānta-texts give information about an accomplished entity, viz. Brahman, and that the fruit of meditation on Brahman is something infinite and permanent. Where, on the other hand, Scripture refers to the fruit of mere works, such as the *ĥāturmāsya*-sacrifices,

as something imperishable, we have to understand this imperishableness in a merely relative sense, for Scripture definitely teaches that the fruit of all works is perishable.

We thus arrive at the settled conclusion that, since the fruit of mere works is limited and perishable, while that of the cognition of Brahman is infinite and permanent, there is good reason for entering on an enquiry into Brahman—the result of which enquiry will be the accurate determination of Brahman's nature.—Here terminates the *adhikāraṇa* of 'Enquiry.'

What then is that Brahman which is here said to be an object that should be enquired into?—To this question the second Sūtra gives a reply.

2. (Brahman is that) from which the origin, &c., of this (world proceed).

The expression 'the origin,' &c., means 'creation, subsistence, and reabsorption.' The 'this' (in 'of this') denotes this entire world with its manifold wonderful arrangements, not to be fathomed by thought, and comprising within itself the aggregate of living souls from Brahmā down to blades of grass, all of which experience the fruits (of their former actions) in definite places and at definite times. 'That from which,' i. e. that highest Person who is the ruler of all; whose nature is antagonistic to all evil; whose purposes come true; who possesses infinite auspicious qualities, such as knowledge, blessedness, and so on; who is omniscient, omnipotent, supremely merciful; from whom the creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of this world proceed—he is Brahman: such is the meaning of the Sūtra.—The definition here given of Brahman is founded on the text *Taitt. Up. III, 1*, 'Bhrigu Vāruṇi went to his father Varuṇa, saying, Sir, teach me Brahman,' &c., up to 'That from which these beings are born, that by which when born they live, that into which they enter at their death, try to know that: that is Brahman.'

A doubt arises here. Is it possible, or not, to gain a knowledge of Brahman from the characteristic marks stated in this passage?—It is not possible, the *Pūrva-*

pakshin contends. The attributes stated in that passage—viz. being that from which the world originates, and so on—do not properly indicate Brahman; for as the essence of an attribute lies in its separative or distinctive function, there would result from the plurality of distinctive attributes plurality on the part of Brahman itself.—But when we say ‘Devadatta is of a dark complexion, is young, has reddish eyes,’ &c., we also make a statement as to several attributes, and yet we are understood to refer to one Devadatta only; similarly we understand in the case under discussion also that there is one Brahman only!—Not so, we reply. In Devadatta’s case we connect all attributes with one person, because we know his unity through other means of knowledge; otherwise the distinctive power of several attributes would lead us, in this case also, to the assumption of several substances to which the several attributes belong. In the case under discussion, on the other hand, we do not, apart from the statement as to attributes, know anything about the unity of Brahman, and the distinctive power of the attributes thus necessarily urges upon us the idea of several Brahmans.—But we maintain that the unity of the term ‘Brahman’ intimates the unity of the thing ‘Brahman’!—By no means, we reply. If a man who knows nothing about cows, but wishes to know about them, is told ‘a cow is that which has either entire horns, or mutilated horns, or no horns,’ the mutually exclusive ideas of the possession of entire horns, and so on, raise in his mind the ideas of several individual cows, although the term ‘cow’ is one only; and in the same way we are led to the idea of several distinct Brahmans. For this reason, even the different attributes combined are incapable of defining the thing, the definition of which is desired.—Nor again are the characteristics enumerated in the Taitt. passage (viz. creation of the world, &c.) capable of defining Brahman in the way of secondary marks (*upalakshana*), because the thing to be defined by them is not previously known in a different aspect. So-called secondary marks are the cause of something already known from a certain point of view, being

known in a different aspect—as when it is said ‘Where that crane is standing, that is the irrigated field of Deva-datta.’—But may we not say that from the text ‘The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman,’ we already have an idea of Brahman, and that hence its being the cause of the origin, &c., of the world may be taken as collateral indications (pointing to something already known in a certain way)?—Not so, we reply; either of these two defining texts has a meaning only with reference to an aspect of Brahman already known from the other one, and this mutual dependence deprives both of their force.—Brahman cannot therefore be known through the characteristic marks mentioned in the text under discussion.

To this *primâ facie* view we make the following reply. Brahman can be known on the basis of the origination, subsistence, and reabsorption of the world—these characteristics occupying the position of collateral marks. No objection can be raised against this view, on the ground that, apart from what these collateral marks point to, no other aspect of Brahman is known; for as a matter of fact they point to that which is known to us as possessing supreme greatness (*brīhattva*) and power of growth (*brimhana*)—this being the meaning of the root *brimh* (from which ‘Brahman’ is derived). Of this Brahman, thus already known (on the basis of etymology), the origination, sustentation, and reabsorption of the world are collateral marks. Moreover, in the Taitt. text under discussion, the relative pronoun—which appears in three forms, (that) ‘from whence,’ (that) ‘by which,’ (that) ‘into which’—refers to something which is already known as the cause of the origin, and so on, of the world. This previous knowledge rests on the *Kh.* passage, ‘Being only this was in the beginning,’ &c., up to ‘it sent forth fire’—which declares that the one principle denoted as ‘being’ is the universal material, and instrumental cause. There the clause ‘Being only this was in the beginning, one only,’ establishes that one being as the general material cause; the word ‘without a second’ negatives the existence of a second operative cause; and the clauses ‘it thought, may I be many, may

I grow forth,' and 'it sent forth fire,' establish that one being (as the cause and substance of everything). If, then, it is said that Brahman is that which is the root of the world's origination, subsistence, and reabsorption, those three processes sufficiently indicate Brahman as that entity which is their material and operative cause; and as being the material and the operative cause implies greatness (*br̥hattva*) manifesting itself in various powers, such as omniscience, and so on, Brahman thus is something already known; and as hence origination, &c., of the world are marks of something already known, the objection founded above on the absence of knowledge of another aspect of Brahman is seen to be invalid.—Nor is there really any objection to the origination, &c., of the world being taken as characteristic marks of Brahman in so far as they are distinctive attributes. For taken as attributes they indicate Brahman as something different from what is opposed to those attributes. Several attributes which do not contradict each other may serve quite well as characteristic marks defining one thing, the nature of which is not otherwise known, without the plurality of the attributes in any way involving plurality of the thing defined; for as those attributes are at once understood to belong to one substrate, we naturally combine them within that one substrate. Such attributes, of course, as the possession of mutilated horns (mentioned above), which are contradictorily opposed to each other, necessarily lead to the assumption of several individual cows to which they severally belong; but the origination, &c., of the world are processes separated from each other by difference of time only, and may therefore, without contradiction, be connected with one Brahman in succession.—The text 'from whence these beings,' &c., teaches us that Brahman is the cause of the origination, &c., of the world, and of this Brahman thus known the other text 'The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman,' tells us that its essential nature marks it off from everything else. The term 'True' expresses Brahman in so far as possessing absolutely non-conditioned existence, and thus distinguishes it from non-intelligent matter, the abode

of change, and the souls implicated in matter ; for as both of these enter into different states of existence called by different names, they do not enjoy unconditioned being. The term 'knowledge' expresses the characteristic of permanently non-contracted intelligence, and thus distinguishes Brahman from the released souls whose intelligence is sometimes in a contracted state. And the term 'Infinite' denotes that, whose nature is free from all limitation of place, time, and particular substantial nature ; and as Brahman's essential nature possesses attributes, infinity belongs both to the essential nature and to the attributes. The qualification of Infinity excludes all those individual souls whose essential nature and attributes are not unsurpassable, and who are distinct from the two classes of beings already excluded by the two former terms (viz. 'true being' and 'knowledge').—The entire text therefore defines Brahman—which is already known to be the cause of the origination, &c., of the world—as that which is in kind different from all other things ; and it is therefore not true that the two texts under discussion have no force because mutually depending on each other. And from this it follows that a knowledge of Brahman may be gained on the ground of its characteristic marks—such as its being the cause of the origination, &c., of the world, free from all evil, omniscient, all-powerful, and so on.

To those, on the other hand, who maintain that the object of enquiry is a substance devoid of all difference, neither the first nor the second Sūtra can be acceptable ; for the Brahman, the enquiry into which the first Sūtra proposes, is, according to authoritative etymology, something of supreme greatness ; and according to the second Sūtra it is the cause of the origin, subsistence, and final destruction of the world. The same remark holds good with regard to all following Sūtras, and the scriptural texts on which they are based—none of them confirm the theory of a substance devoid of all difference. Nor, again, does Reasoning prove such a theory ; for Reasoning has for its object things possessing a 'proving' attribute which constantly goes together with an attribute 'to be proved.'

And even if, in agreement with your view, we explained the second Sūtra as meaning 'Brahman is that whence proceeds the error of the origination, &c., of the world,' we should not thereby advance your theory of a substance devoid of all difference. For, as you teach, the root of all error is Nescience, and Brahman is that which witnesses (is conscious of) Nescience, and the essence of witnessing consciousness consists in being pure light (intelligence), and the essence of pure light or intelligence is that, distinguishing itself from the Non-intelligent, it renders itself, as well as what is different from it, capable of becoming the object of empiric thought and speech (vyavahāra). All this implies the presence of difference—if there were no difference, light or intelligence could not be what it is, it would be something altogether void, without any meaning.—Here terminates the *adhikāraṇa* of 'origination and so on.'

An objection to the purport of the preceding Sūtras here presents itself.—The assertion that Brahman, as the cause of the origination, &c., of the world, must be known through the Vedānta-texts is unfounded; for as Brahman may be inferred as the cause of the world through ordinary reasoning, it is not something requiring to be taught by authoritative texts.—To this objection the next Sūtra replies.

3. Because Scripture is the source (of the knowledge of Brahman).

Because Brahman, being raised above all contact with the senses, is not an object of perception and the other means of proof, but to be known through Scripture only; therefore the text 'Whence these creatures are born,' &c., has to be accepted as instructing us regarding the true nature of Brahman.—But, our opponent points out, Scripture cannot be the source of our knowledge of Brahman, because Brahman is to be known through other means. For it is an acknowledged principle that Scripture has a meaning only with regard to what is not established by other sources of knowledge.—But what, to raise a *prima facie* counter objection, are those other sources of know-

ledge? It cannot, in the first place, be Perception. Perception is twofold, being based either on the sense-organs or on extraordinary concentration of mind (yoga). Of Perception of the former kind there are again two sub-species, according as Perception takes place either through the outer sense-organs or the internal organ (manas). Now the outer sense-organs produce knowledge of their respective objects, in so far as the latter are in actual contact with the organs, but are quite unable to give rise to the knowledge of the special object constituted by a supreme Self that is capable of being conscious of and creating the whole aggregate of things. Nor can internal perception give rise to such knowledge; for only purely internal things, such as pleasure and pain, fall within its cognisance, and it is incapable of relating itself to external objects apart from the outer sense-organs. Nor, again, perception based on Yoga; for although such perception—which springs from intense imagination—implies a vivid presentation of things, it is, after all, nothing more than a reproduction of objects perceived previously, and does not therefore rank as an instrument of knowledge; for it has no means of applying itself to objects other than those perceived previously. And if, after all, it does so, it is (not a means of knowledge but) a source of error.—Nor also inference either of the kind which proceeds on the observation of special cases or of the kind which rests on generalizations (cp. Nyāya Sū. I, 1, 5). Not inference of the former kind, because such inference is not known to relate to anything lying beyond the reach of the senses. Nor inference of the latter kind, because we do not observe any characteristic feature that is invariably accompanied by the presence of a supreme Self capable of being conscious of, and constructing, the universe of things.—But there *is* such a feature, viz. the world's being an effected thing; it being a matter of common experience that whatever is an effect or product, is due to an agent who possesses a knowledge of the material cause, the instrumental cause, the final end, and the person meant to make use of the thing produced. It further is matter of ex-

perience that whatever consists of non-sentient matter is dependent on, or ruled by, a single intelligent principle. The former generalization is exemplified by the case of jars and similar things, and the latter by a living body in good health, which consists of non-intelligent matter dependent on an intelligent principle. And that the body is an effected thing follows from its consisting of parts.—Against this argumentation also objections may be raised. What, it must be asked, do you understand by this dependence on an intelligent principle? Not, we suppose, that the origination and subsistence of the non-intelligent thing should be dependent on the intelligent principle; for in that case your example would not help to prove your contention. Neither the origin nor the subsistence of a person's healthy body depends on the intelligent soul of that person alone; they rather are brought about by the merit and demerit of all those souls which in any way share the fruition of that body—the wife, e. g. of that person, and others. Moreover, the existence of a body made up of parts means that body's being connected with its parts in the way of so-called intimate relation (*samavāya*), and this requires a certain combination of the parts but not a presiding intelligent principle. The existence of animated bodies, moreover, has for its characteristic mark the process of breathing, which is absent in the case of the earth, sea, mountains, &c.—all of which are included in the class of things concerning which you wish to prove something—, and we therefore miss a uniform kind of existence common to all those things.—Let us then understand by the dependence of a non-intelligent thing on an intelligent principle, the fact of the motion of the former depending on the latter!—This definition, we rejoin, would comprehend also those cases in which heavy things, such as carriages, masses of stone, trees, &c., are set in motion by several intelligent beings (while what you want to prove is the dependence of a moving thing on one intelligent principle). If, on the other hand, you mean to say that all motion depends on intelligence in general, you only prove what requires no proof.—Another alternative, more-

over, here presents itself. As we both admit the existence of individual souls, it will be the more economical hypothesis to ascribe to them the agency implied in the construction of the world. Nor must you object to this view on the ground that such agency cannot belong to the individual souls because they do not possess the knowledge of material causes, &c., as specified above; for all intelligent beings are capable of direct knowledge of material causes, such as earth and so on, and instrumental causes, such as sacrifices and the like. Earth and other material substances, as well as sacrifices and the like, are directly perceived by individual intelligent beings at the present time (and were no doubt equally perceived so at a former time when this world had to be planned and constructed). Nor does the fact that intelligent beings are not capable of direct insight into the unseen principle—called ‘apūrva,’ or by similar names—which resides in the form of a power in sacrifices and other instrumental causes, in any way preclude their being agents in the construction of the world. Direct insight into powers is nowhere required for undertaking work: what *is* required for that purpose is only direct presentative knowledge of the things endowed with power, while of power itself it suffices to have some kind of knowledge. Potters apply themselves to the task of making pots and jars on the strength of the direct knowledge they possess of the implements of their work—the wheel, the staff, &c.—without troubling about a similar knowledge of the powers inherent in those implements; and in the same way intelligent beings may apply themselves to their work (to be effected by means of sacrifices, &c.), if only they are assured by sacred tradition of the existence of the various powers possessed by sacrifices and the like.—Moreover, experience teaches that agents having a knowledge of the material and other causes must be inferred only in the case of those effects which can be produced, and the material and other causes of which can be known: such things, on the other hand, as the earth, mountains, and oceans, can neither be produced, nor can their material and other causes ever be known; we there-

fore have no right to infer for them, intelligent producers. Hence the quality of being an effected thing can be used as an argument for proving the existence of an intelligent causal agent, only where that quality is found in things, the production of which, and the knowledge of the causes of which, is possible at all.—Experience further teaches that earthen pots and similar things are produced by intelligent agents possessing material bodies, using implements, not endowed with the power of a Supreme Lord, limited in knowledge and so on ; the quality of being an effect therefore supplies a reason for inferring an intelligent agent of the kind described only, and thus is opposed to the inference of attributes of a contrary nature, viz. omniscience, omnipotence, and those other attributes that belong to the highest Soul, whose existence you wish to establish.—Nor does this (as might be objected) imply an abandonment of all inference. Where the thing to be inferred is known through other means of proof also, any qualities of an opposite nature which may be suggested by the inferential mark (*līṅga*) are opposed by those other means of proof, and therefore must be dropped. In the case under discussion, however, the thing to be inferred is something not guaranteed by any other means of proof, viz. a person capable of constructing the entire universe : here there is nothing to interfere with the ascription to such a person of all those qualities which, on the basis of methodical inference, necessarily belong to it.—The conclusion from all this is that, apart from Scripture, the existence of a Lord does not admit of proof.

Against all this the Pūrvapakshin now restates his case as follows :—It cannot be gainsaid that the world is something effected, for it is made up of parts. We may state this argument in various technical forms. ‘The earth, mountains, &c., are things effected, because they consist of parts ; in the same way as jars and similar things.’ ‘The earth, seas, mountains, &c., are effects, because, while being big (i. e. non-atomic), they are capable of motion ; just as jars and the like.’ ‘Bodies, the world, &c., are effects, because, while being big, they are solid (*mūrtta*) ; just as jars and the like.’—But, an objection is raised, in the case

of things made up of parts we do not, in addition to this attribute of consisting of parts, observe any other aspect determining that the thing is an effect—so as to enable us to say ‘this thing is effected, and that thing is not’; and, on the other hand, we do observe it as an indispensable condition of something being an effect, that there should be the possibility of such an effect being brought about, and of the existence of such knowledge of material causes, &c. (as the bringing about of the effect presupposes).—Not so, we reply. In the case of a cause being inferred on the ground of an effect, the knowledge and power of the cause must be inferred in accordance with the nature of the effect. From the circumstance of a thing consisting of parts we know it to be an effect, and on this basis we judge of the power and knowledge of the cause. A person recognises pots, jars and the like, as things produced, and therefrom infers the constructive skill and knowledge of their maker; when, after this, he sees for the first time a kingly palace with all its various wonderful parts and structures, he concludes from the special way in which the parts are joined that this also is an effected thing, and then makes an inference as to the architect’s manifold knowledge and skill. Analogously, when a living body and the world have once been recognised to be effects, we infer—as their maker—some special intelligent being, possessing direct insight into their nature and skill to construct them.—Pleasure and pain, moreover, by which men are requited for their merit and demerit, are themselves of a non-intelligent nature, and hence cannot bring about their results unless they are controlled by an intelligent principle, and this also compels us to assume a being capable of allotting to each individual soul a fate corresponding to its deserts. For we do not observe that non-intelligent implements, such as axes and the like, however much they may be favoured by circumstances of time, place, and so on, are capable of producing posts and pillars unless they be handled by a carpenter. And to quote against the generalization on which we rely the instance of the seed and sprout and the like can only spring from an ignorance and stupidity which

may be called truly demoniac. The same remark would apply to pleasure and pain if used as a counter instance. (For in all these cases the action which produces an effect must necessarily be guided by an intelligent principle.)—Nor may we assume, as a 'less complicated hypothesis,' that the guiding principle in the construction of the world is the individual souls, whose existence is acknowledged by both parties. For on the testimony of observation we must deny to those souls the power of seeing what is extremely subtle or remote in time or place (while such power must necessarily be ascribed to a world-constructing intelligence). On the other hand, we have no ground for concluding that the Lord is, like the individual souls, destitute of such power ; hence it cannot be said that other means of knowledge make it impossible to infer such a Lord. The fact rather is that as his existence is proved by the argument that any definite effect presupposes a causal agent competent to produce that effect, he is proved at the same time as possessing the essential power of intuitively knowing and ruling all things in the universe.—The contention that from the world being an effect it follows that its maker does not possess lordly power and so on, so that the proving reason would prove something contrary to the special attributes (belonging to a supreme agent, viz. omnipotence, omniscience, &c.), is founded on evident ignorance of the nature of the inferential process. For the inference clearly does not prove that there exist in the thing inferred all the attributes belonging to the proving collateral instances, including even those attributes which stand in no causal relation to the effect. A certain effect which is produced by some agent presupposes just so much power and knowledge on the part of that agent as is requisite for the production of the effect, but in no way presupposes any incapability or ignorance on the part of that agent with regard to things other than the particular effect ; for such incapability and ignorance do not stand towards that effect in any causal relation. If the origination of the effect can be accounted for on the basis of the agent's capability of bringing it about, and of his knowledge

of the special material and instrumental causes, it would be unreasonable to ascribe causal agency to his (altogether irrelevant) incapacities and ignorance with regard to other things, only because those incapacities, &c., are observed to exist together with his special capability and knowledge. The question would arise moreover whether such want of capability and knowledge (with regard to things other than the one actually effected) would be helpful towards the bringing about of that one effect, in so far as extending to all other things or to some other things. The former alternative is excluded because no agent, a potter e. g., is quite ignorant of all other things but his own special work; and the second alternative is inadmissible because there is no definite rule indicating that there should be certain definite kinds of want of knowledge and skill in the case of all agents¹, and hence exceptions would arise with regard to every special case of want of knowledge and skill. From this it follows that the absence of lordly power and similar qualities which (indeed is observed in the case of ordinary agents but) in no way contributes towards the production of the effects (to which such agents give rise) is not proved in the case of that which we wish to prove (i. e. a Lord, creator of the world); and that hence Inference does not establish qualities contrary (to the qualities characteristic of a Lord).

A further objection will perhaps be raised, viz. that as experience teaches that potters and so on direct their implements through the mediation of their own bodies, we are not justified in holding that a bodiless Supreme Lord directs the material and instrumental causes of the universe. —But in reply to this we appeal to the fact of experience, that evil demons possessing men's bodies, and also venom, are driven or drawn out of those bodies by mere will power. Nor must you ask in what way the volition of a bodiless

¹ A certain potter may not possess the skill and knowledge required to make chairs and beds; but some other potter may possess both, and so on. We cannot therefore point to any definite want of skill and knowledge as invariably accompanying the capability of producing effects of some other kind.

Lord can put other bodies in motion; for volition is not dependent on a body. The cause of volitions is not the body but the internal organ (*manas*), and such an organ we ascribe to the Lord also, since what proves the presence of an internal organ endowed with power and knowledge is just the presence of effects.—But volitions, even if directly springing from the internal organ, can belong to embodied beings only, such only possessing internal organs!—This objection also is founded on a mistaken generalization: the fact rather is that the internal organ is permanent, and exists also in separation from the body. The conclusion, therefore, is that—as the individual souls with their limited capacities and knowledge, and their dependence on merit and demerit, are incapable of giving rise to things so variously and wonderfully made as worlds and animated bodies are—inference directly leads us to the theory that there is a supreme intelligent agent, called the Lord, who possesses unfathomable, unlimited powers and wisdom, is capable of constructing the entire world, is without a body, and through his mere volition brings about the infinite expanse of this entire universe so variously and wonderfully planned. As Brahman may thus be ascertained by means of knowledge other than revelation, the text quoted under the preceding Sūtra cannot be taken to convey instruction as to Brahman. Since, moreover, experience demonstrates that material and instrumental causes always are things absolutely distinct from each other, as e.g. the clay and the potter with his implements; and since, further, there are substances not made up of parts, as e.g. ether, which therefore cannot be viewed as effects; we must object on these grounds also to any attempt to represent the one Brahman as the universal material and instrumental cause of the entire world.

Against all this we now argue as follows:—The Vedānta-text declaring the origination, &c., of the world does teach that there is a Brahman possessing the characteristics mentioned; since Scripture alone is a means for the knowledge of Brahman. That the world is an effected thing because it consists of parts; and that, as all effects are observed to

have for their antecedents certain appropriate agents competent to produce them, we must infer a causal agent competent to plan and construct the universe, and standing towards it in the relation of material and operative cause—this would be a conclusion altogether unjustified. There is no proof to show that the earth, oceans, &c., although things produced, were created at one time by one creator. Nor can it be pleaded in favour of such a conclusion that all those things have one uniform character of being effects, and thus are analogous to one single jar; for we observe that various effects are distinguished by difference of time of production, and difference of producers. Nor again may you maintain the oneness of the creator on the ground that individual souls are incapable of the creation of this wonderful universe, and that if an additional principle be assumed to account for the world—which manifestly is a product—it would be illegitimate to assume more than one such principle. For we observe that individual beings acquire more and more extraordinary powers in consequence of an increase of religious merit; and as we may assume that through an eventual supreme degree of merit they may in the end qualify themselves for producing quite extraordinary effects, we have no right to assume a highest soul of infinite merit, different from all individual souls. Nor also can it be proved that all things are destroyed and produced all at once; for no such thing is observed to take place, while it is, on the other hand, observed that things are produced and destroyed in succession; and if we infer that all things are produced and destroyed because they are effects, there is no reason why this production and destruction should not take place in a way agreeing with ordinary experience. If, therefore, what it is desired to prove is the agency of one intelligent being, we are met by the difficulty that the proving reason (viz. the circumstance of something being an effect) is not invariably connected with what it is desired to prove; there, further, is the fault of qualities not met with in experience being attributed to the subject about which something has to be proved; and lastly there is the fault

of the proving collateral instances being destitute of what has to be proved—for experience does not exhibit to us one agent capable of producing everything. If, on the other hand, what you wish to prove is merely the existence of an intelligent creative agent, you prove only what is proved already (not contested by any one).—Moreover, if you use the attribute of being an effect (which belongs to the totality of things) as a means to prove the existence of one omniscient and omnipotent creator, do you view this attribute as belonging to all things in so far as produced together, or in so far as produced in succession? In the former case the attribute of being an effect is not established (for experience does not show that all things are produced together); and in the latter case the attribute would really prove what is contrary to the hypothesis of one creator (for experience shows that things produced in succession have different causes). In attempting to prove the agency of one intelligent creative being only, we thus enter into conflict with Perception and Inference, and we moreover contradict Scripture, which says that ‘the potter is born’ and ‘the cartwright is born’ (and thus declares a plurality of intelligent agents). Moreover, as we observe that all effected things, such as living bodies and so on, are connected with pleasure and the like, which are the effects of *sattva* (goodness) and the other primary constituents of matter, we must conclude that effected things have *sattva* and so on for their causes. *Sattva* and so on—which constitute the distinctive elements of the causal substance—are the causes of the various nature of the effects. Now those effects can be connected with their causes only in so far as the internal organ of a person possessing *sattva* and so on undergoes modifications. And that a person possesses those qualities is due to *karman*. Thus, in order to account for the origination of different effects we must necessarily assume the connexion of an intelligent agent with *karman*, whereby alone he can become the cause of effects; and moreover the various character of knowledge and power (which the various effects presuppose) has its reason in *karman*. And if it be said that

it is (not the various knowledge, &c., but) the mere wish of the agent that causes the origination of effects, we point out that the wish, as being specialised by its particular object, must be based on *sattva* and so on, and hence is necessarily connected with *karman*. From all this it follows that individual souls only can be causal agents: no legitimate inference leads to a Lord different from them in nature.—This admits of various expressions in technical form. ‘Bodies, worlds, &c., are effects due to the causal energy of individual souls, just as pots are’; ‘the Lord is not a causal agent, because he has no aims; just as the released souls have none’; ‘the Lord is not an agent, because he has no body; just as the released souls have none.’ (This last argumentation cannot be objected to on the ground that individual souls take possession of bodies; for in their case there exists a beginningless subtle body by means of which they enter into gross bodies).—‘Time is never devoid of created worlds; because it is time, just like the present time (which has its created world).’

Consider the following point also. Does the Lord produce his effects, with his body or apart from his body? Not the latter; for we do not observe causal agency on the part of any bodiless being: even the activities of the internal organ are found only in beings having a body, and although the internal organ be eternal we do not know of its producing any effects in the case of released disembodied souls. Nor again is the former alternative admissible; for in that case the Lord’s body would either be permanent or non-permanent. The former alternative would imply that something made up of parts is eternal; and if we once admit this we may as well admit that the world itself is eternal, and then there is no reason to infer a Lord. And the latter alternative is inadmissible because in that case there would be no cause of the body, different from it (which would account for the origination of the body). Nor could the Lord himself be assumed as the cause of the body, since a bodiless being cannot be the cause of a body. Nor could it be maintained that the Lord can be assumed to be ‘embodied’ by means of some other body; for this

leads us into a *regressus in infinitum*.—Should we, moreover, represent to ourselves the Lord (when productive) as engaged in effort or not?—The former is inadmissible, because he is without a body. And the latter alternative is excluded because a being not making an effort does not produce effects. And if it be said that the effect, i. e. the world, has for its causal agent one whose activity consists in mere desire, this would be to ascribe to the subject of the conclusion (i. e. the world) qualities not known from experience ; and moreover the attribute to be proved would be absent in the case of the proving instances (such as jars, &c., which are not the work of agents engaged in mere wishing). Thus the inference of a creative Lord which claims to be in agreement with observation is refuted by reasoning which itself is in agreement with observation, and we hence conclude that Scripture is the only source of knowledge with regard to a supreme soul that is the Lord of all and constitutes the highest Brahman. What Scripture tells us of is a being which comprehends within itself infinite, altogether unsurpassable excellences such as omnipotence and so on, is antagonistic to all evil, and totally different in character from whatever is cognised by the other means of knowledge: that to such a being there should attach even the slightest imperfection due to its similarity in nature to the things known by the ordinary means of knowledge, is thus altogether excluded.—The Pûrvapakshin had remarked that the oneness of the instrumental and the material cause is neither matter of observation nor capable of proof, and that the same holds good with regard to the theory that certain non-composite substances such as ether are created things; that these points also are in no way contrary to reason, we shall show later on under Sû. I, 4, 23, and Sû. II, 3, 1.

The conclusion meanwhile is that, since Brahman does not fall within the sphere of the other means of knowledge, and is the topic of Scripture only, the text 'from whence these creatures,' &c., *does* give authoritative information as to a Brahman possessing the characteristic qualities so often enumerated. Here terminates the *adhikarana* of 'Scripture being the source.'

A new objection here presents itself.—Brahman does not indeed fall within the province of the other means of knowledge; but all the same Scripture does not give authoritative information regarding it: for Brahman is not something that has for its purport activity or cessation from activity, but is something fully established and accomplished within itself.—To this objection the following Sūtra replies.

4. But that (i. e. the authoritativeness of Scripture with regard to Brahman) exists on account of the connexion (of Scripture with the highest aim of man).

The word 'but' is meant to rebut the objection raised. *That*, i. e. the authoritativeness of Scripture with regard to Brahman, is possible, on account of samanvaya, i. e. connexion with the highest aim of man—that is to say because the scriptural texts are connected with, i. e. have for their subject, Brahman, which constitutes the highest aim of man. For such is the connected meaning of the whole aggregate of words which constitutes the Upanishads—'That from whence these beings are born' (Taitt. Up. III, 1, 1). 'Being only this was in the beginning, one, without a second' (*Kh.* Up. VI, 2), &c. &c. And of aggregates of words which are capable of giving information about accomplished things known through the ordinary means of ascertaining the meaning of words, and which connectedly refer to a Brahman which is the cause of the origination, subsistence, and destruction of the entire world, is antagonistic to all imperfection and so on, we have no right to say that, owing to the absence of a purport in the form of activity or cessation of activity, they really refer to something other than Brahman.

For all instruments of knowledge have their end in determining the knowledge of their own special objects: their action does not adapt itself to a final purpose, but the latter rather adapts itself to the means of knowledge. Nor is it true that where there is no connexion with activity or cessation of activity all aim is absent; for in such cases we observe connexion with what constitutes the general aim, i. e.

the benefit of man. Statements of accomplished matter of fact—such as ‘a son is born to thee.’ ‘This is no snake’—evidently have an aim, viz. in so far as they either give rise to joy or remove pain and fear.

Against this view the Pûrvapakshin now argues as follows. The Vedānta-texts do not impart knowledge of Brahman; for unless related to activity or the cessation of activity, Scripture would be unmeaning, devoid of all purpose. Perception and the other means of knowledge indeed have their aim and end in supplying knowledge of the nature of accomplished things and facts; Scripture, on the other hand, must be supposed to aim at some practical purpose. For neither in ordinary speech nor in the Veda do we ever observe the employment of sentences devoid of a practical purpose: the employment of sentences not having such a purpose is in fact impossible. And what constitutes such purpose is the attainment of a desired, or the avoidance of a non-desired object, to be effected by some action or abstention from action. ‘Let a man desirous of wealth attach himself to the court of a prince’; ‘a man with a weak digestion must not drink much water’; ‘let him who is desirous of the heavenly world offer sacrifices’; and so on. With regard to the assertion that such sentences also as refer to accomplished things—‘a son is born to thee’ and so on—are connected with certain aims of man, viz. joy or the cessation of fear, we ask whether in such cases the attainment of man’s purpose results from the thing or fact itself, as e.g. the birth of a son, or from the knowledge of that thing or fact.—You will reply that as a thing although actually existing is of no use to man as long as it is not known to him, man’s purpose is accomplished by his knowledge of the thing.—It then appears, we rejoin, that man’s purpose is effected through mere knowledge, even if there is no actual thing; and from this it follows that Scripture, although connected with certain aims, is not a means of knowledge for the actual existence of things. In all cases, therefore, sentences have a practical purpose; they determine either some form of activity or cessation from activity, or else some form of knowledge. No sentence,

therefore, can have for its purport an accomplished thing, and hence the Vedānta-texts do not convey the knowledge of Brahman as such an accomplished entity.

At this point somebody propounds the following view. The Vedānta-texts *are* an authoritative means for the cognition of Brahman, because as a matter of fact they also aim at something to be done. What they really mean to teach is that Brahman, which in itself is pure homogeneous knowledge, without a second, not connected with a world, but is, owing to beginningless Nescience, viewed as connected with a world, should be freed from this connexion. And it is through this process of dissolution of the world that Brahman becomes the object of an injunction.—But which texts embody this injunction, according to which Brahman in its pure form is to be realised through the dissolution of this apparent world with its distinction of knowing subjects and objects of knowledge?—Texts such as the following : ‘One should not see (i. e. represent to oneself) the seer of seeing, one should not think the thinker of thinking’ (*Bṛi. Up. III, 4, 2*) ; for this means that we should realise Brahman in the form of pure Seeing (knowledge), free from the distinction of seeing agents and objects of sight. Brahman is indeed accomplished through itself, but all the same it may constitute an object to be accomplished, viz. in so far as it is being disengaged from the apparent world.

This view (the Mīmāṃsaka rejoins) is unfounded. He who maintains that injunction constitutes the meaning of sentences must be able to assign the injunction itself, the qualification of the person to whom the injunction is addressed, the object of the injunction, the means to carry it out, the special mode of the procedure, and the person carrying out the injunction. Among these things the qualification of the person to whom the injunction addresses itself is something not to be enjoined (but existing previously to the injunction), and is of the nature either of cause (*nimitta*) or a result aimed at (*phala*). We then have to decide what, in the case under discussion (i. e. the alleged injunction set forth by the antagonist), constitutes the qualification of the person to whom the injunction addresses

itself, and whether it be of the nature of a cause or of a result.—Let it then be said that what constitutes the qualification in our case is the intuition of the true nature of Brahman (on the part of the person to whom the injunction is addressed).—This, we rejoin, cannot be a cause, as it is not something previously established; while in other cases the nimitta is something so established, as e.g. 'life' is in the case of a person to whom the following injunction is addressed, 'As long as his life lasts he is to make the Agnihotra-oblation.' And if, after all, it were admitted to be a cause, it would follow that, as the intuition of the true nature of Brahman is something permanent, the object of the injunction would have to be accomplished even subsequently to final release, in the same way as the Agnihotra has to be performed permanently as long as life lasts.—Nor again can the intuition of Brahman's true nature be a result; for then, being the result of an action enjoined, it would be something non-permanent, like the heavenly world.—What, in the next place, would be the 'object to be accomplished' of the injunction? You may not reply 'Brahman'; for as Brahman is something permanent it is not something that can be realised, and moreover it is not denoted by a verbal form (such as denote actions that can be accomplished, as e.g. yāga, sacrifice).—Let it then be said that what is to be realised is Brahman, in so far as free from the world!—But, we rejoin, even if this be accepted as a thing to be realised, it is not the object (vishaya) of the injunction—that it cannot be for the second reason just stated—but its final result (phala). What moreover is, on this last assumption, the thing to be realised—Brahman, or the cessation of the apparent world?—Not Brahman; for Brahman is something accomplished, and from your assumption it would follow that it is not eternal.—Well then, the dissolution of the world!—Not so, we reply; for then it would not be Brahman that is realised.—Let it then be said that the dissolution of the world only is the object of the injunction!—This, too, cannot be, we rejoin; that dissolution is the result (phala) and cannot therefore be the

object of the injunction. For the dissolution of the world means final release; and that is the result aimed at. Moreover, if the dissolution of the world is taken as the object of the injunction, that dissolution would follow from the injunction, and the injunction would be carried out by the dissolution of the world; and this would be a case of vicious mutual dependence.—We further ask—is the world, which is to be put an end to, false or real?—If it is false, it is put an end to by knowledge alone, and then the injunction is needless. Should you reply to this that the injunction puts an end to the world in so far as it gives rise to knowledge, we reply that knowledge springs of itself from the texts which declare the highest truth: hence there is no need of additional injunctions. As knowledge of the meaning of those texts sublates the entire false world distinct from Brahman, the injunction itself with all its adjuncts is seen to be something baseless.—If, on the other hand, the world is true, we ask—is the injunction, which puts an end to the world, Brahman itself or something different from Brahman? If the former, the world cannot exist at all: for what terminates it, viz. Brahman, is something eternal; and the injunction thus being eternal itself cannot be accomplished by means of certain actions.—Let then the latter alternative be accepted!—But in that case, the *niyoga* being something which is accomplished by a set of performances the function of which it is to put an end to the entire world, the performing person himself perishes (with the rest of the world), and the *niyoga* thus remains without a substrate. And if everything apart from Brahman is put an end to by a performance the function of which it is to put an end to the world, there remains no result to be effected by the *niyoga*, consequently there is no release.

Further, the dissolution of the world cannot constitute the instrument (*karana*) in the action enjoined, because no mode of procedure (*itikartavyatā*) can be assigned for the instrument of the *niyoga*, and unless assisted by a mode of procedure an instrument cannot operate.—But why is there no ‘mode of procedure’?—For the following reasons.

A mode of procedure is either of a positive or a negative kind. If positive, it may be of two kinds, viz. either such as to bring about the instrument or to assist it. Now in our case there is no room for either of these alternatives. Not for the former; for there exists in our case nothing analogous to the stroke of the pestle (which has the manifest effect of separating the rice grains from the husks), whereby the visible effect of the dissolution of the whole world could be brought about. Nor, secondly, is there the possibility of anything assisting the instrument, already existing independently, to bring about its effect; for owing to the existence of such an assisting factor the instrument itself, i.e. the cessation of the apparent world, cannot be established. Nor must you say that it is the cognition of the non-duality of Brahman that brings about the means for the dissolution of the world; for, as we have already explained above, this cognition directly brings about final Release, which is the same as the dissolution of the world, and thus there is nothing left to be effected by special means.—And if finally the mode of procedure is something purely negative, it can, owing to this its nature, neither bring about nor in any way assist the instrumental cause. From all this it follows that there is no possibility of injunctions having for their object the realisation of Brahman, in so far as free from the world.

Here another *primâ facie* view of the question is set forth.—It must be admitted that the Vedânta-texts are not means of authoritative knowledge, since they refer to Brahman, which is an accomplished thing (not a thing 'to be accomplished'); nevertheless Brahman itself is established, viz. by means of those passages which enjoin meditation (as something 'to be done'). This is the purport of texts such as the following: 'The Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be reflected on, to be meditated upon' (*Bri. Up. II, 4, 5*); 'The Self which is free from sin must be searched out' (*Kṛ. Up. VIII, 7, 1*); 'Let a man meditate upon him as the Self' (*Bri. Up. I, 4, 7*); 'Let a man meditate upon the Self as his world' (*Bri. Up. I, 4, 15*).—These injunctions have meditation for their object, and

meditation again is defined by its own object only, so that the injunctive word immediately suggests an object of meditation; and as such an object there presents itself, the 'Self' mentioned in the same sentence. Now there arises the question, What are the characteristics of that Self? and in reply to it there come in texts such as 'The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman'; 'Being only this was in the beginning, one without a second.' As these texts give the required special information, they stand in a supplementary relation to the injunctions, and hence are means of right knowledge; and in this way the purport of the Vedānta-texts includes Brahman—as having a definite place in meditation which is the object of injunction. Texts such as 'One only without a second' (*Kh. Up. VI, 2, 1*); 'That is the true, that is the Self' (*Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7*); 'There is here not any plurality' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 19*), teach that there is one Reality only, viz. Brahman, and that everything else is false. And as Perception and the other means of proof, as well as that part of Scripture which refers to action and is based on the view of plurality, convey the notion of plurality, and as there is contradiction between plurality and absolute Unity, we form the conclusion that the idea of plurality arises through beginningless avidyā, while absolute Unity alone is real. And thus it is through the injunction of meditation on Brahman—which has for its result the intuition of Brahman—that man reaches final release, i.e. becomes one with Brahman, which consists of non-dual intelligence free of all the manifold distinctions that spring from Nescience. Nor is this becoming one with Brahman to be accomplished by the mere cognition of the sense of certain Vedānta-texts; for this is not observed—the fact rather being that the view of plurality persists even after the cognition of the sense of those texts—and, moreover, if it were so, the injunction by Scripture of hearing, reflecting, &c., would be purposeless.

To this reasoning the following objection might be raised.—We observe that when a man is told that what he is afraid of is not a snake, but only a rope, his fear comes to an end; and as bondage is as unreal as the snake imagined in the

rope it also admits of being sublated by knowledge, and may therefore, apart from all injunction, be put an end to by the simple comprehension of the sense of certain texts. If final release were to be brought about by injunctions, it would follow that it is not eternal—not any more than the heavenly world and the like; while yet its eternity is admitted by every one. Acts of religious merit, moreover (such as are prescribed by injunctions), can only be the causes of certain results in so far as they give rise to a body capable of experiencing those results, and thus necessarily produce the so-called *samsāra*-state (which is opposed to final release, and) which consists in the connexion of the soul with some sort of body, high or low. Release, therefore, is not something to be brought about by acts of religious merit. In agreement herewith Scripture says, 'For the soul as long as it is in the body, there is no release from pleasure and pain; when it is free from the body, then neither pleasure nor pain touch it' (*Kh. Up.* VIII, 12, 1). This passage declares that in the state of release, when the soul is freed from the body, it is not touched by either pleasure or pain—the effects of acts of religious merit or demerit; and from this it follows that the disembodied state is not to be accomplished by acts of religious merit. Nor may it be said that, as other special results are accomplished by special injunctions, so the disembodied state is to be accomplished by the injunction of meditation; for that state is essentially something *not* to be effected. Thus scriptural texts say, 'The wise man who knows the Self as bodiless among the bodies, as persisting among non-persisting things, as great and all-pervading; he does not grieve' (*Ka. Up.* I, 2, 22); 'That person is without breath, without internal organ, pure, without contact' (*Mu. Up.* II, 1, 2).—Release which is a bodiless state is eternal, and cannot therefore be accomplished through meritorious acts.

In agreement herewith Scripture says, 'That which thou seest apart from merit (dharma) and non-merit, from what is done and not done, from what exists and what has to be accomplished—tell me that' (*Ka. Up.* I, 2, 14).—Consider what follows also. When we speak of something being

accomplished (effected—*sādhya*) we mean one of four things, viz. its being originated (*utpatti*), or obtained (*prāpti*), or modified (*vikṛti*), or in some way or other (often purely ceremonial) made ready or fit (*samskrīti*). Now in neither of these four senses can final Release be said to be accomplished. It cannot be originated, for being Brahman itself it is eternal. It cannot be attained; for Brahman, being the Self, is something eternally attained. It cannot be modified; for that would imply that like sour milk and similar things (which are capable of change) it is non-eternal. Nor finally can it be made 'ready' or 'fit.' A thing is made ready or fit either by the removal of some imperfection or by the addition of some perfection. Now Brahman cannot be freed from any imperfection, for it is eternally faultless; nor can a perfection be added to it, for it is absolutely perfect. Nor can it be improved in the sense in which we speak of improving a mirror, viz. by polishing it; for as it is absolutely changeless it cannot become the object of any action, either of its own or of an outside agent. And, again, actions affecting the body, such as bathing, do not 'purify' the Self (as might possibly be maintained) but only the organ of Egoity (*ahamkārtṛi*) which is the product of *avidyā*, and connected with the body; it is this same *ahamkārtṛi* also that enjoys the fruits springing from any action upon the body. Nor must it be said that the Self *is* the *ahamkārtṛi*; for the Self rather is that which is conscious of the *ahamkārtṛi*. This is the teaching of the mantras: 'One of them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1); 'When he is in union with the body, the senses, and the mind, then wise men call him the Enjoyer' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 4); 'The one God, hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the Self within all beings, watching over all works, dwelling in all beings, the witness, the perceiver, the only one, free from qualities' (Svet. Up. VI, 11); 'He encircled all, bright, bodiless, scatheless, without muscles, pure, untouched by evil' (Īśa Up. 8).—All these texts distinguish from the *ahamkārtṛi* due to Nescience, the true Self, absolutely perfect and pure, free from all change. Release therefore

—which is the Self—cannot be brought about in any way.—But, if this is so, what then is the use of the comprehension of the texts?—It is of use, we reply, in so far as it puts an end to the obstacles in the way of Release. This scriptural texts declare: ‘You indeed are our father, you who carry us from our ignorance to the other shore’ (Pra. Up. VI, 8); ‘I have heard from men like you that he who knows the Self overcomes grief. I am in grief. Do, Sir, help me over this grief of mine’ (Kṛ. Up. VII, 1, 3); ‘To him whose faults had thus been rubbed out Sanatkumāra showed the other bank of Darkness’ (Kṛ. Up. VII, 26, 2). This shows that what is effected by the comprehension of the meaning of texts is merely the cessation of impediments in the way of Release. This cessation itself, although something effected, is of the nature of that kind of non-existence which results from the destruction of something existent, and as such does not pass away.—Texts such as ‘He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman’ (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9); ‘Having known him he passes beyond death’ (Svet. Up. III, 8), declare that Release follows immediately on the cognition of Brahman, and thus negative the intervention of injunctions.—Nor can it be maintained that Brahman is related to action in so far as constituting the object of the action either of knowledge or of meditation; for scriptural texts deny its being an object in either of these senses. Compare ‘Different is this from what is known, and from what is unknown’ (Ke. Up. III); ‘By whom he knows all this, whereby should he know him?’ (Bṛi. Up. IV, 5, 15); ‘That do thou know as Brahman, not that on which they meditate as being this’ (Ke. Up. IV, 4). Nor does this view imply that the sacred texts have no object at all; for it is their object to put an end to the view of difference springing from avidyā. Scripture does not objectivise Brahman in any definite form, but rather teaches that its true nature is to be non-object, and thereby puts an end to the distinction, fictitiously suggested by Nescience, of knowing subjects, acts of knowledge, and objects of knowledge. Compare the text ‘You should not see a seer of seeing, you should not think a thinker of

thought,' &c. (*Bṛi. Up. III, 4, 2*).—Nor, again, must it be said that, if knowledge alone puts an end to bondage, the injunctions of hearing and so on are purposeless; for their function is to cause the origination of the comprehension of the texts, in so far as they divert from all other alternatives the student who is naturally inclined to yield to distractions.—Nor, again, can it be maintained that a cessation of bondage through mere knowledge is never observed to take place; for as bondage is something false (unreal) it cannot possibly persist after the rise of knowledge. For the same reason it is a mistake to maintain that the cessation of bondage takes place only after the death of the body. In order that the fear inspired by the imagined snake should come to an end, it is required only that the rope should be recognised as what it is, not that a snake should be destroyed. If the body were something real, its destruction would be necessary; but being apart from Brahman it is unreal. He whose bondage does not come to an end, in him true knowledge has not arisen; this we infer from the effect of such knowledge not being observed in him. Whether the body persist or not, he who has reached true knowledge is released from that very moment.—The general conclusion of all this is that, as Release is not something to be accomplished by injunctions of meditation, Brahman is not proved to be something standing in a supplementary relation to such injunctions; but is rather proved by (non-injunctory) texts, such as 'Thou art that'; 'The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman'; 'This Self is Brahman.'

This view (the holder of the *dhyāna-vidhi* theory rejoins) is untenable; since the cessation of bondage cannot possibly spring from the mere comprehension of the meaning of texts. Even if bondage were something unreal, and therefore capable of sublation by knowledge, yet being something direct, immediate, it could not be sublated by the indirect comprehension of the sense of texts. When a man directly conscious of a snake before him is told by a competent by-stander that it is not a snake but merely a rope, his fear is not dispelled by a mere cognition contrary to

that of a snake, and due to the information received ; but the information brings about the cessation of his fear in that way that it rouses him to an activity aiming at the direct perception, by means of his senses, of what the thing before him really is. Having at first started back in fear of the imagined snake, he now proceeds to ascertain by means of ocular perception the true nature of the thing, and having accomplished this is freed from fear. It would not be correct to say that in this case words (viz. of the person informing) produce this perceptual knowledge ; for words are not a sense-organ, and among the means of knowledge it is the sense-organs only that give rise to direct knowledge. Nor, again, can it be pleaded that in the special case of Vedic texts sentences may give rise to direct knowledge, owing to the fact that the person concerned has cleansed himself of all imperfection through the performance of actions not aiming at immediate results, and has been withdrawn from all outward objects by hearing, reflection, and meditation ; for in other cases also, where special impediments in the way of knowledge are being removed, we never observe that the special means of knowledge, such as the sense-organs and so on, operate outside their proper limited sphere.—Nor, again, can it be maintained that meditation acts as a means helpful towards the comprehension of texts ; for this leads to vicious reciprocal dependence—when the meaning of the texts has been comprehended it becomes the object of meditation ; and when meditation has taken place there arises comprehension of the meaning of the texts !—Nor can it be said that meditation and the comprehension of the meaning of texts have different objects ; for if this were so the comprehension of the texts could not be a means helpful towards meditation : meditation on one thing does not give rise to eagerness with regard to another thing !—For meditation which consists in uninterrupted remembrance of a thing cognised, the cognition of the sense of texts, moreover, forms an indispensable prerequisite ; for knowledge of Brahman—the object of meditation—cannot originate from any other source.—Nor can it be said that

that knowledge on which meditation is based is produced by one set of texts, while that knowledge which puts an end to the world is produced by such texts as 'thou art that,' and the like. For, we ask, has the former knowledge the same object as the latter, or a different one? On the former alternative we are led to the same vicious reciprocal dependence which we noted above; and on the latter alternative it cannot be shown that meditation gives rise to eagerness with regard to the latter kind of knowledge. Moreover, as meditation presupposes plurality comprising an object of meditation, a meditating subject and so on, it really cannot in any perceptible way be helpful towards the origination of the comprehension of the sense of texts, the object of which is the oneness of a Brahman free from all plurality: he, therefore, who maintains that Nescience comes to an end through the mere comprehension of the meaning of texts really implies that the injunctions of hearing, reflection, and meditation are purposeless.

The conclusion that, since direct knowledge cannot spring from texts, Nescience is not terminated by the comprehension of the meaning of texts, disposes at the same time of the hypothesis of the so-called 'Release in this life' (*gīvanmukti*). For what definition, we ask, can be given of this 'Release in this life'?—'Release of a soul while yet joined to a body'!—You might as well say, we reply, that your mother never had any children! You have yourself proved by scriptural passages that 'bondage' means the being joined to a body, and 'release' being free from a body!—Let us then define *gīvanmukti* as the cessation of embodiedness, in that sense that a person, while the appearance of embodiedness persists, is conscious of the unreality of that appearance.—But, we rejoin, if the consciousness of the unreality of the body puts an end to embodiedness, how can you say that *gīvanmukti* means release of a soul while joined to a body? On this explanation there remains no difference whatsoever between 'Release in this life' and Release after death; for the latter also can only be defined as cessation of the false appearance of embodiedness.—Let us then say that a person is '*gīvanmukta*' when the appear-

ance of embodiedness, although sublated by true knowledge, yet persists in the same way as the appearance of the moon being double persists (even after it has been recognised as false).—This too we cannot allow. As the sublating act of cognition on which Release depends extends to everything with the exception of Brahman, it sublates the general defect due to causal Nescience, inclusive of the particular erroneous appearance of embodiedness: the latter being sublated in this way cannot persist. In the case of the double moon, on the other hand, the defect of vision on which the erroneous appearance depends is *not* the object of the sublative act of cognition, i.e. the cognition of the oneness of the moon, and it therefore remains non-sublated; hence the false appearance of a double moon may persist.—Moreover, the text ‘For him there is delay only as long as he is not freed from the body; then he will be released’ (*Kh. Up. VI, 14, 2*), teaches that he who takes his stand on the knowledge of the Real requires for his Release the putting off of the body only: the text thus negatives *gīvanmukti*. Āpastamba also rejects the view of *gīvanmukti*, ‘Abandoning the Vedas, this world and the next, he (the *Samnyāsin*) is to seek the Self. (Some say that) he obtains salvation when he knows (the Self). This opinion is contradicted by the *sāstras*. (For) if Salvation were obtained when the Self is known, he should not feel any pain even in this world. Hereby that which follows is explained’ (*Dh. Sū. II, 9, 13-17*).—This refutes also the view that Release is obtained through mere knowledge.—The conclusion to be drawn from all this is that Release, which consists in the cessation of all Plurality, cannot take place as long as a man lives. And we therefore adhere to our view that Bondage is to be terminated only by means of the injunctions of meditation, the result of which is direct knowledge of Brahman. Nor must this be objected to on the ground that Release, if brought about by injunctions, must therefore be something non-eternal; for what is effected is not Release itself, but only the cessation of what impedes it. Moreover, the injunction does not directly produce the cessation of

Bondage, but only through the mediation of the direct cognition of Brahman as consisting of pure knowledge, and not connected with a world. It is this knowledge only which the injunction produces.—But how can an injunction cause the origination of knowledge?—How, we ask in return, can, on your view, works not aiming at some immediate result cause the origination of knowledge?—You will perhaps reply ‘by means of purifying the mind’ (*manas*); but this reply may be given by me also.—But (the objector resumes) there is a difference. On my view Scripture produces knowledge in the mind purified by works; while on your view we must assume that in the purified mind the means of knowledge are produced by injunction.—The mind itself, we reply, purified by knowledge, constitutes this means.—How do you know this? our opponent questions.—How, we ask in return, do *you* know that the mind is purified by works, and that, in the mind so purified of a person withdrawn from all other objects by hearing, reflection and meditation, Scripture produces that knowledge which destroys bondage?—Through certain texts such as the following: ‘They seek to know him by sacrifice, by gifts, by penance, by fasting’ (*Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22*); ‘He is to be heard, to be reflected on, to be meditated on’ (*Bri. Up. II, 4, 5*); ‘He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman’ (*Mu. Up. III, 2, 9*).—Well, we reply, in the same way our view—viz. that through the injunction of meditation the mind is cleared, and that a clear mind gives rise to direct knowledge of Brahman—is confirmed by scriptural texts such as ‘He is to be heard, to be reflected on, to be meditated on’ (*Bri. Up. II, 4, 5*); ‘He who knows Brahman reaches the highest’ (*Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1*); ‘He is not apprehended by the eye nor by speech’ (*Mu. Up. III, 1, 8*); ‘But by a pure mind’ (?); ‘He is apprehended by the heart, by wisdom, by the mind’ (*Ka. Up. II, 6, 9*). Nor can it be said that the text ‘not that which they meditate upon as this’ (*Ke. Up. IV*) negatives meditation; it does not forbid meditation on Brahman, but merely declares that Brahman is different from the world. The mantra is to be explained as follows: ‘What men meditate upon as

this world, that is not Brahman ; know Brahman to be that which is not uttered by speech, but through which speech is uttered.' On a different explanation the clause 'know that to be Brahman' would be irrational, and the injunctions of meditation on the Self would be meaningless.—The outcome of all this is that unreal Bondage which appears in the form of a plurality of knowing subjects, objects of knowledge, &c., is put an end to by the injunctions of meditation, the fruit of which is direct intuitive knowledge of Brahman.

Nor can we approve of the doctrine held by some that there is no contradiction between difference and non-difference ; for difference and non-difference cannot co-exist in one thing, any more than coldness and heat, or light and darkness.—Let us first hear in detail what the holder of this so-called *bhedābheda* view has to say. The whole universe of things must be ordered in agreement with our cognitions. Now we are conscious of all things as different and non-different at the same time : they are non-different in their causal and generic aspects, and different in so far as viewed as effects and individuals. There indeed is a contradiction between light and darkness and so on ; for these cannot possibly exist together, and they are actually met with in different abodes. Such contradictoriness is not, on the other hand, observed in the case of cause and effect, and genus and individual ; on the contrary we here distinctly apprehend one thing as having two aspects—'this jar is clay,' 'this cow is short-horned.' The fact is that experience does not show us anything that has one aspect only. Nor can it be said that in these cases there is absence of contradiction because as fire consumes grass so non-difference absorbs difference ; for the same thing which exists as clay, or gold, or cow, or horse, &c., at the same time exists as jar or diadem, or short-horned cow or mare. There is no command of the Lord to the effect that one aspect only should belong to each thing, non-difference to what is non-different, and difference to what is different.—But one aspect only belongs to each thing, because it is thus that things are perceived !—On

the contrary, we reply, things have twofold aspects, just because it is *thus* that they are perceived. No man, however wide he may open his eyes, is able to distinguish in an object—e. g. a jar or a cow—placed before him which part is the clay and which the jar, or which part is the generic character of the cow and which the individual cow. On the contrary, his thought finds its true expression in the following judgments : ‘this jar is clay’ ; ‘this cow is short-horned.’ Nor can it be maintained that he makes a distinction between the cause and genus as objects of the idea of persistence, and the effect and individual as objects of the idea of discontinuance (difference) ; for as a matter of fact there is no perception of these two elements in separation. A man may look ever so close at a thing placed before him, he will not be able to perceive a difference of aspect and to point out ‘this is the persisting, general, element in the thing, and that the non-persistent, individual, element.’ Just as an effect and an individual give rise to the idea of one thing, so the effect *plus* cause, and the individual *plus* generic character, also give rise to the idea of one thing only. This very circumstance makes it possible for us to recognise each individual thing, placed as it is among a multitude of things differing in place, time, and character.—Each thing thus being cognised as endowed with a twofold aspect, the theory of cause and effect, and generic character and individual, being absolutely different, is clearly refuted by perception.

But, an objection is raised, if on account of grammatical co-ordination and the resulting idea of oneness, the judgment ‘this pot is clay’ is taken to express the relation of difference *plus* non-difference, we shall have analogously to infer from judgments such as ‘I am a man,’ ‘I am a divine being’ that the Self and the body also stand in the *bhedābheda*-relation ; the theory of the co-existence of difference and non-difference will thus act like a fire which a man has lit on his hearth, and which in the end consumes the entire house !—This, we reply, is the baseless idea of a person who has not duly considered the true nature of co-ordination as establishing the *bhedābheda*-relation. The

correct principle is that all reality is determined by states of consciousness not sublated by valid means of proof. The imagination, however, of the identity of the Self and the body *is* sublated by all the means of proof which apply to the Self: it is in fact no more valid than the imagination of the snake in the rope, and does not therefore prove the non-difference of the two. The co-ordination, on the other hand, which is expressed in the judgment 'the cow is short-horned' is never observed to be refuted in any way, and hence establishes the *bhedâbheda*-relation.

For the same reasons the individual soul (*gīva*) is not absolutely different from Brahman, but stands to it in the *bhedâbheda*-relation in so far as it is a part (*amsa*) of Brahman. Its non-difference from Brahman is essential (*svâbhāvika*); its difference is due to limiting adjuncts (*aupâdhika*). This we know, in the first place, from those scriptural texts which declare non-difference—such as 'Thou art that' (*Kh. Up. VI*); 'There is no other seer but he' (*Bri. Up. III, 7, 23*); 'This Self is Brahman' (*Bri. Up. II, 5, 19*); and the passage from the *Brahmasûkta* in the *Samhitopanishad* of the *Âtharvaveda* which, after having said that Brahman is Heaven and Earth, continues, 'The fishermen are Brahman, the slaves are Brahman, Brahman are these gamblers; man and woman are born from Brahman; women are Brahman and so are men.' And, in the second place, from those texts which declare difference: 'He who, one, eternal, intelligent, fulfils the desires of many non-eternal intelligent beings' (*Ka. Up. II, 5, 13*); 'There are two unborn, one knowing, the other not-knowing; one strong, the other weak' (*Svet. Up. I, 9*); 'Being the cause of their connexion with him, through the qualities of action and the qualities of the Self, he is seen as another' (*Svet. Up. V, 12*); 'The Lord of nature and the souls, the ruler of the qualities, the cause of the bondage, the existence and the release of the *samsâra*' (*Svet. Up. VI, 16*); 'He is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs' (*Svet. Up. VI, 9*); 'One of the two eats the sweet fruit, without eating the other looks on' (*Svet. Up. IV, 6*); 'He who dwelling in the Self' (*Bri. Up. III, 7, 22*);

‘Embraced by the intelligent Self he knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within’ (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 3, 21*); ‘Mounted by the intelligent Self he goes groaning’ (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 3, 35*); ‘Having known him he passes beyond death’ (*Svet. Up. III, 8*).—On the ground of these two sets of passages the individual and the highest Self must needs be assumed to stand in the *bhedābheda*-relation. And texts such as ‘He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman’ (*Mu. Up. III, 2, 9*), which teach that in the state of Release the individual soul enters into Brahman itself; and again texts such as ‘But when the Self has become all for him, whereby should he see another’ (*Bṛi. Up. II, 4, 13*), which forbid us to view, in the state of Release, the Lord as something different (from the individual soul), show that non-difference is essential (while difference is merely *aupādhika*).

But, an objection is raised, the text ‘He reaches all desires together in the wise Brahman,’ in using the word ‘together’ shows that even in the state of Release the soul is different from Brahman, and the same view is expressed in two of the Sūtras, viz. IV, 4, 17; 21.—This is not so, we reply; for the text, ‘There is no other seer but he’ (*Bṛi. Up. III, 7, 23*), and many similar texts distinctly negative all plurality in the Self. The *Taittiriya*-text quoted by you means that man reaches Brahman with all desires, i.e. Brahman comprising within itself all objects of desire; if it were understood differently, it would follow that Brahman holds a subordinate position only. And if the Sūtra IV, 4, 17 meant that the released soul is separate from Brahman it would follow that it is deficient in lordly power; and if this were so the Sūtra would be in conflict with other Sūtras such as IV, 4, 1.—For these reasons, non-difference is the essential condition; while the distinction of the souls from Brahman and from each other is due to their limiting adjuncts, i.e. the internal organ, the sense-organs, and the body. Brahman indeed is without parts and omnipresent; but through its adjuncts it becomes capable of division just as ether is divided by jars and the like. Nor must it be said that this leads to a reprehensible

mutual dependence—Brahman in so far as divided entering into conjunction with its adjuncts, and again the division in Brahman being caused by its conjunction with its adjuncts; for these adjuncts and Brahman's connexion with them are due to action (karman), and the stream of action is without a beginning. The limiting adjuncts to which a soul is joined spring from the soul as connected with previous works, and work again springs from the soul as joined to its adjuncts: and as this connexion with works and adjuncts is without a beginning in time, no fault can be found with our theory.—The non-difference of the souls from each other and Brahman is thus essential, while their difference is due to the Upādhis. These Upādhis, on the other hand, are at the same time essentially non-distinct and essentially distinct from each other and Brahman; for there are no other Upādhis (to account for their distinction if non-essential), and if we admitted such, we should again have to assume further Upādhis, and so on *in infinitum*. We therefore hold that the Upādhis are produced, in accordance with the actions of the individual souls, as essentially non-different and different from Brahman.

To this *bhedābheda* view the Pûrvapakshin now objects on the following grounds:—The whole aggregate of Vedānta-texts aims at enjoining meditation on a non-dual Brahman whose essence is reality, intelligence, and bliss, and thus sets forth the view of non-difference; while on the other hand the karma-section of the Veda, and likewise perception and the other means of knowledge, intimate the view of the difference of things. Now, as difference and non-difference are contradictory, and as the view of difference may be accounted for as resting on beginningless Nescience, we conclude that universal non-difference is what is real.—The tenet that difference and non-difference are not contradictory because both are proved by our consciousness, cannot be upheld. If one thing has different characteristics from another there is distinction (*bheda*) of the two; the contrary condition of things constitutes non-distinction (*abheda*); who in his senses then would maintain that these two—suchness and non-suchness—can

be found together? You have maintained that non-difference belongs to a thing viewed as cause and genus, and difference to the same viewed as effect and individual; and that, owing to this twofold aspect of things, non-difference and difference are not irreconcilable. But that this view also is untenable, a presentation of the question in definite alternatives will show. Do you mean to say that the difference lies in one aspect of the thing and the non-difference in the other? or that difference *and* non-difference belong to the thing possessing two aspects?—On the former alternative the difference belongs to the individual and the non-difference to the genus; and this implies that there is no one thing with a double aspect. And should you say that the genus and individual together constitute one thing only, you abandon the view that it is difference of aspect which takes away the contradictoriness of difference and non-difference. We have moreover remarked already that difference in characteristics and its opposite are absolutely contradictory.—On the second alternative we have two aspects of different kind and an unknown thing supposed to be the substrate of those aspects; but this assumption of a triad of entities proves only their mutual difference of character, not their non-difference. Should you say that the non-contradictoriness of two aspects constitutes simultaneous difference and non-difference in the thing which is their substrate, we ask in return—How can two aspects which have a thing for their substrate, and thus are different from the thing, introduce into that thing a combination of two contradictory attributes (viz. difference and non-difference)? And much less even are they able to do so if they are viewed as non-different from the thing which is their substrate. If, moreover, the two aspects on the one hand, and the thing in which they inhere on the other, be admitted to be distinct entities, there will be required a further factor to bring about their difference and non-difference, and we shall thus be led into a *regressus in infinitum*.—Nor is it a fact that the idea of a thing inclusive of its generic character bears the character of unity, in the same way as

the admittedly uniform idea of an individual ; for wherever a state of consciousness expresses itself in the form 'this is such and such' it implies the distinction of an attribute or mode, and that to which the attribute or mode belongs. In the case under discussion the genus constitutes the mode, and the individual that to which the mode belongs : the idea does not therefore possess the character of unity.

For these very reasons the individual soul cannot stand to Brahman in the *bhedâbheda*-relation. And as the view of non-difference is founded on Scripture, we assume that the view of difference rests on beginningless Nescience.—But on this view want of knowledge and all the imperfections springing therefrom, such as birth, death, &c., would cling to Brahman itself, and this would contradict scriptural texts such as 'He who is all-knowing' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9) ; 'That Self free from all evil' (*Kh. Up.* VIII, 1, 5). Not so, we reply. For all those imperfections we consider to be unreal. On your view on the other hand, which admits nothing but Brahman and its limiting adjuncts, all the imperfections which spring from contact with those adjuncts must really belong to Brahman. For as Brahman is without parts, indivisible, the *upâdhis* cannot divide or split it so as to connect themselves with a part only ; but necessarily connect themselves with Brahman itself and produce their effects on it.—Here the following explanation may possibly be attempted. Brahman determined by an *upâdhi* constitutes the individual soul. This soul is of atomic size since what determines it, viz. the internal organ, is itself of atomic size ; and the limitation itself is without beginning. All the imperfections therefore connect themselves only with that special place that is determined by the *upâdhi*, and do not affect the highest Brahman which is not limited by the *upâdhi*.—In reply to this we ask—Do you mean to say that what constitutes the atomic individual soul is a part of Brahman which is limited and cut off by the limiting adjunct ; or some particular part of Brahman which, without being thereby divided off, is connected with an atomic *upâdhi* ; or Brahman in its totality as connected with an *upâdhi* ; or some other intelligent

being connected with an upādhi, or finally the upādhi itself?—The first alternative is not possible, because Brahman cannot be divided; it would moreover imply that the individual soul has a beginning, for division means the making of one thing into two.—On the second alternative it would follow that, as a part of Brahman would be connected with the upādhi, all the imperfections due to the upādhis would adhere to that part. And further, if the upādhi would not possess the power of attracting to itself the particular part of Brahman with which it is connected, it would follow that when the upādhi moves the part with which it is connected would constantly change; in other words, bondage and release would take place at every moment. If, on the contrary, the upādhi possessed the power of attraction, the whole Brahman—as not being capable of division—would be attracted and move with the upādhi. And should it be said that what is all-pervading and without parts cannot be attracted and move, well then the upādhi only moves, and we are again met by the difficulties stated above. Moreover, if all the upādhis were connected with the parts of Brahman viewed as one and undivided, all individual souls, being nothing but parts of Brahman, would be considered as non-distinct. And should it be said that they are not thus cognised as one because they are constituted by different parts of Brahman, it would follow that as soon as the upādhi of one individual soul is moving, the identity of that soul would be lost (for it would, in successive moments, be constituted by different parts of Brahman).—On the third alternative (the whole of) Brahman itself being connected with the upādhi enters into the condition of individual soul, and there remains no non-conditioned Brahman. And, moreover, the soul in all bodies will then be one only.—On the fourth alternative the individual soul is something altogether different from Brahman, and the difference of the soul from Brahman thus ceases to depend on the upādhis of Brahman.—And the fifth alternative means the embracing of the view of the *Kārvāka* (who makes no distinction between soul and matter).—The conclusion from all this is that on the

strength of the texts declaring non-difference we must admit that all difference is based on Nescience only. Hence, Scripture being an authoritative instrument of knowledge in so far only as it has for its end action and the cessation of action, the Vedānta-texts must be allowed to be a valid means of knowledge with regard to Brahman's nature, in so far as they stand in a supplementary relation to the injunctions of meditation.

This view is finally combated by the Mīmāṃsaka. Even if, he says, we allow the Vedānta-texts to have a purport in so far as they are supplementary to injunctions of meditation, they cannot be viewed as valid means of knowledge with regard to Brahman. Do the texts referring to Brahman, we ask, occupy the position of valid means of knowledge in so far as they form a syntactic whole with the injunctions of meditation, or as independent sentences? In the former case the purport of the syntactic whole is simply to enjoin meditation, and it cannot therefore aim at giving instruction about Brahman. If, on the other hand, the texts about Brahman are separate independent sentences, they cannot have the purport of prompting to action and are therefore devoid of instructive power. Nor must it be said that meditation is a kind of continued remembrance, and as such requires to be defined by the object remembered; and that the demand of the injunction of meditation for something to be remembered is satisfied by texts such as 'All this is that Self,' 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman,' &c., which set forth the nature and attributes of Brahman and—forming a syntactic whole with the injunctions—are a valid means of knowledge with regard to the existence of the matter they convey. For the fact is that the demand on the part of an injunction of meditation for an object to be remembered may be satisfied even by something unreal (not true), as in the case of injunctions such as 'Let him meditate upon mind as Brahman' (*Kh. Up.* III, 18, 1): the real existence of the object of meditation is therefore not demanded.—The final conclusion arrived at in this pūrvapaksha is therefore as follows. As the Vedānta-texts do not aim at prompting to action or the cessation of action; as, even on the supposition

of their being supplementary to injunctions of meditation, the only thing they effect is to set forth the nature of the object of meditation ; and as, even if they are viewed as independent sentences, they accomplish the end of man (i.e. please, gratify) by knowledge merely—being thus comparable to tales with which we soothe children or sick persons ; it does not lie within their province to establish the reality of an accomplished thing, and hence Scripture cannot be viewed as a valid means for the cognition of Brahman.

To this *primâ facie* view the Sūtrakāra replies, 'But this on account of connexion.' 'Connexion' is here to be taken in an eminent sense, as 'connexion with the end of man.' That Brahman, which is measureless bliss and therefore constitutes the highest end of man, is connected with the texts as the topic set forth by them, proves Scripture to be a valid means for the cognition of Brahman. To maintain that the whole body of Vedānta-texts—which teach us that Brahman is the highest object to be attained, since it consists of supreme bliss free of all blemish whatsoever—is devoid of all use and purpose merely because it does not aim at action or the cessation of action ; is no better than to say that a youth of royal descent is of no use because he does not belong to a community of low wretches living on the flesh of dogs !

The relation of the different texts is as follows. There are individual souls of numberless kinds—gods, Asuras, Gandharvas, Siddhas, Vidyâdharas, Kinnaras, Kimpurushas, Yakshas, Rākshasas, Pisâkas, men, beasts, birds, creeping animals, trees, bushes, creepers, grasses and so on—distinguished as male, female, or sexless, and having different sources of nourishment and support and different objects of enjoyment. Now all these souls are deficient in insight into the true nature of the highest reality, their understandings being obscured by Nescience operating in the form of beginningless karman ; and hence those texts only are fully useful to them which teach that there exists a highest Brahman—which the souls in the state of release may cognise as non-different from themselves, and which

then, through its own essential nature, qualities, power and energies, imparts to those souls bliss infinite and unsurpassable. When now the question arises—as it must arise—, as to how this Brahman is to be attained, there step in certain other Vedânta-texts—such as ‘He who knows Brahman reaches the highest’ (*Bri. Up.* II, 1, 1), and ‘Let a man meditate on the Self as his world’ (*Bri. Up.* I, 4, 15)—and, by means of terms denoting ‘knowing’ and so on, enjoin meditation as the means of attaining Brahman. (We may illustrate this relation existing between the texts setting forth the nature of Brahman and those enjoining meditation by two comparisons.) The case is like that of a man who has been told ‘There is a treasure hidden in your house.’ He learns through this sentence the existence of the treasure, is satisfied, and then takes active steps to find it and make it his own.—Or take the case of a young prince who, intent on some boyish play, leaves his father’s palace and, losing his way, does not return. The king thinks his son is lost; the boy himself is received by some good Brahman who brings him up and teaches him without knowing who the boy’s father is. When the boy has reached his sixteenth year and is accomplished in every way, some fully trustworthy person tells him, ‘Your father is the ruler of all these lands, famous for the possession of all noble qualities, wisdom, generosity, kindness, courage, valour and so on, and he stays in his capital, longing to see you, his lost child. Hearing that his father is alive and a man so high and noble, the boy’s heart is filled with supreme joy; and the king also, understanding that his son is alive, in good health, handsome and well instructed, considers himself to have attained all a man can wish for. He then takes steps to recover his son, and finally the two are reunited.

The assertion again that a statement referring to some accomplished thing gratifies men merely by imparting a knowledge of the thing, without being a means of knowledge with regard to its real existence—so that it would be comparable to the tales we tell to children and sick people—, can in no way be upheld. When it is ascertained that a thing has no real existence, the mere knowledge or idea

of the thing does not gratify. The pleasure which stories give to children and sick people is due to the fact that they erroneously believe them to be true; if they were to find out that the matter present to their thought is untrue their pleasure would come to an end that very moment. And thus in the case of the texts of the Upanishads also. If we thought that these texts do not mean to intimate the real existence of Brahman, the mere idea of Brahman to which they give rise would not satisfy us in any way.

The conclusion therefore is that texts such as 'That from whence these beings are born' &c. do convey valid instruction as to the existence of Brahman, i. e. that being which is the sole cause of the world, is free from all shadow of imperfection, comprises within itself all auspicious qualities, such as omniscience and so on, and is of the nature of supreme bliss.—Here terminates the *adhikarana* of 'connexion.'

5. On account of seeing (i. e. thinking) that which is not founded on Scripture (i. e. the Pradhāna) is not (what is taught by the texts referring to the origination of the world).

We have maintained that what is taught by the texts relative to the origination of the world is Brahman, omniscient, and so on. The present Sūtra and the following Sūtras now add that those texts can in no way refer to the Pradhāna and similar entities which rest on Inference only.

We read in the *Khândogya*, 'Being only was this in the beginning, one only, without a second.—It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth.—It sent forth fire' (VI, 2, 1 ff.)—Here a doubt arises whether the cause of the world denoted by the term 'Being' is the Pradhāna, assumed by others, which rests on Inference, or Brahman as defined by us.

The Pûrvapakshin maintains that the Pradhāna is meant. For he says, the *Khândogya* text quoted expresses the causal state of what is denoted by the word 'this,' viz. the aggregate of things comprising manifold effects, such as ether, &c., consisting of the three elements of Goodness,

Passion and Darkness, and forming the sphere of fruition of intelligent beings. By the 'effected' state we understand the assuming, on the part of the causal substance, of a different condition; whatever therefore constitutes the essential nature of a thing in its effected state the same constitutes its essential nature in the causal state also. Now the effect, in our case, is made up of the three elements Goodness, Passion and Darkness; hence the cause is the Pradhāna which consists in an equipoise of those three elements. And as in this Pradhāna all distinctions are merged, so that it is pure Being, the *Khândogya* text refers to it as 'Being, one only, without a second.' This establishes the non-difference of effect and cause, and in this way the promise that through the knowledge of one thing all things are to be known admits of being fulfilled. Otherwise, moreover, there would be no analogy between the instance of the lump of clay and the things made of it, and the matter to be illustrated thereby. The texts speaking of the origination of the world therefore intimate the Pradhāna taught by the great Sage Kapila. And as the *Khândogya* passage has, owing to the presence of an initial statement (*pratigñā*) and a proving instance, the form of an inference, the term 'Being' means just that which rests on inference, viz. the Pradhāna.

This *primâ facie* view is set aside by the words of the Sûtra. That which does not rest on Scripture, i.e. the Pradhāna, which rests on Inference only, is not what is intimated by the texts referring to the origination of the world; for the text exhibits the root 'iksh'—which means 'to think'—as denoting a special activity on the part of what is termed 'Being.' 'It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth.' 'Thinking' cannot possibly belong to the non-sentient Pradhāna: the term 'Being' can therefore denote only the all-knowing highest Person who is capable of thought. In agreement with this we find that, in all sections which refer to creation, the act of creation is stated to be preceded by thought. 'He thought, shall I send forth worlds. He sent forth these worlds' (Ait. Âr. II, 4, 1, 2); 'He thought he sent forth Prâna' (Pr. Up. VI, 3);

and others.—But it is a rule that as a cause we must assume only what corresponds to the effect!—Just so; and what corresponds to the total aggregate of effects is the highest Person, all-knowing, all-powerful, whose purposes realise themselves, who has minds and matter in their subtle state for his body. Compare the texts ‘His high power is revealed as manifold, as inherent, acting as force and knowledge’ (Svet. Up. VI, 8); ‘He who is all-knowing, all-perceiving’ (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); ‘He of whom the Unevolved is the body, of whom the Imperishable is the body, of whom Death is the body, he is the inner Self of all things’ (Subāl. Up. VII).—This point (viz. as to the body of the highest Person) will be established under Sū. II, 1, 4. The present Sūtra declares that the texts treating of creation cannot refer to the Pradhāna; the Sūtra just mentioned will dispose of objections. Nor is the Pûrvapakshin right in maintaining that the *Khândogya* passage is of the nature of an Inference; for it does not state a reason (hetu—which is the essential thing in an Inference). The illustrative instance (of the lump of clay) is introduced merely in order to convince him who considers it impossible that all things should be known through one thing—as maintained in the passage ‘through which that is heard which was not heard,’ &c.,—that this *is* possible after all. And the mention made in the text of ‘seeing’ clearly shows that there is absolutely no intention of setting forth an Inference.

Let us assume, then, the Pûrvapakshin resumes, that the ‘seeing’ of the text denotes not ‘seeing’ in its primary, direct sense—such as belongs to intelligent beings only; but ‘seeing’ in a secondary, figurative sense which there is ascribed to the Pradhāna in the same way as in passages immediately following it is ascribed to fire and water—‘the fire saw’; ‘the water saw’ (*Kh.* Up. VI, 2, 3). The transference, to non-existent things, of attributes properly belonging to sentient beings is quite common; as when we say ‘the rice-fields look out for rain’; ‘the rain delighted the seeds.’—This view is set aside by the next Sūtra.

6. If it be said that (the word 'seeing') has a secondary (figurative) meaning; we deny this, on account of the word 'Self' (being applied to the cause of the world).

The contention that, because, in passages standing close by, the word 'seeing' is used in a secondary sense, the 'seeing' predicated of the Sat ('Being') is also to be taken in a secondary sense, viz. as denoting (not real thought but) a certain condition previous to creation, cannot be upheld; for in other texts met with in the same section (viz. 'All this has that for its Self; that is the True, that is the Self,' *Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7*), that which first had been spoken of as Sat is called the 'Self.' The designation 'Self' which in this passage is applied to the Sat in its relation to the entire world, sentient or non-sentient, is in no way appropriate to the Pradhāna. We therefore conclude that, as the highest Self is the Self of fire, water, and earth also, the words fire, &c. (in the passages stating that fire, &c. thought) denote the highest Self only. This conclusion agrees with the text 'Let me enter into these three beings with this living Self, and evolve names and forms,' for this text implies that fire, water, &c. possess substantial being and definite names only through the highest Self having entered into them. The thought ascribed in the text to fire, water, &c. hence is thought in the proper sense, and the hypothesis that, owing to its connexion with these latter texts, the thought predicated of 'Being' ('it thought,' &c.) should be thought in a figurative sense only thus lapses altogether.

The next following Sūtra confirms the same view.

7. Because release is taught of him who takes his stand on it.

Svetaketu, who is desirous of final release, is at first—by means of the clause 'Thou art that'—instructed to meditate on himself as having his Self in that which truly is; and thereupon the passage 'for him there is delay' only as long as 'I shall not be released, then I shall

be united' teaches that for a man taking his stand upon that teaching there will be Release, i. e. union with Brahman—which is delayed only until this mortal body falls away. If, on the other hand, the text would teach that the non-intelligent Pradhāna is the general cause, it could not possibly teach that meditation on this Pradhāna being a man's Self is the means towards his Release. A man taking his stand on such meditation rather would on death be united with a non-sentient principle, according to the scriptural saying, 'According as his thought is in this world, so will he be when he has departed this life' (*Kh. Up. III, 14, 1*). And Scripture, which is more loving than even a thousand parents, cannot possibly teach such union with the Non-sentient, which is acknowledged to be the cause of all the assaults of suffering in its threefold form. Moreover, those who hold the theory of the Pradhāna being the cause of the world do not themselves maintain that he who takes his stand upon the Pradhāna attains final release.

The Pradhāna is not the cause of the world for the following reason also :

8. And because there is no statement of its having to be set aside.

If the word 'Sat' denoted the Pradhāna as the cause of the world, we should expect the text to teach that the idea of having his Self in that 'Sat' should be set aside by Svetaketu as desirous of Release; for that idea would be contrary to Release. So far from teaching this, the text, however, directly inculcates that notion in the words 'Thou art that.'—The next Sūtra adds a further reason.

9. And on account of the contradiction of the initial statement.

The Pradhāna's being the cause of the world would imply a contradiction of the initial statement, viz. that through the knowledge of one thing all things are to be known. Now, on the principle of the non-difference of cause and effect, this initial statement can only be fulfilled in that way that

through the knowledge of the 'Sat,' which is the cause, there is known the entire world, whether sentient or non-sentient, which constitutes the effect. But if the Pradhāna were the cause, the aggregate of sentient beings could not be known through it—for sentient beings are not the effect of a non-sentient principle, and there would thus arise a contradiction.—The next Sūtra supplies a further reason.

10. On account of (the individual soul) going to the Self.

With reference to the 'Sat' the text says, 'Learn from me the true nature of sleep. When a man sleeps here, he becomes united with the Sat, he is gone to his own (Self). Therefore they say he sleeps (svapiti), because he is gone to his own (sva-apīta)' (*Kh. Up.* VI, 8, 1). This text designates the soul in the state of deep sleep as having entered into, or being merged or reabsorbed in, the Self. By reabsorption we understand something being merged in its cause. Now the non-intelligent Pradhāna cannot be the cause of the intelligent soul; hence the soul's going to its Self can only mean its going to *the*, i.e. the universal, Self. The term 'individual soul' (*gīva*) denotes Brahman in so far as having an intelligent substance for its body, Brahman itself constituting the Self; as we learn from the text referring to the distinction of names and forms. This Brahman, thus called *gīva*, is in the state of deep sleep, no less than in that of a general pralaya, free from the investment of names and forms, and is then designated as mere 'Being' (*sat*); as the text says, 'he is then united with the Sat.' As the soul is in the state of deep sleep free from the investment of name and form, and invested by the intelligent Self only, another text says with reference to the same state, 'Embraced by the intelligent Self he knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within' (*Bṛi. Up.* IV, 3, 21). Up to the time of final release there arise in the soul invested by name and form the cognitions of objects different from itself. During deep sleep the souls divest themselves of names and forms, and are embraced by the 'Sat' only; but in the waking state they again invest them-

selves with names and forms, and thus bear corresponding distinctive names and forms. This, other scriptural texts also distinctly declare, 'When a man lying in deep sleep sees no dream whatever, he becomes one with that *prāṇa* alone;—from that Self the *prāṇas* proceed, each towards its place' (Ka. Up. III, 3); 'Whatever these creatures are here, whether a lion or a wolf or a boar or a gnat or a mosquito, that they become again' (Kṛ. Up. VI, 9, 3).—Hence the term 'Sat' denotes the highest Brahman, the all-knowing highest Lord, the highest Person. Thus the *Vṛttikāra* also says, 'Then he becomes united with the Sat—this is proved by (all creatures) entering into it and coming back out of it.' And Scripture also says, 'Embraced by the intelligent Self.'—The next Sūtra gives an additional reason.

11. On account of the uniformity of view.

'In the beginning the Self was all this; there was nothing else whatsoever thinking. He thought, shall I send forth worlds? He sent forth these worlds' (Ait. Ār. II, 4, 1, 1); 'From that Self sprang ether, from ether air, from air fire, from fire water, from water earth' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'From this great Being were breathed forth the *Rig-veda*, &c.—These and similar texts referring to the creation have all the same purport: they all teach us that the Supreme Lord is the cause of the world. We therefore conclude that in the *Kṛ.* passage also the Sat, which is said to be the cause of the world, is the Supreme Lord.

12. And because it is directly stated in Scripture.

The text of the same Upanishad directly declares that the being denoted by the word 'Sat' evolves, as the universal Self, names and forms; is all-knowing, all-powerful, all-embracing; is free from all evil, &c.; realises all its wishes and purposes. 'Let me, entering those beings with this living Self, evolve names and forms' (Kṛ. Up. VI, 3, 2); 'All these creatures have their root in the Sat, they dwell in the Sat, they rest in the Sat' (VI, 8, 4); 'All this has that for its Self; it is the True, it is the Self' (VI, 8, 7);

‘Whatever there is of him here in the world, and whatever is not, all that is contained within it’ (VIII, 1, 3); ‘In it all desires are contained. It is the Self free from sin, free from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, whose wishes come true, whose purposes come true’ (VIII, 1, 5).—And analogously other scriptural texts, ‘Of him there is no master in the world, no ruler; not even a sign of him. He is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of him neither parent nor lord’ (Svet. Up. VI, 9). ‘The wise one who, having created all forms and having given them names, is calling them by those names’ (Taitt. Âr. III, 12, 7); ‘He who entered within is the ruler of all beings, the Self of all’ (Taitt. Âr. III, 24); ‘The Self of all, the refuge, the ruler of all, the Lord of the souls’ (Mahânâr. Up. XI); ‘Whatsoever is seen or heard in this world, inside or outside, pervading that all Nârâyana abides’ (Mahânâr. Up. XI); ‘He is the inner Self of all beings, free from all evil, the divine, the only god Nârâyana.’—These and other texts which declare the world to have sprung from the highest Lord, can in no way be taken as establishing the Pradhâna. Hence it remains a settled conclusion that the highest Person, Nârâyana, free from all shadow of imperfection, &c., is the single cause of the whole Universe, and is that Brahman which these Sûtras point out as the object of enquiry.

For the same reasons the theory of a Brahman, which is nothing but non-differenced intelligence, must also be considered as refuted by the Sûtrakâra, with the help of the scriptural texts quoted; for those texts prove that the Brahman, which forms the object of enquiry, possesses attributes such as thinking, and so on, in their real literal sense. On the theory, on the other hand, of a Brahman that is nothing but distinctionless intelligence even the witnessing function of consciousness would be unreal. The Sûtras propose as the object of enquiry Brahman as known from the Vedânta-texts, and thereupon teach that Brahman is intelligent (Sû. I, 1, 5 ff.) To be intelligent means to possess the quality of intelligence: a being devoid of the quality of thought would not differ in nature from the

Pradhāna. Further, on the theory of Brahman being mere non-differenced light it would be difficult to prove that Brahman is self-luminous. For by light we understand that particular thing which renders itself, as well as other things, capable of becoming the object of ordinary thought and speech ; but as a thing devoid of all difference does not, of course, possess these two characteristics it follows that it is as devoid of intelligence as a pot may be.—Let it then be assumed that although a thing devoid of all distinction does not actually possess these characteristics, yet it has the potentiality of possessing them !—But if it possesses the attribute of potentiality, it is clear that you abandon your entire theory of a substance devoid of all distinction !—Let us then admit, on the authority of Scripture, that the universal substance possesses this one distinguishing attribute of self-luminousness.—Well, in that case you must of course admit, on the same authority, all those other qualities also which Scripture vouches for, such as all-knowingness, the possession of all powers, and so on.—Moreover, potentiality means capability to produce certain special effects, and hence can be determined on the ground of those special effects only. But if there are no means of knowing these particular effects, there are also no means of cognising potentiality.—And those who hold the theory of a substance devoid of all difference, have not even means of proof for their substance ; for as we have shown before, Perception, Inference, Scripture, and one's own consciousness, are all alike in so far as having for their objects things marked by difference.—It therefore remains a settled conclusion that the Brahman to be known is nothing else but the highest Person capable of the thought 'of becoming many' by manifesting himself in a world comprising manifold sentient and non-sentient creatures.—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of 'seeing.'

So far the Sūtras have declared that the Brahman which forms the object of enquiry is different from the non-intelligent Pradhāna, which is merely an object of fruition for intelligent beings. They now proceed to show that Brahman—which is antagonistic to all evil and constituted

by supreme bliss—is different from the individual soul, which is subject to karman, whether that soul be in its purified state or in the impure state that is due to its immersion in the ocean of manifold and endless sufferings, springing from the soul's contact with Prakṛiti (Pradhāna).

13. The Self consisting of Bliss (is the highest Self) on account of multiplication.

We read in the text of the Taittirīyas, 'Different from this Self, which consists of Understanding, is the other inner Self which consists of bliss' (Taitt. Up. II, 5).—Here the doubt arises whether the Self consisting of bliss be the highest Self, which is different from the inner Self subject to bondage and release, and termed 'gīva' (i. e. living self or individual soul), or whether it be that very inner Self, i. e. the gīva.—It is that inner Self, the Pūrvapakshin contends. For the text says 'of that this, i. e. the Self consisting of bliss, is the sārīra Self'; and sārīra means that which is joined to a body, in other words, the so-called gīva.—But, an objection is raised, the text enumerates the different Selves, beginning with the Self consisting of bliss, to the end that man may obtain the bliss of Brahman, which was, at the outset, stated to be the cause of the world (II, 1), and in the end teaches that the Self consisting of bliss is the cause of the world (II, 6). And that the cause of the world is the all-knowing Lord, since Scripture says of him that 'he thought,' we have already explained.—That cause of the world, the Pūrvapakshin rejoins, is not different from the gīva; for in the text of the Kāṇḍogyaś that Being which first is described as the creator of the world is exhibited, in two passages, in co-ordination with the gīva ('having entered into them with that living Self' and 'Thou art that, O Svetaketu'). And the purport of co-ordination is to express oneness of being, as when we say, 'This person here is that Devadatta we knew before.' And creation preceded by thought can very well be ascribed to an intelligent gīva. The connexion of the whole Taittirīya-text then is as follows. In the introductory clause, 'He who knows Brahman attains the

Highest,' the true nature of the *gīva*, free from all connexion with matter, is referred to as something to be attained; and of this nature a definition is given in the words, 'The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman.' The attainment of the *gīva* in this form is what constitutes Release, in agreement with the text, 'So long as he is in the body he cannot get free from pleasure and pain; but when he is free from the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches him' (*Kk. Up. VIII, 12, 1*). This true nature of the Self, free from all *avidyā*, which the text begins by presenting as an object to be attained, is thereupon declared to be the Self consisting of bliss. In order to lead up to this—just as a man points out to another the moon by first pointing out the branch of a tree near which the moon is to be seen—the text at first refers to the body ('Man consists of food'); next to the vital breath with its five modifications which is within the body and supports it; then to the *manas* within the vital breath; then to the *buddhi* within the *manas*—'the Self consisting of breath'; 'the Self consisting of mind' (*manas*); 'the Self consisting of understanding' (*viṣṇāna*). Having thus gradually led up to the *gīva*, the text finally points out the latter, which is the innermost of all ('Different from that is the inner Self which consists of bliss'), and thus completes the series of Selves one inside the other. We hence conclude that the Self consisting of bliss is that same *gīva*-self which was at the outset pointed out as the Brahman to be attained.—But the clause immediately following, 'Brahman is the tail, the support (of the Self of bliss)', indicates that Brahman is something different from the Self of bliss!—By no means (the *Pūrvapakshin* rejoins). Brahman is, owing to its different characteristics, there compared to an animal body, and head, wings, and tail are ascribed to it, just as in a preceding clause the body consisting of food had also been imagined as having head, wings, and tail—these members not being something different from the body, but the body itself. Joy, satisfaction, great satisfaction, bliss, are imagined as the members, non-different from it, of Brahman consisting of bliss, and of them all the unmixed bliss-constituted

Brahman is said to be the tail or support. If Brahman were something different from the Self consisting of bliss, the text would have continued, 'Different from this Self consisting of bliss is the other inner Self—Brahman.' But there is no such continuation. The connexion of the different clauses stands as follows: After Brahman has been introduced as the topic of the section ('He who knows Brahman attains the Highest'), and defined as different in nature from everything else ('The True, knowledge'), the text designates it by the term 'Self,' &c. ('From that Self sprang ether'), and then, in order to make it clear that Brahman is the innermost Self of all, enumerates the *prāṇa-maya* and so on—designating them in succession as more and more inward Selves—and finally leads up to the *Ānandamaya* as the innermost Self ('Different from this, &c., is the Self consisting of bliss'). From all which it appears that the term 'Self' up to the end denotes the Brahman mentioned at the beginning.—But, in immediate continuation of the clause, 'Brahman is the tail, the support,' the text exhibits the following *sloka*: 'Non-existing becomes he who views Brahman as non-existing; who knows Brahman as existing, him we know as himself existing.' Here the existence and non-existence of the Self are declared to depend on the knowledge and non-knowledge of Brahman, not of the Self consisting of bliss. Now no doubt can possibly arise as to the existence or non-existence of this latter Self, which, in the form of joy, satisfaction, &c., is known to every one. Hence the *sloka* cannot refer to that Self, and hence Brahman is different from that Self.—This objection, the *Pūrvapakshin* rejoins, is unfounded. In the earlier parts of the chapter we have corresponding *slokas*, each of them following on a preceding clause that refers to the tail or support of a particular Self: in the case, e.g. of the Self consisting of food, we read, 'This is the tail, the support,' and then comes the *sloka*, 'From food are produced all creatures,' &c. Now it is evident that all these *slokas* are meant to set forth not only what had been called 'tail,' but the entire Self concerned (Self of food, Self of breath, &c.); and from this it follows that also the *sloka*, 'Non-existing becomes

he,' does not refer to the 'tail' only as something other than the Self of bliss, but to the entire Self of bliss. And there may very well be a doubt with regard to the knowledge or non-knowledge of the existence of that Self consisting of unlimited bliss. On your view also the circumstance of Brahman which forms the tail not being known is due to its being of the nature of limitless bliss. And should it be said that the Self of bliss cannot be Brahman because Brahman does not possess a head and other members; the answer is that Brahman also does not possess the quality of being a tail or support, and that hence Brahman cannot be a tail.—Let it then be said that the expression, 'Brahman is the tail,' is merely figurative, in so far as Brahman is the substrate of all things imagined through avidyā!—But, the Pūrvapakshin rejoins, we may as well assume that the ascription to Brahman of joy, as its head and so on, is also merely figurative, meant to illustrate the nature of Brahman, i.e. the Self of bliss as free from all pain. To speak of Brahman or the Self as consisting of bliss has thus the purpose of separating from all pain and grief that which in a preceding clause ('The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman') had already been separated from all changeful material things. As applied to Brahman (or the Self), whose nature is nothing but absolute bliss, the term 'ānandamaya' therefore has to be interpreted as meaning nothing more than 'ānanda'; just as *prāṇamaya* means *prāṇa*.

The outcome of all this is that the term 'ānandamaya' denotes the true essential nature—which is nothing but absolute uniform bliss—of the *gīva* that appears as distinguished by all the manifold individualising forms which are the figments of Nescience. The Self of bliss is the *gīva* or *pratyag-ātman*, i.e. the individual soul.

Against this *primā facie* view the Sūtrakāra contends that the Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self 'on account of multiplication.'—The section which begins with the words, 'This is an examination of bliss,' and terminates with the *śloka*, 'from whence all speech turns back' (Taitt. Up. II, 8), arrives at bliss, supreme and not to be surpassed, by successively multiplying inferior stages of bliss by a

hundred ; now such supreme bliss cannot possibly belong to the individual soul which enjoys only a small share of very limited happiness, mixed with endless pain and grief ; and therefore clearly indicates, as its abode, the highest Self, which differs from all other Selves in so far as being radically opposed to all evil and of an unmixed blessed nature. The text says, ' Different from this Self consisting of understanding (*vigñāna*) there is the inner Self consisting of bliss.' Now that which consists of understanding (*vigñāna*) is the individual soul (*gīva*), not the internal organ (*buddhi*) only ; for the formative element, ' *maya*, ' (' consisting of ' ; in *vigñānamaya*) indicates a difference (between *vigñāna* and *vigñānamaya*). The term ' *prāṇa-maya* ' (' consisting of breath ') we explain to mean ' *prāṇa* ' only, because no other explanation is possible ; but as *vigñānamaya* may be explained as *gīva*, we have no right to neglect ' *maya* ' as unmeaning. And this interpretation is quite suitable, as the soul in the states of bondage and release alike is a ' knowing ' subject. That moreover even in ' *prāṇamaya*, ' and so on, the affix ' *maya* ' may be taken as having a meaning will be shown further on.—But how is it then that in the sloka which refers to the *vigñānamaya*, ' Understanding (*vigñāna*) performs the sacrifice, ' the term ' *vigñāna* ' only is used ?—The essential nature, we reply, of the knowing subject is suitably called ' knowledge, ' and this term is transferred to the knowing subject itself which is defined as possessing that nature. For we generally see that words which denote attributes defining the essential nature of a thing also convey the notion of the essential nature of the thing itself. This also accounts for the fact that the sloka (' *Vigñāna* performs the sacrifice, it performs all sacred acts ') speaks of *vigñāna* as being the agent in sacrifices and so on ; the *buddhi* alone could not be called an agent. For this reason the text does not ascribe agency to the other Selves (the *prāṇamaya* and so on) which are mentioned before the *vigñānamaya* ; for they are non-intelligent instruments of intelligence, and the latter only can be an agent. With the same view the text further on (II, 6), distinguishing the intelligent and the non-intelligent

by means of their different characteristic attributes, says in the end 'knowledge and non-knowledge,' meaning thereby that which possesses the attribute of knowledge and that which does not. An analogous case is met with in the so-called antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa (*Bṛi. Up. III, 7*). There the *Kāṇvas* read, 'He who dwells in knowledge' (*vigñāna*; *III, 7, 16*), but instead of this the *Mādhyandinas* read 'he who dwells in the Self,' and so make clear that what the *Kāṇvas* designate as 'knowledge' really is the knowing Self.—That the word *vigñāna*, although denoting the knowing Self, yet has a neuter termination, is meant to denote it as something substantial. We hence conclude that he who is different from the Self consisting of knowledge, i. e. the individual Self, is the highest Self which consists of bliss.

It is true indeed that the sloka, 'Knowledge performs the sacrifice,' directly mentions knowledge only, not the knowing Self; all the same we have to understand that what is meant is the latter, who is referred to in the clause, 'different from this is the inner Self which consists of knowledge.' This conclusion is supported by the sloka referring to the Self which consists of food (*II, 2*); for that sloka refers to food only, 'From food are produced all creatures,' &c., all the same the preceding clause 'this man consists of the essence of food' does not refer to food, but to an effect of it which consists of food. Considering all this the *Sūtra-kāra* himself in a subsequent *Sūtra* (*I, 1, 18*) bases his view on the declaration, in the scriptural text, of difference.—We now turn to the assertion, made by the *Pūrvapakshin*, that the cause of the world is not different from the individual soul because in two *Khândogya* passages it is exhibited in co-ordination with the latter ('having entered into them with this living Self,' 'Thou art that'); and that hence the introductory clause of the *Taitt. passage* ('He who knows Brahman reaches the Highest') refers to the individual soul—which further on is called 'consisting of bliss,' because it is free from all that is not pleasure.—This view cannot be upheld; for although the individual soul is intelligent, it is incapable of producing through its volition this infinite and wonderful Universe—a process described in texts such

as 'It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth.—It sent forth fire,' &c. That even the released soul is unequal to such 'world business' as creation, two later Sûtras will expressly declare. But, if you deny that Brahman, the cause of the world, is identical with the individual soul, how then do you account for the co-ordination in which the two appear in the *Kāndogya* texts?—How, we ask in return, can Brahman, the cause of all, free from all shadow of imperfection, omniscient, omnipotent, &c. &c., be one with the individual soul, all whose activities—whether it be thinking, or winking of an eye, or anything else—depend on *karman*, which implies endless suffering of various kind?—If you reply that this is possible if one of two things is unreal, we ask—which then do you mean to be unreal? Brahman's connexion with what is evil?—or its essential nature, owing to which it is absolutely good and antagonistic to all evil?—You will perhaps reply that, owing to the fact of Brahman, which is absolutely good and antagonistic to all evil, being the substrate of beginningless Nescience, there presents itself the false appearance of its being connected with evil. But there you maintain what is contradictory. On the one side there is Brahman's absolute perfection and antagonism to all evil; on the other it is the substrate of Nescience, and thereby the substrate of a false appearance which is involved in endless pain; for to be connected with evil means to be the substrate of Nescience and the appearance of suffering which is produced thereby. Now it is a contradiction to say that Brahman is connected with all this and at the same time antagonistic to it!—Nor can we allow you to say that there is no real contradiction because that appearance is something false. For whatever is false belongs to that group of things contrary to man's true interest, for the destruction of which the *Vedānta*-texts are studied. To be connected with what is hurtful to man, and to be absolutely perfect and antagonistic to all evil is self-contradictory.—But, our adversary now rejoins, what after all are we to do? The holy text at first clearly promises that through the cognition of one thing everything will be known ('by which that which is

not heard *is* heard,' &c., *Kh. Up.* VI, 1, 3); thereupon declares that Brahman is the sole cause of the world ('Being only this was in the beginning'), and possesses exalted qualities such as the power of realising its intentions ('it thought, may I be many'); and then finally, by means of the co-ordination, 'Thou art that,' intimates that Brahman is one with the individual soul, which we know to be subject to endless suffering! Nothing therefore is left to us but the hypothesis that Brahman is the substrate of Nescience and all that springs from it!—Not even for the purpose, we reply, of making sense of Scripture may we assume what in itself is senseless and contradictory!—Let us then say that Brahman's connexion with evil is real, and its absolute perfection unreal!—Scripture, we reply, aims at comforting the soul afflicted by the assaults of threefold pain, and now, according to you, it teaches that the assaults of suffering are real, while its essential perfection and happiness are unreal figments, due to error! This is excellent comfort indeed!—To avoid these difficulties let us then assume that both aspects of Brahman—viz. on the one hand its entering into the distressful condition of individual souls other than non-differenced intelligence, and on the other its being the cause of the world, endowed with all perfections, &c.—are alike unreal!—Well, we reply, we do not exactly admire the depth of your insight into the connected meaning of texts. The promise that through the knowledge of one thing everything will be known can certainly not be fulfilled if everything is false, for in that case there exists nothing that could be known. In so far as the cognition of one thing has something real for its object, and the cognition of all things is of the same kind, and moreover is comprised in the cognition of one thing; in so far it can be said that everything is known through one thing being known. Through the cognition of the real shell we do not cognise the unreal silver of which the shell is the substrate.—Well, our adversary resumes, let it then be said that the meaning of the declaration that through the cognition of one thing everything is to be known is that only non-differenced Being is real, while everything

else is unreal.—If this were so, we rejoin, the text would not say, 'by which the non-heard is heard—, the non-known is known'; for the meaning of this is, 'by which when heard and known' (*not* 'known as false') 'the non-heard is heard,' &c. Moreover, if the meaning were that only the one non-differenced substance understood to be the cause of the world is real, the illustrative instance, 'As by one lump of clay everything made of clay is known,' would not be suitable; for what is meant there is that through the cognition of the (real) lump of clay its (real) effects are known. Nor must you say that in the illustrative instance also the unreality of the effect is set forth; for as the person to be informed is not in any way convinced at the outset that things made of clay are unreal, like the snake imagined in the rope, it is impossible that such unreality should be referred to as if it were something well known (and the clause, 'as by one lump of clay,' &c., undoubtedly *does* refer to something well known), in order to render the initial assertion plausible. And we are not aware of any means of knowledge—assisted or non-assisted by ratiocination—that would prove the non-reality of things effected, previous to the cognition produced by texts such as 'That art thou'; a point which will be discussed at length under II, 1.—'Being only this was in the beginning, one, without a second'; 'it thought, may I be many, may I grow forth; it sent forth fire'; 'Let me now enter those three beings with this living Self and evolve names and forms'; 'All these creatures, my son, have their root in the True, they dwell in the True, they rest in the True,' &c.; these passages declare in succession that that which really is is the Self of this world; that previous to creation there is no distinction of names and forms; that for the creation of the world Brahman, termed 'the True' (or 'Real'), requires no other operative cause but itself; that at the time of creation it forms a resolution, possible to itself only, of making itself manifold in the form of endless movable and immovable things; that in accordance with this resolution there takes place a creation, proceeding in a particular order, of an infinite number of manifold

beings; that by Brahman entering into all non-intelligent beings with the living soul—which has its Self in Brahman—there takes place an evolution, infinite in extent, of all their particular names and forms; and that everything different from Brahman has its root and abode in that, is moved by that, lives by that, rests on that. All the different points—to be learned from Scripture only—which are here set forth agree with what numerous other scriptural texts teach about Brahman, viz. that it is free from all evil, devoid of all imperfection, all-knowing, all-powerful; that all its wishes and purposes realise themselves; that it is the cause of all bliss; that it enjoys bliss not to be surpassed. To maintain then that the word ‘that,’ which refers back to the Brahman mentioned before, i.e. a Brahman possessing infinite attributes, should aim at conveying instruction about a substance devoid of all attributes, is as unmeaning as the incoherent talk of a madman.

The word ‘thou’ again denotes the individual soul as distinguished by its implication in the course of transmigratory existence, and the proper sense of this term also would have to be abandoned if it were meant to suggest a substance devoid of all distinctions. And that, in the case of a being consisting of non-differenced light, obscuration by Nescience would be tantamount to complete destruction, we have already explained above.—All this being thus, your interpretation would involve that the proper meaning of the two words ‘that’ and ‘thou’—which refer to one thing—would have to be abandoned, and both words would have to be taken in an implied sense only.

Against this the Pûrvapakshin now may argue as follows. Several words which are applied to one thing are meant to express one sense, and as this is not possible in so far as the words connote different attributes, this part of their connotation becomes inoperative, and they denote only the unity of one substance; implication (*lakṣaṇā*), therefore, does not take place. When we say ‘blue (is) (the) lotus’ we employ two words with the intention of expressing the unity of one thing, and hence do not aim at expressing a duality of attributes, viz. the quality of blueness and the

generic character of a lotus. If this latter point was aimed at, it would follow that the sentence would convey the oneness of the two aspects of the thing, viz. its being blue and its being a lotus; but this is not possible, for the thing (denoted by the two terms) is not characterised by (the denotation of) the word 'lotus,' in so far as itself characterised by blueness; for this would imply a reciprocal inherence (*samavāya*) of class-characteristics and quality¹. What the co-ordination of the two words conveys is, therefore, only the oneness of a substance characterised by the quality of blueness, and at the same time by the class attributes of a lotus. In the same way, when we say 'this (person is) that Devadatta' the co-ordination of the words cannot possibly mean that Devadatta in so far as distinguished by his connexion with a past time and a distant place is one with Devadatta in so far as distinguished by his connexion with the present time and a near place; what it means to express is only that there is oneness on the part of a personal substance—which substance is characterised by connexion with both places and moments of time. It is true indeed that when we at first hear the one word 'blue' we form the idea of the attribute of blueness, while, after having apprehended the relation of co-ordination (expressed in 'blue is the lotus'), this idea no longer presents itself, for this would imply a contradiction; but all the same 'implication' does not take place. The essence of co-ordination consists, in all cases, therein that it suppresses the distinguishing elements in the words co-ordinated. And as thus our explanation cannot be charged with 'implication,' it cannot be objected to.

All this, we rejoin, is unfounded. What the words in all sentences whatsoever aim at conveying is only a particular connexion of the things known to be denoted by those words. Words such as 'blue,' standing in co-ordination with others, express that some matter possessing the attri-

¹ I. e. we should not in that case be able to decide whether the quality (i. e., here, the blueness) inheres in the class (i. e., here, the lotus), or vice versa.

bute of blueness, &c., as known from the ordinary use of language, is connected with some other matter. When, e.g., somebody says 'bring the blue lotus,' a thing is brought which possesses the attribute of blueness. And when we are told that 'a herd of elephants excited with passion lives in the Vindhya-forest,' we again understand that what is meant is something possessing several attributes denoted by several words. Analogously we have to understand, as the thing intimated by Vedānta-texts in the form of co-ordination, Brahman as possessing such and such attributes. —It is an error to assume that, where a sentence aims at setting forth attributes, one attribute is to be taken as qualifying the thing in so far as qualified by another attribute; the case rather is that the thing itself is equally qualified by all attributes. For co-ordination means the application, to one thing, of several words having different reasons of application; and the effect of co-ordination is that one and the same thing, because being connected—positively or negatively—with some attribute other than that which is conveyed by one word, is also known through other words. As e.g. when it is said that 'Devadatta (is) dark-complexioned, young, reddish-eyed, not stupid, not poor, of irreproachable character,' Where two co-ordinate words express two attributes which cannot exist combined in one thing, one of the two words is to be taken in a secondary sense, while the other retains its primary meaning, as e.g. in the case of the sentence, 'The Vāhika man is an ox.' But in the case of the 'blue lotus' and the like, where there is nothing contradictory in the connexion of the two attributes with one thing, co-ordination expresses the fact of one thing being characterised by two attributes. —Possibly our opponent will here make the following remark. A thing in so far as defined by its correlation to some one attribute is something different from the thing in so far as defined by its correlation to some second attribute; hence, even if there is equality of case affixes (as in 'nilam utpalam'), the words co-ordinated are incapable of expressing oneness, and cannot, therefore, express the oneness of a thing qualified by several attributes; not any

more than the juxtaposition of two words such as 'jar' and 'cloth'—both having the same case-ending—can prove that these two things are one. A statement of co-ordination, therefore, rather aims at expressing the oneness of a thing in that way that it presents to the mind the essential nature of the thing by means of (words denoting) its attributes.—This would be so, we reply, if it were only the fact of a thing's standing in correlation to two attributes that is in the way of its unity. But this is not the case; for what stands in the way of such unity is the fact of there being several attributes which are not capable of being combined in one thing. Such incapability is, in the case of the generic character of a jar and that of a piece of cloth, proved by other means of knowledge; but there is no contradiction between a thing being blue and its being a lotus; not any more than there is between a man and the stick or the earrings he wears, or than there is between the colour, taste, smell, &c., of one and the same thing. Not only is there no contradiction, but it is this very fact of one thing possessing two attributes which makes possible co-ordination—the essence of which is that, owing to a difference of causes of application, several words express one and the same thing. For if there were nothing but essential unity of being, what reason would there be for the employment of several words? If the purport of the attributes were, not to intimate their connexion with the thing, but merely to suggest the thing itself, one attribute would suffice for such suggestion, and anything further would be meaningless. If, on the other hand, it were assumed that the use of a further 'suggestive' attribute is to bring out a difference of aspect in the thing suggested, such difference of aspect would imply differentiation in the thing (which you maintain to be free from all difference).—Nor is there any shade even of 'implication' in the judgment, 'This person is that Devadatta'; for there is absolutely no contradiction between the past Devadatta, who was connected with some distant place, and the present Devadatta, who is connected with the place before us. For this very reason those who maintain the permanency of

things prove the oneness of a thing related to two moments of time on the basis of the judgment of recognition ('this is that'); if there really were a contradiction between the two representations it would follow that all things are (not permanent but) momentary only. The fact is that the contradiction involved in one thing being connected with two places is removed by the difference of the correlative moments of time. We therefore hold to the conclusion that co-ordinated words denote one thing qualified by the possession of several attributes.

For this very reason the Vedic passage, 'He buys the Soma by means of a cow one year old, of a tawny colour, with reddish-brown eyes' (*aruṇayā, ekahāyanyā, piṅgākshyā*), must be understood to enjoin that the purchase is to be effected by means of a cow one year old, possessing the attributes of tawny colour, &c. This point is discussed Pū. Ml. Sū. III, 1, 12.—The Pūrvapakshin there argues as follows: We admit that the word '*aruṇayā*' ('by means of a tawny one') denotes the quality of tawinness inclusive of the thing possessing that quality; for qualities as well as generic character exist only in so far as being modes of substances. But it is not possible to restrict tawny colour to connexion with a cow one year old, for the injunction of two different things (which would result from such restriction; and which would necessitate the sentence to be construed as—) 'He buys by means of a cow one year old, and that a red one' is not permissible¹. We must therefore break up the sentence into two, one of which is constituted by the one word '*aruṇayā*'—this word expressing that tawny colour extends equally to all the substances enjoined in that section (as instrumental towards the end of the sacrifice). And the use of the feminine case-termination of the word is merely meant to suggest a special instance (viz. the cow) of all the things, of whatever gender, which are enjoined in that section. Tawinness must not therefore

¹ For it would imply so-called *vākyabheda*, 'split of the sentence,' which arises when one injunctory clause is made to enjoin two different things.

be restricted to the cow one year old only.—Of this pûrvapaksha the Sûtra disposes in the following words: 'There being oneness of sense, and hence connexion of substance and quality with one action, there is restriction.'—The fact that the two words 'arunayâ' and 'ekahâyanyâ'—which denote a substance, viz. a cow one year old, distinguished by the quality of possessing tawny colour—stand in co-ordination establishes that they have one sense; and as the substance, viz. the cow, and the quality, viz. tawny colour—which the word 'arunayâ' denotes as standing in the relation of distinguishing attribute and thing distinguished thereby—can thus, without any contradiction, be connected with the one action called 'the buying of the Soma,' tawny colour is restricted to the cow one year old which is instrumental with regard to the purchase. If the connexion of tawnyness with the action of buying were to be determined from syntactical connexion—in the same way as there is made out the connexion of the cow one year old with that action—then the injunctory sentence would indeed enjoin two matters (and this would be objectionable). But such is not the case; for the one word 'arunayâ' denotes a substance characterised by the quality of tawnyness, and the co-ordination in which 'arunayâ' stands to 'ekahâyanyâ' makes us apprehend merely that the thing characterised by tawnyness also is one year old, but does not make a special statement as to the connexion of that quality with the thing. For the purport of co-ordination is the unity of a thing distinguished by attributes; according to the definition that the application to one thing of several words possessing different reasons of application, constitutes co-ordination. For the same reason, the syntactical unity (ekavâkyatvam) of sentences such as 'the cloth is red' follows from all the words referring to one thing. The function of the syntactical collocation is to express the connexion of the cloth with the action of being; the connexion of the red colour (with the cloth) on the other hand is denoted by the word 'red' only. And what is ascertained from co-ordination (sāmānādhikaranyā) is only that the cloth is a substance to which a certain colour belongs.

The whole matter may, without any contradiction, be conceived as follows. Several words—having either the affixes of the oblique cases or that of the nominative case—which denote one or two or several qualities, present to the mind the idea of that which is characterised by those qualities, and their co-ordination intimates that the thing characterised by all those attributes is one only ; and the entire sentence finally expresses the connexion in which the thing with its attributes stands to the action denoted by the verb. This may be illustrated by various sentences exhibiting the co-ordination of words possessing different case-endings, as e.g. ‘ There stands Devadatta, a young man of a darkish complexion, with red eyes, wearing earrings and carrying a stick ’ (where all the words standing in apposition to Devadatta have the nominative termination) ; ‘ Let him make a stage curtain by means of a white cloth ’ (where ‘ white ’ and ‘ cloth ’ have instrumental case-endings), &c. &c. We may further illustrate the entire relation of co-ordinated words to the action by means of the following two examples : ‘ Let him boil rice in the cooking-pot by means of firewood ’ : here we take in simultaneously the idea of an action distinguished by its connexion with several things. If we now consider the following amplified sentence, ‘ Let a skilful cook prepare, in a vessel of even shape, boiled rice mixed with milk, by means of sticks of dry khâdira wood,’ we find that each thing connected with the action is denoted by an aggregate of co-ordinated words ; but as soon as each thing is apprehended, it is at one and the same moment conceived as something distinguished by several attributes, and as such connects itself with the action expressed by the verb. In all this there is no contradiction whatever.—We must further object to the assertion that a word denoting a quality which stands in a sentence that has already mentioned a substance denotes the quality only (exclusive of the substance so qualified), and that hence the word ‘ aruṇayā ’ also denotes a quality only. The fact is that neither in ordinary nor in Vedic language we ever meet with a word which—denoting a quality and at the same time standing in co-ordination

with a word denoting a substance—denotes a *mere* quality. Nor is it correct to say that a quality-word occurring in a sentence which has already mentioned a substance denotes a mere quality: for in a sentence such as 'the cloth (is) white,' where a substance is mentioned in the first place, the quality-word clearly denotes (not mere whiteness but) something which possesses the quality of whiteness. When, on the other hand, we have a collocation of words such as 'paśasya suklāḥ' ('of the cloth'—gen.; 'white' nom.), the idea of a cloth distinguished by whiteness does not arise; but this is due not to the fact of the substance being mentioned first, but to the fact of the two words exhibiting different case-terminations. As soon as we add to those two words an appropriate third one, e.g. 'bhāgaḥ' (so that the whole means 'The white part of a cloth'), the co-ordination of two words with the same case-termination gives rise to the idea of a thing distinguished by the attribute of whiteness.—Nor can we agree to the contention that, as the buying of the Soma is exclusively concluded by the cow one year old (as instrumental in the purchase), the quality of tawinness (denoted by the word 'arunayā') cannot connect itself with the action expressed by the verb; for a word that denotes a quality and stands in co-ordination with a word denoting a substance which has no qualities opposed in nature to that quality, denotes a quality abiding in that substance, and thus naturally connects itself with the action expressed by the verb. And since, as shown, the quality of tawinness connects itself with its substance (the cow) on the mere basis of the form of the words, it is wrong (on the part of the Pūrvaapakshin to abandon this natural connexion and) to establish their connexion on the ground of their being otherwise incapable of serving as means of the purchase.

All this confirms our contention, viz. that the co-ordination of 'thou' and 'that' must be understood to express oneness, without, at the same time, there being given up the different attributes denoted by the two words. This however is not feasible for those who do not admit a highest Self free from all imperfection and endowed with all perfections, and different from that intelligent soul which

is conditioned by Nescience, involved in endless suffering and undergoing alternate states of purity and impurity.—But, an objection is raised, even if such a highest Self be acknowledged, it would have to be admitted that the sentence aims at conveying the oneness of that which is distinguished by the different attributes denoted by the words co-ordinated, and from this it follows that the highest Self participates in all the suffering expressed by the word 'thou'!—This is not so, we reply; since the word 'thou' also denotes the highest Self, viz. in so far as it is the inner Ruler (antaryāmin) of all souls.—The connected meaning of the text is as follows. That which is denoted as 'Being,' i. e. the highest Brahman which is the cause of all, free from all shadow of imperfection, &c., resolved 'to be many'; it thereupon sent forth the entire world, consisting of fire, water, &c.; introduced, in this world so sent forth, the whole mass of individual souls into different bodies divine, human, &c., corresponding to the desert of each soul—the souls thus constituting the Self of the bodies; and finally, itself entering according to its wish into these souls—so as to constitute their inner Self—evolved in all these aggregates, names and forms, i. e. rendered each aggregate something substantial (*vastu*) and capable of being denoted by a word. 'Let me enter into these beings with this living Self' (*gīvena ātmana*) means 'with this living *me*,' and this shows the living Self, i. e. the individual soul to have Brahman for its Self. And that this having Brahman for its Self means Brahman's being the inner Self of the soul (i. e. the Self inside the soul, but not identical with it), Scripture declares by saying that Brahman entered into it. This is clearly stated in the passage Taitt. Up. II, 6, 'He sent forth all this, whatever there is. Having sent forth he entered into it. Having entered it he became *sat* and *tyat*.' For here 'all this' comprises beings intelligent as well as non-intelligent, which afterwards are distinguished as *sat* and *tyat*, as knowledge (*vidyā*) and non-knowledge. Brahman is thus said to enter into intelligent beings also. Hence, owing to this evolution of names and forms, all words denote the highest Self dis-

tinguished by non-intelligent matter and intelligent souls.—Another text, viz. *Kh. Up.* VI, 8, 7, 'All this has its Self in that,' denotes by 'all this' the entire world inclusive of intelligent souls, and says that of this world that (i.e. Brahman) is the Self. Brahman thus being the Self with regard to the whole universe of matter and souls, the universe inclusive of intelligent souls is the body of Brahman.—Other scriptural texts teach the same doctrine; cp. 'Entered within, the ruler of beings, the Self of all' (*Taitt. Ār.* III, 24); 'He who dwelling in the earth is within the earth—whose body is the earth,' &c., up to 'he who dwelling within the Self is within the Self, whom the Self does not know, of whom the Self is the body, who rules the Self from within, he is thy Self, the Ruler within, the Immortal' (*Bṛi. Up.* III, 7, 3-22; *Mādhyaṇḍ. Sā.*); 'He who moves within the earth, of whom the earth is the body, &c.—who moves within the Imperishable, of whom the Imperishable is the body, whom the Imperishable does not know; he the inward ruler of all beings, free from evil, the divine, the one god, *Nārāyaṇa*' (*Subā. Up.* VII). All these texts declare that the world inclusive of intelligent souls is the body of the highest Self, and the latter the Self of everything. Hence those words also that denote intelligent souls designate the highest Self as having intelligent souls for his body and constituting the Self of them; in the same way as words denoting non-sentient masses of matter, such as the bodies of gods, men, &c., designate the individual souls to which those bodies belong. For the body stands towards the embodied soul in the relation of a mode (*prakāra*); and as words denoting a mode accomplish their full function only in denoting the thing to which the mode belongs, we must admit an analogous comprehensiveness of meaning for those words which denote a body. For, when a thing is apprehended under the form 'this is such,' the element apprehended as 'such' is what constitutes a mode; now as this element is relative to the thing, the idea of it is also relative to the thing, and finds its accomplishment in the thing only; hence the word also which expresses the mode finds its accomplishment in the thing. Hence words such as 'cow,' 'horse,' 'man,' which

denote a mode, viz. a species, comprise in their meaning also that mass of matter which exhibits the characteristics of the species, and as that mass of matter constitutes the body and therefore is a mode of a soul, and as that soul again, so embodied, is a mode of the highest Self; it follows that all these words extend in their signification up to the highest Self. The meaning of all words then is the highest Self, and hence their co-ordination with words directly denoting that highest Self is a primary (not merely 'implied') one.

But, an objection is raised, we indeed observe that words denoting species or qualities stand in co-ordination to words denoting substances, 'the ox is short-horned,' 'the sugar is white'; but where substances appear as the modes of other substances we find that formative affixes are used, 'the man is *dandīn*, *kundalīn*' (bearing a stick; wearing earrings).—This is not so, we reply. There is nothing to single out either species, or quality, or substance, as what determines co-ordination: co-ordination disregards such limitations. Whenever a *thing* (whether species, or quality, or substance) has existence as a *mode* only—owing to its proof, existence and conception being inseparably connected with something else—the words denoting it, as they designate a substance characterised by the attribute denoted by them, appropriately enter into co-ordination with other words denoting the same substance as characterised by other attributes. Where, on the other hand, a substance which is established in separation from other things and rests on itself, is assumed to stand occasionally in the relation of mode to another substance, this is appropriately expressed by the use of derived forms such as '*dandīn*, *kundalīn*.' Hence such words as 'I,' 'thou,' &c., which are different forms of appellation of the individual soul, at bottom denote the highest Self only; for the individual souls together with non-sentient matter are the body—and hence modes—of the highest Self. This entire view is condensed in the co-ordination 'Thou art that.' The individual soul being thus connected with the highest Self as its body, its attributes do not touch the highest

Self, not any more than infancy, youth, and other attributes of the material body touch the individual soul. Hence, in the co-ordination 'Thou art that,' the word 'that' denotes the highest Brahman which is the cause of the world, whose purposes come true, which comprises within itself all blessed qualities, which is free from all shadow of evil; while the word 'thou' denotes the same highest Self in so far as having for its body the individual souls together with their bodies. The terms co-ordinated may thus be taken in their primary senses; there is no contradiction either with the subject-matter of the section, or with scripture in general; and not a shadow of imperfection such as Nescience, and so on, attaches to Brahman, the blameless, the absolutely blessed. The co-ordination with the individual soul thus proves only the difference of Brahman from the soul, which is a mere mode of Brahman; and hence we hold that different from the Self consisting of knowledge, i. e. the individual soul, is the Self consisting of bliss, i. e. the highest Self.

Nor is there any force in the objection that as the Self of bliss is said to be 'sārīra,' i. e. embodied—viz. in the clause 'of him the embodied Self is the same' (Taitt. Up. II, 5, 6)—it cannot be different from the individual soul. For throughout this section the recurring clause 'of him the embodied Self is the same as of the preceding one,' refers to the highest Self, calling that the 'embodied' one. The clause 'From that same Self sprang ether' (II, 1) designates the highest Brahman—which is different from the individual soul and is introduced as the highest cause of all things created—as the 'Self'; whence we conclude that all things different from it—from ether up to the Self of food—constitute its body. The Subāla-upanishad moreover states quite directly that all beings constitute the body of the highest Self: 'He of whom the earth is the body, of whom water is the body, of whom fire is the body, of whom wind is the body, of whom ether is the body, of whom the Imperishable is the body, of whom Death is the body, he the inner Self of all, the divine one, the one god Nārāyaṇa.' From this it follows that what constitutes the

embodied Self of the Self of food is nothing else but the highest Self referred to in the clause 'From that same Self sprang ether.' When, then, the text further on says with regard to the Self of breath, 'of him the embodied Self is the same as of the preceding one' (II, 3), the meaning can only be that what constitutes the embodied Self of the 'preceding' Self of food, viz. the highest Self which is the universal cause, is also the embodied Self of the Self consisting of breath. The same reasoning holds good with regard to the Self consisting of mind and the Self consisting of knowledge. In the case, finally, of the Self consisting of bliss, the expression 'the same' (*esha eva*) is meant to convey that that Self has its Self in nothing different from itself. For when, after having understood that the highest Self is the embodied Self of the *vigñānamaya* also, we are told that the embodied Self of that *vigñānamaya* is also the embodied Self of the *ānandamaya*, we understand that of the *ānandamaya*—which we know to be the highest Self on the ground of 'multiplication'—its own Self is the Self. The final purport of the whole section thus is that everything different from the highest Self, whether of intelligent or non-intelligent nature, constitutes its body, while that Self alone is the non-conditioned embodied Self. For this very reason competent persons designate this doctrine which has the highest Brahman for its subject-matter as the '*sārīraka*,' i. e. the doctrine of the 'embodied' Self.—We have thus arrived at the conclusion that the Self of bliss is something different from the individual Self, viz. the highest Self.

Here the *Pūrvapakshin* raises the following objection.—The Self consisting of bliss (*ānandamaya*) is not something different from the individual soul, because the formative element -*maya* denotes something made, a thing effected. That this is the meaning of -*maya* in *ānandamaya* we know from *Pāṇini* IV, 3, 144.—But according to *Pā.* V, 4, 21, -*maya* has also the sense of 'abounding in'; as when we say 'the sacrifice is *annamaya*,' i. e. abounds in food. And this may be its sense in '*ānandamaya*' also!—Not so, the *Pūrvapakshin* replies. In '*annamaya*,' in an earlier part of the chapter, -*maya* has the sense of 'made of,' 'consisting

of'; and for the sake of consistency, we must hence ascribe the same sense to it in 'ānandamaya.' And even if, in the latter word, it denoted abundance, this would not prove that the ānandamaya is other than the individual soul. For if we say that a Self 'abounds' in bliss, this implies that with all this bliss there is mixed some small part of pain; and to be 'mixed with pain' is what constitutes the character of the individual soul. It is therefore proper to assume, in agreement with its previous use, that 'ānandamaya' means 'consisting of bliss.' In ordinary speech as well as in Védic language (cp. common words such as 'mr̥inmaya,' 'hiraṇmaya'; and Vedic clauses such as 'parṇamayī guhûḥ') -maya as a rule means 'consisting of,' and this meaning hence presents itself to the mind first. And the individual soul *may* be denoted as 'made of bliss'; for in itself it is of the essence of bliss, and its Samsāra state therefore is something 'made of bliss.' The conclusion therefore is that, owing to the received meaning of -maya, the ānandamaya is none other than the individual soul.—To this primâ facie view the next Sūtra refers and refutes it.

14. If, on account of its being a word denoting an effect, (ānandamaya be said) not (to denote the highest Self); (we say) no, on account of abundance.

We deny the conclusion of the Pūrvapakshin, on the ground of there being abundance of bliss in the highest Brahman, and 'abundance' being one of the possible meanings of -maya.—Since bliss such as described in the Taitt. Up.—bliss which is reached by successively multiplying by hundred all inferior kinds of bliss—cannot belong to the individual soul, we conclude that it belongs to Brahman; and as Brahman cannot be an effect, and as -maya may have the sense of 'abounding in,' we conclude that the ānandamaya is Brahman itself; inner contradiction obliging us to set aside that sense of -maya which is recommended by regard to 'consequence' and frequency of usage. The regard for consistency, moreover, already has to be set aside in the case of the 'prāṇamaya'; for in that term

-maya cannot denote 'made of.' The 'prāṇamaya' Self can only be called by that name in so far as air with its five modifications has (among others) the modification called *prāṇa*, i. e. breathing out, or because among the five modifications or functions of air *prāṇa* is the 'abounding,' i. e. prevailing one.—Nor can it be truly said that -maya is but rarely used in the sense of 'abounding in': expressions such as 'a sacrifice abounding in food' (*annamaya*), 'a procession with many carriages' (*sakatamayī*), are by no means uncommon.—Nor can we admit that to call something 'abounding in bliss' implies the presence of *some* pain. For 'abundance' precludes paucity on the part of that which is said to abound, but does not imply the presence of what is contrary. The presence or absence of what is contrary has to be ascertained by other means of proof; and in our case we do ascertain the absence of what is contrary to bliss by such means, viz. the clause 'free from evil,' &c. Abundance of bliss on the part of Brahman certainly implies a relation to paucity on the part of some other bliss; and in accordance with this demand the text says 'That is one measure of human bliss,' &c. (II, 8, 1). The bliss of Brahman is of measureless abundance, compared to the bliss of the individual soul.—Nor can it be maintained that the individual soul may be viewed as being an effect of bliss. For that a soul whose essential nature is knowledge and bliss should in any way be changed into something else, as a lump of clay is made into a pot, is an assumption contradicted by all scripture, sacred tradition, and reasoning. That in the *Samsāra* state the soul's bliss and knowledge are contracted owing to *karman* will be shown later on.—The Self of bliss therefore is other than the individual soul; it is Brahman itself.

A further reason for this conclusion is supplied by the next Sūtra.

15. And because he is declared to be the cause of that.

'For who could breathe, who could breathe forth, if that bliss existed not in the ether? He alone causes bliss'

(Taitt. Up. II, 7). This means—He alone is the cause of bliss on the part of the individual souls.—Some one is here designated as the cause of bliss enjoyed by the souls; and we thus conclude that the causer of bliss, who must be other than the souls to which bliss is imparted, is the highest Self abounding in bliss.

In the passage quoted the term 'bliss' denotes him who abounds in bliss, as will be shown later on.—A further reason is given in the next Sūtra.

16. And because that (Brahman) which is referred to in the mantra is declared (to be the ānandamaya).

That Brahman which is described in the mantra, 'True Being, knowledge, infinite is Brahman,' is proclaimed as the Self abounding in bliss. And that Brahman is the highest Brahman, other than the individual soul; for the passage 'He who knows Brahman attains the Highest' refers to Brahman as something to be obtained by the individual soul, and the words 'On this the following verse is recorded' show that the verse is related to that same Brahman. The mantra thus is meant to render clear the meaning of the Brāhmaṇa passage. Now the Brahman to be reached by the meditating Devotee must be something different from him. The same point is rendered clear by all the following Brāhmaṇa passages and mantras: 'from that same Self sprang ether,' and so on. The Self abounding in bliss therefore is other than the individual soul.

Here an opponent argues as follows:—We indeed must acknowledge that the object to be reached is something different from the meditating Devotee; but the fact is that the Brahman described in the mantra does not substantially differ from the individual soul; that Brahman is nothing but the soul of the Devotee in its pure state, consisting of mere non-differenced intelligence; free from all shade of Nescience. To this pure condition it is reduced in the mantra describing it as true Being, knowledge, infinite. A subsequent passage, 'that from which all speech, with the mind, turns away, unable to reach it' (II, 9), expresses this

same state of non-differentiation, describing it as lying beyond mind and speech. It is this therefore to which the mantra refers, and the Self of bliss is identical with it.—To this view the next Sūtra replies.

17. Not the other, on account of impossibility.

The other than the highest Self, i. e. the one called *gīva*, even in the state of release, is not that Self which the mantra describes; for this is not possible. For to a Self of that kind unconditioned intelligence (such as is, in the mantra, ascribed to Brahman; cp. the term '*vipaśkitā*') cannot belong. Unconditioned intelligence is illustrated by the power of all one's purposes realising themselves; as expressed in the text 'He desired, may I be many, may I grow forth.' Intelligence (*vipaśkittvam*, i. e. power of insight into various things) does indeed belong to the soul in the state of release; but as in the *Samsāra* state the same soul is devoid of such insight, we cannot ascribe to it non-conditioned intelligence. And if the released soul is viewed as being mere non-differenced intelligence, it does not possess the capacity of seeing different things, and hence cannot of course possess *vipaśkittva* in the sense stated above. That, however, the existence of a substance devoid of all difference cannot be proved by any means of knowledge, we have already shown before. Again, if the clause 'from whence speech returns,' &c., were meant to express that speech and mind return from Brahman, this could not mean that the Real is devoid of all difference, but only that mind and speech are not means for the knowledge of Brahman. And from this it would follow that Brahman is something altogether empty, futile. Let us examine the context. The whole section, beginning with 'He who knows Brahman reaches Brahman,' declares that Brahman is all-knowing, the cause of the world, consisting of pure bliss, the cause of bliss in others; that through its mere wish it creates the whole universe comprising matter and souls; that entering into the universe of created things it constitutes their Self; that it is the cause of fear and fearlessness; that it rules *Vāyu*

Āditya and other divine beings; that its bliss is ever so much superior to all other bliss; and many other points. Now, all at once, the clause 'from whence speech returns' is said to mean that neither speech nor mind applies to Brahman, and that thus there are no means whatever of knowing Brahman! This is idle talk indeed! In the clause '(that) from which speech returns,' the relative pronoun 'from which' denotes bliss; this bliss is again explicitly referred to in the clause 'knowing the bliss of Brahman'—the genitive 'of Brahman' intimating that the bliss belongs to Brahman; what then could be the meaning of this clause which distinctly speaks of a knowledge of Brahman, if Brahman had at the same time to be conceived as transcending all thought and speech? What the clause really means rather is that if one undertakes to state the definite amount of the bliss of Brahman—the superabundance of which is illustrated by the successive multiplications with hundred—mind and speech have to turn back powerless, since no such definite amount can be assigned. He who knows the bliss of Brahman as not to be defined by any definite amount, does not fear anything.—That, moreover, the all-wise being referred to in the mantra is other than the individual soul in the state of release, is rendered perfectly clear by what—in passages such as 'it desired,' &c.—is said about its effecting, through its mere volition, the origination and subsistence of the world, its being the inner Self of the world, and so on.

18. And on account of the declaration of difference.

The part of the chapter—beginning with the words 'From that same Self there sprang ether'—which sets forth the nature of the Brahman referred to in the mantra, declares its difference from the individual soul, no less than from the Selfs consisting of food, breath, and mind, viz. in the clause 'different from this which consists of knowledge, is the other inner Self which consists of bliss.'—Through this declaration of difference from the individual soul we

know that the Self of bliss referred to in the mantra is other than the individual soul.

19. And on account of desire, there is no regard to what is inferred (i. e. matter).

In order that the individual soul which is enthralled by Nescience may operate as the cause of the world, it must needs be connected with non-sentient matter, called by such names as *pradhāna*, or *ānumānika* (that which is inferred). For such is the condition for the creative energy of *Brahmā* and similar beings. Our text, on the other hand, teaches that the creation of the aggregate of sentient and non-sentient things results from the mere wish of a being free from all connexion with non-sentient matter, 'He desired, may I be many, may I grow forth;' 'He sent forth all, whatever there is' (Taitt. Up. II, 6). We thus understand that that Self of bliss which sends forth the world does not require connexion with non-sentient matter called *ānumānika*, and hence conclude that it is other than the individual soul.—A further reason is stated in the next Sūtra.

20. And Scripture teaches the joining of this (i. e. the individual soul) with that (i. e. bliss) in that (i. e. the *ānandamaya*).

'A flavour he is indeed; having obtained a flavour this one enjoys bliss' (Taitt. Up. II, 7). This text declares that this one, i. e. the so-called individual soul, enjoys bliss through obtaining the *ānandamaya*, here called 'flavour.' Now to say that any one is identical with that by obtaining which he enjoys bliss, would be madness indeed.—It being thus ascertained that the Self of bliss is the highest Brahman, we conclude that in passages such as 'if that bliss were not in the ether' (Taitt. Up. II, 7), and 'knowledge, bliss is Brahman' (*Bṛi.* Up. III, 9, 28), the word '*ānanda*' denotes the '*ānandamaya*'; just as *vigñāna* means the *vigñānamaya*. It is for the same reason (viz. of *ānanda* meaning the same as *ānandamaya*) that the clause 'he who knows the bliss of Brahman' exhibits Brahman as being connected

with ānanda, and that 'the further clause 'he who knows this reaches the Self of bliss,' declares the reaching of the Self of bliss to be the fruit of the knowledge of bliss. In the subsequent anuvāka also, in the clauses 'he perceived that food is Brahman,' 'he perceived that breath is Brahman,' &c. (III, 1; 2, &c.), the words 'food,' 'breath,' and so on, are meant to suggest the Self made of food, the Self made of breath, &c., mentioned in the preceding anuvāka; and hence also in the clause 'he perceived that bliss is Brahman,' the word 'bliss' must be understood to denote the Self of bliss. Hence, in the same anuvāka, the account of the fate after death of the man who knows concludes with the words 'having reached the Self of bliss' (III, 10, 5). It is thus finally proved that the highest Brahman—which in the previous *adhikarṇa* had to be shown to be other than the so-called *Pradhāna*—is also other than the being called individual soul.—This concludes the topic of the *ānandamāya*.

A new doubt here presents itself.—It must indeed be admitted that such individual souls as possess only a moderate degree of merit are unable to accomplish the creation of the world by their mere wish, to enjoy supreme bliss, to be the cause of fearlessness, and so on; but why should not beings like *Āditya* and *Pragāpati*, whose merit is extraordinarily great, be capable of all this?—Of this suggestion the next *Sūtra* disposes.

21. The one within (the sun and the eye); on account of his qualities being declared.

It is said in the *Khândogya*: 'Now that person bright as gold, who is seen within the sun, with beard bright as gold and hair bright as gold, golden altogether to the very tips of his nails, whose eyes are like blue lotus; his name is *Ut*, for he has risen (*udita*) above all evil. He also who knows this rises above all evil. *Rīk* and *Sāman* are his joints.—So much with reference to the *devas*.—Now with reference to the body.—Now that person who is seen within the eye, he is *Rīk*, he is *Sāman*, *Uktha*, *Yagus*, Brahman. The form of this person (in the eye) is the same as of that person yonder (in the sun), the joints of the one are the

joints of the other, the name of the one is the name of the other' (*Kk. Up. I, 7*).—Here there arises the doubt whether that person dwelling within the eye and the sun be the individual soul called Āditya, who through accumulation of religious merit possesses lordly power, or the highest Self other than that soul.

That individual soul of high merit, the Pūrvapakshin maintains. For the text states that that person has a body, and connexion with a body belongs to individual souls only, for it is meant to bring the soul into contact with pleasure and pain, according to its deserts. It is for this reason that Scripture describes final Release where there is no connexion with works as a state of disembodiedness. 'So long as he is in the body he cannot get free from pleasure and pain. But when he is free from the body, then neither pleasure nor pain touches him' (*Kk. Up. VIII, 12, 1*). And a soul of transcendent merit may possess surpassing wisdom and power, and thus be capable of being lord of the worlds and the wishes (*I, 6, 8*). For the same reason such a soul may be the object of devout meditation, bestow rewards, and by being instrumental in destroying evil, be helpful towards final release. Even among men some are seen to be of superior knowledge and power, owing to superior religious merit; and this holds good with regard to the Siddhas and Gandharvas also; then with regard to the devas; then with regard to the divine beings, beginning with Indra. Hence, also, one among the divine beings, beginning with Brahmā, may in each kalpa reach, through a particularly high degree of merit, vast lordly power and thus effect the creation of the world, and so on. On this supposition the texts about that which constitutes the cause of the world and the inward Self of the world must also be understood to refer to some such soul which, owing to superiority of merit, has become all-knowing and all-powerful. A so-called highest Self, different from the individual souls, does not therefore exist. Where the texts speak of that which is neither coarse nor fine nor short, &c., they only mean to characterise the individual soul; and those texts also which refer to final

Release aim only at setting forth the essential nature of the individual soul and the means of attaining that essential nature.

This *primâ facie* view is set aside by the Sûtra. The person who is perceived within the sun and within the eye, is something different from the individual soul, viz. the highest Self; because there are declared qualities belonging to that. The text ascribes to him the quality of having risen above, i. e. being free from all evil, and this can belong to the highest Self only, not to the individual soul. For to be free from all evil means to be free from all influence of *karman*, and this quality can belong to the highest Self only, differing from all individual souls which, as is shown by their experience of pleasure and pain, are in the bonds of *karman*. Those essential qualities also which presuppose freedom from all evil (and which are mentioned in other Vedic passages), such as mastery over all worlds and wishes, capability of realising one's purposes, being the inner Self of all, &c., belong to the highest Self alone. Compare passages such as 'It is the Self free from evil, free from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, whose wishes come true, whose purposes come true' (*Kh. Up.* VIII, 1, 5); and 'He is the inner Self of all, free from evil, the divine one, the one god *Nârâyana*' (*Subâ. Up.*). Attributes such as the attribute of being the creator of the whole universe—which presupposes the power of realising one's wishes—(cp. the passage 'it desired, may I be many'); the attribute of being the cause of fear and fearlessness; the attribute of enjoying transcending bliss not limited by the capabilities of thought and speech and the like, are essential characteristics of that only which is not touched by *karman*, and they cannot therefore belong to the individual soul.—Nor is there any truth in the contention that the person within the sun, &c., cannot be a being different from individual souls because it possesses a body. For since a being which possesses the power of realising all its desires can assume a body through its mere wish, it is not generally true that embodiedness proves dependence on *karman*.—But, it may be said, by a body we understand

a certain combination of matter which springs from the primal substance (*prakṛiti*) with its three constituents. Now connexion with such a body cannot possibly be brought about by the wish of such souls even as are free from all evil and capable of realising their desires; for such connexion would not be to the soul's benefit. In the case, on the other hand, of a soul subject to *karman* and not knowing its own essential nature, such connexion with a body necessarily takes place in order that the soul may enjoy the fruit of its actions—quite apart from the soul's desire.—Your objection would be well founded, we reply, if the body of the highest Self were an effect of *Prakṛiti* with its three constituents; but it is not so, it rather is a body suitable to the nature and intentions of that Self. The highest Brahman, whose nature is fundamentally antagonistic to all evil and essentially composed of infinite knowledge and bliss—whereby it differs from all other souls—possesses an infinite number of qualities of unimaginable excellence, and, analogously, a divine form suitable to its nature and intentions, i. e. adorned with infinite, supremely excellent and wonderful qualities—splendour, beauty, fragrance, tenderness, loveliness, youthfulness, and so on. And in order to gratify his devotees he individualises that form so as to render it suitable to their apprehension—he who is a boundless ocean as it were of compassion, kindness and lordly power, whom no shadow of evil may touch—he who is the highest Self, the highest Brahman, the supreme soul, *Nārāyaṇa*!—Certain texts tell us that the highest Brahman is the sole cause of the entire world: 'From which these beings originate' (*Taitt. Up.*); 'Being only was this in the beginning' (*Kh. Up. VI, 2, 1*); 'The Self only was this in the beginning' (*Ai. Up. I, 1*); '*Nārāyaṇa* alone existed, not *Brahmā* nor *Siva*.' Other texts define his nature: 'The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' (*Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1*); 'Knowledge, bliss is Brahman' (*Bṛi. Up. III, 9, 28*); and others again deny of Brahman all connexion with evil qualities and inferior bodies sprung from *Prakṛiti*, and all dependence on *karman*, and proclaim his glorious qualities and glorious forms: 'Free from

qualities' (?); 'Free from taint' (Svet. Up. VI, 19); 'Free from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, realising his wishes and purposes' (*Kh.* Up. VIII, 1, 5); 'There is no effect and no cause known of him, no one is seen like to him or superior: his high power is revealed as manifold, as inherent action of force and knowledge' (Svet. Up. VI, 8); 'That highest great lord of lords, the highest deity of deities' (Svet. Up. VI, 7); 'He is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of him neither parent nor lord' (Svet. Up. VI, 9); 'Having created all forms and given names to them the wise one goes on calling them by those names' (Taitt. Ār. III, 12, 7); 'I know that great Person of sunlike lustre beyond the darkness' (Svet. Up. III, 8); 'All moments originated from the Person shining like lightning' (Mahānār. Up. I, 6).—This essential form of his the most compassionate Lord by his mere will individualises as a shape human or divine or otherwise, so as to render it suitable to the apprehension of the devotee and thus satisfy him. This the following scriptural passage declares, 'Unborn he is born in many ways' (Gau. Kā. III, 24); and likewise *Smṛiti*, 'Though unborn I, the imperishable Self, the Lord of the beings, presiding over my Nature, manifest myself by my *Māyā* for the protection of the Good and the destruction of the evil doers' (Bha. Gī. IV, 6, 8). The 'Good' here are the Devotees; and by '*Māyā*' is meant the purpose, the knowledge of the Divine Being; in agreement with the *Naighaṇṭukas* who register '*Māyā*' as a synonym of *gñāna* (knowledge). In the *Mahābhārata* also the form assumed by the highest Person in his *avatāras* is said not to consist of *Prakṛiti*, 'the body of the highest Self does not consist of a combination of material elements.'—For these reasons the Person within the Sun and the eye is the highest Self which is different from the individual soul of the Sun, &c.

22. And on account of the declaration of difference (the highest Self is) other (than the individual souls of the sun, &c.).

There are texts which clearly state that the highest

Self is different from Āditya and the other individual souls : 'He who, dwelling within Āditya (the sun), is different from Āditya, whom Āditya does not know, of whom Āditya is the body, who rules Āditya from within ; who dwelling within the Self is different from the Self,' &c. (*Bṛi. Up. III, 7, 9 ff.*) ; 'Of whom the Imperishable is the body, whom the Imperishable does not know ; who moves within Death, of whom Death is the body, whom Death does not know ; he is the inner self of all beings, free from evil, divine, the one God Nārāyaṇa' (*Sub. Up. VII*). These texts declare all individual souls to be the body of the sinless highest Self which is said to be the inward principle of all of them.—It is thereby completely proved that the highest Self is something different from all individual souls such as Āditya, and so on.—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of the 'one within.'

The text, 'That from which these beings are born,' teaches that Brahman is the cause of the world ; to the question thence arising of what nature that cause of the world is, certain other texts give a reply in general terms ('Being only this was in the beginning' ; 'It sent forth fire' ; 'The Self only this was in the beginning,' &c.) ; and thereupon it is shown on the basis of the special nature of that cause as proved by the attributes of 'thought' and 'bliss,' that Brahman is different from the *pradhāna* and the individual souls. The remaining part of this *Pāda* now is devoted to the task of proving that where such special terms as Ether and the like are used in sections setting forth the creation and government of the world, they designate not the thing—sentient or non-sentient—which is known from ordinary experience, but Brahman as proved so far.

23. Ether (is Brahman), on account of the characteristic marks.

We read in the *Kāṇḍogya* (I, 9), 'What is the origin of this world?' 'Ether,' he replied. 'For all these beings spring from the ether only, and return into the ether. Ether is greater than these ; ether is their rest.' Here there arises the doubt whether the word 'ether' denotes

the well-known element or Brahman.—The Pūrvapakshin maintains the former alternative. For, he says, in the case of things to be apprehended through words we must accept that sense of the word which, proved by etymology, is immediately suggested by the word. We therefore conclude from the passage that the well-known Ether is the cause of the entire aggregate of things, moving or non-moving, and that hence Brahman is the same as Ether.—But has it not been shown that Brahman is something different from non-sentient things because its creative activity is preceded by thought?—This has been asserted indeed, but by no means proved. For the proper way to combine the different texts is as follows. Having been told that ‘that from which these beings are born is Brahman,’ we desire to know more especially what that source of all beings is, and this desire is satisfied by the special information given by the text, ‘All these things spring from the ether.’ It thus being ascertained that the ether only is the cause of the origin, and so on, of the world, we conclude that also such general terms as ‘Being’ (‘Being only was this in the beginning’) denote the particular substance called ‘ether.’ And we further conclude that in passages such as ‘the Self only was all this in the beginning,’ the word ‘Self’ (ātman) also denotes the ether; for that word is by no means limited to non-sentient things—cp., e. g., the phrase, ‘Clay constitutes the Self of the jar’—, and its etymology also (ātman from āp, to reach) shows that it may very well be applied to the ether. It having thus been ascertained that the ether is the general cause or Brahman, we must interpret such words as ‘thinking’ (which we meet with in connexion with the creative activity of the general cause) in a suitable, i. e. secondary, or metaphorical sense. If the texts denoted the general cause by general terms only, such as ‘Being,’ we should, in agreement with the primary sense of ‘thinking,’ and similar terms, decide that that cause is an intelligent being; but since, as a matter of fact, we ascertain a particular cause on the basis of the word ‘ether,’ our decision cannot be formed on general considerations of what would suit the sense.—But what then

about the passage, 'From the Self there sprang the ether' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1), from which it appears that the ether itself is something created?—All elementary substances, we reply, such as ether, air, and so on, have two different states, a gross material one, and a subtle one. The ether, in its subtle state, is the universal cause; in its gross state it is an effect of the primal cause; in its gross state it thus springs from itself, i. e. ether in the subtle state. The text, 'All these beings spring from ether only' (*Kh.* Up. I, 9, 1), declares that the whole world originates from ether only, and from this it follows that ether is none other than the general cause of the world, i. e. Brahman. This non-difference of Brahman from the empirically known ether also gives a satisfactory sense to texts such as the following: 'If this ether were not bliss' (Taitt. Up. II, 7, 1); 'Ether, indeed, is the evolver of names and forms' (*Kh.* Up. VIII, 14, 1, and so on).—It thus appears that Brahman is none other than the well-known elemental ether.

This *primâ facie* view is set aside by the Sûtra. The word 'ether' in the text under discussion denotes the highest Self with its previously established characteristics—which is something quite different from the non-sentient elemental ether. For the qualities which the passage attributes to ether, viz. its being the one cause of the entire world, its being greater than all, and the rest of all, clearly indicate the highest Self. The non-intelligent elemental ether cannot be called the cause of all, since intelligent beings clearly cannot be its effects; nor can it be called the 'rest' of intelligent beings, for non-sentient things are evil and antagonistic to the true aim of man; nor can it be called 'greater' than all, for it is impossible that a non-sentient element should possess all excellent qualities whatever and thus be absolutely superior to everything else.—Nor is the Pûrvapakshin right when maintaining that, as the word 'ether' satisfies the demand for a special cause of the world, all other texts are to be interpreted in accordance herewith. The words, 'All these beings indeed spring from the ether only,' merely give expression to something generally known, and statements of this nature presuppose other

means of knowledge to prove them. Now these other means required are, in our case, supplied by such texts as 'Being only was this in the beginning,' and these, as we have shown, establish the existence of Brahman. To Brahman thus established, the text mentioning the ether merely refers as to something well known. Brahman may suitably be called 'ether' (ākāśa), because being of the nature of light it shines (ākāśate) itself, and makes other things shine forth (ākāśayati). Moreover, the word 'ether' is indeed capable of conveying the idea of a special being (as cause), but as it denotes a special non-intelligent thing which cannot be admitted as the cause of the intelligent part of the world we must deny all authoritativeness to the attempt to tamper, in the interest of that one word, with the sense of other texts which have the power of giving instruction as to an entirely new thing (viz. Brahman), distinguished by the possession of omniscience, the power of realising its purposes and similar attributes, which we ascertain from certain complementary texts—such as 'it thought, may I be many, may I grow forth,' and 'it desired, may I be many, may I grow forth.' We also point out that the agreement in purport of a number of texts capable of establishing the existence of a wonderful being possessing infinite wonderful attributes is not lightly to be disregarded in favour of one single text which moreover (has not the power of intimating something not known before, but) only makes a reference to what is already established by other texts.—As to the averment that the word 'Self' is not exclusively limited to sentient beings, we remark that that word is indeed applied occasionally to non-sentient things, but prevailingly to that which is the correlative of a body, i.e. the soul or spirit ; in texts such as 'the Self only was this in the beginning,' and 'from the Self there sprang the ether,' we must therefore understand by the 'Self,' the universal spirit. The denotative power of the term 'ātman,' which is thus proved by itself, is moreover confirmed by the complementary passages 'it desired, may I send forth the worlds,' 'it desired, may I be many, may I grow forth.'—We thus

arrive at the following conclusion : Brahman, which—by the passage ‘Being only this was in the beginning’—is established as the sole cause of the world, possessing all those manifold wonderful attributes which are ascertained from the complementary passages, is, in the text under discussion, referred to as something already known, by means of the term ‘ether.’—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of ‘ether.’

24. For the same reason breath (is Brahman).

We read in the *Khândogya* (I, 10; 11), ‘*Prastotri*, that deity which belongs to the *Prastāva*,’ &c.; and further on, ‘which then is that deity? He said—Breath. For all these beings merge into breath alone, and from breath they arise. This is the deity belonging to the *Prastāva*. If without knowing that deity you had sung forth, your head would have fallen off.’ Here the word ‘breath,’ analogously to the word ‘ether,’ denotes the highest Brahman, which is different from what is commonly called breath; we infer this from the fact that special characteristics of Brahman, viz. the whole world’s entering into and rising from it, are in that text referred to as well-known things. There indeed here arises a further doubt; for as it is a matter of observation that the existence, activity, &c., of the whole aggregate of creatures depend on breath, breath—in its ordinary acceptation—may be called the cause of the world. This doubt is, however, disposed of by the consideration that breath is not present in things such as stones and wood, nor in intelligence itself, and that hence of breath in the ordinary sense it cannot be said that ‘all beings enter into it,’ &c. We therefore conclude that Brahman is here called ‘breath’ in so far as he bestows the breath of life on all beings. And the general result of the discussion carried on in connexion with the last two *Sūtras* thus is that the words ‘ether’ and ‘breath’ denote something other than what is ordinarily denoted by those terms, viz. the highest Brahman, the sole cause of this entire world, free from all evil, &c. &c.—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of ‘breath.’

The subsequent Sûtras up to the end of the Pâda demonstrate that the being which the texts refer to as 'Light' or 'Indra'—terms which in ordinary language are applied to certain other well-known beings—, and which is represented as possessing some one or other supremely exalted quality that is invariably connected with world-creative power, is no other than the highest Brahman.

25. The light (is Brahman), on account of the mention of feet.

We read in the *Khândogya* (III, 13, 7), 'Now that light which shines above this heaven, higher than everything, in the highest worlds beyond which there are no other worlds, that is the same light which is within man.'—Here a doubt arises, viz. whether the brightly shining thing here called 'light' is the well-known light of the sun and so on, viewed as a causal universal principle (Brahman); or the all-knowing, &c., highest Person of infinite splendour, who is different in nature from all sentient and non-sentient beings, and is the highest cause.—The *Pûrvapakshin* maintains that the reference is to ordinary light. For, he says, the passage does not mention a particular characteristic attribute which can belong to the highest Self only—while such attributes *were* met with in the texts referring to Ether and Breath—, and as thus there is no opening for a recognition of the highest Self, and as at the same time the text identifies 'light' with the intestinal heat of living beings, we conclude that the text represents the well-known ordinary light as Brahman, the cause of the world—which is possible as causal agency is connected with extreme light and heat.—This *primâ facie* view the Sûtra sets aside. The light which the text states to be connected with heaven and possessing supreme splendour can be the highest Person only, since a preceding passage in the same section—'All the beings are one foot of it, three feet are the Immortal in heaven'—refers to all beings as being a foot of that same being which is connected with heaven. Although the passage, 'That light which shines above,' &c., does not mention a special attribute of the highest Person, yet the

passage previously quoted refers to the highest Person as connected with heaven, and we therefore recognise that Person as the light connected with heaven, mentioned in the subsequent passage.

Nor does the identification, made in a clause of the text, of light with the intestinal heat give rise to any difficulty ; for that clause is meant to enjoin meditation on the highest Brahman in the form of intestinal heat, such meditation having a special result of its own. Moreover, the Lord himself declares that he constitutes the Self of the intestinal fire, 'Becoming the Vaisvānara-fire I abide in the body of living creatures' (Bha. Gī. XV, 14).

26. If it be objected that (Brahman is) not (denoted) on account of the metre being denoted ; (we reply) not so, because thus the direction of the mind (on Brahman) is declared ; for thus it is seen.

The previous section at first refers to the metre called Gāyatrī, 'The Gāyatrī indeed is everything' (III, 12, 1), and then introduces—with the words 'this is also declared by a *Rik* verse'—the verse, 'Such is the greatness of it (viz. the Gāyatrī),' &c. Now, as this verse also refers to the metre, there is not any reference to the highest Person. —To this objection the second part of the Sūtra replies. The word 'Gāyatrī' does not here denote the metre only, since this cannot possibly be the Self of all ; but the text declares the application of the idea of Gāyatrī to Brahman, i.e. teaches, to the end of a certain result being obtained, meditation on Brahman in so far as similar to Gāyatrī. For Brahman having four feet, in the sense indicated by the *rik*, may be compared to the Gāyatrī with its four (metrical) feet. The Gāyatrī (indeed has as a rule three feet, but) occasionally a Gāyatrī with four feet is met with ; so, e.g., 'Indras *saṁpatiḥ* | valena *plāṭaḥ* | duṣṭyavāno *vrishā* | samitsu *sāsahik*.' We see that in other passages also words primarily denoting metres are employed in other senses ; thus, e.g., in the *samvargavidyā* (*Kā. Up.* IV, 3, 8), where Virāḡ (the name of a metre of ten syllables) denotes a group of ten divine beings.

For this conclusion the next Sūtra supplies a further argument.

27. And thus also, because (thus only) the designation of the beings, and so on, being the (four) feet is possible.

The text, moreover, designates the Gāyatrī as having four feet, after having referred to the beings, the earth, the body, and the heart; now this has a sense only if it is Brahman, which here is called Gāyatrī.

28. If it be said that (Brahman is) not (recognised) on account of the difference of designation; (we say) not so, on account of there being no contradiction in either (designation).

In the former passage, 'three feet of it are what is immortal in heaven,' heaven is referred to as the abode of the being under discussion; while in the latter passage, 'that light which shines above this heaven,' heaven is mentioned as marking its boundary. Owing to this discrepancy, the Brahman referred to in the former text is not recognised in the latter.—This objection the Sūtra disposes of by pointing out that owing to the essential agreement of the two statements, nothing stands in the way of the required recognition. When we say, 'The hawk is on the top of the tree,' and 'the hawk is above the top of the tree,' we mean one and the same thing.—The 'light,' therefore, is nothing else but the most glorious and luminous highest Person. Him who in the former passage is called four-footed, we know to have an extraordinarily beautiful shape and colour—(cp., e.g., 'I know that great Person of sunlike colour beyond the darkness' (Svet. Up. III, 9)—, and as hence his brilliancy also must be extraordinary, he is, in the text under discussion, quite appropriately called 'light.'—Here terminates the adhikarṇa of 'light.'

It has been shown that the being endowed with supreme brilliance, called 'Light,' which the text mentions as something well known, is the highest Person. The Sūtrakāra will now show that the being designated as Indra and

Prāṇa, which the text enjoins as an object of meditation, for the reason that it is the means for attaining immortality—a power which is inseparable from causal power—is likewise the highest Person.

29. Prāṇa is Brahman, on account of connexion.

We read in the Pratardana-vidyā in the Kaushītaki-brāhmaṇa that 'Pratardana, the son of Divodāsa, came, by fighting and strength, to the beloved abode of Indra.' Being asked by Indra to choose a boon he requests the God to bestow on him that boon which he himself considers most beneficial to man; whereupon Indra says, 'I am prāṇa (breath), the intelligent Self, meditate on me as Life, as Immortality.' Here the doubt arises whether the being called Prāṇa and Indra, and designating itself as the object of a meditation most beneficial to man, is an individual soul, or the highest Self.—An individual soul, the Pūrvapakshin maintains. For, he says, the word 'Indra' is known to denote an individual God, and the word 'Prāṇa,' which stands in grammatical co-ordination with Indra, also applies to individual souls. This individual being, called Indra, instructs Pratardana that meditation on himself is most beneficial to man. But what is most beneficial to man is only the means to attain immortality, and such a means is found in meditation on the causal principle of the world, as we know from the text, 'For him there is delay only so long as he is not delivered; then he will be perfect' (*Kh. Up. VI, 14, 2*). We hence conclude that Indra, who is known as an individual soul, is the causal principle, Brahman.

This view is rejected by the Sūtra. The being called Indra and Prāṇa is not a mere individual soul, but the highest Brahman, which is other than all individual souls. For on this supposition only it is appropriate that the being introduced as Indra and Prāṇa should, in the way of grammatical co-ordination, be connected with such terms as 'blessed,' 'non-ageing,' 'immortal.' ('That prāṇa indeed is the intelligent Self, blessed, non-ageing, immortal,' *Kau. Up. III, 9*.)

30. If it be said that (Brahman is) not (denoted) on account of the speaker denoting himself; (we say, not so), because the multitude of connexions with the inner Self (is possible only) in that (speaker if viewed as Brahman).

An objection is raised.—That the being introduced as Indra and Prāṇa should be the highest Brahman, for the reason that it is identical with him who, later on, is called 'blessed,' 'non-ageing,' 'immortal'—this we cannot admit. 'Know me only, I am prāṇa, meditate on me as the intelligent Self, as life, as immortality'—the speaker of these words is Indra, and this Indra enjoins on Pratardana meditation on his own person only, the individual character of which is brought out by reference to certain deeds of strength such as the slaying of the son of Tvashtri ('I slew the three-headed son of Tvashtri,' &c.). As thus the initial part of the section clearly refers to an individual being, the terms occurring in the concluding part ('blessed,' 'non-ageing,' 'immortal') must be interpreted so as to make them agree with what precedes.—This objection the Sūtra disposes of. 'For the multitude of connexions with the Self'—i. e. the multitude of things connected with the Self as its attributes—is possible only 'in that,' i. e. in that speaker viewed as the highest Brahman. 'For, as in a car, the circumference of the wheel is placed on the spokes, and the spokes on the nave, thus are these objects placed on the subjects, and the subjects on the prāṇa. That prāṇa indeed is the intelligent Self, blessed, non-ageing, immortal.' The 'objects' (bhūtamātrāḥ) here are the aggregate of non-sentient things; the 'subjects' (pragjāmātrāḥ) are the sentient beings in which the objects are said to abide; when thereupon the texts says that of these subjects the being called Indra and Prāṇa is the abode, and that he is blessed, non-ageing, immortal; this qualification of being the abode of this Universe, with all its non-sentient and sentient beings, can belong to the highest Self only, which is other than all individual souls.

The Sūtra may also be explained in a somewhat different way, viz. 'there is a multitude of connexions belonging to the highest Self, i. e. of attributes special to the highest Self, in that, viz. section.' The text at first says, 'Choose thou that boon for me which thou deemest most beneficial to man'—to which the reply is, 'Meditate on me.' Here Indra-prāṇa is represented as the object of a meditation which is to bring about Release; the object of such meditation can be none but the highest Self.—'He makes him whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds do a good deed; and him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds he makes do a bad deed.' The causality with regard to all actions which is here described is again a special attribute of the highest Self.—The same has to be said with regard to the attribute of being the abode of all, in the passage about the wheel and spokes, quoted above; and with regard to the attributes of bliss, absence of old age and immortality, referred to in another passage quoted before. Also the attributes of being 'the ruler of the worlds, the lord of all,' can belong to the highest Self only.—The conclusion therefore is that the being called Indra and Prāṇa is none other but the highest Self.—But how then can Indra, who is known to be an individual person only, enjoin meditation on himself?—To this question the next Sūtra replies.

31. The instruction (given by Indra about himself) (is possible) through insight based on Scripture, as in the case of Vāmadeva.

The instruction which, in the passages quoted, Indra gives as to the object of meditation, i. e. Brahman constituting his Self, is not based on such an insight into his own nature as is established by other means of proof, but on an intuition of his own Self, mediated by Scripture. 'Having entered into them with this living Self let me evolve names and forms' (*Kh. Up. VI, 3, 2*); 'In it all that exists has its Self' (*Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7*); 'Entered within, the ruler of creatures, the Self of all' (*Taitt. Âr. III, 21*); 'He who dwelling in the Self is different from the Self,' &c. (*Bṛi. Up.*

III, 7, 22)—from these and similar texts Indra has learned that the highest Self has the individual souls for its body, and that hence words such as 'I' and 'thou,' which denote individual beings, extend in their connotation up to the highest Self; when, therefore, he says, 'Know me only,' and 'Meditate on me,' he really means to teach that the highest Self, of which his own individual person is the body, is the proper object of meditation. 'As in the case of Vāmadeva.' As the *Rīshi* Vāmadeva perceiving that Brahman is the inner Self of all, that all things constitute its body, and that the meaning of words denoting a body extends up to the principle embodied, denotes with the word 'I' the highest Brahman to which he himself stands in the relation of a body, and then predicates of this 'I' Manu Sūrya and other beings—'Seeing this the *Rīshi*. Vāmadeva understood, I am Manu, I am Sūrya' (*Bṛi. Up. I, 4, 10*). Similarly Prahāda says, 'As the Infinite one abides within all, he constitutes my "I" also; all is from me, I am all, within me is all.' (*Vi. Pu. I, 19, 85*.) The next Sūtra states, in reply to an objection, the reason why, in the section under discussion, terms denoting the individual soul, and others denoting non-sentient things are applied to Brahman.

32. If it be said (that Brahman is not meant) on account of characteristic marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air; we say no, on account of the threefoldness of meditation; on account of (such threefold meditation) being met (in other texts also); and on account of (such threefold meditation) being appropriate here (also).

An objection is raised. 'Let none try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker'; 'I slew the three-headed son of Tvashṭri; I delivered the Arunmukhas, the devotees, to the wolves'; these passages state characteristic marks of an individual soul (*viz.* the god Indra).—'As long as *Prāṇa* dwells in this body, so long there is life'; '*Prāṇa* alone is the conscious Self, and having laid hold of this body, it makes it rise up.'—These passages again mention

characteristic attributes of the chief vital air. Hence there is here no 'multitude of attributes belonging to the Self.'—The latter part of the Sūtra refutes this objection. The highest Self is called by these different terms in order to teach threefoldness of devout meditation; viz. meditation on Brahman in itself as the cause of the entire world; on Brahman as having for its body the totality of enjoying (individual) souls; and on Brahman as having for its body the objects and means of enjoyment.—This threefold meditation on Brahman, moreover, is met with also in other chapters of the sacred text. Passages such as 'The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman,' 'Bliss is Brahman,' dwell on Brahman in itself. Passages again such as 'Having created that he entered into it. Having entered it he became *sat* and *tyat*, defined and undefined,' &c. (Taitt. Up. II, 6), represent Brahman as having for its body the individual souls and inanimate nature. Hence, in the chapter under discussion also, this threefold view of Brahman is quite appropriate. Where to particular individual beings such as Hiraṇyagarbha, and so on, or to particular inanimate things such as prakṛiti, and so on, there are attributed qualities especially belonging to the highest Self; or where with words denoting such persons and things there are co-ordinated terms denoting the highest Self, the intention of the texts is to convey the idea of the highest Self being the inner Self of all such persons and things.—The settled conclusion, therefore, is that the being designated as Indra and Prāṇa is other than an individual soul, viz. the highest Self.

SECOND PĀDA.

THE contents of the first Pāda may be summed up as follows :—It has been shown that a person who has read the text of the Veda ; who further, through the study of the Karma-Mīmāṃsā, has acquired a full knowledge of the nature of (sacrificial and similar) works, and has recognised that the fruits of such works are limited and non-permanent ; in whom there has arisen the desire for the highest aim of man, i. e. Release, which, as he has come to know in the course of reading the Vedānta portions of scripture, is effected by meditation on the nature of Brahman—such meditation having an infinite and permanent result ; who has convinced himself that words are capable of conveying information about accomplished things (not only about things to be done), and has arrived at the conclusion that the Vedānta-texts are an authoritative means of knowledge with regard to the highest Brahman ;—that such a person, we say, should begin the study of the Sāriraka-Mīmāṃsā which indicates the method how Brahman is to be known through the Vedānta-texts.

We next have shown that the text ‘That from which these creatures are born,’ &c., conveys the idea of the highest Brahman as that being which in sport, as it were, creates, sustains, and finally reabsorbs this entire universe, comprising within itself infinite numbers of variously constituted animated beings—moving and non-moving—, of objects of enjoyment for those beings, of means of enjoyment, and of abodes of enjoyment ; and which is the sole cause of all bliss. We have established that this highest Brahman, which is the sole cause of the world, cannot be the object of the other means of knowledge, and hence is to be known through scripture only. We have pointed out that the position of scripture as an authoritative means of knowledge is established by the fact that all the Vedānta-texts connectedly refer to the highest Brahman, which, although not related to any injunctions of action or absten-

tion from action, by its own essential nature constitutes the highest end of man. We have proved that Brahman, which the Vedānta-texts teach to be the sole cause of the world, must be an intelligent principle other than the non-sentient *pradhāna*, since Brahman is said to think. We have declared that this intelligent principle is other than the so-called individual soul, whether in the state of bondage or that of release ; since the texts describe it as in the enjoyment of supreme bliss, all-wise, the cause of fear or fearlessness on the part of intelligent beings, the inner Self of all created things, whether intelligent or non-intelligent, possessing the power of realising all its purposes, and so on.—We have maintained that this highest Being has a divine form, peculiar to itself, not made of the stuff of *Prakṛiti*, and not due to *karman*.—We have explained that the being which some texts refer to as a well-known cause of the world—designating it by terms such as ether or breath, which generally denote a special non-sentient being—is that same highest Self which is different from all beings, sentient or non-sentient.—We have declared that, owing to its connexion with heaven, this same highest Self is to be recognised in what the text calls a ‘light,’ said to possess supreme splendour, such as forms a special characteristic of the highest Being. We have stated that, as we recognise through insight derived from scripture, that same highest Person is denoted by terms such as *Indra*, and so on ; as the text ascribes to that ‘*Indra*’ qualities exclusively belonging to the highest Self, such, e. g., as being the cause of the attainment of immortality.—And the general result arrived at was that the Vedānta-texts help us to the knowledge of one being only, viz. Brahman, or the highest Person, or *Nārāyaṇa*—of whom it is shown that he cannot possibly be the object of the other means of knowledge, and whom the possession of an unlimited number of glorious qualities proves to differ totally from all other beings whatsoever.

Now, although Brahman is the only object of the teaching of the Vedānta-texts, yet some of these texts might give rise to the notion that they aim at setting forth (not

Brahman), but some particular being comprised within either the pradhāna or the aggregate of individual souls. The remaining Pādas of the first Adhyāya therefore apply themselves to the task of dispelling this notion and proving that what the texts in question aim at is to set forth certain glorious qualities of Brahman. The second Pāda discusses those texts which contain somewhat obscure references to the individual soul; the third Pāda those which contain clear references to the same; and the fourth Pāda finally those texts which appear to contain even clearer intimations of the individual soul, and so on.

1. Everywhere; because there is taught what is known.

We read in the *Khândogya*, 'Man is made of thought; according to what his thought is in this world, so will he be when he has departed this life. Let him form this thought: he who consists of mind, whose body is breath, whose form is light,' &c. (III, 14). We here understand that of the meditation enjoined by the clause 'let him form this thought' the object is the being said to consist of mind, to have breath for its body, &c. A doubt, however, arises whether the being possessing these attributes be the individual soul or the highest Self.—The *Pûrvapakshin* maintains the former alternative. For, he says, mind and breath are instruments of the individual soul; while the text 'without breath, without mind,' distinctly denies them to the highest Self. Nor can the Brahman mentioned in a previous clause of the same section ('All this indeed is Brahman') be connected as an object with the meditation enjoined in the passage under discussion; for Brahman is there referred to in order to suggest the idea of its being the Self of all—which idea constitutes a means for bringing about that calmness of mind which is helpful towards the act of meditation enjoined in the clause 'Let a man meditate with calm mind,' &c. Nor, again, can it be said that as the meditation conveyed by the clause 'let him form this thought' demands an object, Brahman, although mentioned in another passage, only admits of being connected with:

the passage under discussion ; for the demand for an object is fully satisfied by the being made of mind, &c., which is mentioned in that very passage itself ; in order to supply the object we have merely to change the case-terminations of the words 'manomayaḥ prāṇasarīraḥ,' &c. It having thus been determined that the being made of mind is the individual soul, we further conclude that the Brahman mentioned in the concluding passage of the section ('That is Brahman') is also the individual soul, there called Brahman in order to glorify it.

This *primâ facie* view is set aside by the Sūtra. The being made of mind is the highest Self ; for the text states certain qualities, such as being made of mind, &c., which are well known to denote, in all Vedānta-texts, Brahman only. Passages such as 'He who is made of mind, the guide of the body of breath' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 7) ; 'There is the ether within the heart, and in it there is the Person, consisting of mind, immortal, golden' (Taitt. Up. I, 6, 1) ; 'He is conceived by the heart, by wisdom, by the mind. Those who know him are immortal' (Ka. Up. II, 6, 9) ; 'He is not apprehended by the eye nor by speech, but by a purified mind' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 8) ; 'The breath of breath' (Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 18 ?) ; 'Breath alone is the conscious Self, and having laid hold of this body it makes it rise up' (Ka. Up. III, 3) ; 'All these beings merge into breath alone, and from breath they arise' (Kṛ. Up. I, 11, 5)—these and similar texts refer to Brahman as consisting of mind, to be apprehended by a purified mind, having breath for its body, and being the abode and ruler of breath. This being so, we decide that in the concluding passage, 'my Self within the heart, that is Brahman,' the word 'Brahman' has to be taken in its primary sense (and does not denote the individual soul). The text which declares Brahman to be without mind and breath, merely means to deny that the thought of Brahman depends on a mind (internal organ), and that its life depends on breath.

Or else we may interpret the Vedic text and the Sūtra as follows. The passage 'All this is Brahman ; let a man

meditate with a calm mind on this world as originating, ending, and breathing in Brahman,' conveys the imagination of meditation on Brahman as the Self of all. The subsequent clause 'Let him form the thought,' &c., forms an additional statement to that injunction, the purport of which is to suggest certain attributes of Brahman, such as being made of mind. So that the meaning of the whole section is 'Let a man meditate on Brahman, which is made of mind, has breath for its body, &c., as the Self of the whole world.'—Here a doubt presents itself. Does the term 'Brahman' in this section denote the individual soul or the highest Self?—The individual soul, the Pūrvapakshin maintains, for that only admits of being exhibited in co-ordination with the word 'all.' For the word 'all' denotes the entire world from Brahmā down to a blade of grass; and the existence of Brahmā and other individual beings is determined by special forms of karman, the root of which is the beginningless Nescience of the individual soul. The highest Brahman, on the other hand, which is all-knowing, all-powerful, free from all evil and all shadow of Nescience and similar imperfections, cannot possibly exist as the 'All' which comprises within itself everything that is bad. Moreover we find that occasionally the term 'Brahman' is applied to the individual soul also; just as the highest Lord (paramesvara) may be called 'the highest Self' (paramātmā) or 'the highest Brahman.' That 'greatness' (br̥hattva; which is the essential characteristic of 'brahman') belongs to the individual soul when it has freed itself from its limiting conditions, is moreover attested by scripture: 'That (soul) is fit for infinity' (Svet. Up.V, 9). And as the soul's Nescience is due to karman (only), the text may very well designate it—as it does by means of the term 'taggalān'—as the cause of the origin, subsistence, and reabsorption of the world. That is to say—the individual soul which, in its essential nature, is non-limited, and therefore of the nature of Brahman, owing to the influence of Nescience enters into the state of a god, or a man, or an animal, or a plant.

This view is rejected by the Sūtra. 'Everywhere,' i. e.

in the whole world which is referred to in the clause 'All this is Brahman' we have to understand the highest Brahman—which the term 'Brahman' denotes as the Self of the world—, and not the individual soul ; 'because there is taught what is known,' i.e. because the clause 'All this is Brahman'—for which clause the term 'taggalân' supplies the reason—refers to Brahman as something generally known. Since the world springs from Brahman, is merged in Brahman, and depends on Brahman for its life, therefore—as the text says—'All this has its Self in Brahman'; and this shows to us that what the text understands by Brahman is that being from which, as generally known from the Vedānta-texts, there proceed the creation, and so on, of the world. That the highest Brahman only, all-wise and supremely blessed, is the cause of the origin, &c., of the world, is declared in the section which begins, 'That from which these beings are born,' &c., and which says further on, 'he knew that Bliss is Brahman, for from bliss these beings are born' (Taitt. Up. III, 6); and analogously the text 'He is the cause, the lord of lords of the organs,' &c. (Svet. Up. VI, 9), declares the highest Brahman to be the cause of the individual soul. Everywhere, in fact, the texts proclaim the causality of the highest Self only. As thus the world which springs from Brahman, is merged in it; and breathes through it, has its Self in Brahman, the identity of the two may properly be asserted; and hence the text—the meaning of which is 'Let a man meditate with calm mind on the highest Brahman of which the world is a mode, which has the world for its body, and which is the Self of the world'—first proves Brahman's being the universal Self, and then enjoins meditation on it. The highest Brahman, in its causal condition as well as in its so-called 'effected' state, constitutes the Self of the world, for in the former it has for its body all sentient and non-sentient beings in their subtle form, and in the latter the same beings in their gross condition. Nor is there any contradiction between such identity with the world on Brahman's part, and the fact that Brahman treasures within itself glorious qualities antagonistic to all evil; for the

imperfections adhering to the bodies, which are mere modes of Brahman, do not affect Brahman itself to which the modes belong. Such identity rather proves for Brahman supreme lordly power, and thus adds to its excellences. Nor, again, can it rightly be maintained that of the individual soul also identity with the world can be predicated; for the souls being separate according to the bodies with which they are joined cannot be identical with each other. Even in the state of release, when the individual soul is not in any way limited, it does not possess that identity with the world on which there depends causality with regard to the world's creation, sustentation, and reabsorption; as will be declared in Sûtra IV, 4, 17. Nor, finally, does the Pûrvapakshin improve his case by contending that the individual soul may be the cause of the creation, &c., of the world because it (viz. the soul) is due to karman; for although the fact given as reason is true, all the same the Lord alone is the cause of the Universe.—All this proves that the being to which the text refers as Brahman is none other than the highest Self.

This second alternative interpretation of the Sûtra is preferred by most competent persons. The *Vṛttikāra*, e.g. says, 'That Brahman which the clause "All this is Brahman" declares to be the Self of all is the Lord.'

2. And because the qualities meant to be stated are possible (in Brahman).

The qualities about to be stated can belong to the highest Self only. 'Made of mind, having breath for its body,' &c. 'Made of mind' means to be apprehended by a purified mind only. The highest Self can be apprehended only by a mind purified by meditation on that Self, such meditation being assisted by the seven means, viz. abstention, &c. (see above, p. 17). This intimates that the highest Self is of pure goodness, precluding all evil, and therefore different in nature from everything else; for by the impure minded impure objects only can be apprehended.—'Having the vital breath for its body' means—being the supporter of all life in the world. To stand in

the relation of a body to something else, means to abide in that other thing, to be dependent on it, and to subserve it in a subordinate capacity, as we shall fully show later on. And all 'vital breath' or 'life' stands in that relation to the highest Self. 'Whose form is light'; i.e. who is of supreme splendour, his form being a divine one of supreme excellence peculiar to him, and not consisting of the stuff of Prakṛiti.—'Whose purposes are true'; i.e. whose purposes realise themselves without any obstruction. 'Who is the (or "of the") Self of ether'; i.e. who is of a delicate and transparent nature, like ether; or who himself is the Self of ether, which is the causal substance of everything else; or who shines forth himself and makes other things shine forth.—'To whom all works belong'; i.e. he of whom the whole world is the work; or he to whom all activities belong.—'To whom all wishes belong'; i.e. he to whom all pure objects and means of desire and enjoyment belong. 'He to whom all odours and tastes belong'; i.e. he to whom there belong, as objects of enjoyment, all kinds of uncommon, special, perfect, supremely excellent odours and tastes; ordinary smells and tastes being negated by another text, viz. 'That which is without sound, without touch, without taste,' &c. (Ka. Up. III, 15).—'He who embraces all this'; i.e. he who makes his own the whole group of glorious qualities enumerated.—'He who does not speak,' because, being in possession of all he could desire, he 'has no regard for anything'; i.e. he who, in full possession of lordly power, esteems this whole world with all its creatures no higher than a blade of grass, and hence abides in silence.—All these qualities stated in the text can belong to the highest Self only.

3. But, on account of impossibility, not the embodied soul.

Those who fully consider this infinite multitude of exalted qualities will recognise that not even a shadow of them can belong to the individual soul—whether in the state of bondage or that of release—which is a thing as insignificant as a glow-worm and, through its connexion

with a body, liable to the attacks of endless suffering. It is not possible therefore to hold that the section under discussion should refer to the individual soul.

4. And because there is (separate) denotation of the object and the agent.

The clause 'When I shall have departed from hence I shall obtain him' denotes the highest Brahman as the object to be obtained, and the individual soul as that which obtains it. This shows that the soul which obtains is the person meditating, and the highest Brahman that is to be obtained, the object of meditation: Brahman, therefore, is something different from the attaining soul.

5. On account of the difference of words.

The clause 'That is the Self of me, within the heart' designates the embodied soul by means of a genitive form, while the object of meditation is exhibited in the nominative case. Similarly, a text of the Vāgasaneyins, which treats of the same topic, applies different terms to the embodied and the highest Self, 'Like a rice grain, or a barley grain, or a canary seed, or the kernel of a canary seed, thus that golden Person is within the Self' (Sat. Br. X, 6, 3, 2). Here the locative form, 'within the Self,' denotes the embodied Self, and the nominative, 'that golden Person,' the object to be meditated on.—All this proves the highest Self to be the object of meditation.

6. And on account of *Smṛiti*.

'I dwell within the hearts of all, from me come memory and knowledge, as well as their loss'; 'He who free from delusion knows me to be the highest Person'; 'The Lord, O Arguna, is seated in the heart of all Beings, driving round by his mysterious power all beings as if mounted on a machine; to him fly for refuge' (Bha. Gī. XV, 15, 19; XVIII, 61). These *Smṛiti*-texts show the embodied soul to be the meditating subject, and the highest Self the object of meditation.

7. Should it be said that (the passage does) not

(refer to Brahman) on account of the smallness of the abode, and on account of the denotation of that (viz. minuteness of the being meditated on); we say no, because (Brahman) has thus to be meditated upon, and because (in the same passage) it is said to be like ether.

It might be contended that, as the text 'he is my Self within the heart' declares the being meditated on to dwell within a minute abode, viz. the heart; and as moreover another text—'smaller than a grain of rice,' &c., declares it to be itself of minute size, that being cannot be the highest Self, but only the embodied soul. For other passages speak of the highest Self as unlimited, and of the embodied soul as having the size of the point of a goad (cp. e.g. Mu. Up. I, 1, 6, and Svet. Up. V, 8).—This objection the Sūtra rebuts by declaring that the highest Self is spoken of as such, i. e. minute, on account of its having to be meditated upon as such. Such minuteness does not, however, belong to its true nature; for in the same section it is distinctly declared to be infinite like ether—'greater than the earth, greater than the sky, greater than heaven, greater than all these worlds' (*Kh. Up. III, 14, 3*). This shows that the designation of the highest Self as minute is for the purpose of meditation only.—The connexion of the whole section then is as follows. The clause 'All this is Brahman; let a man meditate with calm mind on this world as beginning, ending, and breathing in Brahman,' enjoins meditation on Brahman as being the Self of all, in so far as it is the cause of the origin and destruction of all, and entering into all beings as their soul gives life to them. The next clause, 'Man is made of thought; according as his thought is in this world, so will he be when he has departed this life,' declares the attainment of the desired object to depend on the nature of the meditation; and the following clause, 'Let him therefore form the following thought,' thereupon repeats the injunction with a view to the declaration of details. The clause 'He who consists of mind,' &c., up to 'who is never surprised,' then

states the nature and qualities, of the being to be meditated upon, which are to be comprised in the meditation. Next, the clause 'He is my Self,' up to 'the kernel of a canary seed,' declares that the highest Person, for the purpose of meditation, abides in the heart of the meditating devotee; representing it as being itself minute, since the heart is minute. After this the clause 'He also is my Self,' up to 'who is never surprised,' describes those aspects of the being meditated upon as within the heart, which are to be attained by the devotee. Next, the words 'this my Self within the heart is that Brahman' enjoins the reflection that the highest Brahman, as described before, is, owing to its supreme kindness, present in our hearts in order thereby to refresh and inspirit us. Then the clause 'When I shall have departed from hence I shall obtain him' suggests the idea that there is a certainty of obtaining him on the basis of devout meditation; and finally the clause 'He who has this faith has no doubt' declares that the devotee who is firmly convinced of his aim being attainable in the way described, will attain it beyond any doubt.—From all this it appears that the 'limitation of abode,' and the 'minuteness' ascribed to Brahman, are merely for the purpose of meditation.

8. Should it be said that there is attainment of fruition (of pleasure and pain); we reply, not so, on account of difference.

But, if the highest Brahman is assumed to dwell within bodies, like the individual soul, it follows that, like the latter, it is subject to the experience of pleasure and pain, such experience springing from connexion with bodies!—Of this objection the Sūtra disposes by remarking 'not so, on account of difference (of reason).' For what is the cause of experiences, pleasurable or painful, is not the mere dwelling within a body, but rather the subjection to the influence of good and evil deeds; and such subjection is impossible in the case of the highest Self to which all evil is foreign. Compare the scriptural text 'One of the two eats the sweet fruit, the other one looks on without eating'

(Mu. Up. III, 1, 1).—Here finishes the *adhikaraṇa* of 'what is known everywhere.'

Well then, if the highest Self is not an enjoyer, we must conclude that wherever fruition is referred to, the embodied soul only is meant!—Of this view the next *adhikaraṇa* disposes.

9. The eater (is the highest Self) on account of there being taken all that is movable and immovable.

We read in the *Kaṭhāvallī* (I, 2, 25), 'Who then knows where he is to whom the Brahmans and Kshatriyas are but food, and death itself a condiment?' A doubt here arises whether the 'eater,' suggested by the words 'food' and 'condiment,' is the individual soul or the highest Self.—The individual soul, the *Pūrvapakṣin* maintains; for all enjoyment presupposes works, and works belong to the individual soul only.—Of this view the *Sūtra* disposes. The 'eater' can be the highest Self only, because the taking, i. e. eating, of the whole aggregate of movable and immovable things can be predicated of that Self only. 'Eating' does not here mean fruition dependent on work, but rather the act of reabsorption of the world on the part of the highest Brahman, i. e. *Vishṇu*, who is the cause of the origination, subsistence, and final destruction of the universe. This appears from the fact that *Vishṇu* is mentioned in the same section, 'He reaches the end of his journey, and that is the highest place of *Vishṇu*' (*Ka. Up.* I, 3, 9). Moreover the clause 'to whom death is a condiment' shows that by the Brahmans and Kshatriyas, mentioned in the text, we have to understand the whole universe of moving and non-moving things, viewed as things to be consumed by the highest Self. For a condiment is a thing which, while itself being eaten, causes other things to be eaten; the meaning of the passage, therefore, is that while death itself is consumed, being a condiment as it were, there is at the same time eaten whatever is flavoured or made palatable by death, and that is the entire world of beings in which the Brahmans and Kshat-

triyas hold the foremost place. Now such eating of course is destruction or reabsorption, and hence such enjoyment—meaning general reabsorption—can belong to the highest Self only.

10. And on account of the topic of the whole section.

Moreover the highest Brahman constitutes the topic of the entire section. Cp. 'The wise who knows the Self as great and omnipresent does not grieve' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 22); 'That Self cannot be gained by the Veda, nor by understanding, nor by much learning. He whom the Self chooses, by him the Self can be gained; the Self chooses him as his own' (I, 2, 23).—Moreover, the clause (forming part of the text under discussion), 'Who knows him (i. e. the being which constitutes the topic of the section) where he is?' clearly shows that we have to recognise here the Self of which it had previously been said that it is hard to know unless it assists us with its grace.

To this conclusion a new objection presents itself.—Further on in the same Upanishad (I, 3, 1) we meet with the following text: 'There are two, drinking their reward in the world of their own works, entered into the cave, dwelling on the highest summit; those who know Brahman call them shade and light, likewise those householders who perform the *Trināṅgiketa*-sacrifice.' Now this text clearly refers to the individual soul which enjoys the reward of its works, together with an associate coupled to it. And this associate is either the vital breath, or the organ of knowledge (*buddhi*). For the drinking of '*rita*' is the enjoyment of the fruit of works, and such enjoyment does not suit the highest Self. The *buddhi*, or the vital breath, on the other hand, which are instruments of the enjoying embodied soul, may somehow be brought into connexion with the enjoyment of the fruit of works. As the text is thus seen to refer to the embodied soul coupled with some associate, we infer, on the ground of the two texts belonging to one section, that also the 'eater' described in the

former text is none other than the individual soul.—To this objection the next Sūtra replies.

11. The 'two entered into the cave' are the two Selves ; on account of this being seen.

The two, entered into the cave and drinking their reward, are neither the embodied soul together with the vital breath, nor the embodied soul together with the buddhi ; it is rather the embodied Self and the highest Self which are designated by those terms. For this is seen, i. e. it is seen that in that section the individual Self and the highest Self only are spoken of as entered into the cave. To the highest Self there refers I, 2, 12, 'The wise who by meditation on his Self recognises the Ancient who is difficult to see, who has entered into the dark, who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss, as God, he indeed leaves joy and sorrow far behind.' And to the individual soul there refers I, 4, 7, 'Who is together with the vital breath, who is Aditi, who is made of the deities, who entering into the cave abides therein, who was born variously through the elements.' Aditi here means the individual soul which enjoys (atti) the fruits of its works ; which is associated with the vital breath ; which is made of the deities, i. e. whose enjoyment is dependent on the different sense-organs ; which abides in the hollow of the heart ; and which, being connected with the elementary substances, earth, and so on, is born in various forms—human, divine, &c.—That the text speaks of the two Selves as drinking their reward (while actually the individual soul only does so) is to be understood in the same way as the phrase 'there go the umbrella-bearers' (one of whom only carries the umbrella). Or else we may account for this on the ground that both are agents with regard to the drinking, in so far as the 'drinking' individual soul is caused to drink by the highest Self.

12. And on account of distinctive qualities.

Everywhere in that section we meet with statements of distinctive attributes of the two Selves, the highest Self

being represented as the object of meditation and attainment, and the individual Self as the meditating and attaining subject. The passage 'When he has known and understood that which is born from Brahman, the intelligent, to be divine and venerable, then he obtains everlasting peace' (I, 1, 17) refers to the meditating individual soul which recognises itself as being of the nature of Brahman. On the other hand, I, 2, 3, 'That which is a bridge for sacrificers, the highest imperishable Brahman for those who wish to cross over to the fearless shore, the Nāṭiketa, may we be able to know that,' refers to the highest Self as the object of meditation; 'Nāṭiketa' here meaning that which is to be reached through the Nāṭiketa-rite. Again, the passage 'Know the Self to be sitting in the chariot and the body to be the chariot' (I, 3, 3) refers to the meditating individual soul; and the verse, I, 3, 9, 'But he who has understanding for his charioteer, and holds the reins of the mind, he reaches the end of his journey, and that is the highest place of Vishṇu,' refers to the embodied and the highest Self as that which attains and that which is to be attained. And in the text under discussion also (I, 3, 1), the two Selfs are distinctly designated as light and shade, the one being all-knowing, the other devoid of knowledge.

But, a new objection is raised, the initial passage, I, 1, 20, 'That doubt which there is when a man is dead—some saying, he is; others, he is not,' clearly asks a question as to the true nature of the individual soul, and we hence conclude that that soul forms the topic of the whole chapter.—Not so, we reply. That question does not spring from any doubt as to the existence or non-existence of the soul apart from the body; for if this were so the two first boons chosen by Nāṭiketas would be unsuitable. For the story runs as follows: When the sacrifice offered by the father of Nāṭiketas—at which all the possessions of the sacrificer were to be given to the priests—is drawing towards its close, the boy, feeling afraid that some deficiency on the part of the gifts might render the sacrifice unavailing, and dutifully wishing to render his father's sacrifice complete by giving his own person also, repeatedly asks

his father, 'And to whom will you give me'? The father, irritated by the boy's persistent questioning, gives an angry reply, and in consequence of this the boy goes to the palace of Yama, and Yama being absent, stays there for three days without eating. Yama on his return is alarmed at this neglect of hospitality, and wishing to make up for it allows him to choose three boons. Nāṭiketas, thereupon, full of faith and piety, chooses as his first boon that his father should forgive him. Now it is clear that conduct of this kind would not be possible in the case of one not convinced of the soul having an existence independent of the body. For his second boon, again, he chooses the knowledge of a sacrificial fire, which has a result to be experienced only by a soul that has departed from the body; and this choice also can clearly be made only by one who knows that the soul is something different from the body. When, therefore, he chooses for his third boon the clearing up of his doubt as to the existence of the soul after death (as stated in v. 20), it is evident that his question is prompted by the desire to acquire knowledge of the true nature of the highest Self—which knowledge has the form of meditation on the highest Self—and by means thereof, knowledge of the true nature of final Release which consists in obtaining the highest Brahman. The passage, therefore, is not concerned merely with the problem as to the separation of the soul from the body, but rather with the problem of the Self freeing itself from all bondage whatever—the same problem, in fact, with which another scriptural passage also is concerned, viz. 'When he has departed there is no more knowledge' (*Bṛi. Up. II, 4, 12*). The full purport of Nāṭiketas' question, therefore, is as follows: When a man qualified for Release has died and thus freed himself from all bondage, there arises a doubt as to his existence or non-existence—a doubt due to the disagreement of philosophers as to the true nature of Release; in order to clear up this doubt I wish to learn from thee the true nature of the state of Release.—Philosophers, indeed, hold many widely differing opinions as to what constitutes Release. Some hold that the Self is con-

stituted by consciousness only, and that Release consists in the total destruction of this essential nature of the Self. Others, while holding the same opinion as to the nature of the Self, define Release as the passing away of Nescience (avidyā). Others hold that the Self is in itself non-sentient, like a stone, but possesses, in the state of bondage, certain distinctive qualities, such as knowledge, and so on. Release then consists in the total removal of all these qualities, the Self remaining in a state of pure isolation (kaivalya). Others, again, who acknowledge a highest Self free from all imperfection, maintain that through connexion with limiting adjuncts that Self enters on the condition of an individual soul; Release then means the pure existence of the highest Self, consequent on the passing away of the limiting adjuncts. Those, however, who understand the Vedānta, teach as follows: There is a highest Brahman which is the sole cause of the entire universe, which is antagonistic to all evil, whose essential nature is infinite knowledge and blessedness, which comprises within itself numberless auspicious qualities of supreme excellence, which is different in nature from all other beings, and which constitutes the inner Self of all. Of this Brahman, the individual souls—whose true nature is unlimited knowledge, and whose only essential attribute is the intuition of the supreme Self—are modes, in so far, namely, as they constitute its body. The true nature of these souls is, however, obscured by Nescience, i. e. the influence of the beginningless chain of works; and by *Release* then we have to understand that intuition of the highest Self, which is the natural state of the individual souls, and which follows on the destruction of Nescience.—When Nāṭiketas desires Yama graciously to teach him the true nature of Release and the means to attain it, Yama at first tests him by dwelling on the difficulty of comprehending Release, and by tempting him with various worldly enjoyments. But having in this way recognised the boy's thorough fitness, he in the end instructs him as to the kind of meditation on the highest Self which constitutes knowledge of the highest Reality, as to the nature of Release—which consists in

reaching the abode of the highest Self—, and as to all the required details. This instruction begins, I, 2, 12, 'The Ancient one who is difficult to see,' &c., and extends up to I, 3, 9, 'and that is the highest place of Vishṇu.'—It thus is an established conclusion that the 'eater' is no other than the highest Self.—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of 'the eater.'

13. (The Person) within the eye (is the highest Self) on account of suitability.

The *Kṛandogas* have the following text : 'The Person that is seen within the eye, that is the Self. This is the immortal, the fearless, this is Brahman' (*Kṛ. Up. IV, 15, 1*). The doubt here arises whether the person that is here spoken of as abiding within the eye is the reflected Self, or some divine being presiding over the sense of sight, or the embodied Self, or the highest Self.—It is the reflected Self, the *Pūrvapakshin* maintains; for the text refers to the person seen as something well known, and the expression, 'is seen,' clearly refers to something directly perceived. Or it may be the individual soul, for that also may be referred to as something well known, as it is in special connexion with the eye: people, by looking into the open eye of a person, determine whether the living soul remains in him or is departing. Or else we may assume that the Person seen within the eye is some particular divine being, on the strength of the scriptural text, *Bṛi. Up. V, 5, 2*, 'He (the person seen within the sun) rests with his rays in him (the person within the eye).' Any of these beings may quite suitably be referred to as something well known.—Of these alternatives the *Sūtra* disposes by declaring that the Person within the eye is the highest Self. For the text goes on to say about the Person seen within the eye, 'They call him *Samyadvāma*, for all blessings go towards him. He is also *Vāmanī*, for he leads all blessings. He is also *Bhāmanī*, for he shines in all worlds.' And all these attributes can be reconciled with the highest Self only.

14. And on account of the statement as to abode, and so on.

Abiding within the eye, ruling the eye, and so on are predicated by scripture of the highest Self only, viz. in *Bṛi. Up.* III, 7, 18, 'He who dwells within the eye, who rules the eye within.' We therefore recognise that highest Self in the text, 'That Person which is seen within the eye.' The argument founded on reference to 'something well known' thus suits the highest Self very well; and also the clause which denotes immediate perception ('is seen') appears quite suitable, since the highest Self is directly intuited by persons practising mystic concentration of mind (Yoga).

15. And on account of the text referring only to what is characterised by pleasure.

The Person abiding within the eye is the highest Person, for the following reason also. The topic of the whole section is Brahman characterised by delight, as indicated in the passage 'Ka (pleasure) is Brahman, Kha (ether) is Brahman' (*Kh. Up.* IV, 10, 5). To that same Brahman the passage under discussion ('The Person that is seen in the eye') refers for the purpose of enjoining first a place with which Brahman is to be connected in meditation, and secondly some special qualities—such as comprising and leading all blessings—to be attributed to Brahman in meditation.—The word 'only' in the Sūtra indicates the independence of the argument set forth.

But—an objection is raised—between the Brahman introduced in the passage 'Ka is Brahman,' &c., and the text under discussion there intervenes the vidyā of the Fires (*Kh. Up.* IV, 11–13), and hence Brahman does not readily connect itself with our passage. For the text says that after the Fires had taught Upakosala the knowledge of Brahman ('Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman,' &c.), they taught him a meditation on themselves ('After that the Gārhapatya fire taught him,' &c., *Kh. Up.* IV, 11, 1). And this knowledge of the Fires cannot be considered a mere subordinate part of the knowledge of Brahman, for the text declares that it has special fruits of its own—viz. the attainment of a ripe old age and prosperous descen-

dants, &c.—which are not comprised in the results of the knowledge of Brahman, but rather opposed to them in nature.—To this we make the following reply. As both passages (viz. IV, 10, 5, ‘Breath is Brahman,’ &c.; and IV, 15, 1, ‘this is Brahman’) contain the word Brahman, and as from the words of the Fires, ‘the teacher will tell you the way,’ it follows that the knowledge of Brahman is not complete before that way has been taught, we determine that the knowledge of the Fires which stands between the two sections of the knowledge of Brahman is a mere subordinate member of the latter. This also appears from the fact that the Gārhapatya fire begins to instruct Upakosala only after he has been introduced into the knowledge of Brahman. Upakosala moreover complains that he is full of sorrows (I, 10, 3), and thus shows himself to be conscious of all the sufferings incidental to human life—birth, old age, death, &c.—which result from man being troubled by manifold desires for objects other than the attainment of Brahman; when therefore the Fires conclude their instruction by combining in saying, ‘This, O friend, is the knowledge of us and the knowledge of the Self which we impart to thee,’ it is evident that the vidyā of the Fires has to be taken as a subordinate member of the knowledge of the Self whose only fruit is Release. And from this it follows that the statement of the results of the Agnividya has to be taken (not as an injunction of results—phalavidhi—but) merely as an arthavāda (cp. Pū. Mī. Sū. IV, 3, 1). It, moreover, is by no means true that the text mentions such fruits of the Agnividya as would be opposed to final Release; all the fruits mentioned suit very well the case of a person qualified for Release. ‘He destroys sin’ (*Kh. Up.* IV, 11, 2; 12, 2; 13, 2), i. e. he destroys all evil works standing in the way of the attainment of Brahman. ‘He obtains the world,’ i. e. all impeding evil works having been destroyed he obtains the world of Brahman. ‘He reaches his full age,’ i. e. he fully reaches that age which is required for the completion of meditation on Brahman. ‘He lives long,’ i. e. he lives unassailed by afflictions until he reaches Brahman. ‘His descendants do not perish,’

i. e. his pupils, and their pupils, as well as his sons, grandsons, &c., do not perish ; i. e. they are all knowers of Brahman, in agreement with what another text declares to be the reward of knowledge of Brahman—'In his family no one is born ignorant of Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9). 'We guard him in this world and the other,' i. e. we Fires guard him from all troubles until he reaches Brahman.—The Agnividya thus being a member of the Brahmanvidya, there is no reason why the Brahman introduced in the earlier part of the Brahmanvidya should not be connected with the latter part—the function of this latter part being to enjoin a place of meditation (Brahman being meditated on as the Person within the eye), and some special qualities of Brahman to be included in the meditation.—But (an objection is raised) as the Fires tell Upakosala 'the teacher will tell you the way,' we conclude that the teacher has to give information as to the way to Brahman only ; how then can his teaching refer to the place of meditation and the special qualities of Brahman?—We have to consider, we reply, in what connexion the Fires address those words to Upakosala. His teacher having gone on a journey without having imparted to him the knowledge of Brahman, and Upakosala being dejected on that account, the sacred fires of his teacher, well pleased with the way in which Upakosala had tended them, and wishing to cheer him up, impart to him the general knowledge of the nature of Brahman and the subsidiary knowledge of the Fires. But remembering that, as scripture says, 'the knowledge acquired from a teacher is best,' and hence considering it advisable that the teacher himself should instruct Upakosala as to the attributes of the highest Brahman, the place with which it is to be connected in meditation and the way leading to it, they tell him 'the teacher will tell you the way,' the 'way' connoting everything that remains to be taught by the teacher. In agreement herewith the teacher—having first said, 'I will tell you this ; and as water does not cling to a lotus leaf, so no evil clings to one who knows it'—instructs him about Brahman as possessing certain

auspicious attributes, and to be meditated upon as abiding within the eye, and about the way leading to Brahman.—It is thus a settled conclusion that the text under discussion refers to that Brahman which was introduced in the passage ‘Ka is Brahman,’ and that hence the Person abiding within the eye is the highest Self.

But—an objection is raised—how do you know that the passage ‘Ka (pleasure) is Brahman, Kha (ether) is Brahman’ really refers to the highest Brahman, so as to be able to interpret on that basis the text about the Person within the eye? It is a more obvious interpretation to take the passage about Ka and Kha as enjoining a meditation on Brahman viewed under the form of elemental ether and of ordinary worldly pleasure. This interpretation would, moreover, be in agreement with other similarly worded texts (which are generally understood to enjoin meditation on Brahman in a definite form), such as ‘Name is Brahman,’ ‘Mind is Brahman.’

16. For that very reason that (ether) is Brahman.

Because the clause ‘What is Ka the same is Kha’ speaks of ether as characterised by pleasure, the ether which is denoted by ‘Kha’ is no other than the highest Brahman. To explain. On the Fires declaring ‘Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman,’ Upakosala says, ‘I understand that breath is Brahman, but I do not understand Ka and Kha.’ The meaning of this is as follows. The Fires cannot speak of meditation on Brahman under the form of breath and so on, because they are engaged in giving instruction to me, who am afraid of birth, old age, death, &c., and desirous of final Release. What they declare to me therefore is meditation on Brahman itself. Now here Brahman is exhibited in co-ordination with certain well-known things, breath and so on. That Brahman should be qualified by co-ordination with breath is suitable, either from the point of view of Brahman having the attribute of supporting the world, or on account of Brahman being the ruler of breath, which stands to it in the relation of a body. Hence Upakosala says, ‘I understand that

breath is Brahman.' With regard to pleasure and ether, on the other hand, there arises the question whether they are exhibited in the relation of qualifying attributes of Brahman on the ground of their forming the body of Brahman, and hence being ruled by it, or whether the two terms are meant to determine each other, and thus to convey a notion of the true nature of Brahman being constituted by supreme delight. On the former alternative the declaration of the Fires would only state that Brahman is the ruler of the elemental ether and of all delight depending on the sense-organs, and this would give no notion of Brahman's true nature; on the latter alternative the Fires would declare that unlimited delight constitutes Brahman's true nature. In order to ascertain which of the two meanings has to be taken, Upakosala therefore says, 'I do not understand Ka and Kha.' The Fires, comprehending what is in his mind, thereupon reply, 'What is Ka the same is Kha, what is Kha the same is Ka,' which means that the bliss which constitutes Brahman's nature is unlimited. The same Brahman therefore which has breath for its attribute because breath constitutes its body, is of the nature of unlimited bliss; the text therefore adds, 'They taught him that (viz. Brahman) as breath and as ether.' What the text, 'Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman,' teaches thus is Brahman as consisting of unlimited bliss, and this Brahman is resumed in the subsequent text about the Person seen within the eye. That Person therefore is the highest Self.

17. And on account of the statement of the way of him who has heard the Upanishads.

Other scriptural texts give an account of the way—the first station of which is light—that leads up to the highest Person, without any subsequent return, the soul of him who has read the Upanishads, and has thus acquired a knowledge of the true nature of the highest Self. Now this same way is described by the teacher to Upakosala in connexion with the instruction as to the Person in the eye, 'They go to light, from light to day,' &c. This also

proves that the Person within the eye is the highest Self.

18. Not any other, on account of non-permanency of abode, and of impossibility.

As the reflected Self and the other Selves mentioned by the Pūrvapakshin do not necessarily abide within the eye, and as conditionless immortality and the other qualities (ascribed in the text to the Person within the eye) cannot possibly belong to them, the Person within the eye cannot be any Self other than the highest Self. Of the reflected Self it cannot be said that it permanently abides within the eye, for its presence there depends on the nearness to the eye of another person. The embodied Self again has its seat within the heart, which is the root of all sense-organs, so as to assist thereby the activities of the different senses; it cannot therefore abide within the eye. And with regard to the divinity the text says that 'he rests with his rays in him, i.e. the eye': this implies that the divine being may preside over the organ of sight although itself abiding in another place; it does not therefore abide in the eye. Moreover, non-conditioned immortality and similar qualities cannot belong to any of these three Selves. The Person seen within the eye therefore is the highest Self.

We have, under Sū. I, 2, 14, assumed as proved that the abiding within the eye and ruling the eye, which is referred to in *Bṛi. Up. III, 7, 18* ('He who dwells in the eye,' &c.), can belong to the highest Self only, and have on that basis proved that the Self within the eye is the highest Self. —Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of that 'within.'—The next Sūtra now proceeds to prove that assumption.

19. The internal Ruler (referred to) in the clauses with respect to the gods, with respect to the worlds, &c. (is the highest Self), because the attributes of that are designated.

The Vāgasaneyins, of the Kāṇva as well as the Mādhyandina branch, have the following text: 'He who

dwelling in the earth is within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, who rules the earth within, he is thy Self, the ruler within, the Immortal.' The text thereupon extends this teaching as to a being that dwells in things, is within them, is not known by them, has them for its body and rules them; in the first place to all divine beings, viz. water, fire, sky, air, sun, the regions, moon, stars, ether, darkness, light; and next to all material beings, viz. breath, speech, eye, ear, mind, skin, knowledge, seed—closing each section with the words, 'He is thy Self, the ruler within, the Immortal.' The Mādhyandinas, however, have three additional sections, viz. 'He who dwells in all worlds,' &c.; 'He who dwells in all Vedas,' &c.; 'He who dwells in all sacrifices'; and, moreover, in place of 'He who dwells in knowledge' (*vigñāna*) they read 'He who dwells in the Self.'—A doubt here arises whether the inward Ruler of these texts be the individual Self or the highest Self.

The individual Self, the Pūrvapakshin maintains. For in the supplementary passage (which follows upon the text considered so far) the internal Ruler is called the 'seer' and 'hearer,' i.e. his knowledge is said to depend on the sense-organs, and this implies the view that the 'seer' only (i.e. the individual soul only) is the inward Ruler; and further the clause 'There is no other seer but he' negatives any other seer.

This view is set aside by the Sūtra. The Ruler within, who is spoken of in the clauses marked in the text by the terms 'with respect of the gods,' 'with respect of the worlds,' &c., is the highest Self free from all evil, *Nārāyaṇa*. The Sūtra purposely joins the two terms 'with respect to the gods' and 'with respect to the worlds' in order to intimate that, in addition to the clauses referring to the gods and beings (*bhūta*) exhibited by the *Kāṇva*-text, the Mādhyandina-text contains additional clauses referring to the worlds, Vedas, &c. The inward Ruler spoken of in both these sets of passages is the highest Self; for attributes of that Self are declared in the text. For it is a clear attribute of the highest Self that being one only

it rules all worlds, all Vedas, all divine beings, and so on. Uddālaka asks, 'Dost thou know that Ruler within who within rules this world and the other world and all beings? &c.—tell now that Ruler within'; and Yāgñavalkya replies with the long passus, 'He who dwells in the earth,' &c., describing the Ruler within as him who, abiding within all worlds, all beings, all divinities, all Vedas, and all sacrifices, rules them from within and constitutes their Self, they in turn constituting his body. Now this is a position which can belong to none else but the highest Person, who is all-knowing, and all whose purposes immediately realise themselves. That it is the highest Self only which rules over all and is the Self of all, other Upanishad-texts also declare; cp. e.g. 'Entered within, the ruler of creatures, the Self of all'; 'Having sent forth this he entered into it. Having entered it he became sat and tyat,' &c. (Taitt. Up. II, 6). Similarly the text from the Subāla-Up., which begins, 'there was not anything here in the beginning,' and extends up to 'the one God, Nārāyaṇa,' shows that it is the highest Brahman only which rules all, is the Self of all, and has all beings for its body. Moreover, essential immortality (which the text ascribes to the Ruler within) is an attribute of the highest Self only.—Nor must it be thought that the power of seeing and so on that belongs to the highest Self is dependent on sense-organs; it rather results immediately from its essential nature, since its omniscience and power to realise its purposes are due to its own being only. In agreement herewith scripture says, 'He sees without eyes, he hears without ears, without hands and feet he grasps and hastes' (Svet. Up. III, 19). What terms such as 'seeing' and 'hearing' really denote is not knowledge in so far as produced by the eye and ear, but the intuitive presentation of colour and sound. In the case of the individual soul, whose essentially intelligising nature is obscured by karman, such intuitive knowledge arises only through the mediation of the sense-organs; in the case of the highest Self, on the other hand, it springs from its own nature.—Again, the clause 'there is no other seer but he'

means that there is no seer other than the seer and ruler described in the preceding clauses. To explain. The clauses 'whom the earth does not know,' &c., up to 'whom the Self does not know' mean to say that the Ruler within rules without being perceived by the earth, Self, and the other beings which he rules. This is confirmed by the subsequent clauses, 'unseen but a seer,' 'unheard but a hearer,' &c. And the next clauses, 'there is no other seer but he,' &c., then mean to negative that there is any other being which could be viewed as the ruler of that Ruler. Moreover, the clauses 'that is the Self of thee,' 'He is the Self of thee' exhibit the individual Self in the genitive form ('of thee'), and thus distinguish it from the Ruler within, who is declared to be their Self.

20. And not that which Smṛiti assumes, on account of the declaration of qualities not belonging to that; nor the embodied one.

'That which Smṛiti assumes' is the Pradhâna; the 'embodied one' is the individual soul. Neither of these can be the Ruler within, since the text states attributes which cannot possibly belong to either. For there is not even the shadow of a possibility that essential capability of seeing and ruling all things, and being the Self of all, and immortality should belong either to the non-sentient Pradhâna or to the individual soul.—The last two Sûtras have declared that the mentioned qualities belong to the highest Self, while they do not belong to the individual soul. The next Sûtra supplies a new, independent argument.

21. For both also speak of it as something different.

Both, i.e. the Mādhyandinas as well as the Kāṇvas, distinguish in their texts the embodied soul, together with speech and other non-intelligent things, from the Ruler within, representing it as an object of his rule. The Mādhyandinas read, 'He who dwells in the Self, whom the Self does not know,' &c.; the Kāṇvas, 'He who dwells

within understanding,' &c. The declaration of the individual Self being ruled by the Ruler within implies of course the declaration of the former being different from the latter.

The conclusion from all this is that the Ruler within is a being different from the individual soul, viz. the highest Self free from all evil, *Nârāyaṇa*.—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of 'the internal Ruler.'

22. That which possesses the qualities of invisibility, &c., on account of the declaration of attributes.

The *Ātharvāṇikas* read in their text, 'The higher knowledge is that by which that Indestructible is apprehended. That which is invisible, unseizable, without origin and qualities, &c., that it is which the wise regard as the source of all beings'; and further on, 'That which is higher than the high Imperishable' (*Mu. Up. I, 1, 5, 6; II, 1, 2*). The doubt here arises whether the Indestructible, possessing the qualities of imperceptibility, &c., and that which is higher than the Indestructible, should be taken to denote the *Pradhāna* and the soul of the *Sāṅkhyas*, or whether both denote the highest Self.—The *Pûrvapakshin* maintains the former alternative. For, he says, while in the text last discussed there is mentioned a special attribute of an intelligent being, viz. in the clause 'unseen but a seer,' no similar attribute is stated in the former of the two texts under discussion, and the latter text clearly describes the collective individual soul, which is higher than the imperishable *Pradhāna*, which itself is higher than all its effects. The reasons for this decision are as follows:—Colour and so on reside in the gross forms of non-intelligent matter, viz. the elements, earth, and so on. When, therefore, visibility and so on are expressly negated, such negation suggests a non-sentient thing cognate to earth, &c., but of a subtle kind, and such a thing is no other than the *Pradhāna*. And as something higher than this *Pradhāna* there are known the collective souls only, under whose guidance the *Pradhāna* gives birth to all its effects, from the so-called *Mahat* downwards

to individual things. This interpretation is confirmed by the comparisons set forth in the next sloka, 'As the spider sends forth and draws in its threads, as plants spring from the earth, as hair grows on the head and body of the living man, thus does everything arise here from the Indestructible.' The section therefore is concerned only with the Pradhâna and the individual soul.

This *primâ facie* view is set aside by the Sûtra. That which possesses invisibility and the other qualities stated in the text, and that which is higher than the high Indestructible, is no other than the highest Self. For the text declares attributes which belong to the highest Self only, viz. in I, 1, 9, 'He who knows all, cognises all,' &c. Let us shortly consider the connexion of the text. The passage beginning 'the higher knowledge is that by which the Indestructible is apprehended' declares an indestructible being possessing the attributes of invisibility and so on. The clause 'everything arises here from the Indestructible' next declares that from that being all things originate. Next the sloka, 'He who knows all and cognises all,' predicates of that Indestructible which is the source of all beings, omniscience, and similar qualities. And finally the text, 'That which is higher than the high Indestructible,' characterises that same being—which previously had been called invisible, the source of beings, indestructible, all-knowing, &c.—as the highest of all. Hence it is evident that in the text 'higher than the high Indestructible' the term 'Indestructible' does not denote the invisible, &c. Indestructible, which is the chief topic of the entire section; for there can of course be nothing higher than that which, as being all-knowing, the source of all, &c., is itself higher than anything else. The 'Indestructible' in that text therefore denotes the elements in their subtle condition.

23. Not the two others, on account of distinction and statement of difference.

The section distinguishes the indestructible being, which is the source of all, &c., from the Pradhâna as well as the individual soul, in so far, namely, as it undertakes to prove

that by the cognition of one thing everything is known; and it moreover, in passages such as 'higher than the high Indestructible,' explicitly states the difference of the indestructible being from those other two.—The text first relates that Brahmā told the knowledge of Brahman, which is the foundation of the knowledge of all, to his eldest son Atharvan: this introduces the knowledge of Brahman as the topic of the section. Then, the text proceeds, in order to obtain this knowledge of Brahman, which had been handed down through a succession of teachers to Aṅgiras, Saunaka approached Aṅgiras respectfully and asked him: 'What is that through which, if known, all this is known?' i. e. since all knowledge is founded on the knowledge of Brahman, he enquires after the nature of Brahman. Aṅgiras replies that he who wishes to attain Brahman must acquire two kinds of knowledge, both of them having Brahman for their object: an indirect one which springs from the study of the śāstras, viz. the Veda, Śikshā, Kalpa, and so on, and a direct one which springs from concentrated meditation (yoga). The latter kind of knowledge is the means of obtaining Brahman, and it is of the nature of devout meditation (bhakti), as characterised in the text 'He whom the Self chooses, by him the Self can be gained' (III, 2, 3). The means again towards this kind of knowledge is such knowledge as is gained from sacred tradition, assisted by abstention and the other six auxiliary means (see above, p. 17); in agreement with the text, 'Him the Brāhmaṇas seek to know by the study of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts, by penance, by fasting' (*Bṛi. Up.* IV, 4, 22).—Thus the Reverend Parāśara also says, 'The cause of attaining him is knowledge and work, and knowledge is twofold, according as it is based on sacred tradition or springs from discrimination.' The *Mundaka*-text refers to the inferior kind of knowledge in the passage 'the lower knowledge is the *Rig-veda*,' &c., up to 'and the dharma-śāstras'; this knowledge is the means towards the intuition of Brahman; while the higher kind of knowledge, which is called 'upāsanā,' has the character of devout meditation (bhakti), and consists in direct intuition of Brahman, is

referred to in the clause 'the higher knowledge is that by which the Indestructible is apprehended.' The text next following, 'That which is invisible,' &c., then sets forth the nature of the highest Brahman, which is the object of the two kinds of knowledge previously described. After this the passage 'As the spider sends forth and draws in its thread' declares that from that indestructible highest Brahman, as characterised before, there originates the whole universe of things, sentient and non-sentient. The next sloka (*tapasā kīyate*, &c.) states particulars about this origination of the universe from Brahman. 'Brahman swells through brooding'; through brooding, i.e. thought—in agreement with a later text, 'brooding consists of thought'—Brahman swells, i.e. through thought in the form of an intention, viz. 'may I become many,' Brahman becomes ready for creation. From it there springs first 'anna,' i.e. that which is the object of fruition on the part of all enjoying agents, viz. the non-evolved subtle principles of all elements. From this 'anna' there spring successively breath, mind, and all other effected things up to work, which is the means of producing reward in the form of the heavenly world, and Release. The last sloka of the first chapter thereupon first states the qualities, such as omniscience and so on, which capacitate the highest Brahman for creation, and then declares that from the indestructible highest Brahman there springs the effected (*kārya*) Brahman, distinguished by name and form, and comprising all enjoying subjects and objects of enjoyment.—The first sloka of the second chapter declares first that the highest Brahman is absolutely real ('That is true'), and then admonishes those who desire to reach the indestructible highest Self, which possesses all the blessed qualities stated before and exists through itself, to turn away from other rewards and to perform all those sacrificial works depending on the three sacred fires which were seen and revealed by poets in the four Vedas and are incumbent on men according to caste and āsrama. The section 'this is your path' (I, 2, 1) up to 'this is the holy Brahma-world gained by your good works' (I, 2, 6) next states the particular mode

of performing those works, and declares that an omission of one of the successive works enjoined in *Sruti* and *Smṛiti* involves fruitlessness of the works actually performed, and that something not performed in the proper way is as good as not performed at all. Stanzas 7 and ff. ('But frail in truth are those boats') declare that those who perform this lower class of works have to return again and again into the *Samsāra*, because they aim at worldly results and are deficient in true knowledge. Stanza 8 ('but those who practise penance and faith') then proclaims that works performed by a man possessing true knowledge, and hence not aiming at worldly rewards, result in the attainment of Brahman; and stanzas 12 a, 13 ('having examined all these worlds') enjoin knowledge, strengthened by due works, on the part of a man who has turned away from *mere* works, as the means of reaching Brahman; and due recourse to a teacher on the part of him who is desirous of such knowledge.—The first chapter of the second section of the Upanishad (II, 1) then clearly teaches how the imperishable highest Brahman, i.e. the highest Self—as constituting the Self of all things and having all things for its body—has all things for its outward form and emits all things from itself. The remainder of the Upanishad ('Manifest, near,' &c.) teaches how this highest Brahman, which is imperishable and higher than the soul, which itself is higher than the Unevolved; which dwells in the highest Heaven; and which is of the nature of supreme bliss, is to be meditated upon as within the hollow of the heart; how this meditation has the character of devout faith (*bhakti*); and how the devotee, freeing himself from Nescience, obtains for his reward intuition of Brahman, which renders him like Brahman.

It thus clearly appears that 'on account of distinction and statement of difference' the Upanishad does not treat of the *Pradhāna* and the soul. For that the highest Brahman is different from those two is declared in passages such as 'That heavenly Person is without body; he is both without and within, not produced, without breath and without mind, pure, higher than what is higher than the

Imperishable' (II, 1, 2); for the last words mean 'that imperishable highest Self possessing invisibility and similar qualities, which is higher than the aggregate of individual souls, which itself is higher than the non-evolved subtle elements.' The term 'akshara' (imperishable) is to be etymologically explained either as that which pervades (asrute) or that which does not pass away (a-ksharati), and is on either of these explanations applicable to the highest Self, either because that Self pervades all its effects or because it is like the so-called Mahat (which is also called akshara), free from all passing away or decaying.—Here terminates the adhikarāṇa of 'invisibility and so on.'

24. And on account of the description of its form,

'Fire is his head, his eyes the sun and the moon, the regions his ears, his speech the Vedas disclosed, the wind his breath, his heart the universe; from his feet came the earth; he is indeed the inner Self of all things' (II, 1, 4)—the outward form here described can belong to none but the highest Self; that is, the inner Self of all beings. The section therefore treats of the highest Self.

25. Vaisvānara (is the highest Self), on account of the distinctions qualifying the common term.

The *Kṛandogas* read in their text, 'You know at present that Vaisvānara Self, tell us that,' &c., and further on, 'But he who meditates on the Vaisvānara Self as a span long,' &c. (*Kṛ. Up.* V, 11, 6; 18, 1). The doubt here arises whether that Vaisvānara Self can be made out to be the highest Self or not. The Pūrvapakshin maintains the latter alternative. For, he says, the word Vaisvānara is used in the sacred texts in four different senses. It denotes in the first place the intestinal fire, so in *Bṛi. Up.* V, 9, 'That is the Vaisvānara fire by which the food that is eaten is cooked, i.e. digested. Its noise is that which one hears when one covers one's ears. When man is on the point of departing this life he does not hear that noise.'—It next denotes the third of the elements, so in *Ri. Samh.* X, 88, 12, 'For the whole world the gods

have made the Agni Vaisvânara a sign of the days.'—It also denotes a divinity, so *Rî. Samh.* I, 98, 1, 'May we be in the favour of Vaisvânara, for he is the king of the kings,' &c. And finally it denotes the highest Self, as in the passage, 'He offered it in the Self, in the heart, in Agni Vaisvânara'; and in *Pra. Up.* I, 7, 'Thus he rises as Vaisvânara, assuming all forms, as breath of life, as fire.'—And the characteristic marks mentioned in the introductory clauses of the *Khândogya*-text under discussion admit of interpretations agreeing with every one of these meanings of the word Vaisvânara.

Against this *primâ facie* view the Sûtra declares itself. The term 'Vaisvânara' in the *Khândogya*-text denotes the highest Self, because the 'common' term is there qualified by attributes specially belonging to the highest Self. For the passage tells us how Aupamanyava and four other great *Rîshis*, having met and discussed the question as to what was their Self and Brahman, come to the conclusion to go to Uddâlaka because he is reputed to know the Vaisvânara Self. Uddâlaka, recognising their anxiety to know the Vaisvânara Self, and deeming himself not to be fully informed on this point, refers them to Arvapati Kaikeya as thoroughly knowing the Vaisvânara Self; and they thereupon, together with Uddâlaka, approach Arvapati. The king duly honours them with presents, and as they appear unwilling to receive them, explains that they may suitably do so, he himself being engaged in the performance of a religious vow; and at the same time instructs them that even men knowing Brahman must avoid what is forbidden and do what is prescribed. When thereupon he adds that he will give them as much wealth as to the priests engaged in his sacrifice, they, desirous of Release and of knowing the Vaisvânara Self, request him to explain that Self to them. Now it clearly appears that as the *Rîshis* are said to be desirous of knowing that Brahman which is the Self of the individual souls ('what is our Self, what is Brahman'), and therefore search for some one to instruct them on that point, the Vaisvânara Self—to a person acquainted with which they address themselves—

can be the highest Self only. In the earlier clauses the terms used are 'Self' and 'Brahman,' in the later 'Self' and 'Vaisvânara'; from this it appears also that the term 'Vaisvânara,' which takes the place of 'Brahman,' denotes none other but the highest Self. The results, moreover, of the knowledge of the Vaisvânara Self, which are stated in subsequent passages, show that the Vaisvânara Self is the highest Brahman. 'He eats food in all worlds, in all beings, in all Selves'; 'as the fibres of the Ishikâ reed when thrown into the fire are burnt, thus all his sins are burned' (V, 18, 1; 24, 3).

The next Sûtra supplies a further reason for the same conclusion.

26. That which the text refers to is an inferential mark—thus.

The text describes the shape of Vaisvânara, of whom heaven, &c., down to earth constitute the several limbs; and it is known from Scripture and Smṛiti that such is the shape of the highest Self. When, therefore, we recognise that shape as referred to in the text, this supplies an inferential mark of Vaisvânara being the highest Self.—The 'thus' (iti) in the Sûtra denotes a certain mode, that is to say, 'a shape of such a kind being recognised in the text enables us to infer that Vaisvânara is the highest Self.' For in Scripture and Smṛiti alike the highest Person is declared to have such a shape. Cp. e.g. the text of the Âtharvavedas. 'Agni is his head, the sun and moon his eyes, the regions his ears, his speech the Vedas disclosed, the wind his breath, his heart the Universe; from his feet came the earth; he is indeed the inner Self of all things' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 4). 'Agni' in this passage denotes the heavenly world, in agreement with the text 'that world indeed is Agni.' And the following Smṛiti texts: 'He of whom the wise declare the heavenly world to be the head, the ether the navel, sun and moon the eyes, the regions the ears, the earth the feet; he whose Self is unfathomable is the leader of all beings'; and 'of whom Agni is the mouth, heaven the head, the ether the navel, the earth the

feet, the sun the eye, the regions the ear ; worship to him, the Self of the Universe!'—Now our text declares the heavenly world and so on to constitute the head and the other limbs of Vaisvânara. For Kaikeya on being asked by the *Rishis* to instruct them as to the Vaisvânara Self recognises that they all know something about the Vaisvânara Self while something they do not know (for thus only we can explain his special questions), and then in order to ascertain what each knows and what not, questions them separately. When thereupon Aupamanyava replies that he meditates on heaven only as the Self, Kaikeya, in order to disabuse him from the notion that heaven is the whole Vaisvânara Self, teaches him that heaven is the head of Vaisvânara, and that of heaven which thus is a part only of Vaisvânara, Suteḡas is the special name. Similarly he is thereupon told by the other *Rishis* that they meditate only on sun, air, ether, and earth, and informs them in return that the special names of these beings are 'the omniform,' 'he who moves in various ways,' 'the full one,' 'wealth,' and 'firm rest,' and that these all are mere members of the Vaisvânara Self, viz. its eyes, breath, trunk, bladder, and feet. The shape thus described in detail can belong to the highest Self only, and hence Vaisvânara is none other but the highest Self.

The next Sūtra meets a further doubt as to this decision not yet being well established.

27. Should it be said that it is not so, on account of the word, &c., and on account of the abiding within ; we say, no ; on account of meditation being taught thus, on account of impossibility ; and because they read of him as person.

An objection is raised. Vaisvânara cannot be ascertained to be the highest Self, because, on the account of the text and of the abiding within, we can understand by the Vaisvânara in our text the intestinal fire also. The text to which we refer occurs in the Vaisvânara-vidyā of the Vāgasaneyins, 'This one is the Agni Vaisvânara,' where the two words 'Agni' and 'Vaisvânara' are exhibited in

co-ordination. And in the section under discussion the passage, 'the heart is the Gārhapatya fire, the mind the Anvāhārya-pañana fire, the mouth the Āhavanīya fire' (*Kh. Up. V, 18, 2*), represents the Vaisvānara in so far as abiding within the heart and so on as constituting the triad of sacred fires. Moreover the text, 'The first food which a man may take is in the place of Soma. And he who offers that first oblation should offer it to Prāṇa' (*V, 19, 1*), intimates that Vaisvānara is the abode of the offering to Prāṇa. In the same way the Vāgasaneyins declare that Vaisvānara abides within man, viz. in the passage 'He who knows this Agni Vaisvānara shaped like a man abiding within man.' As thus Vaisvānara appears in co-ordination with the word 'Agni,' is represented as the triad of sacred fires, is said to be the abode of the oblation to Breath, and to abide within man, he must be viewed as the intestinal fire, and it is therefore not true that he can be identified with the highest Self only.

This objection is set aside by the Sūtra. It is not so 'on account of meditation (on the highest Self) being taught thus,' i.e. as the text means to teach that the highest Brahman which, in the manner described before, has the three worlds for its body should be meditated upon as qualified by the intestinal fire which (like other beings) constitutes Brahman's body. For the word 'Agni' denotes not only the intestinal fire, but also the highest Self in so far as qualified by the intestinal fire.—But how is this to be known?—'On account of impossibility,' i.e. because it is impossible that the mere intestinal fire should have the three worlds for its body. The true state of the case therefore is that the word Agni, which is understood to denote the intestinal fire, when appearing in co-ordination with the term Vaisvānara represented as having the three worlds for his body, denotes (not the intestinal fire, but) the highest Self as qualified by that fire viewed as forming the body of the Self. Thus the Lord also says, 'As Vaisvānara fire I abide in the body of living creatures and, being assisted by breath inspired and expired, digest the four-fold food' (*Bha. Gt. XIV, 15*). 'As Vaisvānara fire' here

means 'embodied in the intestinal fire.'—The *Khândogya* text under discussion enjoins meditation on the highest Self embodied in the Vaisvânara fire.—Moreover the Vâgasaneyins read of him, viz. the Vaisvânara, as man or person, viz. in the passage 'That Agni Vaisvânara is the person' (Sa. Brâ. X, 6, 1, 11). The intestinal fire by itself cannot be called a person; unconditioned personality belongs to the highest Self only. Compare 'the thousand-headed person' (*Ri. Samh.*), and 'the Person is all this' (*Sve. Up. I, 3, 15*).

28. For the same reasons not the divinity and the element.

For the reasons stated Vaisvânara can be neither the deity Fire, nor the elemental fire which holds the third place among the gross elements.

29. Gaimini thinks that there is no objection to (the word 'Agni') directly (denoting the highest Self).

So far it has been maintained that the word 'Agni,' which stands in co-ordination with the term 'Vaisvânara,' denotes the highest Self in so far as qualified by the intestinal fire constituting its body; and that hence the text under discussion enjoins meditation on the highest Self. Gaimini, on the other hand, is of opinion that there is no reasonable objection to the term 'Agni,' no less than the term 'Vaisvânara,' being taken *directly* to denote the highest Self. That is to say—in the same way as the term 'Vaisvânara,' although a common term, yet when qualified by attributes especially belonging to the highest Self is known to denote the latter only as possessing the quality of ruling all men; so the word 'Agni' also when appearing in connexion with special attributes belonging to the highest Self denotes that Self only. For any quality on the ground of which 'Agni' may be etymologically explained to denote ordinary fire—as when e.g. we explain 'agni' as he who 'agre nayati'—may also, in its highest non-conditioned degree, be ascribed to the supreme Self. Another difficulty

remains. The passage (V, 18, 1) 'yas tv etam evam prādesamātram abhivimānam,' &c. declares that the non-limited highest Brahman is limited by the measure of the pradesas, i. e. of the different spaces—heaven, ether, earth, &c.—which had previously been said to constitute the limbs of Vaisvānara. How is this possible?

30. On account of definiteness; thus Āsmarathya opines.

The teacher Āsmarathya is of opinion that the text represents the highest Self as possessing a definite extent, to the end of rendering the thought of the meditating devotee more definite. That is to say—the limitation due to the limited extent of heaven, sun, &c. has the purpose of rendering definite to thought him who pervades (abhi) all this Universe and in reality transcends all measure (vimāna).—A further difficulty remains. For what purpose is the highest Brahman here represented like a man, having a head and limbs?—This point the next Sūtra elucidates.

31. On account of meditation, Bādari thinks.

The teacher Bādari thinks that the representation in the text of the supreme Self in the form of a man is for the purpose of devout meditation. 'He who in this way meditates on that Vaisvānara Self as "prādesamātra" and "abhivimāna," he eats food in all worlds, in all beings, in all Selves.' What this text enjoins is devout meditation for the purpose of reaching Brahman. 'In this way' means 'as having a human form.' And 'the eating' of food in all worlds, &c. means the gaining of intuitional knowledge of Brahman which abides everywhere and is in itself of the nature of supreme bliss. The special kind of food, i. e. the special objects of enjoyment which belong to the different Selves standing under the influence of karman cannot be meant here; for those limited objects have to be shunned by those who desire final release. A further question arises. If Vaisvānara is the highest Self, how can the text say that the altar is its chest, the grass on the altar its hairs, and so

on? (V, 18, 2.) Such a statement has a sense only if we understand by Vaisvânara the intestinal fire.—This difficulty the next Sūtra elucidates.

32. On account of imaginative identification, thus Gaimini thinks; for thus the text declares.

The teacher Gaimini is of opinion that the altar is stated to be the chest of Vaisvânara, and so on, in order to effect an imaginative identification of the offering to Prâna which is daily performed by the meditating devotees and is the means of pleasing Vaisvânara, having the heaven and so on for his body, i. e. the highest Self, with the Agnihotra-offering. For the fruit due to meditation on the highest Self, as well as the identity of the offering to breath with the Agnihotra, is declared in the following text, 'He who without knowing this offers the Agnihotra—that would be as if removing the live coals he were to pour his libation on dead ashes. But he who offers this Agnihotra with a full knowledge of its purport, he offers it in all worlds, in all beings, in all Selves. As the fibres of the Ishikâ reed when thrown into the fire are burnt, thus all his sins are burnt.' (V, 24, 1-3.)

33. Moreover, they record him in that.

They (i. e. the Vâgasaneyins) speak of him, viz. Vaisvânara who has heaven for his head, &c.—i. e. the highest Self—as within that, i. e. the body of the devotee, so as to form the abode of the oblation to Prâna; viz. in the text, 'Of that Vaisvânara Self the head is Suteḡas,' and so on. The context is as follows. The clause 'He who meditates on the Vaisvânara Self as prâdesamâtra,' &c. enjoins meditation on the highest Self having the three worlds for its body, i. e. on Vaisvânara. The following clause 'he eats food in all worlds' teaches that the attaining of Brahman is the reward of such meditation. And then the text proceeds to teach the Agnihotra offered to Prâna, which is something subsidiary to the meditation taught. The text here establishes an identity between the members—fire, sun, &c.—of the Vaisvânara enjoined as object of meditation (which members

are called Suteḡas, Viśvarūpa, &c.), and parts—viz. head, eye, breath, trunk, bladder, feet—of the worshipper's body. 'The head is Suteḡas'—that means: the head of the devotee is (identical with) heaven, which is the head of the highest Self; and so on up to 'the feet,' i. e. the feet of the devotee are identical with the earth, which constitutes the feet of the highest Self. The devotee having thus reflected on the highest Self, which has the three worlds for its body, as present within his own body, thereupon is told to view his own chest, hair, heart, mind and mouth as identical with the altar, grass and the other things which are required for the Agnihotra; further to identify the oblation to Prāṇa with the Agnihotra, and by means of this Prāṇa-agnihotra to win the favour of Vaiśvānara, i. e. the highest Self. The final conclusion then remains that Vaiśvānara is none other than the highest Self, the supreme Person.—Here terminates the adhikaraṇa of 'Vaiśvānara.'

THIRD PĀDA.

1. The abode of heaven, earth, &c. (is the highest Self), on account of terms which are its own.

The followers of the Atharva-veda have the following text, 'He in whom the heaven, the earth and the sky are woven, the mind also, with all the vital airs, know him alone as the Self, and leave off other words; he is the bank (setu) of the Immortal' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 5). The doubt here arises whether the being spoken of as the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, is the individual soul or the highest Self.

The Pûrvapakshin maintains the former alternative. For, he remarks, in the next sloka, 'where like spokes in the nave of a wheel the arteries meet, he moves about within, becoming manifold,' the word 'where' refers back to the being which in the preceding sloka had been called the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, the clause beginning with 'where' thus declaring that that being is the basis of the arteries; and the next clause declares that same being to become manifold or to be born in many ways. Now, connexion with the arteries is clearly characteristic of the individual soul; and so is being born in many forms, divine and so on. Moreover, in the very sloka under discussion it is said that that being is the abode of the mind and the five vital airs, and this also is a characteristic attribute of the individual soul. It being, on these grounds, ascertained that the text refers to the individual soul we must attempt to reconcile therewith, as well as we can, what is said about its being the abode of heaven, earth, &c.

This primâ facie view is set aside by the Sûtra. That which is described as the abode of heaven, earth, &c. is none other than the highest Brahman, on account of a term which is 'its own,' i. e. which specially belongs to it. The clause we have in view is 'he is the bank of the Immortal.' This description applies to the highest Brahman only, which

alone is, in all Upanishads, termed the cause of the attainment of Immortality; cp. e. g. 'Knowing him thus a man becomes immortal; there is no other path to go' (Sve. Up. III, 8). The term 'setu' is derived from *śi*, which means to bind, and therefore means that which binds, i. e. makes one to attain immortality; or else it may be understood to mean that which leads towards immortality that lies beyond the ocean of *samsāra*, in the same way as a bank or bridge (setu) leads to the further side of a river.—Moreover the word 'Self' (ātman) (which, in the text under discussion, is also applied to that which is the abode of heaven, earth, &c.), without any further qualification, primarily denotes Brahman only; for 'ātman' comes from *āp*, to reach, and means that which 'reaches' all other things in so far as it rules them. And further on (II, 2, 7) there are other terms, 'all knowing,' 'all cognising,' which also specially belong to the highest Brahman only. This Brahman may also be represented as the abode of the arteries; as proved e. g. by Mahānār. Up. (XI, 8-12), 'Surrounded by the arteries he hangs . . . in the middle of this pointed flame there dwells the highest Self.' Of that Self it may also be said that it is born in many ways; in accordance with texts such as 'not born, he is born in many ways; the wise know the place of his birth.' For in order to fit himself to be a refuge for gods, men, &c. the supreme Person, without however putting aside his true nature, associates himself with the shape, make, qualities and works of the different classes of beings, and thus is born in many ways. Smṛiti says the same: 'Though being unborn, of non-perishable nature, the Lord of all beings, yet presiding over my Prakṛiti I am born by my own mysterious power' (Bha. Gī. IV, 6). Of the mind also and the other organs of the individual soul the highest Self is strictly the abode; for it is the abode of everything.—The next Sūtra supplies a further reason.

2. And on account of its being declared that to which the released have to resort.

The Person who is the abode of heaven, earth, and so

on, is also declared by the text to be what is to be reached by those who are released from the bondage of *Samsāra* existence. 'When the seer sees the brilliant maker and Lord as the Person who has his source in Brahman, then possessing true knowledge he shakes off good and evil, and, free from passion, reaches the highest oneness' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 3). 'As the flowing rivers disappear in the sea, losing their name and form, thus a wise man freed from name and form goes to the divine Person who is higher than the high' (III, 2, 8). For it is only those freed from the bondage of *Samsāra* who shake off good and evil, are free from passion, and freed from name and form.

For the *Samsāra* state consists in the possession of name and form, which is due to connexion with non-sentient matter, such connexion springing from good and evil works. The Person therefore who is the abode of heaven, earth, &c., and whom the text declares to be the aim to be reached by those who, having freed themselves from good and evil, and hence from all contact with matter, attain supreme oneness with the highest Brahman, can be none other than this highest Brahman itself.

This conclusion, based on terms exclusively applicable to the highest Brahman, is now confirmed by reference to the absence of terms specially applicable to the individual soul.

3. Not that which is inferred, on account of the absence of terms denoting it, and (so also not) the bearer of the *Prāṇas* (i. e. the individual soul).

As the section under discussion does not treat of the *Pradhāna*, there being no terms referring to that, so it is with regard to the individual soul also. In the text of the *Sūtra* we have to read either *ānumānam*, i. e. 'inference,' in the sense of 'object of inference,' or else *ānumānam*, 'object of inference'; what is meant being in both cases the *Pradhāna* inferred to exist by the *Sāṅkhyas*.

4. On account of the declaration of difference.

'On the same tree man sits immersed in grief, be-

wildered by "anīśa"; but when he sees the other one, the Lord, contented, and his glory; then his grief passes away' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 2). This, and similar texts, speak of that one, i. e. the one previously described as the abode of heaven, earth, &c., as different from the individual soul.—The text means—the individual soul grieves, being bewildered by her who is not 'īśa,' i. e. Prakṛiti, the object of fruition. But its grief passes away when it sees him who is other than itself, i. e. the beloved Lord of all, and his greatness which consists in his ruling the entire world.

5. On account of the subject-matter.

It has been already shown, viz. under I, 2, 21, that the highest Brahman constitutes the initial topic of the Upanishad. And by the arguments set forth in the previous Sūtras of the present Pāda, we have removed all suspicion as to the topic started being dropped in the body of the Upanishad.

6. And on account of abiding and eating.

'Two birds, inseparable friends, cling to the same tree. One of them eats the sweet fruit; without eating, the other looks on' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1). This text declares that one enjoys the fruit of works while the other, without enjoying, shining abides within the body. Now this shining being which does not enjoy the fruit of works can only be the being previously described as the abode of heaven, earth, &c., and characterised as all knowing, the bridge of immortality, the Self of all; it can in no way be the individual Self which, lamenting, experiences the results of its works. The settled conclusion, therefore, is that the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, is none other than the highest Self.—Here terminates the adhikaraṇa of 'heaven, earth, and so on.'

7. The bhūman (is the highest Self), as the instruction about it is additional to that about serenity.

The *Kṛandogas* read as follows: 'Where one sees nothing

else, hears nothing else, knows nothing else, that is fulness (bhūman). Where one sees something else, hears something else, knows something else, that is the Little' (*Kh. Up. VII, 23, 24*).

The term 'bhūman' is derived from *bahu* (much, many), and primarily signifies 'muchness.' By 'much' in this connexion, we have however to understand, not what is numerous, but what is large, for the text uses the term in contrast with the 'Little' (*alpa*), i. e. the 'Small.' And the being qualified as 'large,' we conclude from the context to be the Self; for this section of the Upanishad at the outset states that he who knows the Self overcomes grief (*VII, 1, 3*), then teaches the knowledge of the bhūman, and concludes by saying that 'the Self is all this' (*VII, 25, 2*).

The question now arises whether the Self called bhūman is the individual Self or the highest Self.—The Pūrvapakshin maintains the former view. For, he says, to Nārada who had approached Sanatkumāra with the desire to be instructed about the Self, a series of beings, beginning with 'name' and ending with 'breath,' are enumerated as objects of devout meditation; Nārada asks each time whether there be anything greater than name, and so on, and each time receives an affirmative reply ('speech is greater than name,' &c.); when, however, the series has advanced as far as Breath, there is no such question and reply. This shows that the instruction about the Self terminates with Breath, and hence we conclude that breath in this place means the individual soul which is associated with breath, not a mere modification of air. Also the clauses 'Breath is father, breath is mother,' &c. (*VII, 15, 1*), show that breath here is something intelligent. And this is further proved by the clause 'Slayer of thy father, slayer of thy mother,' &c. (*VII, 15, 2; 3*), which declares that he who offends a father, a mother, &c., as long as there is breath in them, really hurts them, and therefore deserves reproach; while no blame attaches to him who offers even the grossest violence to them after their breath has departed. For a conscious being only is capable of being

hurt, and hence the word 'breath' here denotes such a being only. Moreover, as it is observed that also in the case of such living beings as have no vital breath (viz. plants), suffering results, or does not result, according as injury is inflicted or not, we must for this reason also decide that the breath spoken of in the text as something susceptible of injury is the individual soul. It consequently would be an error to suppose, on the ground of the comparison of *Prâna* to the nave of a wheel in which the spokes are set, that *Prâna* here denotes the highest Self; for the highest Self is incapable of being injured. That comparison, on the other hand, is quite in its place, if we understand by *Prâna* the individual soul, for the whole aggregate of non-sentient matter which stands to the individual soul in the relation of object or instrument of enjoyment, has an existence dependent on the individual soul. And this soul, there called *Prâna*, is what the text later on calls *Bhûman*; for as there is no question and reply as to something greater than *Prâna*, *Prâna* continues, without break, to be the subject-matter up to the mention of *bhûman*. The paragraphs intervening between the section on *Prâna* (VII, 15) and the section on the *Bhûman* (VII, 23 ff.) are to be understood as follows. The *Prâna* section closes with the remark that he who fully knows *Prâna* is an *ativâdin*, i. e. one who makes a final supreme declaration. In the next sentence then, 'But this one in truth is an *ativâdin* who makes a supreme statement by means of the True,' the clause 'But this one is an *ativâdin*' refers back to the previously mentioned person who knows the *Prâna*, and the relative clause 'who makes,' &c., enjoins on him the speaking of the truth as an auxiliary element in the meditation on *Prâna*. The next paragraph, 'When one understands the truth then one declares the truth,' intimates that speaking the truth stands in a supplementary relation towards the cognition of the true nature of the *Prâna* as described before. For the accomplishment of such cognition the subsequent four paragraphs enjoin reflection, faith, attendance on a spiritual guide, and the due performance of sacred duties. In order that such

duties may be undertaken, the next paragraphs then teach that bliss constitutes the nature of the individual soul, previously called *Prāṇa*, and finally that the *Bhūman*, i.e. the supreme fulness of such bliss, is the proper object of inquiry. The final purport of the teaching, therefore, is that the true nature of the individual soul, freed from Nescience, is abundant bliss—a conclusion which perfectly agrees with the initial statement that he who knows the Self passes beyond sorrow. That being, therefore, which has the attribute of being ‘*bhūman*,’ is the individual Self. This being so, it is also intelligible why, further on, when the text describes the glory and power of the individual Self, it uses the term ‘*I*’; for ‘*I*’ denotes just the individual Self: ‘*I* am below, *I* am above, &c., *I* am all this’ (VII, 25, 1). This conclusion having been settled, all remaining clauses must be explained so as to agree with it.

This *primā facie* view is set aside by the *Sūtra*. The being characterised in the text as ‘*bhūman*’ is not the individual Self, but the highest Self, since instruction is given about the *bhūman* in addition to ‘serenity’ (*samprasāda*). ‘*Samprasāda*’ denotes the individual soul, as we know from the following text, ‘Now that “serenity,” having risen from out this body, and having reached the highest light, appears in its true form’ (*Kṛ. Up. VIII, 3, 4*). Now in the text under discussion instruction is given about a being called ‘the True,’ and possessing the attribute of ‘*bhūman*,’ as being something additional to the individual soul; and this being called ‘the True’ is none other than the highest Brahman. Just as in the series of beings beginning with name and ending with breath, each successive being is mentioned in addition to the preceding one—wherefrom we conclude that it is something really different from what precedes; so that being also which is called ‘the True,’ and which is mentioned in addition to the individual Self called *Prāṇa*, is something different from the individual Self, and this being called ‘the True’ is the same as the *Bhūman*; in other words, the text teaches that the *Bhūman* is the highest Brahman called ‘the True.’ This the *Vṛit-tikāra* also declares: ‘But the *Bhūman* only. The *Bhūman*

is Brahman, because in the series beginning with name instruction is given about it subsequently to the individual Self.'

But how do we know that the instruction as to 'the True' is in addition to, and refers to something different from, the being called *Prâṇa*?—The text, after having declared that he who knows the *Prâṇa* is an *ativâdin*, goes on, 'But really that one is an *ativâdin* who makes a supreme declaration by means of the True.' The 'but' here clearly separates him who is an *ativâdin* by means of the True from the previous *ativâdin*, and the clause thus does not cause us to recognise him who is *ativâdin* by means of *Prâṇa*; hence 'the True' which is the cause of the latter *ativâdin* being what he is must be something different from the *Prâṇa* which is the cause of the former *ativâdin*'s quality.—But we have maintained above that the text enjoins the speaking of 'the True' merely as an auxiliary duty for him who knows *Prâṇa*; and that hence the *Prâṇa* continues to be the general subject-matter!—This contention is untenable, we reply. The conjunction 'but' shows that the section gives instruction about a new *ativâdin*, and does not merely declare that the *ativâdin* previously mentioned has to speak the truth. It is different with texts such as 'But that one indeed is an *Agnihotrin* who speaks the truth'; there we have no knowledge of any further *Agnihotrin*, and therefore must interpret the text as enjoining truthfulness as an obligation incumbent on the ordinary *Agnihotrin*. In the text under discussion, on the other hand, we have the term 'the True,' which makes us apprehend that there is a further *ativâdin* different from the preceding one; and we know that that term is used to denote the highest Brahman, as e.g. in the text, 'The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman.' The *ativâdin* who takes his stand on this Brahman, therefore, must be viewed as different from the preceding *ativâdin*; and a difference thus established on the basis of the meaning and connexion of the different sentences cannot be set aside. An *ativâdin* ('one who in his declaration goes beyond') is one who maintains, as object of his devotion,

something which, as being more beneficial to man, surpasses other objects of devotion. The text at first declares that he who knows *Prāṇa*, i.e. the individual soul, is an *ativādin*, in so far as the object of his devout meditation surpasses the objects from name up to hope; and then goes on to say that, as that object also is not of *supreme* benefit to man, an *ativādin* in the full sense of the term is he only who proclaims as the object of his devotion the highest Brahman, which alone is of supreme unsurpassable benefit to man. 'He who is an *ativādin* by the True,' i.e. he who is an *ativādin* characterised by the highest Brahman as the object of his meditation. For the same reason the pupil entreats, 'Sir, may I be an *ativādin* with the True!' and the teacher replies, 'But we must desire to know the True!'—Moreover, the text, VII, 26, 1, '*Prāṇa* springs from the Self,' declares the origination from the Self of the being called *Prāṇa*; and from this we infer that the Self which is introduced as the general subject-matter of the section, in the clause 'He who knows the Self passes beyond death,' is different from the being called *Prāṇa*.—The contention that, because there is no question and answer as to something greater than *Prāṇa*, the instruction about the Self must be supposed to come to an end with the instruction about *Prāṇa*, is by no means legitimate. For that a new subject is introduced is proved, not only by those questions and answers; it may be proved by other means also, and we have already explained such means. The following is the reason why the pupil does not ask the question whether there is anything greater than *Prāṇa*. With regard to the non-sentient objects extending from name to hope—each of which surpasses the preceding one in so far as it is more beneficial to man—the teacher does not declare that he who knows them is an *ativādin*; when, however, he comes to the individual soul, there called *Prāṇa*, the knowledge of whose true nature he considers highly beneficial, he expressly says that 'he who sees this, notes this, understands this is an *ativādin*' (VII, 15, 4). The pupil therefore imagines that the instruction about the Self is now completed, and hence asks no further question. The

teacher on the other hand, holding that even that knowledge is not the highest, spontaneously continues his teaching, and tells the pupil that truly he only is an *ativâdin* who proclaims the supremely and absolutely beneficial being which is called 'the True,' i. e. the highest Brahman. On this suggestion of the highest Brahman the pupil, desirous to learn its true nature and true worship, entreats the teacher, 'Sir, may I become an *ativâdin* by the True!' Thereupon the teacher—in order to help the pupil to become an *ativâdin*,—a position which requires previous intuition of Brahman—enjoins on him meditation on Brahman which is the means to attain intuition ('You must desire to know the True!'); next recommends to him reflection (*manana*) which is the means towards meditation ('You must desire to understand reflection'); then—taking it for granted that the injunction of reflection implies the injunction of 'hearing' the sacred texts which is the preliminary for reflecting—advises him to cherish faith in Brahman which is the preliminary means towards hearing ('You must desire to understand faith'); after that tells him to practise, as a preliminary towards faith, reliance on Brahman ('You must desire to understand reliance'); next admonishes him, to apply himself to 'action,' i. e. to make the effort which is a preliminary requisite for all the activities enumerated ('You must desire to understand action'). Finally, in order to encourage the pupil to enter on all this, the teacher tells him to recognise that bliss constitutes the nature of that Brahman which is the aim of all his effort ('You must desire to understand bliss'); and bids him to realise that the bliss which constitutes Brahman's nature is supremely large and full ('You must endeavour to understand the "*bhûman*," i. e. the supreme fulness of bliss'). And of this Brahman, whose nature is absolute bliss, a definition is then given as follows, 'Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, knows nothing else, that is *bhûman*.' This means—when the meditating devotee realises the intuition of this Brahman, which consists of absolute bliss, he does not see anything apart from it, since the whole aggregate of things is contained within

the essence and outward manifestation (vibhūti) of Brahman. He, therefore, who has an intuitive knowledge of Brahman as qualified by its attributes and its vibhūti—which also is called *aivarya*, i. e. lordly power—and consisting of supreme bliss, sees nothing else since there is nothing apart from Brahman; and sees, i. e. feels no pain since all possible objects of perception and feeling are of the nature of bliss or pleasure; for pleasure is just that which, being experienced, is agreeable to man's nature.—But an objection is raised, it is an actual fact that this very world is perceived as something different from Brahman, and as being of the nature of pain, or at the best, limited pleasure; how then can it be perceived as being a manifestation of Brahman, as having Brahman for its Self, and hence consisting of bliss?—The individual souls, we reply, which are under the influence of *karman*, are conscious of this world as different from Brahman, and, according to their individual *karman*, as either made up of pain or limited pleasure. But as this view depends altogether on *karman*, to him who has freed himself from Nescience in the form of *karman*, this same world presents itself as lying within the intuition of Brahman, together with its qualities and vibhūti, and hence as essentially blissful. To a man troubled with excess of bile the water he drinks has a taste either downright unpleasant or moderately pleasant, according to the degree to which his health is affected; while the same water has an unmixedly pleasant taste for a man in good health. As long as a boy is not aware that some plaything is meant to amuse him, he does not care for it; when on the other hand he apprehends it as meant to give him delight, the thing becomes very dear to him. In the same way the world becomes an object of supreme love to him who recognises it as having Brahman for its Self, and being a mere plaything of Brahman—of Brahman, whose essential nature is supreme bliss, and which is a treasure-house, as it were, of numberless auspicious qualities of supreme excellence. He who has reached such intuition of Brahman, sees nothing apart from it and feels no pain. This the concluding passages of the text set

forth in detail, 'He who sees, perceives and understands this, loves the Self, delights in the Self, revels in the Self, rejoices in the Self; he becomes a Self ruler, he moves and rules in all worlds according to his pleasure. But those who have a different knowledge from this, they are ruled by others, they live in perishable worlds, they do not move in all the worlds according to their liking.' 'They are ruled by others,' means 'they are in the power of karman.' And further on, 'He who sees this does not see death, nor illness, nor pain; he who sees this sees everything and obtains everything everywhere.'

That Brahman is of the nature of supreme bliss has been shown in detail under I, 1, 12 ff.—The conclusion from all this is that, as the text applies the term 'bhûman' to what was previously called the Real or True, and which is different from the individual soul there called *Prāna*, the bhûman is the highest Brahman.

8. And on account of the suitability of the attributes.

The attributes also which the text ascribes to the bhûman suit the highest Self only. So immortality ('The Bhûman is immortal,' VII, 24, 1); not being based on something else ('it rests in its own greatness'); being the Self of all ('the bhûman is below,' &c., 'it is all this'); being that which produces all ('from the Self there springs breath,' &c.). All these attributes can be reconciled with the highest Self only.—The *Pûrvapakshin* has pointed to the text which declares the 'I' to be the Self of all (VII, 25, 1); but what that text really teaches is meditation on Brahman under the aspect of the 'I.' This appears from the introductory clause 'Now follows the instruction with regard to the I.' That of the 'I,' i.e. the individual Self, also the highest Self is the true Self, scripture declares in several places, so e.g. in the text about the inward Ruler (*Bri. Up.* III, 7). As therefore the individual soul finds its completion in the highest Self only, the word 'I' also extends in its connotation up to the highest Self; and the instruction about the 'I' which is given in the text has thus for

its object meditation on the highest Self in so far as having the individual Self for its body. As the highest Self has all beings for its body and thus is the Self of all, it is the Self of the individual soul also ; and this the text declares in the passage beginning 'Now follows the instruction about the Self,' and ending 'Self is all this.' In order to prove this the text declares that everything originates from the highest Self which forms the Self of the individual soul also, viz. in the passage 'From the Self of him who sees this, perceives this, knows this, there springs breath,' &c.—that means : breath and all other beings spring from the highest Self which abides within the Self of the meditating devotee as its inner ruler. Hence, the text means to intimate, meditation should be performed on the 'I,' in order thus firmly to establish the cognition that the highest Self has the 'I,' i. e. the individual soul for its body.

It is thus an established conclusion that the bhūman is the highest Self. Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of 'fulness.'

9. The Imperishable (is Brahman), on account of its supporting that which is the end of ether.

The Vāgasaneyins, in the chapter recording the questions asked by Gārgī, read as follows : 'He said, O Gārgī, the Brāhmanas call that the Imperishable. It is neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long, it is not red, not fluid, it is without a shadow,' &c. (*Bṛi. Up.* III, 8, 8). A doubt here arises whether that Imperishable be the Pradhāna, or the individual soul, or the highest Self.—The Pradhāna, it may be maintained in the first place. For we see that in passages such as 'higher than that which is higher than the Imperishable' the term 'Imperishable' actually denotes the Pradhāna ; and moreover the qualities enumerated, viz. not being either coarse or fine, &c., are characteristic of the Pradhāna.—But, an objection is raised, in texts such as 'That knowledge by which the Imperishable is apprehended' (*Mu. Up.* I, 1, 5), the word 'Imperishable' is seen to denote the highest Brahman!—In cases, we reply, where the meaning of a word may be determined on the basis either of some

other means of proof or of Scripture, the former meaning presents itself to the mind first, and hence there is no reason why such meaning should not be accepted.—But how do you know that the ether of the text is not ether in the ordinary sense?—From the description, we reply, given of it in the text, ‘That above the heavens,’ &c. There it is said that all created things past, present and future rest on ether as their basis; ether cannot therefore be taken as that elementary substance which itself is comprised in the sphere of things created. We therefore must understand by ‘ether’ matter in its subtle state, i. e. the Pradhāna; and the Imperishable which thereupon is declared to be the support of that Pradhāna, hence cannot itself be the Pradhāna.—Nor is there any force in the argument that a sense established by some other means of proof presents itself to the mind more immediately than a sense established by Scripture; for as the word ‘akshara’ (i. e. the non-perishable) intimates its sense directly through the meaning of its constituent elements other means of proof need not be regarded at all.

Moreover Yāgyavalkya had said previously that the ether is the cause and abode of all things past, present and future, and when Gārgî thereupon asks him in what that ether ‘is woven,’ i. e. what is the causal substance and abode of ether, he replies ‘the Imperishable.’ Now this also proves that by the ‘Imperishable’ we have to understand the Pradhāna which from other sources is known to be the causal substance, and hence the abode, of all effected things whatsoever.

This *primâ facie* view is set aside by the Sûtra. The ‘Imperishable’ is the highest Brahman, because the text declares it to support that which is the end, i. e. that which lies beyond ether, viz. unevolved matter (*avyākṛitam*). The ether referred to in Gārgî’s question is not ether in the ordinary sense, but what lies beyond ether, viz. unevolved matter, and hence the ‘Imperishable’ which is said to be the support of that ‘unevolved’ cannot itself be the ‘unevolved,’ i. e. cannot be the Pradhāna. Let us, then, the Pûrvapakshin resumes, understand by the ‘Imperishable,’

the individual soul ; for this may be viewed as the support of the entire aggregate of non-sentient matter, inclusive of the elements in their subtle condition ; and the qualities of non-coarseness, &c., are characteristic of that soul also. Moreover there are several texts in which the term 'Imperishable' is actually seen to denote the individual soul ; so e. g. 'the non-evolved' is merged in the 'Imperishable' ; 'That of which the non-evolved is the body ; that of which the Imperishable is the body' ; 'All the creatures are the Perishable, the non-changing Self is called the Imperishable' (Bha. Gī. XV, 16).

To this alternative *primâ facie* view the next Sūtra replies.

10. And this (supporting) (springs) from command.

The text declares that this supporting of ether and all other things proceeds from command. 'In the command of that Imperishable sun and moon stand, held apart ; in the command of that Imperishable heaven and earth stand, held apart,' &c. Now such supreme command, through which all things in the universe are held apart, cannot possibly belong to the individual soul in the state either of bondage or of release. The commanding 'Imperishable' therefore is none other than the supreme Person.

11. And on account of the exclusion of (what is of) another nature (than Brahman).

Another nature, i. e. the nature of the Pradhāna, and so on. A supplementary passage excludes difference on the part of the Imperishable from the supreme Person. 'That Imperishable, O Gārgī, is unseen but seeing ; unheard but hearing ; unthought but thinking ; unknown but knowing. There is nothing that sees but it, nothing that hears but it, nothing that thinks but it, nothing that knows but it. In that Imperishable, O Gārgī, the ether is woven, warp and woof.' Here the declaration as to the Imperishable being what sees, hears, &c. excludes the non-intelligent Pradhāna ; and the declaration as to its being all-seeing, &c. while not

seen by any one excludes the individual soul. This exclusion of what has a nature other than that of the highest Self thus confirms the view of that Self being meant.—Or else the Sûtra may be explained in a different way, viz. ‘On account of the exclusion of the existence of another.’ On this alternative the text ‘There is nothing that sees but it,’ &c., is to be understood as follows: ‘while this Imperishable, not seen by others but seeing all others, forms the basis of all things different from itself; there is no other principle which, unseen by the Imperishable but seeing it, could form *its* basis,’ i. e. the text would exclude the existence of any other thing but the Imperishable, and thus implicitly deny that the Imperishable is either the Pradhâna or the individual Self.—Moreover the text ‘By the command of that Imperishable men praise those who give, the gods follow the Sacrificer, the fathers the Darvî-offering,’ declares the Imperishable to be that on the command of which there proceed all works enjoined by Scripture and Smṛiti, such as sacrificing, giving, &c., and this again shows that the Imperishable must be Brahman, the supreme Person. Again, the subsequent *passus*, ‘Whosoever without knowing that Imperishable,’ &c., declares that ignorance of the Imperishable leads to the Samsâra, while knowledge of it helps to reach Immortality: this also proves that the Imperishable is the highest Brahman.—Here terminates the *adhikarana* of ‘the Imperishable.’

12. On account of his being designated as the object of seeing, he (i. e. the highest Self) (is that object).

The followers of the Atharva-veda, in the section containing the question asked by Satyakâma, read as follows: ‘He again who meditates with this syllable Aum of three Mâtrâs on the highest Person, he comes to light and to the sun. As a snake frees itself from its skin, so he frees himself from evil. He is led up by the Sâman verses to the Brahma-world; he sees the person dwelling in the castle who is higher than the individual souls concreted

with bodies and higher (than those)' (Pra. Up. V, 2). Here the terms 'he meditates' and 'he sees' have the same sense, 'seeing' being the result of devout meditation; for according to the principle expressed in the text (*Kṛ. Up. III, 14*) 'According as man's thought is in this world,' what is reached by the devotee is the object of meditation; and moreover the text exhibits the same object, viz. 'the highest Person' in connexion with both verbs.

The doubt here presents itself whether the highest Person in this text be the so-called four-faced *Brahmā*, the Lord of the mundane egg who represents the individual souls in their collective aspect, or the supreme Person who is the Lord of all.—The *Pūrvapakshin* maintains the former view. For, he argues, on the introductory question, 'He who here among men should meditate until death on the syllable *Om*, what would he obtain by it?' The text first declares that he who meditates on that syllable as having one *Mātrā*, obtains the world of men; and next, that he who meditates on it as having two *Mātrās* obtains the world of the atmosphere. Hence the *Brahma-world*, which the text after that represents as the object reached by him who meditates on *Om* as having three syllables, must be the world of *Brahmā Katurmukha* who is constituted by the aggregate of the individual souls. What the soul having reached that world sees, therefore is the same *Brahmā Katurmukha*; and thus only the attribute '*etasmāḡ gīvaghaṇāt parāt param*' is suitable; for the collective soul, i. e. *Brahmā Katurmukha*, residing in the *Brahma-world* is higher (*para*) than the distributive or discrete soul (*gīva*) which is concreted (*ghaṇī-bhūta*) with the body and sense-organs, and at the same time is higher (*para*) than these. The highest Person mentioned in the text, therefore, is *Brahmā Katurmukha*; and the qualities mentioned further on, such as absence of decay, &c., must be taken in such a way as to agree with that *Brahmā*.

To this *primā facie* view the *Sūtra* replies that the object of seeing is *He*, i. e. the highest Self, on account of designation. The text clearly designates the object of seeing as the highest Self. For the concluding *sloka*,

which refers to that object of seeing, declares that 'by means of the *Omkāra* he who knows reaches that which is tranquil, free from decay, immortal, fearless, the highest'—all which attributes properly belong to the highest Self only, as we know from texts such as 'that is the Immortal, that is the fearless, that is Brahman' (*Kh. Up. IV, 15, 1*). The qualification expressed in the clause '*etasmāg gīva-ghanāt*,' &c. may also refer to the highest Self only, not to *Brahmā Katurmukha*; for the latter is himself comprehended by the term '*gīvaghana*.' For that term denotes all souls which are embodied owing to *karman*; and that *Katurmukha* is one of those we know from texts such as 'He who first creates *Brahmā*' (*Svet. Up. VI, 18*). Nor is there any strength in the argument that, since the *Brahma-world* mentioned in the text is known to be the world of *Katurmukha*, as it follows next on the world of the atmosphere, the being abiding there must needs be *Katurmukha*. We rather argue as follows—as from the concluding clause 'that which is tranquil, free from decay,' &c., we ascertain that the object of intuition is the highest Brahman, the *Brahma-world* spoken of as the abode of the seeing devotee *cannot* be the perishable world of *Brahmā Katurmukha*. A further reason for this conclusion is supplied by what the text says about 'him who is freed from all evil being led up by the *Sāman* verses to the world of Brahman'; for the place reached by him who is freed from all evil cannot be the mere abode of *Katurmukha*. Hence also the concluding *sloka* says with reference to that *Brahma-world* 'that which the wise teach': what the wise see and teach is the abode of the highest, of *Vishṇu*; cp. the text 'the wise ever see that highest abode of *Vishṇu*.' Nor is it even strictly true that the world of *Brahmā* follows on the atmosphere, for the *svarga-world* and several others lie between the two.

We therefore shortly explain the drift of the whole chapter as follows. At the outset of the reply given to *Satyakāma* there is mentioned, in addition to the highest (para) Brahman, a lower (apara) Brahman. This lower or effected (*kārya*) Brahman is distinguished as twofold, being connected either with this terrestrial world or yonder, non-

terrestrial, world. Him who meditates on the *Pravava* as having one syllable, the text declares to obtain a reward in this world—he reaches the world of men. He, on the other hand, who meditates on the *Pravava* as having two syllables is said to obtain his reward in a super-terrestrial sphere—he reaches the world of the atmosphere. And he finally who, by means of the trisyllabic *Pravava* which denotes the highest Brahman, meditates on this very highest Brahman, is said to reach that Brahman, i. e. the supreme Person.—The object of seeing is thus none other than the highest Self.—Here terminates the *adhikarana* of the ‘object of seeing.’

13. The small (ether) (is Brahman), on account of the subsequent (arguments).

The *Khandogas* have the following text, ‘Now in that city of Brahman there is the palace, the small lotus, and in it that small ether. Now what is within that small ether that is to be sought for, that is to be understood’ (*Kh. Up. VIII, 1, 1*).—The question here arises whether that small ether (space) within the lotus of the heart be the material element called ether, or the individual Self, or the highest Self.—The first view presenting itself is that the element is meant, for the reason that the word ‘ether’ is generally used in that sense; and because the clause ‘what is within that small ether’ shows that the ether mentioned constitutes the abode of something else that is to be enquired into.—This view is set aside by the *Sūtra*. The small ether within the heart is the highest Brahman, on account of the subsequent reasons, contained in clauses of the same section. The passage ‘That Self which is free from evil, free from old age, free from death, free from grief, free from hunger and thirst, whose wishes and purposes come true’ (*VIII, 7, 1*) ascribes to that small ether qualities—such as unconditioned Selfhood, freedom from evil, &c.—which clearly show that ether to be the highest Brahman. And this conclusion is confirmed by what other texts say about him who knows the small ether attaining the power of realising his own wishes, ‘Those who

depart from hence having come to know the Self and those real wishes, for them there is freedom in all worlds'; and 'whatever object he desires, by his mere will it comes to him; having obtained it he is happy' (*Kh. Up.* VIII, 1, 6; 2, 9). If moreover the ether within the heart were the elemental ether, the comparison instituted in the passage 'As large as that (elemental) ether is, so large is this ether within the heart' would be wholly inappropriate. Nor must it be said that that comparison rests on the limitation of the ether within the heart (so that the two terms compared would be the limited elemental ether within the heart, and the universal elemental ether); for there still would remain the inappropriate assertion that the ether within the heart is the abode of heaven, earth and all other things.—But, an objection is raised, also on the alternative of the small ether being the highest Brahman, the comparison to the universal elemental ether is unsuitable; for scripture explicitly states that the highest Self is (not as large but) larger than everything else, 'larger than the earth, larger than the sky,' &c. (*Kh. Up.* III, 14, 3). Not so, we reply; what the text says as to the ether within the heart being as large as the universal ether is meant (not to make a conclusive statement as to its extent but only) to negative that smallness of the ether which is established by its abiding within the heart. Similarly we say 'the sun moves with the speed of an arrow'; the sun indeed moves much faster than an arrow, but what our assertion means is merely that he does not move slowly.—But, a further doubt is started, the passage 'That Self which is free from sin,' &c. does not appear to refer back to the small ether within the heart. For the text makes a distinction between that ether and that within that ether which it declares to be the due object of search and enquiry. This latter object therefore is the topic of discussion, and when the text says later on 'That Self, free from sin, &c. is to be searched out' we must understand it to refer to the same object of search.—This would be so, we reply, if the text did not distinguish the small ether and that which abides within it; but as a matter of fact it

does distinguish the two. The connexion is as follows. The text at first refers to the body of the devotee as the city of Brahman, the idea being that Brahman is present therein as object of meditation; and then designates an organ of that body, viz. the small lotus-shaped heart as the palace of Brahman. It then further refers to Brahman—the all knowing, all powerful, whose love towards his devotees is boundless like the ocean—as the small ether within the heart, meaning thereby that Brahman who for the benefit of his devotees is present within that palace should be meditated upon as of minute size, and finally—in the clause ‘that is to be searched out’—enjoins as the object of meditation that which abides in that Brahman, i. e. on the one hand, its essential freedom from all evil qualities, and on the other the whole treasure of its auspicious qualities, its power of realising its wishes and so on. The ‘that’ (in ‘that is to be searched out’) enjoins as objects of search the small ether, i. e. Brahman itself as well as the qualities abiding within it.—But how, it may be asked, do you know that the word ‘that’ really refers to both, viz. the highest Brahman, there called ‘small ether,’ and the qualities abiding in it, and that hence the clause enjoins an enquiry into both these entities?—Listen, attentively, we reply, to our explanation! The clause ‘As large as this ether is, so large is this ether within the heart’ declares the exceeding greatness of the small ether; the clause ‘Both heaven and earth are contained within it’ up to ‘lightning and stars’ declares that same small ether to be the abode of the entire world; and the clause ‘And whatever there is for him in this world, and whatever there is not, all that is contained within it’ declares that whatever objects of enjoyment there are for the devotee in this world, and whatever other objects there are not for him, i. e. are merely wishes but not obtained by him, all those objects are contained within that same small ether. The text next declares that that small ether, although dwelling within the heart which is a part of the body, is not affected by the body’s old age and decay, for being extremely minute it is not capable of change; and adds ‘that true

being is the Brahman-city,' i. e. that Reality which is the cause of all is the city called Brahman, i. e. the abode of the entire Universe. The following clause 'in it all desires are contained' again referring to the small ether ('in it') declares that in it all desires, i. e. all desirable qualities are contained. The text next proceeds to set forth that the small ether possesses Selfhood and certain desirable auspicious qualities—this is done in the passage 'It is the Self free from sin' &c. up to 'whose purposes realise themselves.' The following section—'And as here on earth' down to 'for them there is freedom in all the worlds'—declares that those who do not know those eight qualities and the Self, called 'small ether,' which is characterised by them, and who perform actions aiming at objects of enjoyment different from that Self, obtain perishable results only, and do not attain the power of realising their wishes; while those on the other hand who know the Self called 'small ether' and the qualities abiding within it, through the grace of that very same highest Self, obtain all their wishes and the power of realising their purposes. On the ground of this connected consideration of the whole chapter we are able to decide that the text enjoins as the object of search and enquiry both the highest Brahman and the whole body of auspicious qualities abiding within it. This the Vākyakāra also renders clear in the passage beginning 'In the text "what is within that" there is designation of wishes (i. e. desirable qualities).—For all these reasons the small ether is the highest Brahman.

14. On account of the going and of the word; for thus it is seen; and (there is) an inferential sign.

'As people who do not know the country walk again and again over a gold treasure' &c., 'thus do all these creatures day after day go into *that* Brahma-world' (*Kh. Up.* VIII, 3, 2). The circumstance, here stated, of all individual souls going to a place which the qualification '*that*' connects with the subject-matter of the whole chapter, i. e. the small ether; and the further circumstance of the goal of their going being called the Brahma-world, also prove that the

small ether is none other than the highest Brahman.—But in what way do these two points prove what they are claimed to prove?—‘For thus it is seen’; the Sūtra adds. For we see it stated in other texts, that all individual souls go daily to Brahman, viz. in the state of deep sleep, ‘All these creatures having become united with the True do not know that they are united with the True’; ‘Having come back from the True they know not that they have come back from the True’ (*Kh. Up.* VI, 9, 2; 10, 2). And in the same way we see that the word ‘Brahma-world’ denotes the highest Brahman; so e.g. ‘this is the Brahma-world, O King’ (*Bri. Up.* IV, 3, 32).—The Sūtra subjoins a further reason. Even if the going of the souls to Brahman were not seen in other texts, the fact that the text under discussion declares the individual souls to abide in Brahman in the state of deep sleep, enjoying freedom from all pain and trouble just as if they were merged in the pralaya state, is a sufficient ‘inferential sign’ to prove that the ‘small ether’ is the highest Brahman. And similarly the term ‘Brahma-world’ as exhibited in the text under discussion, if understood as denoting co-ordination (i.e. ‘that world which is Brahman’), is sufficient to prove by itself that the ‘small ether’—to which that term is applied—is the highest Brahman; it therefore is needless to appeal to other passages. That this explanation of ‘Brahma-world’ is preferable to the one which understands by Brahma-world ‘the world of Brahman’ is proved by considerations similar to those by which the *Pū. Mī. Sūtras* prove that ‘Nishāda-sthapati’ means a headman who at the same time is a Nishāda.—Another explanation of the passage under discussion may also be given. What is said there about all these creatures daily ‘going into the Brahma-world,’ may not refer at all to the state of deep sleep, but rather mean that although ‘daily going into the Brahman-world,’ i.e. although at all time moving above the small ether, i.e. Brahman which as the universal Self is everywhere, yet all these creatures not knowing Brahman do not find, i.e. obtain it; just as men not knowing the place where a treasure is hidden do not find it, although

they constantly pass over it. This constant moving about on the part of ignorant creatures on the surface, as it were, of the small ether abiding within as their inward Ruler, proves that small ether to be the highest Brahman. That the highest Brahman abides within as the inner Self of creatures which dwell in it and are ruled by it, we are told in other texts also, so e. g. in the *Antaryâmin-brâhmaṇa*. 'He who dwells in the Self, within the Self, whom the Self does not know, of whom the Self is the body, who rules the Self within; unseen but seeing, unheard but hearing' (*Bṛi. Up. III, 7, 22 ; 23*).—On this interpretation we explain the last part of the *Sûtra* as follows. Even if other texts did not refer to it, this daily moving about on the part of ignorant creatures, on the ether within the heart—which the comparison with the treasure of gold shows to be the supreme good of man—, is in itself a sufficient proof for the small ether being Brahman.

15. And on account of there being observed in that (small ether), supporting which is a greatness of that (i. e. Brahman).

In continuation of the passage 'It is the Self free from Sin,' &c., which refers to the small ether, the text says: 'it is a bank, a liminary support, that these worlds may not be confounded.' What the text here says about the small ether supporting the world proves it to be the highest Brahman; for to support the world is the glory of Brahman. Compare 'He is the Lord of all, the king of all things, the protector of all things. He is a bank and a boundary, so that these worlds may not be confounded' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 22*); 'By the command of that Imperishable, O Gârgi, heaven and earth stand, held apart' (*Bṛi. Up. III, 8, 9*). Now this specific greatness of the highest Brahman, which consists in its supporting the world, is also observed in the small ether—which proves the latter to be none other than Brahman.

16. And on account of the settled meaning.

The word 'ether,' moreover, is known to have, among

other meanings, that of Brahman. Compare 'For who could breathe, who could breathe forth, if that ether were not bliss?' (Taitt. Up. II, 7); 'All these beings take their rise from the ether' (*Kh.* Up. I, 9, 1). It has to be kept in view that in the text under discussion the meaning 'Brahman' is supported by what is said about the qualities of the small ether—viz. freedom from sin, &c.—and hence is stronger than the other meaning, according to which *ākāśa* signifies the elemental ether.

So far the Sūtras have refuted the view of the small ether being the element. They now enter on combating the notion that the small ether may possibly be the individual soul.

17. If it be said that on account of reference to the other one he is meant; we say no, on account of impossibility.

An objection is raised to the argumentation that, on account of complementary passages, the small ether must be explained to mean the highest Self.

For, the objector says, a clear reference to him who is 'other' than the highest Self, i.e. to the individual soul, is contained in the following passage (VIII, 12, 3): 'Thus does that serenity (*samprasāda*), having risen from this body and approached the highest light, appear in its own form.' 'That is the Self,' he said. 'That is the immortal, the fearless, this is Brahman' (VIII, 7, 3?). We admit that for the different reasons stated above the ether within the heart cannot be the elemental ether; but owing to the force of the intimations conveyed by the complementary passages just quoted, we must adopt the view that what is meant is the individual soul. And as the word '*ākāśa*' may be connected with *prakāśa* (light), it may be applied to the individual soul also.—This view is set aside by the Sūtra. The small ether cannot be the individual soul because the qualities attributed in the text to the former, viz. freedom from sin, &c., cannot possibly belong to the individual soul.

18. Should it be said that from a subsequent passage (it appears that the individual Soul is meant) ; rather (the soul) in so far as its true nature has become manifest.

The Pûrvapakshin now maintains that we ascertain from a subsequent declaration made by Pragâpati that it is just the individual Soul that possesses freedom from sin and the other qualities enumerated. The whole teaching of Pragâpati, he says, refers to the individual Soul only. Indra having heard that Pragâpati had spoken about a Self free from sin, old age, &c., the enquiry into which enables the soul to obtain all worlds and desires, approaches Pragâpati with the wish to learn the true nature of that Self which should be enquired into. Pragâpati thereupon, wishing to test the capacity of his pupil for receiving true instruction, gives him successive information about the embodied soul in the state of waking, dream and dreamless sleep. When he finds that Indra sees no good in instruction of this kind and thus shows himself fit to receive instruction about the true nature of the disembodied Self, he explains to him that the body is a mere abode for a ruling Self; that that bodiless Self is essentially immortal; and that the soul, as long as it is joined to a body due to karman, is compelled to experience pleasure and pain corresponding to its embodied state, while it rises above all this when it has freed itself from the body (VIII, 12, 1). He then continues: 'Thus that serenity having risen from this body and approached the highest light, appears in its own form'; thus teaching him the true nature, free from a body, of the individual soul. He next informs him that the 'highest light' which the soul reaches is the supreme Person ('That is the supreme Person'), and that the soul having reached that highest light and freed itself from what obscured its own true nature, obtains in the world of Brahman whatever enjoyments it desires, and is no longer connected with a body springing from karman and inseparable from pain and pleasure, or with anything else that causes distress: ('He moves about there laughing,' &c.). He next illus-

trates the connexion with a body, of the soul in the *Samsāra* state, by means of a comparison: 'Like as a horse attached to a cart,' &c. After that he explains that the eye and the other sense-organs are instruments of knowledge, colour, and so on, the objects of knowledge, and the individual Self the knowing subject; and that hence that Self is different from the body and the sense-organs ('Now where the sight has entered' up to 'the mind is his divine eye'). Next he declares that, after having divested itself of the body and the senses, the Self perceives all the objects of its desire by means of its 'divine eye,' i.e. the power of cognition which constitutes its essential nature ('He by means of the divine eye,' &c.). He further declares that those who have true knowledge know the Self as such ('on that Self the *devas* meditate'); and in conclusion teaches that he who has that true knowledge of the Self obtains for his reward the intuition of Brahman—which is suggested by what the text says about the obtaining of all worlds and all desires ('He obtains all worlds and all desires,' &c., up to the end of the chapter).—It thus appears that the entire chapter proposes as the object of cognition the individual soul free from sin, and so on. The qualities, viz. freedom from guilt, &c., may thus belong to the individual Self, and on this ground we conclude that the small ether is the individual Self.

This view the second half of the Sūtra sets aside. The two sections, that which treats of the small ether and that which contains the teaching of *Pragāpati*, have different topics. *Pragāpati*'s teaching refers to the individual soul, whose true nature, with its qualities such as freedom from evil, &c., is at first hidden by untruth, while later on, when it has freed itself from the bondage of *karman*, risen from the body, and approached the highest light, it manifests itself in its true form and then is characterised by freedom from all evil and by other auspicious qualities. In the section treating of the small ether, on the other hand, we have to do with the small ether, i.e. the highest Brahman, whose true nature is never hidden, and which therefore is unconditionally characterised by freedom from evil, and so on.—

Moreover, the daharākāśa-section ascribes to the small ether other attributes which cannot belong to the individual Self even 'when its true nature has manifested itself.' The small ether is there called a bank and support of all worlds; and one of its names, 'satyam,' is explained to imply that it governs all sentient and non-sentient beings. All this also proves that the small ether is none other than the highest Self. That the individual soul, 'even when its true nature is manifest,' cannot be viewed as a bank and support of the worlds, &c., we shall show under IV, 4.

But if this is so, what then is the meaning of the reference to the individual soul which is made in the section treating of the small ether, viz. in the passage, 'Now that serene being, which after having risen from this body,' &c. (VIII, 3, 4)?

To this question the next Sūtra replies.

19. And the reference has a different meaning.

The text in question declares that the released individual soul when reaching the highest light, i.e. Brahman, which is free from all sin, and so on, attains its true nature, which is characterised by similar freedom from sin, and so on. Now this reference to the individual soul, as described in the teaching of Pragâpati, has the purpose of giving instruction (not about the qualities of the individual soul, but) about the nature of that which is the cause of the qualities of the individual soul, i.e. the qualities specially belonging to the supreme Person. The reason why, in the section containing the teaching of Pragâpati, information is given as to the true nature of the released individual soul is that such knowledge assists the doctrine referring to the small ether. For the individual Self which wishes to reach Brahman must know his own true nature also, so as to realise that he, as being himself endowed with auspicious qualities, will finally arrive at an intuition of the highest Brahman, which is a mass of auspicious qualities raised to the highest degree of excellence. The cognition of the soul's own true nature is itself comprised in the result of the meditation on Brahman, and the results which are

proclaimed in the teaching of Pragâpati ('He obtains all worlds and all wishes'; 'He moves about there laughing,' &c.) thus really are results of the knowledge of the small ether.

20. If it be said, owing to the scriptural declaration of smallness; that has been explained.

The text describes the ether within the heart as being of small compass, and this agrees indeed with the individual soul which elsewhere is compared to the point of an awl, but not with Brahman, which is greater than everything.—The reply to this objection has virtually been given before, viz. under I, 2, 7, where it is said that Brahman may be viewed as of small size, for the purpose of devout meditation.

It thus remains a settled conclusion that the small ether is none other but the highest Person who is untouched by even a shadow of imperfection, and is an ocean of infinite, supremely exalted, qualities—knowledge, strength, lordly power, &c. The being, on the other hand, which in the teaching of Pragâpati is described as first having a body due to karman—as we see from passages such as 'they strike it as it were, they cut it as it were'—and as afterwards approaching the highest light, and then manifesting its essential qualities, viz. freedom from sin, &c., is the individual soul; not the small ether (or Brahman).

The next Sûtra supplies a further reason for this conclusion.

21. And on account of the imitation of that.

The individual soul, free from bondage, and thus possessing the qualities of freedom from sin, &c., cannot be the small ether, i. e. the highest Brahman, because it is stated to 'imitate,' i. e. to be equal to that Brahman. The text making that statement is Mu. Up. III, 1, 3, 'When the seer (i. e. the individual soul) sees the brilliant maker, the Lord, the Person who has his source in Brahman; then becoming wise and shaking off good and evil, he reaches the highest equality, free from passions.' The being to

which the teaching of Pragāpati refers is the 'imitator,' i.e. the individual soul ; the Brahman which is 'imitated' is the small ether.

22. The same is declared by Smṛiti also.

Smṛiti also declares that the transmigrating soul when reaching the state of Release 'imitates,' i.e. attains supreme equality of attributes with the highest Brahman. 'Abiding by this knowledge they, attaining to equality of attributes with me, are not born again at the time of creation, nor are they affected by the general dissolution of the world' (Bha. Gī. XIV, 2).

Some maintain that the last two Sūtras constitute a separate *adhikaraṇa* (head of discussion), meant to prove that the text Mu. Up. II, 2, 10 ('After him the shining one, everything shines ; by the light of him all this is lighted'), refers to the highest Brahman. This view is, however, inadmissible, for the reason that with regard to the text quoted no *pūrvapaksha* can arise, it having been proved under I, 2, 21 ff., and I, 3, 1 ff., that the whole section of which that text forms part is concerned with Brahman ; and it further having been shown under I, 1, 24 ff., that Brahman is apprehended under the form of light.—The interpretation moreover does not fit in with the wording of the Sūtras.—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of the 'small one.'

23. On account of the term, the one measured.

We read in the *Kaṭhāvallī* 'The Person of the size of a thumb stands in the middle of the Self, as lord of the past and the future, and henceforward fears no more' ; 'That Person of the size of a thumb is like a light without smoke,' &c. (Ka. Up. II, 4, 12 ; 13). And 'The Person not larger than a thumb, the inner Self, is always settled in the heart of men' (Ka. Up. II, 6, 17). A doubt here arises whether the being measured by the extent of a span be the individual soul or the highest Self.—The *Pūrvapakshin* maintains the former view ; for, he says, another scriptural text also declares the individual soul to have that measure,

'the ruler of the vital airs moves through his own works, of the size of a thumb, brilliant like the sun, endowed with purposes and egoity' (Svet. Up. V, 11, 7; 8). Moreover, the highest Self is not anywhere else, not even for the purpose of meditation, represented as having the size of a thumb. It thus being determined that the being of the length of a thumb is the individual Self, we understand the term 'Lord,' which is applied to it, as meaning that it is the Lord of the body, the sense-organs, the objects and the instruments of fruition.—Of this view the Sūtra disposes, maintaining that the being a thumb long can be none but the highest Self, just on account of that term. For lordship over all things past and future cannot possibly belong to the individual Self, which is under the power of karman.—But how can the highest Self be said to have the measure of a thumb?—On this point the next Sūtra satisfies us.

24. But with reference to the heart, men being qualified.

In so far as the highest Self abides, for the purpose of devout meditation, in the heart of the devotee—which heart is of the measure of a thumb—it may itself be viewed as having the measure of a thumb. The individual soul also can be said to have the measure of a thumb only in so far as dwelling within the heart; for scripture directly states that its real size is that of the point of a goad, i. e. minute. And as men only are capable of devout meditation, and hence alone have a claim on scripture, the fact that the hearts of other living creatures also, such as donkeys, horses, snakes, &c., have the same size, cannot give rise to any objection.—The discussion of this matter will be completed later on¹.

25. Also beings above them (i. e. men), Bādarāyana thinks, on account of possibility.

In order to prove that the highest Brahman may be

¹ The 'pramitādhikaraṇa' is resumed in Sūtra 41.

viewed as having the size of a thumb, it has been declared that the scriptural texts enjoining meditation on Brahman are the concern of men. This offers an opportunity for the discussion of the question whether also other classes of individual souls, such as devas, are qualified for knowledge of Brahman. The Pūrvapakshin denies this qualification in the case of gods and other beings, on the ground of absence of capability. For, he says, bodiless beings, such as gods, are incapable of the accomplishment of meditation on Brahman, which requires as its auxiliaries the seven means enumerated above (p. 17). This must not be objected to on the ground of the devas, and so on, having bodies; for there is no means of proof establishing such embodiedness. We have indeed proved above that the Vedānta-texts may intimate accomplished things, and hence are an authoritative means for the cognition of Brahman; but we do not meet with any Vedānta-text, the purport of which is to teach that the devas, and so on, possess bodies. Nor can this point be established through mantras and arthavāda texts; for these are merely supplementary to the injunctions of actions (sacrificial, and so on), and therefore have a different aim. And the injunctions themselves prove nothing with regard to the devas, except that the latter are that with a view to which those actions are performed. In the same way it also cannot be shown that the gods have any desires or wants (to fulfil or supply which they might enter on meditation of Brahman). For the two reasons above we therefore conclude that the devas, and so on, are not qualified for meditation on Brahman.—This view is contradicted by the Sūtra. Such meditation is possible in the case of higher beings also, Bādarāyana thinks; on account of the possibility of want and capacity on their part also. Want and wish exist in their case since they also are liable to suffering, springing from the assaults, hard to be endured, of the different kinds of pain, and since they also know that supreme enjoyment is to be found in the highest Brahman, which is untouched by the shadow even of imperfection, and is a mass of auspicious qualities in their highest perfection.

‘Capability,’ on the other hand, depends on the possession of a body and sense-organs of whatever degree of tenuity ; and that the devas, from Brahmā downward, possess a body and sense-organs, is declared in all the Upanishads, in the chapters treating of creation and the chapters enjoining meditation. In the *Khândogya*, e.g. it is related how the highest Being having resolved on creation, evolved the aggregate of non-sentient matter with its different kinds, and then produced the fourfold multitude of living creatures, each having a material body corresponding to its karman, and a suitable name of its own. Similarly, all the other scriptural accounts of creation declare that there are four classes of creatures—devas, men, animals, and non-moving beings, such as plants—and the difference of these classes depends on the individual Selfs being joined to various bodies capacitating them to experience the results of their works, each in that one of the fourteen worlds—beginning with the world of Brahmā—which is the suitable place for retribution. For in themselves, apart from bodies, the individual Selfs are not distinguished as men, gods, and so on. In the same way the story of the devas and Asuras approaching Pragâpati with fuel in their hands, staying with him as pupils for thirty-two years, &c. (*Kh. Up. VIII, 7 ff.*), clearly shows that the devas possess bodies and sense-organs. Analogously, mantras and arthavâdas, which are complementary to injunctions of works, contain unmistakeable references to the corporeal nature of the gods (‘Indra holding in his hand the thunderbolt’; ‘Indra lifted the thunderbolt,’ &c.); and as the latter is not contradicted by any other means of proof it must be accepted on the authority stated. Nor can it be said that those mantras and arthavâdas are really meant to express something else (than those details mentioned above), in so far, namely, as they aim at proclaiming or glorifying the action with which they are connected ; for those very details subserve the purpose of glorification, and so on, and without them glorification is not possible. For we praise or glorify a thing by declaring its qualities ; if such qualities do not exist all glorification lapses. It cannot by any means be

maintained that anything may be glorified by the proclamation of its qualities, even if such qualities do not really exist. Hence the arthavâdas which glorify a certain action, just thereby intimate the real existence of the qualities and details of the action. The mantras again, which are prescribed in connexion with the actions, serve the purpose of throwing light on the use to be derived from the performance of the actions, and this they accomplish by making statements as to the particular qualities, such as embodiedness and the like, which belong to the devas and other classes of beings. Otherwise Indra, and so on, would not be remembered at the time of performance; for the idea of a divinity presents itself to the mind only in connexion with the special attributes of that divinity. In the case of such qualities as are not established by other means of proof, the primary statement is made by the arthavâda or the mantra: the former thereby glorifies the action, and the latter proclaims it as possessing certain qualities or details; and both these ends are accomplished by making statements as to the gods, &c., possessing certain qualities, such as embodiedness and the like. In the case, again, of certain qualities being already established by other means of proof, the mantras and arthavâdas merely refer to them (as something already known), and in this way perform their function of glorification and elucidation. And where, thirdly, there is a contradiction between the other means of knowledge and what mantras and arthavâdas state (as when, e.g. a text of the latter kind says that 'the sacrificial post is the sun'), the intention of the text is metaphorically to denote, by means of those apparently unmeaning terms, certain other qualities which are not excluded by the other means of knowledge; and in this way the function of glorification and elucidation is again accomplished. Now what the injunction of a sacrificial action demands as its supplement, is a statement as to the power of the divinity to whom the sacrifice is offered; for the performance which scripture enjoins on men desirous of certain results, is itself of a merely transitory nature, and hence requires some agent capable of bringing about,

at some future time, the result desired as, e.g. the heavenly world. 'Vāyu is the swiftest god; he (the sacrificer) approaches Vāyu with his own share; the god then leads him to prosperity' (Taitt. Saṃh. I, 2, 1); 'What he seeks by means of that offering, may he obtain that, may he prosper therein, may the gods favourably grant him that' (Taitt. Br. III, 5, 10, 5); these and similar arthavādas and mantras intimate that the gods when propitiated by certain sacrificial works, give certain rewards and possess the power to do so; and they thus connect themselves with the general context of scripture as supplying an evidently required item of information. Moreover, the mere verb 'to sacrifice' (yag), as denoting worship of the gods, intimates the presence of a deity which is to be propitiated by the action called sacrifice, and thus constitutes the main element of that action. A careful consideration of the whole context thus reveals that everything which is wanted for the due accomplishment of the action enjoined is to be learned from the text itself, and that hence we need not have recourse to such entities as the 'unseen principle' (apūrva), assumed to be denoted by, or to be imagined in connexion with, the passages enjoining certain actions. Hence the dharmaśāstras, itihāsas, and purāṇas also, which are founded on the different brāhmaṇas, mantras and arthavādas, clearly teach that Brahmā and the other gods, as well as the Asuras and other superhuman beings, have bodies and sense-organs, constitutions of different kinds, different abodes, enjoyments, and functions.—Owing to their having bodies, the gods therefore are also qualified for meditation on Brahman.

26. If it be said that there results a contradiction to work; we deny this, on account of the observation of the assumption of several (bodies).

An objection here presents itself. If we admit the gods to have bodies, a difficulty arises at the sacrifices, as it is impossible that one and the same corporeal Indra—who is at the same time invited by many sacrificers 'come,

O Indra,' 'come, O Lord of the red horses,' &c.—should be present at all those places. And that the gods, Agni and so on, really do come to the sacrifices is proved by the following scriptural text : 'To whose sacrifice do the gods go, and to whose not? He who first receives the gods, sacrifices to them on the following day' (Taïtt. Samh. I, 6, 7, 1). In refutation of this objection the Sûtra points out that there is seen, i. e. recorded, the assumption of several bodies at the same time, on the part of beings endowed with special powers, such as Saubhari.

27. If it be said (that a contradiction will result) with regard to words; we say no, since beings originate from them (as appears) from perception and inference.

Well then let us admit that there is no difficulty as far as sacrifices are concerned, for the reason stated in the preceding Sûtra. But another difficulty presents itself with regard to the words of which the Veda consists. For if Indra and the other gods are corporeal beings, it follows that they are made up of parts and hence non-permanent. This implies either that the Vedic words denoting them—not differing therein from common worldly words such as Devadatta—are totally devoid of meaning during all those periods which precede the origination of the beings called Indra and so on, or follow on their destruction; or else that the Veda itself is non-permanent, non-eternal.—This objection is not valid, the Sûtra points out, for the reason that those beings, viz. Indra and so on, again and again originate from the Vedic words. To explain. Vedic words, such as Indra and so on, do not, like the word Devadatta and the like, denote, on the basis of convention, one particular individual only: they rather denote by their own power particular species of beings, just as the word 'cow' denotes a particular species of animals. When therefore a special individual of the class called Indra has perished, the creator, apprehending from the Vedic word 'Indra' which is present to his mind the class characteristics of the beings denoted by that word, creates another Indra possessing

those very same characteristics ; just as the potter fashions a new jar, on the basis of the word 'jar' which is stirring in *his* mind.—But how is this known ?—‘Through perception and inference,’ i. e. through Scripture and *Smṛiti*. Scripture says, e. g. ‘By means of the Veda *Pragâpati* evolved names and forms, the being and the non-being’; and ‘Saying “*bhûh*” (earth) he created the earth; saying “*bhuvaḥ*” he created the air,’ and so on; which passages teach that the creator at first bethinks himself of the characteristic make of a thing, in connexion with the word denoting it, and thereupon creates an individual thing characterised by that make. *Smṛiti* makes similar statements; compare, e. g. ‘In the beginning there was sent forth by the creator, divine speech—beginningless and endless—in the form of the Veda, and from it there originated all creatures’; and ‘He, in the beginning, separately created from the words of the Veda the names and works and shapes of all things’; and ‘The names and forms of beings, and all the multiplicity of works He in the beginning created from the Veda.’ This proves that from the corporeality of the gods, and so on, it follows neither that the words of the Veda are unmeaning nor that the Veda itself is non-eternal.

28. And for this very reason eternity (of the Veda).

As words such as *Indra* and *Vasishṭha*, which denote gods and *Rishis*, denote (not individuals only, but) classes, and as the creation of those beings is preceded by their being suggested to the creative mind through those words; for this reason the eternity of the Veda admits of being reconciled with what scripture says about the mantras and *kāṇḍas* (sections) of the sacred text having ‘makers’ and about *Rishis* seeing the hymns; cp. such passages as ‘He chooses the makers of mantras’; ‘Reverence to the *Rishis* who are the makers of mantras’; ‘That is *Agni*; this is a hymn of *Viśvâmitra*.’ For by means of these very texts *Pragâpati* presents to his own mind the characteristics and powers of the different *Rishis* who make the different sections, hymns, and mantras, thereupon creates them endowed with those characteristics and powers, and appoints

them to remember the very same sections, hymns, &c. The *Rishis* being thus gifted by *Pragāpati* with the requisite powers, undergo suitable preparatory austerities and finally see the mantras, and so on, proclaimed by the *Vasishthas* and other *Rishis* of former ages of the world, perfect in all their sounds and accents, without having learned them from the recitation of a teacher. There is thus no conflict between the eternity of the Veda and the fact that the *Rishis* are the *makers* of its sections, hymns, and so on. A further objection is raised. Let it be admitted that after each *pralaya* of the kind called 'contingent' (*naimittika*), *Pragāpati* may proceed to create new *Indras*, and so on, in the way of remembering on the basis of the Veda the *Indras*, and so on, of preceding periods. In the case, on the other hand, of a *pralaya* of the kind called elemental (*prākṛitika*), in which the creator, *Pragāpati* himself, and words—which are the effects of the elemental *ahaṅkāra*—pass away, what possibility is there of *Pragāpati* undertaking a new creation on the basis of Vedic words, and how can we speak of the permanency of a Veda which perishes? He who maintains the eternity of the Veda and the corporeality of gods, and so on, is thus really driven to the hypothesis of the course of mundane existence being without a beginning (i. e. not preceded by a *pralaya*).—Of this difficulty the next *Sūtra* disposes.

29. And on account of the equality of names and forms there is no contradiction, even in the renovation (of the world); as appears from *Śruti* and *Smṛiti*.

On account of the sameness of names and forms, as stated before, there is no difficulty in the way of the origination of the world, even in the case of total *pralayas*. For what actually takes place is as follows. When the period of a great *pralaya* draws towards its close, the divine supreme Person, remembering the constitution of the world previous to the *pralaya*, and forming the volition 'May I become manifold,' separates into its constituent

elements the whole mass of enjoying souls and objects of enjoyment which, during the pralaya state, had been merged in him so as to possess a separate existence (not actual but) potential only, and then emits the entire world just as it had been before, from the so-called Mahat down to the Brahman-egg, and Hiraṇyagarbha (Pragâpati). Having thereupon manifested the Vedas in exactly the same order and arrangement they had had before, and having taught them to Hiraṇyagarbha, he entrusts to him the new creation of the different classes of beings, gods, and so on, just as it was before; and at the same time abides himself within the world so created as its inner Self and Ruler. This view of the process removes all difficulties. The superhuman origin and the eternity of the Veda really mean that intelligent agents having received in their minds an impression due to previous recitations of the Veda in a fixed order of words, chapters, and so on, remember and again recite it in that very same order of succession. This holds good both with regard to us men and to the highest Lord of all; there however is that difference between the two cases that the representations of the Veda which the supreme Person forms in his own mind are spontaneous, not dependent on an impression previously made.

To the question whence all this is known, the Sūtra replies 'from Scripture and Smṛiti.' The scriptural passage is 'He who first creates Brahmā and delivers the Vedas to him' (Svet. Up. VI, 18). And as to Smṛiti we have the following statement in Manu, 'This universe existed in the shape of darkness, &c.—He desiring to produce beings of many kinds from his own body, first with a thought created the waters and placed his seed in them. That seed became a golden egg equal to the sun in brilliancy; in that he himself was born as Brahmā, the progenitor of the whole world' (Manu I, 1, 5; 8-9). To the same effect are the texts of the Paurāṇikas, 'From the navel of the sleeping divinity there sprung up a lotus, and in that lotus there was born Brahmā fully knowing all Vedas and Vedāṅgas. And then Brahmā was told by him (the highest Divinity),

‘Do thou create all beings, O Great-minded one’; and the following passage, ‘From the highest Nārāyaṇa there was born the Four-faced one.’—And in the section which begins ‘I will tell the original creation,’ we read ‘Because having created water (nāra) I abide within it, therefore my name shall be Nārāyaṇa. There I lie asleep in every Kalpa, and as I am sleeping there springs from my navel a lotus, and in that lotus there is born the Four-faced one, and I tell him “Do thou, Great-minded one, create all beings.”’—Here terminates the adhikaraṇa of ‘the deities.’

30. On account of the impossibility (of qualification for the madhuvidyā, &c.) Gaimini maintains the non-qualification (of gods, &c.).

So far it has been proved that also the gods, and so on, are qualified for the knowledge of Brahman. But a further point here presents itself for consideration, viz. whether the gods are qualified or not to undertake those meditations of which they themselves are the objects. The Sūtra states as a pūrvapakṣa view held by Gaimini, that they are not so qualified, for the reason that there are no other Ādityas, Vasus, and so on, who could be meditated on by the Ādityas and Vasus themselves; and that moreover for the Ādityas and Vasus the qualities and position of those classes of deities cannot be objects of desire, considering that they possess them already. The so-called Madhuvidyā (*Kh. Up. III*) represents as objects of devout meditation certain parts of the sun which are being enjoyed by the different classes of divine beings, Vasus, Ādityas, and so on—the sun being there called ‘madhu,’ i.e. honey or nectar, on account of his being the abode of a certain nectar to be brought about by certain sacrificial works to be known from the *Rig-veda*, and so on; and as the reward of such meditation the text names the attainment of the position of the Vasus, Ādityas, and so on.

31. And on account of (meditating on the part of the gods) being in the Light.

‘Him the devas meditate upon as the light of lights, as

immortal time' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 16*). This text declares that the meditation of the gods has for its object the Light, i.e. the highest Brahman. Now this express declaration as to the gods being meditating devotees with regard to meditations on Brahman which are common to men and gods, implies a denial of the gods being qualified for meditations on other objects. The conclusion therefore is that the Vasus, and so on, are not qualified for meditations on the Vasus and other classes of deities.

32. But Bādarāyana (maintains) the existence (of qualification); for there is (possibility of such).

The Reverend Bādarāyana thinks that the Ādityas, Vasus, and so on, are also qualified for meditations on divinities. For it is in their case also possible that their attainment of Brahman should be viewed as preceded by their attainment of Vasu-hood or Āditya-hood, in so far, namely, as they meditate on Brahman as abiding within themselves. They may be Vasus and Ādityas in the present age of the world, but at the same time be desirous of holding the same position in future ages also. In the *Madhuvidyā* we have to distinguish two sections, concerned respectively with Brahman in its causal and its effected state. The former section, extending from the beginning up to 'when from thence he has risen upwards,' enjoins meditation on Brahman in its condition as effect, i.e. as appearing in the form of creatures such as the Vasus, and so on; while the latter section enjoins meditation on the causal Brahman viewed as abiding within the sun as its inner Self. The purport of the whole *vidyā* is that he who meditates on Brahman in this its twofold form will in a future age of the world enjoy Vasu-hood, and will finally attain Brahman in its causal aspect, i.e. the very highest Brahman. From the fact that the text, 'And indeed to him who thus knows the *Brahma-upanishad*, the sun does not rise and does not set; for him there is day once and for all,' calls the whole *Madhuvidyā* a '*Brahma*'-upanishad, and that the reward declared is the attainment of Vasu-hood, and so on, leading up to the attainment of Brahman, we clearly are entitled to

infer that the meditations which the text enjoins, viz. on the different parts of the sun viewed as objects of enjoyment for the Vasus, and so on, really are meant as meditations on Brahman as abiding in those different forms. Meditation on the Vasus and similar beings is thus seen to be possible for the Vasus themselves. And as Brahman really constitutes the only object of meditation, we also see the appropriateness of the text discussed above, 'On him the gods meditate as the light of lights.' The *Vṛttikāra* expresses the same opinion, 'For there is possibility with regard to the Madhu-vidyā, and so on, Brahman only being the object of meditation everywhere.'—Here terminates the *adhikarāṇa* of 'honey.'

The *Sūtras* now enter on a discussion of the question whether the *Sūtras* also are qualified for the knowledge of Brahman.

The *Pūrvapakshin* maintains that they are so qualified; for qualification, he says, depends on want and capacity, and both these are possible in the case of *Sūtras* also. The *Sūdra* is not indeed qualified for any works depending on a knowledge of the sacred fires, for from such knowledge he is debarred; but he possesses qualification for meditation on Brahman, which after all is nothing but a certain mental energy. The only works prerequisite for meditation are those works which are incumbent on a man as a member of a caste or *āśrama*, and these consist, in the *Sūdra's* case, in obedience to the higher castes. And when we read 'therefore the *Sūdra* is not qualified for sacrifices,' the purport of this passage is only to make a confirmatory reference to something already settled by reason, viz. that the *Sūdra* is not qualified for the performance of sacrifices which cannot be accomplished by one not acquainted with the sacred fires (and not to deny the *Sūdra's* competence for devout meditation).—But how can meditation on Brahman be undertaken by a man who has not studied the *Vedas*, inclusive of the *Vedānta*, and hence knows nothing about the nature of Brahman and the proper modes of meditation?—Those also, we reply, who do not study *Veda* and *Vedānta* may acquire the requisite knowledge by

hearing Itihâsas and Purâṇas; and there are texts which allow Sûdras to become acquainted with texts of that kind; cp. e.g. 'one is to make the four castes to hear texts, the Brâhmaṇa coming first.' Moreover, those Purâṇas and Itihâsas make mention of Sûdras, such as Vidura, who had a knowledge of Brahman. And the Upanishads themselves, viz. in the so-called *Samvarga-vidyâ*, show that a Sûdra is qualified for the knowledge of Brahman; for there the teacher Raikva addresses Gāṇasrutî, who wishes to learn from him, as Sûdra, and thereupon instructs him in the knowledge of Brahman (*Kh. Up.* IV, 2, 3). All this proves that Sûdras also have a claim to the knowledge of Brahman.

This conclusion we deny, on the ground of the absence of capability. It is impossible that the capability of performing meditations on Brahman should belong to a person not knowing the nature of Brahman and the due modes of meditation, and not qualified by the knowledge of the requisite preliminaries of such meditation, viz. recitation of the Veda, sacrifices, and so on. Mere want or desire does not impart qualification to a person destitute of the required capability. And this absence of capability is due, in the Sûdra's case, to absence of legitimate study of the Veda. The injunctions of sacrificial works naturally connect themselves with the knowledge and the means of knowledge (i.e. religious ceremonies and the like) that belong to the three higher castes, for these castes actually possess the knowledge (required for the sacrifices), owing to their studying the Veda in agreement with the injunction which prescribes such study for the higher castes; the same injunctions do not, on the other hand, connect themselves with the knowledge and means of knowledge belonging to others (than members of the three higher castes). And the same naturally holds good with regard to the injunctions of meditation on Brahman. And as thus only such knowledge as is acquired by study prompted by the Vedic injunction of study supplies a means for meditation on Brahman, it follows that the Sûdra for whom that injunction is not meant is incapable of such meditation. Itihâsas

and Purāṇas hold the position of being helpful means towards meditation in so far only as they confirm or support the Veda, not independently of the Veda. And that Sūtras are allowed to hear Itihāsas and Purāṇas is meant only for the end of destroying their sins, not to prepare them for meditation on Brahman. The case of Vidura and other Sūtras having been 'founded on Brahman,' explains itself as follows:—Owing to the effect of former actions, which had not yet worked themselves out, they were born in a low caste, while at the same time they possessed wisdom owing to the fact that the knowledge acquired by them in former births had not yet quite vanished.

(On these general grounds we object to Sūtras being viewed as qualified for meditation on Brahman.) The Sūtra now refutes that argument, which the Pūrvapakshin derives from the use of the word 'Sūtra' in the *Samvarga-vidyā*.

33. (That) grief of him (arose), this is intimated by his (Gānasruti's) resorting to him (Raikva) on hearing a disrespectful speech about himself.

From what the text says about Gānasruti Pautrāyana having been taunted by a flamingo for his want of knowledge of Brahman, and having thereupon resorted to Raikva, who possessed the knowledge of Brahman, it appears that sorrow (*śuk*) had taken possession of him; and it is with a view to this that Raikva addresses him as Sūdra. For the word Sūdra, etymologically considered, means one who grieves or sorrows (*śokāti*). The appellation 'sūdra' therefore refers to his sorrow, not to his being a member of the fourth caste. This clearly appears from a consideration of the whole story. Gānasruti Pautrāyana was a very liberal and pious king. Being much pleased with his virtuous life, and wishing to rouse in him the desire of knowing Brahman, two noble-minded beings, assuming the shape of flamingoes, flew past him at night time, when one of them addressed the other, 'O Bhallāksha, the light of Gānasruti has spread like the sky; do not go

near that it may not burn thee.' To this praise of Gānasruti the other flamingo replied, 'How can you speak of him, being what he is, as if he were Raikva "sayuktvaṇ"?' i. e. 'how can you speak of Gānasruti, being what he is, as if he were Raikva, who knows Brahman and is endowed with the most eminent qualities? Raikva, who knows Brahman, alone in this world is truly eminent. Gānasruti may be very pious, but as he does not know Brahman what quality of his could produce splendour capable of burning me like the splendour of Raikva?' The former flamingo thereupon asks who that Raikva is, and its companion replies, 'He in whose work and knowledge there are comprised all the works done by good men and all the knowledge belonging to intelligent creatures, that is Raikva.' Gānasruti, having heard this speech of the flamingo—which implied a reproach to himself as being destitute of the knowledge of Brahman, and a glorification of Raikva as possessing that knowledge—at once sends his door-keeper to look for Raikva; and when the door-keeper finds him and brings word, the king himself repairs to him with six hundred cows, a golden necklace, and a carriage yoked with mules, and asks him to teach him the deity on which he meditates, i. e. the highest deity. Raikva, who through the might of his Yoga-knowledge is acquainted with everything that passes in the three worlds, at once perceives that Gānasruti is inwardly grieved at the slighting speech of the flamingo, which had been provoked by the king's want of knowledge of Brahman, and is now making an effort due to the wish of knowing Brahman; and thus recognises that the king is fit for the reception of that knowledge. Reflecting thereupon that a knowledge of Brahman may be firmly established in this pupil even without long attendance on the teacher if only he will be liberal to the teacher to the utmost of his capability, he addresses him: 'Do thou take away (apāhara) (these things), O Sūdra; keep (the chariot) with the cows for thyself.' What he means to say is, 'By so much only in the way of gifts bestowed on me, the knowledge of Brahman cannot be established in thee, who, through the desire for such knowledge, art plunged

in grief'—the address 'O Sûdra' intimating that Raikva knows Gānasruti to be plunged in grief, and on that account fit to receive instruction about Brahman. Gānasruti thereupon approaches Raikva for a second time, bringing as much wealth as he possibly can, and moreover his own daughter. Raikva again intimates his view of the pupil's fitness for receiving instruction by addressing him a second time as 'Sûdra,' and says, 'You have brought these, O Sûdra; by this mouth only you made me speak,' i.e. 'You now have brought presents to the utmost of your capability; by this means only you will induce me, without lengthy service on your part, to utter speech containing that instruction about Brahman which you desire.'—Having said this he begins to instruct him.—We thus see that the appellation 'sûdra' is meant to intimate the grief of Gānasruti—which grief in its turn indicates the king's fitness for receiving instruction; and is not meant to declare that Gānasruti belongs to the lowest caste.

34. And on account of (Gānasruti's) kshattriya-hood being understood.

The first section of the vidyâ tells us that Gānasruti bestowed much wealth and food; later on he is represented as sending his door-keeper on an errand; and in the end, as bestowing on Raikva many villages—which shows him to be a territorial lord. All these circumstances suggest Gānasruti's being a Kshattriya, and hence not a member of the lowest caste.—The above Sûtra having declared that the kshattriya-hood of Gānasruti is indicated in the introductory legend, the next Sûtra shows that the same circumstance is indicated in the concluding legend.

35. On account of the inferential sign further on, together with Kaitraratha.

The kshattriya-hood of Gānasruti is further to be accepted on account of the Kshattriya Abhipratârin Kaitraratha, who is mentioned further on in this very same Samvarga-vidyâ which Raikva imparts to Gānasruti.—But why?—As follows. The section beginning 'Once a Brahmakârin

begged of Saunaka Kāpeya and Abhipratârin Kākshaseni while being waited on at their meal,' and ending 'thus do we, O Brahma^târin, meditate on that being,' shows Kāpeya, Abhipratârin, and the Brahma^târin to be connected with the Samvarga-vidyâ. Now Abhipratârin is a Kshattriya, the other two are Brâhmanas. This shows that there are connected with the vidyâ, Brâhmanas, and from among non-Brâhmanas, a Kshattriya only, but not a Sûdra. It therefore appears appropriate to infer that the person, other than the Brâhmaⁿa Raikva, who is likewise connected with this vidyâ, viz. Gānasruti, is likewise a Kshattriya, not a Sûdra.—But how do we know that Abhipratârin is a Kaitraratha and a Kshattriya? Neither of these circumstances is stated in the legend in the Samvarga-vidyâ! To this question the Sûtra replies, 'on account of the inferential mark.' From the inferential mark that Saunaka Kāpeya and Abhipratârin Kākshaseni are said to have been sitting together at a meal we understand that there is some connexion between Abhipratârin and the Kāpeyas. Now another scriptural passage runs as follows: 'The Kāpeyas made Kaitraratha perform that sacrifice' (Tānd. Brâ. XX, 12, 5), and this shows that one connected with the Kāpeyas was a Kaitraratha; and a further text shows that a Kaitraratha is a Kshattriya, 'from him there was descended a Kaitraratha who was a prince.' All this favours the inference that Abhipratârin was a Kaitraratha and a Kshattriya.

So far the Sûtras have shown that there is no inferential mark to prove what is contradicted by reasoning, viz. the qualification of the Sûdras. The next Sûtra declares that the non-qualification of the Sûdra proved by reasoning is confirmed by Scripture and Smṛiti.

36. On account of the reference to ceremonial purifications, and on account of the declaration of their absence.

In sections the purport of which is to give instruction about Brahman the ceremony of initiation is referred to, 'I will initiate you; he initiated him' (Kh. Up. IV, 4).

And at the same time the absence of such ceremonies in the case of Sûdras is stated: 'In the Sûdra there is not any sin, and he is not fit for any ceremony' (Manu X, 126); and 'The fourth caste is once born, and not fit for any ceremony' (Manu X, 4).

37. And on account of the procedure, on the ascertainment of the non-being of that.

That a Sûdra is not qualified for knowledge of Brahman appears from that fact also that as soon as Gautama has convinced himself that Gâbâla, who wishes to become his pupil, is not a Sûdra, he proceeds to teach him the knowledge of Brahman.

38. And on account of the prohibition of hearing, studying, and performance of (Vedic) matter.

The Sûdra is specially forbidden to hear and study the Veda and to perform the things enjoined in it. 'For a Sûdra is like a cemetery, therefore the Veda must not be read in the vicinity of a Sûdra;' 'Therefore the Sûdra is like a beast, unfit for sacrifices.' And he who does not hear the Veda recited cannot learn it so as to understand and perform what the Veda enjoins. The prohibition of hearing thus implies the prohibition of understanding and whatever depends on it.

39. And on account of Smṛiti.

Smṛiti also declares this prohibition of hearing, and so on. 'The ears of him who hears the Veda are to be filled with molten lead and lac; if he pronounces it his tongue is to be slit; if he preserves it his body is to be cut through.' And 'He is not to teach him sacred duties or vows.'—It is thus a settled matter that the Sûdras are not qualified for meditations on Brahman.

We must here point out that the non-qualification of Sûdras for the cognition of Brahman can in no way be asserted by those who hold that a Brahman consisting of pure non-differenced intelligence constitutes the sole reality; that everything else is false; that all bondage is unreal;

that such bondage may be put an end to by the mere cognition of the true nature of Reality—such cognition resulting from the hearing of certain texts; and that the cessation of bondage thus effected constitutes final Release. For knowledge of the true nature of Reality, in the sense indicated, and the release resulting from it, may be secured by any one who learns from another person that Brahman alone is real and that everything else is falsely superimposed on Brahman. That the cognition of such truth can be arrived at only on the basis of certain Vedic texts, such as 'Thou art that,' is a restriction which does not admit of proof; for knowledge of the truth does not depend on man's choice, and at once springs up in the mind even of an unwilling man as soon as the conditions for such origination are present. Nor can it be proved in any way that bondage can be put an end to only through such knowledge of the truth as springs from Vedic texts; for error comes to an end through the knowledge of the true nature of things, whatever agency may give rise to such knowledge. True knowledge, of the kind described, will spring up in the mind of a man as soon as he hears the non-scriptural declaration, 'Brahman, consisting of non-differenced intelligence, is the sole Reality; everything else is false,' and this will suffice to free him from error. When a competent and trustworthy person asserts that what was mistaken for silver is merely a sparkling shell, the error of a Sûdra no less than of a Brâhmaṇa comes to an end; in the same way a Sûdra also will free himself from the great cosmic error as soon as the knowledge of the true nature of things has arisen in his mind through a statement resting on the traditional lore of men knowing the Veda. Nor must you object to this on the ground that men knowing the Veda do not instruct Sûdras, and so on, because the text, 'he is not to teach him sacred things,' forbids them to do so; for men who have once learned—from texts such as 'Thou art that'—that Brahman is their Self, and thus are standing on the very top of the Veda as it were, move no longer in the sphere of those to whom injunctions and prohibitions apply, and the prohibition quoted does not

therefore touch them. Knowledge of Brahman may thus spring up in the mind of Sûdras and the like, owing to instruction received from one of those men who have passed beyond all prohibition. Nor must it be said that the instance of the shell and the silver is not analogous, in so far, namely, as the error with regard to silver in the shell comes to an end as soon as the true state of things is declared; while the great cosmic error that clouds the Sûdra's mind does not come to an end as soon as, from the teaching of another man, he learns the truth about Reality. For the case of the Sûdra does not herein differ from that of the Brâhmaṇa; the latter also does not at once free himself from the cosmic error. Nor again will it avail to plead that the sacred texts originate the demanded final cognition in the mind of the Brâhmaṇa as soon as meditation has dispelled the obstructive imagination of plurality; for in the same way, i.e. helped by meditation, the non-Vedic instruction given by another person produces the required cognition in the mind of the Sûdra. For meditation means nothing but a steady consideration of the sense which sentences declaratory of the unity of Brahman and the Self may convey, and the effect of such meditation is to destroy all impressions opposed to such unity; you yourself thus admit that the injunction of meditation aims at something visible (i.e. an effect that can be definitely assigned, whence it follows that the Sûdra also is qualified for it, while he would not be qualified for an activity having an '*adrishṭa*,' i.e. supersensuous, transcendental effect). The recital of the text of the Veda also and the like (are not indispensable means for bringing about cognition of Brahman, but) merely subserve the origination of the *desire* of knowledge. The desire of knowledge may arise in a Sûdra also (viz. in some other way), and thereupon real knowledge may result from non-Vedic instruction, obstructive imaginations having previously been destroyed by meditation. And thus in his case also non-real bondage will come to an end.—The same conclusion may also be arrived at by a different road. The mere ordinary instruments of knowledge, viz. perception

and inference assisted by reasoning, may suggest to the Sūdra the theory that there is an inward Reality constituted by non-differenced self-luminous intelligence, that this inward principle witnesses Nescience, and that owing to Nescience the entire apparent world, with its manifold distinctions of knowing subjects and objects of knowledge, is superimposed upon the inner Reality. He may thereupon, by uninterrupted meditation on this inner Reality, free himself from all imaginations opposed to it, arrive at the intuitive knowledge of the inner principle, and thus obtain final release. And this way being open to release, there is really no use to be discerned in the Vedānta-texts, suggesting as they clearly do the entirely false view that the real being (is not absolutely homogeneous intelligence, but) possesses infinite transcendent attributes, being endowed with manifold powers, connected with manifold creations, and so on. In this way the qualification of Sūdras for the knowledge of Brahman is perfectly clear. And as the knowledge of Brahman may be reached in this way not only by Sūdras but also by Brāhmaṇas and members of the other higher castes, the poor Upanishad is practically defunct.—To this the following objection will possibly be raised. Man being implicated in and confused by the beginningless course of mundane existence, requires to receive from somewhere a suggestion as to this empirical world being a mere error and the Reality being something quite different, and thus only there arises in him a desire to enter on an enquiry, proceeding by means of perception, and so on. Now that which gives the required suggestion is the Veda, and hence we cannot do without it.—But this objection is not valid. For in the minds of those who are awed by all the dangers and troubles of existence, the desire to enter on a philosophical investigation of Reality, proceeding by means of Perception and Inference, springs up quite apart from the Veda, owing to the observation that there are various sects of philosophers, Sāṅkhyas, and so on, who make it their business to carry on such investigations. And when such desire is once roused, Perception and Inference alone (in the way allowed by the Sāṅkaras themselves) lead on to

the theory that the only Reality is intelligence eternal, pure, self-luminous, non-dual, non-changing, and that everything else is fictitiously superimposed thereon. That this self-luminous Reality possesses no other attribute to be learned from scripture is admitted; for according to your opinion also scripture sublates everything that is not Brahman and merely superimposed on it. Nor should it be said that we must have recourse to the Upanishads for the purpose of establishing that the Real found in the way of perception and inference is at the same time of the nature of bliss; for the merely and absolutely Intelligent is seen of itself to be of that nature, since it is different from everything that is not of that nature.—There are, on the other hand, those who hold that the knowledge which the Vedānta-texts enjoin as the means of Release is of the nature of devout meditation; that such meditation has the effect of winning the love of the supreme Spirit and is to be learned from scripture only; that the injunctions of meditation refer to such knowledge only as springs from the legitimate study of the Veda on the part of a man duly purified by initiation and other ceremonies, and is assisted by the seven means (see above, p. 17); and that the supreme Person pleased by such meditation bestows on the devotee knowledge of his own true nature, dissolves thereby the Nescience springing from works, and thus releases him from bondage. And on this view the proof of the non-qualification of the Sûdra, as given in the preceding Sûtras, holds good.—Here terminates the adhikarāṇa of 'the exclusion of the Sûdras.'

Having thus completed the investigation of qualification which had suggested itself in connexion with the matter in hand, the Sûtras return to the being measured by a thumb, and state another reason for its being explained as Brahman—as already understood on the basis of its being declared the ruler of what is and what will be.

40. On account of the trembling.

In the part of the *Kaṭha*-Upanishad which intervenes between the passage 'The Person of the size of a thumb

stands in the middle of the Self' (II, 4, 12), and the passage 'The Person of the size of a thumb, the inner Self' (II, 6, 17), we meet with the text 'whatever there is, the whole world, when gone forth, trembles in its breath. A great terror, a raised thunderbolt; those who knew it became immortal. From fear of it fire burns, from fear the sun shines, from fear Indra and Vāyu, and Death as the fifth run away' (II, 6, 2; 3). This text declares that the whole world and Agni, Sūrya, and so on, abiding within that Person of the size of a thumb, who is here designated by the term 'breath,' and going forth from him, tremble from their great fear of him. 'What will happen to us if we transgress his commandments?'—thinking thus the whole world trembles on account of great fear, as if it were a raised thunderbolt. In this explanation we take the clause 'A great fear, a raised thunderbolt,' in the sense of '(the world trembles) from great fear,' &c., as it is clearly connected in meaning with the following clause: 'from fear the fire burns,' &c.—Now what is described here is the nature of the highest Brahman; for that such power belongs to Brahman only we know from other texts, viz.: 'By the command of that Imperishable, O Gārgī, sun and moon stand apart' (*Bṛi. Up. III, 8, 9*); and 'From fear of it the wind blows, from fear the sun rises; from fear of it Agni and Indra, yea Death runs as the fifth' (*Taitt. Up. II, 8, 1*).—The next Sūtra supplies a further reason.

41. On account of light being seen (declared in the text).

Between the two texts referring to the Person of the size of a thumb, there is a text declaring that to that Person there belongs light that obscures all other light, and is the cause and assistance of all other light; and such light is characteristic of Brahman only. 'The sun does not shine there, nor the moon and the stars, nor these lightnings, and much less this fire. After him, the shining one, everything shines; by his light all this is lighted' (*Ka. Up. II, 5, 15*). This very same śloka is read in the *Ātharvāna* (i. e.

Mundaka) with reference to Brahman. Everywhere, in fact, the texts attribute supreme luminousness to Brahman only. Compare: 'Having approached the highest light he manifests himself in his own shape' (*Kh. Up.* VIII, 12, 3); 'Him the gods meditate on as the light of lights, as immortal time' (*Bri. Up.* IV, 4, 16); 'Now that light which shines above this heaven' (*Kh. Up.* III, 13, 7).—It is thus a settled conclusion that the Person measured by a thumb is the highest Brahman.—Here terminates the *adhikarana* of 'him who is measured' (by a thumb).

42. The ether, on account of the designation of something different, and so on.

We read in the *Khândogya* 'The ether is the evolver of forms and names. That within which these forms and names are (or "that which is within—or without—these forms and names") is Brahman, the Immortal, the Self' (VIII, 14). A doubt here arises whether the being here called ether be the released individual soul, or the highest Self.—The *Pûrvapakshin* adopts the former view. For, he says, the released soul is introduced as subject-matter in an immediately preceding clause, 'Shaking off all as a horse shakes his hair, and as the moon frees himself from the mouth of *Râhu*; having shaken off the body I obtain, satisfied, the uncreated world of Brahman.' Moreover, the clause 'That which is without forms and names' clearly designates the released soul freed from name and form. And 'the evolver of names and forms' is again that same soul characterised with a view to its previous condition; for the individual soul in its non-released state supported the shapes of gods, and so on, and their names. With a view, finally, to its present state in which it is free from name and form, the last clause declares 'that is Brahman, the Immortal.' The term 'ether' may very well be applied to the released soul which is characterised by the possession of non-limited splendour.—But, as the text under discussion is supplementary to the section dealing with the small ether within the heart (VIII, 1, 1 ff.), we understand that

that small ether is referred to here also ; and it has been proved above that that small ether is Brahman!—Not so, we reply. The text under discussion is separated from the section treating of the small ether within the heart, by the teaching of Pragâpati, and that teaching is concerned with the characteristics of the individual soul in its different conditions up to Release ; and moreover the earlier part of the section under discussion speaks of the being which shakes off evil, and this undoubtedly is the released individual soul introduced in the teaching of Pragâpati. All this shows that the ether in our passage denotes the released individual soul.

This view is set aside by the Sûtra. The ether in our passage is the highest Brahman, because the clause 'Ether is the evolver of forms and names' designates something other than the individual soul. The ether which evolves names and forms cannot be the individual soul either in the state of bondage or that of release. In the state of bondage the soul is under the influence of karman, itself participates in name and form, and hence cannot bring about names and forms. And in its released state it is expressly said not to take part in the world-business (Ve. Sû. IV, 4, 17), and therefore is all the less qualified to evolve names and forms. The Lord, on the other hand, who is the ruling principle in the construction of the Universe is expressly declared by scripture to be the evolver of names and forms ; cp. 'Entering into them with this living Self, let me evolve names and forms' (*Kh. Up.* VI, 3, 2) ; 'Who is all-knowing, whose brooding consists of knowledge, from him is born this Brahman, name, form, and matter' (*Mu. Up.* I, 1, 9). &c. Hence the ether which brings about names and forms is something different from the soul for which name and form are brought about ; it is in fact the highest Brahman. This the next clause of the text confirms, 'That which is within those forms and names' ; the purport of which is : because that ether is within names and forms, not being touched by them but being something apart, therefore it is the evolver of them ; this also following from his being free from evil and endowed with the power of realising his

purposes. The 'and so on' in the Sûtra refers to the Brahma-hood, Self-hood, and immortality mentioned in the text ('That is the Brahman, the Immortal, the Self'). For Brahma-hood, i. e. greatness, and so on, in their unconditioned sense, belong to the highest Self only. It is thus clear that the ether is the highest Brahman.—Nor is the Pûrvapakshin right in maintaining that a clause immediately preceding ('shaking off all evil') introduces the individual soul as the general topic of the section. For what the part of the text immediately preceding the passage under discussion does introduce as general topic, is the highest Brahman, as shown by the clause 'I obtain the Brahma-world.' Brahman is, it is true, represented there as the object to be obtained by the released soul; but as the released soul cannot be the evolver of names and forms, &c., we must conclude that it is Brahman (and not the released soul), which constitutes the topic of the whole section. Moreover (to take a wider view of the context of our passage) the term 'ether' prompts us to recognise here the small ether (mentioned in the first section of the eighth book) as the general topic of the book; and as the teaching of Pragâpati is meant to set forth (not the individual soul by itself but) the nature of the soul of the meditating devotee, it is proper to conclude that the text under discussion is meant finally to represent, as the object to be obtained, the small ether previously inculcated as object of meditation. In conclusion we remark that the term 'ether' is nowhere seen to denote the individual Self.—The ether that evolves names and forms, therefore, is the highest Brahman.

But, an objection is raised, there is no other Self different from the individual Self; for scripture teaches the unity of all Selves and denies duality. Terms such as 'the highest Self,' 'the highest Brahman,' 'the highest Lord,' are merely designations of the individual soul in the state of Release. The Brahma-world to be attained, therefore, is nothing different from the attaining individual soul; and hence the ether also that evolves names and forms can be that soul only.—To this objection the next Sûtra replies.

43. On account of difference in deep sleep and departing.

We have to supply 'on account of designation' from the preceding Sūtra. Because the text designates the highest Self as something different from the individual Self in the state of deep sleep as well as at the time of departure, the highest Self is thus different. For the Vāgasaneyaka, after having introduced the individual Self in the passage 'Who is that Self?—He who consisting of knowledge is among the *prāṇas*,' &c. (*Bṛi. Up.* IV, 3, 7), describes how, in the state of deep sleep, being not conscious of anything it is held embraced by the all-knowing highest Self, 'embraced by the intelligent Self it knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within' (IV, 3, 21). So also with reference to the time of departure, i. e. dying 'Mounted by the intelligent Self it moves along groaning' (IV, 3, 35). Now it is impossible that the unconscious individual Self, either lying in deep sleep or departing from the body, should at the same time be embraced or mounted by itself, being all-knowing. Nor can the embracing and mounting Self be some other individual Self; for no such Self can be all-knowing.—The next Sūtra supplies a further reason.

44. And on account of such words as Lord.

That embracing highest Self is further on designated by terms such as Lord, and so on. 'He is the Lord of all, the master of all, the ruler of all. He does not become greater by good works, nor smaller by evil works. He is the lord of all, the king of beings, the protector of beings. He is a bank and a boundary so that these worlds may not be confounded. *Brāhmaṇas* seek to know him by the study of the Veda. He who knows him becomes a Muni. Wishing for that world only, mendicants leave their homes' (IV, 4, 22). 'This indeed is the great unborn Self, the strong, the giver of wealth,—undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless is Brahman' (IV, 4, 24 ; 25). Now all the qualities here declared, viz. being the lord of all, and so on, cannot possibly belong to the individual Self even in the state of Release ; and we thus again arrive at the conclusion that

the ether evolving forms and names is something different from the released individual soul. The declarations of general Unity which we meet with in the texts rest thereon, that all sentient and non-sentient beings are effects of Brahman, and hence have Brahman for their inner Self. That this is the meaning of texts such as 'All this is Brahman,' &c., we have explained before. And the texts denying plurality are to be understood in the same way.—Here terminates the *adhikarāṇa* of 'the designation of something different, and so on.'

FOURTH PĀDA.

1. If it be said that some (mention) that which rests on Inference; we deny this because (the form) refers to what is contained in the simile of the body; and (this the text) shows.

So far the Sūtras have given instruction about a Brahman, the enquiry into which serves as a means to obtain what is the highest good of man, viz. final release; which is the cause of the origination, and so on, of the world; which differs in nature from all non-sentient things such as the Pradhâna, and from all intelligent beings whether in the state of bondage or of release; which is free from all shadow of imperfection; which is all knowing, all powerful, has the power of realising all its purposes, comprises within itself all blessed qualities, is the inner Self of all, and possesses unbounded power and might. But here a new special objection presents itself. In order to establish the theory maintained by Kapila, viz. of there being a Pradhâna and individual souls which do *not* have their Self in Brahman; it is pointed out by some that in certain branches of the Veda there are met with certain passages which appear to adumbrate the doctrine of the Pradhâna being the universal cause. The Sūtras now apply themselves to the refutation of this view, in order thereby to confirm the theory of Brahman being the only cause of all.

We read in the *Kaṭha-Upanishad*, 'Beyond the senses there are the objects, beyond the objects there is the mind, beyond the mind there is the intellect, the great Self is beyond the intellect. Beyond the Great there is the Unevolved, beyond the Unevolved there is the Person. Beyond the Person there is nothing—this is the goal, the highest road' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 11). The question here arises whether by the 'Unevolved' be or be *not* meant the

Pradhāna, as established by Kapila's theory, of which Brahman is not the Self.—The Pūrvapakshin maintains the former alternative. For, he says, in the clause 'beyond the Great is the Unevolved, beyond the Unevolved is the Person,' we recognise the arrangement of entities as established by the Sāṅkhya-system, and hence must take the 'Unevolved' to be the Pradhāna. This is further confirmed by the additional clause 'beyond the Person there is nothing,' which (in agreement with Sāṅkhya principles) denies that there is any being beyond the soul, which itself is the twenty-fifth and last of the principles recognised by the Sāṅkhyas. This *primâ facie* view is expressed in the former part of the Sūtra, 'If it be said that in the *śākhās* of some that which rests on Inference, i.e. the Pradhāna, is stated as the universal cause.'

The latter part of the Sūtra refutes this view. The word 'Unevolved' does not denote a Pradhāna independent of Brahman; it rather denotes the body represented as a chariot in the simile of the body, i.e. in the passage instituting a comparison between the Self, body, intellect, and so on, on the one side, and the charioteer, chariot, &c. on the other side.—The details are as follows. The text at first—in the section beginning 'Know the Self to be the person driving,' &c., and ending 'he reaches the end of the journey, and that is the highest place of Vishṇu' (I, 3, 3-9)—compares the devotee desirous of reaching the goal of his journey through the *samsāra*, i.e. the abode of Vishṇu, to a man driving in a chariot; and his body, senses, and so on, to the chariot and parts of the chariot; the meaning of the whole comparison being that he only reaches the goal who has the chariot, &c. in his control. It thereupon proceeds to declare which of the different beings enumerated and compared to a chariot, and so on, occupy a superior position to the others in so far, namely, as they are that which requires to be controlled—'higher than the senses are the objects,' and so on. Higher than the senses—compared to the horses—are the objects—compared to roads,—because even a man who generally controls his senses finds it difficult to master them when they are in

contact with their objects ; higher than the objects is the mind—compared to the reins—because when the mind inclines towards the objects even the non-proximity of the latter does not make much difference ; higher than the mind (manas) is the intellect (buddhi)—compared to the charioteer—because in the absence of decision (which is the characteristic quality of buddhi) the mind also has little power ; higher than the intellect again is the (individual) Self, for that Self is the agent whom the intellect serves. And as all this is subject to the wishes of the Self, the text characterises it as the ‘great Self.’ Superior to that Self again is the body, compared to the chariot, for all activity whereby the individual Self strives to bring about what is of advantage to itself depends on the body. And higher finally than the body is the highest Person, the inner Ruler and Self of all, the term and goal of the journey of the individual soul ; for the activities of all the beings enumerated depend on the wishes of that highest Self. As the universal inner Ruler that Self brings about the meditation of the Devotee also ; for the Sūtra (II, 3, 41) expressly declares that the activity of the individual soul depends on the Supreme Person. Being the means for bringing about the meditation and the goal of meditation, that same Self is the highest object to be attained ; hence the text says ‘Higher than the Person there is nothing—that is the goal, the highest road.’ Analogously scripture, in the antaryāmin-Brāhmaṇa, at first declares that the highest Self within witnesses and rules everything, and thereupon negatives the existence of any further ruling principle ‘There is no other seer but he,’ &c. Similarly, in the Bhagavad-gītā, ‘The abode, the agent, the various senses, the different and manifold functions, and fifth the Divinity (i.e. the highest Person)’ (XVIII, 14) ; and ‘I dwell within the heart of all ; memory and perception, as well as their loss, come from me’ (XV, 15). And if, as in the explanation of the text under discussion, we speak of that highest Self being ‘controlled,’ we must understand thereby the soul’s taking refuge with it ; compare the passage Bha. Gī. XVIII, 61-62, ‘The Lord

dwells in the heart of all creatures, whirling them round as if mounted on a machine ; to Him go for refuge.'

Now all the beings, senses, and so on, which had been mentioned in the simile, are recognised in the passage 'higher than the senses are the objects,' &c., being designated there by their proper names ; but there is no mention made of the body which previously had been compared to the chariot ; we therefore conclude that it is the body which is denoted by the term 'the Unevolved.' Hence there is no reason to see here a reference to the Pradhâna as established in the theory of Kapila. Nor do we recognise, in the text under discussion, the general system of Kapila. The text declares the objects, i.e. sounds and so on, to be superior to the senses ; but in Kapila's system the objects are not viewed as the causes of the senses. For the same reason the statement that the manas is higher than the objects does not agree with Kapila's doctrine. Nor is this the case with regard to the clause 'higher than the buddhi is the great one, the Self' ; for with Kapila the 'great one' (mahat) is the buddhi, and it would not do to say 'higher than the great one is the great one.' And finally the 'great one,' according to Kapila, cannot be called the 'Self.' The text under discussion thus refers only to those entities which had previously appeared in the simile. The text itself further on proves this, when saying 'That Self is hidden in all beings and does not shine forth, but it is seen by subtle seers through their sharp and subtle intellect. A wise man should keep down speech in the mind, he should keep that within knowledge (which is) within the Self ; he should keep knowledge within the great Self, and that he should keep within the quiet Self.' For this passage, after having stated that the highest Self is difficult to see with the inner and outer organs of knowledge, describes the mode in which the sense-organs, and so on, are to be held in control. The wise man should restrain the sense-organs and the organs of activity within the mind ; he should restrain that (i.e. the mind) within knowledge, i.e. within the intellect (buddhi), which abides within the Self ; he should further restrain the intellect within the

great Self, i.e. the active individual Self; and that Self finally he should restrain within the quiet Self, i.e. the highest Brahman, which is the inner ruler of all; i.e. he should reach, with his individual Self so qualified, the place of Vishṇu, i.e. Brahman.—But how can the term ‘the Unevolved’ denote the evolved body?—To this question the next Sūtra furnishes a reply.

2. But the subtle (body), on account of its capability.

The elements in their fine state are what is called the ‘Unevolved,’ and this entering into a particular condition becomes the body. It is the ‘Unevolved’ in the particular condition of the body, which in the text under discussion is called the ‘Unevolved.’ ‘On account of its capability,’ i.e. because unevolved non-sentient matter, when assuming certain states and forms, is capable of entering on activities promoting the interest of man. But, an objection is raised, if the ‘Unevolved’ is taken to be matter in its subtle state, what objection is there to our accepting for the explanation of our text that which is established in the Sāṅkhya-system? for there also the ‘Unevolved’ means nothing else but matter in its subtle state.

To this the next Sūtra replies—

3. (Matter in its subtle state) subserves an end, on account of its dependence on him (viz. the Supreme Person).

Matter in its subtle state subserves ends, in so far only as it is dependent on the Supreme Person who is the cause of all. We by no means wish to deny unevolved matter and all its effects in themselves, but in so far only as they are maintained not to have their Self in the Supreme Person. For the fact is that they constitute his body and He thus constitutes their Self; and it is only through this their relation to him that the Pradhāna, and so on, are capable of accomplishing their several ends. Otherwise the different essential natures of them all could never

exist,—nor persist, nor act. It is just on the ground of this dependence on the Lord not being acknowledged by the Sāṅkhyas that their system is disproved by us. In Scripture and Smṛiti alike, wherever the origination and destruction of the world are described, or the greatness of the Supreme Person is glorified, the Pradhāna and all its effects, no less than the individual souls, are declared to have their Self in that Supreme Person. Compare, e.g. the text which first says that the earth is merged in water, and further on 'the elements are merged in the Mahat, the Mahat in the Unevolved, the Unevolved in the Imperishable, the Imperishable in Darkness; Darkness becomes one with the highest divinity.' And 'He of whom the earth is the body,' &c. up to 'he of whom the Unevolved is the body; of whom the Imperishable is the body; of whom death is the body; he the inner Self of all beings, free from all evil, the divine one, the one God Nārāyaṇa.' And 'Earth, water, fire, air, ether, mind, intellect, egoity—thus eightfold is my nature divided. Lower is this nature; other than this and higher know that nature of mine which has become the individual soul by which this world is supported. Remember that all beings spring from this; I am the origin and the dissolution of the whole Universe. Higher than I there is none else; all this is strung on me as pearls on a thread' (Bha. Gī. VII, 4-7). And 'the Evolved is Viśṇu, and the Unevolved, he is the Person and time.—The nature (*prakṛiti*) declared by me, having the double form of the Evolved and the Unevolved, and the soul—both these are merged in the highest Self. That Self is the support of all, the Supreme Person who under the name of Viśṇu is glorified in the Vedas and the Vedānta books.'

4. And on account of there being no statement of its being an object of knowledge.

If the text meant the Non-evolved as understood by the Sāṅkhyas it would refer to it as something to be known; for the Sāṅkhyas, who hold the theory of Release resulting from the discriminative knowledge of the Evolved, the

Non-evolved, and the soul, admit that all these are objects of knowledge. Now our text does not refer to the Un-evolved as an object of knowledge, and it cannot therefore be the Pradhāna assumed by the Sāṅkhyas.

5. Should it be said that (the text) declares (it) ; we say, not so ; for the intelligent Self (is meant), on account of subject-matter.

‘He who has meditated on that which is without sound, without touch, without form, without decay, without taste, eternal, without smell, without beginning, without end, beyond the Great, unchangeable ; is freed from the jaws of death’ (Ka. Up. II, 3, 15), this scriptural text, closely following on the text under discussion, represents the ‘Unevolved’ as the object of knowledge !—Not so, we reply. What that sloka represents as the object of meditation is (not the Unevolved but) the intelligent Self, i. e. the Supreme Person. For it is the latter who forms the general subject-matter, as we infer from two preceding passages, viz. ‘He who has knowledge for his charioteer, and who holds the reins of the mind, he reaches the end of his journey, the highest place of Vishṇu’ ; and ‘That Self is hidden in all beings and does not shine forth, but it is seen by subtle seers through their sharp and subtle intellect.’ For this reason, also, the clause ‘Higher than the person there is nothing’ cannot be taken as meant to deny the existence of an entity beyond the ‘purusha’ in the Sāṅkhya sense. That the highest Self possesses the qualities of being without sound, &c., we moreover know from other scriptural texts, such as Mu. Up. I, 1, 6 ‘That which is not to be seen, not to be grasped,’ &c. And the qualification ‘beyond the Great, unchangeable’ is meant to declare that the highest Self is beyond the individual Self which had been called ‘the Great’ in a previous passage ‘beyond the intellect is the Great Self.’

6. And of three only there is this mention and question.

In the Upanishad under discussion there is mention

made of three things only as objects of knowledge—the three standing to one another in the relation of means, end to be realised by those means, and persons realising,—and questions are asked as to those three only. There is no mention of, nor question referring to, the Unevolved.—Naïketas desirous of Release having been allowed by Death to choose three boons, chooses for his first boon that his father should be well disposed towards him—without which he could not hope for spiritual welfare. For his second boon he chooses the knowledge of the Nâïketa-fire, which is a means towards final Release. ‘Thou knowest, O Death, the fire-sacrifice which leads to heaven; tell it to me, full of faith. Those who live in the heaven-world reach Immortality—this I ask as my second boon.’ The term ‘heaven-world’ here denotes the highest aim of man, i. e. Release, as appears from the declaration that those who live there enjoy freedom from old age and death; from the fact that further on (I, 1, 26) works leading to perishable results are disparaged; and from what Yama says in reply to the second demand ‘He who thrice performs this Nâïketa-rite overcomes birth and death.’ As his third boon he, in the form of a question referring to final release, actually enquires about three things, viz. ‘the nature of the end to be reached, i. e. Release; the nature of him who wishes to reach that end; and the nature of the means to reach it, i. e. of meditation assisted by certain works. Yama, having tested Naïketas’ fitness to receive the desired instruction, thereupon begins to teach him. ‘The Ancient who is difficult to be seen, who has entered into the dark, who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss; having known him as God, by means of meditation on his Self, the wise one leaves joy and sorrow behind.’ Here the clause ‘having known the God,’ points to the divine Being that is to be meditated upon; the clause ‘by means of meditation on his Self’ points to the attaining agent, i. e. the individual soul as an object of knowledge; and the clause ‘having known him the wise ones leave joy and sorrow behind’ points to the meditation through which Brahman is to be reached. Naïketas, pleased with the

general instruction received, questions again in order to receive clearer information on those three matters, 'What thou seest as different from dharma and different from adharma, as different from that, from that which is done and not done, as different from what is past or future, tell me that'; a question referring to three things, viz. an object to be effected, a means to effect it, and an effecting agent—each of which is to be different from anything else past, present, or future¹. Yama thereupon at first instructs him as to the *Pranava*, 'That word which all the Vedas record, which all penances proclaim, desiring which men become religious students; that word I tell thee briefly—it is Om'—an instruction which implies praise of the *Pranava*, and in a general way sets forth that which the *Pranava* expresses, e. g. the nature of the object to be reached, the nature of the person reaching it, and the means for reaching it, such means here consisting in the word 'Om,' which denotes the object to be reached². He then continues to glorify the *Pranava* (I, 2, 16-17), and thereupon gives special information in the first place about the nature of the attaining subject, i. e. the individual soul, 'The knowing Self is not born, it dies not,' &c. Next he teaches *Naïketas* as to the true nature of the object to be attained, viz. the highest Brahman or Vishnu, in the section beginning 'The Self smaller than small,' and ending 'Who then knows where he is?' (I, 2, 20-25). Part of this section, viz. 'That Self cannot be gained by the Veda,' &c.,

¹ The commentary proposes different ways of finding those three objects of enquiry in the words of *Naïketas*. According to the first explanation, 'that which is different from dharma' is a means differing from all ordinary means; 'adharma' 'not-dharma' is what is not a means, but the result to be reached: hence 'that which is different from adharma' is a result differing from all ordinary results. 'What is different from that' is an agent different from 'that'; i. e. an ordinary agent, and so on. (*Sru. Prakāś. p. 1226.*)

² The syllable 'Om,' which denotes Brahman, is a means towards meditation (Brahman being meditated upon under this form), and thus indirectly a means towards reaching Brahman.

at the same time teaches that the meditation through which Brahman is attained is of the nature of devotion (bhakti). Next the sloka I, 3, 1 'There are the two drinking their reward' shows that, as the object of devout meditation and the devotee abide together, meditation is easily performed. Then the section beginning 'Know the Self to be him who drives in the chariot,' and ending 'the wise say the path is hard' (I, 3, 3-14), teaches the true mode of meditation, and how the devotee reaches the highest abode of Vishnu; and then there is a final reference to the object to be reached in I, 3, 15, 'That which is without sound, without touch,' &c. It thus appears that there are references and questions regarding those three matters only; and hence the 'Un-evolved' cannot mean the Pradhâna of the Sāṅkhyas.

7. And as in the case of the 'Great.'

In the case of the passage 'Higher than the intellect is the Great Self,' we conclude from the co-ordination of 'the Great' with the Self that what the text means is not the 'Great' principle of the Sāṅkhyas; analogously we conclude that the 'Unevolved,' which is said to be higher than the Self, cannot be the Pradhâna of Kapila's system.

8. On account of there being no special characteristic; as in the case of the cup.

In the discussion of the following passages also we aim only at refuting the system of the Sāṅkhyas; not at disproving the existence and nature of Prakṛiti, the 'great' principle, the ahaṁkāra, and so on, viewed as dependent on Brahman. For that they exist in this latter relation is proved by Scripture as well as Smṛiti.—A text of the followers of the Atharvan runs as follows: 'Her who produces all effects, the non-knowing one, the unborn one, wearing eight forms, the firm one—she is known (by the Lord) and ruled by him, she is spread out and incited and ruled by him, gives birth to the world for the benefit of the souls. A cow she is without beginning and end, a mother producing all beings; white, black, and red, milking all wishes for the Lord. Many babes unknown drink her, the impartial one;

but one God only, following his own will, drinks her submitting to him. By his own thought and work the mighty God strongly enjoys her, who is common to all, the milkgiver, who is pressed by the sacrifices. The Non-evolved when being counted by twenty-four is called the Evolved.' This passage evidently describes the nature of Prakṛiti, and so on, and the same Upanishad also teaches the Supreme Person who constitutes the Self of Prakṛiti, and so on. 'Him they call the twenty-sixth or also the twenty-seventh; as the Person devoid of all qualities of the Sāṅkhyas he is known by the followers of the Atharvan¹.—Other followers of the Atharvan read in their text that there are sixteen originating principles (prakṛiti) and eight effected things (vikāra; Garbha Up. 3).—The Svetāsvataras again set forth the nature of Prakṛiti, the soul and the Lord as follows. 'The Lord supports all this together; the Perishable and the Imperishable, the Evolved and the Unevolved; the other one is in bondage, since he is an enjoyer; but having known the God he is free from all fetters. There are two unborn ones, the one knowing and a Lord, the other without knowledge and lordly power; there is the one unborn female on whom the enjoyment of all enjoyers depends; and there is the infinite Self appearing in all shapes, but itself inactive. When a man finds out these three, that is Brahman. The Perishable is the Pradhāna, the Immortal and Imperishable is Hara; the one God rules the Perishable and the Self. From meditation on him, from union with him, from becoming one with him there is in the end cessation of all Māyā' (Svet. Up. I, 8–10). And 'The sacred verses, the offerings, the sacrifices, the vows, the past, the future, and all that the Vedas declare—from that the Ruler of Māyā creates all this; and in this the other one is bound up through Māyā. Know then Prakṛiti to be Māyā and the great Lord the ruler of Māyā; with his members this

¹ These quotations are from the Kulikā-Upanishad (transl. by Deussen, Seventy Upanishads, p. 638 ff.) The translation as given above follows the readings adopted by Rāmānuja and explained in the Śruti-Prakārikā.

whole world is filled' (Svet. Up. V, 9-10). And, further on, 'The master of Pradhâna and the soul, the lord of the *gunas*, the cause of the bondage, existence, and release of worldly existence' (VI, 16). Thus likewise in *Smṛiti*, 'Do thou know both Nature and the soul to be without beginning, and know all effects and qualities to have sprung from Nature. Nature is declared to be the cause of the activity of causes and effects, whilst the soul is the cause of there being enjoyment of pleasure and pain. For the soul abiding in Nature experiences the qualities derived from Nature, the reason being its connexion with the qualities, in its births in good and evil wombs' (Bha. Gî. XIII, 19-21). And 'Goodness, Passion, and Darkness—these are the qualities which, issuing from nature, bind in the body the embodied soul, the undecaying one' (XIV, 5). And 'All beings at the end of a kalpa return into my Nature, and again, at the beginning of a kalpa, do I send them forth. Presiding over my own nature again and again do I send forth this vast body of beings which has no freedom of its own, being subject to Nature.—With me as ruler Nature brings forth all moving and non-moving things, and for this reason the world does ever go round' (Bha. Gî. IX, 7, 8, 10). What we therefore refuse to accept are a *Prakṛiti*, and so on, of the kind assumed by Kapila, i. e. not having their Self in Brahman.—We now proceed to explain the Sûtra.

We read in the *Svetâsvatara-Upanishad* 'There is one *agâ*, red, white, and black, producing manifold offspring of the same nature. One *agâ* loves her and lies by her; another leaves her after having enjoyed her.' A doubt arises here whether this mantra declares a mere *Prakṛiti* as assumed in Kapila's system, or a *Prakṛiti* having its Self in Brahman.

The *Pûrvapakshin* maintains the former alternative. For, he points out, the text refers to the non-originatedness of *Prakṛiti*, calling her *agâ*, i. e. unborn, and further says that she by herself independently produces manifold offspring resembling herself. This view is rejected by the Sûtra, on the ground that there is no intimation of a special circumstance determining the acceptance of the *Prakṛiti* as

assumed by the Sāṅkhyas, i.e. independent of Brahman; for that she is agā, i.e. not born, is not a sufficiently special characteristic. The case is analogous to that of the 'cup.' In the mantra 'There is a cup having its mouth below and its bottom above' (*Bṛi. Up. II, 2, 3*), the word *kamasa* conveys to us only the idea of some implement used in eating, but we are unable to see what special kind of *kamasa* is meant; for in the case of words the meaning of which is ascertained on the ground of their derivation (as '*kamasa*' from '*kam*,' to eat or drink), the special sense of the word in any place cannot be ascertained without the help of considerations of general possibility, general subject-matter, and so on. Now in the case of the cup we are able to ascertain that the cup meant is the head, because there is a complementary passage 'What is called the cup with its mouth below and its bottom above is the head'; but if we look out for a similar help to determine the special meaning of agā, we find nothing to convince us that the agā, i.e. the 'unborn' principle, is the Prakṛti of the Sāṅkhyas. Nor is there anything in the text to convey the idea of that agā having the power of independent creation; for the clause 'giving birth to manifold offspring' declares only that she creates, not that she creates unaided. The mantra does not therefore tell us about an 'unborn' principle independent of Brahman.—There moreover is a special reason for understanding by the agā something that depends on Brahman. This the following Sūtra states.

9. But she begins with light; for thus some read in their text.

The 'but' has assertory force. 'Light' in the Sūtra means Brahman, in accordance with the meaning of the term as known from texts such as 'On him the gods meditate, the light of lights' (*Bṛi. Up. X, 4, 16*); 'That light which shines beyond heaven' (*Kh. Up. III, 13, 7*). 'She begins with light' thus means 'she has Brahman for her cause.'—'For thus some read in their text,' i.e. because the members of one Sākhā, viz. the Taittirīyas read in their

text that this 'agā' has Brahman for her cause. The Mahânārāyaṇa-Upanishad (of the Taittirīyas) at first refers to Brahman abiding in the hollow of the heart as the object of meditation. 'Smaller than the small, greater than the great, the Self placed in the hollow of this creature'; next declares that all the worlds and Brahmā and the other gods originated from that Self; and then says that there sprung from it also this agā which is the cause of all 'The one agā (goat), red, white and black, which gives birth to numerous offspring of the same shape, one aga (he-goat) loves and lies by her; another one forsakes her after having enjoyed her.' The subject-matter of the entire section evidently is to give instruction as to the whole aggregate of things other than Brahman originating from Brahman and thus having its Self in it; hence we conclude that also the agā which gives birth to manifold creatures like her, and is enjoyed by the soul controlled by karman, while she is abandoned by the soul possessing true knowledge is, no less than vital airs, seas, mountains, &c., a creature of Brahman, and hence has its Self in Brahman. We then apply to the interpretation of the Svetāsvatara-text the meaning of the analogous Mahânārāyaṇa-text, as determined by the complementary passages, and thus arrive at the conclusion that the agā in the former text also is a being having its Self in Brahman.

That this is so, moreover, appears from the Svetāsvatara itself. For in the early part of that Upanishad, we have after the introductory question, 'Is Brahman the cause?' the passage 'The sages devoted to meditation and concentration have seen the person whose Self is the divinity, hidden in its own qualities' (I, 1, 3); which evidently refers to the agā as being of the nature of a power of the highest Brahman. And as further on also (viz. in the passages 'From that the Māyin creates all this, and in this the other is bound up through Māyā'; 'Know then Prakṛiti to be Māyā and the Great Lord the ruler of Māyā'; and 'he who rules every place of birth,' V, 9-11) the very same being is referred to, there remains not even a shadow of proof for the assertion that the mantra under discussion

refers to an independent Prakṛiti as assumed by the Sāṅkhyas.

But a further objection is raised, if the Prakṛiti denoted by agā begins with, i. e. is caused by Brahman, how can it be called agā, i. e. the non-produced one; or, if it is non-produced, how can it be originated by Brahman? To this the next Sūtra replies.

10. And on account of the teaching of formation (i. e. creation) there is no contradiction; as in the case of the honey.

The 'and' expresses disposal of a doubt that had arisen. There is no contradiction between the Prakṛiti being agā and originating from light. On account of instruction being given about the formation (kalpana), i. e. creation of the world. This interpretation of 'kalpana' is in agreement with the use of the verb kṛip in the text, 'as formerly the creator made (akalpayat) sun and moon.'

In our text the sloka 'from that the Lord of Māyā creates all this' gives instruction about the creation of the world. From that, i. e. from matter in its subtle causal state when it is not yet divided, the Lord of all creates the entire Universe. From this statement about creation we understand that Prakṛiti exists in a twofold state according as it is either cause or effect. During a pralaya it unites itself with Brahman and abides in its subtle state, without any distinction of names and forms; it then is called the 'Unevolved,' and by other similar names. At the time of creation, on the other hand, there reveal themselves in Prakṛiti Goodness and the other guṇas, it divides itself according to names and forms, and then is called the 'Evolved,' and so on, and, transforming itself into fire, water, and earth, it appears as red, white, and black. In its causal condition it is agā, i. e. unborn, in its effected condition it is 'caused by light, i. e. Brahman'; hence there is no contradiction. The case is analogous to that of the 'honey.' The sun in his causal state is one only, but in his effected state the Lord makes him into honey in so far namely as he then, for the purpose of enjoyment on the part of the Vasu

and other gods, is the abode of nectar brought about by sacrificial works to be learned from the *R̥ik* and the other Vedas ; and further makes him to rise and to set. And between these two conditions there is no contradiction. This is declared in the *Madhuvidyā* (*Kh. Up. III*), from 'The sun is indeed the honey of the Devas,' down to 'when from thence he has risen upwards he neither rises nor sets ; being one he stands in the centre'—'one' here means 'of one nature.'—The conclusion therefore is that the *Svetāsvatara* mantra under discussion refers to *Prakṛiti* as having her Self in Brahman, not to the *Prakṛiti* assumed by the *Sāṅkhyas*.

Others, however, are of opinion that the one *agā* of which the mantra speaks has for its characteristics light, water, and earth. To them we address the following questions. Do you mean that by what the text speaks of as an *agā*, consisting of fire, water, and earth, we have to understand those three elements only ; or Brahman in the form of those three elements ; or some power or principle which is the cause of the three elements ? The first alternative is in conflict with the circumstance that, while fire, water, and earth are several things, the text explicitly refers to *one agā*. Nor may it be urged that fire, water, and earth, although several, become one, by being made tripartite (*Kh. Up. VI, 3, 3*) ; for this making them tripartite, does not take away their being several ; the text clearly showing that each several element becomes tripartite, 'Let me make each of these three divine beings tripartite.'—The second alternative again divides itself into two alternatives. Is the one *agā* Brahman in so far as having passed over into fire, water, and earth ; or Brahman in so far as abiding within itself and not passing over into effects ? The former alternative is excluded by the consideration that it does not remove plurality (which cannot be reconciled with the *one agā*). The second alternative is contradicted by the text calling that *agā* red, white, and black ; and moreover Brahman viewed as abiding within itself cannot be characterised by fire, water, and earth. On the third alternative it has to be assumed that the text denotes by the

term 'agā' the three elements, and that on this basis there is imagined a causal condition of these elements; but better than this assumption it evidently is to accept the term 'agā' as directly denoting the causal state of those three elements as known from scripture.

Nor can we admit the contention that the term 'agā' is meant to teach that Prakṛiti should metaphorically be viewed as a she-goat; for such a view would be altogether purposeless. Where—in the passage 'Know the Self to be him who drives in the chariot'—the body, and so on, are compared to a chariot, and so on, the object is to set forth the means of attaining Brahman; where the sun is compared to honey, the object is to illustrate the enjoyment of the Vasus and other gods; but what similar object could possibly be attained by directing us to view Prakṛiti as a goat? Such a metaphorical view would in fact be not merely useless; it would be downright irrational. Prakṛiti is a non-intelligent principle, the causal substance of the entire material Universe, and constituting the means for the experience of pleasure and pain, and for the final release, of all intelligent souls which are connected with it from all eternity. Now it would be simply contrary to good sense, metaphorically to transfer to Prakṛiti such as described the nature of a she-goat—which is a sentient being that gives birth to very few creatures only, enters only occasionally into connexion with others, is of small use only, is not the cause of herself being abandoned by others, and is capable of abandoning those connected with her. Nor does it recommend itself to take the word agā (understood to mean 'she-goat') in a sense different from that in which we understand the term 'aga' which occurs twice in the same mantra.—Let then all three terms be taken in the same metaphorical sense (aga meaning he-goat).—It would be altogether senseless, we reply, to compare the soul which absolutely dissociates itself from Prakṛiti ('Another aga leaves her after having enjoyed her') to a he-goat which is able to enter again into connexion with what he has abandoned, or with anything else.—Here terminates the adhikaraṇa of 'the cup.'

11. Not from the mention of the number even, on account of the diversity and of the excess.

The Vāgasaneyins read in their text 'He in whom the five "five-people" and the ether rest, him alone I believe to be the Self; I, who know, believe him to be Brahman' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 17*). The doubt here arises whether this text be meant to set forth the categories as established in Kapila's doctrine, or not.—The Pūrvapakshin maintains the former view, on the ground that the word 'five-people,' qualified by the word 'five,' intimates the twenty-five categories of the Sāṅkhyas. The compound 'five-people' (*pañcakānāḥ*) denotes groups of five beings, just as the term *pañka-pūlyāḥ* denotes aggregates of five bundles of grass. And as we want to know how many such groups there are, the additional qualification 'five' intimates that there are five such groups; just as if it were said 'five five-bundles, i. e. five aggregates consisting of five bundles each.' We thus understand that the 'five five-people' are twenty-five things, and as the mantra in which the term is met with refers to final release, we recognise the twenty-five categories known from the Sāṅkhya-smṛiti which are here referred to as objects to be known by persons desirous of release. For the followers of Kapila teach that 'there is the fundamental causal substance which is not an effect. There are seven things, viz. the Mahat, and so on, which are causal substances as well as effects. There are sixteen effects. The soul is neither a causal substance nor an effect' (*Sāṅ. Kā. 3*). The mantra therefore is meant to intimate the categories known from the Sāṅkhya.—To this the Sūtra replies that from the mention of the number twenty-five supposed to be implied in the expression 'the five five-people,' it does not follow that the categories of the Sāṅkhyas are meant. 'On account of the diversity,' i. e. on account of the five-people further qualified by the number five being different from the categories of the Sāṅkhyas. For in the text 'in whom the five five-people and the ether rest,' the 'in whom' shows the five-people to have their abode, and hence their Self, in Brahman; and

in the continuation of the text, 'him I believe the Self,' the 'him' connecting itself with the preceding 'in whom' is recognised to be Brahman. The five five-people must therefore be different from the categories of the Sāṅkhya-system. 'And on account of the excess.' Moreover there is, in the text under discussion, an excess over and above the Sāṅkhya categories, consisting in the Self denoted by the relative pronoun 'in whom,' and in the specially mentioned Ether. What the text designates therefore is the Supreme Person who is the Universal Lord in whom all things abide—such as he is described in the text quoted above, 'Therefore some call him the twenty-sixth, and others the twenty-seventh.' The 'even' in the Sūtra is meant to intimate that the 'five five-people' can in no way mean the twenty-five categories, since there is no pentad of groups consisting of five each. For in the case of the categories of the Sāṅkhyas there are no generic characteristics or the like which could determine the arrangement of those categories in fives. Nor must it be urged against this that there *is* a determining reason for such an arrangement in so far as the tattvas of the Sāṅkhyas form natural groups comprising firstly, the five organs of action; secondly, the five sense-organs; thirdly, the five gross elements; fourthly, the subtle parts of those elements; and fifthly, the five remaining tattvas; for as the text under discussion mentions the ether by itself, the possibility of a group consisting of the five gross elements is precluded. We cannot therefore take the compound 'five people' as denoting a group consisting of five constituent members, but, in agreement with II, 1, 50, as merely being a special name. There are certain beings the special name of which is 'five-people,' and of these beings the additional word 'pañka' predicates that they are five in number. The expression is thus analogous to the term 'the seven seven-*rishis*' (where the term 'seven-*rishis*' is to be understood as the name of a certain class of *rishis* only).—Who then are the beings called 'five-people?'—To this question the next Sūtra replies.

12. The breath, and so on, on the ground of the complementary passage.

We see from a complementary passage, viz. 'They who know the breath of breath, the eye of the eye, the ear of the ear, the food of food, the mind of mind,' that the 'five-people' are the breath, and eye, and so on, all of which have their abode in Brahman.

But, an objection is raised, while the mantra 'in whom the five five-people,' &c., is common to the Kāṇvas and the Mādhyandinas, the complementary passage 'they who know the breath of breath,' &c., in the text of the former makes no mention of food, and hence we have no reason to say that the 'five-people' in their text are the breath, eye, and so on.

To this objection the next Sūtra replies.

13. By light, food not being (mentioned in the text) of some.

In the text of some, viz. the Kāṇvas, where food is not mentioned, the five-people are recognised to be the five senses, owing to the phrase 'of lights' which is met with in another complementary passage. In the mantra, 'him the gods worship as the light of lights,' which precedes the mantra about the 'five-people,' Brahman is spoken of as the light of lights, and this suggests the idea of certain lights the activity of which depends on Brahman. The mantra leaves it undetermined what these lights are; but from what follows about the 'five-people,' &c., we learn that what is meant are the senses which light up as it were their respective objects. In 'the breath of breath' the second 'breath' (in the genitive case) denotes the sense-organ of touch, as that organ is connected with air, and as the vital breath (which would otherwise suggest itself as the most obvious explanation of *prāṇa*) does not harmonise with the metaphorical term 'light.' 'Of the eye' refers to the organ of sight; 'of the ear' to the organ of hearing. 'Of food' comprises the senses of smell and taste together: it denotes the sense of smell on the ground that that sense is connected with earth, which may be 'food,'

and the sense of taste in so far as 'anna' may be also explained as that by means of which eating goes on (adyate). 'Of mind' denotes mind, i. e. the so-called internal organ. Taste and smell thus being taken in combination, we have the required number of five, and we thus explain the 'five-people' as the sense-organs which throw light on their objects, together with the internal organ, i. e. mind. The meaning of the clause about the 'five-people' therefore is that the senses—called 'five-people'—and the elements, represented by the Ether, have their basis in Brahman; and as thus all beings are declared to abide in Brahman, the five 'five-people' can in no way be the twenty-five categories assumed by the Sāṅkhyas.—The general conclusion is that the Vedānta-texts, whether referring to numbers or not, nowhere set forth the categories established in Kapila's system.

14. And on account of (Brahman) as described being declared to be the cause with regard to Ether, and so on.

Here the philosopher who holds the Pradhāna to be the general cause comes forward with another objection. The Vedānta-texts, he says, do not teach that creation proceeds from one and the same agent only, and you therefore have no right to hold that Brahman is the sole cause of the world. In one place it is said that our world proceeded from 'Being,' 'Being only this was in the beginning' (*Kh. Up. VI, 2, 1*). In other places the world is said to have sprung from 'Non-being,' 'Non-being indeed this was in the beginning' (*Taitt. Up. II, 7, 1*); and 'Non-being only was this in the beginning; it became Being' (*Kh. Up. III, 19, 1*). As the Vedānta-texts are thus not consequent in their statements regarding the creator, we cannot conclude from them that Brahman is the sole cause of the world. On the other hand, those texts do enable us to conclude that the Pradhāna only is the universal cause. For the text 'Now all this was then undeveloped' (*Bṛi. Up. I, 4, 7*) teaches that the world was merged in the undeveloped Pradhāna, and the subsequent

clause, 'That developed itself by form and name,' that from that Undeveloped there resulted the creation of the world. For the Undeveloped is that which is not distinguished by names and forms, and this is none other than the Pradhāna. And as this Pradhāna is at the same time eternal, as far as its essential nature is concerned, and the substrate of all change, there is nothing contradictory in the different accounts of creation calling it sometimes 'Being' and sometimes 'Non-being'; while, on the other hand, these terms cannot, without contradiction, both be applied to Brahman. The causality of the Undeveloped having thus been ascertained, such expressions as '*it thought*, may I be many,' must be interpreted as meaning its being about to proceed to creation. The terms 'Self' and 'Brahman' also may be applied to the Pradhāna in so far as it is all-pervading (ātman from *apnoti*), and pre-eminently great (*brihat*). We therefore conclude that the only cause of the world about which the Vedānta-texts give information is the Pradhāna.

This view is set aside by the Sūtra. The word *and* is used in the sense of *but*. It is possible to ascertain from the Vedānta-texts that the world springs from none other than the highest Brahman, which is all-knowing, lord of all, free from all shadow of imperfection, capable of absolutely realising its purposes, and so on; since scripture declares Brahman as described to be the cause of Ether, and so on. By 'Brahman as described' is meant 'Brahman distinguished by omniscience and other qualities, as described in the Sūtra "that from which the origination, and so on, of the world proceed," and in other places.' That Brahman only is declared by scripture to be the cause of Ether, and so on, i. e. the being which is declared to be the cause in passages such as 'From that Self sprang Ether' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'that sent forth fire' (*Kh.* Up. VI, 2, 3), is none other than Brahman possessing omniscience and similar qualities. For the former of these texts follows on the passage 'The True, intelligence, infinite is Brahman; he reaches all desires together with the intelligent Brahman,' which introduces Brahman as the general subject-matter—that

Brahman being then referred to by means of the connecting words 'from that.' In the same way the 'that' (in 'that sent forth fire') refers back to the omniscient Brahman introduced in the clause 'that thought, may I be many.' This view is confirmed by a consideration of all the accounts of creation, and we hence conclude that Brahman is the sole cause of the world.—But the text 'Non-being indeed this was in the beginning' calls the general cause 'something that is not'; how then can you say that we infer from the Vedānta-texts as the general cause of the world a Brahman that is all-knowing, absolutely realises its purposes, and so on?—To this question the next Sūtra replies.

15. From connexion.

The fact is that Brahman intelligent, consisting of bliss, &c., connects itself also with the passage 'Non-being was this in the beginning' (Taitt. Up. II, 7). For the section of the text which precedes that passage (viz. 'Different from this Self consisting of understanding is the Self consisting of Bliss;—he wished, may I be many;—he created all whatever there is. Having created he entered into it; having entered it he became sat and tyat') clearly refers to Brahman consisting of Bliss, which realises its purposes, creates all beings, and entering into them is the Self of all. When, therefore, after this we meet with the sloka ('Non-being this was in the beginning') introduced by the words 'On this there is also this sloka'—which shows that the sloka is meant to throw light on what precedes; and when further on we have the passage 'From fear of it the wind blows,' &c., which, referring to the same Brahman, predicates of it universal rulership, bliss of nature, and so on; we conclude with certainty that the sloka about 'Non-being' also refers to Brahman. As during a pralaya the distinction of names and forms does not exist, and Brahman also then does not exist in so far as connected with names and forms, the text applies to Brahman the term 'Non-being.' The text 'Non-being only this was in the beginning' explains itself in the same way.—Nor can we admit

the contention that the text 'Now all this was then undeveloped' refers to the Pradhāna as the cause of the world; for the Undeveloped there spoken of is nothing else but Brahman in so far as its body is not yet evolved. For the text continues 'That same being entered thither to the very tips of the finger-nails;' 'When seeing, eye by name; when hearing, ear by name; when thinking, mind by name;' 'Let men meditate upon him as Self;' where the introductory words 'that same being' refer back to the Undeveloped—which thus is said to enter into all things and thereby to become their ruler. And it is known from another text also (*Kh. Up. VI, 3, 2*) that it is the all-creative highest Brahman which enters into its creation and evolves names and forms. The text 'Having entered within, the ruler of creatures, the Self of all' moreover shows that the creative principle enters into its creatures for the purpose of ruling them, and such entering again cannot be attributed to the non-sentient Pradhāna. The Undeveloped therefore is Brahman in that state where its body is not yet developed; and when the text continues 'it developed itself by names and forms' the meaning is that Brahman developed itself in so far as names and forms were distinguished in the world that constitutes Brahman's body. On this explanation of the texts relating to creation we further are enabled to take the thought, purpose, &c., attributed to the creative principle, in their primary literal sense. And, we finally remark, neither the term 'Brahman' nor the term 'Self' in any way suits the Pradhāna, which is neither absolutely great nor pervading in the sense of entering into things created with a view to ruling them. It thus remains a settled conclusion that Brahman is the sole cause of the world.—Here terminates the *adhikāraṇa* of '(Brahman's) causality.'

16. Because it denotes the world.

The Sāṅkhya comes forward with a further objection. Although the Vedānta-texts teach an intelligent principle to be the cause of the world, they do not present to us as objects of knowledge anything that could be the cause of

the world, apart from the Pradhāna and the soul as established by the Sāṅkhya-system. For the Kaushîtakins declare in their text, in the dialogue of Bālāki and Agātasatru, that none but the enjoying (individual) soul is to be known as the cause of the world, 'Shall I tell you Brahman? He who is the maker of those persons and of whom this is the work (or "to whom this work belongs") he indeed is to be known' (Kau. Up. IV, 19). Bālāki at the outset proposes Brahman as the object of instruction, and when he is found himself not to know Brahman, Agātasatru instructs him about it, 'he indeed is to be known.' But from the relative clause 'to whom this work belongs,' which connects the being to be known with work, we infer that by Brahman we have here to understand the enjoying soul which is the ruler of Prakṛiti, not any other being. For no other being is connected with work ; work, whether meritorious or the contrary, belongs to the individual soul only. Nor must you contest this conclusion on the ground that 'work' is here to be explained as meaning the object of activity, so that the sense of the clause would be 'he of whom this entire world, as presented by perception and the other means of knowledge, is the work.' For in that case the separate statements made in the two clauses, 'who is the maker of those persons' and 'of whom this is the work,' would be devoid of purport (the latter implying the former). Moreover, the generally accepted meaning of the word 'karman,' both in Vedic and worldly speech, is work in the sense of good and evil actions. And as the origination of the world is caused by actions of the various individual souls, the designation of 'maker of those persons' also suits only the individual soul. The meaning of the whole passage therefore is 'He who is the cause of the different persons that have their abode in the disc of the sun, and so on, and are instrumental towards the retributive experiences of the individual souls ; and to whom there belongs karman, good and evil, to which there is due his becoming such a cause ; *he* indeed is to be known, *his* essential nature is to be cognised in distinction from Prakṛiti.' And also in what follows, 'The two came to a person who was asleep. He

pushed him with a stick,' &c., what is said about the sleeping man being pushed, roused, &c., all points only to the individual soul being the topic of instruction. Further on also the text treats of the individual soul only, 'As the master feeds with his people, nay as his people feed on the master, thus does this conscious Self feed with the other Selves.' We must consider also the following passage—which contains the explanation given by Agâtasatru to Bâlâki, who had been unable to say where the soul goes at the time of deep sleep—'There are the arteries called Hitas. In these the person is; when sleeping he sees no dream, then he (*or* that, i.e. the aggregate of the sense-organs) becomes one with this prâna alone. Then speech goes to him with all names, &c., the mind with all thoughts. And when he awakes, then, as from a burning fire sparks proceed in all directions, thus from that Self the prânas proceed each towards its place, from the prânas the gods, from the gods the worlds.' The individual soul which passes through the states of dream, deep sleep and waking, and is that into which there are merged and from which there proceed speech and all the other organs, is here declared to be the abode of deep sleep 'then it (viz. the aggregate of the organs) becomes one in that prâna.' Prâna here means the individual soul in so far as supporting life; for the text continues 'when *that* one awakes' and neither the vital breath nor the Lord (both of whom might be proposed as explanations of prâna) can be said to be asleep and to wake. Or else 'asmin prâne' might be explained as 'in the vital breath (which abides) in the individual soul,' the meaning of the clause being 'all the organs, speech and so on, become one in the vital breath which itself abides in this soul.' The word 'prâna' would thus be taken in its primary literal sense; yet all the same the soul constitutes the topic of the section, the vital breath being a mere instrument of the soul. The Brahman mentioned at the outset therefore is none other than the individual soul, and there is nothing to prove a lord different from it. And as the attributes which the texts ascribe to the general cause, viz. thought and so on, are attributes of

intelligent beings only, we arrive at the conclusion that what constitutes the cause of the world is the non-intelligent Pradhāna guided by the intelligent soul.

This *primā facie* view the Sūtra disposes of, by saying 'because (the work) denotes the world.' It is not the insignificant individual soul—which is under the influence of its good and evil works, and by erroneously imputing to itself the attributes of Prakṛiti becomes the cause of the effects of the latter—that is the topic of our text; but rather the Supreme Person who is free from all shadow of imperfection such as Nescience and the like, who is a treasure of all possible auspicious qualities in their highest degree of perfection, who is the sole cause of this entire world. This is proved by the circumstance that the term 'work' connected with 'this' (in 'of whom this (is) the work') denotes the Universe which is an effect of the Supreme Person. For the word 'this' must, on account of its sense, the general topic of the section and so on, be taken in a non-limited meaning, and hence denotes the entire world, as presented by Perception and the other means of knowledge, with all its sentient and non-sentient beings. That the term 'work' does not here denote good and evil actions, appears from the following consideration of the context. Bālāki at first offers to teach Brahman ('Shall I tell you Brahman?') and thereupon holds forth on various persons abiding in the sun, and so on, as being Brahman. Agātasatru however refuses to accept this instruction as not setting forth Brahman, and finally, in order to enlighten Bālāki, addresses him 'He, O Bālāki, who is the maker of those persons,' &c. Now as the different personal souls abiding in the sun, &c., and connected with karman in the form of good and evil actions, are known already by Bālāki, the term 'karman'—met with in the next clause—is clearly meant to throw light on some Person so far not known to Bālāki, and therefore must be taken to mean not good and evil deeds or action in general, but rather the entire Universe in so far as being the outcome of activity. On this interpretation only the passage gives instruction about something not

known before. Should it be said that this would be the case also if the subject to which the instruction refers were the true essential nature of the soul, indicated here by its connexion with karman, we reply that this would involve the (objectionable) assumption of so-called implication (*lakṣhaṇā*), in so far namely as what the clause would directly intimate is (not the essential nature of the soul as free from karman but rather) the connexion of the soul with karman. Moreover if the intention of the passage were this, viz. to give instruction as to the soul, the latter being pointed at by means of the reference to karman, the intention would be fully accomplished by saying 'to whom karman belongs, he is to be known;' while in the text as it actually stands 'of whom this is the karman' the 'this' would be unmeaning. The meaning of the two separate clauses 'who is the maker of those persons' and 'of whom this is the work' is as follows. He who is the creator of those persons whom you called Brahman, and of whom those persons are the creatures; he of whom this entire world is the effect, and before whom all things sentient and non-sentient are equal in so far as being produced by him; he, the highest and universal cause, the Supreme Person, is the object to be known. The meaning implied here is—although the origination of the world has for its condition the deeds of individual souls, yet those souls do not independently originate the means for their own retributive experience, but experience only what the Lord has created to that end in agreement with their works. The individual soul, hence, cannot stand in creative relation to those persons.—What the text under discussion inculcates as the object of knowledge therefore is the highest Brahman which is known from all Vedānta-texts as the universal cause.

17. Should it be said that this is not so on account of the inferential marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air; we reply that this has been explained before.

With reference to the plea urged by the Pūrvapakṣin

that, owing to inferential marks pointing to the individual soul, and the circumstance of mention being made of the chief vital air, we must decide that the section treats of the enjoying individual soul and not of the highest Self, the Sūtra remarks that this argumentation has already been disposed of, viz. in connexion with the Pratardana vidyā. For there it was shown that when a text is ascertained, on the ground of a comprehensive survey of initial and concluding clauses, to refer to Brahman, all inferential marks which point to other topics must be interpreted so as to fall in with the principal topic. Now in our text Brahman is introduced at the outset 'Shall I tell you Brahman?' it is further mentioned in the middle of the section, for the clause 'of whom this is the work' does not refer to the soul in general but to the highest Person who is the cause of the whole world; and at the end again we hear of a reward which connects itself only with meditations on Brahman, viz. supreme sovereignty preceded by the conquest of all evil. 'Having overcome all evil he obtains pre-eminence among all beings, sovereignty and supremacy—yea, he who knows this.' The section thus being concerned with Brahman, the references to the individual soul and to the chief vital air must also be interpreted so as to fall in with Brahman. In the same way it was shown above that the references to the individual soul and the chief vital air which are met with in the Pratardana vidyā really explain themselves in connexion with a threefold meditation on Brahman. As in the passage 'Then with this prāṇa alone he becomes one' the two words 'this' and 'prāṇa' may be taken as co-ordinated and it hence would be inappropriate to separate them (and to explain 'in the prāṇa which abides in this soul'), and as the word 'prāṇa' is ascertained to mean Brahman also, we must understand the mention of prāṇa to be made with a view to meditation on Brahman in so far as having the prāṇa for its body. But how can the references to the individual soul be put in connexion with Brahman?—This point is taken up by the next Sūtra.

18. But Gaimini thinks that it has another purport,

on account of the question and answer ; and thus some also.

The 'but' is meant to preclude the idea that the mention made of the individual soul enables us to understand the whole section as concerned with that soul.—The teacher Gaimini is of opinion that the mention made of the individual soul has another meaning, i.e. aims at conveying the idea of what is different from the individual soul, i.e. the nature of the highest Brahman. 'On account of question and answer.' According to the story told in the Upanishad, Agâtasatru leads Bâlâki to where a sleeping man is resting, and convinces him that the soul is different from breath, by addressing the sleeping person, in whom breath only is awake, with names belonging to *prâna*¹ without the sleeper being awaked thereby, and after that rousing him by a push of his staff. Then, with a view to teaching Bâlâki the difference of Brahman from the individual soul, he asks him the following questions: 'Where, O Bâlâki, did this person here sleep? Where was he? Whence did he thus come back?' To these questions he thereupon himself replies, 'When sleeping he sees no dream, then he becomes one in that *prâna* alone.—From that Self the organs proceed each towards its place, from the organs the gods, from the gods the worlds.' Now this reply, no less than the questions, clearly refers to the highest Self as something different from the individual Self. For that entering into which the soul, in the state of deep sleep, attains its true nature and enjoys complete serenity, being free from the disturbing experiences of pleasure and pain that accompany the states of waking and of dream ; and

¹ The names with which the king addresses the sleeper are *Great one, clad in white raiment, Soma, king*. The *Sru. Pra.* comments as follows: *Great one* ; because according to *Śruti* *Prâna* is the oldest and best. *Clad in white raiment* ; because *Śruti* says that water is the raiment of *Prâna* ; and elsewhere, that what is white belongs to water. *Soma* ; because scripture says 'of this *prâna* water is the body, light the form, viz. yonder moon.' *King* ; for *Śruti* says '*Prâna* indeed is the ruler.'

that from which it again returns to the fruition of pleasure and pain ; that is nothing else but the highest Self. For, as other scriptural texts testify (‘Then he becomes united with the True,’ *Kh. Up.* VI, 8, 1 ; ‘Embraced by the intelligent Self he knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within,’ *Bri. Up.* IV, 3, 21), the abode of deep sleep is the intelligent Self which is different from the individual Self, i.e. the highest Self. We thus conclude that the reference, in question and answer, to the individual soul subserves the end of instruction being given about what is different from that soul, i.e. the highest Self. We hence also reject the Pûrvapakshin’s contention that question and answer refer to the individual soul, that the veins called hita are the abode of deep sleep, and that the well-known clause as to the prāna must be taken to mean that the aggregate of the organs becomes one in the individual soul called prāna. For the veins are the abode, not of deep sleep, but of dream, and, as we have shown above, Brahman only is the abode of deep sleep ; and the text declares that the individual soul, together with all its ministering organs, becomes one with, and again proceeds from, Brahman only—which the text designates as Prāna. —Moreover some, viz. the Vāgasaneyins in this same colloquy of Bālāki and Agātaratru as recorded in their text, clearly distinguish from the vigñāna-maya, i.e. the individual soul in the state of deep sleep, the highest Self which then is the abode of the individual soul. ‘Where was then the person, consisting of intelligence, and from whence did he thus come back?—When he was thus asleep, then the intelligent person, having through the intelligence of the senses absorbed within himself all intelligence, lies in the ether that is within the heart.’ Now the word ‘ether’ is known to denote the highest Self ; cf. the text ‘there is within that the small ether’ (*Kh. Up.* VIII, 1, 1). This shows us that the individual soul is mentioned in the Vāgasaneyin passage to the end of setting forth what is different from it, viz. the prāgñā Self, i.e. the highest Brahman. The general conclusion therefore is that the Kaushîtaki-text under discussion proposes as

the object of knowledge something that is different from the individual soul, viz. the highest Brahman which is the cause of the whole world, and that hence the Vedānta-texts nowhere intimate that general causality belongs either to the individual soul or to the Pradhāna under the soul's guidance. Here terminates the *adhikāraṇa* of 'denotation of the world.'

19. On account of the connected meaning of the sentences.

In spite of the conclusion arrived at there may remain a suspicion that here and there in the Upanishads texts are to be met with which aim at setting forth the soul as maintained in Kapila's system, and that hence there is no room for a being different from the individual soul and called Lord. This suspicion the Sūtra undertakes to remove, in connexion with the *Maitreyī-brāhmaṇa*, in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*. There we read 'Verily, a husband is dear, not for the love of the husband, but for the love of the Self a husband is dear, and so on. Everything is dear, not for the love of everything, but for the love of the Self everything is dear. The Self should be seen, should be heard, should be reflected on, should be meditated upon. When the Self has been seen, heard, reflected upon, meditated upon, then all this is known' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 5, 6*).—Here the doubt arises whether the Self enjoined in this passage as the object of seeing, &c., be the soul as held by the Sāṅkhyas, or the Supreme Lord, all-knowing, capable of realising all his purposes, and so on. The Pūrvaśloka upholds the former alternative. For, he says, the beginning no less than the middle and the concluding part of the section conveys the idea of the individual soul only. In the beginning the individual soul only is meant, as appears from the connexion of the Self with husband, wife, children, wealth, cattle, and so on. This is confirmed by the middle part of the section where the Self is said to be connected with origination and destruction, 'a mass of knowledge, he having risen from these elements vanishes again into them. When he has departed there

is no more consciousness.' And in the end we have 'whereby should he know the knower'; where we again recognise the knowing subject, i. e. the individual soul, not the Lord. We thus conclude that the whole text is meant to set forth the soul as held by the Sāṅkhyas.—But in the beginning there is a clause, viz. 'There is no hope of immortality by wealth,' which shows that the whole section is meant to instruct us as to the means of immortality; how then can it be meant to set forth the individual soul only?—You state the very reason proving that the text is concerned with the individual soul only! For according to the Sāṅkhya-system immortality is obtained through the cognition of the true nature of the soul viewed as free from all erroneous imputation to itself of the attributes of non-sentient matter; and the text therefore makes it its task to set forth, for the purpose of immortality, the essential nature of the soul free from all connexion with Prakṛiti, 'the Self should be heard,' and so on. And as the souls dissociated from Prakṛiti are all of a uniform nature, all souls are known through the knowledge of the soul free from Prakṛiti, and the text therefore rightly says that through the Self being known everything is known. And as the essential nature of the Self is of one and the same kind, viz. knowledge or intelligence, in all beings from gods down to plants, the text rightly asserts the unity of the Self 'that Self is all this'; and denies all otherness from the Self, on the ground of the characteristic attributes of gods and so on really being of the nature of the Not-self, 'he is abandoned by everything,' &c. The clause, 'For where there is duality as it were,' which denies plurality, intimates that the plurality introduced into the homogeneous Self by the different forms—such as of gods, and so on—assumed by Prakṛiti, is false. And there is also no objection to the teaching that 'the R̥g-veda and so on are breathed forth from that great being (i. e. Prakṛiti); for the origination of the world is caused by the soul in its quality as ruler of Prakṛiti.—It thus being ascertained that the whole Maitreyī-brāhmaṇa is concerned with the soul in the Sāṅkhya sense, we, according to the principle of the

unity of purport of all Vedānta-texts, conclude that they all treat of the Sāṅkhya soul only, and that hence the cause of the world is to be found not in a so-called Lord but in Prakṛiti ruled and guided by the soul.

This *primâ facie* view is set aside by the Sūtra. The whole text refers to the Supreme Lord only; for on this supposition only a satisfactory connexion of the parts of the text can be made out. On being told by Yāgyavalkya that there is no hope of immortality through wealth, Maitreyī expresses her slight regard for wealth and all such things as do not help to immortality, and asks to be instructed as to the means of immortality only ('What should I do with that by which I do not become immortal? What my lord knows tell that clearly to me'). Now the Self which Yāgyavalkya, responding to her requests, points out to her as the proper object of knowledge, can be none other than the highest Self; for other scriptural texts clearly teach that the only means of reaching immortality is to know the Supreme Person—'Having known him thus man passes beyond death'; 'Knowing him thus he becomes immortal here, there is no other path to go' (Svet. Up. III, 8). The knowledge of the true nature of the individual soul which obtains immortality, and is a mere manifestation of the power of the Supreme Person, must be held to be useful towards the cognition of the Supreme Person who brings about Release, but is not in itself instrumental towards such Release; the being the knowledge of which the text declares to be the means of immortality is therefore the highest Self only. Again, the causal power with regard to the entire world which is expressed in the passage, 'from that great Being there were breathed forth the *Rig-veda*,' &c., cannot possibly belong to the mere individual soul which in its state of bondage is under the influence of *karman* and in the state of release has nothing to do with the world; it can in fact belong to the Supreme Person only. Again, what the text says as to everything being known by the knowledge of one thing ('By the seeing indeed of the Self,' &c.) is possible only in the case of a Supreme Self which constitutes the Self of all. What

the Pūrvapakshin said as to everything being known through the cognition of the one individual soul, since all individual souls are of the same type—this also cannot be upheld; for as long as there is a knowledge of the soul only and not also of the world of non-sentient things, there is no knowledge of everything. And when the text enumerates different things ('this Brahman class, this Kshatra class,' &c.), and then concludes 'all this is that Self'—where the 'this' denotes the entire Universe of animate and inanimate beings as known through Perception, Inference, and so on—universal unity such as declared here is possible only through a highest Self which is the Self of all. It is not, on the other hand, possible that what the word 'this' denotes, i. e. the whole world of intelligent and non-intelligent creatures, should be one with the personal soul as long as it remains what it is, whether connected with or disassociated from non-sentient matter. In the same spirit the passage, 'All things abandon him who views all things elsewhere than in the Self,' finds fault with him who views anything apart from the universal Self. The qualities also which in the earlier Maitreyī-brāhmaṇa (II, 4, 12) are predicated of the being under discussion, viz. greatness, endlessness, unlimitedness, cannot belong to any one else but the highest Self. That Self therefore is the topic of the Brāhmaṇa.

We further demur to our antagonist's maintaining that the entire Brāhmaṇa treats of the individual soul because that soul is at the outset represented as the object of enquiry, this being inferred from its connexion with husband, wife, wealth, &c. For if the clause 'for the love (literally, *for the desire*) of the Self' refers to the individual Self, we cannot help connecting (as, in fact, we must do in any case) that Self with the Self referred to in the subsequent clause, 'the Self indeed is to be seen,' &c.; the connexion having to be conceived in that way that the information given in the former clause somehow subserves the cognition of the Self enjoined in the latter clause. 'For the desire of the Self' would then mean 'for the attainment of the objects desired by the Self.' But if it

is first said that husband, wife, &c., are dear because they fulfil the wishes of the individual Self, it could hardly be said further on that the nature of that Self must be enquired into; for what, in the circumstances of the case, naturally is to be enquired into and searched for are the dear objects but not the true nature of him to whom those objects are dear, apart from the objects themselves. It would certainly be somewhat senseless to declare that since husband, wife, &c., are dear because they fulfil the desires of the individual soul, therefore, setting aside those dear objects, we must enquire into the true nature of that soul apart from all the objects of its desire. On the contrary, it having been declared that husband, wife, &c., are dear not on account of husband, wife, &c., but on account of the Self, they should not be dropped, but included in the further investigation, just because they subserve the Self. And should our opponent (in order to avoid the difficulty of establishing a satisfactory connexion between the different clauses) maintain that the clause, 'but everything is dear for the love of the Self,' is not connected with the following clause, 'the Self is to be seen,' &c., we point out that this would break the whole connexion of the Brāhmaṇa. And if we allowed such a break, we should then be unable to point out what is the use of the earlier part of the Brāhmaṇa. We must therefore attempt to explain the connexion in such a way as to make it clear why all search for dear objects—husband, wife, children, wealth, &c.—should be abandoned and the Self only should be searched for. This explanation is as follows. After having stated that wealth, and so on, are no means to obtain immortality which consists in permanent absolute bliss, the text declares that the pleasant experiences which we derive from wealth, husband, wife, &c., and which are not of a permanent nature and always alloyed with a great deal of pain, are caused not by wealth, husband, wife, &c., themselves, but rather by the highest Self whose nature is absolute bliss. He therefore who being himself of the nature of perfect bliss causes other beings and things also to be the abodes of partial bliss, he—the highest Self—is to be constituted

the object of knowledge. The clauses, 'not for the wish of the husband a husband is dear,' &c., therefore must be understood as follows—a husband, a wife, a son, &c., are not dear to us in consequence of a wish or purpose on their part, 'may I, for my own end or advantage be dear to him,' but they are dear to us for the wish of the Self, i.e. to the end that there may be accomplished the desire of the highest Self—which desire aims at the devotee obtaining what is dear to him. For the highest Self pleased with the works of his devotees imparts to different things such dearness, i.e. joy-giving quality as corresponds to those works, that 'dearness' being bound in each case to a definite place, time, nature and degree. This is in accordance with the scriptural text, 'For he alone bestows bliss' (Taitt. Up. II, 7). Things are not dear, or the contrary, to us by themselves, but only in so far as the highest Self makes them such. Compare the text, 'The same thing which erst gave us delight later on becomes the source of grief; and what was the cause of wrath afterwards tends to peace. Hence there is nothing that in itself is of the nature either of pleasure or of pain.'

But, another view of the meaning of the text is proposed, even if the Self in the clause 'for the desire of the Self' were accepted as denoting the individual Self, yet the clause 'the Self must be seen' would refer to the highest Self only. For in that case also the sense would be as follows—because the possession of husband, wife, and other so-called dear things is aimed at by a person to whom they are dear, not with a view of bringing about what is desired by them (viz. husband, wife, &c.), but rather to the end of bringing about what is desired by himself; therefore that being which is, to the individual soul, absolutely and unlimitedly dear, viz. the highest Self, must be constituted the sole object of cognition, not such objects as husband, wife, wealth, &c., the nature of which depends on various external circumstances and the possession of which gives rise either to limited pleasure alloyed with pain or to mere pain.—But against this we remark that as, in the section under discussion, the words designating the

individual Self denote the highest Self also¹, the term 'Self' in both clauses, 'For the desire of the Self' and 'The Self is to be seen,' really refers to one and the same being (viz. the highest Self), and the interpretation thus agrees with the one given above.—In order to prove the tenet that words denoting the individual soul at the same time denote the highest Self, by means of arguments made use of by other teachers also, the Sûtrakâra sets forth the two following Sûtras.

20. (It is) a mark indicating that the promissory statement is proved; thus Āsmarathya thinks.

According to the teacher Āsmarathya the circumstance that terms denoting the individual soul are used to denote Brahman is a mark enabling us to infer that the promissory declaration according to which through the knowledge of one thing everything is known is well established. If the individual soul were not identical with Brahman in so far as it is the effect of Brahman, then the knowledge of the soul—being something distinct from Brahman—would not follow from the knowledge of the highest Self. There are the texts declaring the oneness of Brahman previous to creation, such as 'the Self only was this in the beginning' (Ait. Ār. II, 4, 1, 1), and on the other hand those texts which declare that the souls spring from and again are merged in Brahman; such as 'As from a blazing fire sparks being like unto fire fly forth a thousandfold, thus are various beings brought forth from the Imperishable, and return thither also' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 1). These two sets of texts together make us apprehend that the souls are one with Brahman in so far as they are its effects. On this ground a word denoting the individual soul denotes the highest Self as well.

¹ If it be insisted upon that the Self in 'for the desire of the Self' is the individual Self, we point out that terms denoting the individual Self at the same time denote the highest Self also. This tenet of his Rāmānuja considers to be set forth and legitimately proved in Sûtra 23, while Sûtras 21 and 22 although advocating the right principle fail to assign valid arguments.

21. Because (the soul) when it will depart is such; thus Auḍulomi thinks.

It is wrong to maintain that the designation of Brahman by means of terms denoting the individual soul is intended to prove the truth of the declaration that through the knowledge of one thing everything is known, in so far namely as the soul is an effect of Brahman and hence one with it. For scriptural texts such as 'the knowing Self is not born, it dies not' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18), declare the soul not to have originated, and it moreover is admitted that the world is each time created to the end of the souls undergoing experiences retributive of their former deeds; otherwise the inequalities of the different parts of the creation would be inexplicable. If moreover the soul were a mere effect of Brahman, its Release would consist in a mere return into the substance of Brahman,—analogous to the refunding into Brahman of the material elements, and that would mean that the injunction and performance of acts leading to such Release would be purportless. Release, understood in that sense, moreover would not be anything beneficial to man; for to be refunded into Brahman as an earthen vessel is refunded into its own causal substance, i. e. clay, means nothing else but complete annihilation. How, under these circumstances, certain texts can speak of the origination and reabsorption of the individual soul will be set forth later on.—According to the opinion of the teacher Auḍulomi, the highest Self's being denoted by terms directly denoting the individual soul is due to the soul's becoming Brahman when departing from the body. This is in agreement with texts such as the following, 'This serene being having risen from this body and approached the highest light appears in its true form' (Kh. Up. VIII, 3, 4); 'As the flowing rivers disappear in the sea, losing their name and form, thus a wise man freed from name and form goes to the divine Person who is higher than the high' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8).

22. On account of (Brahman's) abiding (within the individual soul); thus Kāśakṛtsna (holds).

We must object likewise to the view set forth in the preceding Sūtra, viz. that Brahman is denoted by terms denoting the individual soul because that soul when departing becomes one with Brahman. For that view cannot stand the test of being submitted to definite alternatives.—Is the soul's not being such, i. e. not being Brahman, previously to its departure from the body, due to its own essential nature or to a limiting adjunct, and is it in the latter case real or unreal? In the first case the soul can never become one with Brahman, for if its separation from Brahman is due to its own essential nature, that separation can never vanish as long as the essential nature persists. And should it be said that its essential nature comes to an end together with its distinction from Brahman, we reply that in that case it perishes utterly and does not therefore become Brahman. The latter view, moreover, precludes itself as in no way beneficial to man, and so on.—If, in the next place, the difference of the soul from Brahman depends on the presence of real limiting adjuncts, the soul is Brahman even before its departure from the body, and we therefore cannot reasonably accept the distinction implied in saying that the soul becomes Brahman only when it departs. For on this view there exists nothing but Brahman and its limiting adjuncts, and as those adjuncts cannot introduce difference into Brahman which is without parts and hence incapable of difference, the difference resides altogether in the adjuncts, and hence the soul is Brahman even before its departure from the body.—If, on the other hand, the difference due to the adjuncts is not real, we ask—what is it then that becomes Brahman on the departure of the soul?—Brahman itself whose true nature had previously been obscured by Nescience, its limiting adjunct!—Not so, we reply. Of Brahman whose true nature consists in eternal, free, self-luminous intelligence, the true nature cannot possibly be hidden by Nescience. For by 'hiding' or 'obscuring' we understand the cessation of the light that belongs to the essential nature of a thing. Where, therefore, light itself and alone constitutes the essential nature of a thing, there

can either be no obscuration at all, or if there is such it means complete annihilation of the thing. Hence Brahman's essential nature being manifest at all times, there exists no difference on account of which it could be said to *become* Brahman at the time of the soul's departure; and the distinction introduced in the last Sūtra ('when departing') thus has no meaning. The text on which Audulomi relies, 'Having risen from this body,' &c., does not declare that that which previously was not Brahman becomes such at the time of departure, but rather that the true nature of the soul which had previously existed already becomes manifest at the time of departure. This will be explained under IV, 4, 1.

The theories stated in the two preceding Sūtras thus having been found untenable, the teacher Kāśakṛtsna states his own view, to the effect that words denoting the *gīva* are applied to Brahman because Brahman abides as its Self within the individual soul which thus constitutes Brahman's body. This theory rests on a number of well-known texts, 'Entering into them with this living (individual) soul let me evolve names and forms' (*Kh. Up.* VI, 3, 2); 'He who dwelling within the Self, &c., whose body the Self is,' &c. (*Bṛi. Up.* III, 7, 22); 'He who moves within the Imperishable, of whom the Imperishable is the body,' &c.; 'Entered within, the ruler of beings, the Self of all.' That the term '*gīva*' denotes not only the *gīva* itself, but extends in its denotation up to the highest Self, we have explained before when discussing the text, 'Let me evolve names and forms.' On this view of the identity of the individual and the highest Self consisting in their being related to each other as body and soul, we can accept in their full and unmutilated meaning all scriptural texts whatever—whether they proclaim the perfection and omniscience of the highest Brahman, or teach how the individual soul steeped in ignorance and misery is to be saved through meditation on Brahman, or describe the origination and reabsorption of the world, or aim at showing how the world is identical with Brahman. For this reason the author of the Sūtras,

rejecting other views, accepts the theory of Kāśakṛtsna. Returning to the Maitreyī-brāhmaṇa we proceed to explain the general sense, from the passage previously discussed onwards. Being questioned by Maitreyī as to the means of immortality, Yāgyavalkya teaches her that this means is given in meditation on the highest Self ('The Self is to be seen,' &c.). He next indicates in a general way the nature of the object of meditation ('When the Self is seen,' &c.), and—availing himself of the similes of the drum, &c.—of the government over the organs, mind, and so on, which are instrumental towards meditation. He then explains in detail that the object of meditation, i. e. the highest Brahman, is the sole cause of the entire world; and the ruler of the aggregate of organs on which there depends all activity with regard to the objects of the senses ('As clouds of smoke proceed,' &c.; 'As the ocean is the home of all the waters'). He, next, in order to stimulate the effort which leads to immortality, shows how the highest Self abiding in the form of the individual Self, is of one uniform character, viz. that of limitless intelligence ('As a lump of salt,' &c.), and how that same Self characterised by homogeneous limitless intelligence connects itself in the Samsāra state with the products of the elements ('a mass of knowledge, it rises from those elements and again vanishes into them'). He then adds, 'When he has departed, there is no more knowledge'; meaning that in the state of Release, where the soul's unlimited essential intelligence is not contracted in any way, there is none of those specific cognitions by which the Self identifying itself with the body, the sense-organs, &c., views itself as a man or a god, and so on. Next—in the passage, 'For where there is duality as it were'—he, holding that the view of a plurality of things not having their Self in Brahman is due to ignorance, shows that for him who has freed himself from the shackles of ignorance and recognises this whole world as animated by Brahman, the view of plurality is dispelled by the recognition of the absence of any existence apart from Brahman. He then proceeds, 'He by whom he knows all this, by what means should

he know Him?' This means—He, i.e. the highest Self, which abiding within the individual soul as its true Self bestows on it the power of knowledge so that the soul knows all this through the highest Self; by what means should the soul know Him? In other words, there is no such means of knowledge: the highest Self cannot be fully understood by the individual soul. 'That Self,' he continues, 'is to be expressed as—not so, not so!' That means—He, the highest Lord, different in nature from everything else, whether sentient or non-sentient, abides within all beings as their Self, and hence is not touched by the imperfections of what constitutes his body merely. He then concludes, 'Whereby should he know the Knower? Thus, O Maitreyī, thou hast been instructed. Thus far goes Immortality'; the purport of these words being—By what means, apart from the meditation described, should man know Him who is different in nature from all other beings, who is the sole cause of the entire world, who is the Knower of all, Him the Supreme Person? It is meditation on Him only which shows the road to Immortality. It thus appears that the Maitreyī-brāhmaṇa is concerned with the highest Brahman only; and this confirms the conclusion that Brahman only, and with it Prakṛiti as ruled by Brahman, is the cause of the world.—Here terminates the adhikarṇa of 'the connexion of sentences.'

23. (Brahman is) the material cause on account of this not being in conflict with the promissory statements and the illustrative instances.

The claims raised by the atheistic Sāṅkhya having thus been disposed of, the theistic Sāṅkhya comes forward as an opponent. It must indeed be admitted, he says, that the Vedānta-texts teach the cause of the world to be an all-knowing Lord; for they attribute to that cause thought and similar characteristics. But at the same time we learn from those same texts that the material cause of the world is none other than the Pradhāna; with an all-knowing, unchanging superintending Lord they connect a Pradhāna,

ruled by him, which is non-intelligent and undergoes changes, and the two together only they represent as the cause of the world. This view is conveyed by the following texts, 'who is without parts, without actions, tranquil, without fault, without taint' (Svet. Up. VI, 18); 'This great unborn Self, undecaying, undying' (Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 25); 'He knows her who produces all effects, the non-knowing one, the unborn one, wearing eight forms, the firm one. Ruled by him she is spread out, and incited and guided by him gives birth to the world for the benefit of the souls. A cow she is without beginning and end, a mother producing all beings' (see above, p. 363). That the Lord creates this world in so far only as guiding Prakṛiti, the material cause, we learn from the following text, 'From that the Lord of Mâyā creates all this. Know Mâyā to be Prakṛiti and the Lord of Mâyā the great Lord' (Svet. Up. IV, 9, 10). And similarly Smṛiti, 'with me as supervisor Prakṛiti brings forth the Universe of the movable and the immovable' (Bha. Gī. IX, 10). Although, therefore, the Pradhāna is not expressly stated by Scripture to be the material cause, we must assume that there is such a Pradhāna and that, superintended by the Lord, it constitutes the material cause, because otherwise the texts declaring Brahman to be the cause of the world would not be fully intelligible. For ordinary experience shows us on all sides that the operative cause and the material cause are quite distinct: we invariably have on the one side clay, gold, and other material substances which form the material causes of pots, ornaments, and so on, and on the other hand, distinct from them, potters, goldsmiths, and so on, who act as operative causes. And we further observe that the production of effects invariably requires several instrumental agencies. The Vedānta-texts therefore cannot possess the strength to convince us, in open defiance of the two invariable rules, that the one Brahman is at the same time the material and the operative cause of the world; and hence we maintain that Brahman is only the operative but not the material cause, while the material cause is the Pradhāna guided by Brahman.

This primâ facie view the Sûtra combats. *Prakṛiti*, i.e. the material cause, not only the operative cause, is Brahman only; this view being in harmony with the promissory declaration and the illustrative instances. The promissory declaration is the one referring to the knowledge of all things through the knowledge of one, 'Did you ever ask for that instruction by which that which is not heard becomes heard?' &c. (*Kh. Up. VI, 1, 3*). And the illustrative instances are those which set forth the knowledge of the effect as resulting from the knowledge of the cause, 'As by one lump of clay there is made known all that is made of clay; as by one nugget of gold, &c.; as by one instrument for paring the nails,' &c. (*Kh. Up. VI, 1, 4*). If Brahman were merely the operative cause of the world, the knowledge of the entire world would not result from the knowledge of Brahman; not any more than we know the pot when we know the potter. And thus scriptural declaration and illustrative instances would be stultified. But if Brahman is the general material cause, then the knowledge of Brahman implies the knowledge of its effect, i.e. the world, in the same way as the knowledge of such special material causes as a lump of clay, a nugget of gold, an instrument for paring the nails, implies the knowledge of all things made of clay, gold or iron—such as pots, bracelets, diadems, hatchets, and so on. For an effect is not a substance different from its cause, but the cause itself which has passed into a different state. The initial declaration thus being confirmed by the instances of clay and its products, &c., which stand in the relation of cause and effect, we conclude that Brahman only is the material cause of the world. That Scripture teaches the operative and the material causes to be separate, is not true; it rather teaches the unity of the two. For in the text, 'Have you asked for that âdesa (above, and generally, understood to mean "instruction"), by which that which is not heard becomes heard?' the word 'âdesa' has to be taken to mean *ruler*, in agreement with the text, 'by the command—or rule—of that Imperishable sun and moon stand apart' (*Bṛi. Up. III, 8, 9*), so that the passage means, 'Have you asked for that

Ruler by whom, when heard and known, even that which is not heard and known, becomes heard and known?' This clearly shows the unity of the operative (ruling or supervising) cause and the material cause ; taken in conjunction with the subsequent declaration of the unity of the cause previous to creation, ' Being only, this was in the beginning, one only,' and the denial of a further operative cause implied in the further qualification 'advitīyam,' i.e. 'without a second.'—But how then have we to understand texts such as the one quoted above (from the *Kûlika-Upanishad*) which declare *Prakṛiti* to be eternal and the material cause of the world?—*Prakṛiti*, we reply, in such passages denotes Brahman in its causal phase when names and forms are not yet distinguished. For a principle independent of Brahman does not exist, as we know from texts such as 'Everything abandons him who views anything as apart from the Self'; and 'But where for him the Self has become all, whereby should he see whom?' (*Bṛi. Up. II, 4, 6 ; 15*). Consider also the texts, 'All this is Brahman' (*Kh. Up. III, 14, 1*); and 'All this has its Self in that' (*Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7*); which declare that the world whether in its causal or its effected condition has Brahman for its Self. The relation of the world to Brahman has to be conceived in agreement with scriptural texts such as 'He who moves within the earth,' &c., up to 'He who moves within the Imperishable'; and 'He who dwells within the earth,' &c., up to 'He who dwells within the Self' (*Bṛi. Up. III, 7, 3-23*). The highest Brahman, having the whole aggregate of non-sentient and sentient beings for its body, ever is the Self of all. Sometimes, however, names and forms are not evolved, not distinguished in Brahman; at other times they are evolved, distinct. In the latter state Brahman is called an effect and manifold; in the former it is called one, without a second, the cause. This causal state of Brahman is meant where the text quoted above speaks of the cow without beginning and end, giving birth to effects, and so on.—But, the text, 'The great one is merged in the Unevolved, the Unevolved is merged in the Imperishable,' intimates that the Unevolved originates

and again passes away; and similarly the Mahābhārata says, 'from that there sprung the Non-evolved comprising the three *guṇas*; the Non-evolved is merged in the indivisible Person.'—These texts, we reply, present no real difficulty. For Brahman having non-sentient matter for its body, that state which consists of the three *guṇas* and is denoted by the term 'Unevolved' is something effected. And the text, 'When there was darkness, neither day nor night,' states that also in a total *pralaya* non-sentient matter having Brahman for its Self continues to exist in a highly subtle condition. This highly subtle matter stands to Brahman the cause of the world in the relation of a mode (*prakāra*), and it is Brahman viewed as having such a mode that the text from the *Kūl. Upanishad* refers to. For this reason also the text, 'the Imperishable is merged in darkness, darkness becomes one with the highest God,' declares not that darkness is completely merged and lost in the Divinity but only that it becomes one with it; what the text wants to intimate is that state of Brahman in which, having for its mode extremely subtle matter here called 'Darkness,' it abides without evolving names and forms. The mantra, 'There was darkness, hidden in darkness,' &c. (*Ri. Samh.* X, 129, 3), sets forth the same view; and so does Manu (I, 5), 'This universe existed in the shape of Darkness, unperceived, destitute of distinctive marks, unattainable by reasoning, unknowable, wholly immersed as it were in deep sleep.' And, as to the text, 'from that the Lord of *Mâyā* creates everything,' we shall prove later on the unchangeableness of Brahman, and explain the scriptural texts asserting it.

As to the contention raised by the *Pūrvapakshin* that on the basis of invariable experience it must be held that one and the same principle cannot be both material and operative cause, and that effects cannot be brought about by one agency, and that hence the Vedānta-texts can no more establish the view of Brahman being the sole cause than the command 'sprinkle with fire' will convince us that fire may perform the office of water; we simply remark that the highest Brahman which totally differs in nature from

all other beings, which is omnipotent and omniscient, can by itself accomplish everything. The invariable rule of experience holds good, on the other hand, with regard to clay and similar materials which are destitute of intelligence and hence incapable of guiding and supervising ; and with regard to potters and similar agents who do not possess the power of transforming themselves into manifold products, and cannot directly realise their intentions.—The conclusion therefore remains that Brahman alone is the material as well as the operative cause of the Universe.

24. And on account of the statement of reflection.

Brahman must be held to be both causes for that reason also that texts such as 'He desired, may I be many, may I grow forth,' and 'It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth,' declare that the creative Brahman forms the purpose of its own Self multiplying itself. The text clearly teaches that creation on Brahman's part is preceded by the purpose 'May I, and no other than I, become manifold in the shape of various non-sentient and sentient beings.'

25. And on account of both being directly declared.

The conclusion arrived at above is based not only on scriptural declaration, illustrative instances and statements of reflection ; but in addition Scripture directly states that Brahman alone is the material as well as operative cause of the world. 'What was the wood, what the tree from which they have shaped heaven and earth? You wise ones, search in your minds, whereon it stood, supporting the worlds.—Brahman was the wood, Brahman the tree from which they shaped heaven and earth ; you wise ones, I tell you, it stood on Brahman, supporting the worlds.'—Here a question is asked, suggested by the ordinary worldly view, as to what was the material and instruments used by Brahman when creating ; and the answer—based on the insight that there is nothing unreasonable in ascribing all possible powers to Brahman which differs from all other beings—declares that Brahman itself is the material

and the instruments;—whereby the ordinary view is disposed of.—The next Sūtra supplies a further reason.

26. On account of (the Self) making itself.

Of Brahman which the text had introduced as intent on creation, 'He wished, may I be many' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), a subsequent text says, 'That itself made its Self' (II, 7), so that Brahman is represented as the object as well as the agent in the act of creation. It being the Self only which here is made many, we understand that the Self is material cause as well as operative one. The Self with names and forms non-evolved is agent (cause), the same Self with names and forms evolved is object (effect). There is thus nothing contrary to reason in one Self being object as well as agent.

A new doubt here presents itself.—'The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'Bliss is Brahman' (Bri. Up. III, 9, 28); 'Free from sin, free from old age, free from death and grief, free from hunger and thirst' (Kh. Up. VIII, 1, 5); 'Without parts, without action, tranquil, without fault, without taint' (Svet. Up. VI, 19); 'This great unborn Self, undecaying, undying' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 25)—from all these texts it appears that Brahman is essentially free from even a shadow of all the imperfections which afflict all sentient and non-sentient beings, and has for its only characteristics absolutely supreme bliss and knowledge. How then is it possible that this Brahman should form the purpose of becoming, and actually become, manifold, by appearing in the form of a world comprising various sentient and non-sentient beings—all of which are the abodes of all kinds of imperfections and afflictions? To this question the next Sūtra replies.

27. Owing to modification.

This means—owing to the essential nature of modification (*pariṇāma*). The modification taught in our system is not such as to introduce imperfections into the highest Brahman, on the contrary it confers on it limitless glory. For our teaching as to Brahman's modification is as follows.

Brahman—essentially antagonistic to all evil, of uniform goodness, differing in nature from all beings other than itself, all-knowing, endowed with the power of immediately realising all its purposes, in eternal possession of all it wishes for, supremely blessed—has for its body the entire universe, with all its sentient and non-sentient beings—the universe being for it a plaything as it were—and constitutes the Self of the Universe. Now, when this world which forms Brahman's body has been gradually reabsorbed into Brahman, each constituent element being refunded into its immediate cause, so that in the end there remains only the highly subtle, elementary matter which Scripture calls Darkness; and when this so-called Darkness itself, by assuming a form so extremely subtle that it hardly deserves to be called something separate from Brahman, of which it constitutes the body, has become one with Brahman; then Brahman invested with this ultra-subtle body forms the resolve 'May I again possess a world-body constituted by all sentient and non-sentient beings, distinguished by names and forms just as in the previous aeon,' and modifies (*parināmayati*) itself by gradually evolving the world-body in the inverse order in which reabsorption had taken place.

All Vedānta-texts teach such modification or change on Brahman's part. There is, e.g., the text in the *Bṛihad-Āraṇyaka* which declares that the whole world constitutes the body of Brahman and that Brahman is its Self. That text teaches that earth, water, fire, sky, air, heaven, sun, the regions, moon and stars, ether, darkness, light, all beings, breath, speech, eye, ear, mind, skin, knowledge form the body of Brahman which abides within them as their Self and Ruler. Thus in the *Kāṇva*-text; the *Mādhyandina*-text reads 'the Self' instead of 'knowledge'; and adds the worlds, sacrifices and vedas. The parallel passage in the *Subāla-Upanishad* adds to the beings enumerated as constituting Brahman's body in the *Bṛihad-Āraṇyaka*, buddhi, *ahamkāra*, the mind (*kitta*), the Un-evolved (*avyakta*), the Imperishable (*akshara*), and concludes 'He who moves within death, of whom death is the body,

whom death does not know, he is the inner Self of all, free from all evil, divine, the one god Nārāyaṇa.' The term 'Death' here denotes matter in its extremely subtle form, which in other texts is called Darkness; as we infer from the order of enumeration in another passage in the same Upanishad, 'the Unevolved is merged in the Imperishable, the Imperishable in Darkness.' That this Darkness is called 'Death' is due to the fact that it obscures the understanding of all souls and thus is harmful to them. The full text in the Subāla-Up. declaring the successive absorption of all the beings forming Brahman's body is as follows, 'The earth is merged in water, water in fire, fire in air, air in the ether, the ether in the sense-organs, the sense-organs in the tanmātras, the tanmātras in the gross elements, the gross elements in the great principle, the great principle in the Unevolved, the Unevolved in the Imperishable; the Imperishable is merged in Darkness; Darkness becomes one with the highest Divinity.' That even in the state of non-separation (to which the texts refer as 'becoming one') non-sentient matter as well as sentient beings, together with the impressions of their former deeds, persists in an extremely subtle form, will be shown under II, 1, 35. We have thus a Brahman all-knowing, of the nature of supreme bliss and so on, one and without a second, having for its body all sentient and non-sentient beings abiding in an extremely subtle condition and having become 'one' with the Supreme Self in so far as they cannot be designated as something separate from him; and of this Brahman Scripture records that it forms the resolve of becoming many—in so far, namely, as investing itself with a body consisting of all sentient and non-sentient beings in their gross, manifest state which admits of distinctions of name and form—and thereupon modifies (pariṇāma) itself into the form of the world. This is distinctly indicated in the Taittiriya-Upanishad, where Brahman is at first described as 'The True, knowledge, infinite,' as 'the Self of bliss which is different from the Self of Understanding,' as 'he who bestows bliss'; and where the text further on says, 'He desired, may I be many, may

I grow forth. He brooded over himself, and having thus brooded he sent forth all whatever there is. Having sent forth he entered it. Having entered it he became sat and tyat, defined and undefined, supported and non-supported, knowledge and non-knowledge, real and unreal.' The 'brooding' referred to in this text denotes knowing, viz. reflection on the shape and character of the previous world which Brahman is about to reproduce. Compare the text 'whose brooding consists of knowledge' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9). The meaning therefore is that Brahman, having an inward intuition of the characteristics of the former world, creates the new world on the same pattern. That Brahman in all kalpas again and again creates the same world is generally known from Sruti and Smṛiti. Cp. 'As the creator formerly made sun and moon, and sky and earth, and the atmosphere and the heavenly world,' and 'whatever various signs of the seasons are seen in succession, the same appear again and again in successive yugas and kalpas.'

The sense of the Taittirīya-text therefore is as follows. The highest Self, which in itself is of the nature of unlimited knowledge and bliss, has for its body all sentient and non-sentient beings—instruments of sport for him as it were—in so subtle a form that they may be called non-existing; and as they are his body he may be said to consist of them (tan-mayā). Then desirous of providing himself with an infinity of playthings of all kinds he, by a series of steps beginning with Prakṛiti and the aggregate of souls and leading down to the elements in their gross state, so modifies himself as to have those elements for his body—when he is said to consist of them—and thus appears in the form of our world containing what the text denotes as sat and tyat, i.e. all intelligent and non-intelligent things, from gods down to plants and stones. When the text says that the Self having entered into it became sat and tyat, the meaning is that the highest Self, which in its causal state had been the universal Self, abides, in its effected state also, as the Self of the different substances undergoing changes and thus becomes this and that. While the highest Self thus

undergoes a change—in the form of a world comprising the whole aggregate of sentient and non-sentient beings—all imperfection and suffering are limited to the sentient beings constituting part of its body, and all change is restricted to the non-sentient things which constitute another part. The highest Self is *effected* in that sense only that it is the ruling principle, and hence the Self, of matter and souls in their gross or evolved state ; but just on account of being this, viz. their inner Ruler and Self, it is in no way touched by their imperfections and changes. Consisting of unlimited knowledge and bliss he for ever abides in his uniform nature, engaged in the sport of making this world go round. This is the purport of the clause ‘it became the real and the unreal’: although undergoing a change into the multiplicity of actual sentient and non-sentient things, Brahman at the same time was the Real, i. e. that which is free from all shadow of imperfection, consisting of nothing but pure knowledge and bliss. That all beings, sentient and non-sentient, and whether in their non-evolved or evolved states, are mere playthings of Brahman, and that the creation and reabsorption of the world are only his sport, this has been expressly declared by Dvaipâyana, Parâsara and other *Rishis*, ‘Know that all transitory beings, from the Unevolved down to individual things, are a mere play of Hari’; ‘View his action like that of a playful child,’ &c. The Sûtrakâra will distinctly enounce the same view in II, 1, 33. With a similar view the text ‘from that the Lord of Mâyâ sends forth all this ; and in that the other is bound by Mâyâ’ (Svet. Up. IV, 9), refers to *Prakṛiti* and soul, which together constitute the body of Brahman, as things different from Brahman, although then, i. e. at the time of a *pralaya*, they are one with Brahman in so far as their extreme subtlety does not admit of their being conceived as separate ; this it does to the end of suggesting that even when Brahman undergoes the change into the shape of this world, all changes exclusively belong to non-sentient matter which is a mode of Brahman, and all imperfections and sufferings to the individual souls which also are modes of Brahman. The

text has to be viewed as agreeing in meaning with 'that Self made itself.' Of a similar purport is the account given in Manu, 'He being desirous to send forth from his body beings of many kinds, first with a thought created the waters and placed his seed in them' (I, 8).

It is in this way that room is found for those texts also which proclaim Brahman to be free from all imperfection and all change. It thus remains a settled conclusion that Brahman by itself constitutes the material as well as the operative cause of the world.

28. And because it is called the womb.

Brahman is the material as well as the operative cause of the world for that reason also that certain texts call it the womb, 'the maker, the Lord, the Person, Brahman, the womb' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 3); 'that which the wise regard as the womb of all beings' (I, 1, 6). And that 'womb' means as much as material cause, appears from the complementary passage 'As a spider sends forth and draws in its threads' (I, 1, 7).

29. Herewith all (texts) are explained, explained.

Hereby, i. e. by the whole array of arguments set forth in the four pâdas of the first adhyâya; all those particular passages of the Vedânta-texts which give instruction as to the cause of the world, are explained as meaning to set forth a Brahman all-wise, all-powerful, different in nature from all beings intelligent and non-intelligent. The repetition of the word 'explained' is meant to indicate the termination of the adhyâya.

SECOND ADHYĀYA.

FIRST PĀDA.

1. If it be said that there would result the fault of there being no room for (certain) *Smṛitis*: (we reply) 'no,' because there would result the fault of want of room for other *Smṛitis*.

The first adhyāya has established the truth that what the Vedānta-texts teach is a Supreme Brahman, which is something different as well from non-sentient matter known through the ordinary means of proof, viz. Perception and so on, as from the intelligent souls whether connected with or separated from matter; which is free from even a shadow of imperfection of any kind; which is an ocean as it were of auspicious qualities and so on; which is the sole cause of the entire Universe; which constitutes the inner Self of all things. The second adhyāya is now begun for the purpose of proving that the view thus set forth cannot be impugned by whatever arguments may possibly be brought forward. The Sūtrakāra at first turns against those who maintain that the Vedānta-texts do not establish the view indicated above, on the ground of that view being contradicted by the *Smṛiti* of Kapila, i. e. the Sāṅkhya-system.

But how can it be maintained at all that Scripture does not set forth a certain view because thereby it would enter into conflict with *Smṛiti*? For that *Smṛiti* if contradicted by Scripture is to be held of no account, is already settled in the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā ('But where there is contradiction *Smṛiti* is not to be regarded,' I, 3, 3).—Where, we reply, a matter can be definitely settled on the basis of Scripture—as e.g. in the case of the Vedic injunction, 'he is to sing, after having touched the Uḍumbara branch' (which clearly contradicts the *Smṛiti* injunction that the whole branch is to be covered up)—*Smṛiti* indeed

need not be regarded. But the topic with which the Vedānta-texts are concerned is hard to understand, and hence, when a conflict arises between those texts and a *Smṛiti* propounded by some great *Rishi*, the matter does not admit of immediate decisive settlement: it is not therefore unreasonable to undertake to prove by *Smṛiti* that Scripture does not set forth a certain doctrine. That is to say—we possess a *Smṛiti* composed with a view to teach men the nature and means of supreme happiness, by the great *Rishi* Kapila to whom Scripture, *Smṛiti*, Itihāsa and Purāṇa alike refer as a person worthy of all respect (compare e.g. ‘the *Rishi* Kapila,’ Svet. Up. V, 2), and who moreover (unlike *Bṛhaspati* and other *Smṛiti*-writers) fully acknowledges the validity of all the means of earthly happiness which are set forth in the *karmakāṇḍa* of the Veda, such as the daily oblations to the sacred fires, the New and Full Moon offerings and the great Soma sacrifices. Now, as men having only an imperfect knowledge of the Veda, and moreover naturally slow-minded, can hardly ascertain the sense of the Vedānta-texts without the assistance of such a *Smṛiti*, and as to be satisfied with that sense of the Vedānta which discloses itself on a mere superficial study of the text would imply the admission that the whole Sāṅkhya *Smṛiti*, although composed by an able and trustworthy person, really is useless; we see ourselves driven to acknowledge that the doctrine of the Vedānta-texts cannot differ from the one established by the Sāṅkhyas. Nor must you object that to do so would force on us another unacceptable conclusion, viz. that those *Smṛitis*, that of Manu e.g., which maintain Brahman to be the universal cause, are destitute of authority; for Manu and similar works inculcate practical religious duty and thus have at any rate the uncontested function of supporting the teaching of the *karmakāṇḍa* of the Veda. The Sāṅkhya *Smṛiti*, on the other hand, is entirely devoted to the setting forth of theoretical truth (not of practical duty), and if it is not accepted in that quality, it is of no use whatsoever.—On this ground the Sūtra sets forth the *primā facie* view,

‘If it be said that there results the fault of there being no room for certain *Smṛitis*.’

The same Sūtra replies ‘no ; because there would result the fault of want of room for other *Smṛitis*.’ For other *Smṛitis*, that of Manu e.g., teach that Brahman is the universal cause. Thus Manu says, ‘This (world) existed in the shape of darkness, and so on. Then the divine Self existent, indiscernible but making discernible all this, the great elements and the rest, appeared with irresistible power, dispelling the darkness. He, desiring to produce beings of many kinds from his own body, first with a thought created the waters, and placed his seed in them’ (Manu I, 5-8). And the Bhagavad-gītā, ‘I am the origin and the dissolution of the whole Universe’ (VII, 6). ‘I am the origin of all ; everything proceeds from me’ (X, 8). Similarly, in the Mahābhārata, to the question ‘Whence was created this whole world with its movable and immovable beings?’ the answer is given, ‘Nārāyaṇa assumes the form of the world, he the infinite, eternal one’ ; and ‘from him there originates the Unevolved consisting of the three *guṇas*’ ; and ‘the Unevolved is merged in the non-acting Person.’ And Parāśara says, ‘From Viṣṇu there sprang the world and in him it abides ; he makes this world persist and he rules it—he is the world.’ Thus also Āpastamba, ‘The living beings are the dwelling of him who lies in all caves, who is not killed, who is spotless’ ; and ‘From him spring all bodies ; he is the primary cause, he is eternal, permanent’ (Dharmasū. I, 8, 22, 4 ; 23, 2).—If the question as to the meaning of the Vedānta-texts were to be settled by means of Kapila’s *Smṛiti*, we should have to accept the extremely undesirable conclusion that all the *Smṛitis* quoted are of no authority. It is true that the Vedānta-texts are concerned with theoretical truth lying outside the sphere of Perception and the other means of knowledge, and that hence students possessing only a limited knowledge of the Veda require some help in order fully to make out the meaning of the Vedānta. But what must be avoided in this case is to give any opening for the conclusion that the very numerous

Smṛitis which closely follow the doctrine of the Vedānta, are composed by the most competent and trustworthy persons and aim at supporting that doctrine, are irrelevant; and it is for this reason that Kapila's *Smṛiti* which contains a doctrine opposed to Scripture must be disregarded. The support required is elucidation of the sense conveyed by Scripture, and this clearly cannot be effected by means of a *Smṛiti* contradicting Scripture. Nor is it of any avail to plead, as the Pūrvapakshin does, that Manu and other *Smṛitis* of the same kind fulfil in any case the function of elucidating the acts of religious duty enjoined in the *karmakānda*. For if they enjoin acts of religious duty as means to win the favour of the Supreme Person but do not impress upon us the idea of that Supreme Person himself who is to be pleased by those acts, they are also not capable of impressing upon us the idea of those acts themselves. That it is the character of all religious acts to win the favour of the Supreme Spirit, *Smṛiti* distinctly declares, 'Man attains to perfection by worshipping with his proper action Him from whom all Beings proceed; and by whom all this is stretched out' (Bha. Gī. XVIII, 46); 'Let a man meditate on Nārāyaṇa, the divine one, at all works, such as bathing and the like; he will then reach the world of Brahman and not return hither' (Dakṣa-smṛiti); and 'Those men with whom, intent on their duties, thou art pleased, O Lord, they pass beyond all this Māyā and find Release for their souls' (Vi. Pu.). Nor can it be said that Manu and similar *Smṛitis* have a function in so far as setting forth works (not aiming at final Release but) bringing about certain results included in transmigratory existence, whether here on earth or in a heavenly world; for the essential character of those works also is to please the highest Person. As is said in the Bhagavad-gītā (IX, 23, 24); 'Even they who devoted to other gods worship them with faith, worship me, against ordinance. For I am the enjoyer and the Lord of all sacrifices; but they know me not in truth and hence they fall,' and 'Thou art ever worshipped by me with sacrifices; thou alone, bearing the form of

pitṛis and of gods, enjoyest all the offerings made to either.' Nor finally can we admit the contention that it is rational to interpret the Vedānta-texts in accordance with Kapila's Smṛiti because Kapila, in the Svetāsvatara text, is referred to as a competent person. For from this it would follow that, as Bṛihaspati is, in Sruti and Smṛiti, mentioned as a pattern of consummate wisdom, Scripture should be interpreted in agreement with the openly materialistic and atheistic Smṛiti composed by that authority.—But, it may here be said, the Vedānta-texts should after all be interpreted in agreement with Kapila's Smṛiti, for the reason that Kapila had through the power of his concentrated meditation (yoga) arrived at an insight into truth.—To this objection the next Sūtra replies.

2. And on account of the non-perception (of truth on the part) of others.

The 'and' in the Sūtra has the force of 'but,' being meant to dispel the doubt raised. There are many other authors of Smṛitis, such as Manu, who through the power of their meditation had attained insight into the highest truth, and of whom it is known from Scripture that the purport of their teaching was a salutary medicine to the whole world ('whatever Manu said that was medicine'). Now, as these Rishis did not see truth in the way of Kapila, we conclude that Kapila's view, which contradicts Scripture, is founded on error, and cannot therefore be used to modify the sense of the Vedānta-texts.—Here finishes the adhikaraṇa treating of 'Smṛiti.'

3. Hereby the Yoga is refuted.

By the above refutation of Kapila's Smṛiti the Yoga-smṛiti also is refuted.—But a question arises, What further doubt arises here with regard to the Yoga system, so as to render needful the formal extension to the Yoga of the arguments previously set forth against the Sāṅkhya?—It might appear, we reply, that the Vedānta should be supported by the Yoga-smṛiti, firstly, because the latter admits

the existence of a Lord ; secondly, because the Vedānta-texts mention Yoga as a means to bring about final Release ; and thirdly, because Hiraṇyagarbha, who proclaimed the Yoga-smṛiti, is qualified for the promulgation of all Vedānta-texts.—But these arguments refute themselves as follows. In the first place the Yoga holds the Pradhāna, which is independent of Brahman, to be the general material cause, and hence the Lord acknowledged by it is a mere operative cause. In the second place the nature of meditation, in which Yoga consists, is determined by the nature of the object of meditation, and as of its two objects, viz. the soul and the Lord, the former does not have its Self in Brahman, and the latter is neither the cause of the world nor endowed with the other auspicious qualities (which belong to Brahman), the Yoga is not of Vedic character. And as to the third point, Hiraṇyagarbha himself is only an individual soul, and hence liable to be overpowered by the inferior guṇas, i. e. passion and darkness ; and hence the Yoga-smṛiti is founded on error, no less than the Purāṇas, promulgated by him, which are founded on rāgas and tamas. The Yoga cannot, therefore, be used for the support of the Vedānta.—Here finishes the adhikaraṇa of ‘the refutation of the Yoga.’

4. Not, on account of the difference of character of that ; and its being such (appears) from Scripture.

The same opponent who laid stress on the conflict between Scripture and Smṛiti now again comes forward, relying this time (not on Smṛiti but) on simple reasoning. Your doctrine, he says, as to the world being an effect of Brahman which you attempted to prove by a refutation of the Sāṅkhya Smṛiti shows itself to be irrational for the following reason. Perception and the other means of knowledge show this world with all its sentient and non-sentient beings to be of a non-intelligent and impure nature, to possess none of the qualities of the Lord, and to have pain for its very essence ; and such a world totally differs in nature from the Brahman, postulated by you, which is said to be all-knowing, of supreme lordly power,

antagonistic to all evil, enjoying unbroken uniform blessedness. This difference in character of the world from Brahman is, moreover, not only known through Perception, and so on, but is seen to be directly stated in Scripture itself; compare 'Knowledge and non-knowledge' (Taitt. Up. II, 6, 1); 'Thus are these objects placed on the subjects, and the subjects on the *prāṇa*' (Kau. Up. III, 9); 'On the same tree man sits grieving, immersed, bewildered by his own impotence' (Svet. Up. IV, 7); 'The soul not being a Lord is bound because he has to enjoy' (Svet. Up. I, 8); and so on; all which texts refer to the effect, i.e. the world as being non-intelligent, of the essence of pain, and so on. The general rule is that an effect is non-different in character from its cause; as e.g. pots and bracelets are non-different in character from their material causes—clay and gold. The world cannot, therefore, be the effect of Brahman from which it differs in character, and we hence conclude that, in agreement with the Sāṅkhya *Smṛiti*, the *Pradhāna* which resembles the actual world in character must be assumed to be the general cause. Scripture, although not dependent on anything else and concerned with super-sensuous objects, must all the same come to terms with ratiocination (*tarka*); for all the different means of knowledge can in many cases help us to arrive at a decisive conclusion, only if they are supported by ratiocination. For by *tarka* we understand that kind of knowledge (intellectual activity) which in the case of any given matter, by means of an investigation either into the essential nature of that matter or into collateral (auxiliary) factors, determines what possesses proving power, and what are the special details of the matter under consideration: this kind of cognitional activity is also called *ūha*. All means of knowledge equally stand in need of *tarka*; Scripture however, the authoritative character of which specially depends on expectancy (*ākāṅkshā*), proximity (*sannidhi*), and compatibility (*yogyatā*), throughout requires to be assisted by *tarka*. In accordance with this Manu says, 'He who investigates by means of reasoning, he only knows religious duty, and none other.' It is with a view to such confirmation of

the sense of Scripture by means of Reasoning that the texts declare that certain topics such as the Self must be 'reflected on' (*mantavya*).—Now here it might possibly be said that as Brahman is ascertained from Scripture to be the sole cause of the world, it must be admitted that intelligence exists in the world also, which is an effect of Brahman. In the same way as the consciousness of an intelligent being is not perceived when it is in the states of deep sleep, swoon, &c., so the intelligent nature of jars and the like also is not observed, although it really exists; and it is this very difference of manifestation and non-manifestation of intelligence on which the distinction of intelligent and non-intelligent beings depends.—But to this we reply that permanent non-perception of intelligence proves its non-existence. This consideration also refutes the hypothesis of things commonly called non-intelligent possessing the power, or potentiality, of consciousness. For if you maintain that a thing possesses the power of producing an effect while yet that effect is never and nowhere *seen* to be produced by it, you may as well proclaim at a meeting of sons of barren women that their mothers possess eminent procreative power! Moreover, to prove at first from the Vedânta-texts that Brahman is the material cause of the world, and from this that pots and the like possess potential consciousness, and therefrom the existence of non-manifested consciousness; and then, on the other hand, to start from the last principle as proved and to deduce therefrom that the Vedânta-texts prove Brahman to be the material cause of the world, is simply to argue in a circle; for that the relation of cause and effect should exist between things different in character is just what cannot be proved.—What sameness of character, again, of causal substance and effects, have you in mind when you maintain that from the absence of such sameness it follows that Brahman cannot be proved to be the material cause of the world? It cannot be complete sameness of all attributes, because in that case the relation of cause and effect (which after all requires *some* difference) could not be established. For we do not observe that in

pots and jars which are fashioned out of a lump of clay there persists the quality of 'being a lump' which belongs to the causal substance. And should you say that it suffices that there should be equality in some or any attribute, we point out that such is actually the case with regard to Brahman and the world, both of which have the attribute of 'existence' and others. The true state of the case rather is as follows. There is equality of nature between an effect and a cause, in that sense that those essential characteristics by which the causal substance distinguishes itself from other things persist in its effects also: those characteristic features, e.g., which distinguish gold from clay and other materials, persist also in things made of gold—bracelets and the like. But applying this consideration to Brahman and the world we find that Brahman's essential nature is to be antagonistic to all evil, and to consist of knowledge, bliss and power, while the world's essential nature is to be the opposite of all this. Brahman cannot, therefore, be the material cause of the world.

But, it may be objected, we observe that even things of different essential characteristics stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect. From man, e.g., who is a sentient being, there spring nails, teeth, and hair, which are non-sentient things; the sentient scorpion springs from non-sentient dung; and non-sentient threads proceed from the sentient spider.—This objection, we reply, is not valid; for in the instances quoted the relation of cause and effect rests on the non-sentient elements only (i.e. it is only the non-sentient matter of the body which produces nails, &c.).

But, a further objection is raised, Scripture itself declares in many places that things generally held to be non-sentient really possess intelligence; compare 'to him the earth said'; 'the water desired'; 'the *prāṇas* quarrelling among themselves as to their relative pre-eminence went to Brahman.' And the writers of the *Purāṇas* also attribute consciousness to rivers, hills, the sea, and so on. Hence there is after all no essential difference in nature between

sentient and so-called non-sentient beings.—To this objection the Pûrvapakshin replies in the next Sûtra.

5. But (there is) denotation of the superintending (deities), on account of distinction and entering.

The word 'but' is meant to set aside the objection started. In texts such as 'to him the earth said,' the terms 'earth' and so on, denote the divinities presiding over earth and the rest.—How is this known?—'Through distinction and connexion.' For earth and so on are denoted by the distinctive term 'divinities'; so e.g. 'Let me enter into those three divinities' (*Kh. Up. VI, 3, 2*), where fire, water, and earth are called divinities; and *Kau. Up. II, 14*, 'All divinities contending with each other as to pre-eminence,' and 'all these divinities having recognised pre-eminence in *prâṇa*.' The 'entering' of the Sûtra refers to *Ait. Âr. II, 4, 2, 4*, 'Agni having become speech entered into the mouth; Âditya having become sight entered into the eyes,' &c., where the text declares that Agni and other divine beings entered into the sense-organs as their superintendents.

We therefore adhere to our conclusion that the world, being non-intelligent and hence essentially different in nature from Brahman, cannot be the effect of Brahman; and that therefore, in agreement with *Smṛiti* confirmed by reasoning, the Vedânta-texts must be held to teach that the *Pradhâna* is the universal material cause. This *primâ facie* view is met by the following Sûtra.

6. But it is seen.

The 'but' indicates the change of view (introduced in the present Sûtra). The assertion that Brahman cannot be the material cause of the world because the latter differs from it in essential nature, is unfounded; since it is a matter of observation that even things of different nature stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect. For it is observed that from honey and similar substances there originate worms and other little animals.—But it has been said above that in those cases there is sameness of nature,

in so far as the relation of cause and effect holds good only between the non-intelligent elements in both!—This assertion was indeed made, but it does not suffice to prove that equality of character between cause and effect which you have in view. For, being apprehensive that from the demand of equality of character in some point or other only it would follow that, as all things have certain characteristics in common, anything might originate from anything, you have declared that the equality of character necessary for the relation of cause and effect is constituted by the persistence, in the effect, of those characteristic points which differentiate the cause from other things. But it is evident that this restrictive rule does not hold good in the case of the origination of worms and the like from honey and so on; and hence it is not unreasonable to assume that the world also, although differing in character from Brahman, may originate from the latter. For in the case of worms originating from honey, scorpions from dung, &c., we do *not* observe—what indeed we *do* observe in certain other cases, as of pots made of clay, ornaments made of gold—that the special characteristics distinguishing the causal substance from other things persist in the effects also.

7. If it be said that (the effect is) non-existing; we say no, there being a mere denial.

But, an objection is raised, if Brahman, the cause, differs in nature from the effect, viz. the world, this means that cause and effect are separate things and that hence the effect does not exist in the cause, i. e. Brahman; and this again implies that the world originates from what has no existence!—Not so, we reply. For what the preceding Sūtra has laid down is merely the denial of an absolute rule demanding that cause and effect should be of the same nature; it was not asserted that the effect is a thing altogether different and separate from the cause. We by no means abandon our tenet that Brahman the cause modifies itself so as to assume the form of a world differing from it in character. For such is the case with the honey

and the worms also. There is difference of characteristics, but—as in the case of gold and golden bracelets—there is oneness of substance.—An objection is raised.

8. On account of such consequences in reabsorption (the Vedânta-texts would be) inappropriate.

The term 'reabsorption' here stands as an instance of all the states of Brahman, reabsorption, creation, and so on—among which it is the first as appears from the texts giving instruction about those several states 'Being only was this in the beginning'; 'The Self only was this in the beginning.' If we accept the doctrine of the oneness of substance of cause and effect, then, absorption, creation, &c. of the world all being in Brahman, the different states of the world would connect themselves with Brahman, and the latter would thus be affected by all the imperfections of its effect; in the same way as all the attributes of the bracelet are present in the gold also. And the undesirable consequence of this would be that contradictory attributes as predicated in different Vedânta-texts would have to be attributed to one and the same substance; cp. 'He who is all-knowing' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); 'Free from sin, free from old age and death' (Kṛ. Up. VIII, 1, 5); 'Of him there is known neither cause nor effect' (Svet. Up. VI, 8); 'Of these two one eats the sweet fruit' (Svet. Up. IV, 6); 'The Self that is not a Lord is bound because he has to enjoy' (Svet. Up. I, 8); 'On account of his impotence he laments, bewildered' (Svet. Up. IV, 7).—Nor can we accept the explanation that, as Brahman in its causal as well as its effected state has all sentient and non-sentient beings for its body; and as all imperfections inhere in that body only, they do not touch Brahman in either its causal or effected state. For it is not possible that the world and Brahman should stand to each other in the relation of effect and cause, and if it were possible, the imperfections due to connexion with a body would necessarily cling to Brahman. It is not, we say, possible that the intelligent and non-intelligent beings together should constitute the body of Brahman. For a body is a particular aggregate of earth

and the other elements, depending for its subsistence on vital breath with its five modifications, and serving as an abode to the sense-organs which mediate the experiences of pleasure and pain retributive of former works: such is in Vedic and worldly speech the sense connected with the term 'body.' But numerous Vedic texts—'Free from sin, from old age and death' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 1*); 'Without eating the other one looks on' (*Svet. Up. IV, 6*); 'Grasping without hands, hasting without feet, he sees without eyes, he hears without ears' (*Svet. Up. III, 19*); 'Without breath, without mind' (*Mu. Up. II, 1, 2*)—declare that the highest Self is free from *karman* and the enjoyment of its fruits, is not capable of enjoyment dependent on sense-organs, and has no life dependent on breath: whence it follows that he cannot have a body constituted by all the non-sentient and sentient beings. Nor can either non-sentient beings in their individual forms such as grass, trees, &c., or the aggregate of all the elements in their subtle state be viewed as the abode of sense-activity (without which they cannot constitute a body); nor are the elements in their subtle state combined into earth and the other gross elements (which again would be required for a body). And sentient beings which consist of mere intelligence are of course incapable of all this, and hence even less fit to constitute a body. Nor may it be said that to have a body merely means to be the abode of fruition, and that Brahman may possess a body in this latter sense; for there are abodes of fruition, such as palaces and the like, which are not considered to be bodies. Nor will it avail, narrowing the last definition, to say that that only is an abode of enjoyment directly abiding in which a being enjoys pain and pleasure; for if a soul enters a body other than its own, that body is indeed the abode in which it enjoys the pains and pleasures due to such entering, but is not admitted to be in the proper sense of the word the *body* of the soul thus entered. In the case of the Lord, on the other hand, who is in the enjoyment of self-established supreme bliss, it can in no way be maintained that he must be joined to a body, consisting of all sentient and non-sentient

beings, for the purpose of enjoyment.—That view also according to which a ‘body’ means no more than a *means* of enjoyment is refuted hereby.

You will now possibly try another definition, viz. that the body of a being is constituted by that, the nature, subsistence and activity of which depend on the will of that being, and that hence a body may be ascribed to the Lord in so far as the essential nature, subsistence, and activity of all depend on him.—But this also is objectionable; since in the first place it is not a fact that the nature of a body depends on the will of the intelligent soul joined with it; since, further, an injured body does not obey in its movements the will of its possessor; and since the persistence of a dead body does not depend on the soul that tenanted it. Dancing puppets and the like, on the other hand, are things the nature, subsistence, and motions of which depend on the will of intelligent beings, but we do not on that account consider them to be the bodies of those beings. As, moreover, the nature of an eternal intelligent soul does not depend on the will of the Lord, it cannot be its body under the present definition.—Nor again can it be said that the body of a being is constituted by that which is exclusively ruled and supported by that being and stands towards it in an exclusive subservient relation (*sesha*); for this definition would include actions also. And finally it is a fact that several texts definitely declare that the Lord is without a body, ‘Without hands and feet he grasps and hastens’ &c.

As thus the relation of embodied being and body cannot subsist between Brahman and the world, and as if it did subsist, all the imperfections of the world would cling to Brahman; the Vedânta-texts are wrong in teaching that Brahman is the material cause of the world.

To this *primâ facie* view the next Sûtra replies.

9. Not so; as there are parallel instances.

The teaching of the Vedânta-texts is not inappropriate, since there are instances of good and bad qualities being separate in the case of one thing connected with two

different states. The 'but' in the Sūtra indicates the impossibility of Brahman being connected with even a shadow of what is evil. The meaning is as follows. As Brahman has all sentient and non-sentient things for its body, and constitutes the Self of that body, there is nothing contrary to reason in Brahman being connected with two states, a causal and an effected one, the essential characteristics of which are expansion on the one hand and contraction on the other; for this expansion and contraction belong (not to Brahman itself, but) to the sentient and non-sentient beings. The imperfections adhering to the body do not affect Brahman, and the good qualities belonging to the Self do not extend to the body; in the same way as youth, childhood, and old age, which are attributes of embodied beings, such as gods or men, belong to the body only, not to the embodied Self; while knowledge, pleasure and so on belong to the conscious Self only, not to the body. On this understanding there is no objection to expressions such as 'he is born as a god or as a man' and 'the same person is a child, and then a youth, and then an old man.' That the character of a god or man belongs to the individual soul only in so far as it has a body, will be shown under III, 1, 1.

The assertion made by the Pûrvapakshin as to the impossibility of the world, comprising matter and souls and being either in its subtle or its gross condition, standing to Brahman in the relation of a body, we declare to be the vain outcome of altogether vicious reasoning springing from the idle fancies of persons who have never fully considered the meaning of the whole body of Vedānta-texts as supported by legitimate argumentation. For as a matter of fact all Vedānta-texts distinctly declare that the entire world, subtle or gross, material or spiritual, stands to the highest Self in the relation of a body. Compare e.g. the *antaryāmin-brāhmaṇa*, in the *Kāṇva* as well as the *Mādhyandina*-text, where it is said first of non-sentient things ('he who dwells within the earth, whose body the earth is' &c.), and afterwards separately of the intelligent soul ('he who dwells in understanding,' according to the

Kāṇvas ; 'he who dwells within the Self,' according to the Mādhyandinas) that they constitute the body of the highest Self. Similarly the Subāla-Upanishad declares that matter and souls in all their states constitute the body of the highest Self ('He who dwells within the earth' &c.), and concludes by saying that that Self is the soul of all those beings ('He is the inner Self of all' &c.). Similarly Smṛiti, 'The whole world is thy body'; 'Water is the body of Viṣṇu'; 'All this is the body of Hari'; 'All these things are his body'; 'He having reflected sent forth from his body'—where the 'body' means the elements in their subtle state. In ordinary language the word 'body' is not, like words such as *jar*, limited in its denotation to things of one definite make or character, but is observed to be applied directly (not only secondarily or metaphorically) to things of altogether different make and characteristics—such as worms, insects, moths, snakes, men, four-footed animals, and so on. We must therefore aim at giving a definition of the word that is in agreement with general use. The definitions given by the Pūrvapakṣin—'a body is that which causes the enjoyment of the fruit of actions' &c.—do not fulfil this requirement; for they do not take in such things as earth and the like which the texts declare to be the body of the Lord. And further they do not take in those bodily forms which the Lord assumes according to his wish, nor the bodily forms released souls may assume, according to 'He is one' &c. (*Kh. Up.* VII, 26, 2); for none of those embodiments subserve the fruition of the results of actions. And further, the bodily forms which the Supreme Person assumes at wish are not special combinations of earth and the other elements; for Smṛiti says, 'The body of that highest Self is not made from a combination of the elements.' It thus appears that it is also too narrow a definition to say that a body is a combination of the different elements. Again, to say that a body is that, the life of which depends on the vital breath with its five modifications is also too narrow, viz. in respect of plants; for although vital air is present in plants, it does not in them support the body by appearing

in five special forms. Nor again does it answer to define a body as either the abode of the sense-organs or as the cause of pleasure and pain ; for neither of these definitions takes in the bodies of stone or wood which were bestowed on Ahalyâ and other persons in accordance with their deeds. We are thus led to adopt the following definition—Any substance which a sentient soul is capable of completely controlling and supporting for its own purposes, and which stands to the soul in an entirely subordinate relation, is the body of that soul. In the case of bodies injured, paralysed, &c., control and so on are not actually perceived because the power of control, although existing, is obstructed ; in the same way as, owing to some obstruction, the powers of fire, heat, and so on may not be actually perceived. A dead body again begins to decay at the very moment in which the soul departs from it, and is actually dissolved shortly after ; it (thus strictly speaking is not a body at all but) is spoken of as a body because it is a part of the aggregate of matter which previously constituted a body. In this sense, then, all sentient and non-sentient beings together constitute the body of the Supreme Person, for they are completely controlled and supported by him for his own ends, and are absolutely subordinate to him. Texts which speak of the highest Self as ‘bodiless among bodies’ (e.g. Ka. Up. I, 2, 22), only mean to deny of the Self a body due to karman ; for as we have seen, Scripture declares that the Universe *is* his body. This point will be fully established in subsequent adhikaraṇas also. The two preceding Sūtras (8 and 9) merely suggest the matter proved in the adhikaraṇa beginning with II, 1, 21.

10. And on account of the objections to his view.

The theory of Brahman being the universal cause has to be accepted not only because it is itself free from objections, but also because the pradhâna theory is open to objections, and hence must be abandoned. For on this latter theory the origination of the world cannot be accounted for. The Sāṅkhyas hold that owing to the soul’s approximation to Prakṛiti the attributes of the latter

are fictitiously superimposed upon the soul which in itself consists entirely of pure intelligence free from all change, and that thereon depends the origination of the empirical world. Now here we must raise the question as to the nature of that approximation or nearness of Prakṛiti which causes the superimposition on the changeless soul of the attributes of Prakṛiti. Does that nearness mean merely the existence of Prakṛiti or some change in Prakṛiti? or does it mean some change in the soul?—Not the latter; for the soul is assumed to be incapable of change.—Nor again a change in Prakṛiti; for changes in Prakṛiti are supposed, in the system, to be the effects of superimposition, and cannot therefore be its cause. And if, finally, the nearness of Prakṛiti means no more than its existence, it follows that even the released soul would be liable to that superimposition (for Prakṛiti exists always).—The Sāṅkhya is thus unable to give a rational account of the origination of the world. This same point will be treated of fully in connexion with the special refutation of the Sāṅkhya theory. (II, 2, 6.)

11. Also in consequence of the ill-foundedness of reasoning.

The theory, resting on Scripture, of Brahman being the universal cause must be accepted, and the theory of the Pradhāna must be abandoned, because all (mere) reasoning is ill-founded. This latter point is proved by the fact that the arguments set forth by Buddha, Kaṇāda, Akṣhapāda, Gīva, Kapila and Patañjali respectively are all mutually contradictory.

12. Should it be said that inference is to be carried on in a different way; (we reply that) thus also it follows that (the objection raised) is not got rid of.

Let us then view the matter as follows. The arguments actually set forth by Buddha and others may have to be considered as invalid, but all the same we may arrive at the Pradhāna theory through other lines of reasoning by which

the objections raised against the theory are refuted.—But, we reply, this also is of no avail. A theory which rests exclusively on arguments derived from human reason may, at some other time or place, be disestablished by arguments devised by people more skilful than you in reasoning; and thus there is no getting over the objection founded on the invalidity of all mere argumentation. The conclusion from all this is that, with regard to super-sensuous matters, Scripture alone is authoritative, and that reasoning is to be applied only to the support of Scripture. In agreement herewith Manu says, ‘He who supports the teaching of the *Rishis* and the doctrine as to sacred duty with arguments not conflicting with the Veda, he alone truly knows sacred duty’ (Manu XII, 106). The teaching of the Sāṅkhyas which conflicts with the Veda cannot therefore be used for the purpose of confirming and elucidating the meaning of the Veda.—Here finishes the section treating of ‘difference of nature.’

13. Thereby also the remaining (theories) which are not comprised (within the Veda) are explained.

Not comprised means those theories which are not known to be comprised within (countenanced by) the Veda. The Sūtra means to say that by the demolition given above of the Sāṅkhya doctrine which is not comprised within the Veda the remaining theories which are in the same position, viz. the theories of Kaṇāda, Akṣhapāda, Gīva, and Buddha, must likewise be considered as demolished.

Here, however, a new objection may be raised, on the ground namely that, since all these theories agree in the view of atoms constituting the general cause, it cannot be said that their reasoning as to the causal substance is ill-founded.—They indeed, we reply, are agreed to that extent, but they are all of them equally founded on Reasoning only, and they are seen to disagree in many ways as to the nature of the atoms which by different schools are held to be either fundamentally void or non-

void, having either a merely cognitional or an objective existence, being either momentary or permanent, either of a definite nature or the reverse, either real or unreal, &c. This disagreement proves all those theories to be ill-founded, and the objection is thus disposed of.—Here finishes the section of 'the remaining (theories) non-comprised (within the Veda).'

14. If it be said that from (Brahman) becoming an enjoyer, there follows non-distinction (of Brahman and the individual soul) ; we reply—it may be as in ordinary life.

The Sāṅkhya here comes forward with a new objection. You maintain, he says, that the highest Brahman has the character either of a cause or an effect according as it has for its body sentient and non-sentient beings in either their subtle or gross state ; and that this explains the difference in nature between the individual soul and Brahman. But such difference is not possible, since Brahman, if embodied, at once becomes an enjoying subject (just like the individual soul). For if, possessing a body, the Lord necessarily experiences all pain and pleasure due to embodiedness, no less than the individual soul does.—But we have, under I, 2, 8, refuted the view of the Lord's being liable to experiences of pleasure and pain!—By no means ! There you have shown only that the Lord's abiding within the heart of a creature so as to constitute the object of its devotion does not imply fruition on his part of pleasure and pain. Now, however, you maintain that the Lord is embodied just like an individual soul, and the unavoidable inference from this is that, like that soul, he undergoes pleasurable and painful experiences. For we observe that embodied souls, although not capable of participating in the changing states of the body such as childhood, old age, &c., yet experience pleasures and pains caused by the normal or abnormal condition of the matter constituting the body. In agreement with this Scripture says, 'As long as he possesses a body there is for him no escape from pleasure and pain ; but when he

is free of the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches him' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 1*). As thus, the theory of an embodied Brahman constituting the universal cause does not allow of a distinction in nature between the Lord and the individual soul; and as, further, the theory of a mere Brahman (i.e. an absolutely homogeneous Brahman) leads to the conclusion that Brahman is the abode of all the imperfections attaching to the world, in the same way as a lump of clay or gold participates in the imperfections of the thing fashioned out of it; we maintain that the theory of the Pradhāna being the general cause is the more valid one.

To this objection the Sūtra replies in the words, 'it may be, as in ordinary life.' The desired distinction in nature between the Lord and the individual soul may exist all the same. That a soul experiences pleasures and pains caused by the various states of the body is not due to the fact of its being joined to a body, but to its karman in the form of good and evil deeds. The scriptural text also which you quote refers to that body only which is originated by karman; for other texts ('He is onefold, he is threefold'; 'If he desires the world of the Fathers'; 'He moves about there eating, playing, rejoicing'; *Kh. Up. VII, 26, 2; VIII, 2, 1; 12, 3*) show that the person who has freed himself from the bondage of karman and become manifest in his true nature is not touched by a shadow of evil while all the same he has a body. The highest Self, which is essentially free from all evil, thus has the entire world in its gross and its subtle form for its body; but being in no way connected with karman it is all the less connected with evil of any kind.—'As in ordinary life.' We observe in ordinary life that while those who either observe or transgress the ordinances of a ruler experience pleasure or pain according as the ruler shows them favour or restrains them, it does not follow from the mere fact of the ruler's having a body that he himself also experiences the pleasure and pain due to the observance or transgression of his commands. The author of the *Dramiḍa-bhāṣya* gives expression to

the same view, 'As in ordinary life a prince, although staying in a very unpleasant place infested with mosquitoes and full of discomforts of all kind is yet not touched by all these troubles, his body being constantly refreshed by fans and other means of comfort, rules the countries for which he cares and continues to enjoy all possible pleasures, such as fragrant odours and the like; so the Lord of creation, to whom his power serves as an ever-moving fan as it were, is not touched by the evils of that creation, but rules the world of Brahman and the other worlds for which he cares, and continues to enjoy all possible delights.' That the nature of Brahman should undergo changes like a lump of clay or gold we do not admit, since many texts declare Brahman to be free from all change and imperfection.—Others give a different explanation of this Sûtra. According to them it refutes the pûrvapaksha that on the view of Brahman being the general cause the distinction of enjoying subjects and objects of enjoyment cannot be accounted for—proving the possibility of such distinction by means of the analogous instance of the sea and its waves and flakes of foam. But this interpretation is inappropriate, since for those who hold that creation proceeds from Brahman connected with some power or Nescience or a limiting adjunct (upâdhi) no such primâ facie view can arise. For on their theory the enjoying subject is that which is conditioned by the power or Nescience or upâdhi inhering in the causal substance, and the power or Nescience or upâdhi is the object of enjoyment; and as the two are of different nature, they cannot pass over into each other. The view of Brahman itself undergoing an essential change (on which that primâ facie view might possibly be held to arise) is not admitted by those philosophers; for Sûtra II, i, 35 teaches that the individual souls and their deeds form a stream which has no beginning (so that the distinction of enjoying subjects and objects of enjoyment is eternal). But even if it be held that Brahman itself undergoes a change, the doubt as to the non-distinction of subjects and objects of enjoyment does not arise; for the distinction

of the two groups will, on that view, be analogous to that of jars and platters which are modifications of the one substance clay, or to that of bracelets and crowns fashioned out of the one substance gold. And on the view of Brahman itself undergoing a change there arises a further difficulty, viz. in so far as Brahman (which is nothing but pure non-conditioned intelligence) is held to transform itself into (limited) enjoying souls and (non-sentient) objects of enjoyment.

15. The non-difference (of the world) from that (viz. Brahman) follows from what begins with the word *ārambhana*.

Under II, 1, 7 and other Sūtras the non-difference of the effect, i.e. the world from the cause, i.e. Brahman was assumed, and it was on this basis that the proof of Brahman being the cause of the world proceeded. The present Sūtra now raises a *primâ facie* objection against that very non-difference, and then proceeds to refute it.

On the point in question the school of Kāṇāda argues as follows. It is in no way possible that the effect should be non-different from the cause. For cause and effect are the objects of different ideas: the ideas which have for their respective objects threads and a piece of cloth, or a lump of clay and a jar, are distinctly not of one and the same kind. The difference of words supplies a second argument; nobody applies to mere threads the word 'piece of cloth,' or vice versâ. A third argument rests on the difference of effects: water is not fetched from the well in a lump of clay, nor is a well built with jars. There, fourthly, is the difference of time; the cause is prior in time, the effect posterior. There is, fifthly, the difference of form: the cause has the shape of a lump, the effect (the jar) is shaped like a belly with a broad basis; clay in the latter condition only is meant when we say 'The jar has gone to pieces.' There, sixthly, is a numerical difference: the threads are many, the piece of cloth is one only. In the seventh place, there is the uselessness of the activity of the producing agent (which would result from cause and effect being

identical); for if the effect were nothing but the cause, what could be effected by the activity of the agent?—Let us then say that, although the effect *exists* (at all times), the activity of the agent must be postulated as helpful towards the effect.—But in that case the activity of the agent would have to be assumed as taking place perpetually, and as hence everything would exist always, there would be no distinction between eternal and non-eternal things!—Let us then say that the effect, although always existing, is at first non-manifest and then is manifested through the activity of the agent; in this way that activity will not be purposeless, and there will be a distinction between eternal and non-eternal things!—This view also is untenable. For if that manifestation requires another manifestation (to account for it) we are driven into a *regressus in infinitum*. If, on the other hand, it is independent of another manifestation (and hence eternal), it follows that the effect also is eternally perceived. And if, as a third alternative, the manifestation is said to originate, we lapse into the *asatkâryavâda* (according to which the effect does not exist before its origination). Moreover, if the activity of the agent serves to manifest the effect, it follows that the activity devoted to a jar will manifest also waterpots and similar things. For things which admittedly possess manifesting power, such as lamps and the like, are not observed to be restricted to particular objects to be manifested by them: we do not see that a lamp lit for showing a jar does *not* at the same time manifest waterpots and other things. All this proves that the activity of the agent has a purpose in so far only as it is the cause of the origination of an effect which previously did *not* exist; and thus the theory of the previous existence of the effect cannot be upheld. Nor does the fact of definite causes having to be employed (in order to produce definite effects; clay e.g. to produce a jar) prove that that only which already exists can become an effect; for the facts explain themselves also on the hypothesis of the cause having definite potentialities (determining the definite effect which will result from the cause).

But, an objection is raised, he also who holds the theory of the previous non-existence of the effect, can really do nothing with the activity of the agent. For as, on his view, the effect has no existence before it is originated, the activity of the agent must be supposed to operate elsewhere than on the effect; and as this 'elsewhere' comprises without distinction all other things, it follows that the agent's activity with reference to threads may give rise to waterpots also (not only to cloth).—Not so, the Vaiseshika replies. Activity applied to a certain cause gives rise to those effects only the potentiality of which inheres in that cause.

Now, against all this, the following objection is raised. The effect is non-different from the cause. For in reality there is no such thing as an effect different from the cause, since all effects, and all empirical thought and speech about effects, are based on Nescience. Apart from the causal substance, clay, which is seen to be present in effected things such as jars, the so-called effect, i. e. the jar or pot, rests altogether on Nescience. All effected things whatever, such as jars, waterpots, &c., viewed as different from their causal substance, viz. clay, which is perceived to exist in these its effects, rest merely on empirical thought and speech, and are fundamentally false, unreal; while the causal substance, i. e. clay, alone is real. In the same way the entire world in so far as viewed apart from its cause, i. e. Brahman which is nothing but pure non-differenced Being, rests exclusively on the empirical assumption of Egoity and so on, and is false; while reality belongs to the causal Brahman which is mere Being. It follows that there is no such thing as an effect apart from its cause; the effect in fact is identical with the cause. Nor must you object to our theory on the ground that the corroborative instance of the silver erroneously imagined in the shell is inappropriate because the non-reality of such effected things as jars is by no means well proved while the non-reality of the shell-silver is so proved; for as a matter of fact it is determined by reasoning that it is the causal substance of jars, viz. clay, only that is real while the

reality of everything apart from clay is disproved by reasoning. And if you ask whereupon that reasoning rests, we reply—on the fact that the clay only is continuous, permanent, while everything different from it is discontinuous, non-permanent. For just, as in the case of the snake-rope we observe that the continuously existing rope only—which forms the substrate of the imagined snake—is real, while the snake or cleft in the ground, which is non-continuous, is unreal; so we conclude that it is the permanently enduring clay-material only which is real, while the non-continuous effects, such as jars and pots, are unreal. And, further, since what is real, i. e. the Self, does not perish, and what is altogether unreal, as e. g. the horn of a hare, is not perceived, we conclude that an effected thing, which on the one hand is perceived and on the other is liable to destruction, must be viewed as something to be defined neither as that which is nor as that which is not. And what is thus undefinable, is false, no less than the silver imagined in the shell, the *anirvaṇanīyatva* of which is proved by perception and sublation (see above, p. 102 ff.).—We further ask, ‘Is a causal substance, such as clay, when producing its effect, in a non-modified state, or has it passed over into some special modified condition?’ The former alternative cannot be allowed, because thence it would follow that the cause originates effects at all times; and the latter must equally be rejected, because the passing over of the cause into a special state would oblige us to postulate a previous passing over into a different state (to account for the latter passing over) and again a previous one, &c., so that a *regressus in infinitum* would result.—Let it then be said that the causal substance when giving rise to the effect is indeed unchanged, but connected with a special operative cause, time and place (this connexion accounting for the origination of the effect).—But this also we cannot allow; for such connexion would be with the causal substance either as unchanged or as having entered on a changed condition; and thus the difficulties stated above would arise again.—Nor may you say that the origination of jars, gold coins, and sour milk from clay,

gold, and milk respectively is actually perceived ; that this perception is not sublated with regard to time and place—while, on the other hand, the perception of silver in the shell is so sublated—and that hence all those who trust perception must necessarily admit that the effect *does* originate from the cause. For this argumentation does not stand the test of being set forth in definite alternatives. Does the mere gold, &c., by itself originate the svastika-ornament? or is it the gold coins (used for making ornaments) which originate? or is it the gold, as forming the substrate of the coins¹? The mere gold, in the first place, cannot be originative as there exists no effect different from the gold (to which the originative activity could apply itself); and a thing cannot possibly display originative activity with regard to itself.—But, an objection is raised, the svastika-ornament is perceived as different from the gold!—It is not, we reply, different from the gold; for the gold is recognised in it, and no other thing but gold is perceived.—But the existence of another thing is proved by the fact of there being a different idea, a different word, and so on!—By no means, we reply. Other ideas, words, and so on, which have reference to an altogether undefined thing are founded on error, no less than the idea of, and the word denoting, shell-silver, and hence have no power of proving the existence of another thing. Nor, in the second place, is the *gold coin* originative of the svastika-ornament; for we do not perceive the coin in the svastika, as we do perceive the threads in the cloth. Nor, in the third place, is the effect originated by the gold in so far as being the substrate of the coin; for the gold in so far as forming the substrate of the coin is not perceived in the svastika. As it thus appears that all effects viewed apart from their causal

¹ In other words — is the golden ornament originated by the mere formless substance, gold; or by the form belonging to that special piece of gold (a coin, a bar, &c.), out of which the ornament is fashioned; or by the substance, gold, in so far as possessing that special form? The *ruḥaka* of the text has to be taken in the sense of *nishka*.

substances are unreal, we arrive at the conclusion that the entire world, viewed apart from Brahman, is also something unreal ; for it also is an effect.

In order to facilitate the understanding of the truth that everything apart from Brahman is false, we have so far reasoned on the assumption of things such as clay, gold, &c., being real, and have thereby proved the non-reality of all effects. In truth, however, all special causal substances are unreal quite as much as jars and golden ornaments are ; for they are all of them equally effects of Brahman.

'In that all this has its Self ; it is the True' (*Kh. Up.* VI, 8, 7) ; 'There is here no plurality ; from death to death goes he who sees here plurality as it were' (*Bri. Up.* IV, 4, 19) ; 'For where there is duality as it were, there one sees another ; but when for him the Self only has become all, whereby then should he see and whom should he see ?' (*Bri. Up.* II, 4, 13) ; 'Indra goes manifold by means of his *mâyâs*' (*Bri. Up.* II, 5, 19) ;—these and other similar texts teach that whatever is different from Brahman is false. Nor must it be imagined that the truth intimated by Scripture can be in conflict with Perception ; for in the way set forth above we prove that all effects are false, and moreover Perception really has for its object pure Being only (cp. above, p. 30). And if there is a conflict between the two, superior force belongs to Scripture, to which no imperfection can be attributed ; which occupies a final position among the means of knowledge ; and which, although dependent on Perception, and so on, for the apprehension of the form and meaning of words, yet is independent as far as proving power is concerned. Hence it follows that everything different from Brahman, the general cause, is unreal.

Nor must this conclusion be objected to on the ground that from the falsity of the world it follows that the individual souls also are non-real. For it is Brahman itself which constitutes the individual souls : Brahman alone takes upon itself the condition of individual soul in all living bodies ; as we know from many texts : 'Having entered into them with this living Self' (*Kh. Up.* VI, 3) ;

‘The one god hidden within all beings’ (Svet. Up. VI, 11); ‘The one god entered in many places’; ‘That Self hidden in all beings does not shine forth’ (Ka. Up. I, 3, 12); ‘There is no other seer but he’ (Bṛi. Up. III, 3, 23); and others.—But if you maintain that the one Brahman constitutes the soul in all living bodies, it follows that any particular pain or pleasure should affect the consciousness of all embodied beings, just as an agreeable sensation affecting the foot gives rise to a feeling of pleasure in the head; and that there would be no distinction of individual soul and Lord, released souls and souls in bondage, pupils and teachers, men wise and ignorant, and so on.

Now, in reply to this, some of those who hold the non-duality of Brahman give the following explanation. The many individual souls are the reflections of the one Brahman, and their states of pain, pleasure, and so on, remain distinct owing to the different limiting adjuncts (on which the existence of each individual soul as such depends), in the same way as the many reflected images of one and the same face in mirrors, crystals, sword-blades, &c., remain distinct owing to their limiting adjuncts (viz. mirrors, &c.); one image being small, another large, one being bright, another dim, and so on.—But you have said that scriptural texts such as ‘Having entered with this living Self’ show that the souls are not different from Brahman!—They are indeed not different in reality, but we maintain their distinction on the basis of an imagined difference.—To whom then does that imagination belong? Not to Brahman surely whose nature, consisting of pure intelligence, allows no room for imagination of any kind! Nor also to the individual souls; for this would imply a faulty mutual dependence, the existence of the soul depending on imagination and that imagination residing in the soul!—Not so, the advaita-vādin replies. Nescience (wrong imagination) and the existence of the souls form an endless retrogressive chain; their relation is like that of the seed and the sprout. Moreover, mutual dependence and the like, which are held to constitute defects in the case of real things, are unable to disestablish Nescience,

the very nature of which consists in being that which cannot rationally be established, and which hence may be compared to somebody's swallowing a whole palace and the like (as seen in a dream or under the influence of a magical illusion). In reality the individual souls are non-different from Brahman, and hence essentially free from all impurity; but as they are liable to impurity caused by their limiting adjuncts—in the same way as the face reflected in a mirror is liable to be dimmed by the dimness of the mirror—they may be the abodes of Nescience, and hence may be viewed as the figments of wrong imagination. Like the dimness of the reflected face, the imperfection adhering to the soul is a mere error; for otherwise it would follow that the soul can never obtain release. And as this error of the souls has proceeded from all eternity, the question as to its cause is not to be raised.

This, we reply, is the view of teachers who have no insight into the true nature of aduality, and are prompted by the wish of capturing the admiration and applause of those who believe in the doctrine of duality. For if, as a first alternative, you should maintain that the abode of Nescience is constituted by the soul in its essential, not fictitiously imagined, form; this means that Brahman itself is the abode of Nescience. If, in the second place, you should say that the abode of Nescience is the soul, viewed as different from Brahman and fictitiously imagined in it, this would mean that the Non-intelligent (*gāda*) is the abode of Nescience. For those who hold the view of Non-duality do not acknowledge a third aspect different from these two (i.e. from Brahman which is pure intelligence, and the Non-intelligent fictitiously superimposed on Brahman). And if, as a third alternative, it be maintained that the abode of Nescience is the soul in its essential nature, this nature being however qualified by the fictitiously imagined aspect; we must negative this also, since that which has an absolutely homogeneous nature cannot in any way be shown to be qualified, apart from Nescience. The soul is qualified in so far only as it is the abode of Nescience, and you therefore define

nothing.—Moreover, the theory of Nescience abiding within the individual soul is resorted to for the purpose of establishing a basis for the distinction of bondage and release, but it really is quite unable to effect this. For if by Release be understood the destruction of Nescience, it follows that when one soul attains Release and Nescience is thus destroyed, the other souls also will be released.—But Nescience persists because other souls are not released!—Well then the one soul also is not released since Nescience is not destroyed!—But we assume a different Nescience for each soul; that soul whose Nescience is destroyed will be released, and that whose Nescience is not destroyed will remain in Bondage!—You now argue on the assumption of a special avidyā for each soul. But what about the distinction of souls implied therein? Is that distinction essential to the nature of the soul, or is it the figment of Nescience? The former alternative is excluded, as it is admitted that the soul essentially is pure, non-differenced intelligence; and because on that alternative the assumption of avidyā to account for the distinction of souls would be purposeless. On the latter alternative two subordinate alternatives arise—Does this avidyā which gives rise to the fictitious distinction of souls belong to Brahman? or to the individual souls?—If you say ‘to Brahman,’ your view coincides with mine.—Well then, ‘to the souls’!—But have you then quite forgotten that Nescience is assumed for the purpose of accounting for the distinction of souls?—Let us then view the matter as follows—those several avidyās which are assumed for the purpose of establishing the distinction of souls bound and released, to those same avidyās the distinction of souls is due.—But here you reason in a manifest circle: the avidyās are established on the basis of the distinction of souls, and the distinction of souls is established when the avidyās are established. Nor does the argument of the seed and sprout apply to the present question. For in the case of seeds and plants each several seed gives rise to a different plant; while in the case under discussion you adopt the impossible procedure of establishing the

several avidyâs on the basis of the very souls which are assumed to be due to those avidyâs. And if you attempt to give to the argument a somewhat different turn, by maintaining that it is the avidyâs abiding in the earlier souls which fictitiously give rise to the later souls, we point out that this implies the souls being short-lived only, and moreover that each soul would have to take upon itself the consequences of deeds not its own and escape the consequences of its own deeds. The same reasoning disposes of the hypothesis that it is Brahman which effects the fictitious existence of the subsequent souls by means of the avidyâs abiding within the earlier souls. And if there is assumed a beginningless flow of avidyâs, it follows that there is also a beginningless flow of the condition of the souls dependent on those avidyâs, and that steady uniformity of the state of the souls which is supposed to hold good up to the moment of Release could thus not be established. Concerning your assertion that, as Nescience is something unreal and hence altogether unproved, it is not disestablished by such defects as mutual dependence which touch real things only ; we remark that in that case Nescience would cling even to released souls and the highest Brahman itself.—But impure Nescience cannot cling to what has for its essence pure cognition!—Is Nescience then to be dealt with by rational arguments? If so, it will follow that, on account of the arguments set forth (mutual dependence, and so on), it likewise does not cling to the individual souls. We further put the following question—When the Nescience abiding in the individual soul passes away, owing to the rise of the knowledge of truth, does then the soul also perish or does it not perish? In the former case Release is nothing else but destruction of the essential nature of the soul ; in the latter case the soul does not attain Release even on the destruction of Nescience, since it continues to exist as soul different from Brahman.—You have further maintained that the distinction of souls as pure and impure, &c., admits of being accounted for in the same way as the dimness or clearness, and so on, of the different images of a face as

seen reflected in mirrors, crystals, sword-blades and the like. But here the following point requires consideration. On what occasion do the smallness, dimness and other imperfections due to the limiting adjuncts (i.e. the mirrors, &c.) pass away?—When the mirrors and other limiting adjuncts themselves pass away!—Does then, we ask, the reflected image which is the substrate of those imperfections persist or not? If you say that it persists, then by analogy the individual soul also must be assumed to persist, and from this it follows that it does not attain Release. And if the reflected image is held to perish together with its imperfections, by analogy the soul also will perish and then Release will be nothing but annihilation.—Consider the following point also. The destruction of a non-advantageous (apurushârtha) defect is of advantage to him who is conscious of that disadvantage. Is it then, we ask, in the given case Brahman—which corresponds to the thing reflected—that is conscious of the imperfections due to the limiting adjuncts? or is it the soul which corresponds to the reflected image? or is it something else? On the two former alternatives it appears that the comparison (between Brahman and the soul on the one hand, and the thing reflected and the reflection on the other—on which comparison your whole theory is founded) does not hold good; for neither the face nor the reflection of the face is conscious of the imperfections due to the adjuncts; for neither of the two is a being capable of consciousness. And, moreover, Brahman's being conscious of imperfections would imply its being the abode of Nescience. And the third alternative, again, is impossible, since there is no other knowing subject *but* Brahman and the soul.—It would, moreover, be necessary to define who is the imaginatively shaping agent (kalpaka) with regard to the soul as formed from Nescience. It cannot be Nescience itself, because Nescience is not an intelligent principle. Nor can it be the soul, because this would imply the defect of what has to be proved being presupposed for the purposes of the proof; and because the existence of the soul is that which *is formed* by Nescience, just as

shell-silver is. And if, finally, you should say that Brahman is the fictitiously forming agent, we have again arrived at a Brahman that is the abode of Nescience.—If Brahman is not allowed to be the abode of Nescience, we further must ask whether Brahman sees (is conscious of) the individual souls or not. If not, it is not possible that Brahman should give rise to this manifold creation which, as Scripture declares, is preceded by ‘seeing’ on his part, and to the differentiation of names and forms. If, on the other hand, Brahman which is of an absolutely homogeneous nature *sees* the souls, it cannot do so without Nescience; and thus we are again led to the view of Nescience abiding in Brahman.

For similar reasons the theory of the distinction of Mâyâ and Nescience must also be abandoned. For even if Brahman possesses Mâyâ, i. e. illusive power, it cannot, without Nescience, be conscious of souls. And without being conscious of others the lord of Mâyâ is unable to delude them by his Mâyâ; and Mâyâ herself cannot bring about the consciousness of others on the part of its Lord, for it is a mere means to delude others, after they have (by other means) become objects of consciousness.—Perhaps you will say that the Mâyâ of Brahman causes him to be conscious of souls, and at the same time is the cause of those souls’ delusion. But if Mâyâ causes Brahman—which is nothing but self-illuminated intelligence, absolutely homogeneous and free from all foreign elements—to become conscious of other beings, then Mâyâ is nothing but another name for Nescience.—Let it then be said that Nescience is the cause of the cognition of what is contrary to truth; such being the case, Mâyâ which presents all false things different from Brahman *as* false, and thus is not the cause of wrong cognition on the part of Brahman, is *not* avidyâ.—But this is inadmissible; for, when the oneness of the moon is known, that which causes the idea of the moon being double can be nothing else but avidyâ. Moreover, if Brahman recognises all beings apart from himself as false, he does not delude them; for surely none but a madman would aim at deluding beings known by him to be unreal!—

Let us then define avidyā as the cause of a disadvantageous cognition of unreal things. Māyā then, as not being the cause of such a disadvantageous cognition on Brahman's part, cannot be of the nature of avidyā!—But this also is inadmissible; for although the idea of the moon being double is not the cause of any pain, and hence not disadvantageous to man, it is all the same caused by avidyā; and if, on the other hand, Māyā which aims at dispelling that idea (in so far as it presents the image and idea of one moon) did not present what is of disadvantage, it would not be something to be destroyed, and hence would be permanently connected with Brahman's nature.—Well, if it were so, what harm would there be?—The harm would be that such a view implies the theory of duality, and hence would be in conflict with the texts inculcating non-duality such as 'For where there is duality as it were, &c.; but when for him the Self only has become all, whereby then should he see, and whom should he see?'—But those texts set forth the Real; Māyā on the other hand is non-real, and hence the view of its permanency is not in real conflict with the texts!—Brahman, we reply, has for its essential nature unlimited bliss, and hence cannot be conscious of, or affected with, unreal Māyā, without avidyā. Of what use, we further ask, should an eternal non-real Māyā be to Brahman?—Brahman by means of it deludes the individual souls!—But of what use should such delusion be to Brahman?—It affords to Brahman a kind of sport or play!—But of what use is play to a being whose nature is unlimited bliss?—Do we not then see in ordinary life also that persons in the enjoyment of full happiness and prosperity indulge all the same in play?—The cases are not parallel, we reply. For none but persons not in their right mind would take pleasure in an unreal play, carried on by means of implements unreal and known by them to be unreal, and in the consciousness, itself, unreal of such a play!—The arguments set forth previously also prove the impossibility of the fictitious existence of an individual soul considered as the abode of avidyā, apart from Brahman considered as the abode of Māyā.

We thus arrive at the conclusion that those who hold the non-duality of Brahman must also admit that it is Brahman alone which is affected with beginningless avidyā, and owing to this avidyā is conscious of plurality within itself. Nor must it be urged against him who holds this view of avidyā belonging to Brahman that he is unable to account for the distinction of bondage and release, for as there is only the one Brahman affected with Nescience and to be released by the cessation of that Nescience, the distinction of souls bound and released, &c., has no true existence : the empirical distinction of souls bound and released, of teachers and pupils, &c. is a merely fictitious one, and all such fiction can be explained by means of the avidyā of one intelligent being. The case is analogous to that of a person dreaming : the teachers and pupils and all the other persons and things he may see in his dream are fictitiously shaped out of the avidyā of the one dreaming subject. For the same reason there is no valid foundation for the assumption of many avidyās. For those also who hold that avidyā belongs to the individual souls do not maintain that the distinction of bondage and release, of one's own self and other persons, is real ; and if it is unreal it can be accounted for by the avidyā of one subject. This admits of being stated in various technical ways.—The distinctions of bondage and of one's own self and other persons are fictitiously shaped by one's own avidyā ; for they are unreal like the distinctions seen by a dreaming person.—Other bodies also have a Self through me only ; for they are bodies like this my body.—Other bodies also are fictitiously shaped by my avidyā ; for they are bodies or effects, or non-intelligent or fictitious creations, as this my body is.—The whole class of intelligent subjects is nothing but *me* ; for they are of intelligent nature ; what is *not me* is seen to be of non-intelligent nature ; as e. g. jars. —It thus follows that the distinctions of one's own self and other persons, of souls bound and released, of pupils and teachers, and so on, are fictitiously created by the avidyā of one intelligent subject.

The fact is that the upholder of Duality himself is not

able to account for the distinction of souls bound and released. For as there is an infinity of past aeons, it follows that, even if one soul only should attain release in each aeon, all souls would by this time have attained release; the actual existence of non-released souls cannot thus be rationally accounted for.—But the souls are ‘infinite’; this accounts for there being souls not yet released!—What, pray, do you understand by this ‘infinity’ of souls? Does it mean that they cannot be counted? This we cannot allow, for although a being of limited knowledge may not be able to count them, owing to their large number, the all-knowing Lord surely can count them; if he could not do so it would follow that he is not all-knowing.—But the souls are really numberless, and the Lord’s not knowing a definite number which does not exist does not prove that he is not all-knowing!—Not so, we reply. Things which are definitely separate (*bhinna*) from each other cannot be without number. Souls have a number, because they are separate; just as mustard seeds, beans, earthen vessels, pieces of cloth, and so on. And from their being separate it moreover follows that souls, like earthen vessels, and so on, are non-intelligent, not of the nature of Self, and perishable; and it further follows therefrom that Brahman is not infinite. For by infinity we understand the absence of all limitation. Now on the theory which holds that there is a plurality of separate existences, Brahman which is considered to differ in character from other existences cannot be said to be free from substantial limitation; for substantial limitation means nothing else than the existence of other substances. And what is substantially limited cannot be said to be free from temporal and spatial limitation; for observation shows that it is just those things which differ in nature from other things and thus are substantially limited—such as earthen vessels, and so on—which are also limited in point of space and time. Hence all intelligent existences, including Brahman, being substantially limited, are also limited in point of space and time. But this conclusion leads to a conflict with those scriptural texts which declare Brahman to be free from all limitation whatsoever

(‘The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman,’ and similar texts), and moreover would imply that the souls as well as Brahman are liable to origination, decay, and so on; for limitation in time means nothing else but a being’s passing through the stages of origination, decay, and so on.

The dvaita-view thus being found untenable on all sides, we adhere to our doctrine that this entire world, from Brahmâ down to a blade of grass, springs from the avidyâ attached to Brahman which in itself is absolutely unlimited; and that the distinctions of consciousness of pleasure and pain, and all similar distinctions, explain themselves from the fact of all of them being of the nature of avidyâ, just as the distinctions of which a dreaming person is conscious. The one Brahman, whose nature is eternal self-illuminatedness, free from all heterogeneous elements, owing to the influence of avidyâ illusorily manifests itself (vivarttate) in the form of this world; and as thus in reality there exists nothing whatever different from Brahman, we hold that the world is ‘non-different’ from Brahman.

To this the Dvaitavâdin, i.e. the Vaiseshika, replies as follows. The doctrine that Brahman, which in itself is pure, non-differenced self-illuminatedness, has its own true nature hidden by avidyâ and hence sees plurality within itself, is in conflict with all the valid means of right knowledge; for as Brahman is without parts, obscuration, i.e. cessation, of the light of Brahman, would mean complete destruction of Brahman; so that the hypothesis of obscuration is altogether excluded. This and other arguments have been already set forth; as also that the hypothesis of obscuration contradicts other views held by the Advaitin. Nor is there any proof for the assertion that effects apart from their causes are mere error, like shell-silver, the separate existence of the effect being refuted by Reasoning; for as a matter of fact there is no valid reasoning of the kind. The assertion that the cause only is real because it persists, while the non-continuous effects—such as jars and waterpots—are unreal, has also been refuted before, on the ground that the fact of a thing not existing at one place and one time does not sublate its

real existence at another time and place. Nor is there any soundness in the argumentation that the effect is false because, owing to its being perceived and its being perishable, it cannot be defined either as real or unreal. For a thing's being perceived and its being perishable does not prove the thing's falseness, but only its non-permanency. To prove a thing's falseness it is required to show that it is sublated (i. e. that its non-existence is proved by valid means) with reference to that very place and time in connexion with which it is perceived ; but that a thing is sublated with reference to a place and time *other* than those in connexion with which it is perceived, proves only that the thing does not exist in connexion with that place and time, but not that it is false. This view also may be put in technical form, viz. effects such as jars and the like are real because they are not sublated with regard to their definite place and time ; just as the Self is.—Nor is there any truth in the assertion that the effect cannot originate from the cause either modified or unmodified ; for the effect may originate from the cause if connected with certain favouring conditions of place, time, &c. Nor can you show any proof for the assertion that the cause, whether modified or non-modified, cannot enter into connexion with such favouring conditions ; as a matter of fact the cause may very well, without being modified, enter into such connexion.—But from this it follows that the cause must have been previously connected with those conditions, since previously also it was equally unmodified !—Not so, we reply. The connexion with favouring conditions of time, place, &c., into which the cause enters, depends on some other cause, and not therefore on the fact of its not being modified. No fault then can be found with the view of the cause, when having entered into a special state depending on its connexion with time, place, &c., producing the effect. Nor can it be denied in any way that the cause possesses originative agency with regard to the effect ; for such agency is actually observed, and cannot be proved to be irrational.—Further there is no proof for the assertion that originative agency cannot belong

either to mere gold or to a (first) effect of gold such as coined gold, or to gold in so far as forming the substrate for coins and the like; for as a matter of fact mere gold (gold in general), if connected with the helpful factors mentioned above, may very well possess originaive capacity. To say that we do not perceive any effect different from gold is futile; for as a matter of fact we perceive the svastika-ornament which is different from mere gold, and the existence of different terms and ideas moreover proves the existence of different things. Nor have we here to do with a mere error analogous to that of shell-silver. For a real effected thing, such as a golden ornament, is perceived during the whole period intervening between its origination and destruction, and such perception is not sublated with regard to that time and place. Nor is there any valid line of reasoning to sublate that perception. That at the same time when the previously non-perceived svastika-ornament is perceived the gold also is recognised, is due to the fact of the gold persisting as the substrate of the ornament, and hence such recognition of the causal substance does not disprove the reality of the effect.—And the attempts to prove the unreality of the world by means of scriptural texts we have already disposed of in a previous part of this work.

We further object to the assertion that it is one Self which bestows on all bodies the property of being connected with the Self; as from this it would follow that one person is conscious of all the pains and pleasures caused by all bodies. For, as seen in the case of Saubhari and others, it is owing to the oneness of the Self that one person is conscious of the pains and pleasures due to several bodies. Nor again must you allege that the non-consciousness (on the part of one Self of all pleasures and pains whatever) is due to the plurality of the Egos, which are the subjects of cognition, and not to the plurality of Selves; for the Self is none other than the subject of cognition and the Ego. The organ of egoity (*ahamkāra*), on the other hand, which is the same as the internal organ (*antaḥkāraṇa*), cannot be the knowing subject, for it is of a non-intelligent nature, and is a mere instrument like the

body and the sense-organs. This also has been proved before.—Nor is there any proof for your assertion that all bodies must be held to spring from the avidyā of one subject, because they are bodies, non-intelligent, effects, fictitious. For that all bodies are the fictitious creations of avidyā is not true; since that which is not sublated by valid means of proof must be held to be real.—Nor again can you uphold the assertion that all intelligent subjects are non-different, i.e. one, because we observe that whatever is other than a subject of cognition is non-intelligent; for this also is disproved by the fact of the plurality of intelligent subjects as proved by the individual distribution, among them, of pleasures and pains.—You have further maintained ‘Through me only all bodies are animated by a Self; they are the fictitious creations of *my* avidyā; I alone constitute the whole aggregate of intelligent subjects,’ and, on the basis of these averments, have attempted to prove the oneness of the Ego. But all this is nothing but the random talk of a person who has not mastered even the principles of his own theory; for according to your theory the Self is pure intelligence to which the whole distinction of ‘I,’ ‘Thou,’ &c., is altogether foreign. Moreover, if it be held that everything different from pure, non-differenced intelligence is false, it follows that all effort spent on learning the Veda with a view to Release is fruitless, for the Veda also is the effect of avidyā, and the effort spent on it therefore is analogous to the effort of taking hold of the silver wrongly imagined in the shell. Or, to put it from a different point of view, all effort devoted to Release is purposeless, since it is the effect of knowledge depending on teachers of merely fictitious existence. Knowledge produced by texts such as ‘Thou art that’ does not put an end to bondage, because it is produced by texts which are the fictitious product of avidyā; or because it is itself of the nature of avidyā; or because it has for its abode knowing subjects, who are mere creatures of avidyā; or because it is the product of a process of study which depends on teachers who are the mere creatures of avidyā; it is thus no better than knowledge resting on texts teaching

how bondage is to be put an end to, which one might have heard in a dream. Or, to put the matter again from a different point of view, Brahman constituted by pure non-differenced intelligence is false, since it is to be attained by knowledge, which is the effect of avidyā; or since it is to be attained by knowledge abiding in knowing subjects who are mere figments of avidyā; or because it is attained through knowledge which is the mere figment of avidyā. For whatever is attained through knowledge of that kind is false; as e.g. the things seen in dreams or a town of the Gandharvas (Fata Morgana).

Nor does Brahman, constituted by pure non-differenced intelligence, shine forth by itself, so as not to need—for its cognition—other means of knowledge. And that that self-luminous knowledge which you declare to be borne witness to by itself, really consists in the knowledge of particular objects of knowledge—such knowledge abiding in particular cognising subjects—this also has been proved previously. And the different arguments which were set forth as proving Brahman's non-differenced nature, are sufficiently refuted by what we have said just now as to all such arguments themselves being the products of avidyā.

Nor again is there any sense in the theory that the principle of non-differenced intelligence 'witnesses' avidyā, and implicates itself in the error of the world. For 'witnessing' and error are observed to abide only in definite conscious subjects, not in consciousness in general. Nor can that principle of pure intelligence be proved to possess illumining power or light depending on itself only. For by light (enlightenment) we can understand nothing but definite well-established knowledge (siddhi) on the part of some knowing subject with regard to some particular object. It is on this basis only that you yourself prove the self-illuminedness of your universal principle; to an absolutely non-differenced intelligence not implying the distinction of subject and object such 'svayamprakāśatā' could not possibly belong. With regard again to what you so loudly proclaim at your meetings, viz. that real effects are seen to spring even from unreal causes, we point

out that although you allow to such effects, being non-sublated as it were, a kind of existence called 'empirical' (or 'conventional'—vyāvahārika), you yourself acknowledge that fundamentally they are nothing but products of avidyā; you thus undermine your own position. We have, on the other hand, already disposed of this your view above, when proving that in all cases effects are originated by real causes only. Nor may you plead that what perception tells us in such cases is contradicted by Scripture; for as, according to you, Scripture itself is an effect, and hence of the essence of avidyā, it is in no better case than the instances quoted.—You have further declared that, although Brahman is to be attained only through unreal knowledge, yet it is real since when once attained it is not sublated by any subsequent cognition. But this reasoning also is not valid; for when it has once been ascertained that some principle is attained through knowledge resting on a vicious basis, the fact that we are not aware of a subsequent sublation of that principle is irrelevant. That the principle 'the reality of things is a universal Void' is false, we conclude therefrom that the reasoning leading to that principle is ascertained to be ill-founded, although we are not aware of any subsequent truth sublating that principle. Moreover, for texts such as 'There is here no plurality whatsoever,' 'Knowledge, bliss is Brahman,' the absence of subsequent sublation is claimed on the ground that they negative the whole aggregate of things different from mere intelligence, and hence are later in order than all other texts (which had established that aggregate of things). But somebody may rise and say 'the Reality is a Void,' and thus negative the existence of the principle of mere Intelligence also; and the latter principle is thus sublated by the assertion as to the Void, which is later in order than the texts which it negatives. On the other hand the assertion as to the Void being the universal principle is not liable to subsequent sublation; for it is impossible for any negation to go beyond it. And as to resting on a vicious basis, there is in that respect no difference between Perception and the other means of

knowledge, and the view of general unreality, founded on the Vedānta. The proper conclusion therefore is that all cognitions whatsoever abide in real subjects of cognition and are themselves real, consisting in mental certainty with regard to special objects. Some of these cognitions rest on defects which themselves are real ; others spring from a combination of causes, real and free from all defect. Unless we admit all this we shall not be able to account in a satisfactory way for the distinction of things true and things false, and for all empirical thought. For empirical thought, whether true or of the nature of error, presupposes inward light (illumination) in the form of certainty with regard to a particular object, and belonging to a real knowing subject ; mere non-differenced Being, on the other hand (not particularised in the form of a knowing subject), cannot be the cause of states of consciousness, whether referring to real or unreal things, and cannot therefore form the basis of empirical thought.

Against our opponent's argument that pure Being must be held the real substrate of all erroneous superimposition (adhyāsa), for the reason that no error can exist without a substrate, we remark that an error may take place even when its substrate is unreal, in the same way as an error may exist even when the defect (giving rise to the error), the abode of the defect, the subject of cognition and the cognition itself are unreal. The argument thus loses its force. Possibly he will now argue that as an error is never seen to exist where the substrate is unreal, the reality of pure Being (as furnishing the required basis for error) must necessarily be admitted. But, we point out, it also is a fact that errors are never observed where the defect, the abode of the defect, the knowing subject and the act of knowledge are unreal ; and if we pay regard to observation, we must therefore admit the reality of all these factors as well. There is really no difference between the two cases, unless our opponent chooses to be obstinate.

You further asserted that, on the theory of many really different Selves, it would follow from the infinity of the past æons that all souls must have been released before this,

none being left in the state of bondage ; and that hence the actually observed distinction of souls bound and released remains unexplained. But this argumentation is refuted by the fact of the souls also being infinite. You indeed maintained that, if the souls are really separate, they must necessarily have a definite number like beans, mustard-seeds, earthen vessels, and so on ; but these instances are beside the point, as earthen vessels, and so on, are also infinite in number.—But do we not actually see that all these things have definite numbers, ‘ Here are ten jars ; a thousand beans,’ &c. ?—True, but those numbers do not belong to the essential nature of jars, and so on, but only to jars in so far as connected with time, place, and other limiting adjuncts. And that souls also have definite numbers in this sense, we readily admit. And from this it does not follow that all souls should be released ; for essentially the souls are infinite (in number).—Nor are you entitled to maintain that the real separation of individual souls would imply that, as earthen vessels and the like, they are non-intelligent, not of the nature of Self, and perishable. For the circumstance of individuals of one species being distinct from each other, does in no way imply that they possess the characteristics of things belonging to another species: the individual separation of jars does not imply their having the characteristics of pieces of cloth.—You further maintain that from the hypothesis of a real plurality of souls it follows that Brahman is substantially limited, and in consequence of this limited with regard to time and space also, and that hence its infinity is disproved. But this also is a mistaken conclusion. Things substantially limited may be limited more or less with regard to time and place: there is no invariable rule on this point, and the measure of their connexion with space and time has hence to be determined in dependence on other means of knowledge. Now Brahman’s connexion with *all* space and *all* time results from such other means of proof, and hence there is no contradiction (between this non-limitation with regard to space and time, and its limitation in point of substance—

which is due to the existence of other souls).—But mere substantial limitation, as meaning the absence of non-limitation of any kind, by itself proves that Brahman is not infinite!—Well, then you yourself are in no better case; for you admit that Brahman is something different from avidyā. From this admission it follows that Brahman also is something ‘different,’ and thus all the disadvantages connected with the view of difference cling to your theory as well. If on the other hand it should not be allowed that Brahman differs in nature from avidyā, then Brahman’s nature itself is constituted by avidyā, and the text defining Brahman as ‘the True, knowledge, infinite’ is contrary to sense.—If the reality of ‘difference’ is not admitted, then there is no longer any distinction between the proofs and the mutual objections set forth by the advocates of different theories, and we are landed in general confusion. The proof of infinity, we further remark, rests altogether on the absence of limitation of space and time, not on absence of substantial limitation; absence of such limitation is something very much akin to the ‘horn of a hare’ and is perceived nowhere. On the view of difference, on the other hand, the whole world, as constituting Brahman’s body, is its mode, and Brahman is thus limited neither through itself nor through other things.—We thus arrive at the conclusion that, as effects are real in so far as different from their cause, the effect of Brahman, i.e. the entire world, is different from Brahman.

Against this view the Sūtra now declares itself as follows.—The non-difference of the world from Brahman, the highest cause, follows from ‘what begins with the word ārambhana’—which proves such non-difference; ‘what begins with the word ārambhana’ means those clauses at the head of which that word is met with, viz. ‘*vākārambhanam vikāro nāmadheyam mṛttikety eva satyam*’; ‘Being only this was in the beginning, one only, without a second’; ‘it thought, may I be many, may I grow forth; it sent forth fire’; ‘having entered with this living Self’; ‘In the True, my son, all these creatures have their root, in the True they dwell, in the True they rest’; ‘In that all

that exists has its Self; it is the True, it is the Self; and thou art it, O Svetaketu' (*Kh. Up. VI, 1-8*)—it is these clauses and others of similar purport which are met with in other chapters, that the Sūtra refers to. For these texts prove the non-difference from Brahman of the world consisting of non-sentient and sentient beings. This is as follows. The teacher, bearing in his mind the idea of Brahman constituting the sole cause of the entire world and of the non-difference of the effect from the cause, asks the pupil, 'Have you ever asked for that instruction by which the non-heard is heard, the non-perceived is perceived, the not known is known'; wherein there is implied the promise that, through the knowledge of Brahman the general cause, its effect, i.e. the whole Universe, will be known? The pupil, not knowing that Brahman is the sole cause of the Universe, raises a doubt as to the possibility of one thing being known through another, 'How then, Sir, is that instruction?' and the teacher thereupon, in order to convey the notion of Brahman being the sole universal cause, quotes an instance showing that the non-difference of the effect from the cause is proved by ordinary experience, 'As by one clod of clay there is known everything that is made of clay'; the meaning being 'as jars, pots, and the like, which are fashioned out of one piece of clay, are known through the cognition of that clay, since their substance is not different from it.' In order to meet the objection that according to Kanāda's doctrine the effect constitutes a substance different from the cause, the teacher next proceeds to prove the non-difference of the effect from the cause by reference to ordinary experience, '*vākārambhanam vikāro nāmadheyam mṛttikety eva satyam.*' *Ārambhanam* must here be explained as that which is taken or touched (*ā-rabh=ā-labh*; and '*ālambhaḥ sparsa-himsayoh*') ; compare *Pāṇini III, 3, 113*, as to the form and meaning of the word. '*Vākā*,' 'on account of speech,' we take to mean 'on account of activity preceded by speech'; for activities such as the fetching of water in a pitcher are preceded by speech, 'Fetch water in the pitcher,' and so on. For the bringing about of such activity, the material clay

(which had been mentioned just before) touches (enters into contact with) an effect (vikāra), i. e. a particular make or configuration, distinguished by having a broad bottom and resembling the shape of a belly, and a special name (nāmadheya), viz. *pitcher*, and so on, which is applied to that effect; or, to put it differently, to the end that certain activities may be accomplished, the substance clay receives a new configuration and a new name¹. Hence jars and other things of clay are clay (mr̥ttikā), i. e. are of the substance of clay, only; this *only* is true (satyam), i. e. known through authoritative means of proof; *only* (eva), because the effects are not known as different substances. One and the same substance therefore, such as clay or gold, gives occasion for different ideas and words only as it assumes different configurations; just as we observe that one and the same Devadatta becomes the object of different ideas and terms, and gives rise to different effects, according to the different stages of life—youth, old age, &c.—which he has reached.—The fact of our saying ‘the jar has perished’ while yet the clay persists, was referred to by the Pūrvapakshin as proving that the effect is something different from the cause; but this view is disproved by the view held by us that origination, destruction, and so on, are merely different states of one and the same causal substance. According as one and the same substance is in this or that state, there belong to it different terms and different activities, and these different states may rightly be viewed as depending on the activity

¹ The meaning of the four words constituting the clause therefore would be, ‘On account of speech (i. e. for the sake of the accomplishment of certain activities such as the bringing of water, which are preceded by speech), there is touched (by the previously mentioned substance clay) an effect and a name; i. e. for the sake of, &c., clay modifies itself into an effect having a special name.’ The Commentary remarks that ‘ārambhanam’ cannot be taken in the sense of upādāna; since, on the theory of the unreality of effects, the effect is originated not by speech but by thought (imagination) only; and on the parināma doctrine the effect is likewise not originated by speech but by Brahman.

of an agent. The objections again which are connected with the theory of 'manifestation' are refuted by our not acknowledging such a thing at all as 'manifestation.' Nor does the admission of origination render the doctrine of the reality of the effect irrational; for it is only the Real that originates.—But it is a contradiction to maintain that that which previously exists is originated!—This, we reply, is the objection of a person who knows nothing about the true nature of origination and destruction. A substance enters into different states in succession; what passes away is the substance in its previous states, what originates is the substance in its subsequent states. As thus the substance in all its states has being, there is nothing irrational in the satkārya theory.—But the admission of the origination of a non-existing state lands us in the asatkārya theory!—If he, we retort, who holds the asatkārya theory is of opinion that the origination of the effect does not itself originate, he is similarly landed in the satkārya theory; and if he holds that the origination itself originates, he is led into a *regressus in infinitum*. According to us, on the other hand, who hold that states are incapable of being apprehended and of acting apart from that of which they are states, origination, destruction, and so on, belong only to a substance which is in a certain state; and on this theory no difficulty remains. And in the same way as the state of being a jar results from the clay abandoning the condition of being either two halves of a jar or a lump of clay, plurality results from a substance giving up the state of oneness, and oneness from the giving up of plurality; hence this point also gives rise to no difficulty.

We now consider the whole *Khândogya*-text in connexion. 'Sad eva somye*dam agra âśid ekam evâdvitīyam.' This means—That which is Being, i.e. this world which now, owing to the distinction of names and forms, bears a manifold shape, was in the beginning one only, owing to the absence of the distinction of names and forms. And as, owing to the 'Sat' being endowed with all powers, a further ruling principle is out of the question, the world was

also 'without a second.' This proves the non-difference of the world from Brahman. In the same way the next clause also, 'It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth,' which describes the creation of the world as proceeding from a resolve of the Self to differentiate itself into a world consisting of manifold beings movable and immovable, viz. Fire, and so on, enables us to determine that the effect, i. e. the world, is non-different from the highest cause, i. e. the highest Brahman.

And as now a further doubt may arise as to how the highest Brahman with all its perfections can be designated as one with the world, and how the world can be designated as one, without a second, not dependent on another guiding principle; and how this thought, i. e. the resolution, on the part of the Supreme cause, of differentiating itself into a manifold world, and the creation corresponding to that resolution are possible; the text continues, 'That deity thought—Let me now enter those three beings with this living Self (*gīva ātman*) and distinguish names and forms'—which means, 'Let me make the aggregate of non-sentient things (for this is meant by the "three beings") to possess various names and forms, by entering into them by means of the *gīva* which is of the nature of my Self.' The possession of names and forms must thus be understood to be effected by the *gīva* entering into matter as its Self. There is another scriptural text also which makes it clear that the highest Brahman enters, so as to be their Self, into the world together with the *gīvas*. 'Having sent forth that he entered into it. Having entered into it he became sat and tyat (i. e. sentient and non-sentient beings).' And that the entire aggregate of sentient and non-sentient beings, gross or subtle, in their effected or their causal state, constitutes the body of the highest Brahman, and that on the other hand the highest Brahman constitutes their Self—this is proved by the *antaryāmin-brāhmaṇa* and similar texts. This disposes of the doubt raised above. Since Brahman abides, as their Self, in all non-sentient matter together with the *gīvas*, Brahman is denoted by the term 'world' in so far only as it (i. e.

Brahman) has non-sentient and sentient beings for its body, and hence utterances such as 'This which is Being only was in the beginning one only' are unobjectionable in every way. All change and all imperfection belongs only to the beings constituting Brahman's body, and Brahman itself is thus proved to be free from all imperfection, a treasure as it were of all imaginable holy qualities. This point will be further elucidated under II, 1, 22.—The *Khândogya*-text then further teaches that all sentient and non-sentient beings have their Self in Brahman 'in that all this has its Self'; and further inculcates this truth in 'Thou art that.'

Texts met with in other sections also teach this same non-difference of the general cause and its effect: 'All this indeed is Brahman' (*Kh.* Up. III, 14, 1); 'When the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and known, then all this is known' (*Bri.* Up. IV, 5, 6); 'That Self is all this' (*Bri.* Up. II, 4, 6); 'Brahman indeed is all this' (*Mai.* Up. IV, 6); 'The Self only is all this' (*Kh.* Up. VII, 25, 2). Other texts, too, negative difference: 'Everything abandons him who looks for anything elsewhere than in the Self' (*Bri.* Up. II, 4, 6); 'There is not any plurality here' (*Bri.* Up. IV, 4, 19); 'From death to death goes he who sees here any plurality' (*Bri.* Up. IV, 4, 19). And in the same spirit the passage 'For where there is duality as it were, one sees the other; but when for him the Self has become all, whereby then should he see and whom?' (*Bri.* Up. II, 4, 13)—in setting forth that the view of duality belongs to him who does not know and the view of non-duality to him who knows—intimates that non-difference only is real.

It is in this way that we prove, by means of the texts beginning with *ârambhana*, that the world is non-different from the universal cause, i.e. the highest Brahman. Brahman only, having the aggregate of sentient and non-sentient beings for its body and hence for its modes (*prakâra*), is denoted by all words whatsoever. The body of this Brahman is sometimes constituted by sentient and non-sentient beings in their subtle state, when—just owing to that subtle state—they are incapable of being (conceived

and) designated as apart from Brahman whose body they form: Brahman is then in its so-called causal condition. At other times the body of Brahman is constituted by all sentient and non-sentient beings in their gross, manifest state, owing to which they admit of being thought and spoken of as having distinct names and forms: Brahman then is in its 'effected' state. The effect, i.e. the world, is thus seen to be non-different from the cause, i.e. the highest Brahman. And that in the effected as well as the causal state of Brahman's body as constituted by sentient and non-sentient beings, and of Brahman embodied therein, perfections and imperfections are distributed according to the difference of essential nature between Brahman and its body, as proved by hundreds of scriptural texts, we have shown above.

Those on the other hand who establish the non-difference of cause and effect, on the basis of the theory of the effect's non-reality, are unable to prove what they wish to prove; for the True and the False cannot possibly be one. If these two were one, it would follow either that Brahman is false or that the world is real.—Those again who (like Bhāskara) hold the effect also to be real—the difference of the soul and Brahman being due to limiting conditions, while their non-difference is essential; and the difference as well as the non-difference of Brahman and matter being essential—enter into conflict with all those texts which declare that the soul and Brahman are distinct in so far as the soul is under the power of karman while Brahman is free from all evil, &c., and all those texts which teach that non-sentient matter undergoes changes while Brahman does not. For as, according to them, nothing exists but Brahman and the limiting adjuncts, Brahman—as being indivisible—must be undivided while entering into connexion with the upādhis, and hence itself undergoes a change into inferior forms. And if they say that it is only the power (śakti), not Brahman itself, which undergoes a change; this also is of no avail since Brahman and its power are non-different.

Others again (Yādavaprakāśa) hold that the general

cause, i.e. Brahman, is pure Being in which all distinctions and changes such as being an enjoying subject, and so on, have vanished, while however it is endowed with all possible potentialities. During a pralaya this causal substance abides self-luminous, with all the distinctions of consciousness of pleasure and pain gone to rest, comparable to the soul of a man held by dreamless sleep, different however in nature from mere non-sentient matter. During the period of a creation, on the other hand, just as the substance called clay assumes the forms of jars, platters, and so on, or as the water of the sea turns itself into foam, waves, bubbles, and so on, the universal causal substance abides in the form of a triad of constituent parts, viz. enjoying subjects, objects of enjoyment, and a ruler. The attributes of being a ruler, or an object of enjoyment, or an enjoying subject, and the perfections and imperfections depending on those attributes, are therefore distributed in the same way as the attributes of being a jar or pitcher or platter; and the different effects of these attributes are distributed among different parts of the substance, clay. The objects of enjoyment, subjects of enjoyment, and the ruler are one, on the other hand, in so far as 'that which is' constitutes their substance; just as jars, platters and pitchers are one in so far as their substance is constituted by clay. It is thus one substance only, viz. 'that which is,' that appears in different conditions, and it is in this sense that the world is non-different from Brahman.—But this theory is really in conflict with all Scripture, *Smṛiti*, *Itihāsa*, *Purāṇa* and Reasoning. For Scripture, *Smṛiti*, *Itihāsa* and *Purāṇa* alike teach that there is one supreme cause, viz. Brahman—a being that is the Lord of all Lords, all-knowing, all-powerful, instantaneously realising all its purposes, free of all blemish, not limited either by place or time, enjoying supreme unsurpassable bliss. Nor can it be held that above the Lord there is 'pure Being' of which the Lord is a part only. For 'This which is "being" only was in the beginning one only, without a second; it thought, may I be many, may I grow forth' (*Kh. Up.* VI, 2, 3); 'Verily, in the beginning this was Brahman, one only. Being one

it was not strong enough. It created the most excellent Kshattras, viz. those Kshattras among the Devas—Indra, Varuna, Soma, Rudra, Parganya, Yama, Mrityu, Îsâna' (*Bri. Up. I, 4, 11*); 'In the beginning all this was Self, one only; there was nothing whatsoever else blinking. He thought, shall I send forth worlds' (*Ait. Âr. II, 4, 1, 1, 2*); 'There was in truth Nârâyana only, not Brahmâ, not Îsâna, nor heaven and earth, nor the nakshatras, nor the waters, nor Agni, nor Soma, nor Sûrya. Being alone he felt no delight. Of him merged in meditation' &c. (*Mahânâ. Up. I, 1*)—these and other texts prove that the highest cause is the Lord of all Lords, Nârâyana. For as the terms 'Being,' 'Brahman,' 'Self,' which are met with in sections treating of the same topic, are in one of those parallel sections particularised by the term 'Nârâyana,' it follows that they all mean Nârâyana. That the Lord only is the universal cause is shown by the following text also, 'He the highest great lord of lords, the highest deity of deities—he is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of him neither parent nor lord' (*Svet. Up. VI, 7, 9*). Similarly the Manu Smṛiti, 'Then the divine Self-existent (Brahmâ)—desirous to produce from his own body beings of many kind—first with a thought created the waters and placed his seed in them' (*Ma. I, 6-8*). Itihâsas and Purâṇas also declare the Supreme Person only to be the universal cause, 'Nârâyana, of whom the world is the body, of infinite nature, eternal, when desirous to create sent forth from a thousandth part of himself the souls in two divisions.' 'From Vishṇu the world originated and in him it abides.'

Nor is it possible to hold that the Lord is pure 'Being' only, for such 'Being' is admitted to be an element of the Lord; and moreover all 'Being' has difference. Nor can it be maintained that the Lord's connexion with all his auspicious qualities—knowledge, bliss, and so on—is occasional (adventitious) merely; it rather is essential and hence eternal. Nor may you avail yourself of certain texts—viz. 'His high power (*sakti*) is revealed as manifold, as essential, and (so) his knowledge, strength and action'

(Svet. Up. VI, 8); 'He who is all-knowing, all-cognising' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9), and others—to the end of proving that what is essential is only the Lord's connexion with the *potentialities* (sakti) of knowledge, bliss, and so on. For in the Svetāsvatara-text the word 'essential' independently qualifies 'knowledge, strength, and action' no less than 'sakti'; and your explanation would necessitate so-called implication (lakṣhaṇā). Nor again can it be said that in words such as sarvaḡṇa (all-knowing), the formative suffix expresses potentiality only, as it admittedly does in other words such as pāṭaka (cook); for grammar does not teach that all these (kṛit) affixes in general express potentiality or capability only. It rather teaches (cp. Pāṇini III, 2, 54) that a few kṛit-affixes only have this limited meaning; and in the case of pāṭaka and similar words we must assume capability to be denoted, because there is no other explanation open to us.—If, moreover, the Lord were held to be only a part of the Sat it would follow that the Sat, as the whole, would be superior to the Lord just as the ocean is superior to a wave, and this would be in conflict with ever so many scriptural texts which make statements about the Lord, cp. e.g. 'Him the highest great lord of lords'; 'There is none seen like to him or superior' (Svet. Up. VI, 7, 8). If, moreover, mere Being is held to be the Self of all and the general whole, and the Lord only a particular part of it, this would imply the stultification of all those texts which declare the Lord to be the general Self and the whole of which all beings are parts; for jars and platters certainly cannot be held to be parts of, and to have their being in, pitchers (which themselves are only special things made of clay). Against this you perhaps will plead that as Being in general is fully present in all its parts, and hence also in that part which is the Lord, all other things may be viewed as having their Self in, and being parts of, him.—But from your principles we might with equal right draw the inference that as Being in general is fully present in the jar, the Lord is a part of the jar and has his Self in that! From enunciations such as 'the jar is,' 'the cloth is,' it appears that Being

is an attribute of things, and cannot therefore be a substance and a cause. By the 'being' of a thing we understand the attribute of its being suitable for some definite practical effect; while its 'non-being' means its suitability for an effect of an opposite nature.—Should it on the other hand be held that substances only have being, the (unacceptable) consequence would be that actions, and so on, are non-existent. And if (to avoid this consequence) it were said that the being of actions, and so on, depends on their connexion with substances, it would be difficult to show (what yet should be shown) that 'being' is everywhere of one and the same nature. Moreover, if everything were non-different in so far as 'being,' there would be a universal consciousness of the nature of everything, and from this there would follow a general confusion of all good and evil (i. e. every one would have conscious experience of everything) This point we have explained before. For all these reasons non-difference can only have the meaning set forth by us.—Here the following doubt may arise. In the case of childhood, youth, and so on, we observe that different ideas and different terms are applied to different states of one and the same being; in the case of clay, wood, gold, &c., on the other hand, we observe that different ideas and terms are applied to different things. On what ground then do you determine that in the case of causes and effects, such as e. g. clay and jars, it is mere difference of state on which the difference of ideas and terms is based?—To this question the next Sūtra gives a reply.

16. And because (the cause) is perceived in the existence of the effect.

This means—because gold which is the cause is perceived in the existence of its effects, such as earrings and the like; i. e. on account of the recognition of gold which expresses itself in the judgment 'this earring is gold.' We do not on the other hand perceive the presence of clay, and so on, in gold, and so on. The case of the cause and the effect is thus analagous to that of the child and the youth: the word 'effect' denotes nothing else but the causal substance which

has passed over into a different condition. He also who holds the effect to be a new thing acknowledges that the effect is connected with a different state, and as this different state suffices to account for the difference of ideas and words, we are not entitled to assume a new substance which is not perceived. Nor must it be said that the recognition of the gold in the earring is due to generic nature (the two *things* being different, but having the same generic nature); for we perceive no new substance which could be the abode of the generic character. What we actually perceive is one and the same substance possessing the generic characteristics of gold, first in the causal state and then in the effected state. Nor again can it be said that even on the supposition of difference of substance, recognition of the cause in the effect results from the continuity of the so-called intimate cause (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*). For where there is difference of substances we do not observe that mere continuity of the abode gives rise to the recognition (of one substance) in the other substance residing in that abode.—But in the case of certain effects, as e.g. scorpions and other vermin which originate from dung, that recognition of the causal substance, i.e. dung (to which you refer as proving the identity of cause and effect), is not observed to take place!—You misstate the case, we reply; here also we *do* recognise in the effect that substance which is the primal cause, viz. earth.—But in smoke, which is the effect of fire, we do not recognise fire!—True! but this does not disprove our case. Fire is only the operative cause of smoke; for smoke originates from damp fuel joined with fire. That smoke is the effect of damp fuel is proved thereby, as well as that both have smell (which shows them to be alike of the substance of earth).—As thus the identity of the substance is perceived in the effect also, we are entitled to conclude that the difference of ideas and terms rests on difference of state only. The effect, therefore, is non-different from the cause.—This is so for the following reason also.

17. And on account of the existence of that which is posterior.

On account of the existence of the posterior, i.e. the effect existing in the cause—for this reason also the effect is non-different from the cause. For in ordinary language as well as in the Veda the effect is spoken of in terms of the cause; as when we say, 'all these things—jars, platters, &c.—were clay only this morning'; or when the Veda says, 'Being only was this in the beginning.'

18. If it be said 'not, on account of the designation of the (effect as the) non-existent; we reply, not so, on account (of such designation being due to) another attribute, (as appears) from the complementary passage, from Reasoning, and from another Vedic text.

The assertion that ordinary speech as well as the Veda acknowledges the existence of the effect in the cause cannot be upheld 'on account of the designation of (the effect as) the non-existent.' For the Veda says, 'Non-being only was this in the beginning' (*Kh. Up. III, 19, 1*); 'Non-being indeed was this in the beginning' (*Taitt. Up. II, 6, 1*); 'In the beginning truly this was not anything whatever.' And in ordinary language we say 'In the morning all this—jars, platters, and so on,—was not.'—This objection the Sūtra proceeds to refute. 'Not so, on account of such designation being due to another attribute.' The designation of the effected substance as the non-existent is due to the effect having at an earlier time a different quality, i.e. a different constitution; not to its being, as you think, absolutely non-existing. The quality different from the quality of existence is non-existence; that is to say, of the world designated as *this*, the quality of existence is constituted by name and form, while the quality of non-existence consists in the subtle state opposed to name and form.—But how is this known?—'From the complementary passage, from Reasoning, and from another text.' The complementary passage is the one following on the last text quoted above, viz. 'that Non-existent formed the resolve "may I be."' The resolve referred to in this complementary text serving as

an inferential sign to determine that the Non-existence spoken of is other than absolute Non-existence, we, on the basis of the observation that all the three texts quoted treat of the same matter, conclude that in the other two texts also the Non-existent has to be understood in the same sense. 'From Reasoning.' Reasoning shows Being and Non-being to be attributes of things. The possession, on the part of clay, of a certain shape, a broad base, a belly-shaped body, and so on, is the cause of our thinking and saying 'the jar exists,' while the connexion, on the part of the clay, with a condition opposed to that of a jar is the cause of our thinking and saying 'the jar does not exist.' A condition of the latter kind is e. g. the clay's existing in the form of two separate halves of a jar, and it is just this and similar conditions of the clay which account for our saying that the jar does not exist. We do not perceive any non-existence of the jar different from the kind of non-existence described; and as the latter sufficiently accounts for all current ideas and expressions as to non-existence, there is no occasion to assume an additional kind of non-existence.—And also 'from another text.' The text meant is that often quoted, 'Being only was this in the beginning.' For there the view of the absolute non-being of the effect is objected to, 'But how could it be thus?' &c., and then the decision is given that from the beginning the world was 'being.' This matter is clearly set forth in the text 'This was then undistinguished; it became distinguished by name and form' (*Bṛi. Up. I, 4, 7*).

The next two Sūtras confirm the doctrine of the non-difference of the effect from the cause by two illustrative instances.

19. And like a piece of cloth.

As threads when joined in a peculiar cross-arrangement are called a piece of cloth, thus acquiring a new name, a new form, and new functions, so it is with Brahman also.

20. And as the different vital airs.

As the one air, according as it undergoes in the body

different modifications, acquires a new name, new characteristics, and new functions, being then called *prāṇa*, *apāṇa*, and so on; thus the one Brahman becomes the world, with its manifold moving and non-moving beings.—The non-difference of the world from Brahman, the highest cause, is thus fully established.

Here terminates the 'ārambhāṇa' *adhikaraṇa*.

21. From the designation of the 'other' (as non-different from Brahman) there result (Brahman's) not creating what is beneficial, and other imperfections.

'Thou art that'; 'this Self is Brahman'—these and similar texts which declare the non-difference of the world from Brahman, teach, as has been said before, at the same time the non-difference from Brahman of the individual soul also. But an objection here presents itself. If these texts really imply that the 'other one,' i. e. the soul, is Brahman, there will follow certain imperfections on Brahman's part, viz. that Brahman, endowed as it is with omniscience, the power of realising its purposes, and so on, does not create a world of a nature beneficial to itself, but rather creates a world non-beneficial to itself; and the like. This world no doubt is a storehouse of numberless pains, either originating in living beings themselves or due to the action of other natural beings, or caused by supernatural agencies. No rational independent person endeavours to produce what is clearly non-beneficial to himself. And as you hold the view of the non-difference of the world from Brahman, you yourself set aside all those texts which declare Brahman to be different from the soul; for were there such difference, the doctrine of general non-difference could not be established. Should it be maintained that the texts declaring difference refer to difference due to limiting adjuncts, while the texts declaring non-difference mean essential non-difference, we must ask the following question—does the non-conditioned Brahman know, or does it not know, the soul which is essentially non-different from it? If it does not know it, Brahman's omniscience has to be abandoned. If, on the other hand, it knows it, then

Brahman is conscious of the pains of the soul—which is non-different from Brahman—as its own pains; and from this there necessarily follows an imperfection, viz. that Brahman does not create what is beneficial and does create what is non-beneficial to itself. If, again, it be said that the difference of the soul and Brahman is due to Nescience on the part of both, and that the texts declaring difference refer to difference of this kind, the assumption of Nescience belonging to the soul leads us to the very alternatives just stated and to their respective results. Should the *agñāna*, on the other hand, belong to Brahman, we point out that Brahman, whose essential nature is self-illuminatedness, cannot possibly be conscious of *agñāna* and the creation of the world effected by it. And if it be said that the light of Brahman is obscured by *agñāna*, we point to all the difficulties, previously set forth, which follow from this hypothesis—to obscure light means to make it cease, and to make cease the light of Brahman, of whom light is the essential nature, means no less than to destroy Brahman itself. The view of Brahman being the cause of the world thus shows itself to be untenable.—This *primā facie* view the next Sūtra refutes.

22. But (Brahman is) additional, on account of the declaration of difference.

The word 'but' sets aside the *primā facie* view. To the individual soul capable of connexion with the various kinds of pain there is additional, i.e. from it there is different, Brahman.—On what ground?—'Owing to the declaration of difference.' For Brahman is spoken of as different from the soul in the following texts:—'He who dwells in the Self and within the Self, whom the Self does not know, of whom the Self is the body, who rules the Self within, he is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal' (*Bṛi. Up. III, 7, 22*); 'Knowing as separate the Self and the Mover, blessed by him he gains Immortality' (*Svet. Up. I, 6*); 'He is the cause, the Lord of the lords of the organs' (i.e. the individual souls) (*Svet. Up. VI, 9*); 'One of them eats the sweet fruit; without eating the other looks on' (*Svet. Up.*

IV, 6); 'There are two, the one knowing, the other not knowing, both unborn, the one a ruler, the other not a ruler' (Svet. Up. I, 9); 'Embraced by the *prāgña* Self' (Bṛi. Up. IV, 3, 21); 'Mounted by the *prāgña* Self' (Bṛi. Up. IV, 3, 35); 'From that the ruler of *mâyā* sends forth all this, in that the other is bound up through *mâyā* (Svet. Up. IV, 9); 'the Master of the Pradhāna and the souls, the lord of the *guṇas*' (Svet. Up. VI, 16); 'the eternal among eternal, the intelligent among the intelligent, who, one, fulfils the desires of many' (Svet. Up. VI, 13); 'who moves within the Unevolved, of whom the Unevolved is the body, whom the Unevolved does not know; who moves within the Imperishable, of whom the Imperishable is the body, whom the Imperishable does not know; who moves within Death, of whom Death is the body, whom Death does not know; he is the inner Self of all beings, free from evil, the divine one, the one God, *Nārāyaṇa*'; and other similar texts.

23. And as in the analogous case of stones and the like, there is impossibility of that.

In the same way as it is impossible that the different non-sentient things such as stones, iron, wood, herbs, &c., which are of an extremely low constitution and subject to constant change, should be one in nature with Brahman, which is faultless, changeless, fundamentally antagonistic to all that is evil, &c. &c.; so it is also impossible that the individual soul, which is liable to endless suffering, and a mere wretched glowworm as it were, should be one with Brahman who, as we know from the texts, comprises within himself the treasure of all auspicious qualities, &c. &c. Those texts, which exhibit Brahman and the soul in co-ordination, must be understood as conveying the doctrine, founded on passages such as 'of whom the Self is the body,' that as the *gīva* constitutes Brahman's body and Brahman abides within the *gīva* as its Self, Brahman has the *gīva* for its mode; and with this doctrine the co-ordination referred to is not only not in conflict but even confirms it—as we have shown repeatedly, e.g. under Sū. I, 4, 22. Brahman

in all its states has the souls and matter for its body ; when the souls and matter are in their subtle state Brahman is in its causal condition ; when, on the other hand, Brahman has for its body souls and matter in their gross state, it is 'effected' and then called world. In this way the co-ordination above referred to fully explains itself. The world is non-different from Brahman in so far as it is its effect. There is no confusion of the different characteristic qualities ; for liability to change belongs to non-sentient matter, liability to pain to sentient souls, and the possession of all excellent qualities to Brahman : hence the doctrine is not in conflict with any scriptural text. That even in the state of non-separation—described in texts such as, 'Being only this was in the beginning'—the souls joined to non-sentient matter persist in a subtle condition and thus constitute Brahman's body must necessarily be admitted ; for that the souls at that time also persist in a subtle form is shown under Sūtras II, 1, 34 ; 35. Non-division, at that time, is possible in so far as there is no distinction of names and forms. It follows from all this that Brahman's causality is not contrary to reason.

Those, on the other hand, who explain the difference, referred to in Sūtra 22, as the difference between the *gīva* in its state of bondage and the *gīva* in so far as free from *avidyā*, i. e. the unconditioned Brahman, implicate themselves in contradictions. For the *gīva*, in so far as free from *avidyā*, is neither all-knowing, nor the Lord of all, nor the cause of all, nor the Self of all, nor the ruler of all—it in fact possesses none of those characteristics on which the scriptural texts found the difference of the released soul ; for according to the view in question all those attributes are the mere figment of Nescience. Nor again can the Sūtra under discussion be said to refer to the distinction, from the individual soul, of a Lord fictitiously created by *avidyā*—a distinction analogous to that which a man in the state of *avidyā* makes between the shell and the silver ; for it is the task of the Vedānta to convey a knowledge of that true Brahman which is introduced as the object of enquiry in the first Sūtra ('Now then the enquiry into Brahman')

and which is the cause of the origination and so on of the world, and what they at this point are engaged in is to refute the objections raised against the doctrine of that Brahman on the basis of *Smṛiti* and Reasoning.—The two Sūtras II, 1, 8; 9 really form a complementary statement to what is proved in the present *adhikarāṇa*; for their purport is to show also that things of different nature can stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect. And the Sūtra II, 1, 7 has reference to what is contained in the previous *adhikarāṇa*.

Here terminates the *adhikarāṇa* of 'designation of the other.'

24. Should it be said that (it is) not, on account of the observation of employment; we say, not so; for as in the case of milk.

We have so far determined that it is in no way unreasonable to hold that the highest Brahman, which is all-knowing, capable of realising its purposes, &c., has all beings, sentient and non-sentient, for its body, and hence constitutes the Self of all and differs in nature from everything else. We now proceed to show that it is not unreasonable to hold that, possessing all those attributes, it is able to effect by its mere will and wish the creation of this entire manifold Universe.—But, it may here be said, it is certainly a matter of observation that agents of limited power are obliged to employ a number of instrumental agencies in order to effect their purposes; but how should it follow therefrom that the view of the all-powerful Brahman producing the world without such instrumental agencies is in any way irrational?—As, we reply, it is observed in ordinary life that even such agents as possess the capability of producing certain effects stand in need of certain instruments, some slow-witted person may possibly imagine that Brahman, being destitute of all such instruments, is incapable of creating the world. It is this doubt which we have to dispel. It is seen that potters, weavers, &c., who produce jars, cloth, and the like, are incapable of actually producing unless they make use of certain implements, although they may fully

possess the specially required skill. Men destitute of such skill are not capable of production, even with the help of implements; those having the capacity produce by means of the instruments only. This leads to the conclusion that Brahman also, although possessing all imaginable powers, is not capable of creating the world without employing the required instrumental agencies. But before creation there existed nothing that could have assisted him, as we know from texts such as 'Being only this was in the beginning'; 'there was Nārāyaṇa alone.' Brahman's creative agency thus cannot be rendered plausible; and hence the *prima facie* view set forth in the earlier part of the Sūtra, 'Should it be said that (it is) not; on account of the observation of employment (of instruments).'

This view is set aside by the latter part of the Sūtra, 'not so; for as in the case of milk.' It is by no means a fact that every agent capable of producing a certain effect stands in need of instruments. Milk, e.g. and water, which have the power of producing certain effects, viz. sour milk and ice respectively, produce these effects unaided. Analogously Brahman also, which possesses the capacity of producing everything, may actually do so without using instrumental aids. The 'for' in the Sūtra is meant to point out the fact that the proving instances are generally known, and thus to indicate the silliness of the objection. Whey and similar ingredients are indeed sometimes mixed with milk, but not to the end of making the milk turn sour, but merely in order to accelerate the process and give to the sour milk a certain flavour.

25. And as in the case of the gods and so on, in (their) world.

As the gods and similar exalted beings create, each in his own world, whatever they require by their mere volition, so the Supreme Person creates by his mere volition the entire world. That the gods about whose powers we know from the Veda only (not through perception) are here quoted as supplying a proving instance, is done in order to facilitate the comprehension of the creative power of Brahman, which

is also known through the Veda.—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of 'the observation of employment.'

26. Or the consequence of the entire (Brahman entering into the effect), and stultification of (Brahman's) being devoid of parts.

'Being only was this in the beginning'; 'This indeed was in the beginning not anything'; 'The Self alone indeed was this in the beginning'—these and other texts state that in the beginning Brahman was one only, i. e. without parts—that means: Brahman, in its causal state, was without parts because then all distinction of matter and souls had disappeared. This one, non-divided, Brahman thereupon having formed the resolution of being many divided itself into the aggregate of material things—ether, air, and so on—and the aggregate of souls from Brahmā down to blades of grass. This being so, it must be held that the entire highest Brahman entered into the effected state; that its intelligent part divided itself into the individual souls, and its non-intelligent part into ether, air, and so on. This however stultifies all those often-quoted texts which declare Brahman in its causal state to be devoid of parts. For although the cause is constituted by Brahman in so far as having for its body matter and souls in their subtle state, and the effect by Brahman invested with matter and souls in their gross state; the difficulty stated above cannot be avoided, since also that element in Brahman which is embodied is held to enter into the effect. If, on the other hand, Brahman is without parts, it cannot become many, and it is not possible that there should persist a part not entering into the effected state. On the ground of these unacceptable results we conclude that Brahman cannot be the cause.—This objection the next Sūtra disposes of.

27. But on account of Scripture; (Brahman's possession of various powers) being founded upon the word.

The 'but' sets aside the difficulty raised. There is no

inappropriateness; 'on account of Scripture.' Scripture declares on the one hand that Brahman is not made up of parts, and on the other that from it a multiform creation proceeds. And in matters vouched for by Scripture we must conform our ideas to what Scripture actually says.—But then Scripture might be capable of conveying to us ideas of things altogether self-contradictory; like as if somebody were to tell us 'Water with fire'!—The Sūtra therefore adds 'on account of its being founded on the word.' As the possession, on Brahman's part, of various powers (enabling it to emit the world) rests exclusively on the authority of the word of the Veda and thus differs altogether from other matters (which fall within the sphere of the other means of knowledge also), the admission of such powers is not contrary to reason. Brahman cannot be either proved or disproved by means of generalisations from experience.

28. And thus in the Self; for (there are) manifold (powers).

If attributes belonging to one thing were on that account to be ascribed to other things also, it would follow that attributes observed in non-sentient things, such as jars and the like, belong also to the intelligent eternal Self, which is of an altogether different kind. But that such attributes do not extend to the Self is due to the variety of the essential nature of things. This the Sūtra expresses in 'for (there are) manifold (powers).' We perceive that fire, water, and so on, which are of different kind, possess different powers, viz. heat, and so on: there is therefore nothing unreasonable in the view that the highest Brahman which differs in kind from all things observed in ordinary life should possess innumerable powers not perceived in ordinary things. Thus Parāśara also—in reply to a question founded on ordinary observation—viz. 'How can creative energy be attributed to Brahman, devoid of qualities, pure, &c.?'—declares 'Numberless powers, lying beyond the sphere of all ordinary thought, belong to Brahman, and qualify it for creation, and so on; just as

heat belongs to fire.' Similarly, Scripture says, 'what was that wood, what was that tree from which they built heaven and earth?' &c. (*Ri. Samh.* X, 81); and 'Brahman was that wood, Brahman was that tree,' and so on.—Objections founded on ordinary generalisations have no force against Brahman which differs in nature from all other things.

29. And on account of the defects of his view also.

On his view, i.e. on the view of him who holds the theory of the Pradhâna or something similar, the imperfections observed in ordinary things would attach themselves to the Pradhâna also, since it does not differ in nature from those things. The legitimate conclusion therefore is that Brahman only which differs in nature from all other things can be held to be the general cause.

The Pradhâna, moreover, is without parts; how then is it possible that it should give rise to a manifold world, comprising the 'great principle,' and so on?—But there *are* parts of the Pradhâna, viz. Goodness, Passion, and Darkness!—This we reply necessitates the following distinction. Does the aggregate of Goodness, Passion, and Darkness constitute the Pradhâna? or is the Pradhâna the effect of those three? The latter alternative is in conflict with your own doctrine according to which the Pradhâna is cause only. It moreover contradicts the number of tattvas (viz. 24) admitted by you; and as those three *gunas* also have no parts one does not see how they can produce an effect. On the former alternative, the *gunas* not being composed of parts must be held to aggregate or join themselves without any reference to difference of space, and from such conjunction the production of gross effects cannot result.—The same objection applies to the doctrine of atoms being the general cause. For atoms, being without parts and spatial distinction of parts, can join only without any reference to such spatial distinction, and hence do not possess the power of originating effects.

30. And (the divinity is) endowed with all powers, because that is seen.

The highest divinity which is different in nature from all other things is endowed with all powers ; for scriptural texts show it to be such, 'His high power is revealed as manifold, as essential, and so his knowledge, force, and action' (Svet. Up. VI, 8). In the same way another text first declares the highest divinity to differ in nature from everything else, 'Free from sin, from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst,' and then goes on to represent it as endowed with all powers, 'realising all its wishes, realising all its intentions,' &c. (*Kh. Up.* VIII, 1, 5). Compare also 'He, consisting of mind, having *prāṇa* for his body, whose form is light, who realises his wishes,' &c. (*Kh. Up.* III, 14, 2).

31. Not, on account of the absence of organs ; this has been explained (before).

Although the one Brahman is different from all other beings and endowed with all powers, we yet infer from the text 'Of him there is known no effect and no instrument,' that as it is destitute of instruments it cannot produce any effect.—To this objection an answer has already been given in II, 1, 27 ; 28, 'on account of its being founded on the word,' and 'for there are manifold (powers).' That for which the sacred word is the only means of knowledge, and which is different from all other things, is capable of producing those effects also of the instrumental means of which it is destitute. It is in this spirit that Scripture says 'He sees without eyes, he hears without ears, without hands and feet he hastens and grasps' (Svet. Up. III, 19).—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of 'the consequence of the entire (Brahman).'

32. (Brahman is) not (the cause) ; on account of (the world) having the nature of what depends on a motive.

Although the Lord, who before creation is alone, is endowed with all kinds of powers since he differs in nature

from all other beings, and hence is by himself capable of creating the world ; we all the same cannot ascribe to him actual causality with regard to the world ; for this manifold world displays the nature of a thing depending on a motive, and the Lord has no motive to urge him to creation. In the case of all those who enter on some activity after having formed an idea of the effect to be accomplished, there exists a motive in the form of something beneficial either to themselves or to others. Now Brahman, to whose essential nature it belongs that all his wishes are eternally fulfilled, does not attain through the creation of the world any object not attained before. Nor again is the second alternative possible. For a being, all whose wishes are fulfilled, could concern itself about others only with a view to benefitting them. No merciful divinity would create a world so full, as ours is, of evils of all kind—birth, old age, death, hell, and so on ;—if it created at all, pity would move it to create a world altogether happy. Brahman thus having no possible motive cannot be the cause of the world. —This *primâ facie* view is disposed of in the next Sûtra.

33. But (it is) mere sport, as in ordinary life.

The motive which prompts Brahman—all whose wishes are fulfilled and who is perfect in himself—to the creation of a world comprising all kinds of sentient and non-sentient beings dependent on his volition, is nothing else but sport, play. We see in ordinary life how some great king, ruling this earth with its seven *dvīpas*, and possessing perfect strength, valour, and so on, has a game at balls, or the like, from no other motive than to amuse himself ; hence there is no objection to the view that sport only is the motive prompting Brahman to the creation, sustentation, and destruction of this world which is easily fashioned by his mere will.

34. Not inequality and cruelty, on account of there being regard ; for so (Scripture) declares.

It must indeed be admitted that the Lord, who differs in nature from all other beings, intelligent and non-intelligent,

and hence possesses powers unfathomable by thought, is capable of creating this manifold world, although before creation he is one only and without parts. But the assumption of his having actually created the world would lay him open to the charge of partiality, in so far as the world contains beings of high, middle, and low station—gods, men, animals, immovable beings; and to that of cruelty, in so far as he would be instrumental in making his creatures experience pain of the most dreadful kind.—The reply to this is ‘not so, on account of there being regard’; i. e. ‘on account of the inequality of creation depending on the deeds of the intelligent beings, gods, and so on, about to be created.’ *Sruti* and *Smṛiti* alike declare that the connexion of the individual souls with bodies of different kinds—divine, human, animal, and so on—depends on the *karman* of those souls; compare ‘He who performs good works becomes good, he who performs bad works becomes bad. He becomes pure by pure deeds, bad by bad deeds’ (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 5*). In the same way the reverend *Parāśara* declares that what causes the difference in nature and status between gods, men, and so on, is the power of the former deeds of the souls about to enter into a new creation—‘He (the Lord) is the operative cause only in the creation of new beings; the material cause is constituted by the potentialities of the beings to be created. The being to be embodied requires nothing but an operative cause; it is its own potentiality which leads its being into that condition of being (which it is to occupy in the new creation).’ Potentiality here means *karman*.

35. If it be said ‘not so, on account of non-distinction of deeds’; we say, ‘not so, on account of beginninglessness’; this is reasonable, and it is also observed.

But before creation the individual souls do not exist; since Scripture teaches non-distinction ‘Being only this was in the beginning.’ And as then the souls do not exist, no *karman* can exist, and it cannot therefore be said that the inequality of creation depends on *karman*.—Of this objec-

tion the Sûtra disposes by saying 'on account of beginninglessness,' i. e. although the individual souls and their deeds form an eternal stream, without a beginning, yet non-distinction of them 'is reasonable' (i. e. may reasonably be asserted) in so far as, previous to creation, the substance of the souls abides in a very subtle condition, destitute of names and forms, and thus incapable of being designated as something apart from Brahman, although in reality then also they constitute Brahman's body only. If it were not admitted (that the distinctions in the new creation are due to *karman*), it would moreover follow that souls are requited for what they have not done, and not requited for what they have done. The fact of the souls being without a beginning is observed, viz., to be stated in Scripture, 'The intelligent one is not born and dies not' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18); so also the fact of the flow of creation going on from all eternity, 'As the creator formed sun and moon formerly.' Moreover, the text, 'Now all this was then undeveloped. It became developed by form and name' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7), states merely that the names and forms of the souls were developed, and this shows that the souls themselves existed from the beginning. *Smṛiti* also says, 'Dost thou know both *Prakṛiti* and the soul to be without beginning?' (Bha. Gî. XIII, 19.)—As Brahman thus differs in nature from everything else, possesses all powers, has no other motive than sport, and arranges the diversity of the creation in accordance with the different *karman* of the individual souls, Brahman alone can be the universal cause.

36. And because all the attributes are proved (to be present in Brahman).

As all those attributes required to constitute causality which have been or will be shown to be absent in the *Pradhâna*, the atoms, and so on, can be shown to be present in Brahman, it remains a settled conclusion that Brahman only is the cause of the world. Here terminates the *adhikarâṇa* of 'that which has the nature of depending on a motive.'

SECOND PĀDA.

1. Not that which is inferred, on account of the impossibility of construction, and on account of activity.

The Sūtras have so far set forth the doctrine that the highest Brahman is the cause of the origination and so on of the world, and have refuted the objections raised by others. They now, in order to safeguard their own position, proceed to demolish the positions held by those very adversaries. For otherwise it might happen that some slow-witted persons, unaware of those other views resting on mere fallacious arguments, would imagine them possibly to be authoritative, and hence might be somewhat shaken in their belief in the Vedic doctrine. Another pāda therefore is begun to the express end of refuting the theories of others. The beginning is made with the theory of Kapila, because that theory has several features, such as the view of the existence of the effect in the cause, which are approved of by the followers of the Veda, and hence is more likely, than others, to give rise to the erroneous view of its being the true doctrine. The Sūtras I, 1, 5 and ff. have proved only that the Vedic texts do not set forth the Sāṅkhya view, while the task of the present pāda is to demolish that view itself: the Sūtras cannot therefore be charged with needless reiteration.

The outline of the Sāṅkhya doctrine is as follows. 'There is the fundamental Prakṛiti, which is not an effect; there are the seven effects of Prakṛiti, viz. the Mahat and so on, and the sixteen effects of those effects; and there is the soul, which is neither Prakṛiti nor effect'—such is the comprehensive statement of the principles. The entity called 'fundamental Prakṛiti' is constituted by the three

substances called Sattva, Ragas, and Tamas, (when) in a state of complete equipoise, none of the three being either in defect or in excess ; the essential nature of those three consists respectively in pleasure, pain, and dullness ; they have for their respective effects lightness and illumination, excitement and mobility, heaviness and obstruction ; they are absolutely non-perceivable by means of the senses, and to be defined and distinguished through their effects only. *Prakṛiti*, consisting in the equipoise of Sattva, Ragas, and Tamas, is one, itself non-sentient but subserving the enjoyment and final release of the many sentient beings, eternal, all-pervading, ever active, not the effect of anything, but the one general cause. There are seven Principles which are the effects of *Prakṛiti* and the causal substances of everything else ; these seven are the Mahat, the ahaṅkāra, the subtle matter (tanmātra) of sound, the subtle matter of touch, the subtle matter of colour, the subtle matter of taste, and the subtle matter of smell. The ahaṅkāra is threefold, being either modified (*vaikārika*), or active (*taigasa*), or the originator of the elements (*bhûtādi*).

The *vaikārika* is of sattva-nature and the originator of the sense-organs ; the *bhûtādi* is of tamas-nature, and the cause of those subtle matters (tanmātra) which in their turn are the cause of the gross elements ; the *taigasa* is of the nature of ragas, and assists the other two. The five gross elements are the ether and so on ; the five intellectual senses are hearing and so on ; the five organs of action are speech and so on. With the addition of the internal organ (*manas*) these are the sixteen entities which are mere effects.—The soul, not being capable of any change, is not either the causal matter or the effect of anything. For the same reason it is without attributes, consisting of mere intelligence, eternal, non-active, all-pervading, and different in each body. Being incapable of change and non-active, it can neither be an agent nor an enjoyer ; but although this is so, men in their confusion of mind, due to the closeness to each other of *Prakṛiti* and the soul, erroneously attribute to *Prakṛiti* the intelligence of the soul, and to the soul the activity of *Prakṛiti*—just as the redness of the rose

superimposes itself on the crystal near it,—and thus consider the soul to be an ‘I’ and an enjoyer. Fruition thus results from ignorance, and release from knowledge of the truth. This their theory the Sāṅkhyas prove by means of perception, inference, and authoritative tradition. Now with regard to those matters which are proved by perception, we Vedāntins have no very special reason for dissenting from the Sāṅkhyas ; and what they say about their authoritative tradition, claiming to be founded on the knowledge of all-knowing persons such as Kapila, has been pretty well disproved by us in the first adhyāya. If, now, we further manage to refute the inference which leads them to assume the Pradhāna as the cause of the world, we shall have disestablished their whole theory. We therefore proceed to give this refutation.

On this point the Sāṅkhyas reason as follows. It must necessarily be admitted that the entire world has one cause only ; for if effects were assumed to originate from several causes we should never arrive at an ultimate cause. Assume that parts such as e.g. threads produce a whole (i. e. in the case of threads, a piece of cloth) in the way of their being joined together by means of their six sides, which are parts of the threads. You must then further assume that the threads themselves are in the same way produced by their parts, having a similar constitution. And these parts again by their parts, until you reach the atoms ; these also must be assumed to produce their immediate effects by being joined together with their six sides, for otherwise solid extension (prathiman) could not be brought about. And then the atoms also as being wholes, consisting of parts¹, must be viewed as produced by their parts, and these again by their parts and so on, so that we never arrive at an ultimate cause. In order therefore to establish such an ultimate cause we must have recourse to the hypothesis of the general cause being constituted by one substance, which possesses the power of transforming itself in various different ways, without at the

¹ As follows from their having six sides.

same time forfeiting its own essential nature, and which forms the general substrate for an infinity of different effects, from the Mahat downwards. This one general cause is the Pradhâna constituted by the equipoise of the three guṇas. The reasons for the assumption of this Pradhâna are as follows :—‘ On account of the limitedness of particular things ; of connexion (anvaya) ; of activity proceeding from special power ; and of the difference and non-difference of cause and effect—the Non-evolved (Pradhâna) is the general cause of this many-natured Universe ’ (vaisvarûpya) (Sâṅkhya Kâ. I, 15 ; 16).—The term ‘ vaisvarûpya ’ denotes that which possesses all forms, i. e. the entire world with its variously constituted parts—bodies, worlds, and so on. This world, which on account of its variegated constitution must be held to be an effect, has for its cause the Unevolved (avyakta = Prakṛiti), which is of the same nature as the world. Why so? Because it is an effect ; for we perceive that every effect is different from its special cause—which has the same nature as the effect—and at the same time is non-different. Such effected things as e. g. a jar and a gold ornament are different from their causes, i. e. clay and gold, which have the same nature as the effects, and at the same time non-different. Hence the manifold-natured world originates from the Pradhâna which has the same nature, and is again merged in it : the world thus has the Pradhâna alone for its cause. This Pradhâna is constituted by the equipoise of the three guṇas, and thus is a cause possessing a nature equal to that of its effect, i. e. the world ; for the world is of the nature of pleasure, pain, and dullness, which consist of sattva, ragas, and tamas respectively. The case is analogous to that of a jar consisting of clay ; of that also the cause is none other than the substance clay. For in every case observation shows that only such causal substances as are of the same nature as the effects possess that power which is called the origination of the effect. That the general cause can be found only in the unevolved Pradhâna, which consists of the three guṇas in a state of equipoise and is unlimited with regard to space as well as time, follows from the limitedness of the particular

things, viz. the Mahat, the ahaṅkāra, and so on. These latter things are limited like jars and so on, and hence incapable of originating the entire world. Hence it follows that this world, consisting of the three *guṇas*, has for its only cause the Pradhāna, which is constituted by those three *guṇas* in a state of equipoise.

Against this argumentation the Sūtra says, 'Not that which is inferred, on account of the impossibility of construction, and on account of activity.'—'Inference' means 'that which is inferred,' i. e. the Pradhāna. The Pradhāna postulated by you is not capable of constructing this manifold-natured world, because while itself being non-intelligent it is not guided by an intelligent being understanding its nature. Whatever is of this latter kind is incapable of producing effects; as e. g. wood and the like by themselves are not capable of constructing a palace or a carriage. As it is matter of observation that non-intelligent wood, not guided by an intelligent agent understanding its nature, cannot produce effects; and as it is observed that if guided by such an agent matter does enter on action so as to produce effects; the Pradhāna, which is not ruled by an intelligent agent, cannot be the general cause. The 'and' in the Sūtra is meant to add as a further argument that 'presence' (*anvaya*) has no proving force. For whiteness present in cows and so on is not invariably accompanied by the quality of being the cause of the class characteristics of cows. Nor must it be said that qualities such as whiteness, although present in the effect, may not indeed be causes, but that substances such as gold and the like which are present in certain effects are invariably accompanied by the quality of being causes, and that hence also the substances called *sattva*, *ragas*, and *tamas*, which are found present in all effects, are proved to be the causes of all those effects. For *sattva* and so on are attributes of substances, but not themselves substances. *Sattva* and so on are the causes of the lightness, light, &c., belonging to substances such as earth and the like, and hence distinctive attributes of the essential nature of those substances, but they are not observed to be present in any effects in

a substantial form, as clay, gold, and other substances are. It is for this reason that they are known as 'gunas.' You have further said that the world's having one cause only must be postulated in order that an ultimate cause may be reached. But as the sattva, ragas, and tamas are not one but three, you yourself do not assume one cause, and hence do not manage to arrive at an ultimate cause. For your Pradhāna consists in the equipoise of the three gunas; there are thus several causes, and you have no more an ultimate cause than others. Nor can you say that this end is accomplished through the three gunas being unlimited. For if the three gunas are all alike unlimited, and therefore omnipresent, there is nowhere a plus or minus of any of them, and as thus no inequality can result, effects cannot originate. In order to explain the origination of results it is therefore necessary to assume limitation of the gunas.

Nor is our view confirmed by those cases only in which it is clearly perceived that matter produces effects only when guided by an intelligent principle; other cases also (where the fact is not perceived with equal clearness) are in favour of our view. This the next Sūtra declares.

2. If it be said—like milk or water; there also (intelligence guides).

What has been said—the Sāṅkhya rejoins—as to the impossibility of the Pradhāna not guided by an intelligent principle constructing this variously constituted world, is unfounded; for the Pradhāna may be supposed to act in the same way as milk and water do. Milk, when turning into sour milk, is capable of going by itself through a series of changes: it does not therefore depend on anything else. In the same way we observe that the homogeneous water discharged from the clouds spontaneously proceeds to transform itself into the various saps and juices of different plants, such as palm trees, mango trees, wood-apple trees, lime trees, tamarind trees, and so on. In the same way the Pradhāna, of whose essential nature it is to change, may, without being guided by another agent, abide in the interval

between two creations in a state of homogeneousness, and then when the time for creation comes modify itself into many various effects due to the loss of equilibrium on the part of the *gunas*. As has been said '(the Pradhāna acts), owing to modification, as water according to the difference of the abodes of the several *gunas*' (Sāṅkhya Kā. I, 16). In this way the Unevolved acts independently of anything else.

To this reasoning the Sūtra replies 'there also.' Also, in the instances of milk and water, activity is not possible in the absence of an intelligent principle, for these very cases have already been referred to as proving our position. The Sūtra II, 1, 24 (where the change of milk into sour milk is instanced) meant to prove only that a being destitute of other visible instruments of action is able to produce its own special effect, but not to disprove the view of all agency presupposing an intelligent principle. That even in water and so on an intelligent principle is present is proved by scriptural texts, 'he who dwells in water' and so on.

3. And because from the independence (of the Pradhāna) there would follow the non-existence of what is different (from creation, i. e. of the pralaya condition).

That the Pradhāna which is not guided by an intelligent principle is not the universal cause is proved also by the fact that, if we ascribe to it a power for change independent of the guidance of a Lord capable of realising all his purposes, it would follow that the pralaya state, which is different from the state of creation, would not exist; while on the other hand the guidance of the Pradhāna by a Lord explains the alternating states of creation and pralaya as the effects of his purposes. Nor can the Sāṅkhya retort that our view gives rise to similar difficulties in so far, namely, as the Lord, all whose wishes are eternally accomplished, who is free from all imperfection, &c. &c., cannot be the originator of either creation or pralaya, and as the creation of an unequal world would lay him open to the

charge of mercilessness. For, as explained before, even a being perfect and complete may enter on activity for the sake of sport; and as the reason for a particular creation on the part of an all-knowing Lord may be his recognition of *Prakṛiti* having reached a certain special state, it is the deeds of the individual souls which bring about the inequalities in the new creation.—But if this is so, all difference of states is caused exclusively by the good and evil deeds of the individual souls; and what position remains then for a ruling Lord? *Prakṛiti*, impressed by the good and evil deeds of the souls, will by herself modify herself on such lines as correspond to the deserts of the individual souls; in the same way as we observe that food and drink, if either vitiated by poison or reinforced by medicinal herbs and juices, enter into new states which render them the causes of either pleasure or pain. Hence all the differences between states of creation and *pralaya*, as also the inequalities among created beings such as gods, men, and so on, and finally the souls reaching the condition of Release, may be credited to the *Pradhāna*, possessing as it does the capability of modifying itself into all possible forms!—You do not, we reply, appear to know anything about the nature of good and evil works; for this is a matter to be learned from the *Sāstra*. The *Sāstra* is constituted by the aggregate of words called *Veda*, which is handed on by an endless unbroken succession of pupils learning from qualified teachers, and raised above all suspicion of imperfections such as spring from mistake and the like. It is the *Veda* which gives information as to good and evil deeds, the essence of which consists in their pleasing or displeasing the Supreme Person, and as to their results, viz. pleasure and pain, which depend on the grace or wrath of the Lord. In agreement herewith the *Dramidākārya* says, ‘From the wish of giving rise to fruits they seek to please the Self with works; he being pleased is able to bestow fruits, this is the purport of the *Sāstra*.’ Thus *Sruti* also says, ‘Sacrifices and pious works which are performed in many forms, all that he bears (i. e. he takes to himself); he the navel of the Universe’ (*Mahānār. Up. I, 6*). And in the same spirit the Lord

himself declares, 'From whom there proceed all beings, by whom all this is pervaded—worshipping him with the proper works man attains to perfection' (Bha. Gī. XVIII, 46); and 'These evil and malign haters, lowest of men, I hurl perpetually into transmigrations and into demoniac wombs' (Bha. Gī. XVI, 19). The divine Supreme Person, all whose wishes are eternally fulfilled, who is all-knowing and the ruler of all, whose every purpose is immediately realised, having engaged in sport befitting his might and greatness and having settled that work is of a twofold nature, such and such works being good and such and such being evil, and having bestowed on all individual souls bodies and sense-organs capacitating them for entering on such work and the power of ruling those bodies and organs; and having himself entered into those souls as their inner Self abides within them, controlling them as an animating and cheering principle. The souls, on their side, endowed with all the powers imparted to them by the Lord and with bodies and organs bestowed by him, and forming abodes in which he dwells, apply themselves on their own part, and in accordance with their own wishes, to works either good or evil. The Lord, then, recognising him who performs good actions as one who obeys his commands, blesses him with piety, riches, worldly pleasures, and final release; while him who transgresses his commands he causes to experience the opposites of all these. There is thus no room whatever for objections founded on deficiency, on the Lord's part, of independence in his dealings with men, and the like. Nor can he be arraigned with being pitiless or merciless. For by pity we understand the inability, on somebody's part, to bear the pain of others, coupled with a disregard of his own advantage. When pity has the effect of bringing about the transgression of law on the part of the pitying person, it is in no way to his credit; it rather implies the charge of unmanliness (weakness), and it is creditable to control and subdue it. For otherwise it would follow that to subdue and chastise one's enemies is something to be blamed. What the Lord himself aims at is ever to increase happiness to the highest degree, and to this end it is instrumental that

he should reprove and reject the infinite and intolerable mass of sins which accumulates in the course of beginning and endless aeons, and thus check the tendency on the part of individual beings to transgress his laws. For thus he says : ' To them ever devoted, worshipping me in love, I give that means of wisdom by which they attain to me. In mercy only to them, dwelling in their hearts, do I destroy the darkness born of ignorance with the brilliant light of knowledge' (Bha. Gī. X, 10, 11).—It thus remains a settled conclusion that the Pradhāna, which is not guided by an intelligent principle, cannot be the general cause.—Here a further objection is raised. Although Prakṛiti, as not being ruled by an intelligent principle, is not capable of that kind of activity which springs from effort, she may yet be capable of that kind of activity which consists in mere transformation. For we observe parallel cases ; the grass and water e.g. which are consumed by a cow change on their own account into milk. In the same way, then, Prakṛiti may on her own account transform herself into the world.—To this the next Sūtra replies.

4. Nor like grass and so on ; because (milk) does not exist elsewhere.

This argumentation does not hold good ; for as grass and the like do not transform themselves without the guidance of an intelligent principle, your proving instance is not established.—But why is it not established ?—' Because it does not exist elsewhere.' If grass, water and so on changed into milk even when consumed by a bull or when not consumed at all, then indeed it might be held that they change without the guidance of an intelligent principle. But nothing of the kind takes place, and hence we conclude that it is the intelligent principle only which turns the grass eaten by the cow into milk.—This point has been set forth above under Sūtra 3 ; the present Sūtra is meant to emphasise and particularise it.

5. And if you say—as the man and the stone ; thus also.

Here the following view might be urged. Although the soul consists of mere intelligence and is inactive, while the Pradhāna is destitute of all power of thought ; yet the non-sentient Pradhāna may begin to act owing to the mere nearness of the soul. For we observe parallel instances. A man blind but capable of motion may act in some way, owing to the nearness to him of some lame man who has no power of motion but possesses good eyesight and assists the blind man with his intelligence. And through the nearness of the magnetic stone iron moves. In the same way the creation of the world may result from the connexion of Prakṛiti and the soul. As has been said, ' In order that the soul may know the Pradhāna and become isolated, the connexion of the two takes place like that of the lame and the blind ; and thence creation springs ' (Sāṅkhya Kā. 21). This means—to the end that the soul may experience the Pradhāna, and for the sake of the soul's emancipation, the Pradhāna enters on action at the beginning of creation, owing to the nearness of the soul.

To this the Sūtra replies ' thus also.' This means—the inability of the Pradhāna to act remains the same, in spite of these instances. The lame man is indeed incapable of walking, but he possesses various other powers—he can see the road and give instructions regarding it ; and the blind man, being an intelligent being, understands those instructions and directs his steps accordingly. The magnet again possesses the attribute of moving towards the iron and so on. The soul on the other hand, which is absolutely inactive, is incapable of all such changes. As, moreover, the mere nearness of the soul to the Pradhāna is something eternal, it would follow that the creation also is eternal. If, on the other hand, the soul is held to be eternally free, then there can be no bondage and no release.

6. And on account of the impossibility of the relation of principal (and subordinate) matter.

You Sāṅkhyas maintain that the origination of the world results from a certain relation between principal and subordinate entities which depends on the relative inferiority

and superiority of the *gunas*—‘according to the difference of the abodes of the several *gunas*’ (Sāṅkhya Kā. I, 16).

But, as in the *pralaya* state the three *gunas* are in a state of equipoise, none of them being superior or inferior to the others, that relation of superiority and subordination cannot then exist, and hence the world cannot originate. Should it, on the other hand, be maintained that even in the *pralaya* state there is a certain inequality, it would follow therefrom that creation is eternal.

7. And if another inference be made (the result remains unchanged), on account of (the *Pradhāna*) being destitute of the power of a knowing subject.

Even if the *Pradhāna* were inferred by some reasoning different from the arguments so far refuted by us, our objections would remain in force because, anyhow, the *Pradhāna* is devoid of the power of a cognising subject. The *Pradhāna* thus cannot be established by any mode of inference.

8. And even if it be admitted ; on account of the absence of a purpose.

Even if it were admitted that the *Pradhāna* is established by Inference, the Sāṅkhya theory could not be accepted for the reason that the *Pradhāna* is without a purpose. For, according to the view expressed in the passage, ‘In order that the soul may know the *Pradhāna* and become isolated’ (Sāṅkhya Kā. I, 21), the purpose of the *Pradhāna* is fruition and final release on the part of the soul ; but both these are impossible. For, as the soul consists of pure intelligence, is inactive, changeless, and spotless, and hence eternally emancipated, it is capable neither of fruition which consists in consciousness of *Prakṛiti*, nor of Release which consists in separation from *Prakṛiti*. If, on the other hand, it be held that the soul constituted as described is, owing to the mere nearness of *Prakṛiti*, capable of fruition, i.e. of being conscious of pleasure and pain, which are special modifications of *Prakṛiti*, it follows that, as *Prakṛiti* is ever near, the soul will never accomplish emancipation.

9. And (it is) objectionable on account of the contradictions.

The Sāṅkhya-system, moreover, labours from many internal contradictions.—The Sāṅkhyas hold that while Prakṛiti is for the sake of another and the object of knowledge and fruition, the soul is independent, an enjoying and knowing agent, and conscious of Prakṛiti; that the soul reaches isolation through the instrumentality of Prakṛiti only, and that as its nature is pure, permanent, unchanging consciousness, absence of all activity and isolation belong to that nature; that for this reason the accomplishing of the means of bondage and release and of release belong to Prakṛiti only; and that, owing to Prakṛiti's proximity to the unchanging non-active soul, Prakṛiti, by a process of mutual superimposition (adhyāsa), works towards the creation of a world and subserves the purposes of the soul's fruition and emancipation.—'Since the aggregate of things is for the sake of another; since there is an opposite of the three guṇas and the rest; since there is superintendence; since there is an experiencing subject; and since there is activity for the sake of isolation; the soul exists' (Sāṅkhya Kā. 17); 'And from that contrast the soul is proved to be a witness, isolated, neutral, cognising, and inactive' (18).—And after having stated that the activity of the Pradhāna is for the purpose of the release of the Self, the text says, 'therefore no (soul) is either bound or released, nor does it migrate; it is Prakṛiti, which, abiding in various beings, is bound and released and migrates' (62). And 'From this connexion therewith (i.e. with the soul) the non-intelligent appears as intelligent; and although all agency belongs to the guṇas, the indifferent (soul) becomes an agent. In order that the soul may know the Pradhāna and become isolated, the connexion of the two takes place like that of the lame and the blind; and thence creation springs' (20, 21).—Now to that which is eternally unchanging, non-active and isolated, the attributes of being a witness and an enjoying and cognising agent can in no way belong. Nor also can such a being be subject to error resting on

superimposition ; for error and superimposition both are of the nature of change. And, on the other hand, they also cannot belong to Prakṛiti, since they are attributes of intelligent beings. For by superimposition we understand the attribution, on the part of an intelligent being, of the qualities of one thing to another thing ; and this is the doing of an intelligent being, and moreover a change. Nor is it possible that superimposition and the like should take place in the soul only if it is in approximation to Prakṛiti. —They may take place just on account of the non-changing nature of the soul !—Then, we reply, they would take place permanently. And that mere proximity has no effective power we have already shown under II, 1, 4. And if it is maintained that it is Prakṛiti only that migrates, is bound and released, how then can she be said to benefit the soul, which is eternally released ? That she does so the Sāṅkhyas distinctly assert, ‘By manifold means Prakṛiti, helpful and endowed with the *guṇas*, without any benefit to herself, accomplishes the purpose of the soul, which is thankless and not composed of the *guṇas*’ (Sāṅkhya Kā. 60).—The Sāṅkhyas further teach that Prakṛiti, on being seen by any soul in her true nature, at once retires from that soul —‘As a dancer having exhibited herself on the stage withdraws from the soul, so Prakṛiti withdraws from the soul when she has manifested herself to it’ (59) ; ‘My opinion is that there exists nothing more sensitive than Prakṛiti, who knowing “I have been seen” does not again show itself to the soul’ (61). But this doctrine also is inappropriate. For, as the soul is eternally released and above all change, it never sees Prakṛiti, nor does it attribute to itself her qualities ; and Prakṛiti herself does not see herself since she is of non-intelligent nature ; nor can she wrongly impute to herself the soul’s seeing of itself as her own seeing of herself, for she herself is non-intelligent and the soul is incapable of that change which consists in seeing or knowing.—Let it then be said that the ‘seeing’ means nothing more than the proximity of Prakṛiti to the soul !—But this also does not help you ; for, as said above, from that there would follow eternal seeing, since the two are in eternal

proximity. Moreover, the ever unchanging soul is not capable of an approximation which does not form an element of its unchanging nature.—Moreover, if you define the seeing as mere proximity and declare this to be the cause of Release, we point out that it equally is the cause of bondage—so that bondage and release would both be permanent.—Let it then be said that what causes bondage is wrong seeing—while intuition of the true nature of things is the cause of Release !—But as both these kinds of seeing are nothing but proximity, it would follow that both take place permanently. And if, on the other hand, the proximity of Soul and Prakṛiti were held not to be permanent, then the cause of such proximity would have to be assigned, and again the cause of that, and so on *ad infinitum*.—Let us then, to escape from these difficulties, define proximity as nothing more than the true nature of soul and Prakṛiti !—As the true nature is permanent, we reply, it would follow therefrom that bondage and release would be alike permanent.—On account of all these contradictory views the system of the Sāṅkhyas is untenable.

We finally remark that the arguments here set forth by us at the same time prove the untenableness of the view of those who teach that there is an eternally unchanging Brahman whose nature is pure, non-differenced intelligence, and which by being conscious of Nescience experiences unreal bondage and release. For those philosophers can show no more than the Sāṅkhyas do how their Brahman can be conscious of Nescience, can be subject to adhyāsa, and so on. There is, however, the following difference between the two theories. The Sāṅkhyas, in order to account for the definite individual distribution of birth, death, and so on, assume a plurality of souls. The Vedāntins, on the other hand, do not allow even so much, and their doctrine is thus all the more irrational. The assertion that there is a difference (in favour of the Vedāntins) between the two doctrines, in so far as the Vedāntins hold Prakṛiti to be something unreal, while the Sāṅkhyas consider it to be real, is unfounded ; for pure, homogeneous intelligence, eternally non-changing, cannot possibly be conscious of anything

different from itself, whether it be unreal or real. And if that thing is held to be unreal, there arise further difficulties, owing to its having to be viewed as the object of knowledge, of refutation, and so on.

Here terminates the *adhikarâṇa* of 'the impossibility of construction.'

10. Or in the same way as the big and long from the short and the atomic.

We have shown that the theory of the *Pradhâna* being the universal cause is untenable, since it rests on fallacious arguments, and suffers from inner contradictions. We shall now prove that the view of atoms constituting the universal cause is untenable likewise. 'Or in the same way as the big and long from the short and the atomic.'—'Is untenable' must be supplied from the preceding *Sûtra*; 'or' has to be taken in the sense of 'and.' The sense of the *Sûtra* is—in the same way as the big and long, i.e. as the theory of ternary compounds originating from the short and the atomic, i.e. from binary compounds and simple atoms is untenable, so everything else which they (the *Vaiseshikas*) maintain is untenable; or, in other words—as the theory of the world originating from atoms through binary compounds is untenable, so everything else is likewise untenable.—Things consisting of parts, as e.g. a piece of cloth, are produced by their parts, e.g. threads, being joined by means of the six sides which are parts of those parts. Analogously the atoms also must be held to originate binary compounds in the way of combining by means of their six sides; for if the atoms possessed no distinction of parts (and hence filled no space), a group of even a thousand atoms would not differ in extension from a single atom, and the different kinds of extension—minuteness, shortness, bigness, length, &c.—would never emerge. If, on the other hand, it is admitted that the atoms also have distinct sides, they have parts and are made up of those parts, and those parts again are made up of their parts, and so on *in infinitum*.—But, the *Vaiseshika* may object, the difference between a mustard seed and a mountain is due to the paucity of the constituent

parts on the one hand, and their multitude on the other. If, now, it be held that the atom itself contains an infinity of parts, the mustard seed and the mountain alike will contain an infinity of parts, and thus their inequality cannot be accounted for. We must therefore assume that there is a limit of subdivision (i.e. that there are real atoms which do not themselves consist of parts).—Not so, we reply. If the atoms did not possess distinct parts, there could originate no extension greater than the extension of one atom (as already shown), and thus neither mustard seed nor mountain would ever be brought about.—But what, then, are we to do to get out of this dilemma?—You have only to accept the Vedic doctrine of the origination of the world!

Others explain the above Sūtra as meant to refute an objection against the doctrine of Brahman being the general cause. But this does not suit the arrangement of the Sūtras, and would imply a meaningless iteration. The objections raised by some against the doctrine of Brahman have been disposed of in the preceding pāda, and the present pāda is devoted to the refutation of other theories. And that the world admits of being viewed as springing from an intelligent principle such as Brahman was shown at length under II, 1, 4. The sense of the Sūtra, therefore, is none other than what we stated above.—But what are those other untenable views to which the Sūtra refers?—To this question the next Sūtra replies.

11. On both assumptions also there is no motion, and thence non-being (of the origination of the world).

The atomic theory teaches that the world is produced by the successive formation of compounds, binary, ternary, and so on, due to the aggregation of atoms—such aggregation resulting from the motion of the atoms. The primary motion of the atoms—which are the cause of the origination of the entire world—is assumed to be brought about by the unseen principle (*adrishṭa*), ‘The upward flickering of fire, the sideway motion of air, the primary motion on the part

of atoms and of the manas are caused by the unseen principle.'—Is then, we ask, this primary motion of the atoms caused by an *adrishṭa* residing in them, or by an *adrishṭa* residing in the souls? Neither alternative is possible. For the unseen principle which is originated by the good and evil deeds of the individual souls cannot possibly reside in the atoms; and if it could, the consequence would be that the atoms would constantly produce the world. Nor again can the *adrishṭa* residing in the souls be the cause of motion originating in the atoms.—Let it then be assumed that motion originates in the atoms, owing to their being in contact with the souls in which the *adrishṭa* abides!—If this were so, we reply, it would follow that the world would be permanently created, for the *adrishṭa* of the souls forms an eternal stream.—But the *adrishṭa* requires to be matured in order to produce results. The *adrishṭas* of some souls come to maturity in the same state of existence in which the deeds were performed; others become mature in a subsequent state of existence only; and others again do not become mature before a new Kalpa has begun. It is owing to this dependence on the maturation of the *adrishṭas* that the origination of the world does not take place at all times.—But this reasoning also we cannot admit. For there is nothing whatever to establish the conclusion that all the different *adrishṭas* which spring from the manifold actions performed at different times, without any previous agreement, by the infinite multitude of individual Selfs should reach a state of uniform maturation at one and the same moment of time (so as to give rise to a new creation). Nor does this view of yours account for the fact of the entire world being destroyed at the same time, and remaining in a state of non-maturation for the period of a *dviparârdha*.—Nor can you say that the motion of the atoms is due to their conjunction with (souls whose) *adrishṭa* possesses certain specific qualities imparted to them by the will of the Lord; for by mere inference the existence of a Lord cannot be proved, as we have shown under I, 1.

The origin of the world cannot, therefore, be due to any action on the part of the atoms.

12. And because owing to the acknowledgment of samavāya, there results a *regressus in infinitum* from equality.

The Vaiseshika doctrine is further untenable on account of the acknowledgment of samavāya.—Why so?—Because the samavāya also, like part, quality, and generic characteristics, requires something else to establish it, and that something else again requires some further thing to establish it—from which there arises an infinite regress. To explain. The Vaiseshikas assume the so-called samavāya relation, defining it as ‘that connexion which is the cause of the idea “this is here,” in the case of things permanently and inseparably connected, and standing to each other in the relation of abode and thing abiding in the abode.’ Now, if such a samavāya relation is assumed in order to account for the fact that things observed to be inseparably connected—as, e.g., class characteristics are inseparably connected with the individuals to which they belong—are such, i.e. inseparably connected, a reason has also to be searched for why the samavāya, which is of the same nature as those things (in so far, namely, as it is also inseparably connected with the things connected by it), is such; and for that reason, again, a further reason has to be postulated, and so on, *in infinitum*. Nor can it be said that inseparable connexion must be assumed to constitute the essential nature of samavāya (so that no further reason need be demanded for its inseparable connexion); for on this reasoning you would have to assume the same essential nature for class characteristics, qualities, and so on (which would render the assumption of a samavāya needless for them also). Nor is it a legitimate proceeding to postulate an unseen entity such as the samavāya is, and then to assume for it such and such an essential nature.—These objections apply to the samavāya whether it be viewed as eternal or non-eternal. The next Sūtra urges a further objection against it if viewed as eternal.

13. And because (the world also) would thus be eternal.

The samavāya is a relation, and if that relation is eternal that to which the relation belongs must also be eternal, so that we would arrive at the unacceptable conclusion that the world is eternal.

14. And on account of (the atoms) having colour and so on, the reverse (takes place); as it is observed.

From the view that the atoms of four kinds—viz. of earth or water or fire or air—possess colour, taste, smell, and touch, it would follow that the atoms are non-eternal, gross, and made up of parts—and this is the reverse of what the Vaiśeṣikas actually teach as to their atoms, viz. that they are eternal, subtle, and not made up of parts. For things possessing colour, e.g. jars, are non-eternal, because it is observed that they are produced from other causes of the same, i.e. non-eternal nature, and so on. To a non-perceived thing which is assumed in accordance with what is actually perceived, we may not ascribe any attributes that would be convenient to us; and it is in accordance with actual experience that you Vaiśeṣikas assume the atoms to possess colour and other qualities. Hence your theory is untenable.—Let it then, in order to avoid this difficulty, be assumed that the atoms do not possess colour and other sensible qualities. To this alternative the next Sūtra refers.

15. And as there are objections in both cases.

A difficulty arises not only on the view of the atoms having colour and other sensible qualities, but also on the view of their being destitute of those qualities. For as the qualities of effected things depend on the qualities of their causes, earth, water, and so on, would in that case be destitute of qualities. And if to avoid this difficulty, it be held that the atoms do possess qualities, we are again met by the difficulty stated in the preceding Sūtra. Objections thus arising in both cases, the theory of the atoms is untenable.

16. And as it is not accepted, it is altogether disregarded.

Kapila's doctrine, although to be rejected on account of its being in conflict with Scripture and sound reasoning, yet recommends itself to the adherents of the Veda on some accounts—as e.g. its view of the existence of the effect in the cause. Kaṇāda's theory, on the other hand, of which no part can be accepted and which is totally destitute of proof, cannot but be absolutely disregarded by all those who aim at the highest end of man.—Here terminates the adhikaraṇa of 'the big and long.'

17. Even on the aggregate with its two causes, there is non-establishment of that.

We so far have refuted the Vaiseshikas, who hold the doctrine of atoms constituting the general cause. Now the followers of Buddha also teach that the world originates from atoms, and the Sūtras therefore proceed to declare that on their view also the origination, course, and so on, of the world cannot rationally be accounted for. These Bauddhas belong to four different classes. Some of them hold that all outward things, which are either elements (bhūta) or elemental (bhautika), and all inward things which are either mind (kitta) or mental (kaitta),—all these things consisting of aggregates of the atoms of earth, water, fire and air—are proved by means of Perception as well as Inference. Others hold that all external things, earth, and so on, are only to be inferred from ideas (vignāna). Others again teach that the only reality are ideas to which no outward things correspond; the (so-called) outward things are like the things seen in dreams. The three schools mentioned agree in holding that the things admitted by them have a momentary existence only, and do not allow that, in addition to the things mentioned, viz. elements and elemental things, mind and mental things, there are certain further independent entities such as ether, Self, and so on.—Others finally assert a universal void, i.e. the non-reality of everything.

The Sūtras at first dispose of the theory of those who acknowledge the real existence of external things. Their opinion is as follows. The atoms of earth which possess the qualities of colour, taste, touch and smell; the atoms of water which possess the qualities of colour, taste and touch; the atoms of fire which possess the qualities of colour and touch; and the atoms of air which possess the quality of touch only, combine so as to constitute earth, water, fire and air; and out of the latter there originate the aggregates called bodies, sense-organs, and objects of sense-organs. And that flow of ideas, which assumes the form of the imagination of an apprehending agent abiding within the body, is what constitutes the so-called Self. On the agencies enumerated there rests the entire empiric world.— On this view the Sūtra remarks, ‘Even on the aggregate with its two causes, there is non-establishment of that.’ That aggregate which consists of earth and the other elements and of which the atoms are the cause; and that further aggregate which consists of bodies, sense-organs and objects, and of which the elements are the cause—on neither of these two aggregates with their twofold causes can there be proved establishment of that, i. e. can the origination of that aggregate which we call the world be rationally established. If the atoms as well as earth and the other elements are held to have a momentary existence only, when, we ask, do the atoms which perish within a moment, and the elements, move towards combination, and when do they combine? and when do they become the objects of states of consciousness? and when do they become the abodes of the activities of appropriation, avoidance and so on (on the part of agents)? and what is the cognising Self? and with what objects does it enter into contact through the sense-organs? and which cognising Self cognises which objects, and at what time? and which Self proceeds to appropriate which objects, and at what time? For the sentient subject has perished, and the object of sensation has perished; and the cognising subject has perished, and the object cognised has perished. And how can one subject cognise what has been appre-

hended through the senses of another? and how is one subject to take to itself what another subject has cognised? And should it be said that each stream of cognitions is one (whereby a kind of unity of the cognising subject is claimed to be established), yet this affords no sufficient basis for the ordinary notions and activities of life, since the stream really is nothing different from the constituent parts of the stream (all of which are momentary and hence discrete).— That in reality the Ego constitutes the Self and is the knowing subject, we have proved previously.

18. If it be said that (this) is to be explained through successive causality; we say 'no,' on account of their not being the causes of aggregation.

'If it be said that through the successive causality of Nescience and so on, the formation of aggregates and other matters may be satisfactorily accounted for.' To explain. Although all the entities (acknowledged by the Bauddhas) have a merely momentary existence, yet all that is accounted for by avidyā. Avidyā means that conception, contrary to reality, by which permanency, and so on, are ascribed to what is momentary, and so on. Through avidyā there are originated desire, aversion, &c., which are comprised under the general term 'impression' (*samskāra*); and from those there springs cognition (*viṣṇāna*) which consists in the 'kindling' of mind; from that mind (*kitta*) and what is of the nature of mind (*kaitta*) and the substances possessing colour, and so on, viz. earth, water, &c. From that again the six sense-organs, called 'the six abodes'; from that the body, called 'touch' (*sparsa*); from that sensation (*vedanā*), and so on. And from that again avidyā, and the whole series as described; so that there is an endlessly revolving cycle, in which avidyā, and so on, are in turn the causes of the links succeeding them. Now all this is not possible without those aggregates of the elements and elemental things which are called earth, and so on; and thereby the rationality of the formation of those aggregates is proved.

To this the second half of the Sūtra replies 'Not so, on

account of (their) not being the causes of aggregation.¹ This cannot rationally be assumed, because avidyā, and so on, cannot be operative causes with regard to the aggregation of earth and the other elements and elemental things. For avidyā, which consists in the view of permanency and so on, belonging to what is non-permanent, and desire, aversion and the rest, which are originated by avidyā, cannot constitute the causes of (other) momentary things entering into aggregation; not any more than the mistaken idea of shell-silver is the cause of the aggregation of things such as shells. Moreover, on the Bauddha doctrine, he who views a momentary thing as permanent himself perishes at the same moment; who then is the subject in whom the so-called *samskāras*, i. e. desire, aversion, and so on, originate? Those who do not acknowledge one permanent substance constituting the abode of the *samskāras* have no right to assume the continuance of the *samskāras*.

19. And on account of the cessation of the preceding one on the origination of the subsequent one.

For the following reason also the origination of the world cannot be accounted for on the view of the momentariness of all existence. At the time when the subsequent momentary existence originates, the preceding momentary existence has passed away, and it cannot therefore stand in a causal relation towards the subsequent one. For if non-existence had causal power, anything might originate at any time at any place.—Let it then be said that what constitutes a cause is nothing else but existence in a previous moment.—But, if this were so, the previous momentary existence of a jar, let us say, would be the cause of all things whatever that would be met with in this threefold world in the subsequent moment—cows, buffaloes, horses, chairs, stones, &c.!—Let us then say that a thing existing in a previous moment is the cause only of those things, existing in the subsequent moment, which belong to the same species.—But from this again it would follow that one jar existing in the previous moment would be the cause of all jars, to be met with in any place, existing in

the following moment !—Perhaps you mean to say that one thing is the cause of one subsequent thing only. But how then are we to know which thing is the cause of which one subsequent thing?—Well then I say that the momentarily existing jar which exists in a certain place is the cause of that one subsequent momentary jar only which exists at the very same place !—Very good, then you hold that a place is something permanent ! (while yet your doctrine is that there is nothing permanent).—Moreover as, on your theory, the thing which has entered into contact with the eye or some other sense-organ does no longer exist at the time when the idea originates, nothing can ever be the object of a cognition.

20. There not being (a cause), there results contradiction of the admitted principle ; otherwise simultaneousness.

If it be said that the effect may originate even when a cause does not exist, then—as we have pointed out before—anything might originate anywhere and at any time. And not only would the origination of the effect thus remain unexplained, but an admitted principle would also be contradicted. For you hold the principle that there are four causes bringing about the origination of a cognition, viz. the adhipati-cause, the sahakāri-cause, the ālambhana-cause, and the samanantara-cause. The term adhipati denotes the sense-organs.—And if, in order to avoid opposition to an acknowledged principle, it be assumed that the origination of a further momentary jar takes place at the time when the previous momentary jar still exists, then it would follow that the two momentary jars, the causal one and the effected one, would be perceived together ; but as a matter of fact they are not so perceived. And, further, the doctrine of general momentariness would thus be given up. And should it be said that (this is not so, but that) momentariness remains, it would follow that the connexion of the sense-organ with the object and the cognition are simultaneous.

21. There is non-establishment of pratisaṅkhyā

and apratisaṅkhyā destruction, on account of non-interruption.

So far the hypothesis of origination from that which is not has been refuted. The present Sūtra now goes on to declare that also the absolute (niranvaya) destruction of that which is cannot rationally be demonstrated. Those who maintain the momentariness of all things teach that there are two kinds of destruction, one of a gross kind, which consists in the termination of a series of similar momentary existences, and is capable of being perceived as immediately resulting from agencies such as the blow of a hammer (breaking a jar, e.g.); and the other of a subtle kind, not capable of being perceived, and taking place in a series of similar momentary existences at every moment. The former is called pratisaṅkhyā-destruction; the latter apratisaṅkhyā-destruction.—Both these kinds of destruction are not possible.—Why?—On account of the non-interruption, i.e. on account of the impossibility of the complete destruction of that which is. The impossibility of such destruction was proved by us under II, 1, 14, where we showed that origination and destruction mean only the assumption of new states on the part of one and the same permanent substance, and therefrom proved the non-difference of the effect from the cause.—Here it may possibly be objected that as we see that a light when extinguished passes away absolutely, such absolute destruction may be inferred in other cases also. But against this we point out that in the case of a vessel of clay being smashed we perceive that the material, i.e. clay, continues to exist, and that therefrom destruction is ascertained to be nothing else but the passing over of a real substance into another state. The proper assumption, therefore, is that the extinguished light also has passed over into a different state, and that in that state it is no longer perceptible may be explained by that state being an extremely subtle one.

22. And on account of the objections presenting themselves in either case.

It has been shown that neither origination from nothing, as held by the advocates of general momentariness, is possible; nor the passing away into nothing on the part of the thing originated. The acknowledgment of either of these views gives rise to difficulties. If the effect originates from nothing, it is itself of the nature of nothing; for it is observed that effects share the nature of what they originate from. Pitchers and ornaments, e.g. which are produced from clay and gold respectively, possess the nature of their causal substances. But you hold yourself that the world is not seen to be of the nature of nothingness; and certainly it is not observed to be so.—Again, if that which is underwent absolute destruction, it would follow that after one moment the entire world would pass away into nothingness; and subsequently the world again originating from nothingness, it would follow that, as shown above, it would itself be of the nature of nothingness (i. e. there would no longer be a *real* world).—There being thus difficulties on both views, origination and destruction cannot take place as described by you.

23. And in the case of space also, on account of there being no difference.

In order to prove the permanency of external and internal things, we have disproved the view that the two forms of destruction called *pratisaṅkhyā* and *apratisaṅkhyā* mean reduction of an existing thing to nothing. This gives us an opportunity to disprove the view of Ether (space) being likewise a mere irrational non-entity, as the Bauddhas hold it to be. Ether cannot be held to be a mere irrational non-entity, because, like those things which are admitted to be positive existences, i. e. earth, and so on, it is proved by consciousness not invalidated by any means of proof. For the formation of immediate judgments such as 'here a hawk flies, and there a vulture,' implies our being conscious of ether as marking the different places of the flight of the different birds. Nor is it possible to hold that Space is nothing else but the non-existence (*abhāva*) of earth, and so on; for this view collapses as soon as set

forth in definite alternatives. For whether we define Space as the antecedent and subsequent non-existence of earth, and so on, or as their mutual non-existence, or as their absolute non-existence—on none of these alternatives we attain the proper idea of Space. If, in the first place, we define it as the antecedent and subsequent non-existence of earth, and so on, it will follow that, as the idea of Space can thus not be connected with earth and other things existing at the present moment, the whole world is without Space.

If, in the second place, we define it as the mutual non-existence of earth, and so on, it will follow that, as such mutual non-existence inheres in the things only which stand towards each other in the relation of mutual non-existence, there is no perception of Space in the intervals between those things (while as a matter of fact there is). And, in the third place, absolute non-existence of earth, and so on, cannot of course be admitted. And as non-existence (*abhāva*) is clearly conceived as a special state of something actually existing, Space even if admitted to be of the nature of *abhāva*, would not on that account be a futile non-entity (something '*tukṣṇa*' or '*nirupākhyā*').

24. And on account of recognition.

We return to the proof of the, previously mooted, permanence of things. The '*anusmṛiti*' of the Sūtra means cognition of what was previously perceived, i. e. recognition. It is a fact that all things which were perceived in the past may be recognised, such recognition expressing itself in the form 'this is just that (I knew before).' Nor must you say that this is a mere erroneous assumption of oneness due to the fact of the thing now perceived being similar to the thing perceived before, as in the case of the flame (where a succession of flames continually produced anew is mistaken for one continuous flame); for you do not admit that there is one permanent knowing subject that could have that erroneous idea. What one person has perceived, another cannot judge to be the same as, or similar to, what he is perceiving himself. If therefore you hold that there is an erroneous

idea of oneness due to the perception of similarity residing in different things perceived at different times, you necessarily must acknowledge oneness on the part of the cognising subject. In the case of the flame there is a valid means of knowledge to prove that there really is a succession of similar flames, but in the case of the jar, we are not aware of such a means, and we therefore have no right to assume that recognition is due to the similarity of many successive jars.—Perhaps you will here argue as follows. The momentariness of jars and the like is proved by Perception as well as Inference. Perception in the first place presents as its object the present thing which is different from non-present things, in the same way as it presents the blue thing as different from the yellow; it is in this way that we know the difference of the present thing from the past and the future. Inference again proceeds as follows—jars and the like are momentary because they produce effects and have existence (*sattva*); what is non-momentary, such as the horn of a hare, does not produce effects and does not possess existence. We therefore conclude from the existence of the last momentary jar that the preceding jar-existences also are perishable, just because they are momentary existences like the existence of the last jar.—But both this perception and this inference have already been disproved by what was said above about the impossibility of momentary existences standing to one another in the relation of cause and effect. Moreover, that difference of the present object from the non-present object which is intimated by Perception does not prove the present object to be a different *thing* (from the past object of Perception), but merely its being connected with the present time. This does not prove it to be a different thing, for the same thing can be connected with different times. The two reasons again which were said to prove the momentariness of jars are invalid because they may be made to prove just the contrary of what they are alleged to prove. For we may argue as follows—From existence and from their having effects it follows that jars, and so on, are permanent; for whatever is non-permanent, is non-existent, and does

not produce effects, as e.g. the horn of a hare. The capacity of producing effects can in fact be used only to prove non-momentariness on the part of jars, and so on; for as things perishing within a moment are not capable of acting, they are not capable of producing effects. Further, as it is seen in the case of the last momentary existence that its destruction is due to a visible cause (viz. the blow of a hammer or the like), the proper conclusion is that also the other momentary jars (preceding the last one) require visible causes for their destruction; and (as no such causes are seen, it follows that) the jar is permanent and continuous up to the time when a destructive cause, such as the blow of a hammer, supervenes. Nor can it be said that hammers and the like are not the causes of destruction, but only the causes of the origination of a new series of momentary existences dissimilar to the former ones—in the case of the jar, e.g. of a series of momentary fragments of a jar; for we have proved before that the destruction of jars, and so on, means nothing but their passing over into a different condition, e.g. that of fragments. And even if destruction were held to be something different from the origination of fragments, it would yet be reasonable to infer, on the ground of immediate succession in time, that the cause of the destruction is the blow of the hammer.

Hence it is impossible to deny in any way the permanency of things as proved by the fact of recognition. He who maintains that recognition which has for its object the oneness of a thing connected with successive points of time has for its objects different things, might as well say that several cognitions of, let us say, blue colour have for their object something different from blue colour. Moreover, for him who maintains the momentariness of the cognising subject and of the objects of cognition, it would be difficult indeed to admit the fact of Inference which presupposes the ascertainment and remembrance of general propositions. He would in fact not be able to set forth the reason required to prove his assertion that things are momentary; for the speaker perishes in the very moment when he states the proposition to be proved, and another person is unable to

complete what has been begun by another and about which he himself does not know anything.

25. Not from non-entity, this not being observed.

So far we have set forth the arguments refuting the views of the Vaibhāṣikas as well as the Sautrāntikas—both which schools maintain the reality of external things.—Now the Sautrāntika comes forward and opposes one of the arguments set forth by us above, viz. that, on the view of general momentariness, nothing can ever become an object of cognition, since the thing which enters into connexion with the sense-organ is no longer in existence when the cognition originates.—It is not, he says, the persistence of the thing up to the time of cognition which is the cause of its becoming an object of cognition. To be an object of cognition means nothing more than to be the cause of the origination of cognition. Nor does this definition imply that the sense-organs also are the objects of cognition. For a cause of cognition is held to be an object of cognition only in so far as it imparts to the cognition its own form (and this the sense-organs do not). Now even a thing that has perished may have imparted its form to the cognition, and on the basis of that form, blue colour, and so on, the thing itself is inferred. Nor can it be said (as the Yogācāras do) that the form of subsequent cognitions is due to the action of previous cognitions (and not to the external thing); for on this hypothesis it could not be explained how in the midst of a series of cognitions of blue colour there all at once arises the cognition of yellow colour. The manifold character of cognitions must therefore be held to be due to the manifold character of real things.—To this we reply 'not from non-entity; this not being observed.' The special forms of cognition, such as blue colour, and so on, cannot be the forms of things that have perished, and therefore are not in Being, since this is not observed. For it is not observed that when a substrate of attributes has perished, its attributes pass over into another thing. (Nor can it be said that the thing that perished leaves in cognition a reflection of itself, for) reflections also are only of

persisting things, not of mere attributes. We therefore conclude that the manifoldness of cognitions can result from the manifoldness of things only on the condition of the thing persisting at the time of cognition.—The Sūtras now set forth a further objection which applies to both schools.

26. And thus there would be accomplishment on the part of non-active people also.

Thus, i.e. on the theory of universal momentariness, origination from the non-existent, causeless cognition, and so on, it would follow that persons also not making any efforts may accomplish all their ends. It is a fact that the attainment of things desired and the warding off of things not desired is effected through effort, and so on. But if all existences momentarily perish, a previously existing thing, or special attributes of it, such as after-effects (through which Svarga and the like are effected) or knowledge (through which Release is effected) do not persist, and hence nothing whatever can be accomplished by effort. And as thus all effects would be accomplished without a cause, even perfectly inert men would accomplish all the ends to be reached in this and in the next life, including final release.—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of 'the aggregates.'

27. Not non-existence, on account of consciousness.

Here now come forward the *Yogācāras*, who hold that cognitions (ideas) only are real. There is no reasonable ground, they say, for the view that the manifoldness of ideas is due to the manifoldness of things, since ideas themselves—no less than the things assumed by others—have their distinct forms, and hence are manifold. And this manifold nature of Ideas is sufficiently explained by so-called *vāsanā*. *Vāsanā* means a flow of ideas (states of consciousness—*pratyaya*) of different character. We observe, e.g., that a cognition which has the form of a jar (i.e. the idea of a jar) gives rise to the cognition of the two halves of a jar, and is itself preceded and produced by the cognition of a jar, and this again by a similar cognition,

and so on ; this is what we call a stream or flow of ideas.— But how, then, is it that internal cognitions have the forms of external things, mustard-grains, mountains, and so on ? —Even if real things are admitted, the *Yogākāra* replies, their becoming objects of thought and speech depends altogether on the light of knowledge, for otherwise it would follow that there is no difference between the objects known by oneself and those known by others. And that cognitions thus shining forth to consciousness have forms (distinctive characteristics) must needs be admitted ; for if they were without form they could not shine forth. Now we are conscious only of one such form, viz. that of the cognition ; that this form at the same time appears to us as something external (i.e. as the form of an outward thing) is due to error. From the general law that we are conscious of ideas and things together only, it follows that the thing is not something different from the idea.

As, moreover, the fact of one idea specially representing one particular thing only, whether it be a jar or a piece of cloth or anything else, requires for its explanation an equality in character of the idea and the thing, those also who hold the existence of external things must needs assume that the idea has a form similar to that of the thing ; and as this suffices for rendering possible practical thought and intercourse, there is nothing authorising us to assume the existence of things in addition to the ideas. Hence cognitions only constitute reality ; external things do not exist.

To this the *Sūtra* replies, 'Not non-existence, on account of consciousness.' The non-existence of things, apart from ideas, cannot be maintained, because we are conscious of cognitions as what renders the knowing subject capable of thought and intercourse with regard to particular *things*. For the consciousness of all men taking part in worldly life expresses itself in forms such as 'I know the jar.' Knowledge of this kind, as everybody's consciousness will testify, presents itself directly as belonging to a knowing subject and referring to an object ; those therefore who

attempt to prove, on the basis of this very knowledge, that Reality is constituted by mere knowledge, are fit subjects for general derision. This point has already been set forth in detail in our refutation of those crypto-Baudhas who take shelter under a pretended Vedic theory.—To maintain, as the Yogācāras do, that the general rule of idea and thing presenting themselves together proves the non-difference of the thing from the idea, implies a self-contradiction; for 'going together' can only be where there are different things. To hold that it is a general rule that of the idea—the essential nature of which is to make the thing to which it refers capable of entering into common thought and intercourse—we are always conscious together with the thing, and then to prove therefrom that the thing is not different from the idea, is a laughable proceeding indeed. And as, according to you, cognitions perish absolutely, and do not possess any permanently persisting aspect, it is rather difficult to prove that such cognitions form a series in which each member colours or affects the next one (*vāsanā*); for how is the earlier cognition, which has absolutely perished, to affect the later one, which has not yet arisen? We conclude therefore that the manifoldness of cognitions is due solely to the manifoldness of things. We are directly conscious of cognitions (ideas) as rendering the things to which they refer capable of being dealt with by ordinary thought and speech, and the specific character of each cognition thus depends on the relation which connects it with a particular thing. This relation is of the nature of conjunction (*samyoga*), since knowledge (cognition) also is a substance. Just as light (*prabhā*), although a substance, stands to the lamp in the relation of an attribute (*guṇa*), so knowledge stands in the relation of an attribute to the Self, but, viewed in itself, it is a substance.—From all this it follows that external things are not non-existent.

The next Sūtra refutes the opinion of those who attempt to prove the baselessness of the cognitions of the waking state by comparing them to the cognitions of a dreaming person.

28. And on account of difference of nature (they are) not like dreams.

Owing to the different nature of dream-cognitions, it cannot be said that, like them, the cognitions of the waking state also have no things to correspond to them. For dream-cognitions are originated by organs impaired by certain defects, such as drowsiness, and are moreover sublated by the cognitions of the waking state; while the cognitions of the waking state are of a contrary nature. There is thus no equality between the two sets.—Moreover, if all cognitions are empty of real content, you are unable to prove what you wish to prove since your inferential cognition also is devoid of true content. If, on the other hand, it be held to have a real content, then it follows that no cognition is devoid of such content; for all of them are alike cognitions, just like the inferential cognition.

29. The existence (is) not, on account of the absence of perception.

The existence of mere cognitions devoid of corresponding things is not possible, because such are nowhere perceived. For we nowhere perceive cognitions not inherent in a cognising subject and not referring to objects. That even dream-cognitions are not devoid of real matter we have explained in the discussion of the different *khyātis* (above, p. 118).—Here terminates the *adhikarana* of '*perception*.'

30. And on account of its being unproved in every way.

Here now come forward the *Mādhyamikas* who teach that there is nothing but a universal Void. This theory of a universal Nothing is the real purport of Sugata's doctrine; the theories of the momentariness of all existence, &c., which imply the acknowledgment of the reality of things, were set forth by him merely as suiting the limited intellectual capacities of his pupils.—Neither cognitions nor external objects have real existence; the Void (the '*Nothing*') only constitutes Reality, and final Release means passing over into Non-being.

This is the real view of Buddha, and its truth is proved by the following considerations. As the Nothing is not to be proved by any argument, it is self-proved. For a cause has to be assigned for that only which *is*. But what *is* does not originate either from that which is or that which is not. We never observe that which is to originate from Being; for things such as jars, and so on, do not originate as long as the lump of clay, &c., is non-destroyed. Nor can Being originate from Non-being; for if the jar were supposed to originate from Non-being, i. e. that non-being which results from the destruction of the lump of clay, it would itself be of the nature of Non-being. Similarly it can be shown that nothing can originate either from itself or from anything else. For the former hypothesis would imply the vicious procedure of the explanation presupposing the thing to be explained; and moreover no motive can be assigned for a thing originating from itself. And on the hypothesis of things originating from other things, it would follow that anything might originate from anything, for all things alike are *other* things. And as thus there is no origination there is also no destruction. Hence the *Nothing* constitutes Reality: origination, destruction, Being, Non-being, and so on, are mere illusions (bhrānti). Nor must it be said that as even an illusion cannot take place without a substrate we must assume something real to serve as a substrate; for in the same way as an illusion may arise even when the defect, the abode of the defect, and the knowing subject are unreal, it also may arise even when the substrate of the illusion is unreal. Hence the *Nothing* is the only reality.—To this the Sūtra replies, 'And on account of its being in every way unproved'—the theory of general Nothingness which you hold cannot stand. Do you hold that everything is being or non-being, or anything else? On none of these views the Nothingness maintained by you can be established. For the terms *being* and *non-being* and the ideas expressed by them are generally understood to refer to particular states of actually *existing* things only. If therefore you declare 'everything is nothing,' your declaration is equiva-

lent to the declaration, 'everything is being,' for your statement also can only mean that everything that *exists* is capable of abiding in a certain condition (which you call 'Nothing'). The absolute Nothingness you have in mind cannot thus be established in any way. Moreover, he who tries to establish the tenet of universal Nothingness can attempt this in so far only as, through some means of knowledge, he has come to know Nothingness, and he must therefore acknowledge the truth of that means. For if it were not true it would follow that everything is real. The view of general Nothingness is thus altogether incapable of proof.—Here terminates the *adhikāraṇa* of 'unprovedness in every way.'

31. Not so, on account of the impossibility in one.

The Bauddhas have been refuted. As now the Gainas also hold the view of the world originating from atoms and similar views, their theory is reviewed next.—The Gainas hold that the world comprises souls (*gīva*), and non-souls (*agīva*), and that there is no Lord. The world further comprises six substances (*dravya*), viz. souls (*gīva*), merit (*dharma*), demerit (*adharma*), bodies (*pudgala*), time (*kāla*), and space (*ākāśa*). The souls are of three different kinds—bound (in the state of bondage), perfected by Yoga (*Yogasiddha*), and released (*mukta*). 'Merit' is that particular world-pervading substance which is the cause of the motion of all things moving; 'demerit' is that all-pervading substance which is the cause of stationariness, 'Body' is that substance which possesses colour, smell, taste, and touch. It is of two kinds, atomic or compounded of atoms; to the latter kind belong wind, fire, water, earth, the bodies of living creatures, and so on. 'Time' is a particular atomic substance which is the cause of the current distinction of past, present, and future. 'Space' is one, and of infinite extent. From among these substances those which are not atomic are comprehended under the term 'the five *astikāyas* (existing bodies)'—the *astikāya* of souls, the *astikāya* of merit, the *astikāya* of demerit, the *astikāya* of matter, the *astikāya* of space. This term '*astikāya*' is applied to

substances occupying several parts of space.—They also use another division of categories which subserves the purpose of Release; distinguishing souls, non-souls, influx (*âsrava*), bondage, *nirgara*, *saṃvara*, and Release. *Release* comprises the means of Release also, viz. perfect knowledge, good conduct, and so on. The soul is that which has knowledge, seeing, pleasure, strength (*virya*) for its qualities. Non-soul is the aggregate of the things enjoyed by the souls. 'Influx' is whatever is instrumental towards the souls having the fruition of objects, viz. the sense-organs, and so on.—Bondage is of eight different kinds, comprising the four *ghâtikarman*, and the four *aghâtikarman*. The former term denotes whatever obstructs the essential qualities of the soul, viz. knowledge, intuition, strength, pleasure; the latter whatever causes pleasure, pain, and indifference, which are due to the persistence of the wrong imagination that makes the soul identify itself with its body.—'Decay' means the austerities (*tapas*), known from the teaching of the Arhat, which are the means of Release.—*Samvara* is such deep meditation (*Samādhi*) as stops the action of the sense-organs.—Release, finally, is the manifestation of the Self in its essential nature, free from all afflictions such as passion, and so on.—The atoms which are the causes of earth and the other compounds, are not, as the *Vaisheshikas* and others hold, of four different kinds, but have all the same nature; the distinctive qualities of earth, and so on, are due to a modification (*pariṇâma*) of the atoms. The *Gainas* further hold that the whole complex of things is of an ambiguous nature in so far as being existent and non-existent, permanent and non-permanent, separate and non-separate. To prove this they apply their so-called *sapta-bhaṅgī-nyāya* ('the system of the seven paralogisms')—'May be, it is'; 'May be, it is not'; 'May be, it is and is not'; 'May be, it is not predicable'; 'May be, it is and is not predicable'; 'May be, it is not, and is not predicable'; 'May be, it is and is not, and is not predicable.' With the help of this they prove that all things—which they declare to consist of substance (*dravya*), and *paryāya*—to be existing, one and permanent

in so far as they are substances, and the opposite in so far as they are paryāyas. By paryāya they understand the particular states of substances, and as those are of the nature of Being as well as Non-being, they manage to prove existence, non-existence, and so on.—With regard to this the Sūtra remarks that no such proof is possible, 'Not so, on account of the impossibility in one'; i. e. because contradictory attributes such as existence and non-existence cannot at the same time belong to one thing, not any more than light and darkness. As a substance and particular states qualifying it—and (by the Gainas), called paryāya—are different things (padārtha), one substance cannot be connected with opposite attributes. It is thus not possible that a substance qualified by one particular state, such as existence, should at the same time be qualified by the opposite state, i. e. non-existence. The non-permanency, further, of a substance consists in its being the abode of those particular states which are called origination and destruction; how then should permanency, which is of an opposite nature, reside in the substance at the same time? Difference (bhinnatva) again consists in things being the abodes of contradictory attributes; non-difference, which is the opposite of this, cannot hence possibly reside in the same things which are the abode of difference; not any more than the generic character of a horse and that of a buffalo can belong to one animal. We have explained this matter at length, when—under Sūtra I, 1—refuting the bhedābheda-theory. Time we are conscious of only as an attribute of substances (not as an independent substance), and the question as to its being and non-being, and so on, does not therefore call for a separate discussion. To speak of time as being and non-being in no way differs from generic characteristics (gāti), and so on, being spoken of in the same way; for—as we have explained before—of gāti and the like we are conscious only as attributes of substances.—But (the Gaina may here be supposed to ask the Vedāntin), how can you maintain that Brahman, although one only, yet at the same time is the Self of all?—Because, we reply, the whole aggregate of sentient and non-sentient

beings constitutes the body of the Supreme Person, omniscient, omnipotent, and so on. And that the body and the person embodied and their respective attributes are of totally different nature (so that Brahman is not touched by the defects of his body), we have explained likewise.—Moreover, as your six substances, soul, and so on, are not one substance and one paryāya, their being one substance, and so on, cannot be used to prove their being one and also not one, and so on.—And if it should be said that those six substances are such (viz. one and several, and so on), each owing to its own paryāya and its own nature, we remark that then you cannot avoid contradicting your own theory of everything being of an ambiguous nature. Things which stand to each other in the relation of mutual non-existence cannot after all be identical.—Hence the theory of the *Gainas* is not reasonable. Moreover it is liable to the same objections which we have above set forth as applying to all theories of atoms constituting the universal cause, without the guidance of a Lord.

33. And likewise non-entireness of the Self.

On your view there would likewise follow non-entireness of the Self. For your opinion is that souls abide in numberless places, each soul having the same size as the body which it animates. When, therefore, the soul previously abiding in the body of an elephant or the like has to enter into a body of smaller size, e.g. that of an ant, it would follow that as the soul then occupies less space, it would not remain entire, but would become incomplete.—Let us then avoid this difficulty by assuming that the soul passes over into a different state—which process is called paryāya,—which it may manage because it is capable of contraction and dilatation.—To this the next *Sūtra* replies.

34. Nor also is there non-contradiction from paryāya ; on account of change, and so on.

Nor is the difficulty to be evaded by the assumption of the soul assuming a different condition through contraction or dilatation. For this would imply that the soul is subject

to change, and all the imperfections springing from it, viz. non-permanence, and so on, and hence would not be superior to non-sentient things such as jars and the like.

35. And on account of the endurance of the final (size), and the (resulting) permanency of both ; there is no difference.

The final size of the soul, i. e. the size it has in the state of Release, is enduring since the soul does not subsequently pass into another body ; and both, i. e. the soul in the state of Release and the size of that soul, are permanent (nitya). From this it follows that that ultimate size is the true essential size of the soul and also belongs to it previously to Release. Hence there is no difference of sizes, and the soul cannot therefore have the size of its temporary bodies. The Ārhatta theory is therefore untenable.—Here terminates the adhikaraṇa of 'the impossibility in one.'

36. (The system) of the Lord (must be disregarded), on account of inappropriateness.

So far it has been shown that the doctrines of Kapila, Kaṇāda, Sugata, and the Arhat must be disregarded by men desirous of final beatitude ; for those doctrines are all alike untenable and foreign to the Veda. The Sūtras now declare that, for the same reasons, the doctrine of Paśupati also has to be disregarded. The adherents of this view belong to four different classes—Kāpālas, Kālāmukhas, Pāsupatas, and Saivas. All of them hold fanciful theories of Reality which are in conflict with the Veda, and invent various means for attaining happiness in this life and the next. They maintain the general material cause and the operative cause to be distinct, and the latter cause to be constituted by Paśupati. They further hold the wearing of the six so-called 'mudrā' badges and the like to be means to accomplish the highest end of man.

Thus the Kāpālas say, 'He who knows the true nature of the six mudrās, who understands the highest mudrā, meditating on himself as in the position called bhagāsana, reaches Nirvāṇa. The necklace, the golden ornament, the

earring, the head-jewel, ashes, and the sacred thread are called the six mudrās. He whose body is marked with these is not born here again.'—Similarly the Kālamukhas teach that the means for obtaining all desired results in this world as well as the next are constituted by certain practices—such as using a skull as a drinking vessel, smearing oneself with the ashes of a dead body, eating the flesh of such a body, carrying a heavy stick, setting up a liquor-jar and using it as a platform for making offerings to the gods, and the like. 'A bracelet made of Rudrāksha-seeds on the arm, matted hair on the head, a skull, smearing oneself with ashes, &c.'—all this is well known from the sacred writings of the Saivas. They also hold that by some special ceremonial performance men of different castes may become Brāhmaṇas and reach the highest āsrama: 'by merely entering on the initiatory ceremony (dikṣhā) a man becomes a Brāhmaṇa at once; by undertaking the kâpāla rite a man becomes at once an ascetic.'

With regard to these views the Sūtra says 'of pati, on account of inappropriateness.' A 'not' has here to be supplied from Sūtra 32. The system of Paśupati has to be disregarded because it is inappropriate, i.e. because the different views and practices referred to are opposed to one another and in conflict with the Veda. The different practices enumerated above, the wearing of the six mudrās and so on, are opposed to each other; and moreover the theoretical assumptions of those people, their forms of devotion and their practices, are in conflict with the Veda. For the Veda declares that Nārāyaṇa who is the highest Brahman is alone the operative and the substantial cause of the world, 'Nārāyaṇa is the highest Brahman, Nārāyaṇa is the highest Reality, Nārāyaṇa is the highest light, Nārāyaṇa is the highest Self'; 'That thought, may I be many, may I grow forth' (*Kā. Up. VI, 2, 3*); 'He desired, may I be many, may I grow forth' (*Taitt. Up. II, 6, 1*), and so on. In the same way the texts declare meditation on the Supreme Person, who is the highest Brahman, to be the only meditation which effects final release; cp. 'I know that great Person of sunlike lustre beyond the

darkness. A man who knows him passes over death ; there is no other path to go' (Svet. Up. III, 8). And in the same way all texts agree in declaring that the works subserving the knowledge of Brahman are only those sacrificial and other works which the Veda enjoins on men in the different castes and stages of life : 'Him Brāhmaṇas seek to know by the study of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts, by penance, by fasting. Wishing for that world only, mendicants wander forth from their homes' (Bṛi. Up. XI, 4, 22). In some texts enjoining devout meditation, and so on, we indeed meet with terms such as Pragāpati, Siva, Indra, Ākāśa, Prāṇa, &c., but that these all refer to the supreme Reality established by the texts concerning Nārāyaṇa—the aim of which texts it is to set forth the highest Reality in its purity—, we have already proved under I, 1, 30. In the same way we have proved under Sū. I, 1, 2 that in texts treating of the creation of the world, such as 'Being only this was in the beginning,' and the like, the words *Being*, *Brahman*, and so on, denote nobody else but Nārāyaṇa, who is set forth as the universal creator in the account of creation given in the text, 'Alone indeed there was Nārāyaṇa, not Brahmā, not Iśāna—he being alone did not rejoice' (Mahopaniṣad I).—As the Paśupati theory thus teaches principles, meditations and acts conflicting with the Veda, it must be disregarded.

37. And on account of the impossibility of rulership.

Those who stand outside the Veda arrive through inference at the conclusion that the Lord is a mere operative cause. This being so, they must prove the Lord's being the ruler (of the material cause) on the basis of observation. But it is impossible to prove that the Lord is the ruler of the Pradhāna in the same way as the potter e.g. is the ruler of the clay. For the Lord is without a body, while the power of ruling material causes is observed only in the case of embodied beings such as potters. Nor may you have recourse to the hypothesis of the Lord being embodied ; for—as we have shown under I, 1, 3—there arise

difficulties whether that body, which as body must consist of parts, be viewed as eternal or as non-eternal.

38. If you say, as in the case of the organs ; we deny this, on account of enjoyment and so on.

It may possibly be said that, in the same way as the enjoying (individual) soul, although in itself without a body, is seen to rule the sense-organs, the body, and so on, the great Lord also, although without a body, may rule the Pradhāna. But this analogy cannot be allowed 'on account of enjoyment,' and so on. The body's being ruled by the soul is due to the unseen principle in the form of good and evil works, and has for its end the requital of those works. Your analogy would thus imply that the Lord also is under the influence of an unseen principle, and is requited for his good and evil works.—The Lord cannot therefore be a ruler.

39. Finiteness or absence of omniscience.

'Or' here has the sense of 'and.' If the Lord is under the influence of the *adṛiṣṭa*, it follows that, like the individual soul, he is subject to creation, dissolution, and so on, and that he is not omniscient. The *Parupati* theory cannot therefore be accepted.—It is true that the *Sūtra*, 'but in case of conflict (with Scripture) it is not to be regarded' (*Pū. Mī. Sū. I, 3, 3*), has already established the non-acceptability of all views contrary to the *Veda* ; the present *adhikāraṇa*, however, raises this question again in order specially to declare that the *Parupati* theory *is* contrary to the *Veda*. Although the *Pāsupata* and the *Saiva* systems exhibit some features which are not altogether contrary to the *Veda*, yet they are unacceptable because they rest on an assumption contrary to the *Veda*, viz. of the difference of the general, instrumental and material causes, and imply an erroneous interchange of higher and lower entities.—Here terminates the *adhikāraṇa* of '*Parupati*.'

40. On account of the impossibility of origination.
The *Sūtras* now proceed to refute a further doubt, viz.

that the *Pañkarātra* tantra—which sets forth the means of attaining supreme beatitude, as declared by the Lord (Bhagavat)—may also be destitute of authority, in so far, namely, as belonging to the same class as the tantras of Kapila and others. The above Sūtra raises the doubt.

The theory of the *Bhāgavatas* is that from *Vāsudeva*, who is the highest Brahman and the highest cause, there originates the individual soul called *Saṅkarshana*; from *Saṅkarshana* the internal organ called *Pradyumna*; and from *Pradyumna* the principle of egoity called *Aniruddha*. Now this theory implies the origination of the individual soul, and this is contrary to Scripture. For scriptural texts declare the soul to be without a beginning—cp. 'the intelligent one is not born and does not die' (*Ka. Up. II, 18*), and other texts.

41. And there is not (origination) of the instrument from the agent..

'The internal organ called *Pradyumna* originates from *Saṅkarshana*,' i.e. the internal organ originates from the individual soul which is the agent. But this is inadmissible, since the text 'from him there is produced breath, mind, and all sense-organs' (*Mu. Up. II, 1, 3*) declares that the mind also springs from none else but the highest Brahman. As the *Bhāgavata* doctrine thus teaches things opposed to Scripture, its authoritativeness cannot be admitted.—Against these objections the next Sūtra declares itself.

42. Or, if they are of the nature of that which is knowledge and so on, there is no contradiction to that (i.e. the *Bhāgavata* doctrine).

The 'or' sets aside the view previously maintained. By 'that which is knowledge and so on'¹ we have to understand the highest Brahman. If *Saṅkarshana*, *Pradyumna*, and *Aniruddha* are of the nature of the highest Brahman, then truly there can be no objection to a body of doctrine

¹ Or 'by that which is knowledge and cause.'

which sets forth this relation. The criticism that the Bhāgavatas teach an inadmissible origination of the individual soul, is made by people who do not understand that system. What it teaches is that the highest Brahman, there called Vāsudeva, from kindness to those devoted to it, voluntarily abides in a fourfold form, so as to render itself accessible to its devotees. Thus it is said in the Paushkara-saṁhitā, 'That which enjoins that Brāhmaṇas have to worship, under its proper names, the fourfold nature of the Self; that is the authoritative doctrine.' That this worship of that which is of a fourfold nature means worship of the highest Brahman, called Vāsudeva, is declared in the Sātvata-saṁhitā, 'This is the supreme śāstra, the great Brahmopanishad, which imparts true discrimination to Brāhmaṇas worshipping the real Brahman under the name of Vāsudeva.' That highest Brahman, called Vāsudeva, having for its body the complete aggregate of the six qualities, divides itself in so far as it is either the 'Subtle' (sūkshma), or 'division' (vyūha), or 'manifestation' (vibhava), and is attained in its fulness by the devotees who, according to their qualifications, do worship to it by means of works guided by knowledge. 'From the worship of the vibhava-aspect one attains to the vyūha, and from the worship of the vyūha one attains to the "Subtle" called Vāsudeva, i.e. the highest Brahman'—such is their doctrine. By the 'vibhava' we have to understand the aggregate of beings, such as Rāma, Kṛishṇa, &c., in whom the highest Being becomes manifest; by the 'vyūha' the fourfold arrangement or division of the highest Reality, as Vāsudeva, Saṅkarshana, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha; by the 'Subtle' the highest Brahman itself, in so far as it has for its body the mere aggregate of the six qualities—as which it is called 'Vāsudeva.' Compare on this point the Paushkara, 'That body of doctrine through which, by means of works based on knowledge, one fully attains to the imperishable highest Brahman, called Vāsudeva,' and so on. Saṅkarshana, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha are thus mere bodily forms which the highest Brahman voluntarily assumes. Scripture already declares, 'Not born he is born

in many ways,' and it is this birth—consisting in the voluntary assumption of bodily form, due to tenderness towards its devotees—which the Bhāgavata system teaches ; hence there lies no valid objection to the authoritativeness of that system. And as Saṅkarshana, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha are the beings ruling over the individual souls, internal organs and organs of egoity, there can be no objection to their being themselves denoted by those latter terms, viz. individual soul, and so on. The case is analogous to that of Brahman being designated, in some texts, by terms such as ether, breath, and the like.

43. And on account of contradiction.

The origination of the *gīva* is, moreover, distinctly controverted in the books of the Bhāgavatas also. Thus in the Parama-saṁhitā 'The nature of Prakṛiti consists therein that she is non-sentient, for the sake of another, eternal, ever-changing, comprising within herself the three guṇas, and constituting the sphere of action and experience for all agents. With her the soul (puruṣha) is connected in the way of inseparable association ; that soul is known to be truly without beginning and without end.' And as all Saṁhitās make similar statements as to the eternity of the soul, the Pāñkarātra doctrine manifestly controverts the view of the essential nature of the *gīva* being something that originates. How it is possible that in the Veda as well as in common life the soul is spoken of as being born, dying, &c., will be explained under Sū. II, 3, 17. The conclusion, therefore, is that the Bhāgavata system also denies the origination of the soul, and that hence the objections raised on this ground against its authoritativeness are without any force. Another objection is raised by some. Sāṁdilya, they argue, is said to have promulgated the Pāñkarātra doctrine because he did not find a sure basis for the highest welfare of man in the Veda and its auxiliary disciplines, and this implies that the Pāñkarātra is opposed to the Veda.—This objection, we reply, springs from nothing else but the mere unreasoning faith of men who do not possess the faintest knowledge

of the teachings of the Veda, and have never considered the hosts of arguments which confirm that teaching. When the Veda says, 'Morning after morning those speak untruth who make the Agnihotra offering before sunrise,' it is understood that the censure there passed on the offering before sunrise is really meant to glorify the offering after sunrise. We meet with a similar case in the 'bhûma-vidyâ' (*Kṛ. Up. VII, 2*). There at the beginning Nârada says, 'I know the *Rîg-veda*, the *Yagur-veda*, the *Sâma-veda*, the *Âtharvâna* as the fourth, the *Itihâsa-purâna* as the fifth,' and so on, enumerating all the various branches of knowledge, and finally summing up 'with all this I know the mantras only, I do not know the Self.' Now this declaration of the knowledge of the Self not being attainable through any branch of knowledge except the knowledge of the Bhûman evidently has no other purpose but to glorify this latter knowledge, which is about to be expounded. Or else Nârada's words refer to the fact that from the Veda and its auxiliary disciplines he had not obtained the knowledge of the highest Reality. Analogous to this is the case of *Sândilya's* alleged objection to the Veda. That the Bhâgavata doctrine is meant to facilitate the understanding of the sense of the Veda which by itself is difficult of comprehension, is declared in the *Parama-samhitâ*, 'I have read the Vedas at length, together with all the various auxiliary branches of knowledge. But in all these I cannot see a clear indication, raised above all doubt, of the way to blessedness, whereby I might reach perfection'; and 'The wise Lord Hari, animated by kindness for those devoted to him, extracted the essential meaning of all the Vedânta-texts and condensed it in an easy form.' The incontrovertible fact then is as follows. The Lord who is known from the Vedânta-texts, i.e. Vâsudeva, called there the highest Brahman—who is antagonistic to all evil, whose nature is of uniform excellence, who is an ocean, as it were, of unlimited exalted qualities, such as infinite intelligence, bliss, and so on, all whose purposes come true—perceiving that those devoted to him, according as they are differently placed in the four castes and the

four stages of life, are intent on the different ends of life, viz. religious observances, wealth, pleasure, and final release; and recognising that the Vedas—which teach the truth about his own nature, his glorious manifestations, the means of rendering him propitious and the fruits of such endeavour—are difficult to fathom by all beings other than himself, whether gods or men, since those Vedas are divided into *R̥k*, *Yagus*, *Sāman*, and *Atharvan*; and being animated by infinite pity, tenderness, and magnanimity; with a view to enable his devotees to grasp the true meaning of the Vedas, himself composed the *Pañkarātra-sāstra*. The author of the *Sūtras* (*Vyāsa*)—who first composed the *Sūtras*, the purport of which it is to set forth the arguments establishing the Vedānta doctrine, and then the *Bhārata-saṃhitā* (i.e. the *Mahābhārata*) in a hundred thousand slokas in order to support thereby the teaching of the Veda—himself says in the chapter called *Mokshadharma*, which treats of knowledge, ‘If a householder, or a *Brahmakārin*, or a hermit, or a mendicant wishes to achieve success, what deity should he worship?’ and so on; explains then at great length the *Pañkarātra* system, and then says, ‘From the lengthy *Bhārata* story, comprising one hundred thousand slokas, this body of doctrine has been extracted, with the churning-staff of mind, as butter is churned from curds—as butter from milk, as the *Brāhmaṇa* from men, as the *Āraṇyaka* from the Vedas, as *Amṛita* from medicinal herbs.—This great Upanishad, consistent with the four Vedas, in harmony with *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga*, was called by him by the name of *Pañkarātra*. This is excellent, this is Brahman, this is supremely beneficial. Fully agreeing with the *R̥k*, the *Yagus*, the *Sāman*, and the *Atharvāṅgiras*, this doctrine will be truly authoritative.’ The terms *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga* here denote the concentrated application of knowledge and of works. As has been said, ‘By the application of knowledge on the part of the *Sāṅkhya*, and of works on the part of the *Yogins*.’ And in the *Bhīṣmaparvan* we read, ‘By *Brāhmaṇas*, *Kshatriyas*, *Vaiśyas* and *Sūdras*, *Mādhava* is to be honoured, served and worshipped—he who was proclaimed by *Saṅkarshana*

in agreement with the Sātvata law.'—How then could these utterances of Bādarāyana, the foremost among all those who understand the teaching of the Veda, be reconciled with the view that in the Sūtras he maintains the non-authoritativeness of the Sātvata doctrine, the purport of which is to teach the worship of, and meditation on, Vāsudeva, who is none other than the highest Brahman known from the Vedānta-texts?

But other passages in the Mahābhārata, such as 'There is the Sāṅkhya, the Yoga, the Pañkarātra, the Vedas, and the Pāsupata doctrine; do all these rest on one and the same basis, or on different ones?' and so on, declare that the Sāṅkhya and other doctrines also are worthy of regard, while yet in the Sārīraka Sūtras those very same doctrines are formally refuted. Why, therefore, should not the same hold good in the case of the Bhāgavata doctrine?—Not so, we reply. In the Mahābhārata also Bādarāyana applies to the Sāṅkhya and other doctrines the same style of reasoning as in the Sūtras. The question, asked in the passage quoted, means 'Do the Sāṅkhya, the Yoga, the Pāsupata, and the Pañkarātra set forth one and the same reality, or different ones? If the former, what is that reality? If the latter, they convey contradictory doctrines, and, as reality is not something which may be optionally assumed to be either such or such, one of those doctrines only can be acknowledged as authoritative, and the question then arises which is to be so acknowledged?'—The answer to the question is given in the passage beginning, 'Know, O royal Sage, all those different views. The promulgator of the Sāṅkhya is Kapila,' &c. Here the human origin of the Sāṅkhya, Yoga, and Pāsupata is established on the ground of their having been produced by Kapila, Hiranyagarbha, and Paśupati. Next the clause 'Aparāntatamas is said to be the teacher of the Vedas' intimates the non-human character of the Vedas; and finally the clause 'Of the whole Pañkarātra, Nārāyaṇa himself is the promulgator' declares that Nārāyaṇa himself revealed the Pañkarātra doctrine. The connected purport of these different clauses is as follows. As the systems

of human origin set forth doctrines mutually contradictory, and, moreover, teach what is in conflict with the matter known from the Veda—which, on account of its non-human character, is raised above all suspicion of error and other imperfections—they cannot be accepted as authoritative with regard to anything not depending on human action and choice. Now the matter to be known from the Veda is Nārāyaṇa, who is none other than the highest Brahman. It hence follows that the entities set forth in those different systems—the pradhāna, the soul (puruṣa), Paśupati, and so on—have to be viewed as real only in so far as Nārāyaṇa, i.e. the highest Brahman, as known from the Vedānta-texts, constitutes their Self. This the text directly declares in the passage, ‘In all those doctrines it is seen, in accordance with tradition and reasoning, that the lord Nārāyaṇa is the only basis.’ This means—‘To him who considers the entities set forth in those systems with the help of argumentation, it is evident that Nārāyaṇa alone is the basis of all those entities.’ In other words, as the entities set forth in those systems are not Brahman, any one who remembers the teaching of texts such as ‘all this indeed is Brahman,’ ‘Nārāyaṇa is all,’ which declare Brahman to be the Self of all, comes to the conclusion that Nārāyaṇa alone is the basis of those entities. As thus it is settled that the highest Brahman, as known from the Vedānta-texts, or Nārāyaṇa, himself is the promulgator of the entire Pañkarātra, and that this system teaches the nature of Nārāyaṇa and the proper way of worshipping him, none can disestablish the view that in the Pañkarātra all the other doctrines are comprised. For this reason the Mahābhārata says, ‘Thus the Sāṅkhya-yoga and the Veda and the Āraṇyaka, being members of one another, are called the Pañkarātra,’ i.e. the Sāṅkhya, the Yoga, the Vedas, and the Āraṇyakas, which are members of one another because they are one in so far as aiming at setting forth one Truth, together are called the Pañkarātra.—The Sāṅkhya explains the twenty-five principles, the Yoga teaches certain practices and means of mental concentration, and the Āraṇyakas teach that all the subordinate

principles have their true Self in Brahman, that the mental concentration enjoined in the Yoga is a mode of meditation on Brahman, and that the rites and works which are set forth in the Veda are means to win the favour of Brahman—thus giving instruction as to Brahman's nature. Now all these elements, in their inward connexion, are clearly set forth in the *Pañkarātra* by the highest Brahman, i.e. *Nārāyaṇa*, himself. The *Sāriraka Sāstra* (i.e. the *Vedānta*) does not disprove the principles assumed by the *Sāṅkhyas*, but merely the view of their not having Brahman for their Self; and similarly in its criticism on the Yoga and *Pāsupata* systems, it merely refutes the view of the Lord being a mere instrumental cause, the erroneous assumptions as to the relative position of higher and lower entities, and certain practices not warranted by the Veda; but it does not reject the Yoga itself, nor again the lord *Paśupati*. Hence *Smṛiti* says, 'The *Sāṅkhya*, the Yoga, the *Pañkarātra*, the *Vedas*, and the *Pāsupata* doctrine—all these having their proof in the Self may not be destroyed by arguments.' The essential points in all these doctrines are to be adopted, not to be rejected absolutely as the teaching of *Gina* or *Sugata* is to be rejected. For, as said in the *Smṛiti* text quoted above, 'in all those doctrines it is seen, according to tradition and reasoning, that the lord *Nārāyaṇa* is the only basis.'—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of 'the impossibility of origination.'

THIRD PĀDA.

1. Not Ether; on account of the absence of scriptural statement.

We have demonstrated that the Sāṅkhya-system and other systems standing outside the Veda are untenable since they rest on fallacious reasoning and are self-contradictory. In order to prove that our own view is altogether free from all objections of this kind, we shall now explain in detail the mode in which this world, with all its sentient and non-sentient beings, is produced by Brahman, whom we hold to be the general creator.

The first doubt here presenting itself is whether Ether be something produced or not.—The Pūrvapakshin maintains that it is not produced, since there is no scriptural statement to that effect. A scriptural statement may be expected with regard to what is possible; but what is impossible—as e.g. the origination of a sky-flower or of Ether—cannot possibly be taught by Scripture. For the origination of Ether, which is not made up of parts and is all pervasive, cannot be imagined in any way. For this very reason, i.e. the impossibility of the thing, the *Khândogya*, in its account of creation, mentions the origination of fire, water, &c. only (but not of Ether)—‘It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth,’ ‘It sent forth fire,’ and so on. When therefore the *Taittirīya*, the *Ātharvāna*, and other texts tell us that Ether did originate—‘From that Self sprang Ether’ (*Taitt. Up. II, 1*); ‘From him is born breath, mind, and all organs of sense, Ether, air, light, water,’ &c. (*Mu. Up. II, 1, 4*)—such statements are contrary to sense, and hence refute themselves.—To this the *Sūtra* replies.

2. But there is.

But there is origination of Ether. For Scripture, which is concerned with matters transcending sense perception, is able to establish the truth even of the origination of Ether, although this be not proved by other means of knowledge.

And in a matter known from Scripture a contradictory inference, such as that Ether cannot originate because it is without parts, is not of sufficient force. That the non-originatedness of the Self also does not rest on its being without parts will be shown further on.—Here the Pûrvapakshin raises an objection.

3. It has a secondary sense, on account of impossibility and of the text.

It is reasonable to assume that in passages such as 'From that Self there sprang Ether,' the origination of Ether is not to be taken in its literal sense; for according to the *Khândogya*-text 'it sent forth fire.' Brahman engaged in creation first produces fire, and fire thus having the first place, the text cannot possibly mean to say that Ether also was produced. Moreover, there is another text, viz. 'Vāyu and antariksha (i. e. Ether), this is the Immortal,' according to which Ether is immortal, i. e. non-produced.—But how can one and the same word, viz. it 'sprang' (i. e. originated), be taken in a metaphorical sense with reference to Ether, and in its literal sense with reference to fire, and so on?—To this the next Sûtra replies.

4. There may be (a double sense) of the one (word), as in the case of the word 'Brahmaṇ.'

Since in the clause 'from that Self there sprang Brahman,' the word 'sprang' cannot be taken in its literal sense, it may be used there in a secondary sense; while the same word as connected with the subsequent clauses 'from Vāyu Agni,' &c., may have its primary sense. This would be analogous to the use of the word Brahman in *Mu. Up. I, 1*. There in the clause 'From him is born that Brahman, name, form, and matter' (9), the word *Brahman* is used in a secondary sense, i. e. denotes the Pradhâna; while in the same chapter, in the clause 'Brahman swells by means of brooding' (8), the same word denotes Brahman in its primary sense. It is true indeed that in this latter case the word 'Brahman' occurs twice; while in the *Taitt. text* the word 'sambhûta' occurs once only, and has to be carried

over from the first clause into the subsequent ones ; but this makes no difference, for, in the case of such carrying over of a word, no less than in the case of actual repetition, the general denotation of the word is repeated.—The next Sūtra refutes this objection.

5. The non-abandonment of the promissory statement (results) from non-difference.

It is not appropriate to assume, from deference to the *Khândogya*-text, a secondary meaning for those other texts also which declare Ether to have originated. For the *Khândogya* itself virtually admits the origination of Ether ; in so far, namely, as the clause ' that by which the non-heard is heard,' &c., declares that through the knowledge of Brahman everything is known. This declaration is not abandoned, i. e. is adhered to, only if the Ether also is an effect of Brahman and thus non-different from it.

6. (As follows also) from (other) texts.

That Ether is an originated thing follows from other clauses also in the *Khândogya* : ' Being only this was in the beginning, one without a second ' affirms the oneness of everything before creation, and ' In that all this has its Self ' implies that everything is an effect of, and hence non-different from, Brahman.—Nor does the statement as to the creation of fire, ' it sent forth fire,' exclude the creation of Ether. For the first place which there is assigned to fire rests only thereon that no mention is made of the creation of Ether, and this has no force to negative the creation of Ether as positively stated in other texts.

7. But the division (origination) extends over all effects ; as in ordinary life.

The ' but ' has the sense of ' and. ' As the clause ' In that all this has its Self ' and similar ones directly state that Ether also is a creation of Brahman, the division, i. e. the origination of Ether from Brahman, is implicitly declared thereby. As in ordinary life. When in ordinary life somebody has said ' all these men are the sons of

Devadatta,' it is known that any particulars which may afterwards be given about the descent of some of them are meant to apply to all.—In accordance with this our conclusion we interpret the text 'Air and Ether, this is the Immortal,' as asserting only that air and Ether continue to exist for a long time, as the Devas do.

8. Hereby air is explained.

The same argumentation explains the origination of air also. That a special Sûtra is devoted to the origination of air—instead of disposing in one Sûtra of Ether and air—is for the sake of Sûtra 10, which states that 'hence (i. e. from air) there originated fire.'

9. But there is non-origination of that which is (only); on account of impossibility.

The 'but' has an affirmative sense. There is non-origination of that which is, i. e. of Brahman only; of whatever is different from Brahman non-origination cannot possibly be established. This means—the origination of Ether and air has been proved only in order to illustrate a general truth. Only that which *is*, i. e. Brahman, which is the general cause, cannot originate. Whatever is other than Brahman, i. e. the entire world comprising the Unevolved, the great principle (mahat), ahankâra, the tanmâtras, the sense-organs, the Ether, the air, and so on, cannot possibly be shown to be non-originated, since its being an effect is proved by the text declaring that everything is known through one thing, and in other ways.—Here terminates the adhikarâṇa of 'the Ether.'

10. Fire (is produced) thence, for thus Scripture declares.

It has been stated that everything different from Brahman is the effect of Brahman. The doubt now arises whether the more remote effects of Brahman originate, each of them, only from that substance which is their immediately antecedent cause or from Brahman in the form of that substance.—The decision is that they originate from those

substances only; for the text 'from air fire' directly states the origination of fire from air.

11. Water (from fire).

Water also originates 'thence,' i. e. from fire; for so the texts declare 'From fire water' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); 'that sent forth water' (*Kh.* Up. VI, 2, 3).

12. Earth (from water).

Earth originates from water; for so the texts declare 'From water earth' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1). 'It (water) sent forth food' (*Kh.* Up. VI, 2, 3). But how can the word 'food' denote earth?—To this the next Sūtra replies.

13. Earth on account of the subject-matter, the colour, and other texts.

That the word 'food' denotes the earth is to be inferred from the fact that the section in which the word occurs has for its subject-matter the creation of the elements; as everything eatable is a product of the earth, the term denoting the effect is there applied to denote the cause. In the same chapter, where the colour of the elements is mentioned ('The red colour of a flame is the colour of fire, the white one that of water, the black one that of food'), the collocation of words clearly shows that 'food' means something of the same kind as fire and water, viz. the elements of earth. And there are other texts also which treat of the same topic and declare the origination of earth from water, cp. Taitt. Up. II, 1, 'from fire sprang water, from water earth.' All this proves that the term 'food' denotes earth, and that hence earth originates from water.

Fire and the other substances, the origination of which has been detailed, are mentioned merely as instances, and it must be understood that also other entities, such as the 'Mahat,' and so on, originate only from the immediately preceding cause, in agreement with scriptural statements. And texts such as 'From him is born breath, mind, and all organs of sense, ether, air, light, water, and the earth, the support of all' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3); 'From him is born that

Brahman, name, form, and food' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); 'From that Self there sprang ether' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); 'It (i. e. that which is) sent forth fire' (Kh. Up. VI, 2, 3)—(which seems to teach the direct origination from Brahman of the different elements, and so on)—may be interpreted on the understanding of Brahman being their mediate cause also.—This *primâ facie* view the next Sûtra disposes of. •

14. But he; from the inferential mark supplied by their reflection.

The 'but' indicates the setting aside of the *primâ facie* view raised. Of all effected things, the *Mahat*, and so on, the highest Person himself, in so far as embodied in the immediately preceding substance, is the direct cause.—How is this known?—'From the inferential mark supplied by the reflection of them.' By 'reflection' the Sûtra means the resolve expressed in the recurring phrase, 'May I be many'; 'That fire thought, may I be many'; 'That water thought, may I be many' (Kh. Up. VI, 2, 3; 4). As these texts declare that there was thought—in the form of a resolve of self-multiplication—which thought can belong to a Self only, we conclude that also the *Mahat*, the *ahankâra*, the Ether, and so on, accomplish the sending forth of their respective effects only after similar thought; and such thought can belong only to the highest Brahman embodied in the *Mahat*, *ahankâra*, and so on. That the highest Brahman is embodied in all beings and constitutes their Self, is directly stated in the *antaryâmin-brâhmaṇa*, 'He who abiding in the earth; abiding in water; abiding in fire,' &c. &c. (*Bṛi.* Up. III, 7, 3 ff.); and likewise in the *Subâla-Up.*, 'Whose body is the earth,' &c. &c., up to 'Whose body is the Unevolved.'—The *Pûrvapakshin* had maintained that the creation, from Brahman, of breath, and so on, which is declared in texts such as 'From him are born breath, mind,' &c., may be understood as a mediate creation. This point is taken up by the next Sûtra.

15. But the order of succession (which is stated) in reverse order (of the true one) is possible, (only

if the origination of all effects is) thence (i.e. from Brahman).

The 'but' has an asseverative sense. The direct origination from Brahman of all effects—which in passages such as the one quoted by the Pûrvapakshin is stated in a form the reverse of the (true) order of origination according to which the Unevolved, the Mahat, the ahañkāra, Ether, and so on, succeed each other—is possible only on the supposition of the origination of each effect being really from Brahman itself in the form of a special causal substance. To understand the causality of Brahman as a merely mediate one would be to contradict all those statements of immediate origination. Texts such as the one quoted thus confirm the conclusion that everything originates from Brahman directly.

16. If it be said that knowledge and mind (which are mentioned) between (breath and the elements) (are stated) in order of succession, owing to an inferential mark of this; we say, not so, on account of non-difference.

'Knowledge' in the Sûtra denotes the means of knowledge, i. e. the sense-organs.—An objection is raised against the conclusion arrived at under the preceding Sûtra. We cannot, the opponent says, admit the conclusion that the passage from the *Mundaka Up.* 'from him is born breath, mind, &c., declares the immediate origination from Brahman of all things, and that hence the passage confirms the view, first suggested by the inferential mark of 'thought' (see above, Sû. 14), that everything springs from Brahman direct. For the purport of the text is to state a certain order of succession, and we hence conclude that all the beings mentioned were successively created. In the second half of the text we recognise the series of ether, air, fire, &c., which is known to us from other texts, and from the fact of their being exhibited in one and the same text we conclude that knowledge and mind—which are mentioned between breath on the one side and the elements on the

other—must be viewed as created in that order. The text therefore in no way confirms the direct origination of everything from Brahman. To this the Sūtra replies, 'Not so, on account of non-difference.' The first words of the text 'from him is born' connect themselves equally with breath, and knowledge, and mind, and the series of elements beginning with ether; and the meaning of the whole therefore is to declare that all the entities spring directly from Brahman, not to teach the order of succession in which they are produced. It moreover cannot have the purport of teaching a certain order of succession, because the order stated contradicts the order established by other scriptural passages; such as the one beginning 'the earth is merged in water,' and ending 'darkness becomes one.' We hence hold to the conclusion that all effects originate from Brahman only, in so far as embodied in the Unevolved, and so on, and that the terms 'fire' and so on denote Brahman, which is the Self of all those substances.—But to interpret all these words as denoting Brahman is to set aside their special denotative power as established by etymology!—To this objection the next Sūtra replies.

17. But that which abides in the things movable and immovable, i.e. the terms denoting those things, are non-secondary (i.e. of primary denotative power, viz. with regard to Brahman); since (their denotative power) is effected by the being of that (i.e. Brahman).

The 'but' sets aside the objection raised. (The *primâ facie* view here is as follows.) As Brahman, which has all things for its modes, is not the object of Perception and the other means of knowledge which give rise to the apprehension of the things only which are Brahman's modes, and as hence, previously to the study of the Vedānta-texts, the idea of that to which the modes belong (i.e. of Brahman) does not arise, and as the knowledge of all words finally denoting Brahman depends on the existence of the idea of that to which the modes belong (i.e. Brahman); all the

individual words are used in worldly language only separately to denote special things. In other words, as the terms 'fire' and so on have denotative power with regard to particular things only, their denotative power with regard to Brahman is secondary, indirect only.—Of this view the Sūtra disposes by saying 'that which abides in the moving and the non-moving,' &c. The meaning is—the terms which abide in, i. e. are connected with, the different moving and non-moving things, and hence denote those things, possess with regard to Brahman a denotative power which is not 'bhākta,' i. e. secondary or figurative, but primary and direct. 'Why so?' Because the denotative power of all words is dependent on the being of Brahman. For this we know from the scriptural passage which tells how names and forms were evolved by Brahman.—Here terminates the adhikaraṇa of 'fire.'

18. Not the Self, on account of scriptural statement, and on account of the eternity (which results) from them.

The Sūtras so far have stated that this entire world, from Ether downwards, originates from the highest Brahman. It now becomes a matter for discussion whether the individual soul also originates in the same way or not.—It does so originate, the Pūrvapakshin maintains. For on this assumption only the scriptural statement as to the cognition of all things through the cognition of one thing holds good, and moreover Scripture declares that before creation everything was one. Moreover, there are texts directly stating that the soul also was produced in the same way as Ether and other created things.

'Pragāpati sent forth all creatures'; 'All these creatures have their root in the True, they abide in the True, they rest on the True' (*Kh. Up.* VI, 8, 6); 'From whence these beings are produced' (*Taitt. Up.* III, 1, 1). As these passages declare the origination of the world inclusive of sentient beings, we conclude that the souls also originate. Nor must this be objected to on the ground that from the fact that Brahman is eternal, and the other fact that texts

such as 'That art thou' teach the soul to be of the nature of Brahman, it follows that the soul also is eternal. For if we reasoned in this style we should have to admit also that the Ether and the other elements are eternal, since texts such as 'in that all this has its Self' and 'all this indeed is Brahman' intimate them also to be of the nature of Brahman. Hence the individual soul also originates no less than Ether and the rest.—To this the Sūtra replies, 'Not the Self, on account of scriptural statement.' The Self is not produced, since certain texts directly deny its origination; cp. 'the intelligent one is not born nor does he die' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18); 'There are two unborn ones, one intelligent and strong, the other non-intelligent and weak' (Svet. Up. I, 9). And the eternity of the soul is learned from the same texts, cp. 'There is one eternal thinker,' &c. (Ka. Up. II, 5, 13); 'Unborn, eternal, everlasting is that ancient one; he is not killed though the body is killed' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18).—For these reasons the soul is not produced.

But how then about the declaration that through the cognition of one thing everything is known?—There is no difficulty here, since the soul also is an effect; and since effect and cause are non-different.—But this implies that the soul is an originated thing just like Ether and so on!—Not so, we reply. By a thing being an effect we mean its being due to a substance passing over into some other state; and from this point of view the soul also is an effect. There is, however, the difference, that the 'other condition' which is represented by the soul is of a different kind from that which constitutes non-sentient things, such as Ether and so on. The 'otherness' on which the soul depends consists in the contraction and expansion of intelligence; while the change on which the origination of Ether and so on depends is a change of essential nature. And change of the latter kind is what we deny of the soul. We have shown that there are three entities of distinct nature, viz. objects of fruition, enjoying subjects, and a Ruler; that origination and so on which are characteristic of the objects do not belong to the subjects, and that the latter are eternal; that the characteristic qualities of the objects and

likewise those of the subjects—viz. liability to pain and suffering—do not belong to the Ruler ; that the latter is eternal, free from all imperfections, omniscient, immediately realising all his purposes, the Lord of the lords of the organs, the highest Lord of all ; and that sentient and non-sentient beings in all their states constitute the body of the Lord while he constitutes their Self. While Brahman thus has for its modes (prakāra) the sentient and non-sentient beings in which it ever is embodied, during certain periods those beings abide in so subtle a condition as to be incapable of receiving designations different from that of Brahman itself ; Brahman then is said to be in its causal state. When, on the other hand, its body is constituted by all those beings in their gross state, when they have separate, distinct names and forms, Brahman is said to be in its effected condition. When, now, Brahman passes over from the causal state into the effected state, the aggregate of non-sentient things which in the causal state were destitute of name and form undergoes an essential change of nature—implying the possession of distinct names and so on—so as to become fit to constitute objects of fruition for sentient beings ; the change, on the other hand, which the sentient beings (the souls) undergo on that occasion is nothing more than a certain expansion of intelligence (or consciousness), capacitating them to experience the different rewards or punishments for their previous deeds. The ruling element of the world, i. e. the Lord, finally, who has the sentient and non-sentient beings for his modes, undergoes a change in so far as he is, at alternating periods, embodied in all those beings in their alternating states. The two modes, and he to whom the modes belong, thus undergo a common change in so far as in the case of all of them the causal condition passes over into a different condition.

It is with reference to this change undergone by one substance in passing over into a different state that the *Khândogya* says that through the knowledge of one thing everything is known, and illustrates this by the case of the lump of clay (knowing which we know all things made of clay). Texts such as ‘Pragâpati sent forth the creatures,’

which declare the origination of the soul, really mean only to state that the souls are by turns associated with or dissociated from bodies—the effect of which is that their intelligence is either contracted or expanded. Texts again which deny the origination of the soul and affirm its permanency ('He is not born and does not die,' &c.) mean to say that the soul does not, like the non-sentient element of creation, undergo changes of essential nature. And finally there are texts the purport of which it is to declare the absence of change of essential nature as well as of alternate expansion and contraction of intelligence—cp. 'That is the great unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal, Brahman' (*Bṛi. Up. XI, 4, 25*); 'the eternal thinker,' &c. (*Ka. Up. II, 5, 13*); such texts have for their subject the highest Lord.—All this also explains how Brahman, which is at all times differentiated by the sentient and non-sentient beings that constitute its body, can be said to be one only previous to creation; the statement is possible because at that time the differentiation of names and forms did not exist. That that which makes the difference between plurality and unity is the presence or absence of differentiation through names and forms, is distinctly declared in the text, 'Now all this was undifferentiated. It became differentiated by form and name' (*Bṛi. Up. I, 4, 7*).—Those also who hold that the individual soul is due to Nescience; and those who hold it to be due to a real limiting adjunct (*upādhi*); and those who hold that Brahman, whose essential nature is mere Being, assumes by itself the threefold form of enjoying subjects, objects of enjoyment, and supreme Ruler; can all of them explain the unity which Scripture predicates of Brahman in the *pralaya* state, only on the basis of the absence of differentiation by names and forms; for according to them also (there is no absolute unity at any time, but) either the potentiality of Nescience, or the potentiality of the limiting adjunct, or the potentialities of enjoying subjects, objects of enjoyment, and supreme Ruler persist in the *pralaya* condition also. And, moreover, it is proved by the two *Sūtras*, II, 1, 33; 35, that the distinction of the several individual souls and the stream of their works are eternal.

There is, however, the following difference between those several views. The first-mentioned view implies that Brahman itself is under the illusive influence of beginningless Avidyā. According to the second view, the effect of the real and beginningless limiting adjunct is that Brahman itself is in the state of bondage; for there is no other entity but Brahman and the adjunct. According to the third view, Brahman itself assumes different forms, and itself experiences the various unpleasant consequences of deeds. Nor would it avail to say that that part of Brahman which is the Ruler is not an experiencing subject; for as Brahman is all-knowing it recognises the enjoying subject as non-different from itself, and thus is itself an enjoying subject.—According to our view, on the other hand, Brahman, which has for its body all sentient and non-sentient beings, whether in their subtle or their gross state, is always—in its effected as well as in its causal condition—free from all shadow of imperfection, and a limitless ocean as it were of all exalted qualities. All imperfections, and suffering, and all change belong not to Brahman, but only to the sentient and non-sentient beings which are its modes. This view removes all difficulties.—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of ‘the Self.’

19. For this very reason (the individual soul is) a knower.

It has been shown that, different therein from Ether and the rest, the soul is not produced. This leads to the consideration of the soul’s essential nature. Is that essential nature constituted by mere intelligence as Sugata and Kapila hold; or is the soul as Kaṇāda thinks, essentially non-intelligent, comparable to a stone, while intelligence is merely an adventitious quality of it; or is it essentially a knowing subject?—The soul is mere intelligence, the Pūrvaapakshin maintains; for the reason that Scripture declares it to be so. For in the *antaryāmin-brāhmaṇa* the clause which in the *Mādhyandina*-text runs as follows, ‘he who abides in the Self,’ is in the text of the *Kāṇvas* represented by the clause ‘he who abides in knowledge.’

Similarly the text 'knowledge performs the sacrifice and all sacred acts' (Taitt. Up. II, 5, 1) shows that it is knowledge only which is the true nature of the active Self. And Smṛiti texts convey the same view, as e.g. 'it in reality is of the nature of absolutely spotless intelligence.' A second Pûrvapakshin denies the truth of this view. If, he says, we assume that the Self's essential nature consists either in mere knowledge or in its being a knowing subject, it follows that as the Self is omnipresent there must be consciousness at all places and at all times. On that doctrine we, further, could not account for the use of the instruments of cognition (i.e. the sense-organs, &c.); nor for the fact that in the states of deep sleep, swoon and so on, the Self although present is not observed to be conscious, while on the other hand consciousness is seen to arise as soon as the conditions of the waking state are realised. We therefore conclude that neither intelligence or consciousness, nor being a knowing agent, constitutes the essence of the soul, but that consciousness is a mere adventitious or occasional attribute. And the omnipresence of the Self must needs be admitted since its effects are perceived everywhere. Nor is there any valid reason for holding that the Self moves to any place; for as it is assumed to be present everywhere the actual accomplishment of effects (at certain places only) may be attributed to the moving of the body only.—Scripture also directly declares that in the state of deep sleep there is no consciousness, 'I do not indeed at the present moment know myself, so as to be able to say "that am I," nor do I know those beings.' Similarly Scripture declares the absence of consciousness in the state of final release, 'when he has departed there is no consciousness' (Bṛi. Up. II, 4, 12); where the Self is spoken of as having knowledge for its essential nature, the meaning only is that knowledge constitutes its specific quality, and the expression is therefore not to be urged in its literal sense.

Against all this the Sûtra declares 'for this very reason a knower.' This Self is essentially a knower, a knowing subject; not either mere knowledge or of non-sentient

nature.—Why?—‘For this very reason,’ i.e. on account of Scripture itself. ‘For this reason’ refers back to the ‘on account of Scripture’ in the preceding Sūtra. For in the *Khândogya*, where the condition of the released and the non-released soul is described, the text says ‘He who knows, let me smell this, he is the Self—with the mind seeing those pleasures he rejoices—the devas who are in the world of Brahman—whose desires are true, whose purposes are true—not remembering the body into which he was born’ (*Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 4-5; 1, 5; 12, 3*). And elsewhere ‘The seer does not see death’ (*Kh. Up. VII, 26, 2*). Similarly we read in the *Vāgasaneyaka*, in reply to the question ‘Who is that Self?’—‘He who is within the heart, surrounded by the *Prāṇas*, the person of light, consisting of knowledge’ (*Bri. Up. IV, 3, 7*); ‘By what should one know the knower?’ (*Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15*); ‘That person knows.’ And ‘for he is the knower, the hearer, the smeller, the taster, the perceiver, the thinker, the agent—he the person whose Self is knowledge’; and ‘thus these sixteen parts of that seer’ (*Pra. Up. IV, 9; VI, 5*). To the objection that if being a cognising subject constituted the essential nature of the Self it would follow that as the Self is omnipresent, there would be consciousness always and everywhere, the next Sūtra replies.

20. On account of (its) passing out, moving and returning.

The Self is not omnipresent, but on the contrary, of atomic size (*anu*).—How is this known?—Since Scripture says that it passes out, goes and returns. Its passing out is described in the following passage ‘by that light this Self departs, either through the eye, or through the skull, or through other parts of the body’ (*Bri. Up. IV, 4, 2*). Its going in the following text ‘all those who pass away out of this world go to the moon,’ and its returning in the text ‘from that world he comes again into this world, for action.’ All this going, and so on, cannot be reconciled with the soul being present everywhere.

21. And on account of the latter two (being effected) through the Self.

The 'and' has affirming power. The 'passing out' might somehow be reconciled with a non-moving Self (such as the omnipresent Self would be) if it were taken in the sense of the Self separating from the body; but for the going and returning no analogous explanation is possible. They, therefore, must be taken as effected by the Self itself (which, then, cannot be omnipresent and non-moving).

22. If it be said that (the soul) is not atomic, on account of scriptural statement of (what is) not that; we say no, on account of the other one being the topic.

The passage 'He who is within the heart, surrounded by the Prāṇas, the person consisting of knowledge' (Bṛi. Up. IV, 3, 7) introduces as the topic of discussion the personal Self, and further on in the same chapter we read 'the unborn Self, the great one' (IV, 4, 22). The personal Self, being expressly called *great*, cannot, therefore, be atomic!—Not so, we reply. 'Since the other one is the topic.' In the second text quoted that Self which is other than the personal Self—i.e. the highest Self (prāgñā) constitutes the topic. In the beginning of the chapter, indeed, the individual Self is introduced, but later on, between the two texts quoted, the instruction begins to concern itself with the highest Self, 'he by whom there is known the Self of intelligence' (pratibuddha ātmā; IV, 4, 13). It is this latter Self which, in 22, is called *great*, not the individual Self.

23. And on account of the very word, and of measure.

Scripture directly applies the word 'anu' to the individual Self, 'By thought is to be known that atomic Self into which Breath has entered fivefold' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 9).—By the term 'unmāna' in the Sūtra we have to understand measurement by selection of comparative instances.

Scripture declares the minuteness of the individual Self by reference to things which are like atoms in size, 'The individual soul is to be known as part of the hundredth part of the point of a hair divided a hundred times, and yet it is to be infinite' (Svet. Up. V, 9); 'that lower one is seen of the measure of the point of a goad' (V, 8). For these reasons also the individual Self must be viewed as atomic.—But this conflicts with the fact that sensation extends over the whole body!—This objection the next Sūtra refutes by means of an analogous instance.

24. There is no contradiction, as in the case of sandal-ointment.

As a drop of sandal-ointment, although applied to one spot of the body only, yet produces a refreshing sensation extending over the whole body; thus the Self also, although dwelling in one part of the body only, is conscious of sensations taking place in any part of the body.

25. Should it be said (that this is not so) on account of specialisation of abode; we say no, on account of the acknowledgment (of a place of the Self), viz. in the heart.

There is a difference. The drop of ointment can produce its effect as at any rate it is in contact with a definite part of the body. But we know of no such part in the case of the soul!—Not so, we reply. Scripture informs us that the Self abides in a definite part of the body, viz. the heart. 'For that Self is in the heart, there are a hundred and one veins.' And in reply to the question 'What is that Self?' the text has 'He who is within the heart, surrounded by the Prāṇas, the Person of light, consisting of knowledge' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 7).—The parallel case of the sandal-ointment is referred to in order to point out that the Self abides in some particular part of the body; while the ointment is not bound to any special place.—In the next Sūtra the Sūtrakāra proceeds to state how, according to his own view, the Self, although abiding in one spot only, gives rise to effects extending over the whole body.

26. Or on account of its quality as light.

The 'or' is meant to set aside the view previously stated. The Self extends through the whole body by means of its quality, viz. knowledge or consciousness. 'As light.' As the light of things abiding in one place—such as gems, the sun, and so on—is seen to extend to many places, so the consciousness of the Self dwelling in the heart pervades the entire body. That the knowledge of the knowing subject may extend beyond its substrate, as the light of a luminous body does, we have already explained under the first Sūtra.—But it has been said that the Self is *mere* knowledge; how then can knowledge be said to be a quality—which is something different from the essential nature of a thing?—This the next Sūtra explains.

27. There is distinction as in the case of smell; and thus Scripture declares.

Just as smell, which is perceived as a quality of earth, is distinct from earth; thus knowledge of which we are conscious as the quality of a knowing subject—which relation expresses itself in judgments such as 'I know'—is different from the knowing subject. Scriptural texts also prove this relation, as e.g. 'This Person knows.'

28. On account of the separate statement.

Scripture even states quite directly that knowledge is something distinct from the knowing subject, viz. in the passage 'For there is not known any intermission of the knowing of the knower' (*Bri. Up. IV, 3, 30*).—It has been said that in passages such as 'he who abiding in knowledge' (*Bri. Up. III, 7, 22*); 'Knowledge performs the sacrifice' (*Taitt. Up. II, 5, 1*); 'having knowledge for its nature, absolutely free from stain,' Scripture speaks of the Self as being mere knowledge (not a knower). This point the next Sūtra elucidates.

29. But (the Self) is designated as that because it has that quality (viz. knowledge) for its essential quality; as in the case of the intelligent (*prāgñā*) Self.

The 'but' discards the objection. Because that quality, viz. the quality of knowledge, is the essential quality, therefore the Self is, in the passages quoted, designated as knowledge. For knowledge constitutes the essential quality of the Self. Similarly, the intelligent highest Self is occasionally called 'Bliss,' because bliss is its essential quality. Compare 'If that bliss existed not in the ether' (Taitt. Up. II, 7, 1); 'He perceived that bliss is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 6, 1). That bliss is the essential attribute of Brahman is proved by texts such as 'That is one bliss of Brahman'; 'He who knows the bliss of Brahman is afraid of nothing' (Taitt. Up. II, 4, 1).—Or else the analogous case to which the Sūtra refers may be that of the intelligent Brahman being designated by the term 'knowledge,' in texts such as 'Truth, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1). That knowledge is the essential quality of Brahman is known from passages such as 'together with the intelligent Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); 'He who is all-knowing' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9).

30. And there is no objection, since (the quality of knowledge) exists wherever the Self is; this being observed.

Since knowledge is an attribute which is met with wherever a Self is, there is no objection to the Self being designated by that attribute. Similarly we observe that special kinds of cows, as e. g. hornless ones, are designated by the term 'cow,' since the quality of possessing the generic character of cows is met with everywhere in connexion with the essential character of such animals with mutilated horns; since in fact that quality contributes to define their essential character. The 'and' of the Sūtra is meant to suggest a further argument, viz. that to apply to the Self the term 'knowledge' is suitable for that reason also that like knowledge the Self is self-illuminated. The objection that knowledge or consciousness cannot be an attribute inseparably connected with the essential nature of the Self as there is no consciousness in deep sleep and similar states is taken up in the next Sūtra.

31. Since there may be manifestation of that which exists; as in the case of virile power and so on.

The 'but' is meant to set the raised objection aside. The case may be that while consciousness is present also in deep sleep, and so on, it is manifested in the waking state only; whence there would be no objection to viewing consciousness as an essential attribute of the Self. 'As in the case of virile power and the like.' Special substances such as the virile element are indeed present in the male child already, but then are not manifest, while later on they manifest themselves with advancing youth; but all the same the possession of those substances is essential to the male being, not merely adventitious. For to be made up of seven elementary substances (viz. blood, humour, flesh, fat, marrow, bone, and semen) is an essential property of the body. That even in deep sleep and similar states the 'I' shines forth we have explained above. Consciousness is always there, but only in the waking state and in dreams it is observed to relate itself to objects. And that to be a subject of cognition, and so on, are essential attributes of the Self, we have also proved before. The conclusion, therefore, is that to be a knowing subject is the essential character of the Self. And that Self is of atomic size. The text 'when he has departed there is no consciousness' (*samgñâ*; *Bri. Up.* II, 4, 12) does not declare that the released Self has no consciousness; but only that in the case of that Self there is absent that knowledge (experience) of birth, death, and so on, which in the *Samsâra* state is caused by the connexion of the Self with the elements—as described in the preceding passage, 'that great being having risen from out these elements again perishes after them.' For the text as to the absence of *samgñâ* after death must be interpreted in harmony with other texts describing the condition of the released soul, such as 'the seeing one does not see death nor illness nor pain; the seeing one sees everything and obtains everything everywhere' (*Kh. Up.* VII, 25, 2); 'not remembering that body

into which he was born—seeing these pleasures with the mind he rejoices' (VIII, 12, 3 ; 5).

The Sūtras now proceed to refute the doctrine of the Self being (not a knower) but mere knowledge, and being omnipresent.

32. There would result permanent consciousness or non-consciousness, or else limitative restriction to either.

On the other view, i. e. on the view of the Self being omnipresent and mere knowledge, it would follow either that consciousness and also non-consciousness would permanently take place together everywhere ; or else that there would be definite permanent restriction to either of the two, i. e. either permanent consciousness or permanent non-consciousness.—If the omnipresent Self, consisting of mere knowledge only, were the cause of all that actual consciousness and non-consciousness on the part of Selves which takes place in the world, it might be conceived either as the cause of both—i. e. consciousness and non-consciousness—and this would mean that there is everywhere and at all times simultaneous consciousness and non-consciousness. If, on the other hand, it were the cause of consciousness only, there would never and nowhere be unconsciousness of anything ; and if it were the cause of non-consciousness only, there would never and nowhere be consciousness of anything. On our view, on the other hand, the actually perceived distribution of consciousness and non-consciousness explains itself, since we hold the Self to abide within bodies only, so that naturally consciousness takes place there only, not anywhere else.—The view, finally (held by the Vaiśeṣikas), of the consciousness of the Self depending on its organs (mind, senses, &c. ; while the omnipresent Self is, apart from those organs, non-sentient, *gaḍa*), results in the same difficulties as the view criticised above ; for as all the Selves are omnipresent they are in permanent conjunction with all organs ; and moreover it would follow that the *adṛśhṭas* (due to the actions of the different bodies) could

not thus be held apart (but would cling to all Selfs, each of which is in contact with all bodies).

Here terminates the *adhikarana* of 'the *knower*.'

33. (The soul is) an agent, on account of Scripture (thus) having a purport.

It has been shown that the individual Self is a knowing subject and atomic. Now the question arises whether that Self is an agent or, being itself non-active, erroneously ascribes to itself the activity of the non-sentient *gunas*. The *primâ facie* answer is that the individual Self is not an agent, since the sacred texts concerned with the Self declare that the Self does not act, while the *gunas* do act. Thus, e. g. in the *Kaṭhāvalli*, where the text at first denies of the individual Self all the attributes of *Prakṛiti*, such as being born, ageing and dying ('he is not born, he does not die'), and then also denies that the Self is the agent in acts such as killing and the like, 'If the slayer thinks that he slays, if the slain thinks that he is slain, they both do not understand; for this one does not slay, nor is that one slain' (II, 18). This means—if one thinks the Self to be the slayer one does not know the Self. And the Lord himself teaches that non-agency is the essential nature of the individual soul, and that it is mere delusion on the Self's part to ascribe to itself agency. 'By the attributes (*guna*) of *Prakṛiti*, actions are wrought all round.' He who is deluded by self-conceit thinks 'I am the agent'; 'when the seer beholds no other agent than the *gunas*'; '*Prakṛiti* is said to be the cause of all agency of causes and effects, whilst the soul is the cause of all enjoyment of pleasure and pain' (Bha. Gi. III, 27; XIV, 19; XIII, 20).—The soul, therefore, is an enjoyer only, while all agency belongs to *Prakṛiti*.—To this the *Sûtra* replies, 'an agent, on account of Scripture thus having a meaning.' The Self only is an agent, not the *gunas*, because thus only Scripture has a meaning. For the scriptural injunctions, such as 'he who desires the heavenly world is to sacrifice,' 'He who desires Release is to meditate on Brahman,' and similar ones, enjoin action on him only who will enjoy the fruit

of the action—whether the heavenly world, or Release, or anything else. If a non-sentient thing were the agent, the injunction would not be addressed to another being (viz. to an intelligent being—to which it actually is addressed). The term 'sāstra' (scriptural injunction) moreover comes from *sās*, to command, and commanding means impelling to action. But scriptural injunctions impel to action through giving rise to a certain conception (in the mind of the being addressed), and the non-sentient Pradhāna cannot be made to conceive anything. Scripture therefore has a sense only, if we admit that none but the intelligent enjoyer of the fruit of the action is at the same time the agent. Thus the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā declares 'the fruit of the injunction belongs to the agent' (III, 7, 18). The Pūrva-pakshin had contended that the text 'if the slayer thinks, &c.,' proves the Self not to be the agent in the action of slaying; but what the text really means is only that the Self as being eternal cannot be killed. The text, from *Smṛiti*, which was alleged as proving that the *guṇas* only possess active power, refers to the fact that in all activities lying within the sphere of the *samsāra*, the activity of the Self is due not to its own nature but to its contact with the different *guṇas*. The activity of the *guṇas*, therefore, must be viewed not as permanent, but occasional only. In the same sense *Smṛiti* says 'the reason is the connexion of the soul with the *guṇas*, in its births, in good and evil wombs' (Bha. Gī. XIII, 21). Similarly it is said there (XVIII, 16) that 'he who through an untrained understanding looks upon the isolated Self as an agent, that man of perverted mind does not see'; the meaning being that, since it appears from a previous passage that the activity of the Self depends on five factors (as enumerated in sl. 16), he who views the isolated Self to be an agent has no true insight.

34. On account of taking and the declaration as to its moving about.

The text beginning 'And as a great king,' &c., declares that 'the Self taking the *prāṇas* moves about in its own body,

according to its pleasure' (*Bṛi. Up. II, 1, 18*), i. e. it teaches that the Self is active in taking to itself the *prāṇas* and moving about in the body.

35. And on account of the designation (of the Self as the agent) in actions. If not so, there would be change of grammatical expression.

Because in the text 'Knowledge performs the sacrifice, it performs all works' (*Taitt. Up. II, 5*) the Self is designated as the agent in all worldly and Vedic works, for this reason also the Self must be held to be an agent. And should it be said that the word 'knowledge' in that text denotes not the Self, but the internal organ or *buddhi*, we point out that in that case there would be a change of grammatical expression, that is to say, as the *buddhi* is the instrument of action, the text would exhibit the instrumental case instead of the nominative case 'by knowledge, and so on' (*vigñānena* instead of *vigñānam*).

36. (There would be) absence of definite rule, as in the case of consciousness.

The *Sūtra* points out a difficulty which arises on the view of the Self not being an agent. *Sūtra* 32 has declared that if the Self were all-pervading it would follow that there would be no definite determination with regard to consciousness. Similarly, if the Self were not an agent but all activity belonged to *Prakṛiti*, it would follow that as *Prakṛiti* is a common possession of all souls, all actions would result in enjoyment (experience) on the part of all souls, or else on the part of none; for as each Self is held to be omnipresent, they are all of them in equal proximity to all parts of the *Pradhāna*. For the same reason it could not be maintained that the distribution of results between the different souls depends on the different internal organs which are joined to the souls; for if the souls are omnipresent, no soul will be exclusively connected with any particular internal organ.

37. On account of the inversion of power.

If the internal organ were the agent, then—since it is

impossible that a being other than the agent should be the enjoyer of the fruit of the action—the power of enjoyment also would belong to the internal organ, and would consequently have to be denied of the Self. But if this were so, there would be no longer any proof for the existence of the Self; for they expressly teach that ‘the person (i.e. the soul) exists, on account of the fact of enjoyment.’

38. And on account of the absence of samādhi.

If the internal organ were the agent, it would be such even in that final state of meditation, called samādhi, which is the instrument of Release. But that state consists therein that the meditating being realises its difference from Prakṛti, and this is a conception which Prakṛti itself (of which the internal organ is only a modification) cannot form.—The Self alone, therefore, is the agent.—But this would imply that the activity of the Self is never at rest!—Of this difficulty the next Sūtra disposes.

39. And as the carpenter, in both ways.

The Self, although always provided with the instruments of action, such as the organ of speech, and so on, acts when it wishes to do so, and does not act when it does not wish to do so. Just as a carpenter, although having his axe and other implements ready at hand, works or does not work just as he pleases.—If the internal organ, on the contrary, were essentially active, it would constantly be acting, since as a non-intelligent being it could not be influenced by particular reasons for action, such as the desire for enjoyment.

Here terminates the adhikaraṇa of ‘the agent.’

40. But from the highest, this being declared by Scripture.

Is the activity of the individual soul independent (free), or does it depend on the highest Self?—It is free; for if it were dependent on the highest Self, the whole body of scriptural injunctions and prohibitions would be unmeaning. For commandments can be addressed to such

agents only as are capable of entering on action or refraining from action, according to their own thought and will.

This *primâ facie* view is set aside by the Sûtra. The activity of the individual soul proceeds from the highest Self as its cause. For Scripture teaches this. 'Entered within, the ruler of creatures, the Self of all'; 'who dwelling in the Self is different from the Self, whom the Self does not know, whose body the Self is, who rules the Self from within, he is thy Self, the inward ruler, the immortal one.' *Smṛiti* teaches the same, 'I dwell within the heart of all; memory and knowledge as well as their loss come from me' (Bha. Gt. XV, 15); 'The Lord, O Arguna, dwells in the heart of all creatures, whirling, by his mysterious power, all creatures as if mounted on a machine' (Bha. Gt. XVIII, 61).—But this view implies the meaninglessness of all scriptural injunctions and prohibitions!—To this the next Sûtra replies.

41. But with a view to the efforts made (the Lord makes the soul act) on account of the (thus resulting) non-meaninglessness of injunctions and prohibitions and the rest.

The inwardly ruling highest Self promotes action in so far as it regards in the case of any action the volitional effort made by the individual soul, and then aids that effort by granting its favour or permission (*anumati*); action is not possible without permission on the part of the highest Self. In this way (i.e. since the action primarily depends on the volitional effort of the soul) injunctions and prohibitions are not devoid of meaning. The 'and the rest' of the Sûtra is meant to suggest the grace and punishments awarded by the Lord.—The case is analogous to that of property of which two men are joint owners. If one of these wishes to transfer that property to a third person he cannot do so without the permission of his partner, but that that permission is given is after all his own doing, and hence the fruit of the action (reward or anything) properly belongs to him only.—That, in the case of evil

actions, allowance of the action on the part of one able to stop it does not necessarily prove hardheartedness, we have shown above when explaining the Sāṅkhya doctrine.—But there is a scriptural text.—‘He (the Lord) makes him whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds do a good deed, and the same makes him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds do a bad deed’ (Kau. Up. III, 8)—which means that the Lord himself causes men to do good and evil actions, and this does not agree with the partial independence claimed above for the soul.—The text quoted, we reply, does not apply to all agents, but means that the Lord, wishing to do a favour to those who are resolved on acting so as fully to please the highest Person, engenders in their minds a tendency towards highly virtuous actions, such as are means to attain to him ; while on the other hand, in order to punish those who are resolved on lines of action altogether displeasing to him, he engenders in their minds a delight in such actions as have a downward tendency and are obstacles in the way of the attainment of the Lord. Thus the Lord himself says, ‘I am the origin of all, everything proceeds from me ; knowing this the wise worship me with love. To them ever devoted, worshipping me in love, I give that means of wisdom by which they attain to me. In mercy only to them, dwelling in their hearts, do I destroy the darkness born of ignorance, with the brilliant light of knowledge’ (Bha. Gī. X, 8; 10–11). And further on the Lord—after having described ‘demoniac’ people, in the passus beginning ‘they declare the world to be without a Truth, without a resting-place, without a Ruler,’ and ending ‘malignantly hating me who abides in their own bodies and those of others’—declares, ‘These evil and malign haters, most degraded of men, I hurl perpetually into transmigrations and into demoniac wombs’ (XVI, 8–19).

Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of ‘that which depends on the Highest.’

42. (The soul is) a part, on account of the declarations of difference and otherwise ; some also record

(that Brahman is of) the nature of slaves, fishermen, and so on.

The Sûtras have declared that the individual soul is an agent, and as such dependent on the highest Person. The following question now arises—Is the individual soul absolutely different from Brahman? or is it nothing else than Brahman itself in so far as under the influence of error? or is it Brahman in so far as determined by a limiting adjunct (upâdhi)? or is it a part (*amsa*) of Brahman?—The doubt on this point is due to the disagreement of the scriptural texts.—But this whole matter has already been decided under Sû. II, 1, 22.—True. But as a difficulty presents itself on the ground of the conflicting nature of the texts—some asserting the difference and some the unity of the individual soul and Brahman—the matter is here more specially decided by its being proved that the soul is a part of Brahman. As long as this decision remains unsettled, the conclusions arrived at under the two Sûtras referred to, viz. that the soul is non-different from Brahman and that Brahman is ‘additional’ to the soul, are without a proper basis.

Let it then first be said that the soul is absolutely different from Brahman, since texts such as ‘There are two, the one knowing, the other not knowing, both unborn, the one strong, the other weak’ (Svet. Up. I, 9) declare their difference. Texts which maintain the non-difference of a being which is knowing and another which is not knowing, if taken literally, convey a contradiction—as if one were to say, ‘Water the ground with fire’!—and must therefore be understood in some secondary metaphorical sense. To hold that the individual soul is a part of Brahman does not explain matters; for by a ‘part’ we understand that which constitutes part of the extension of something. If, then, the soul occupied part of the extension of Brahman, all its imperfections would belong to Brahman. Nor can the soul be a part of Brahman if we take ‘part’ to mean a *piece* (*khandā*); for Brahman does not admit of being divided into pieces, and moreover, the difficulties

connected with the former interpretation would present themselves here also. That something absolutely different from something else should yet be a part of the latter cannot in fact be proved.

Or else let it be said that the soul is Brahman affected by error (bhrama). For this is the teaching of texts such as 'Thou art that'; 'this Self is Brahman.' Those texts, on the other hand, which declare the difference of the two merely restate what is already established by perception and the other means of knowledge, and therefore are shown, by those texts the purport of which it is to teach non-duality not established by other means, to lie—like perception and the other means of knowledge themselves—within the sphere of Nescience.

Or let it be assumed, in the third place, that the individual soul is Brahman as determined by a beginningless limiting adjunct (upādhi). For it is on this ground that Scripture teaches the Self to be Brahman. And that upādhi must not be said to be a mere erroneous imagination, for on that view the distinction of bondage, release, and so on, would be impossible.

Against all these views the Sūtra declares that the soul is a part of Brahman; since there are declarations of difference and also 'otherwise,' i.e. declarations of unity. To the former class belong all those texts which dwell on the distinction of the creator and the creature, the ruler and the ruled, the all-knowing and the ignorant, the independent and the dependent, the pure and the impure, that which is endowed with holy qualities and that which possesses qualities of an opposite kind, the lord and the dependent. To the latter class belong such texts as 'Thou art that' and 'this Self is Brahman.' Some persons even record that Brahman is of the nature of slaves, fishermen, and so on. The Ātharvavikās, that is to say, have the following text, 'Brahman are the slaves, Brahman are these fishers,' and so on; and as Brahman there is said to comprise within itself all individual souls, the passage teaches general non-difference of the Self. In order, then, that texts of both these classes may be taken in their

primary, literal sense, we must admit that the individual soul is a part of Brahman. Nor is it a fact that the declarations of difference refer to matters settled by other means of knowledge, such as perception and so on, and on that account are mere reiterations of something established otherwise (in consequence of which they would have no original proving force of their own, and would be sublated by the texts declaring non-duality). For the fact that the soul is created by Brahman, is ruled by it, constitutes its body, is subordinate to it, abides in it, is preserved by it, is absorbed by it, stands to it in the relation of a meditating devotee, and through its grace attains the different ends of man, viz. religious duty, wealth, pleasure and final release—all this and what is effected thereby, viz. the distinction of the soul and Brahman, does not fall within the cognisance of perception and the other means of proof, and hence is not established by something else. It is therefore not true that the texts declaring the creation of the world, and so on, are mere reiterations of differences established by other means of authoritative knowledge, and hence have for their purport to teach things that are false.—[Nor will it do to say that the texts declaring duality teach what indeed is not established by other means of knowledge but is erroneous.] 'Brahman conceives the thought of differentiating itself, forms the resolution of becoming many, and accordingly creates the ether and the other elements, enters into them as individual soul, evolves all the different forms and names, takes upon himself all the pleasures and pains which spring from experiencing the infinite multitude of objects thus constituted, abides within and inwardly rules all beings, recognises itself in its *gīva*-condition to be one with the universal causal Brahman, and finally accomplishes its release from the *samsāra* and the body of sacred doctrine by which this release is effected'—all this the Veda indeed declares, but its real purport is that all this is only true of a Brahman under the influence of an illusion, and therefore is unreal!—while at the same time Brahman is defined as that the essential nature of which is absolutely pure intelligence! Truly, if such were the purport of the Veda, what

more would the Veda be than the idle talk of a person out of his mind !

Nor finally is there any good in the theory of the soul being Brahman in so far as determined by a limiting adjunct. For this view also is in conflict with the texts which distinguish Brahman as the ruling and the soul as the ruled principle, and so on. One and the same Devadatta does not become double as it were—a ruler on the one hand and a ruled subject on the other—because he is determined by the house in which he is, or by something else.

In order to be able to account for the twofold designations of the soul, we must therefore admit that the soul is a *part* of Brahman.

43. And on account of the mantra.

‘One part (quarter) of it are all beings, three feet (quarters) of it are the Immortal in heaven’ (*Kh. Up. III, 12, 6*)—on account of this mantra also the soul must be held to be a part of Brahman. For the word ‘foot’ denotes a part. As the individual souls are many the mantra uses the plural form ‘all beings.’ In the Sūtra (42) the word ‘part’ is in the singular, with a view to denote the whole class. For the same reason in II, 3, 18 also the word ‘ātman’ is in the singular. For that the individual Selfs are different from the Lord, and are many and eternal, is declared by texts such as ‘He who, eternal and intelligent, fulfils the desires of many who likewise are eternal and intelligent’ (*Ka. Up. II, 5, 13*). Since thus the plurality of the eternal individual Selfs rests on good authority, those who have an insight into the true nature of Selfs will discern without difficulty different characteristics distinguishing the individual Selfs, although all Selfs are alike in so far as having intelligence for their essential nature. Moreover the Sūtra II, 3, 48 directly states the plurality of the individual Selfs.

44. Moreover it is so stated in Smṛiti.

Smṛiti moreover declares the individual soul to be a part of the highest Person, ‘An eternal part of myself becomes

the individual soul (*gīva*) in the world of life' (Bha. Gī. XV, 7).—For this reason also the soul must be held to be a part of Brahman.

But if the soul is a part of Brahman, all the imperfections of the soul are Brahman's also!—To this objection the next Sūtra replies.

45. But as in the case of light and so on. Not so is the highest.

The 'but' discards the objection.—'Like light and so on.' The individual soul is a part of the highest Self; as the light issuing from a luminous thing such as fire or the sun is a part of that body; or as the generic characteristics of a cow or horse, and the white or black colour of things so coloured, are attributes and hence parts of the things in which those attributes inhere; or as the body is a part of an embodied being. For by a part we understand that which constitutes one place (*deśa*) of some thing, and hence a distinguishing attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*) is a part of the thing distinguished by that attribute. Hence those analysing a thing of that kind discriminate between the *distinguishing* element or part of it, and the *distinguished* element or part. Now although the distinguishing attribute and the thing distinguished thereby stand to each other in the relation of part and whole, yet we observe them to differ in essential character. Hence there is no contradiction between the individual and the highest Self—the former of which is a *viśeṣaṇa* of the latter—standing to each other in the relation of part and whole, and their being at the same time of essentially different nature. This the Sūtra declares 'not so is the highest,' i.e. the highest Self is not of the same nature as the individual soul. For as the luminous body is of a nature different from that of its light, thus the highest Self differs from the individual soul which is a part of it. It is this difference of character—due to the individual soul being the distinguishing element and the highest Self being the substance distinguished thereby—to which all those texts refer which declare difference. Those texts, on the other hand, which declare non-difference are

based on the circumstance that attributes which are incapable of separate existence are ultimately bound to the substance which they distinguish, and hence are fundamentally valid. That in declarations such as 'Thou art that' and 'this Self is Brahman,' the words *thou* and *Self*, no less than the words *that* and *Brahman*, denote Brahman in so far as having the individual souls for its body, and that thus the two sets of words denote fundamentally one and the same thing, has been explained previously.

46. And Smṛiti texts declare this.

That the world and Brahman stand to each other in the relation of part and whole, the former being like the light and the latter like the luminous body, or the former being like the power and the latter like that in which the power inheres, or the former being like the body and the latter like the soul; this Parāśara also and other Smṛiti writers declare, 'As the light of a fire which abides in one place only spreads all around, thus this whole world is the power (śakti) of the highest Brahman.' The 'and' in the Sūtra implies that scriptural texts also ('of whom the Self is the body' and others) declare that the individual Self is a part of Brahman in so far as it is its body.

But if all individual souls are equal in so far as being alike parts of Brahman, alike actuated by Brahman, and alike knowing subjects, what is the reason that, as Scripture teaches, some of them are allowed to read the Veda and act according to its injunctions, while others are excluded therefrom; and again that some are to see, feel, and so on, while others are excluded from these privileges?—This question is answered by the next Sūtra.

47. Permission and exclusion (result) from connexion with a body; as in the case of light and so on.

Although all souls are essentially of the same nature in so far as they are parts of Brahman, knowing subjects and so on, the permissions and exclusions referred to are possible for the reason that each individual soul is joined to some

particular body, pure or impure, whether of a Brāhmaṇa or Kshattriya or Vaisya or Sūdra, and so on. 'As in the case of fire and so on.' All fire is of the same kind, and yet one willingly fetches fire from the house of a Brāhmaṇa, while one shuns fire from a place where dead bodies are burnt. And from a Brāhmaṇa one accepts food without any objection, while one refuses food from a low person.

48. And on account of non-connectedness there is no confusion.

Although the souls, as being parts of Brahman and so on, are of essentially the same character, they are actually separate, for each of them is of atomic size and resides in a separate body. For this reason there is no confusion or mixing up of the individual spheres of enjoyment and experience. The Sūtrakāra introduces this reference to an advantage of his own view of things, in order to intimate that the views of the soul being Brahman deluded or else Brahman affected by a limiting adjunct are on their part incapable of explaining how it is that the experiences of the individual Self and the highest Self, and of the several individual Selves, are not mixed up.

But may not, on the view of the soul being Brahman deluded, the distinction of the several spheres of experience be explained by means of the difference of the limiting adjuncts presented by Nescience?—This the next Sūtra negatives.

49. And it is a mere apparent argument.

The argumentation by which it is sought to prove that that being whose nature is constituted by absolutely uniform light, i. e. intelligence, is differentiated by limiting adjuncts which presuppose an obscuration of that essential nature, is a mere apparent (fallacious) one. For, as we have shown before, obscuration of the light of that which is nothing but light means destruction of that light.—If we accept as the reading of the Sūtra 'ābhāśāt' (in plural) the meaning is that the various reasons set forth by the adherents of that doctrine are all of them fallacious. The 'and' of

the Sūtra is meant to point out that that doctrine, moreover, is in conflict with texts such as 'thinking himself to be different from the Mover' (Svet. Up. I, 6); 'there are two unborn ones, one a ruler, the other not a ruler' (I, 9); 'of those two one eats the sweet fruit' (V, 6); and others. For even if difference is due to upādhis which are the figment of Nescience, there is no escaping the conclusion that the spheres of experience must be mixed up, since the theory admits that the thing itself with which all the limiting adjuncts connect themselves is one only.

But this cannot be urged against the theory of the individual soul being Brahman in so far as determined by real limiting adjuncts; for on that view we may explain the difference of spheres of experience as due to the beginningless *adrishṭas* which are the cause of the difference of the limiting adjuncts!—To this the next Sūtra replies.

50. On account of the non-determination of the *adrishṭas*.

As the *adrishṭas* also which are the causes of the series of upādhis have for their substrate Brahman itself, there is no reason for their definite allotment (to definite individual souls), and hence again there is no definite separation of the spheres of experience. For the limiting adjuncts as well as the *adrishṭas* cannot by their connexion with Brahman split up Brahman itself which is essentially one.

51. And it is thus also in the case of purposes and so on.

For the same reason there can be no definite restriction in the case of purposes and so on which are the causes of the different *adrishṭas*. (For they also cannot introduce plurality into Brahman that is fundamentally one.)

52. Should it be said (that that is possible) owing to the difference of place; we deny this, on account of (all upādhis) being within (all places).

Although Brahman is one only and not to be split by the several limiting adjuncts with which it is connected,

yet the separation of the spheres of enjoyment is not impossible since the places of Brahman which are connected with the upādhis are distinct.—This the Sūtra negatives on the ground that, as the upādhis move here and there and hence all places enter into connexion with all upādhis, the mixing up of spheres of enjoyment cannot be avoided. And even if the upādhis were connected with different places, the pain connected with some particular place would affect the whole of Brahman which is one only.—The two Sūtras II, 3, 32 and 37 have stated an objection against those who, without taking their stand on the Veda, held the view of an all-pervading soul. The Sūtras II, 3, 50 and ff., on the other hand, combat the view of those who, while basing their doctrine on the Veda, teach the absolute unity of the Self.—Here terminates the adhikaraṇa of ‘the part.’

FOURTH PĀDA.

1. Thus the *prāṇas*.

After having taught that Ether and all the other elements are effects, and hence have originated, the Sūtras had shown that the individual soul, although likewise an effect, does not originate in the sense of undergoing a change of essential nature; and had in connexion therewith clearly set forth wherein the essential nature of the soul consists. They now proceed to elucidate the question as to the origination of the instruments of the individual soul, viz. the organs and the vital breath.

The point here to be decided is whether the organs are effects as the individual soul is an effect, or as ether and the other elements are. As the soul is, thus the *prāṇas* are, the Pūrvapakshin maintains. That means—as the soul is not produced, thus the organs also are not produced. For the latter point no less than the former is directly stated in Scripture; the wording of the Sūtra ‘thus the *prāṇas*’ being meant to extend to the case of the *prāṇas* also, the authority of Scripture to which recourse was had in the case of the soul.—But what is the scriptural text you mean?

‘Non-being, truly this was in the beginning. Here they say, what was that? Those *Rishis* indeed were that Non-being, thus they say. And who were those *Rishis*? The *prāṇas* indeed were those *Rishis*.’ This is the passage which declares that before the origination of the world the *Rishis* existed. As ‘*prāṇāḥ*’ is in the plural, we conclude that what is meant is the organs and the vital air. Nor can this text be interpreted to mean only that the *prāṇas* exist for a very long time (but are not uncreated); as we may interpret the texts declaring *Vāyu* and the atmosphere (*antariksha*) to be immortal: ‘*Vāyu* and the atmosphere are immortal’; ‘*Vāyu* is the deity that never sets’ (*Bṛi. Up.* II, 3, 3; I, 5, 22). For the clause ‘Non-being indeed was

this in the beginning' declares that the *prāṇas* existed even at the time when the entire world was in the *pralaya* state. Those texts, then, which speak of an origination of the *prāṇas* must be explained somehow, just as we did with the texts referring to the origination of the individual soul.

To this the *Siddhāntin* replies, 'the *prāṇas* also originate in the same way as ether, and so on.'—Why?—Because we have scriptural texts directly stating that before creation everything was one, 'Being only this was in the beginning,' 'The Self only was this in the beginning.' And moreover, the text 'from that there is produced the *prāṇa* and the mind and all organs' (*Mu. Up.* II, 3, 1) declares that the organs originated; they therefore cannot have existed before creation. Nor is it permissible to ascribe a different meaning to the texts which declare the origination of the sense-organs—as we may do in the case of the texts declaring the origination of the soul. For we have no texts directly denying the origination of the sense-organs, or affirming their eternity, while we *have* such texts in the case of the individual soul. In the text quoted by the *Pūrvapakshin*, 'Non-being indeed was this in the beginning,' &c., the word *prāṇa* can denote the highest Self only; for from texts such as 'All these beings indeed enter into breath alone, and from breath they arise' (*Kh. Up.* I, 11, 5), the word *prāṇa* is known to be one of the designations of the highest Self. And as to the clause 'the *prāṇas* indeed are those *Rishis*,' we remark that the term *Rishi* may properly be applied to the all-seeing highest Self, but not to the non-intelligent organs.

But how then is the plural form 'the *Rishis* are the *prāṇas*' to be accounted for? This the next *Sūtra* explains.

2. (The scriptural statement of the plural) is secondary, on account of impossibility; and since (the highest Self) is declared before that.

The plural form exhibited by the text must be taken (not in its literal, but) in a secondary figurative sense, since there is no room there for a plurality of things. For Scrip-

ture declares that previous to creation the highest Self only exists.

3. On account of speech having for its antecedent that.

For the following reason also the word 'prāṇa,' in the text quoted, can denote Brahman only. Speech, i.e. the names which have for their object all things apart from Brahman, presupposes the existence of the entire universe of things—ether, and so on—which is the object of speech. But, as according to the text 'this was then non-differentiated ; it was thereupon differentiated by names and forms,' then (i.e. before the differentiation of individual things), no things having name and form existed, there existed also no effects of speech and the other organs of action and sensation, and hence it cannot be inferred that those organs themselves existed.—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of 'the origination of the prāṇas.'

4. (They are seven) on account of the going of the seven and of specification.

The question here arises whether those organs are seven only, or eleven—the doubt on this point being due to the conflicting nature of scriptural texts.—The Pūrvapakshin maintains the former alternative.—On what grounds?—'On account of going, and of specification.' For the text refers to the 'going,' i.e. to the moving about in the different worlds, together with the soul when being born or dying, of seven prāṇas only, 'seven are these worlds in which the prāṇas move which rest in the cave, being placed there as seven and seven' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 8)—where the repetition 'seven and seven' intimates the plurality of souls to which the prāṇas are attached. Moreover those moving prāṇas are distinctly specified in the following text, 'when the five instruments of knowledge stand still, together with the mind (*manas*), and when the *buddhi* does not move, that they call the highest "going"' (*gati*—Ka. Up. II, 6, 10). The 'highest going' here means the moving towards Release, all movement within the body having

come to an end. As thus the text declares that at the time of birth and death seven *prāṇas* only accompany the soul, and as, with regard to the condition of final concentration, those *prāṇas* are distinctly specified as forms of knowledge (*gñānāni*), we conclude that the *prāṇas* are the seven following instruments of the soul—the organs of hearing, feeling, seeing, tasting and smelling, the *buddhi* and the *manas*. In various other passages indeed, which refer to the *prāṇas*, higher numbers are mentioned, viz. up to fourteen, speech, the hands, the feet, the anus, the organ of generation, the *ahaṅkāra* and the *kleśa* being added to those mentioned above; cp. e.g. ‘there are eight *grahas*’ (*Bṛi. Up.* III, 2, 1); ‘Seven are the *prāṇas* of the head, two the lower ones’ (*Taitt. Samh.* V, 3, 2, 5). But as the text says nothing about those additional organs accompanying the soul, we assume that they are called *prāṇas* in a metaphorical sense only, since they all, more or less, assist the soul.—This view the next *Sūtra* sets aside.

5. But the hands and so on also; (since they assist the soul) abiding (in the body). Hence (it is) not so.

The organs are not seven only, but eleven, since the hands and the rest also contribute towards the experience and fruition of that which abides in the body, i.e. the soul, and have their separate offices, such as seizing, and so on. Hence it is not so, i.e. it must not be thought that the hands and the rest are not organs. *Buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra* and *kleśa*, on the other hand, are (not independent organs but) mere designations of the *manas*, according as the latter is engaged in the functions of deciding (*adhyavasāya*), or misconception (*abhimāna*), or thinking (*kleśa*). The organs therefore are eleven. From this it follows that in the passage ‘Ten are these *prāṇas* in man, and *Ātman* is the eleventh’ (*Bṛi. Up.* II, 4, 11), the word *Ātman* denotes the *manas*. The number *eleven* is confirmed by scriptural and *Smṛiti* passages, cp. ‘the ten organs and the one’ (*Bha. Gī.* XIII, 5); ‘ten are the *vaikārika* beings, the *manas* is the eleventh,’ and others. Where more organs

are mentioned, the different functions of the *manas* are meant; and references to smaller numbers are connected with special effects of the organs, such as accompanying the soul, and the like.—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of 'the going of the seven.'

6. And (they are) minute.

As the text 'these are all alike, all infinite' (*Bṛi. Up. I, 5, 13*), declares speech, mind, and breath to be infinite, we conclude that the *prāṇas* are all-pervading.—To this the *Sūtra* replies, that they are minute; for the text 'when the vital breath passes out of the body, all the *prāṇas* pass out after it' (*Bṛi. Up. V, 4, 2*), proves those *prāṇas* to be of limited size, and as when passing out they are not perceived by bystanders, they must be of minute size.—The text which speaks of them as infinite is a text enjoining meditation ('he who meditates on them as infinite'), and infinity there means only that abundance of activities which is an attribute of the *prāṇa* to be meditated on.

7. And the best.

By 'the best' we have to understand the chief vital air (*mukhya prāṇa*), which, in the colloquy of the *prāṇas*, is determined to be the best because it is the cause of the preservation of the body. This chief vital air the *Pūrva-pakshin* maintains to be something non-created, since Scripture (*Ri. Samh. V, 129, 2*), 'By its own law the One was breathing without wind,' shows that an effect of it, viz. the act of breathing, existed even previously to creation, at the time of a great *pralaya*; and because texts declaring it to have been created—such as 'from him is born breath' (*Mu. Up. II, 1, 3*)—may be interpreted in the same way as the texts declaring that the soul is something created (see p. 540 ff.).—To this the reply is that, since this view contradicts scriptural statements as to the oneness of all, previous to creation; and since the *Mundaka*-text declares the *prāṇa* to have been created in the same way as earth and the other elements; and since there are no texts plainly denying its createdness, the chief vital air also must

be held to have been created. The words 'the One was breathing without wind' by no means refer to the vital breath of living creatures, but intimate the existence of the highest Brahman, alone by itself; as indeed appears from the qualification 'without wind.'—That the vital breath, although really disposed of in the preceding Sûtras, is specially mentioned in the present Sûtra, is with a view to the question next raised for consideration.—Here terminates the *adhikarana* of 'the minuteness of the *prānas*.'

8. Neither air nor function, on account of its being stated separately.

Is this main vital breath nothing else but air, the second of the elements? Or is it a certain motion of the air? Or is it air that has assumed some special condition?—The first alternative may be adopted, on account of the text '*prāna* is air.'—Or, since mere air is not called breath, while this term is generally applied to that motion of air which consists in inhalation and exhalation, we may hold that breath is a motion of air.—Of both these views the Sûtra disposes by declaring 'not so, on account of separate statement.' For in the passage 'From him there is produced breath, mind, and all sense-organs, ether and air,' &c., breath and air are mentioned as two separate things. For the same reason breath also cannot be a mere motion or function of air; for the text does not mention any functions of fire and the other elements, side by side with these elements, as separate things (and this shows that breath also cannot, in that text, be interpreted to denote a function of air). The text '*prāna* is air,' on the other hand, intimates (not that breath is identical with air, but) that breath is air having assumed a special form, not a thing altogether different from it, like fire. In ordinary language, moreover, the word *breath* does not mean a mere motion but a substance to which motion belongs; we say, 'the breath moves to and fro in inhalation and exhalation.'

Is breath, which we thus know to be a modification of air, to be considered as a kind of elementary substance, like fire, earth, and so on? Not so, the next Sûtra replies.

9. But like the eye and the rest, on account of being taught with them, and for other reasons.

Breath is not an element, but like sight and the rest, a special instrument of the soul. This appears from the fact that the texts mention it together with the recognised organs of the soul, the eye, and so on; so e.g. in the colloquy of the *prāṇas*. And such common mention is suitable in the case of such things only as belong to one class.—The ‘and for other reasons’ of the Sūtra refers to the circumstance of the principal breath being specially mentioned among the organs comprised under the term ‘*prāṇa*’; cp. ‘that principal breath’ (*Kh. Up.* I, 2, 7); ‘that central breath’ (*Bṛi. Up.* I, 5, 21).—But if the chief breath is, like the eye and the other organs, an instrument of the soul, there must be some special form of activity through which it assists the soul, as the eye e. g. assists the soul by seeing. But no such activity is perceived, and the breath cannot therefore be put in the same category as the organs of sensation and action!—To this objection the next Sūtra replies.

10. And there is no objection on account of its not having an activity (*karana*); for (Scripture) thus declares.

The *karana* of the Sūtra means *kriyā*, action. The objection raised on the ground that the principal breath does not exercise any form of activity helpful to the soul, is without force, since as a matter of fact Scripture declares that there is such an activity, in so far as the vital breath supports the body with all its organs. For the text (*Kh. Up.* V, 1, 7 ff.) relates how on the successive departure of speech, and so on, the body and the other organs maintained their strength, while on the departure of the vital breath the body and all the organs at once became weak and powerless.—The conclusion therefore is that the breath, in its fivefold form of *prāṇa*, *apāṇa*, and so on, subserves the purposes of the individual soul, and thus occupies the position of an instrument, no less than the eye and the other organs.

But as those five forms of breath, viz. *prāna*, *udāna*, &c., have different names and functions they must be separate principles (and hence there is not *one* principal breath)! To this the next Sūtra replies.

11. It is designated as having five functions like mind.

As desire, and so on, are not principles different from mind, although they are different functions and produce different effects—according to the text, ‘Desire, purpose, doubt, faith, want of faith, firmness, absence of firmness, shame, reflection, fear—all this is mind’ (*Bṛi. Up. I, 5, 3*); so, on the ground of the text, ‘*prāna*, *apāna*, *vyāna*, *udāna*, *samāna*—all this is *prāna*’ (*ibid.*), *apāna* and the rest must be held to be different functions of *prāna* only, not independent principles.—Here terminates the *adhikāraṇa* of what is ‘a modification of air.’

12. And (it is) minute.

This *prāna* also is minute, since as before (i. e. as in the case of the organs) the text declares it to pass out of the body, to move, and so on, ‘him when he passes out the *prāna* follows after’ (*Bṛi. Up. V, 4, 2*). A further doubt arises, in the case of *prāna*, owing to the fact that in other texts it is spoken of as of large extent, ‘It is equal to these three worlds, equal to this Universe’ (*Bṛi. Up. I, 3, 22*); ‘On *prāna* everything is founded’; ‘For all this is shut up in *prāna*.’ But as the texts declaring the passing out, and so on, of the *prāna*, prove it to be of limited size, the all-embracingness ascribed to *prāna* in those other texts must be interpreted to mean only that the life of all living and breathing creatures depends on breath.—Here terminates the *adhikāraṇa* of ‘the minuteness of the best.’

13. But the rule (over the *prānas*) on the part of Fire and the rest, together with him to whom the *prānas* belong (i. e. the soul), is owing to the thinking of that (viz. the highest Self); on account of scriptural statement.

It has been shown that the *prāṇas*, together with the main *prāṇa*, originate from Brahman, and have a limited size. That the *prāṇas* are guided by Agni and other divine beings has also been explained on a previous occasion, viz. under Sū. II, 1, 5. And it is known from ordinary experience that the organs are ruled by the individual soul, which uses them as means of experience and fruition. And this is also established by scriptural texts, such as 'Having taken these *prāṇas* he (i.e. the soul) moves about in his own body, according to his pleasure' (*Bṛi. Up.* II, 1, 18). The question now arises whether the rule of the soul and of the presiding divine beings over the *prāṇas* depends on them (i.e. the soul and the divinities) only, or on some other being.—On them only, since they depend on no one else!—Not so, the Sūtra declares. The rule which light, and so on, i. e. Agni and the other divinities, together with him to whom the *prāṇas* belong, i. e. the soul, exercise over the *prāṇas*, proceeds from the thinking of that, i. e. from the will of the highest Self.—How is this known?—'From scriptural statement.' For Scripture teaches that the organs, together with their guiding divinities and the individual soul, depend in all their doings on the thought of the highest Person. 'He, who abiding within Fire, rules Fire from within.—He, who abiding within air—within the Self—within the eye, and so on' (*Bṛi. Up.* III, 7); 'From fear of it the wind blows, from fear of it the sun rises, from fear of it Agni and Indra, yea Death runs as the fifth' (*Taitt. Up.* II, 8, 1); 'By the command of that Imperishable one, sun and moon stand, held apart' (*Bṛi. Up.* II, 8, 9).

14. And on account of the eternity of this.

As the quality, inhering in all things, of being ruled by the highest Self, is eternal and definitely fixed by being connected with his essential nature, it is an unavoidable conclusion that the rule of the soul and of the divinities over the organs depends on the will of the highest Self. The text, 'Having sent forth this he entered into it, having entered into it he became sat and tyat' (*Taitt. Up.* II, 6), shows that the entering on the part of the highest Person

into all things, so as to be their ruler, is connected with his essential nature. Similarly *Smṛiti* says, 'Pervading this entire Universe by a portion of mine I do abide' (Bha. Gî. X, 42).—Here terminates the *adhikarana* of 'the rule of Fire and the rest.'

15. They, with the exception of the best, are organs, on account of being so designated.

Are all principles called *prâṇas* to be considered as 'organs' (*indriyâṇi*), or is the 'best,' i. e. the chief *prâṇa*, to be excepted?—All of them, without exception, are organs; for they all are called *prâṇas* equally, and they all are instruments of the soul.—Not so, the *Sûtra* replies. The 'best' one is to be excepted, since only the *prâṇas* other than the best are designated as *organs*. Texts such as 'the organs are ten and one' (Bha. Gî. XIII, 5) apply the term 'organ' only to the senses of sight and the rest, and the internal organ.

16. On account of scriptural statement of difference, and on account of difference of characteristics.

Texts such as 'from him is born *prâṇa*, and the internal organ, and all organs' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3) mention the vital breath separately from the organs, and this shows that the breath is not one of the organs. The passage indeed mentions the internal organ (*manas*) also as something separate; but in other passages the *manas* is formally included in the organs, 'the (five) organs with mind as the sixth' (Bha. Gî. XV, 7). That the vital breath differs in nature from the organ of sight and the rest, is a matter of observation. For in the state of deep sleep the function of breath is seen to continue, while those of the eye, and so on, are not perceived. The work of the organs, inclusive of the *manas*, is to act as instruments of cognition and action, while the work of breath is to maintain the body and the organs. It is for the reason that the subsistence of the organs depends on breath, that the organs themselves are called *prâṇas*. Thus Scripture says, 'they all became the form of that (breath), and therefore they are called after him *prâṇas*' (*Bṛi. Up. I, 5, 21*). 'They became

its form' means—they became its body, their activity depended on it.—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of 'the organs.'

17. But the making of names and forms (belongs) to him who renders tripartite, on account of scriptural teaching.

The Sūtras have shown that the creation of the elements and organs in their collective aspect (*samashā*) and the activity of the individual souls proceed from the highest Self; and they have also further confirmed the view that the rule which the souls exercise over their organs depends on the highest Self. A question now arises with regard to the creation of the world in its discrete aspect (*vyashā*), which consists in the differentiation of names and forms (i. e. of individual beings). Is this latter creation the work of *Hiraṇyagarbha* only, who represents the collective aggregate of all individual souls; or, fundamentally, the work of the highest Brahman having *Hiraṇyagarbha* for its body—just as the creation of water e. g. is the work of the highest Brahman having fire for its body?—The *Pûrvapakshin* maintains the former alternative. For, he says, the text 'Having entered with this living-soul-self (*anena gīvenâtmanâ*), let me differentiate names and forms' (*Kṛ. Up. VI, 3, 2*), declares the *gīva*-soul to be the agent in differentiation. For the resolve of the highest deity is expressed, not in the form 'let me differentiate names and forms by myself' (*svena rūpeṇa*), but 'by this soul-self,' i. e. by a part of the highest Self, in the form of the individual soul.—But on this interpretation the first person in '*vyākaraṇāsi*' (let me enter), and the grammatical form of 'having entered,' which indicates the agent, could not be taken in their literal, but only in an implied, sense—as is the case in a sentence such as 'Having entered the hostile army by means of a spy, I will estimate its strength' (where the real agent is not the king, who is the speaker, but the spy).—The cases are not analogous, the *Pûrvapakshin* replies. For the king and the spy are fundamentally separate, and hence the king is agent by implication only. But in the

case under discussion the soul is a part, and hence contributes to constitute the essential nature of, the highest Self; hence that highest Self itself enters and differentiates in the form of the soul. Nor can it be said that the instrumental case ('with this soul-self') has the implied meaning of association ('together with this soul-self'); for if a case can be taken in its primary sense, it is not proper to understand it in a sense which has to be expressed by means of a preposition. But the third case, *givena*, cannot here be understood even in its primary sense, i.e. that of the instrument of the action; for if Brahman is the agent in the acts of entering and differentiating, the soul is not that which is most suitable to accomplish the end of action (while yet grammar defines the *instrumental* case—*karana*—on this basis). Nor can it be said that the activity of the soul comes to an end with the entering, while the differentiation of names and forms is Brahman's work, for the past participle (*pravīṣya*) indicates (according to the rules of grammar) that the two actions—of entering and differentiating—belong to the same agent. And although the soul as being a part of the highest Self shares in its nature, yet in order to distinguish it from the highest Self, the text by means of the clause 'with *that* living Self' refers to it as something outward (not of the nature of the Self). The agent in the action of differentiation of names and forms therefore is *Hiranyagarbha*. *Smṛiti* texts also ascribe to him this activity; cp. 'he in the beginning made, from the words of the Veda, the names and forms of beings, of the gods and the rest, and of actions.'

Against this view the *Sûtra* declares itself. The differentiation of names and forms belongs to him who renders tripartite, i.e. the highest Brahman; since it is assigned by Scripture to the latter only. For the text 'That divinity thought, let me, having entered these three beings with this living-soul-self, differentiate names and forms—let me make each of these three tripartite,' shows that all the activities mentioned have one and the same agent. But the rendering tripartite cannot belong to *Brahmā* (*Hiranyagarbha*), who abides within the *Brahma*-egg, for that egg

itself is produced from fire, water, and earth, only after these elements have been rendered tripartite; and *Smṛiti* says that *Brahmā* himself originated in that egg, 'in that egg there originated *Brahmā*, the grandfather of all the worlds.' As thus the action of rendering tripartite can belong to the highest Brahman only, the differentiation of names and forms, which belongs to the same agent, also is Brahman's only.—But how then does the clause 'with that living-soul-self' fit in?—The co-ordination 'with that soul, with the Self,' shows that the term 'soul' here denotes the highest Brahman as having the soul for its body; just as in the clauses 'that fire thought'; 'it sent forth water'; 'water thought,' and so on, what is meant each time is Brahman having fire, water, and so on, for its body. The work of differentiating names and forms thus belongs to the highest Brahman which has for its body *Hiraṇyagarbha*, who represents the soul in its aggregate form. On this view the first person (in 'let me differentiate') and the agency (conveyed by the form of 'pravisya') may, without any difficulty, be taken in their primary literal senses; and the common agency, implied in the connexion of *pravisya* and *vyākaraṇi*, is accounted for. The view here set forth as to the relation of Brahman and *Hiraṇyagarbha* also explains how the accounts of *Hiraṇyagarbha*'s (*Brahmā*'s) creative activity can say that *he* differentiated names and forms.

The whole passus beginning 'that divinity thought,' therefore has the following meaning—'Having entered into those three beings, viz. Fire, Water, and Earth, with my Self which is qualified by the collective soul (as constituting its body), let me differentiate names and forms, i.e. let me produce gods and all the other kinds of individual beings, and give them names; and to that end, since fire, water, and earth have not yet mutually combined, and hence are incapable of giving rise to particular things, let me make each of them tripartite, and thus fit them for creation.'—The settled conclusion then is, that the differentiation of names and forms is the work of the highest Brahman only.

But, an objection is raised, the fact that the differentia-

tion of names and forms must be due to the same agent as the rendering tripartite, does not after all prove that the former is due to the highest Self. For the rendering tripartite may itself belong to the individual soul. For the text relates how, after the creation of the cosmic egg, a process of tripartition was going on among the individual living beings created by Brahmâ. 'Learn from me, my friend, how those three beings having reached man become tripartite, each of them. The earth when eaten is disposed of in three ways; its grossest portion becomes feces, its middle portion flesh, its subtlest portion mind,' and so on. Similarly, in the preceding section, it is described how the process of tripartition goes on in the case of fire, sun, moon, and lightning, which all belong to the world created by Brahmâ, 'the red colour of burning fire is the colour of fire,' &c. And the text moreover states the original tripartition to have taken place after the differentiation of names and forms: 'That divinity having entered into these three beings differentiated names and forms. Each of these (beings) it rendered tripartite.'—To this objection the next Sûtra replies.

18. Flesh is of earthy nature; in the case of the two others also according to the text.

The view that the description of tripartition, given in the passage 'each of these he made tripartite,' refers to a time subsequent to the creation of the mundane egg and to the gods created by Brahmâ, cannot be upheld. For from it there would follow that, as in the passage 'earth when eaten is disposed of in three ways,' &c., flesh is declared to be more subtle than feces, and mind yet subtler, it would have to be assumed—in agreement with the nature of the causal substance—that flesh is made of water and manas of fire¹. And similarly we should have to assume that urine

¹ I. e. if the tripartition of earth (i. e. solid food) when eaten, which is described in VI, 5, 1, were the same tripartition which is described in VI, 3, 3-4, we should have to conclude that the former tripartition consists, like the latter, in an admixture to earth of water and fire.

—which is the grossest part of water drunk (cp. VI, 5, 2)—is of the nature of earth, and breath, which is its subtlest part, of the nature of fire. But this is not admissible; for as the text explicitly states that earth when eaten is disposed of in three ways, flesh and mind also must be assumed to be of an earthy nature. In the same way we must frame our view concerning 'the two others,' i. e. water and fire, 'according to the text.' That means—the three parts into which water divides itself when drunk, must be taken to be all of them modifications of water, and the three parts of fire when consumed must be held to be all of them modifications of fire. Thus feces, flesh and mind are alike transformations of earth; urine, blood and breath transformations of water; bones, marrow and speech transformations of fire.

This moreover agrees with the subsequent statement (VI, 5, 4), 'For, truly, mind consists of earth, breath of water, speech of fire.' The process of tripartition referred to in VI, 3, 4, is not therefore the same as the one described in the section that tells us what becomes of food when eaten, water when drunk, &c. Were this (erroneous) assumption made, and were it thence concluded that mind, breath and speech—as being the subtlest created things—are made of fire, this would flatly contradict the complementary text quoted above ('mind consists of earth,' &c.). When the text describes how earth, water and fire, when eaten, are transformed in a threefold way, it refers to elements which had already been rendered tripartite; the process of tripartition must therefore have taken place before the creation of the cosmic egg. Without such tripartition the elements would be incapable of giving rise to any effects; such capability they acquire only by being mutually conjoined, and that is just the process of tripartition. In agreement herewith *Smṛiti* says, 'Separate from each other, without connexion, those elements with their various powers were incapable of producing creatures. But having combined completely, entered into mutual conjunction, abiding one within the other, the principles—from the highest Mahat down to

individual things—produced the mundane egg.’—When the text therefore says (VI, 3, 3) ‘The divinity having entered into those three beings with that soul-self differentiated names and forms; he made each of these tripartite,’ the order in which the text mentions the activities of differentiation and tripartition is refuted by the order demanded by the sense¹.—The text then proceeds to exemplify the process of tripartition, by means of burning fire, the sun and lightning, which indeed are things contained within the mundane egg (while yet the tripartition of elements took place before the egg, with all its contents, was created); but this is done for the information of Svetaketu, who himself is a being within the mundane egg, and has to be taught with reference to things he knows.

But, a final objection is raised, as on this view of the matter the elements—earth, water and fire—which are eaten and drunk, are already tripartite, each of them containing portions of all, and thus are of a threefold nature, how can they be designated each of them by a simple term—*earth, water, fire*?—To this the next Sūtra replies.

19. But on account of their distinctive nature there is that designation, that designation.

Each element indeed is of a threefold nature, owing to the primary tripartition; but as in each mixed element one definite element prevails—so that each element has a distinctive character of its own—a definite designation is given to each.—The repetition (of ‘that designation’) in the Sūtra indicates the completion of the adhyāya.—Here terminates the adhikaraṇa of ‘the fashioning of names and forms.’

¹ That means—in reality the tripartition of the elements came first, and after that the creation of individual beings.

THIRD ADHYĀYA.

FIRST PĀDA.

1. In obtaining another of that, it goes enveloped, (as appears) from question and explanation.

That the Vedānta-texts establish as the proper object of meditation, on the part of all men desirous of Release, the highest Brahman, which is the only cause of the entire world, which is not touched by even a shadow of imperfection, which is an ocean, as it were, of supremely exalted qualities, and which totally differs in nature from all other beings—this is the point proved in the two previous adhyāyas; there being given at the same time arguments to disprove the objections raised against the Vedānta doctrine on the basis of Smṛiti and reasoning, to refute the views held by other schools, to show that the different Vedānta-texts do not contradict each other, and to prove that the Self is the object of activities (enjoined in injunctions of meditation, and so on). In short, those two adhyāyas have set forth the essential nature of Brahman. The subsequent part of the work now makes it its task to enquire into the mode of attaining to Brahman, together with the means of attainment. The third adhyāya is concerned with an enquiry into meditation—which is the means of attaining to Brahman; and as the motive for entering on such meditation is supplied by the absence of all desire for what is other than the thing to be obtained, and by the desire for that thing, the points first to be enquired into are the imperfections of the individual soul—moving about in the different worlds, whether waking or dreaming or merged in dreamless sleep, or in the state of swoon; and those blessed characteristics by which Brahman is raised above all these imperfections. These are the topics of the first and second pādas of the adhyāya.

The first question to be considered is whether the soul,

when moving from one body into another, is enveloped by those subtle rudiments of the elements from which the new body is produced, or not. The Pûrvapakshin maintains the latter alternative ; for, he says, wherever the soul goes it can easily provide itself there with those rudiments. Other reasons supporting this primâ facie view will be mentioned and refuted further on.—The Sûtra states the view finally accepted, ‘In obtaining another “of that” it goes enveloped.’ The ‘of that’ refers back to the form, i. e. body, mentioned in II, 4, 17. The soul when moving towards another embodiment goes enveloped by the rudiments of the elements. This is known ‘from question and explanation,’ i. e. answer. Question and answer are recorded in the ‘Knowledge of the five fires’ (*Kh. Up. V, 3-10*), where Pravâhana, after having addressed to Sveta-ketu several other questions, finally asks ‘Do you know why in the fifth libation water is called man?’ In answer to this last question the text then explains how the Devas, i. e. the prâṇas attached to the soul, offer into the heavenly world, imagined as a sacrificial fire, the oblation called *ṛaddhâ* ; how this *ṛaddhâ* changes itself into a body consisting of *amṛta*, which body is called moon ; how the same prâṇas offer this body of *amṛta* in *Parganya*, imagined as a fire, whereupon the body so offered becomes rain ; how the same prâṇas throw that rain on to the earth, also imagined as a sacrificial fire, whereupon it becomes food ; how this food is then offered into man, also compared to fire, where it becomes seed ; and how, finally, this seed is offered into woman, also compared to a fire, and there becomes an embryo. The text then goes on, ‘Thus in the fifth oblation water becomes *purushavaḥas*,’ i. e. to be designated by the term *man*. And this means that the water which, in a subtle form, was throughout present in the previous oblations also, now, in that fifth oblation, assumes the form of a man.—From this question and answer it thus appears that the soul moves towards a new embodiment, together with the subtle rudiments from which the new body springs.—But the words, ‘water becomes *purushavaḥas*,’ only intimate that water assumes

the form of a man, whence we conclude that water only invests the soul during its wanderings; how then can it be held that the soul moves invested by the rudiments of all elements?—To this question the next Sūtra replies.

2. But on account of (water) consisting of the three elements; on account of predominance.

Water alone could not produce a new body; for the text *Kṛ. Up. VI, 3, 4*, 'Each of these he made tripartite,' shows that all the elements were made tripartite to the end of producing bodies. That the text under discussion mentions water only, is due to the predominance of water; and that among the elements giving rise to a new body water predominates, we infer from the fact that blood and the other humours are the predominating element in the body.

3. And on account of the going of the *prāṇas*.

That the soul goes embedded in the subtle rudiments of the elements follows therefrom also that when passing out of the old body it is said to be followed by the *prāṇas*, 'when he thus passes out, the chief *prāṇa* follows after him,' &c. (*Bṛi. Up. V, 4, 2*). Compare also *Smṛiti*: 'It draws to itself the organs of sense, with the mind for the sixth. When the Ruler (soul) obtains a new body, and passes out of another, he takes with him those organs and then moves on, as the wind takes the odours from their abodes (the flowers)' (*Bha. Gī. XV, 8*). But the *prāṇas* cannot move without a substrate, and hence we must admit that the rudiments of the elements—which are their substrate—are also moving.

4. If it be said (that it is not so) on account of scriptural statement as to going to Agni and the rest; we say no, on account of the secondary nature (of the statement).

But the text, 'when the speech of the dead person enters into fire,' &c. (*Bṛi. Up. III, 2, 13*), declares that when a person dies his organs go into fire, and so on; they cannot therefore accompany the soul. Hence the text which

asserts the latter point must be explained in some other way!—Not so, the Sūtra replies. The text stating that the organs go to fire, and so on, cannot be taken in its literal sense; for it continues, ‘the hairs of the body enter into herbs, the hair of the head into trees’ (which manifestly is not true, in its literal sense). The going of speech, the eye, and so on, must therefore be understood to mean that the different organs approach the divinities (Agni and the rest) who preside over them.

5. Should it be said, on account of absence of mention in the first (reply); we say no, for just that (is meant), on the ground of fitness.

An objection is raised to the conclusion arrived at under III, 1, 1; on the ground that in the first oblation, described in *Kh. Up. V, 4, 2*, as being made into the heavenly world, water is not mentioned at all as the thing offered. The text says, ‘on that altar the gods offer *śraddhā*’; and by *śraddhā* (belief) everybody understands a certain activity of mind. Water therefore is not the thing offered.—Not so, we reply. It is nothing else but water, which there is called *śraddhā*. For thus only question and answer have a sense. For the question is, ‘Do you know why in the fifth libation water is called man?’ and at the outset of the reply *śraddhā* is mentioned as constituting the oblation made into the heavenly world viewed as a fire. If here the word *śraddhā* did not denote water, question and answer would refer to different topics, and there would be no connexion. The form in which the final statement is introduced (*iti tu pañkamyām*, &c., ‘but thus in the fifth oblation,’ &c.), moreover, also intimates that *śraddhā* means water. The word ‘*iti*,’ *thus*, here intimates that the answer is meant to dispose of the question, ‘Do you know *how*?’ &c. *Śraddhā* becomes moon, rain, food, seed, embryo in succession, and *thus* the water comes to be called man. Moreover, the word *śraddhā* is actually used in the Veda in the sense of ‘water’; ‘he carries water, *śraddhā* indeed is water’ (*Taitt. Samh. I, 6, 8, 1*). And what the text says as

to king Soma (the moon) originating from *śraddhā* when offered, also shows that *śraddhā* must mean water.

6. 'On account of this not being stated by Scripture'; not so, on account of those who perform sacrifices and so on being understood.

But, a further objection is raised, in the whole section under discussion no mention at all is made of the soul; the section cannot therefore prove that the soul moves, enveloped by water. The text speaks only of different forms of water—*śraddhā* and the rest.—This, the *Sūtra* points out, is not so, on account of those who perform sacrifices being understood. For further on in the same chapter it is said, that those who, while destitute of the knowledge of Brahman, practise sacrifices, useful works and alms, reach the heavenly world and become there of the essence of the moon (*somarāgānaḥ*); whence, on the results of their good works being exhausted, they return again and enter on a new embryonic state (*Kh. Up. V, 10*). Now in the preceding section (*V, 9*) it is said that they offer *śraddhā* in the heavenly world, and that from that oblation there arises the king Soma—an account which clearly refers to the same process as the one described in *V, 10*. We herefrom infer that what is meant in *V, 9* is that that being which was distinguished by a body of *śraddhā*, becomes a being distinguished by a body of the nature of the moon. The word *body* denotes that the nature of which it is to be the attribute of a soul, and thus extends in its connotation up to the soul. The meaning of the section therefore is that it is the soul which moves enveloped by water and the other rudimentary elements.—But the phrase 'him the gods eat' (*V, 10, 4*) shows that the king Soma cannot be the soul, for that cannot be eaten!—To this the next *Sūtra* replies.

7. Or it is metaphorical, on account of their not knowing the Self. For thus Scripture declares.

He who performs sacrifices, and so on, and thus does not know the Self, is here below and in yonder world a mere

means of enjoyment for the devas. He serves them here, by propitiating them with sacrifices, and so on ; and when the gods, pleased with his service, have taken him up into yonder world, he there is a common means of enjoyment for them (since they are gratified by the presence of a faithful servant). That those not knowing the Self serve and benefit the gods, Scripture explicitly declares, 'He is like a beast for the devas' (*Bṛi. Up. I, 4, 10*). *Smṛiti* also declares, that while those who know the Self attain to Brahman, those who do not know it are means of enjoyment for the devas, 'To the gods go the worshippers of the gods, and they that are devoted to me go to me' (*Bha. Gī. VII, 23*). When Scripture speaks of the soul being eaten by the gods, it therefore only means that the soul is to them a source of enjoyment. That eating the soul means no more than satisfaction with it, may also be inferred from the following scriptural passage, 'The gods in truth do not eat nor do they drink ; by the mere sight of that *amṛita* they are satisfied.'—It thus remains a settled conclusion that the soul moves enveloped by the subtle rudiments of the elements.—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of 'the obtaining of another body.'

8. On the passing away of the works, with a remainder, according to Scripture and *Smṛiti* ; as it went and not so.

The text declares that those who only perform sacrifices and useful works ascend by the road of the fathers, and again return to the earth when they have fully enjoyed the fruit of their works, 'having dwelt there *yāvat sampātam*, they return by the same way' (*Kṛ. Up. V, 10, 5*). The question here arises whether the descending soul carries a certain remainder (*anusaya*) of its works or not.—It does not, since it has enjoyed the fruit of all its works. For by '*anusaya*' we have to understand that part of the *karman* which remains over and above the part retributively enjoyed ; but when the fruit of the entire *karman* has been enjoyed, there is no such remainder. And that this is so we learn from the phrase '*yāvat sampātam*

ushitvá,' which means 'having dwelt there as long as the karman lasts' (sapatanty anena svargalokam iti sampātak). Analogously another text says, 'Having obtained the end of whatever deed he does on earth, he again returns from that world to this world to action' (*Bṛi. Up. V, 4, 6*).—Against this primā facie view the Sūtra declares 'with a remainder he descends, on account of what is seen, i. e. scriptural text, and Smṛiti.' The scriptural text is the one 'Those whose conduct has been good' (*V, 10, 7*), which means that among the souls that have returned, those whose karman is good obtain a good birth as Brāhmanas or the like, while those whose karman is bad are born again as low creatures—dogs, pigs, Kāṇḍālas, and the like. This shows that the souls which have descended are still connected with good or evil karman. Smṛiti also declares this: 'Men of the several castes and orders, who always stand firm in the works prescribed for them, enjoy after death the rewards of their works, and by virtue of a remnant (of their works) they are born again in excellent countries, castes and families, endowed with beauty, long life, learning in the Vedas, wealth, good conduct, happiness and wisdom. Those who act in a contrary manner perish' (*Gautama Dha. Sū. XI, 29*); 'Afterwards when a man returns to this world he obtains, by virtue of a remainder of works, birth in a good family, beauty of form, beauty of complexion, strength, aptitude for learning, wisdom, wealth, and capacity for fulfilling his duties. Therefore, rolling like a wheel (from the one to the other), in both worlds he dwells in happiness' (*Āpast. Dha. Sū. II, 1, 2, 3*). The clause 'as long as his works last' (yāvat-sampātam) refers to that part of his works only which was performed with a view to reward (as promised for those works by the Veda); and the same holds true with regard to the passage 'whatever work man does here on earth' (*Bṛi. Up. V, 4, 6*). Nor is it possible that works, the fruit of which has not yet been enjoyed, and those the result of which has not been wiped out by expiatory ceremonies, should be destroyed by the enjoyment of the fruits of other works. Hence those who have gone to that world return with

a remnant of their works, 'as they went and not so'—i.e. in the same way as they ascended and also in a different way. For the ascent takes place by the following stages—smoke, night, the dark half of the moon, the six months of the sun's southern progress, the world of the fathers, ether, moon. The descent, on the other hand, goes from the place of the moon, through ether, wind, smoke, mist, cloud. The two journeys are alike in so far as they pass through ether, but different in so far as the descent touches wind, and so on, and does not touch the world of the fathers, and other stages of the ascent.

9. 'On account of conduct'; not so, since (*karana*) connotes works; thus Kārshṇāgini thinks.

In the phrases 'those whose works were good' (*ramanīya-karanāḥ*), and 'those whose works were bad' (*kapūyā-karanāḥ*), the word *karana* does not denote good and evil works (i.e. not such works as the Veda on the one hand enjoins as leading to certain rewards, and on the other prohibits, threatening punishment), for, in Vedic as well as ordinary language, the term *karana* is generally used in the sense of *ākāra*, i.e. general conduct. In ordinary speech such words as *ākāra*, *śila*, *vṛitta* are considered synonymous, and in the Veda we read 'whatever works (*karmāṇi*) are blameless, those should be regarded, not others. Whatever our good conduct (*su-kāritāni*) was, that should be observed by thee, nothing else' (Taitt. Up. I, 11, 2)—where 'works' and 'conduct' are distinguished, Difference in quality of birth therefore depends on conduct, not on the remainder of works performed with a view to certain results.—This *primā facie* view the Sūtra sets aside, 'not so, because the scriptural term *karana* connotes works; thus the teacher Kārshṇāgini thinks.' For mere conduct does not lead to experiences of pleasure and pain; pleasure and pain are the results of *works* in the limited sense.

10. 'There is purposelessness'; not so, on account of the dependence on that.

But if conduct has no result, it follows that good con-

duct, as enjoined in the *Smṛitis*, is useless!—Not so, we reply; for holy works enjoined by the Veda depend on conduct, in so far as a man of good conduct only is entitled to perform those works. This appears from passages such as the following: 'A man who is not pure is unfit for all religious work,' and 'Him who is devoid of good conduct the Vedas do not purify.' Kārshnāgini's view thus is, that the *karana* of the text implies *karman*.

11. But only good and evil works, thus Bādari thinks.

As the verb *ā-kar* takes *karman* for its object (*punyaṁ karmā-karati*, &c.), and as the separate denotation (i. e. the use of apparently equivalent words, viz. *ākar* and *karman*) can be accounted for on the ground that one of them refers to works established by manifest texts, and the other to texts inferred from actually existing rules of good conduct; and as, when the primary meaning is possible, no secondary meaning must be adopted; nothing else but good and evil works (in the Vedic sense) are denoted by the word *karana*: such is the opinion of the teacher Bādari. This opinion of Bādari, the author of the Sūtra states as representing his own. On the other hand, he adopts the view of Kārshnāgini in so far as he considers such items of virtuous conduct as the *Sandhyā*—which are enjoined by scriptural texts, the existence of which is inferred on the basis of conduct as enjoined by *Smṛiti*—to have the result of qualifying the agent for the performance of other works.—The conclusion therefore is that the souls descend, carrying a remnant of their works.—Here terminates the *adhikarana* of 'the passing of works.'

12. Of those also who do not perform sacrifices (the ascent) is declared by Scripture.

It has been said that those who perform only sacrifices, and so on, go to the moon and thence return with a remainder of their works. The question now arises whether those also who do not perform sacrifices go to the moon. The phrase 'who do not perform sacrifices' denotes evil-

doers of two kinds, viz. those who do not do what is enjoined, and those who do what is forbidden.—These also go to the moon, the Pūrvapakshin maintains; for the text contains a statement to that effect, 'All who depart from this world go to the moon' (Ka. Up. I, 2)—where it is said that all go, without any distinction. So that those who perform good works and those who perform evil works, equally go to the moon.—This the next Sūtra negatives.

13. But of the others having enjoyed in *Samyama*, there is ascent and descent; as such a course is declared.

Of the others, i.e. those who do not perform sacrifices, and so on, there is ascent to the moon and descent from there, only after they have in the kingdom of Yama suffered the punishments due to their actions. For the text declares that evil-doers fall under the power of Yama, and have to go to him, 'He who thinks, this is the world there is no other, falls again and again under my sway' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 6); 'the son of Vivasvat, the gathering place of men' (*Rik Samh.* X, 14, 1); 'King Yama,' and other texts.

14. *Smṛiti* texts also declare this.

That all beings are under the sway of Yama, Parāśara also and other *Smṛiti* writers declare, 'And all these pass under the sway of Yama.'

15. Moreover there are seven.

The *Smṛitis* moreover declare that there are seven hells, called Raurava, and so on, to which evil-doers have to go.—But how do they, if moving about in those seven places, reach the palace of Yama?

16. On account of his activity there also, there is no contradiction.

As their going to those seven places also is due to the command of Yama, there is no contradiction.—Thus those also who do not perform sacrifices, and so on, after having gone to the world of Yama, and there undergone punish-

ments according to the nature of their works, later on ascend to the moon and again descend from there.—Of this conclusion the next Sūtra disposes.

17. But, of knowledge and work—as these are the leading topics.

The 'but' sets aside the view developed so far. It cannot be admitted that those also who do not perform sacrifices, and so on, reach the moon; because the path of the gods and the path of the fathers are meant for the enjoyment of the fruits 'of knowledge and work.' That is to say—as those who do not perform sacrifices cannot ascend by the path of the gods, since they are destitute of knowledge; so they also cannot go by the path of the fathers, since they are destitute of meritorious works. And that these two paths are dependent respectively on knowledge and works, we know from the fact that these two are the leading topics. For knowledge forms the leading topic with regard to the path of the gods, 'Those who know this, and those who in the forest follow faith and austerities, go to light,' &c.; and works have the same position with regard to the path of the fathers, 'they who living in a village perform sacrifices, &c. go to the smoke,' &c. The text, 'all those who depart from this world go to the moon,' must therefore be interpreted to mean 'all those who perform sacrifices go to the moon.'—But if evil-doers do not go to the moon, the fifth oblation cannot take place, and no new body can be produced. For the text says, 'In the fifth oblation water is called man,' and, as we have shown, that fifth oblation presupposes the soul's going to the moon. In order, therefore, to understand how in their case also a new embodiment is possible, it must needs be admitted that they also ascend to the moon.—To this the next Sūtra replies.

18. Not in the case of the third (place), as it is thus perceived.

The third 'place' does not, for the origination of a new body, depend on the fifth oblation. The term, 'the third

place,' denotes mere evil-doers. That these do not, for the origination of a new body, depend on the fifth oblation, is seen from Scripture. For, in answer to the question 'Do you know why that world never becomes full?' the text says, 'On neither of these two ways are those small creatures continually returning, of whom it may be said, Live and die. This is the third place. Therefore that world never becomes full.' As this passage states that in consequence of 'the third place' (i. e. the creatures forming a third class) not ascending to and descending from the heavenly world that world never becomes full, it follows that that third place does not, for the origination of bodies, depend on the fifth oblation. The clause, 'in the fifth oblation,' moreover, merely states that the connexion of water with the fifth fire is the cause of the water 'being called man' (i. e. becoming an embryo), but does not deny the origination of embryos in other ways; for the text contains no word asserting such a limitation.

19. It moreover is recorded, in the world.

Smṛiti, moreover, states that the bodies of some specially meritorious persons, such as Draupadī, *Drishadyumna*, and others, were formed independently of the fifth oblation' (i. e. sexual union).

20. And on account of its being seen.

And it is seen in Scripture also, that the bodies of some beings originate independently of the fifth oblation: 'Of all beings there are indeed three origins only, that which springs from an egg, that which springs from a living being, that which springs from a germ' (*Kh. Up. VI, 3, 1*). It is observed that from among these beings those springing from a germ and those springing from heat originate without that fifth oblation.—But the text quoted does not refer to the creatures springing from heat; for it says that there are three origins only!—To this the next *Sūtra* replies.

21. The third term includes that which springs from heat.

Creatures sprung from heat are included in the third term—viz. that which springs from a germ—which is exhibited in the text quoted. The settled conclusion therefore is that the evil-doers do not go to the moon.—Here terminates the *adhikarāṇa* of 'those who do not perform sacrifices.'

22. There is entering into similarity of being with those, there being a reason.

The text describes the manner in which those who perform sacrifices, and so on, descend from the moon as follows: 'They return again that way as they came, to the ether, from the ether to the air. Then having become air they become smoke, having become smoke they become mist,' &c. The doubt here arises whether the soul when reaching ether, and so on, becomes ether in the same sense as here on earth it becomes a man or other being, or merely becomes similar to ether, and so on.—The former view is the true one; for as the soul in the *śraddhā* state becomes the moon, so it must likewise be held to *become* ether, and so on, there being no reason for a difference in the two cases.—This *primā facie* view the Sūtra sets aside. The descending soul enters into similarity of being with ether, and so on; since there is a reason for this. When the soul becomes a man or becomes the moon, there is a reason for that, since it thereby becomes capacitated for the enjoyment of pain and pleasure. But there is no similar reason for the soul becoming ether, and so on, and hence the statement that the soul becomes ether, and so on, can only mean that, owing to contact with them, it becomes similar to them.—Here terminates the *adhikarāṇa* of 'entering into similarity of being.'

23. Not very long; on account of special statement.

Does the soul in its descent through ether, and so on, stay at each stage for a not very long time, or is there nothing to define that time?—It stays at each stage for an indefinite time, there being nothing to define the time.—

Not so, the Sūtra decides. For there is a special statement, i.e. the text says that when the soul has become rice or grain or the like, the passing out of that stage is beset with difficulties. From this we infer that as there is no such statement concerning the earlier stages, the soul stays at each of them for a short time only.—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of 'the not very long time.'

24. Into (plants) animated by other souls, because the statement is as in the previous cases.

The text declares that the descending souls are born as rice, corn, &c., 'they are born here as rice, corn, herbs, trees,' &c. The question here is whether the souls cling to plants animated by other souls which have those plants for their bodies; or whether the descending souls themselves are born with those plants for their bodies.—The latter view is the right one; for the text says, 'they are born as rice, grain,' and so on, and this expression is of the same kind as when we say 'he is born as a man, as a deva,' and so on. The text therefore means that the souls are embodied in the different plants.—This view the Sūtra rejects. The souls merely cling to those plants which constitute the bodies of other souls; 'since the statement is as in the previous cases,' i.e. because the text only says that the souls become plants as it had previously been said that they become ether, and so on. Where the text means to say that the soul enters on the condition of an enjoying soul (i.e. of a soul assuming a new body for the purpose of retributive enjoyment), it refers to the deeds which lead to such enjoyment; so e.g. in the passage, 'Those whose works have been good obtain a good birth,' &c. But in the text under discussion there is no such reference to *karman*. For those works—viz. sacrifices and the like—which were undertaken with a view to reward, such as enjoyment of the heavenly world, are, in the case of the descending souls, completely wiped out by the enjoyment of the heavenly world (which precedes the descent of the souls); and those works on the other hand, the action of which has not yet begun, lead to the embodiments men-

tioned further on ('Those whose works are good'). And in the interval between those two conditions no new karman originates. When, therefore, the text says that the souls are born as plants, the statement cannot be taken in its literal sense.

25. It is unholy. Not so, on the ground of Scripture.

The conclusion arrived at above cannot be accepted, since there is a reason why the descending soul should enter on the condition of an enjoying soul. Such works as sacrifices, the fruit of which is the enjoyment of the heavenly world, are mixed with evil, for they imply injury to living beings as in the case of the goat offered to Agnīshomau. And such injury is evil as it is forbidden by texts such as 'let him not harm any creature.' Nor can it be said that the injunctions of sacrificing animals constitute exceptions to the general rule of not harming any creature.—For the two injunctions refer to different things. The injunction to kill the goat for Agnīshomau intimates that the killing of the animal subserves the accomplishment of the sacrifice, while the injunction not to 'harm' teaches that such harming has disastrous consequences. Should it be said that the prohibition of harming does not refer to such actions as the sacrifice of the goat which proceed on the basis of scriptural injunction, but only to such actions as spring from natural passion or desire (rāga); we remark that in the case of sacrifices also the action is equally prompted by natural desire. Injunctions such as 'He who desires the heavenly world is to sacrifice,' teach that sacrifices are to be undertaken by persons desirous of certain pleasant results, and such persons having thus learned by what means the result is to be accomplished proceed to action from the natural desire of the result. This applies to the killing of the goat also which is offered to Agnīshomau; man learns from Scripture that such actions help to accomplish the sacrifice which effects the result, and then performs those actions from natural desire. The case in no way differs from that of harm

done in ordinary life—where the agent always is prompted by natural desire, having somehow arrived at the conclusion that his action will accomplish something aimed at by himself. The same holds good with regard to works of permanent obligation. Men learn from Scripture that through the performance of the special duties of their caste they attain happiness of the highest kind, and then apply themselves to their duties from a natural desire of such happiness, and therefore such works also are mixed with evil. Hence the souls of those who have performed sacrifices, and so on, which contain an element of evil, at first experience in the heavenly world that result which is to be enjoyed there, and then embodying themselves in non-moving things such as plants, experience the fruit of that part of their actions which is of a harmful nature. That embodiment in non-moving beings is the result of evil deeds *Smṛiti* declares: 'Owing to those defects of work which are due to the body, a man becomes a non-moving being.' From all this it follows that the souls embody themselves in plants to the end of enjoying the fruits of their works.—To this the *Sūtra* replies—it is not so, on account of scriptural statement. For Scripture declares that the killing of sacrificial animals makes them to go up to the heavenly world, and therefore is not of the nature of harm. This is declared in the text, 'The animal killed at the sacrifice having assumed a divine body goes to the heavenly world'; 'with a golden body it ascends to the heavenly world.' An action which is the means of supreme exaltation is not of the nature of harm, even if it involves some little pain; it rather is of beneficial nature.—With this the mantra also agrees: 'Thou dost not die, thou goest to the gods on easy paths; where virtuous men go, not evil-doers, there the divine *Savitrī* may lead thee.' An act which has a healing tendency, although it may cause a transitory pain, men of insight declare to be preservative and beneficial.

26. After that conjunction with him who performs the act of generation.

The declaration that the descending souls *become* rice plants, and so on, cannot be taken literally for that reason also, that the text afterwards declares them to *become* those who perform the act of generation : 'Whoever the being may be that eats the food and begets offspring, that being he (i.e. the soul that has descended) becomes.' Now the meaning of this latter text can only be that the soul enters into conjunction with the creature which eats the grain ; and hence we have to interpret the previous text, as to the soul's becoming a plant, in the same way.

27. From the yoni the body.

Only after having reached a yoni the soul, affected with a remnant of its works, obtains a new body, and only in a body there can be the enjoyment of pleasure and pain. When, therefore, previous to that the soul is said to reach ether, wind, and so on, this can only mean that it enters into conjunction with them.—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of 'that animated by another soul.'

SECOND PĀDA.

1. In the intermediate sphere the creation (is effected by the soul); for (Scripture) says (so).

So far it has been shown that the soul in the waking state suffers affliction since, in accordance with its deeds, it goes, returns, is born, and so on. Next an enquiry is instituted into its condition in the state of dream. With reference to the state of dreaming Scripture says, 'There are no chariots in that state, no horses, no roads; then he creates chariots, horses and roads. There are no blessings, no happiness, no joys; then he himself creates blessings, happiness, joys, and so on. For he is the creator' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 3, 10*). A doubt here arises whether this creation of chariots and the rest is accomplished by the individual soul, or by the Lord.—'The creation in the intermediate state' is due to the individual soul only. 'The intermediate state' means the sphere of dreams, in agreement with the passage 'There is a third intermediate state, the place of dreams' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 3, 1*). And that creation is effected by the soul only; for what is referred to in the passages 'he creates,' 'For he is the maker,' is none other but the dreaming soul.

2. And some (state the soul to be) the shaper; and sons, and so on.

And the followers of one śākhā state in their text that the dreaming soul is the shaper of its desires: 'He, the person who is awake in those who sleep, shaping one desired thing (*kāma*) after the other.' The term '*kāma*' there denotes not mere desires, but such things as sons and the like which are objects of desire. For sons and so on are introduced as '*kāmas*' in previous passages: 'Ask for all *kāmas* according to thy wish'; 'Choose sons and grandsons living a hundred years' (*I, 1, 25; 23*). The individual soul thus creates chariots, and so on, in its dreams. That the soul has the power of realising all its

wishes is known from the declaration of Pragāpati. It is therefore able to create, even in the absence of special instruments.—This view is set aside by the next Sūtra.

3. But it is mere Mâyâ; on account of the true nature (of the soul) not being fully manifested.

The things appearing in dreams—chariots, lotus tanks, and so on—are absolute Mâyâ, i. e. things created by the Supreme Person. For the term 'Mâyâ' denotes wonderful things, as appears from passages such as 'She was born in the race of Ganaka, appearing like the wonderful power of the divine being in bodily shape' (devamâyâ). The sense of the passage 'there are no chariots,' &c. then is—there are no chariots and horses to be perceived by any other person but the dreaming one; and then 'he creates chariots,' &c.—i. e. the Supreme Person creates things to be perceived by the dreamer and persisting for a certain time only. Those things therefore are of a wonderful nature (but not illusions). And the creation of such wonderful things is possible for the Supreme Person who can immediately realise all his wishes; but not for the individual soul. The latter also, indeed, fundamentally possesses that power; but as in the Samsâra state the true nature of the soul is not fully manifested, it is then incapable of accomplishing such wonderful creations. The text 'the person shaping one desired thing after the other' declares the Supreme Person to be the creator, for the clauses immediately preceding and following that text (viz. 'He who is awake in those who sleep'; and 'that is the Bright, that is Brahman, that alone is called the Immortal; all worlds are contained in it and no one goes beyond'—Ka. Up. II, 5, 8) mention attributes distinctively characteristic of the Supreme Person. And the Bri. Up. text, 'For he is the maker,' must therefore, in agreement with the Kaṭha-text, also be understood as declaring that it is the Supreme Person only that creates the things seen in a dream.—But if it is the true nature of the soul to be free from all imperfections, and so on, why then does this not manifest itself?—To this the next Sūtra replies.

4. But owing to the wish of the highest it is hidden; for from that are its bondage and the opposite state.

The *but* sets the objection aside. Owing to the wish of the highest, i.e. the Supreme Person, the essential nature of the individual soul is hidden. The Supreme Person hides the true, essentially blessed, nature of the soul which is in a state of sin owing to the endless chain of karman. For this reason we find it stated in Scripture that the bondage and release of the soul result from the wish of the Supreme Person only 'when he finds freedom from fear and rest in that invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported; then he has gone to fearlessness'; 'for he alone causes blessedness'; 'from fear of it the wind blows' (Taitt. Up. II, 7, 8).

5. Or that (results) also from connexion with the body.

The obscuration of the soul's true nature results either from the soul's connexion with the body or from its connexion with the power of matter in a subtle state. As long as the creation lasts, the soul is obscured by its connexion with matter in the form of a body; at the time of a pralaya, on the other hand, by its connexion with matter of so exceedingly subtle a kind as not to admit of differentiation by means of name and form. As thus its true nature is not manifest, the soul is unable to create, in dreams, chariots, lotus tanks, and so on, by its mere wish. And what the texts say about a being that is awake in those who sleep and is the abode of all worlds ('in that all the worlds abide, and no one goes beyond it'—Ka. Up. II, 4, 9) can apply to the Supreme Person only. The things seen by an individual soul in its dreams therefore are specially created by the Supreme Person, and are meant by him to be a retribution—whether reward or punishment—for deeds of minor importance; they therefore last for the time of the dream only, and are perceived by that one soul only.

6. And it is suggestive, according to Scripture; this the experts also declare.

The things seen in dreams are not created by the wish of the individual soul for this reason also, that according to Scripture dreams are prophetic of future good or ill fortune. 'When a man engaged in some work undertaken for some special wish sees a woman in his dream, he may infer success from his dream vision.' Those also who understand the science of dreams teach that dreams foreshadow good and evil fortune. But that which depends on one's own wish can have no prophetic quality; and as ill fortune is not desired the dreamer would create for himself only such visions as would indicate good fortune. Hence the creation which takes place in dreams can be the Lord's work only.—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of 'the intermediate state.'

7. The absence of that takes place in the *nâdîs* and in the Self, according to scriptural statement.

Next the state of deep dreamless sleep is enquired into. Scripture says, 'When a man is asleep, reposing and at perfect rest, so that he sees no dream, then he lies asleep in those *nâdîs*' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 6, 3*); 'When he is in profound sleep and is conscious of nothing, there are seventy-two thousand veins called *hita* which from the heart spread through the pericardium. Through them he moves forth and rests in the pericardium' (*Bṛi. Up. II, 1, 19*). 'When a man sleeps here, he becomes united with the True' (*Kh. Up. VI, 8, 1*). These texts declare the veins, the pericardium, and Brahman to be the place of deep sleep; and hence there is a doubt whether each of them in turns, or all of them together, are that place.—There is an option between them, since they are not in mutual dependence, and since the sleeping soul cannot at the same time be in several places!—To this the *Sūtra* replies—the absence of dreams, i. e. deep sleep takes place in the veins, in the pericardium, and in the highest Self together; since these three are declared by Scripture. When different alternatives may be combined, on the ground of there being

different effects in each case, it is improper to assume an option which implies sublation of some of the alternatives. And in the present case such combination is possible, the veins and the pericardium holding the position of a mansion, as it were, and a couch within the mansion, while Brahman is the pillow, as it were. Thus Brahman alone is the immediate resting-place of the sleeping soul.

8. Hence the awaking from that.

Since Brahman alone directly is the place of deep sleep, Scripture is able to declare that the souls awake from that, i.e. Brahman; compare 'Having come back from the True they do not know that they come from the True' (*Kh. Up. VI, 10, 2*), and other texts.—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of 'the absence of that.'

9. But the same, on account of work, remembrance, text, and injunction.

Does the same person who had gone to sleep rise again at the time of waking, or a different one?—Since the soul in deep sleep frees itself from all limiting adjuncts, unites itself with Brahman, and thus being in no way different from the released soul, is no longer in any way connected with its previous body, organs, and so on; the person rising from sleep is a different one.—This view the *Sūtra* sets aside, saying 'but the same.' For there remains the work, i.e. the good and evil deeds previously done by the sleeper, for which the same person has to undergo retribution before the knowledge of truth arises. There is next remembrance—'I, the waking person, am the same as I who was asleep.' Scripture also declares this: 'Whatever these creatures are here, whether a lion, or tiger, or wolf, &c., that they become again' (*Kh. Up. VI, 10, 2*). And, lastly, the injunctions which enjoin certain acts for the sake of final Release would be purportless if the person merged in deep sleep attained Release. Nor can it be said that the sleeping soul is free from all limiting adjuncts and manifests itself in its true nature (so as not to be different from the released soul). For with regard to the sleeping

person the text says, 'In truth he thus does not know himself that he is I, nor does he know anything that exists. He is gone to utter annihilation. I see no good in this' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 11, 1*); while, on the other hand, the texts, 'Having approached the highest light he manifests himself in his true nature; he moves about there laughing, playing, delighting himself'; 'He becomes a Self-ruler; he moves about in all the worlds according to his wish'; 'The seeing one sees everything, and attains everything everywhere' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 3*; *VII, 25, 2*; *26, 2*), declare that the released soul is all-knowing, and so on. What is true about the sleeping person is that he is still comprised within the *Samsāra*, but for the time having put off all instruments of knowledge and action and become incapable of knowledge and enjoyment repairs to the place of utter rest, i. e. the highest Self, and having there refreshed himself, again rises to new enjoyment of action.—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of 'work, remembrance, text, and injunction.'

10. In the swooning person there is half-combination; this being the remaining (hypothesis).

With regard to a person lying in a swoon or stunned, the question arises whether that state of swoon is one of the other states, viz. deep sleep and so on, or whether it is a special condition of its own.—The former alternative must be accepted. For the term 'swoon' may be explained as denoting either deep sleep or some other acknowledged state, and there is no authority for assuming an altogether different new state.—This view the *Sūtra* sets aside. The condition of a swooning person consists in reaching half, viz. of what leads to death; for this is the only hypothesis remaining. A swoon cannot be either dreaming or being awake; for in a swoon there is no consciousness. And as it is different in character as well as in the occasions giving rise to it from deep sleep and death, it cannot be either of those two states; for there are special circumstances occasioning a swoon, such as a blow on the head. The only possible alternative then is to view a swoon as a state in

which there is made a half-way approach to death. For while death consists in the complete cessation of the soul's connexion with the body or organs of any kind, a swoon consists in the soul's remaining connected with the subtle body and organs only.—Here terminates the *adhikarâṇa* of 'the swooning person.'

11. Not on account of place even (is there any imperfection) of the Highest; for everywhere (it is described) as having twofold characteristics.

The different states of the individual soul have been discussed, to the end that an insight into their imperfections may give rise to indifference towards all worldly enjoyments. Next now, in order to give rise to the desire of attaining to Brahman, the Sûtras proceed to expound how Brahman's nature is raised above all imperfections and constituted by mere blessed qualities. The following point requires to be considered first. Do those imperfections which cling to the individual soul in consequence of its different states—viz. the waking state, dreams, deep sleep, swoon, departure from the body—affect also the highest Brahman which as its inner Ruler abides within the soul in those different states, or not?—They do affect it, since Brahman abides within the bodies which are in those different states.—But Sûtras such as I, 2, 8 have already declared that the highest Brahman, because not subject to the influence of *karman*, is free from all imperfections; how then can imperfections cling to it for the reason that it is connected with this or that place?—In the following way. As was shown under III, 2, 6, works give rise to imperfection and suffering in so far as they cause the connexion of the soul with a body. The efficient cause therein is the imperfection inherent in the connexion with a body; for otherwise the works themselves would directly give rise to pain, and what then would be the use of the connexion with a body? Hence, even in the case of a being not subject to *karman*, its connexion with various unholy bodies will cause imperfection and suffering. And even when such a being voluntarily enters into such bodies in order to rule

them, connexion with imperfections is unavoidable ; no less than to be immersed in blood and purulent matter, even if done voluntarily, will make a man unclean. Although therefore Brahman is the sole cause of the world and a treasure-house of all blessed qualities, yet it is affected by the imperfections springing therefrom that, as declared by Scripture, it abides within matter, bodies, and their parts, and thus is connected with them (cp. 'he who abides within earth, within the soul, within the eye, within the seed,' &c., *Bṛi. Up. III, 7, 3*).

Of this *primâ facie* view the Sūtra disposes by saying— 'Not even from place, such as earth, soul, &c., is there possible for the highest Self a shadow even of imperfection ; since everywhere in Scripture as well as *Smṛiti* Brahman is described as having characteristics of a double kind ; viz. on the one hand freedom from all imperfections, and on the other possession of all blessed qualities. For Scripture says that the Supreme Person is free from evil, free from old age, free from death, free from grief, free from hunger and thirst ; that all his wishes realise themselves, that all its purposes realise themselves' (*Kṛ. Up. VIII, 1, 5*). And *Smṛiti* says, 'He comprises within himself all blessed qualities, by a particle of his power the whole mass of beings is supported. In him there are combined energy, strength, might, wisdom, valour, and all other noble qualities. He is the Highest of the high, no pain or other imperfections affect him, the Lord of all, high or low. From all evil he is free, he whose name is Vishnu, the highest abode.' These and other passages teach that Brahman possesses the double characteristics stated above.

12. Should it be said 'on account of difference' ; not so, because with reference to each the text says what is not that.

But, an objection is raised, we observe, that the individual soul also, although in reality possessing the same twofold attributes, viz. freedom from all evil and so on, as we learn from the teaching of *Pragâpati* (*Kṛ. Up. VIII, 7*), yet is affected with imperfections owing to the fact that it is

connected with bodies, divine, human, and so on, and thus undergoes a variety of conditions. Analogously we cannot avoid the conclusion that the inner Ruler also, although in reality possessing those same twofold attributes, is also affected by imperfection, because through its connexion with those different bodies it likewise undergoes a variety of conditions.—This objection the Sūtra sets aside in the words, 'not so, because with reference to each the text says what is not that,' i.e. what is contrary. For where the text says that the inner Ruler dwells within the earth, within the soul, within the eye, and so on, it concludes each clause by saying, 'that is thy Self, the inner Ruler, the immortal one,' i.e. declares the inner Ruler to be immortal, and thus denies of him any imperfections due to his connexion with the bodies which he voluntarily enters in order to rule them. The true (perfect) nature of the individual soul, on the other hand, is obscured as long as it is connected with a body, as we have explained under III, 2, 5.—But, as the Pūrvapakshin has pointed out, even if the highest Self voluntarily enters into bodies, it cannot escape connexion with the imperfections which depend on the essential nature of those bodies.—Not so, we reply. The fact is, that not even non-sentient things are, essentially or intrinsically, bad; but in accordance with the nature of the works of those beings which are under the rule of karman, one thing, owing to the will of the Supreme Person, causes pain to one man at one time and pleasure at another time, and causes pleasure or pain to one person and the opposite to another person. If the effects of things depended on their own nature only, everything would at all times be productive for all persons, either of pleasure only or of pain only. But this is not observed to be the case. In agreement herewith Smṛiti says, 'Because one and the same thing causes pain and pleasure and envy and wrath, the nature of a thing cannot lie in itself. As the same thing which erst gave rise to love causes pain later on, and that which once caused anger now causes satisfaction, nothing is in itself of the nature either of pleasure or of pain.' To the soul therefore which is sub-

ject to karman the connexion with different things is the source of imperfection and suffering, in agreement with the nature of its works; while to the highest Brahman, which is subject to itself only, the same connexion is the source of playful sport, consisting therein that he in various ways guides and rules those things.

13. Some also (teach) thus.

Moreover, the followers of one śākhā explicitly teach that the connexion with one and the same body is for the individual soul a source of disadvantage, while for the highest Brahman it is nothing of the kind, but constitutes an accession of glory in so far as it manifests him as a Lord and Ruler, 'Two birds, inseparable friends, cling to the same tree. One of them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1).—But the text, 'Having entered by means of that *gīva*-self I will differentiate names and forms,' teaches that the differentiation of names and forms depends on the entering into the elements of the *gīva*-soul whose Self is Brahman, and this implies that Brahman also, as the Self of the individual soul, possesses definite shapes, divine, human, and so on, and is to be denominated by the corresponding names. Brahman thus falls within the sphere of beings to which injunctions and prohibitions are addressed—such as 'a *Brāhmaṇa* is to sacrifice'—and hence necessarily is under the power of karman.—To this the next Sūtra replies.

14. For (Brahman is) without form merely, since it is the principal agent with regard to that.

Brahman, although by entering into bodies, human, divine, and so on, it becomes connected with various forms, yet is in itself altogether devoid of form, and therefore does not share that subjection to karman which in the case of the soul is due to its embodiedness.—Why?—Because as it is that which brings about names and forms it stands to them in the relation of a superior (*pradhāna*). For the text, 'The Ether (Brahman) indeed is the accom-

plisher of names and forms; that which is without these two is Brahman,' teaches that Brahman, although entering into all beings, is not touched by name and form, but is that which brings about name and form.—But, an objection is raised, if Brahman is the inner ruler of beings in so far as he has them for its body, how can it be said that it is altogether destitute of form?—There is a difference, we reply. The individual soul is connected with the shape of the body in which it dwells because it participates in the pleasures and pains to which the body gives rise; but as Brahman does not share those pleasures and pains, it has no shape or form. And the scriptural injunctions and prohibitions apply to those only who are under the power of karman. The highest Brahman therefore is like a being without form, and hence, although abiding within all things, free from all imperfection and endowed with all blessed qualities.

But, an objection is raised, texts such as 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' suggest a Brahman whose nature is constituted exclusively by non-differentiated light; while at the same time a Brahman endowed with qualities—such as omniscience, being the cause of the world, being the inner Self of all, having the power of immediately realising its wishes and purposes—is expressly negated by texts such as 'not so, not so' (*Bri. Up. II, 3, 6*), and therefore must be held to be false. How then can it be maintained that Brahman possesses the 'twofold characteristics' mentioned under Sûtra 11?—To this the next Sûtra replies.

15. And in the same way as (a Brahman) consisting of light; (the texts thus) not being devoid of meaning.

In order that texts such as 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' may not be devoid of meaning, we have to admit that light (intelligence) constitutes the essential nature of Brahman. But analogously we have also to admit that Brahman possesses the 'twofold characteristics'; for otherwise the texts declaring it to be free from all

imperfections, all-knowing, the cause of the world, and so on, would in their turn be devoid of meaning.

16. And (the text) says so much only.

Moreover the text 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' only teaches that Brahman has light for its essential nature, and does not negative those other attributes of Brahman—omniscience, being the cause of the world, &c.—which are intimated by other texts. What is the object of the negation in 'not so, not so' will be shown further on.

17. (This Scripture) also shows, and it is also stated in *Smṛiti*.

That Brahman is a treasure as it were of all blessed qualities and free from all imperfections, the whole body of Vedānta-texts clearly declares: 'That highest great lord of lords, that highest deity of deities'; 'He is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of him neither parent nor lord'; 'There is no effect and no cause known of him, no one is seen like unto him or higher. His high power is revealed as manifold, as essential action of knowledge and strength' (*Svet. Up. VI, 7-9*); 'He who is all-knowing, whose brooding consists of knowledge' (*Mu. I, 1, 9*); 'From fear of him the wind blows, from fear of him the sun moves'; 'That is one bliss of Brahman' (*Taitt. Up. II, 8*); 'That from which all speech with the mind turns away, not having reached it, knowing the bliss of that Brahman man fears nothing' (*Taitt. Up. II, 9*); 'He who is without parts, without action, tranquil, without fault, without taint' (*Svet. Up. VI, 19*).—And *Smṛiti*: 'He who knows me to be unborn and without a beginning, the Supreme Lord of the worlds'; 'Pervading this entire universe, by one part of mine I do abide'; 'With me as supervisor *Prakṛiti* brings forth the universe of the movable and the immovable, and for this reason the world does ever move round'; 'But another is the Supreme Person, who is called the Supreme Spirit, who pervading the three worlds supports them—the eternal Lord' (*Bha.*

Gi. X, 3; 42; IX, 10; XV, 17); 'The all-working, all-powerful one, rich in knowledge and strength, who becomes neither less nor more, who is self-dependent, without beginning, master of all; who knows neither weariness nor exhaustion, nor fear, wrath and desire; the blameless one, raised above all, without support, imperishable.'—As thus Brahman in whatever place it may abide has the 'twofold characteristics,' the imperfections dependent on those places do not touch it.

18. For this very reason comparisons, such as reflected images of the sun and the like.

Because Brahman, although abiding in manifold places, ever possesses the twofold characteristics, and hence does not share the imperfections due to those places, scriptural texts illustrate its purity in the midst of inferior surroundings by comparing it to the sun reflected in water, mirrors, and the like. Compare e.g. 'As the one ether is rendered manifold by jars and the like, or as the one sun becomes manifold in several sheets of water; thus the one Self is rendered manifold by abiding in many places. For the Self of all beings, although one, abides in each separate being and is thus seen as one and many at the same time, as the moon reflected in water.'

19. But because it is not apprehended like water, there is no equality.

The 'but' indicates an objection.—The highest Self is not apprehended in earth and other places in the same way as the sun or a face is apprehended in water or a mirror. For the sun and a face are erroneously apprehended as abiding in water or a mirror; they do not really abide there. When, on the other hand, Scripture tells us that the highest Self dwells in the earth, in water, in the soul, &c., we apprehend it as really dwelling in all those places. That the imperfections caused by water and mirrors do not attach themselves to the sun or a face is due to the fact that the sun and the face do not really abide in the water and the mirror. Hence there is no real parallelism

between the thing compared (the highest Self) and the thing to which it is compared (the reflected image).

20. The participation (on Brahman's part) in increase and decrease, due to its abiding within (is denied); on account of the appropriateness of both (comparisons), and because thus it is seen.

The comparison of the highest Self to the reflected sun and the rest is meant only to deny of the Self that it participates in the imperfections—such as increase, decrease, and the like—which attach to the earth and the other beings within which the Self abides.—How do we know this?—From the circumstance that on this supposition both comparisons are appropriate. In the scriptural text quoted above Brahman is compared to ether, which although one becomes manifold through the things—jars and so on—within it; and to the sun, which is multiplied by the sheets of water in which he is reflected. Now the employment of these comparisons—with ether which really does abide within the jars and so on, and with the sun which in reality does not abide in the water—is appropriate only if they are meant to convey the idea that the highest Self does not participate in the imperfections inherent in earth and so on. Just as ether, although connecting itself separately with jars, pots, and so on, which undergo increase and decrease, is not itself touched by these imperfections; and just as the sun, although seen in sheets of water of unequal extent, is not touched by their increase and decrease; thus the highest Self, although abiding within variously-shaped beings, whether non-sentient like earth or sentient, remains untouched by their various imperfections—increase, decrease, and so on—, remains one although abiding in all of them, and ever keeps the treasure of its blessed qualities unsullied by an atom even of impurity.—The comparison of Brahman with the reflected sun holds good on the following account. As the sun is not touched by the imperfections belonging to the water, since he does not really abide in the water and hence there is no reason for his sharing those imperfections, thus the highest Self,

which really abides within earth and the rest, is not affected by their imperfections ; for as the nature of the highest Self is essentially antagonistic to all imperfection, there is no reason for its participating in the imperfection of others.—‘And as this is seen.’ This means—Since we observe in ordinary life also that comparisons are instituted between two things for the reason that although they do not possess all attributes in common, they yet have some attribute in common. We say, e. g. ‘this man is like a lion.’—The conclusion from all this is that the highest Self, which is essentially free from all imperfections and a treasure as it were of all blessed qualities, in no way suffers from dwelling within the earth and the rest.

An objection is raised. In the *Bṛihad-Araṇyaka*, in the chapter beginning ‘There are two forms of Brahman, the material and the immaterial,’ the whole material world, gross and subtle, is at first referred to as constituting the form of Brahman, and next a special form of Brahman is mentioned : ‘And what is the form of that Person? Like a saffron-coloured raiment,’ &c. But thereupon the text proceeds, ‘Now follows the teaching—not so, not so ; for there is not anything else higher than this “not so.”’ This passage, referring to all the previously mentioned forms of Brahman by means of the word ‘so,’ negatives them ; intimating thereby that Brahman is nothing else than pure Being, and that all distinctions are mere imaginations due to Brahman not knowing its own essential nature. How then can Brahman possess the twofold characteristics?—To this the next Sûtra replies.

21. For the text denies the previously declared so-muchness ; and declares more than that.

It is impossible to understand the text ‘not so, not so’ as negating those distinctions of Brahman which had been stated previously. If the text meant that, it would be mere idle talk. For none but a person not in his right mind would first teach that all the things mentioned in the earlier part of the section are distinctive attributes of Brahman—as which they are not known by any other

means of proof—and thereupon deliberately negative his own teaching. Although among the things mentioned there are some which, in themselves, are known through other means of proof, yet they are not thus known to be modes of Brahman, and others again are known neither in themselves nor as modes of Brahman. The text therefore cannot merely refer to them as things otherwise known, but gives fundamental instruction about them. Hence the later passage cannot be meant as a sheer negation, but must be taken as denying the previously described 'so-muchness' of Brahman ; i.e. the passage denies that limited nature of Brahman which would result from Brahman being viewed as distinguished by the previously stated attributes only. The word *so* refers to that limited nature, and the phrase *not so* therefore means that Brahman is not distinguished by the previously stated modes *only*. This interpretation is further confirmed by the fact that after that negative phrase further qualities of Brahman are declared by the text : 'For there is not anything higher than this *not so*. Then comes the name, the *True of the True* ; for the *prāṇas* are the True, and he is the True of them.' That means : Than that Brahman which is expressed by the phrase 'not so' there is no other thing higher, i.e. there is nothing more exalted than Brahman either in essential nature or in qualities. And of that Brahman the name is the 'True of the True.' This name is explained in the next clause, 'for the *prāṇas*,' &c. The term *prāṇas* here denotes the individual souls, so called because the *prāṇas* accompany them. They are the 'True' because they do not, like the elements, undergo changes implying an alteration of their essential nature. And the highest Self is the 'True of the True' because while the souls undergo, in accordance with their *karman*, contractions and expansions of intelligence, the highest Self which is free from all sin knows of no such alternations. He is therefore more eminently *true* than they are. As thus the complementary passage declares Brahman to be connected with certain qualities, the clause 'not so, not so' (to which that passage is complementary) cannot deny that Brahman possesses

distinctive attributes, but only that Brahman's nature is confined to the attributes previously stated.—Brahman therefore possesses the twofold characteristics. That the clause 'not so' negatives Brahman's being fully described by the attributes previously mentioned, was above proved on the ground that since Brahman is not the object of any other means of proof, those previous statements cannot refer to what is already proved, and that the final clause cannot therefore be meant to deny what the previous clauses expressly teach. The next Sūtra now confirms this circumstance of Brahman not lying within the sphere of the other means of proof.

22. That (is) unmanifested ; for (this Scripture) declares.

Brahman is not manifested by other means of proof ; for Scripture says, 'His form is not to be seen, no one beholds him with the eye' (Ka. Up. II, 6, 9) ; 'He is not apprehended by the eye nor by speech' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 8).

23. Also in perfect conciliation, according to Scripture and Smṛiti.

Moreover, it is only in the state of perfect conciliation or endearment, i. e. in meditation bearing the character of devotion, that an intuition of Brahman takes place, not in any other state. This Scripture and Smṛiti alike teach. 'That Self cannot be gained by the Veda, nor by understanding, nor by much learning. He whom the Self chooses by him the Self can be gained. The Self chooses him as his own' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 23) ; 'When a man's nature has become purified by the serene light of knowledge, then he sees him, meditating on him as without parts' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 9). Smṛiti : 'Neither by the Vedas, nor austerities, nor gifts, nor by sacrifice, but only by exclusive devotion, may I in this form be known and beheld in truth and also entered into' (Bha. Gī. XI, 53, 54). The scriptural text beginning 'Two are the forms of Brahman,' which declares the nature of Brahman for the purposes of devout meditation, cannot therefore refer to Brahman's being characterised by two forms, a material and an immaterial, as something

already known ; for apart from Scripture nothing is known about Brahman.

24. And there is non-difference (of the intention of Brahman's distinguishing attributes), as in the case of light ; and the light (is) intuited as constituting Brahman's essential nature by repetition of the practice (of meditation).

That the clause 'not so' negatives not Brahman's possessing two forms, a material and an immaterial one, but only Brahman's nature being restricted to those determinations, follows therefrom also that in the vision of Vāmadeva and others who had attained to intuition into Brahman's nature, the fact of Brahman having all material and immaterial beings for its attributes is apprehended in non-difference, i. e. in the same way as the fact of light (i. e. knowledge) and bliss constituting Brahman's essential nature. Compare the text 'Seeing this the Ṛishi Vāmadeva understood, I am Manu and the sun' (*Bṛi. Up. I, 4, 10*). And that light and bliss constitute Brahman's nature was perceived by Vāmadeva and the rest through repeated performance of the practice of devout meditation. In the same way then, i. e. by repeated meditation, they also became aware that Brahman has all material and immaterial things for its distinguishing modes.—The next Sūtra sums up the proof of Brahman's possessing twofold characteristics.

25. Hence (Brahman is distinguished) by what is infinite ; for thus the characteristics (hold good).

By the arguments stated it is proved that Brahman is distinguished by the infinite multitude of blessed qualities. And this being so, it follows that Brahman possesses the twofold characteristics.—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of 'that which has twofold characteristics.'

26. But on account of twofold designation, as the snake and its coils.

It has been shown in the preceding *adhikaraṇa* that

the entire non-sentient universe is the outward form of Brahman. For the purpose of proving Brahman's freedom from all imperfection, an enquiry is now begun into the particular mode in which the world may be conceived to constitute the form of Brahman. Is the relation of the two like that of the snake and its coils; or like that of light and the luminous body, both of which fall under the same genus; or like that of the individual soul and Brahman, the soul being a distinguishing attribute and for that reason a part (*amsa*) of Brahman?—On the assumption of this last alternative, which is about to be established here, it has been already shown under two preceding Sûtras (I, 4, 23; II, 1, 14), that from Brahman, as distinguished by sentient and non-sentient beings in their subtle form, there originates Brahman as distinguished by all those beings in their gross form.

Which then of the alternatives stated above is the true one?—The material world is related to Brahman as the coils to the snake, 'on account of twofold designation.' For some texts declare the identity of the two: 'Brahman only is all this'; 'The Self only is all this.' Other texts again refer to the difference of the two: 'Having entered into these three deities with this *gīva*-self, let me differentiate names and forms.' We therefore consider all non-sentient things to be special forms or arrangements of Brahman, as the coils are of a coiled-up snake or a coiled-up rope.

27. Or else like light and its abode, both being fire.

The *or* sets aside the other two alternatives. If Brahman itself only appeared in the form of non-sentient things—as the snake itself only constitutes the coils—both sets of texts, those which declare difference as well as those which declare the unchangeableness of Brahman, would be contrary to sense. We therefore, adopting the second alternative, hold that the case under discussion is analogous to that of light and that in which it abides, i. e. the luminous body. The two are different, but at the same time they are

identical in so far as they both are fire (*tegas*). In the same way the non-sentient world constitutes the form of Brahman.

28. Or else in the manner stated above.

The *but* sets aside the two preceding alternatives. One substance may indeed connect itself with several states, but the former of the two alternatives implies that Brahman itself constitutes the essential nature of non-sentient matter, and thus there is no escape from the objections already stated under Sūtra 27. Let then the second alternative be adopted according to which Brahma-hood (*brahmatva*) constitutes a genus inhering in Brahman as well as in non-sentient matter, just as fire constitutes the common genus for light and luminous bodies. But on this view Brahman becomes a mere abstract generic character inhering in the Lord (*īśvara*), sentient souls and non-sentient matter, just as the generic character of horses (*asvatva*) inheres in concrete individual horses; and this contradicts all the teaching of *Sruti* and *Smṛiti* (according to which Brahman is the highest concrete entity). We therefore hold that non-sentient matter stands to Brahman in the same relation as the one previously proved for the individual soul in Sūtra II, 3, 43; 46; viz. that it is an attribute incapable of being realised apart from Brahman and hence is a part (*amsa*) of the latter. The texts referring to the two as non-different may thus be taken in their primary sense; for the part is only a limited place of that of which it is a part. And the texts referring to the two as different may also be taken in their primary sense; for the distinguishing attribute and that to which the attribute belongs are essentially different. Thus Brahman's freedom from all imperfection is preserved.—Lustre is an attribute not to be realised apart from the gem, and therefore is a part of the gem; the same relation also holds good between generic character and individuals having that character, between qualities and things having qualities, between bodies and souls. In the same way souls as well as non-sentient matter stand to Brahman in the relation of parts.

29. And on account of denial.

Texts such as 'This is that great unborn Self, undecaying, undying' (*Bri. Up.* IV, 4, 25), 'By the old age of the body that does not age' (*Kh. Up.* VIII, 1, 5), deny of Brahman the properties of non-sentient matter. From this it follows that the relation of the two can only be that of distinguishing attribute and thing distinguished, and hence of part and whole. Brahman distinguished by sentient and non-sentient beings in their subtle state is the cause; distinguished by the same beings in their gross state is the effect: the effect thus is non-different from the cause, and by the knowledge of the causal Brahman the effect is likewise known. All these tenets are in full mutual agreement. Brahman's freedom from defects also is preserved; and this and Brahman's being the abode of all blessed qualities prove that Brahman possesses the 'twofold characteristics.'—Here terminates the *adhikarana* of 'the coils of the snake.'

30. (There is something) higher than that; on account of the designations of bridge, measure, connexion, and difference.

The Sûtras now proceed to refute an erroneous view based on some fallacious arguments, viz. that there is a being higher even than the highest Brahman, the supreme cause, material as well as operative, of the entire world—a refutation which will confirm the view of Brahman being free from all imperfections and a treasure as it were of countless transcendently exalted qualities.—There is some entity higher than the Brahman described so far as being the cause of the world and possessing the twofold characteristics. For the text 'That Self is a bank (or bridge), a boundary' (*Kh. Up.* VIII, 4, 1) designates the Self as a bank or bridge (*setu*). And the term '*setu*' means in ordinary language that which enables one to reach the other bank of a river; and from this we conclude that in the Vedic text also there must be meant something to be reached. The text further says that that bridge is to be crossed:

'He who has crossed that bridge, if blind,' &c.; this also indicates that there must be something to be reached by crossing. Other texts, again, speak of the highest Brahman as something measured, i. e. limited. 'Brahman has four feet (quarters), sixteen parts.' Such declarations of Brahman being something limited suggest the existence of something unlimited to be reached by that bridge. Further there are texts which declare a connexion of the bridge as that which is a means towards reaching, and a thing connected with the bridge as that to be reached: 'the highest bridge of the Immortal' (Svet. Up. VI, 19); 'he is the bridge of the Immortal' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 5). For this reason also there is something higher than the Highest.—And other texts again expressly state that being beyond the Highest to be something different: 'he goes to the divine Person who is higher than the Highest' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8); 'by this Person this whole universe is filled; what is higher than that is without form and without suffering' (Svet. Up. III, 9-10). All this combined shows that there is something higher than the highest Brahman.—The next Sūtra disposes of this view.

31. But on account of resemblance.

The 'but' sets aside the pūrvapaksha. There is no truth in the assertion that from the designation of the Highest as a bridge (or bank) it follows that there is something beyond the Highest. For Brahman in that text is not called a bank with regard to something to be reached thereby; since the additional clause 'for the non-confounding of these worlds' declares that it is compared to a bridge or bank in so far as it binds to itself (*setu* being derived from *si*, to bind) the whole aggregate of sentient and non-sentient things without any confusion. And in the clause 'having passed beyond that bridge' the *passing beyond* means *reaching*; as we say, 'he passes beyond the Vedānta,' meaning 'he has fully mastered it.'

32. It subserves the purpose of thought; as in the case of the feet.

Where the texts speak of Brahman as having four quarters, and sixteen parts, or say that 'one quarter of him are all these beings' (*Kh. Up. III, 12, 6*), they do so for the purpose of thought, i. e. meditation, only. For as texts such as 'the Truth, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' teach Brahman, the cause of the world, to be unlimited, it cannot in itself be subject to measure. The texts referring to measure therefore aim at meditation only, in the same way as texts such as 'Speech is one foot (quarter) of him, breath another, the eye another, the mind another' (*Kh. Up. III, 18, 2*).—But how can something that in itself is beyond all measure, for the purpose of meditation, be spoken of as measured? To this the next Sûtra replies.

33. Owing to difference of place, as in the case of light, and so on.

Owing to the difference of limiting adjuncts constituted by special places, such as speech, and so on, Brahman in so far as connected with these adjuncts may be viewed as having measure; just as light and the like although spread everywhere may be viewed as limited, owing to its connexion with different places—windows, jars, and so on.

34. And on account of possibility.

Nor is there any truth in the assertion that, because texts such as 'he is the bridge of the Immortal' intimate a distinction between that which causes to reach and the object reached, there must be something to be reached different from that which causes to reach; for the highest Self may be viewed as being itself a means towards itself being reached; cp. 'The Self cannot be reached by the Veda, and so on; he whom the Self chooses by him the Self can be gained' (*Kh. Up. I, 2, 23*).

35. Thus, from the denial of anything else.

Nor can we allow the assertion that there is something higher than the highest because certain texts ('the Person which is higher than the highest'; 'beyond the Imperishable there is the highest,' &c.) refer to such a difference.

For the same texts expressly deny that there is anything else higher than the highest—‘than whom there is nothing else higher, than whom there is nothing smaller or larger’ (Svet. Up. III, 9). So also other texts: ‘For there is nothing else higher than this “not so”’ (i. e. than this Brahman designated by the phrase ‘not so’; *Bṛi. Up.* II, 3, 6); ‘Of him none is the Lord, his name is great glory’ (Mahānār. Up. I, 10).

But what then is the entity referred to in the text ‘tato yad uttarataram’? (Svet. Up. III, 10)?—The passage immediately preceding (8), ‘I know that great person, &c.; a man who knows him passes over death,’ had declared that the knowledge of Brahman is the only way to immortality; and the clause (9), ‘Higher than whom there is nothing else,’ had confirmed this by declaring that Brahman is the Highest and that there is no other thing higher. In agreement herewith we must explain stanza 10 as giving a reason for what had been said, ‘Because that which is the highest (uttarataram), viz. the Supreme Person is without form and without suffering, therefore (tataḥ) those who know him become immortal,’ &c. On any other explanation stanza 10 would not be in harmony with stanza 8 where the subject is introduced, and with what is declared in stanza 9.—Analogously in the text ‘He goes to the divine Person who is higher than the highest’ (*Mu. Up.* III, 2, 8) ‘the highest’ means the aggregate soul (samashāi-purusha), which in a previous passage had been said to be ‘higher than the high Imperishable’ (II, 1, 2); and the ‘higher’ refers to the Supreme Person, with all his transcendent qualities, who is superior to the aggregate soul.

36. The omnipresence (possessed) by that, (understood) from the declaration of extent. .

That omnipresence which is possessed ‘by that,’ i. e. by Brahman, and which is known ‘from declarations of extent,’ and so on, i. e. from texts which declare Brahman to be all-pervading, is also known from texts such as ‘higher than that there is nothing.’ Declarations of extent are e. g. the following: ‘By this Person this whole Universe is filled’

(Svet. Up. III, 9) ; 'whatever is seen or heard in this world' is pervaded inside and outside by Nārāyaṇa' (Mahānār. Up.) ; 'The eternal, pervading, omnipresent, which the Wise consider as the source of all beings' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 6). The 'and the rest' in the Sūtra comprises passages such as 'Brahman indeed is all this,' 'The Self indeed is all this,' and the like. The conclusion is that the highest Brahman is absolutely supreme.—Here terminates the adhikaraṇa of 'the Highest.'

37. From thence the reward ; on account of possibility.

It has been shown, for the purpose of giving rise to a desire for devout meditation, that the soul in all its states is imperfect, while the Supreme Person to be reached by it is free from imperfections, the owner of blessed qualities and higher than everything else. Being about to investigate the nature of meditation, the Sūtrakāra now declares that the meditating devotee receives the reward of meditation, i.e. Release, which consists in attaining to the highest Person, from that highest Person only ; and that analogously the rewards for all works prescribed by the Veda—whether to be enjoyed in this or the next world—come from the highest Person only. The Sūtra therefore says generally, 'from thence the reward.'—'Why so?'—'Because that only is possible.'

For it is he only—the all-knowing, all-powerful, supremely generous one—who being pleased by sacrifices, gifts, offerings, and the like, as well as by pious meditation, is in a position to bestow the different forms of enjoyment in this and the heavenly world, and Release which consists in attaining to a nature like his own. For action which is non-intelligent and transitory is incapable of bringing about a result connected with a future time.

38. And on account of scriptural declaration.

That he bestows all rewards—whether in the form of enjoyment or Release—Scripture also declares 'This indeed is the great, the unborn Self, the eater of food, the giver of

wealth' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 24*); and 'For he alone causes delight' (*Taitt. Up. II, 7*).—Next a *primâ facie* view is stated.

39. For the same reasons *Gaimini* (thinks it to be) religious action.

For the same reasons, viz. possibility and scriptural declaration, the teacher *Gaimini* thinks that religious works, viz. sacrifices, gifts, offerings, and meditation, of themselves bring about their rewards. For we observe that in ordinary life actions such as ploughing and the like, and charitable gifts and so on, bring about their own reward, directly or indirectly. And although Vedic works do not bring about their rewards immediately, they may do so mediately, viz. by means of the so-called *apūrva*. This follows also from the form of the Vedic injunctions, such as 'He who is desirous of the heavenly world is to sacrifice.' As such injunctions enjoin sacrifices as the means of bringing about the object desired to be realised, viz. the heavenly world and the like, there is no other way left than to assume that the result (which is seen not to spring directly from the sacrifice) is accomplished by the mediation of the *apūrva*.

40. But the former, *Bâdarâyana* (thinks), on account of the designation (of deities) as the cause.

The reverend *Bâdarâyana* maintains the previously declared awarding of rewards by the Supreme Person since the scriptural texts referring to the different sacrifices declare that the deities only, *Agni*, *Vâyu*, and so on, who are propitiated by the sacrifices—which are nothing else but means to propitiate deities—are the cause of the rewards attached to the sacrifices. Compare texts such as 'Let him who is desirous of prosperity offer a white animal to *Vâyu*. For *Vâyu* is the swiftest god. The man thus approaches *Vâyu* with his proper share, and *Vâyu* leads him to prosperity.' And the whole instruction which the texts give, as to the means by which men desirous of certain results are to effect those results, is required on account of the injunctions only, and hence it cannot be doubted that

it has reference to the injunctions. The apparatus of means to bring about the results thus being learnt from the text only, no person acquainted with the force of the means of proof will assent to that apparatus, as stated by the text, being set aside and an apūrva about which the text says nothing being fancifully assumed. And that the imperative verbal forms of the injunctions denote as the thing to be effected by the effort of the sacrificer, only that which on the basis of the usage of language and grammatical science is recognised as the meaning of the root-element of such words as 'yageta,' viz. the sacrifice (yāga), which consists in the propitiation of a divine being, and not some additional supersensuous thing such as the apūrva, we have already proved above (p. 153 ff.). Texts such as 'Vāyu is the swiftest god' teach that Vāyu and other deities are the bestowers of rewards. And that it is fundamentally the highest Self—as constituting the inner Self of Vāyu and other deities—which is pleased by offerings, and bestows rewards for them is declared by texts such as 'Offerings and pious works, all this he bears who is the nave of the Universe. He is Agni and Vāyu, he is Sun and Moon' (Mahânār. Up. I, 6, 7). Similarly in the antaryāmin-brāhmaṇa, 'He who dwells in Vāyu, of whom Vāyu is the body'; 'He who dwells in Agni,' &c. Smṛiti expresses itself similarly, 'Whatsoever devotee wishes to worship with faith whatsoever divine form, of him do I make that faith unshakable. Endued with such faith he endeavours to propitiate him and obtains from him his desires—those indeed being ordained by me' (Bha. Gi. VII, 21-22); 'For I am the enjoyer and the Lord of all sacrifices' (IX, 24)—where Lord means him who bestows the reward for the sacrifices. 'To the gods go the worshippers of the gods, and those devoted to me go to me' (VII, 23).—In ordinary life men, by agriculture and the like, acquire wealth in various forms, and by means of this propitiate their king, either directly or through his officials and servants; and the king thereupon is seen to reward them in a manner corresponding to the measure of their services and presents. The Vedānta-texts, on the other hand, give

instruction on a subject which transcends the sphere of all the other means of knowledge, viz. the highest Person who is free from all shadow even of imperfection, and a treasure-house as it were of all exalted qualities in their highest state of perfection ; on sacrifices, gifts, oblations, which are helpful towards the propitiation of that Person ; on praise, worship, and meditation, which directly propitiate him ; and on the rewards which he, thus propitiated, bestows, viz. temporal happiness and final Release.—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of 'reward.'

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THIRD PĀDA.

1. What is understood from all the Vedānta-texts (is one), on account of the non-difference of injunction and the rest.

The Sūtras have stated whatever has to be stated to the end of rousing the desire of meditation—concluding with the fact that Brahman bestows rewards. Next the question is introduced whether the vidyās (i. e. the different forms of meditation on Brahman which the Vedānta-texts enjoin) are different or non-different, on the decision of which question it will depend whether the qualities attributed to Brahman in those vidyās are to be comprised in one act of meditation or not.—The first subordinate question arising here is whether one and the same meditation—as e.g. the vidyā of Vaisvānara—which is met with in the text of several sākḥās, constitutes one vidyā or several.—The vidyās are separate, the Pūrvapakshin maintains; for the fact that the same matter is, without difference, imparted for a second time, and moreover stands under a different heading—both which circumstances necessarily attend the text's being met with in different sākḥās—proves the difference of the two meditations. It is for this reason only that a restrictive injunction, such as the one conveyed in the text, 'Let a man tell this science of Brahman to those only who have performed the rite of carrying fire on their head' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 10)—which restricts the imparting of knowledge to the Ātharvanikas, to whom that rite is peculiar—has any sense; for if the vidyās were one, then the rite mentioned, which is a part of the vidyā, would be valid for the members of other sākḥās also, and then the restriction enjoined by the text would have no meaning.—This view is set aside by the Sūtra, 'What is understood from all the Vedānta-texts' is one and the same meditation, 'because there is non-difference of injunction and the rest.' By injunction is meant the

injunction of special activities denoted by different verbal roots—such as upāsita ‘he should meditate,’ vidyât ‘he should know.’ The ‘and the rest’ of the Sūtra is meant to comprise as additional reasons the circumstances mentioned in the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā-sūtras (II, 4, 9). Owing to all these circumstances, non-difference of injunction and the rest, the same vidyā is recognised in other śākhās also. In the *Khândogya* (V, 12, 2) as well as in the *Vāgasaneyaka* we meet with one and the same injunction (viz. ‘He should meditate on Vaisvānara’). The form (character, rūpa) of the meditations also is the same, for the form of a cognition solely depends on its object; and the object is in both cases the same, viz. Vaisvānara. The name of the two vidyās also is the same, viz. the knowledge of Vaisvānara. And both vidyās are declared to have the same result, viz. attaining to Brahman. All these reasons establish the identity of vidyās even in different śākhās.—The next Sūtra refers to the reasons set forth for his view by the Pūrvapakshin and refutes them.

2. If it be said (that the vidyās are not one) on account of difference, we deny this, since even in one (vidyā there may be repetition).

If it be said that there is no oneness of vidyā, because the fact of the same matter being stated again without difference, and being met with in a different chapter, proves the object of injunction to be different; we reply that even in one and the same vidyā some matter may be repeated without any change, and under a new heading (in a different chapter); if, namely, there is difference of cognising subjects. Where the cognising person is one only, repetition of the same matter under a new heading can only be explained as meaning difference of object enjoined, and hence separation of the two vidyās. But where the cognising persons are different (and this of course is eminently so in the case of different śākhās), the double statement of one and the same matter explains itself as subserving the cognition of those different persons, and hence does not imply difference of matter enjoined.—The next Sūtra

refutes the argument founded on a rite enjoined in the *Mundaka*.

3. For (the *sirovrata*) concerns the mode of the study of the Veda; also on account of (that rite) being a heading in the *samākāra*; and the restriction is like that of the libations.

What the text says as to a restriction connected with the 'vow of the head,' does not intimate a difference of *vidyās*. For that vow does not form part of the *vidyā*. The restriction refers only to a peculiarity of the *study* of the Veda on the part of the *Ātharvanikas*, being meant to establish that they should possess that special qualification which the rite produces; but it does not affect the *vidyā* itself. This is proved by the subsequent clause, 'a man who has not performed that rite may not *read* the text,' which directly connects the rite with the studying of the text. And it is further proved by the fact that in the book of the *Ātharvanikas*, called '*samākāra*,' that rite is referred to as a rite connected with the Veda (not with the special *vidyā* set forth in the *Mundaka*), viz. in the passage, 'this is explained already by the Veda-observance' (which extends the details of the *sirovrata*, there called *veda-vrata*, to other observances). By the *knowledge of Brahman* (referred to in the *Mundaka*-text 'let a man tell this science of Brahman to those only,' &c.), we have therefore to understand knowledge of the Veda in general. And that restriction is 'like that of the libations'—i. e. it is analogous to the restriction under which the *sava*-libations, beginning with the *Saptasūrya*-libation, and terminating with the *Sataudana*-libation, are offered in the one fire which is used by the followers of the *Atharvan*, and not in the ordinary three fires.

4. Scripture also declares this.

Scripture also shows that (identical) meditation is what all the *Vedānta*-texts intimate. The *Khândogya* (VIII, 1, 1 ff.) declares that that which is within the small space in the heart is to be enquired into, and then in reply to the

question what the thing to be enquired into is, says that it is the highest Self possessing the eight attributes, freedom from all evil and the rest, which is to be meditated upon within the heart. And then the Taittiriya-text, referring to this declaration in the *Kāṇḍogya*, says, 'Therein is a small space, free from all grief; what is within that is to be meditated upon' (Mahānār. Up. X, 23), and thus likewise enjoins meditation on the highest Self possessing the eight qualities. And this is possible only if, owing to unity of vidyā, the qualities mentioned in the first text are included also in the meditation enjoined in the second text.—Having thus established the unity of meditations, the Sūtras proceed to state the practical effect of such unity.

5. (Meditation) thus being equal, there is combination (of guṇas); on account of non-difference of purport in the case of what subserves injunction.

The meditation in all Vedānta-texts thus being the same, the qualities mentioned in one text are to be combined with those mentioned in another; 'on account of non-difference of purport in the case of what subserves injunction.' We find that in connexion with certain injunctions of meditation—such as the meditation on Vaisvānara, or the small ether within the heart—the text of some individual Vedānta-book mentions certain secondary matters (qualities, guṇa) which subserve that meditation; and as these guṇas are connected with the meditation they are to be comprised in it, so that they may accomplish their aim, i. e. of subserving the meditation. For the same reason therefore we have to enclose in the meditation guṇas mentioned in other Vedānta-texts; for being also connected with the meditation they subserve it in the same way.—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of 'what is intimated by all Vedānta-texts.

6. If it be said that there is difference on account of the text; we say no; on account of non-difference.

So far it has been shown that the non-difference of in-

junction, and so on, establishes the unity of meditations, and that owing to the latter the special features of meditation enjoined in different texts have to be combined. Next, an enquiry is entered upon whether in the case of certain particular meditations there actually exists, or not, that non-difference of injunction which is the cause of meditations being recognised as identical. A meditation on the Udgītha is enjoined in the text of the *Khandogas*, as well as in that of the *Vāgasaneyins* (*Kh. Up. I, 2*; *Bri. Up. I, 3*); and the question arises whether the two are to be viewed as one meditation or not. The *Pūrvapakshin* maintains the former alternative. For, he says, there is no difference of injunction, and so on, since both texts enjoin as the object of meditation the Udgītha viewed under the form of *Prāṇa*; since there is the same reward promised in both places, viz. mastering of one's enemies; since the form of meditation is the same, the Udgītha being in both cases viewed under the form of *Prāṇa*; since the injunction is the same, being conveyed in both cases by the same verbal root (*vid*, to know); and since both meditations have the same technical name, viz. *udgītha-vidyā*. The *Sūtra* states this view in the form of the refutation of an objection raised by the advocate of the final view. We do not admit, the objector says, the unity maintained by you, since the texts clearly show a difference of form. The text of the *Vāgasaneyins* represents as the object of meditation that which is the agent in the act of singing out the Udgītha; while the text of the *Khandogas* enjoins meditation on what is the object of the action of singing out (i.e. the Udgītha itself). This discrepancy establishes difference in the character of the meditation, and as this implies difference of the object enjoined, the mere non-difference of injunction, and so on, is of no force, and hence the two meditations are separate ones.—This objection the *Pūrvapakshin* impugns, 'on account of non-difference.' For both texts, at the outset, declare that the Udgītha is the means to bring about the conquest of enemies ('Let us overcome the *Asuras* at the sacrifices by means of the Udgītha' (*Bri. Up.*); 'The gods took the Udgītha,

thinking they would with that overcome the Asuras'—*Kh. Up.*). In order therefore not to stultify this common beginning, we must assume that in the clause 'For them that breath sang out' (*Bri. Up.*), the Udgitha, which really is the object of the action of singing, is spoken of as the agent. Otherwise the term udgitha in the introductory passage ('by means of the Udgitha') would have to be taken as by implication denoting the agent (while directly it indicates the instrument).—Hence there is oneness of the two vidyās.—Of this view the next Sūtra disposes.

7. Or not, on account of difference of subject-matter; as in the case of the attribute of being higher than the high, and so on.

There is no unity of the two vidyās, since the subject-matter of the two differs. For the tale in the *Khândogya*-text, which begins 'when the Devas and the Asuras struggled together,' connects itself with the *praṇava* (the syllable Om) which is introduced as the object of meditation in *Khând. I, 1, 1*, 'Let a man meditate on the syllable Om as the Udgitha'; and the clause forming part of the tale, 'they meditated on that chief breath as Udgitha,' therefore refers to a meditation on the *praṇava* which is a part only of the Udgitha. In the text of the *Vāgasaneyins*, on the other hand, there is nothing to correspond to the introductory passage which in the *Khândogya*-text determines the subject-matter, and the text clearly states that the meditation refers to the whole Udgitha (not only the *praṇava*). And this difference of leading subject-matter implies difference of matter enjoined, and this again difference of the character of meditation, and hence there is no unity of vidyās. Thus the object of meditation for the *Khândogya* is the *praṇava* viewed under the form of *Prāṇa*; while for the *Vāgasaneyins* it is the Udgātri (who sings the Udgitha), imaginatively identified with *Prāṇa*. Nor does there arise, on this latter account, a contradiction between the later and the earlier part of the story of the *Vāgasaneyins*. For as a meditation on the Udgātri neces-

sarily extends to the Udgītha, which is the object of the activity of singing, the latter also helps to bring about the result, viz. the mastering of enemies.—There is thus no unity of vidyā, although there may be non-difference of injunction, and so on.—‘As in the case of the attribute of being higher than the high,’ &c. In one and the same sākḥā there are two meditations, in each of which the highest Self is enjoined to be viewed under the form of the *pranava* (*Kṛ. Up.* I, 6 ; I, 9), and in so far the two vidyās are alike. But while the former text enjoins that the *pranava* has to be viewed under the form of a golden man, in the latter he has to be viewed as possessing the attributes of being higher than the high, and owing to this difference of attributes the two meditations must be held separate (*a fortiori*, then, those meditations are separate which have different objects of meditation).

8. If that be declared on account of name ; (we object, since) that is also (where the objects of injunction differ).

If the oneness of the vidyās be maintained on the ground that both have the same name, viz. *udgītha-vidyā*, we point out that oneness is found also where the objects enjoined are different. The term *agnihotra* is applied equally to the permanent *agnihotra* and to that *agnihotra* which forms part of the sacrifice called ‘*Kundapāyinām ayanam*’; and the term *udgītha* is applied equally to the many different meditations described in the first *prapāṭhaka* of the *Kṛāṇḍogya*.

9. And (this is) appropriate, on account of the extension.

Since the *pranava*, which is a part of the *udgītha*, is introduced as the subject of meditation in the first *prapāṭhaka* of the *Kṛāṇḍogya*, and extends over the later vidyās also, it is appropriate to assume that also in the clause ‘the gods took the *udgītha*’—which stands in the middle—the term *udgītha* denotes the *pranava*. Expressions such as ‘the cloth is burned’ show that frequently the whole denotes

the part.—The conclusion from all this is that in the *Khândogya* the object of meditation is constituted by the *pranava*—there termed *udgîtha*—viewed under the form of *prāna*; while in the *Vāgasaneyaka* the term *udgîtha* denotes the whole *udgîtha*, and the object of meditation is he who produces the *udgîtha*, i. e. the *udgâtri*, viewed under the form of *prāna*. And this proves that the two *vidyās* are separate.—Here terminates the *adhikarana* of ‘difference.’

10. On account of non-difference of everything, those elsewhere.

The *Khândogya* and the *Vāgasaneyaka* alike record a meditation on *Prāna*; the object of meditation being *Prāna* as possessing the qualities of being the oldest and the best, and also as possessing certain other qualities such as being the richest, and so on (*Kh. Up. V, 1*; *Bri. Up. VI, 1*). In the text of the *Kaushîtakins*, on the other hand, there is a meditation on *Prāna* which mentions the former qualities (‘being the best’ and ‘being the oldest’), but not the latter (‘being the richest,’ and so on). This, the *Pûrvapakshin* maintains, constitutes a difference between the objects of meditation, and hence between the meditations themselves.—This view the *Sûtra* sets aside ‘on account of non-difference of everything, those elsewhere.’ There is no difference of meditation. Those qualities, viz. being the richest, and so on, are to be meditated upon in the other place also, viz. in the meditation on *Prāna* of the *Kaushîtakins*; ‘since there is non-difference of everything,’ i. e. since the text of the *Kaushîtakins* also exhibits the very same method, in all its details, for proving what it is undertaken to prove, viz. that *Prāna* is the oldest and best. And for that proof it is required that *Prāna* should be viewed as possessing also the quality of being the richest, and so on, and these qualities therefore have to be comprised in the meditation of the *Kaushîtakins* also. Hence there is no difference of meditation.—Here terminates the *adhikarana* of ‘non-difference of everything.’

In the same way as the meditation on *Prāna* as the

oldest and best cannot be accomplished without *Prāṇa* being also meditated upon as the richest, and so on, and as hence these latter qualities have to be comprised in the meditation on *Prāṇa* of the *Kaushītakins*, although they are not expressly mentioned there; thus those qualities of *Brahman* also, without which the meditation on *Brahman* cannot be accomplished, must be included in all meditations on *Brahman*—this is the point to be proved next.

11. Bliss and other qualities, as belonging to the subject of the qualities.

The point to be decided here is whether, or not, the essential qualities of *Brahman* are to be included in all meditations on the highest *Brahman*.—Since there is no valid reason for including in a meditation those qualities which are not expressly mentioned in the section containing that meditation, only those qualities which are thus expressly mentioned should be included!—This *primā facie* view is negated by the *Sūtra*. The clause, 'on account of non-difference,' has to be carried on from the preceding *Sūtra*. As the 'subject of the qualities,' i. e. *Brahman* is the same in all meditations, the qualities which do not exist apart from their subject, viz. bliss, and so on, are to be comprised in all meditations.—But for the same reason then such qualities as 'having joy for its head' (*Taitt. Up. II, 5*) would also have to be included in all meditations on *Brahman*!—This the next *Sūtra* negatives.

12. Such qualities as having joy for its head, and so on, are not established, for if there were difference (of members) there would be increase and decrease.

The declaration that the essential qualities of *Brahman* are established for all meditations, does not imply that such attributes as 'having joy for its head' are equally established. For the latter are not qualities of *Brahman*, since they are mere elements in a figurative representation of *Brahman* under the form of an animal body. Otherwise, i. e. if *Brahman* really possessed different members, such as head, wings, and so on, it would be liable to increase

and decrease, and this would be in conflict with texts such as 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman.'—But if this reasoning holds good, then all the infinite qualities belonging to Brahman such as lordly power, generosity, compassion, and so on—all of which are incapable of existing apart from the subject to which they belong—would have to be comprehended in all those meditations on Brahman where they are not expressly mentioned; and this could not possibly be done, as those qualities are infinite in number.—This difficulty the next Sūtra removes.

13. But the others, on account of equality with the thing.

Those other qualities which are 'equal to the thing,' i. e. which are attributes determining the essential character of the thing, and therefore necessarily entering into the idea of the thing, must be included in all meditations, no less than the thing itself. To this class belong qualities such as true being, knowledge, bliss, purity, infinity, and so on. For of Brahman—which by texts such as 'that from which all these beings,' &c. had been suggested as the cause of the world—the essential definition is given in texts such as 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman'; 'bliss is Brahman,' and others; and hence, in order that a true notion may be formed of Brahman as the object of meditation, such qualities as true being, bliss, and so on, have to be included in all meditations on Brahman. Such additional qualities, on the other hand, as e. g. compassion, which indeed cannot exist apart from the subject to which they belong, but are not necessary elements of the idea of Brahman, are to be included in those meditations only where they are specially mentioned.

But, an objection is raised, if 'having joy for its head' and the like are not qualities of Brahman, but merely serve the purpose of a figurative representation of Brahman, for what purpose then is this representation introduced? For if something is represented as something else, there must be some motive for doing so. Where, e. g. the sacred text compares the meditating devotee to a charioteer, its body

and organs to a chariot, and so on, it does so for the purpose of assisting the subjection to the Self of the means of meditation, i. e. the body, the senses, and so on. But in the present case no such purpose is to be discerned, and hence it must needs be admitted that having joy for its head, and so on, are real qualities of Brahman.—The next Sūtra disposes of this difficulty.

14. For meditation, owing to the absence of purpose.

As no other purpose can be assigned, the text must be supposed to represent Brahman as having joy for its head, and so on, for the purpose of meditation. In order to accomplish the meditation on Brahman which is enjoined in the text 'he who knows (i. e. meditates on) Brahman reaches the Highest,' the text represents the Brahman consisting of bliss as made up of joy, satisfaction, &c., and compares these to the head, the wings, and so on. The Self of bliss, which is the inmost of all the Selves mentioned in the text, is by this means represented to the mind in a definite shape; just as in the preceding sections the Self of food, the Self of breath, and the rest had similarly been represented in definite shapes, consisting of head, wings, and so on. As thus the qualities of having joy for its head, &c. are merely secondary marks of the Self of bliss, they are not necessarily included in each meditation that involves the idea of that Self.

15. And on account of the term 'Self.'

That this is so further follows from the fact that in the clause 'different from this is the inner Self consisting of bliss' the term 'Self' is used. For as the Self cannot really possess a head, wings, and tail, its having joy for its head, and so on, can only be meant in a metaphorical sense, for the sake of easier comprehension.—But, in the preceding sections, the term *Self* had been applied to what is *not* of the nature of Self—the text speaking of the Self of breath, the Self of mind, and so on; how then are we able to determine that in the phrase 'the Self of bliss' the term

Self denotes a true *Self*? — To this the next Sūtra replies.

16. There is reference to the Self, as in other places; on account of the subsequent passage.

In the clause, 'different from that is the Self of bliss,' the term Self can refer to the highest Self only; 'as in other cases,' i. e. as in other passages—'the Self only was this in the beginning; it thought, let me send forth the worlds,' and similar ones—the term 'Self' denotes the highest Self only.—But whereby is this proved?—'By the subsequent passage', i. e. by the passage, 'he desired, may I be many, may I grow forth,' which refers to the Self of bliss.

17. If it be said 'on account of connexion'; it may be so, on account of ascertainment.

But as in the preceding sections the term Self is seen to be connected with what is not of the nature of the Self, such as the Self of breath, and so on, it is not possible to draw a valid conclusion from the subsequent passage!—It is possible, the Sūtra replies, 'on account of ascertainment.' For the previous clause, 'from that Self there originated the Ether,' settles in the mind the idea of the highest Self, and that idea then is transferred in succession to the (so-called) Self of breath, the Self of mind, and so on, until it finally finds rest in the Self of bliss, beyond which there is no other Self; while at the same time the subsequent clause 'he desired', confirms the idea of the highest Self. The term *Self* thus connects itself from the beginning with things which are not true Selves, because the highest Self is as it were viewed in them.—Here terminates the *adhikāraṇa* of 'bliss and the rest.'

18. The new (thing is enjoined); on account of the statement of what has to be done.

The Sūtra discusses an additional question connected with the meditation on breath. Both texts—the *Khândogya* as well as the *Vāgasaneyaka*—declare that water constitutes a dress for *prāṇa*, and refer to the rinsing of the mouth

with water. The doubt here arises whether what the texts mean to enjoin is the rinsing of the mouth, or a meditation on *prâṇa* as having water for its dress.—The *Pûrvapakshin* maintains the former view ; for, he says, the *Vâgasaneyaka* uses the injunctive form ‘he is to rinse,’ while there is no injunctive form referring to the meditation ; and what the text says in praise of the breath thus not being allowed to remain naked may be taken as a mere glorification of the act of rinsing. And as ordinary rinsing of the mouth, subsequent to eating, is already established by *Smṛiti* and custom, we must conclude that the text means to enjoin rinsing of the mouth of a different kind, viz. as auxiliary to the meditation on *prâṇa*.—To this the *Sûtra* replies that what the text enjoins is the ‘new’ thing, i. e. the previously non-established meditation on water as forming the dress of *prâṇa*. ‘On account of the statement of what has to be done,’ i. e. on account of the statement of what is not established—for only on the latter condition Scripture has a meaning. The beginning as well as the end of the *Vâgasaneyaka*-text clearly refers to a meditation on the water used for rinsing as forming a dress for *prâṇa* ; and as rinsing is already established by *Smṛiti* and custom, we naturally infer that what the text enjoins is a meditation on breath as having the water used in rinsing for its dress. This also explains why the *Khândogya*-text does not mention the rinsing at all, but merely the clothing of breath with water.—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of ‘the statement of what has to be done.’

19. And (the qualities) thus being equal, on account of non-difference.

In the book of the *Vâgasaneyaka*, called *Agnirahasya*, we meet with a meditation on Brahman called *Sândilya-vidyâ* ; and there is also a *Sândilya-vidyâ* in the *Bṛhadâraṇyaka*. The *Pûrvapakshin* holds that these two meditations are different since the latter text mentions qualities—such as Brahman being the lord of all—which are not mentioned in the former ; the objects of meditation thus being different, the meditations themselves are different.

—This the Sūtra negatives. The object of meditation is 'equal,' for both texts state the same qualities, such as 'consisting of mind,' and so on ; and the additional qualities stated in the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka*, such as the rulership of Brahman, 'do not differ' from those equally stated by both texts, such as Brahman realising all its purposes, and so on. Thus the objects of meditation do not differ in character.—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of 'what is equal.'

20. On account of connexion, thus elsewhere also.

In the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka* (V, 5) it is said that Brahman is to be meditated upon as abiding within the orb of the sun and within the right eye; and then the text mentions two secret names of Brahman—*aham* and *ahar*. Here the *Pūrvapakshin* holds that both these names are to be comprehended in each of the two meditations 'On account of connexion,' i. e. on account of the object of meditation, i. e. Brahman being one only, although connected with different abodes, it is 'thus elsewhere also,' i. e. the same conclusion which had been arrived at in the case of the *Sāṇḍilya-vidyās*, has to be accepted with regard to Brahman abiding in the sun and in the eye. The meditation is one only, and hence the two secret names apply to Brahman in both its abodes.—This view the next Sūtra negatives.

21. Or not so, on account of difference.

This is not so, for as Brahman is to be meditated upon in two different abodes, the meditations are separate. In both the *Sāṇḍilya-vidyās*, on the other hand, Brahman is to be meditated upon as abiding within the heart.

22. The text also declares this.

That the qualities of that which abides within the sun and that which abides in the eye are not to be combined, the text itself moreover shows by specially stating that the characteristics of the one are those of the other. For such a special transfer of qualities is needed only where the qualities are not of themselves established, i. e. where the two things are naturally different.—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of 'connexion.'

23. And for the same reason the holding together and the pervading the sky.

In the Taittirīyaka and in the khilas of the Rāṇyānyas we have the following passage : 'Gathered together are the powers among which Brahman is the oldest ; Brahman as the oldest in the beginning stretched out the sky. Brahman was born as the first of all beings ; who may rival that Brahman ?' which declares that Brahman gathered together all the most ancient powers, that it pervades the sky, and so on. And as these attributes are not stated in connexion with any special meditation, we must infer that they are to be included in all meditations whatever on Brahman.—This primā facie view is controverted by the Sūtra. The holding together of all powers, &c., although not mentioned in connexion with any special meditation, is not to be included in all meditations whatever, but to be connected with particular meditations 'on the same ground,' i. e. according to difference of place. *Where* those qualities have to be included must be decided on the ground of feasibility. The attribute of pervading the whole heaven cannot be included in a meditation on Brahman as abiding within a small place such as the heart, and hence the other attributes also which are stated together with the attribute mentioned cannot be included in those meditations. And when we find that in meditations on Brahman as abiding within a small place it is said that Brahman is greater than the earth, or that the ether within the heart is as great as the universal ether, these attributes cannot be taken in their literal sense and hence included in those meditations, but must be viewed as merely meant to glorify the object proposed for meditation.—Herewith terminates the adhi-karṇa of 'holding together.'

24. And although (they both be) meditations on man ; on account of others not being recorded.

In the Taittirīyaka as well as the Kṛāṇḍogya we meet with a meditation on man (puruṣa-vidyā), in which parts of the sacrifice are fancifully identified with the parts of

the human body.—Here the Pûrvapakshin maintains that these two meditations are identical ; for, he says, both meditations have the same name (*purusha-vidyâ*), and the same character as stated above ; and as the *Taittirīyaka* mentions no fruit of the meditation, the fruit declared in the *Khândogya* holds good for the *Taittirīyaka* also, and thus there is no difference of fruit.—This view the *Sūtra* negatives. Although both meditations are meditations on man, yet they are separate ‘on account of the others not being recorded,’ i. e. on account of the qualities recorded in one *sākhâ* not being recorded in the other. For the *Taittirīyaka* mentions the three libations, while the *Khândogya* does not, and so on. The character of the two meditations thus differs. And there is a difference of result also. For an examination of the context in the *Taittirīyaka* shows that the *purusha-vidyâ* is merely a subordinate part of a meditation on Brahman, the fruit of which the text declares to be that the devotee reaches the greatness of Brahman ; while the *Khândogya* meditation is an independent one, and has for its reward the attainment of long life. The two meditations are thus separate, and hence the details of one must not be included in the other.—Here terminates the *adhikarana* of ‘the meditation on man.’

25. On account of the difference of sense of piercing and so on.

The text of the *Ātharvāṇikas* exhibits at the beginning of their *Upanishad* some mantras, ‘Pierce the sukra, pierce the heart.’ The followers of the *Sāma-veda* read at the beginning of their *rahasya-brāhmaṇa* ‘O God *Savitri*, promote the sacrifice.’ The *Kāṭhikas* and the *Taittirīyakas* have ‘May *Mitra* be propitious to us, may *Varuṇa* be propitious.’ The *Sātyāyanins* have ‘Thou art a white horse, a tawny and a black one!’ The *Kaushītakins* have a *Brāhmaṇa* referring to the *Mahāvratā-ceremony*, ‘*Indra* having slain *Vṛitra* became great.’ The *Kaushītakins* also have a *Mahāvratā-brāhmaṇa*, ‘*Pragāpati* is the year ; his Self is that *Mahāvratā*.’ The *Vāgasaneyins* have a *Brāhmaṇa* referring to the *Pravargya*, ‘The gods sat

down for a sattra-celebration.' With reference to all this a doubt arises whether these mantras and the sacrificial works referred to in the Brâhmana texts form parts of the meditations enjoined in the Upanishads or not.—The Pûrvapakshin affirms this, on the ground that as the mantras and works are mentioned in the immediate neighbourhood of the meditations the idea of their forming parts of the latter naturally presents itself. Such mantras as 'pierce the heart' and works such as the pravargya may indeed—on the basis of direct statement (sruti), inferential mark (liṅga), and syntactical connexion (vākya), which are stronger than mere proximity—be understood to be connected with certain actions; but, on the other hand, mantras such as 'May Varuṇa be propitious' have no application elsewhere, and are suitable introductions to meditations. We therefore take them to be parts of the meditations, and hence hold that those mantras are to be included in all meditations.—This view the Sûtra sets aside 'on account of the difference of sense of piercing, and so on.' The inferential marks contained in texts such as 'pierce the sukra, pierce the heart'; 'I shall speak the right, I shall speak the true,' show that the mantras have an application in connexion with certain magical practices, or else the study of the Veda, and the like, and do not therefore form part of meditations. That is to say—in the same way as the mantra 'pierce the heart' enables us to infer that also the mantra 'pierce the sukra' belongs to some magical rite, so we infer from the special meaning of mantras such as 'I shall speak the right,' &c., that also mantras such as 'May Mitra be propitious' are connected with the study of the Veda, and do not therefore form part of meditations. That mantras of this kind and Brâhmana passages relative to the Pravargya and the like are placed at the beginning of Upanishads is owing to their having, like the latter, to be studied in the forest.—Herewith terminates the adhikarṇa of 'piercing and the like.'

26. But in the case of the getting rid of (it has to be combined with the obtaining), as it is supple-

mentary to statements of obtaining; as in the case of the kuras, the metres, the praise, and the singing. This has been explained.

The *Kṛandogas* read in their text 'Shaking off all evil as a horse shakes his hair, and shaking off the body as the moon frees herself from the mouth of Rāhu, I obtain the world of Brahman' (*Kṛ. Up. VIII, 13*). The *Ātharvāṇikas* have 'He who knows, shaking off good and evil, free from passion, reaches the highest oneness.' The *Sātyāyanins* have 'His sons obtain his inheritance, his friends the good, his enemies the evil he has done.' The *Kaushītakins* 'He shakes off his good and his evil deeds. His beloved relatives obtain the good, his unbeloved relatives the evil he has done.' Two of these texts mention only the shaking off, on the part of him who knows, of his good and evil works; one mentions only the obtainment of these works, on the part of friends and enemies; and one mentions both these occurrences.—Now both the occurrences, although mentioned in several meditations, must be considered elements of all meditations: for whoever, on the basis of a knowledge of Brahman, reaches Brahman, necessarily leaves behind all his good and evil works, and those works unless thus left behind cannot be obtained by others. Meditation on those two matters therefore enters as an element into all meditations. The doubtful point, however, is whether there is option between the meditation on the abandonment of works, and that on the obtainment of works by others, and that on both these events; or whether in each case all these meditations are to be combined.—There is option, the *Pūrvapakshin* holds; for the reason that the texts make different declarations on this point. For, if the meditations had to be combined, there would be in each case meditation on both the matters mentioned; and as such double meditation is established by the *Kaushitakin* text, it would follow that the statements of the other texts are without meaning. Thus the only motive for the declarations made in different places can be to allow option. Nor must this conclusion be controverted on the ground that declarations of the same

matter, made in different places, are made with reference to the difference of students severally reading the several texts; for this holds good in those cases only where identical statements are made in different texts; while in the case under discussion two sâkhās mention the abandonment of works, and one their passing over to other persons. Nor can you account for the difference of statement on the ground of difference of vidyās; for you yourself maintain that the meditations in question form part of all meditations.—This view the Sûtra impugns, 'but where the getting rid of is mentioned,' &c. Where a text mentions either the abandonment only of works or only their being obtained by others, both these matters must necessarily be combined, since the statement as to the works being obtained forms a supplement to the statement of their being abandoned. For the former statement declares the place to which the good and evil works, got rid of by him who knows Brahman, are transferred.—This supplementary relation of two statements the Sûtra illustrates by some parallel cases. A clause in the text of the Sâxyāyanins, 'the kuras are the children of the udumbara tree,' forms a defining supplement to a more general statement in the text of the Kaushitakins, 'the kuras are the children of the tree.' The clause, 'the metres of the gods are prior,' defines the order of the metres which in other texts mentioning 'the metres of the gods and Asuras' had been left undefined, and therefore forms a supplement to those texts. Analogous is the relation of the clause, 'he assists the stotra of the shodasin when the sun has half risen,' to the less definite statement 'he assists with gold the stotra of the shodasin;' and the relation of the clause, 'the adhvaryu is not to sing,' to the general injunction 'all the priests join in the singing.' Unless we admit that one statement, which defines some other more general statement, may stand to the latter in a supplementary relation, we are driven to assume an optional proceeding, and this is objectionable as long as there is any other way open; according to a principle laid down in the Pûrva Mīmāṃsā (X, 8, 15). As the clauses referring to the abandonment of the works, and

those referring to their being taken up by others, thus form one connected whole, there is no such thing as mere abandonment and mere taking up, and hence there can be no option between the two. That the text of the Kaushîtakins mentions both thus explains itself, on the ground that the several declarations of what is really only one and the same matter are directed to different hearers.—Here terminates the *adhikarāṇa* of ‘getting rid of.’

27. At departing; there being nothing to be reached. For thus others (also declare).

The further question arises whether the putting off of all good and evil deeds takes place only at the time when the soul leaves the body, or also after it has departed and is on its journey to the world of Brahman. The Pûrvapakshin holds the latter view, for, he says, the texts declare both. The Kaushîtakins say that the soul shakes off its good and evil deeds when it crosses the river Viragâ in the world of Brahman; while the Tândîns say ‘Shaking off all evil, and shaking off the body,’ &c., which shows that the deeds are shaken off at the time when the soul leaves the body. And when the Sâtyâyanaka says that ‘his sons obtain his inheritance, his friends his good deeds,’ and so on, this also intimates that the deeds are shaken off at the time when the soul leaves the body. We therefore must conclude that a part of the deeds is left behind at the moment of death, and the remainder on the journey to the world of Brahman.—This view the Sûtra controverts. All the good and evil deeds of the dying man are left behind, without remainder, at the time when the soul parts from the body. For after the soul of him who knows has departed from the body, ‘there is nothing to be reached,’ i. e. there are no further pleasures and pains to be enjoyed as the result of good and evil deeds, different from the obtaining of Brahman, which is the fruit of knowledge. Thus others also declare that, subsequently to the soul’s departure from the body, there is no enjoyment of any pain or pleasure different from the obtaining of Brahman. ‘But when he is free of the body, then neither pleasure nor pain

touches him'; 'Thus does that serene being, rising from this body, appear in its own form as soon as it has approached the highest light' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 1; 3*); 'For him there is delay only so long as he is not freed (from the body); then he will be perfect' (*VI, 14, 2*).

28. As it is desired; on account of there being no contradiction of either.

The time when good and evil deeds are left behind thus having been determined on the basis of the reason of the thing, the several words of the passages must be construed as it is desired, i. e. so as not to contradict either, i. e. either the declaration of scripture or the reason of the thing. Thus in the text of the Kaushitakins the later clause, 'he shakes off his good and evil deeds,' must be taken as coming before the earlier passage 'having entered on that path of the gods.'—Here the Pūrvapakshin raises a new objection.

29. There is meaning of the soul's going (only) on the twofold hypothesis; for otherwise there is contradiction.

It is only on the hypothesis of a part of the good and evil works being left behind at the time of the soul's departure from the body, and another part later on, and the effacement of works thus taking place in a double way, that a sense can be found in the scriptural declaration of the soul proceeding on the path of the gods. For otherwise there would be a contradiction. For if all the works perished at the time of the soul's departure from the body, the subtle body also would perish, and if this were so, no going on the part of the mere Self would be possible. It is not therefore possible that at the time of the soul's departure from the body all works should perish without a remainder.—To this the next Sūtra replies.

30. (That assumption) is justified; on account of the perception of things which are marks of that; as in ordinary experience.

The assumption of all the works perishing at the time of 'departure' involves no contradiction; since we perceive, in the sacred texts, matters which are marks of connexion with a body even on the part of the soul which has divested itself of all its works and become manifest in its true nature. Compare 'Having approached the highest light he manifests himself in his true form'; 'He moves about there laughing, playing, and rejoicing'; 'He becomes a self-ruler, he moves about in all worlds according to his will'; 'He becomes one, he becomes three,' &c. (*Kh. Up.* VIII, 12, 3; VII, 25, 2; 26, 2). All these texts refer to the soul's connexion with a body. The soul therefore, joined to the subtle body, may proceed on the path of the gods, even after all its works have passed away. But how can the subtle body persist, when the works which originate it have passed away? Through the power of knowledge, we reply. Knowledge does not indeed by itself originate the subtle body, but it possesses the power of making that body persist, even after the gross body—which is the instrument for the experience of all ordinary pains and pleasures—and all works have passed away, so as thereby to make the soul capable of moving on the path of the gods, and thus to obtain Brahman which is the fruit of knowledge. 'As in ordinary life.' As in ordinary life, a tank, which may have been made with a view to the irrigation of rice-fields and the like, is maintained and used for the purpose of drawing drinking-water, and so on, even after the intentions which originally led to its being made have passed away.—Here an objection is raised. It may be admitted, that at the time when a man possessing true knowledge dies, all his works pass away without a remainder, and that the subtle body only remains, enabling him to move towards Brahman; but it cannot be held that the soul in that state does not experience pain and pleasure; for we know from sacred tradition that Vasishtha, Avântarāmas, and others, who had reached intuition of the highest truth, entered after death on other embodiments, and experienced pain and pleasure due to the birth of sons, various calamities, and so on.—To this the next Sūtra replies.

31. Of those who have a certain office there is subsistence (of their works) as long as the office lasts.

We do not maintain that all those who have reached true knowledge divest themselves at the time of death of all their good and evil works; we limit our view to those who immediately after death attain to moving on the path, the first stage of which is light. Persons like Vasishtha, on the other hand, who are entrusted with certain offices, do not immediately after death attain to moving on the path beginning with light, since the duties undertaken by them are not completely accomplished. In the case of beings of this kind, who owing to particular deeds have been appointed to particular offices, the effect of the works which gave rise to the office does not pass away before those offices are completely accomplished; for the effect of a work is exhausted only through the complete enjoyment of its result. In the case of those persons, therefore, the effects of the works which gave rise to their office continue to exist as long as the office itself, and hence they do not after death enter on the path beginning with light.—Here terminates the *adhikāra* of 'passing away.'

32. There is no restriction (since) all (have to go on that path). (Thus) there is non-contradiction of sacred text and *Smṛiti*.

The question here is whether Brahman is to be reached on the path of the gods by those only who take their stand on those meditations which, like the *Upakosala-vidyā*, describe that path, or by all who practise any of the meditations on Brahman. The *Pūrvapakshin* holds the former view, since there is no proof to show that in other *vidyās* the going on that path is not mentioned, and since those other *vidyās*—such as the texts 'and those who in the forest meditate on faith and austerities,' and 'those who in the forest worship faith, the True' (*Kh. Up.* V, 10, 1; *Bṛi. Up.* VI, 2, 15)—suggest to the mind the idea of the knowledge of Brahman. This the *Sūtra* negatives.

There is no restriction to that limited class of devotees, since all who carry on meditations have to go on that path. For on this latter assumption only text and inference, i. e. scripture and authoritative tradition, are not contradicted. As to scripture, the *Khândogya* and the *Vāgasaneyaka* alike, in the *Pañkâgni-vidyâ*, declare that all those who practise meditation go on that path. In the *Vāgasaneyaka* the words 'who know this' refer to those who practise the meditation on the five fires, while the following words 'those who in the forest meditate on faith and the True' refer to those who meditate on Brahman; and the text then goes on to say that all those devotees go to Brahman, on the path of the gods. Texts such as 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman,' and 'the True must be enquired into,' prove that the term 'the True' denotes Brahman; and as in the *Khândogya* the term 'tapas' occurs in the corresponding place, we conclude that both these terms, viz. *the True* and *tapas*, denote nothing else but Brahman. Meditation on Brahman, preceded by faith, is mentioned elsewhere also; in the text which begins 'The True must be enquired into' we read further on 'Faith must be enquired into' (*Kh. Up. VII, 18, 16; 19*). *Smṛiti* also declares that all those who know Brahman proceed on the path of the gods, 'Fire, the light, the day, the bright fortnight, the six months of the sun's northern progress—proceeding by that road those who know Brahman go to Brahman' (*Bha. Gi. VIII, 24*). And there are many other *Sruti* and *Smṛiti* passages of this kind. The conclusion therefore is that the *Upakosala-vidyâ* and similar texts merely refer to that going of the soul which is common to all *vidyâs*.—Here terminates the *adhikarâṇa* of 'non-restriction.'

33. But the conceptions of the Imperishable are to be comprised (in all meditations). There being equality (of the Brahman to be meditated on) and (those conceptions) existing (in Brahman); as in the case of what belongs to the *upasad*. This has been explained.

We read in the *Bṛihad-āraṇyaka* (III, 8, 9), 'O Gārgī, the Brāhmaṇas call that the Akshara. It is neither coarse nor fine,' and so on. And in the *Ātharvaṇa* (Mu. Up. I, 1, 5) we have 'The higher knowledge is that by which the Akshara is apprehended. That which cannot be seen nor seized,' &c. The doubt here arises whether all the qualities there predicated of Brahman—called akshara, i.e. the Imperishable—and constituting something contrary in nature to the apparent world, are to be included in all meditations on Brahman, or only those where the text specially mentions them. The *Pūrvapakshin* advocates the latter view; for, he says, there is no authority for holding that the qualities which characterise one meditation are characteristic of other meditations also; and such negative attributes as are mentioned in those two texts do not—as positive qualities such as bliss do—contribute to the apprehension of the true nature of Brahman. What those two texts do is merely to deny of Brahman, previously apprehended as having bliss, and so on, for its essential qualities, certain qualities belonging to the empirical world, such as grossness, and so on; for all negation must refer to an established basis.—This view the *Sūtra* refutes. The ideas of absence of grossness, and so on, which are connected with Brahman viewed as the Akshara, are to be included in all meditations on Brahman. For the imperishable (akshara) Brahman is the same in all meditations, and qualities such as non-grossness enter into the conception of its essential nature. The apprehension of a thing means the apprehension of its specific character. But mere bliss, and so on, does not suggest the specific character of Brahman, since those qualities belong also to the individual soul. What is specifically characteristic of Brahman is bliss, and so on, in so far as fundamentally opposed to all evil and imperfection. The individual soul, on the other hand, although fundamentally free from evil, yet is capable of connexion with evil. Now being fundamentally opposed to evil implies having a character the opposite of grossness and all similar qualities which belong to the empirical world, material and mental. He therefore who thinks of

Brahman must think of it as having for its essential nature bliss, knowledge, and so on, in so far as distinguished by absence of grossness and the like, and those qualities, being no less essential than bliss, and so on, must therefore be included in all meditations on Brahman.—The Sūtra gives an instance illustrating the principle that qualities (secondary matters) follow the principal matter to which they belong. As the mantra 'Agnir vai hotram vetu,' although given in the Sāma-veda, yet has to be recited in the Yagur-veda style, with a subdued voice, because it stands in a subordinate relation to the upasad-offerings prescribed for the four-days' sacrifice called Gāmadagnya; those offerings are the principal matter to which the subordinate matter—the mantra—has to conform. This point is explained in the first section, i. e. in the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā-sūtras III, 3, 9.—But this being admitted, it would follow that as Brahman is the principal matter in all meditations on Brahman, and secondary matters have to follow the principal matter, also such qualities as 'doing all works, enjoying all odours and the like,' which are mentioned in connexion with special meditations only, would indiscriminately have to be included in all meditations.—With reference to this the next Sūtra says.

34. So much ; on account of reflection.

Only so much, i. e. only those qualities which have to be included in all meditations on Brahman, without which the essential special nature of Brahman cannot be conceived, i. e. bliss, knowledge, and so on, characterised by absence of grossness and the like. Other qualities, such as doing all works and the like, although indeed following their substrate, are explicitly to be meditated on in special meditations only.—Here terminates the adhikāraṇa of 'the idea of the Imperishable.'

35. Should it be said that (the former reply refers) to that Self to which the aggregate of material things belongs (since) otherwise the difference (of the two replies) could not be accounted for ; we say—no ; as in the case of instruction.

In the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka* (III, 4 ; 5) the same question is asked twice in succession ('Tell me the Brahman which is visible, not invisible, the Self who is within all'), while *Yāgyavalkya* gives a different answer to each ('He who breathes in the upbreathing,' &c.; 'He who overcomes hunger and thirst,' &c.). The question here is whether the two meditations, suggested by these sections, are different or not. They are different, since the difference of reply effects a distinction between the two vidyās. The former reply declares him who is the maker of breathing forth, and so on, to be the inner Self of all; the latter describes him as free from hunger, thirst, and so on. It thence appears that the former passage refers to the inner (individual) Self which is different from body, sense-organs, internal organ, and vital breath; while the latter refers to that which again differs from the inner Self, viz. the highest Self, free from hunger, thirst, and so on. As the individual soul is inside the aggregate of material things, it may be spoken of as being that inner Self of all. Although this kind of inwardness is indeed only a relative one, we nevertheless must accept it in this place; for if, desirous of taking this 'being the inner Self of all' in its literal sense, we assumed the highest Self to be meant, the difference of the two replies could not be accounted for. The former reply evidently refers to the individual soul, since the highest Self cannot be conceived as breathing forth, and so on; and the latter reply, which declares the Self to be raised above hunger, &c., evidently refers to the highest Self. This is expressed in the earlier part of the *Sūtra*: 'The former reply refers to the Self to which there belongs the aggregate of material things, i. e. the individual soul as being the inner Self of all; otherwise we could not account for the difference of the two replies.'—The last words of the *Sūtra* negative this—'not so,' i. e. there is no difference of vidyās, since both assertions and replies refer to the highest Self. The question says in both places, 'the Brahman which is visible, not invisible, the Self who is within all,' and this clearly refers to the highest Self only. We indeed observe that in some places the term *Brahman*

is, in a derived sense, applied to the individual soul also ; but the text under discussion, for distinction's sake, adds the qualification 'the Brahman which is manifest' (sākshāt). The quality of 'aparokshatva' (i. e. being that which does not transcend the senses but lies openly revealed) also, which implies being connected with all space and all time, suits Brahman only, which from texts such as 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' is known to be infinite. In the same way the attribute of being the inner Self of all can belong to the highest Self only, which texts such as 'He who dwelling within the earth,' &c., declare to be the inner ruler of the universe. The replies to the two questions likewise can refer to Brahman only. The unconditional causal agency with regard to breath, declared in the clause 'he who breathes in the upbreathing,' &c., can belong to the highest Self only, not to the individual soul, since the latter possesses no such causal power when in the state of deep sleep. Ushasta thereupon, being not fully enlightened, since causality with regard to breathing may in a sense be attributed to the individual soul also, again asks a question, in reply to which Yāgyavalkya clearly indicates Brahman, 'Thou mayest not see the seer of sight,' &c., i. e. thou must not think that my previous speech has named as the causal agent of breathing the individual soul, which is the causal agent with regard to those activities which depend on the sense-organs, viz. seeing, hearing, thinking, and knowing ; for in the state of deep sleep, swoon, and so on, the soul possesses no such power. And moreover another text also—'Who could breathe if that bliss existed not in the ether?' (Taitt. Up. II, 7)—declares that the highest Self only is the cause of the breathing of all living beings. In the same way the answer to the second question can refer to the highest Self only, which alone can be said to be raised above hunger, thirst, and so on. For this reason also both replies wind up with the same phrase, 'Everything else is of evil.' The iteration of question and reply serves the purpose of showing that the same highest Brahman which is the cause of all breathing is beyond all hunger, thirst, and so on.—The

Sûtra subjoins a parallel instance. 'As in the case of instruction.' As in the vidyâ of that which truly is (*Kh. Up. VI, 1 ff.*), question and reply are iterated several times, in order to set forth the various greatness and glory of Brahman.—Thus the two sections under discussion are of the same nature, in so far as setting forth that the one Brahman which is the inner Self of all is the cause of all life and raised beyond all imperfections; and hence they constitute one meditation only.—To this a new objection is raised. The two sections may indeed both refer to the highest Brahman; nevertheless there is a difference of meditation, as according to the one Brahman is to be meditated upon as the cause of all life, and according to the other as raised above all defects; this difference of character distinguishes the two meditations. And further there is a difference of interrogators; the first question being asked by Ushasta, the second by Kahola.

36. There is interchange (of ideas), for the texts distinguish; as in other cases.

There is no difference of vidyâ because both questions and answers have one subject-matter, and because the one word that possesses enjoining power proves the connexion of the two sections. Both questions have for their topic Brahman viewed as the inner Self of all; and in the second question the word 'eva' ('just,' 'very') in 'Tell me just that Brahman,' &c., proves that the question of Kahola has for its subject the Brahman, to the qualities of which the question of Ushasta had referred. Both answers again refer to the one Brahman, viewed as the Self of all. The idea of the injunction of the entire meditation again is suggested in the second section only, 'Therefore a Brâhmaṇa, after he has done with learning, is to wish to stand by real strength.' The object of meditation being thus ascertained to be one, there must be effected a mutual interchange of the ideas of Ushasta and Kahola, i. e. Ushasta's conception of Brahman being the cause of all life must be entertained by the interrogating Kahola also; and vice versâ the conception of Kahola as to Brahman being beyond hunger,

thirst, and so on, must be entertained by Ushasta also. This interchange being made, the difference of Brahman, the inner Self of all, from the individual soul is determined by both sections. For this is the very object of Yāgñavalkya's replies: in order to intimate that the inner Self of all is different from the individual soul, they distinguish that Self as the cause of all life and as raised above hunger, thirst, and so on. Hence Brahman's being the inner Self of all is the only quality that is the subject of meditation; that it is the cause of life and so on are only means to prove its being such, and are not therefore to be meditated on independently.—But if this is so, to what end must there be made an interchange, on the part of the two interrogators, of their respective ideas?—Brahman having, on the ground of being the cause of all life, been ascertained by Ushasta as the inner Self of all, and different from the individual soul, Kahola renews the question, thinking that the inner Self of all must be viewed as different from the soul, on the ground of some special attribute which cannot possibly belong to the soul; and Yāgñavalkya divining his thought thereon declares that the inner Self possesses an attribute which cannot possibly belong to the soul, viz. being in essential opposition to all imperfection. The interchange of ideas therefore has to be made for the purpose of establishing the idea of the individual nature of the object of meditation.—‘As elsewhere,’ i. e. as in the case of the knowledge of that which truly is, the repeated questions and replies only serve to define one and the same Brahman, not to convey the idea of the object of meditation having to be meditated on under new aspects.—But a new objection is raised—As there is, in the Sad-vidyā also, a difference between the several questions and answers, how is that vidyā known to be one?—To this question the next Sūtra replies.

37. For one and the same (highest divinity), called the ‘truly being,’ and so on (is the subject of that meditation).

For the highest divinity, called there *that which is*—

which was introduced in the clause 'that divinity thought,' &c.—is intimated by all the following sections of that chapter. This is proved by the fact that the attributes—'*that which truly is*,' and so on—which were mentioned in the first section and confirmed in the subsequent ones, are finally summed up in the statement, 'in that all this has its Self, that is the True, that is the Self.'

Some interpreters construe the last two Sûtras as constituting two adhikarāṇas. The former Sûtra, they say, teaches that the text, 'I am thou, thou art I,' enjoins a meditation on the soul and the highest Self as interchangeable. But as on the basis of texts such as 'All this is indeed Brahman,' 'all this has its Self in Brahman,' 'Thou art that,' the text quoted is as a matter of course understood to mean that there is one universal Self, the teaching which it is by those interpreters assumed to convey would be nothing new; and their interpretation therefore must be rejected. The point as to the oneness of the individual and the highest Self will moreover be discussed under IV, 1, 3. Moreover, there is no foundation for a special meditation on Brahman as the individual soul and the individual soul as Brahman, apart from the meditation on the Self of all being one.—The second Sûtra, they say, declares the oneness of the meditation on the True enjoined in the text, 'whosoever knows this great wonderful first-born as the True Brahman' (*Bṛi. Up. V, 4*), and of the meditation enjoined in the subsequent passage (*V, 5, 2*), 'Now what is true, that is the Āditya, the person that dwells in yonder orb, and the person in the right eye.' But this also is untenable. For the difference of abode mentioned in the latter passage (*viz.* the abode in the sun and in the eye) establishes difference of vidyā, as already shown under Sū. III, 3, 21. Nor is it possible to assume that the two meditations comprised in the latter text which have a character of their own in so far as they view the True as embodied in syllables, and so on, and which are declared to be connected with a special result ('he who knows this destroys evil and leaves it'), should be identical with the one earlier meditation which has an independent

character of its own and a result of its own ('he conquers these worlds'). Nor can it be said that the declaration of a fruit in 'he destroys evil and leaves it' refers merely to the fruit (not of the entire meditation but) of a subordinate part of the meditation; for there is nothing to prove this. The proof certainly cannot be said to lie in the fact of the vidyās being one; for this would imply reasoning in a circle, viz. as follows—it being settled that the vidyās are one, it follows that the fruit of the former meditation only is the main one, while the fruits of the two later meditations are subordinate ones; and—it being settled that those two later fruits are subordinate ones, it follows that, as thus there is no difference depending on connexion with fruits, the two later meditations are one with the preceding one.—All this proves that the two Sūtras can be interpreted only in the way maintained by us.—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of 'being within.'

38. Wishes and the rest, here and there; (as is known from the abode, and so on).

We read in the *Kāṇḍogya* (VIII, 1, 1), 'There is that city of Brahman, and in it the palace, the small lotus, and in it that small ether,' &c.; and in the *Vāgasaneyaka*, 'He is that great unborn Self who consists of knowledge,' and so on. A doubt here arises whether the two texts constitute one meditation or not.—The two meditations are separate, the *Pūrvapakshin* maintains; for they have different characters. The *Kāṇḍogya* represents as the object of meditation the ether as distinguished by eight different attributes, viz. freedom from all evil and the rest; while, according to the *Vāgasaneyaka*, the being to be meditated on is he who dwells within that ether, and is distinguished by attributes such as lordship, and so on.—To this we reply that the meditations are not distinct, since there is no difference of character. For desires and so on constitute that character 'here and there,' i. e. in both texts nothing else but Brahman distinguished by attributes, such as having true wishes, and so on, forms the subject of meditation. This is known 'from the abode and so on,'

i.e. the meditation is recognised as the same because in both texts Brahman is referred to as abiding in the heart, being a bridge, and so on. Lordship and the rest, which are stated in the Vāgasaneyaka, are special aspects of the quality of being capable to realise all one's purposes, which is one of the eight qualities declared in the *Khândogya*, and as such prove that all the attributes going together with that quality in the *Khândogya* are valid for the Vāgasaneyaka also. The character of the two vidyās therefore does not differ. The connexion with a reward also does not differ, for it consists in both cases in attaining to Brahman; cp. *Kh. Up.* VIII, 12, 3 'Having approached the highest light he is manifested in his own form,' and *Bri. Up.* V, 4, 24 'He becomes indeed the fearless Brahman.' That, in the *Khândogya*-text, the term *ether* denotes the highest Brahman, has already been determined under I, 3, 14. As in the Vāgasaneyaka, on the other hand, he who abides in the ether is recognised as the highest Self, we infer that by the ether in which he abides must be understood the ether within the heart, which in the text 'within there is a little hollow space (sushira)' (*Mahânār. Up.* XI, 9) is called sushira. The two meditations are therefore one. Here an objection is raised. It cannot be maintained that the attributes mentioned in the *Khândogya* have to be combined with those stated in the Vāgasaneyaka (lordship, rulership, &c.), since even the latter are not truly valid for the meditation. For the immediately preceding passage, 'By the mind it is to be perceived that there is here no plurality: from death to death goes he who sees here any plurality; as one only is to be seen that eternal being, not to be proved by any means of proof,' as well as the subsequent text, 'that Self is to be described by No, no,' shows that the Brahman to be meditated upon is to be viewed as devoid of attributes; and from this we infer that the attributes of lordship and so on, no less than the qualities of grossness and the like, have to be denied of Brahman. From this again we infer that in the *Khândogya* also the attributes of satyakāmatva and so on are not meant to be declared as Brahman's true qualities. All such qualities—

as not being real qualities of Brahman—have therefore to be omitted in meditations aiming at final release.—This objection the next Sūtra disposes of.

39. On account of emphasis there is non-omission.

Attributes, such as having the power of immediately realising one's purposes, and so on, which are not by other means known to constitute attributes of Brahman, and are in the two texts under discussion, as well as in other texts, emphatically declared to be attributes of Brahman, as constituting the object of meditations undertaken with a view to final release, cannot be omitted from those meditations, but must be comprised within them. In the *Khândogya* the passage, 'Those who depart from hence, after having cognised the Self and those self-realising desires, move about at will in all those worlds,' enjoins the knowledge of Brahman as distinguished by the power of realising its desires and similar qualities, while the text, 'Those who depart from here not having cognised the Self, &c., do *not* move about at will,' &c., finds fault with the absence of such knowledge, and in this way emphasises the importance of the possession of it. In the same way the repeated declarations as to Brahman's ruling power ('the lord of all, the king of all beings,' &c.) show that stress is to be laid upon the quality indicated. It truly cannot be held that Scripture, which in tender regard to man's welfare is superior to a thousand of parents, should, deceitfully, give emphatic instruction as to certain qualities—not known through any other means of knowledge—which fundamentally would be unreal and hence utterly to be disregarded, and thus throw men desirous of release, who as it is are utterly confused by the revolutions of the wheel of *Samsāra*, into even deeper confusion and distress. That the text, 'there is not any diversity here; as one only is to be seen that eternal being,' teaches a unitary view of the world in so far as everything is an effect of Brahman and thus has Brahman for its Self, and negatives the view of plurality—established antecedently to Vedic teaching—as excluding Brahman's being the universal Self, we have explained

before. In the clause 'not so, not so' the *so* refers back to the world as established by other means of proof, and the clause thus declares that Brahman who is the Self of all is different in nature from the world. This is confirmed by the subsequent passage, 'He is incomprehensible, for he is not comprehended, he is undecaying,' &c. ; which means—as he is different in nature from what is comprehended by the other means of proof he is not grasped by those means ; as he is different from what suffers decay he does not decay, and so on. And analogously, in the *Khândogya*, the text 'by the old age of the body he does not age' &c. first establishes Brahman's being different in nature from everything else, and then declares it to be *satyakâma*, and so on.—But, an objection is raised, the text, 'Those who depart from hence, having cognised the Self and those true desires, move about at will in all worlds. Thus he who desires the world of the fathers,' &c., really declares that the knowledge of Brahman as possessing the power of immediately realising its wishes has for its fruit something lying within the sphere of transmigratory existence, and from this we infer that for him who is desirous of release and of reaching Brahman the object of meditation is not to be found in Brahman in so far as possessing qualities. The fruit of the highest knowledge is rather indicated in the passage, 'Having approached the highest light it manifests itself in its own form' ; and hence the power of realising its wishes and the rest are not to be included in the meditation of him who wishes to attain to Brahman.—To this objection the next *Sûtra* replies.

40. In the case of him who has approached (Brahman) ; just on that account, this being declared by the text.

When the soul, released from all bonds and manifesting itself in its true nature, has approached, i. e. attained to Brahman ; then just on that account, i. e. on account of such approach, the text declares it to possess the power of moving about at will in all worlds. 'Having approached the highest light he manifests himself in his true form.

He is the highest Person. He moves about there laughing, playing, &c. This point will be proved in greater detail in the fourth adhyāya. Meanwhile the conclusion is that such qualities as satyakāmatva have to be included in the meditation of him also who is desirous of release; for the possession of those qualities forms part of the experience of the released soul itself.—Here terminates the adhikāraṇa of 'wishes and the rest.'

41. There is non-restriction of determination, because this is seen; for there is a separate fruit, viz. non-obstruction.

There are certain meditations connected with elements of sacrificial actions; as e.g. 'Let a man meditate on the syllable Om as udgītha.' These meditations are subordinate elements of the sacrificial acts with which they connect themselves through the udgītha and so on, in the same way as the quality of being made of parṇa wood connects itself with the sacrifice through the ladle (made of parṇa wood), and are to be undertaken on that very account. Moreover the statement referring to these meditations, viz. 'whatever he does with knowledge, with faith, with the Upanishad, that becomes more vigorous,' does not allow the assumption of a special fruit for these meditations (apart from the fruit of the sacrificial performance); while in the case of the ladle being made of parṇa wood the text mentions a special fruit ('he whose ladle is made of parṇa wood does not hear an evil sound'). The meditations in question are therefore necessarily to be connected with the particular sacrificial performances to which they belong.—This view the Sūtra refutes, 'There is non-restriction with regard to the determinations.' By 'determination' we have here to understand the definite settling of the mind in a certain direction, in other words, meditation. The meditations on the udgītha and so on are not definitely connected with the sacrificial performances; 'since that is seen,' i.e. since the texts themselves declare that there is no such necessary connexion; cp. the text, 'therefore both perform the sacrificial work, he who thus knows it

(i. e. who possesses the knowledge implied in the meditations on the sacrifice), as well as he who does not know'—which declares that he also who does not know the meditations may perform the work. Were these meditations auxiliary elements of the works, there could be no such absence of necessary connexion (as declared in this text). It thus being determined that they are not auxiliary elements, a special result must be assigned to the injunction of meditation, and this we find in the greater strength which is imparted to the sacrifice by the meditation, and which is a result different from the result of the sacrifice itself. The *greater strength* of the performance consists herein, that its result is not impeded, as it might be impeded, by the result of some other performance of greater force. This result, viz. absence of obstruction, is something apart from the general result of the action, such as the reaching of the heavenly world, and so on. This the Sûtra means when saying, 'for separate is non-obstruction.' As thus those meditations also which refer to auxiliary members of sacrifices have their own results, they may or may not be combined with the sacrifices, according to wish. Their case is like that of the godohana vessel which, with the view of obtaining a certain special result, may be used instead of the *kamasa*.—Here terminates the *adhi-karana* of 'non-restriction of determination.'

42. Just as in the case of the offerings. This has been explained.

In the *daharavidyâ* (*Kh. Up. VIII, 1 ff.*) the text, 'those who depart having known here the Self, and those true desires,' declares at first a meditation on the small ether, i. e. the highest Self, and separately therefrom a meditation on its qualities, viz. true desires, and so on. The doubt here arises whether, in the meditation on those qualities, the meditation on the highest Self—as that to which the qualities belong—is to be repeated or not.—It is not to be repeated, the *Pûrvapakshin* maintains; for the highest Self is just that which is constituted by the qualities—freedom from all evil, and so on—and as that Self so con-

stituted can be comprised in one meditation, there is no need of repeating the meditation on account of the qualities. —This view the Sūtra sets aside. The meditation has to be repeated. The highest Self indeed is that being to which alone freedom from evil and the other qualities belong, and it forms the object of the first meditation ; yet there is a difference between it as viewed in its essential being and as viewed as possessing those qualities ; and moreover, the clause ‘free from evil, from old age,’ &c. enjoins a meditation on the Self as possessing those qualities. It is therefore first to be meditated on in its essential nature, and then there takes place a repetition of the meditation on it in order to bring in those special qualities. The case is analogous to that of ‘the offerings.’ There is a text ‘He is to offer a *puroḍāsa* on eleven potsherds to Indra the ruler, to Indra the supreme ruler, to Indra the self-ruler.’ This injunction refers to one and the same Indra, possessing the qualities of rulership and so on ; but as, through connexion with those several qualities, the aspects of Indra differ, the oblation of the *puroḍāsa* has to be repeated. This is declared in the *Sāṅkarshana*, ‘The divinities are different on account of separation.’—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of ‘offerings.’

43. On account of the plurality of indicatory marks ; for that (proof) is stronger. This also is declared (in the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā*).

The *Taittirīyaka* contains another *daharavidyā*, ‘The thousand-headed god, the all-eyed one,’ &c. (*Mahānār. Up. XI*). Here the doubt arises whether this *vidyā*, as being one with the previously introduced *vidyā*, states qualities to be included in the meditation enjoined in that *vidyā*, or qualities to be included in the meditations on the highest Self as enjoined in all the *Vedānta*-texts.—The former is the case, the *Pūrvapakshin* holds, on account of the leading subject-matter. For in the preceding section (X) the meditation on the small ether is introduced as the subject-matter. ‘There is the small lotus placed in the middle of the town (of the body), free from all evil, the abode

of the Highest; within that there is a small space, free from sorrow—what is within that should be meditated upon' (Mahânâr. Up. X, 23). Now, as the lotus of the heart is mentioned only in section X, the 'Nârâyana-section' ('the heart resembling the bud of a lotus, with its point turned downwards,' XI, 6), we conclude that that section also is concerned with the object of meditation to which the daharavidyâ refers.—Against this view the Sûtra declares itself, 'on account of the majority of indicatory marks'; i.e. there are in the text several marks proving that that section is meant to declare characteristics of that which constitutes the object of meditation in all meditations on the highest being. For that being which in those meditations is denoted as the Imperishable, Sîva, Sambhu, the highest Brahman, the highest light, the highest entity, the highest Self, and so on, is here referred to by the same names, and then declared to be Nârâyana. There are thus several indications to prove that Nârâyana is none other than that which is the object of meditation in all meditations on the Highest, viz. Brahman, which has bliss and the rest for its qualities. By 'lînga' (inferential mark) we here understand clauses (vākya) which contain a specific indication; for such clauses have, according to the Pûrva Mimâmsâ, greater proving power than leading subject-matter (prakaraṇa). The argumentation that the clause 'the heart resembling the bud of a lotus flower,' &c., proves that section to stand in a dependent relation to the daharavidyâ, is without force; for it being proved by a stronger argument that the section refers to that which is the object of meditation in all meditations, the clause mentioned may also be taken as declaring that in the daharavidyâ also the object of meditation is Nârâyana. Nor must it be thought that the accusatives with which the section begins (sahasrasîrsham, &c.) are to be connected with the 'meditating' enjoined in the previous section; for the 'meditating' is there enjoined by a gerundive form ('tasmin yad antas tad upâsitavyam'), and with this the subsequent accusatives cannot be construed. Moreover, the subsequent clause ('all this is Nârâ-

yaṇa,' &c., where the nominative case is used) shows that those accusatives are to be taken in the sense of nominatives.—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of 'the plurality of indicatory marks.'

44. There is option with regard to what precedes (i. e. the altar made of bricks) on account of subject-matter, and hence there is action; as in the case of the *mānasa* cup.

In the *Vāgasaneyaka*, in the *Agnirahasya* chapter, there are references to certain altars built of mind, 'built of mind, built of speech,' &c. The doubt here arises whether those structures of mind, and so on, which metaphorically are called fire-altars, should be considered as being of the nature of action, on account of their connexion with a performance which itself is of the nature of action; or merely of the nature of meditation, as being connected with an activity of the nature of meditation. The *Sūtra* maintains the former view. Since those things 'built of mind, and so on,' are, through being *built* (or *piled up*), constituted as fire-altars, they demand a performance with which to connect themselves; and as in immediate proximity to them no performance is enjoined, and as the general subject-matter of the section is the fire-altar built of bricks—introduced by means of the clause 'Non-being this was in the beginning'—which is invariably connected with a performance of the nature of outward action, viz. a certain sacrificial performance—we conclude that the altars built of mind, &c., which the text mentions in connexion with the same subject-matter, are themselves of the nature of action, and as such can be used as alternatives for the altar built of bricks¹. An analogous case is presented by the so-called *mental* cup. On the tenth, so-called *avivākya*, day of the *Soma* sacrifice extending over twelve days,

¹ So that for the actual outward construction of a brick altar there may optionally be substituted the merely mental construction of an imaginary altar.

there takes place the mental offering of a Soma cup, all the rites connected with which are rehearsed in imagination only; the offering of that cup is thus really of the nature of thought only, but as it forms an auxiliary element in an actual outward sacrificial performance it itself assumes the character of an action.

45. And on account of the transfer.

That the altar built of thought is an optional substitute for the altar built of bricks, and of the nature of an action, appears therefrom also that the clause 'of these each one is as great as that previous one,' explicitly transfers to the altars of mind, and so on, the powers of the previous altar made of bricks. All those altars thus having equal effects there is choice between them. The altars of mind, and so on, therefore are auxiliary members of the sacrificial performance which they help to accomplish, and hence themselves of the nature of action.—Against this view the next Sûtra declares itself.

46. But it is a meditation only, on account of assertion and what is seen.

The altars built of mind, and so on, are not of the nature of action, but of meditation only, i.e. they belong to a performance which is of the nature of meditation only. For this is what the text asserts, viz. in the clauses 'they are built of knowledge only,' and 'by knowledge they are built for him who thus knows.' As the energies of mind, speech, sight, and so on, cannot be piled up like bricks, it is indeed a matter of course that the so-called altars constructed of mind, and so on, can be mental constructions only; but the text in addition specially confirms this by declaring that those altars are elements in an activity of purely intellectual character, and hence themselves mere creatures of the intellect. Moreover there is seen in the text a performance consisting of thought only to which those fires stand in a subsidiary relation, 'by the mind they were established on hearths, by the mind they were built up, by the mind the Soma cups were drawn thereat;

by the mind they chanted, and by the mind they recited; whatever rite is performed at the sacrifice, whatever sacrificial rite there is, that, as consisting of mind, was performed by the mind only, on those (fire-altars) composed of mind, built up of mind.' From this declaration, that whatever sacrificial rite is actually performed in the case of fire-altars built of bricks is performed mentally only in the case of altars built of mind, it follows that the entire performance is a mental one only, i. e. an act of meditation. —But, an objection is raised, as the entire passus regarding the altars of mind does not contain any word of injunctive power, and as the text states no special result (from which it appears to follow that the passus does not enjoin a new independent performance), we must, on the strength of the fact that the leading subject-matter is an actual sacrificial performance as suggested by the altars built of brick, give up the idea that the altars built of mind, &c., are mental only because connected with a performance of merely mental nature.—This objection the next Sūtra refutes.

47. And on account of the greater strength of direct statement, and so on, there is no refutation.

The weaker means of proof, constituted by so-called leading subject-matter, cannot refute what is established by three stronger means of proof—direct statement, inferential mark, and syntactical connexion—viz. that there is an independent purely mental performance, and that the altars made of mind are parts of the latter. The direct statement is contained in the following passage, 'Those fire-altars indeed are built of knowledge,'—which is further explained in the subsequent passage, 'by knowledge alone these altars are built for him who knows this'—the sense of which is: the structures of mind, and so on, are built in connexion with a performance which consists of knowledge (i. e. meditation).—The inferential mark is contained in the passage, 'For him all beings at all times build them, even while he is asleep.' And the syntactical connexion (vākya) consists in the connexion of the two words *eva m-*

vide (for him who knows this), and *kīnvanti* (they build) —the sense being: for him who accomplishes the performance consisting of knowledge all beings at all times build those altars. The proving power of the passage above referred to as containing an indicatory mark (*liṅga*) lies therein that a construction mentally performed at all times by all beings cannot possibly connect itself with a sacrificial performance through the brick-altar, which is constructed by certain definite agents and on certain definite occasions only, and must therefore be an element in a mental performance, i. e. a meditation.—The next Sūtra disposes of the objection that the text cannot possibly mean to enjoin a new mental performance, apart from the actual performance, because it contains no word of injunctive force and does not mention a special result.

48. On account of connexions and the rest, as in the case of the separateness of other cognitions. And this is seen (elsewhere also); as declared (in the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā).

That the text enjoins a meditative performance different from the actual performance of which the brick-altar is a constituent element, follows from the reasons proving separation, viz. *the connexions*, i. e. the things connected with the sacrifice, such as the Soma cups, the hymns, the recitations, and so on. What is meant is that the special mention of the cups, and so on, made in the passage 'by the mind the Soma cups were drawn thereat,' proves the difference of the performance.—The 'and the rest' of the Sūtra comprises the previously stated arguments, viz. direct statement, and so on. 'As other meditations,' i. e. the case is analogous to that of other meditations such as the meditation on the small ether within the heart, which are likewise proved by textual statement, and so on, to be different and separate from actual outward sacrificial performances.—The existence of a separate meditative act having thus been ascertained, the requisite injunction has to be construed on the basis of the text as it stands.

Such construction of injunctions on the basis of texts of arthavāda character is seen in other places also ; the matter is discussed in Pū. Mī. Sūtras III, 5, 21.—The result of the meditative performance follows from the passage ‘of these (altars made of mind, and so on) each is as great as that former one (i.e. the altar built of bricks)’—for this implies that the same result which the brick-altar accomplishes through the sacrifice of which it forms an element is also attained through the altars made of mind, and so on, through the meditations of which they form parts.—The next Sūtra disposes of the argumentation that, as this formal transfer of the result of the brick-altar to the altars built of mind, and so on, shows the latter to possess the same virtues as the former, we are bound to conclude that they also form constituent elements of an actual (not merely meditative) performance.

49. Not so, on account of this being observed on account of similarity also ; as in the case of Death ; for (the person in yonder orb) does not occupy the worlds (of Death).

From a transfer or assimilation of this kind it does not necessarily follow that things of different operation are equal, and that hence those altars of mind, and so on, must connect themselves with an actual outward performance. For it is observed that such assimilation rests sometimes on a special point of resemblance only ; so in the text, ‘The person in yonder orb is Death indeed,’—where the feature of resemblance is the destroying power of the two ; for the person within yonder orb does certainly not occupy the same worlds, i.e. the same place as Death. Analogously, in the case under discussion, the fact that the altars made of mind are treated as, in a certain respect, equivalent to the altar built of bricks, does not authorise us to connect those altars with the sacrificial performance to which the altar of bricks belongs. When the text says that the altar made of mind is as great as the altar of bricks, this only means that the same result which is

attained through the brick-altar in connexion with its own sacrificial performance is also attained through the altar of mind in connexion with the meditational performance into which it enters.

50. And by a subsequent (Brāhmaṇa) also the 'being of such a kind' of the word (is proved). But the connexion is on account of plurality.

The subsequent Brāhmaṇa (Sat. Br. X, 5, 4) also proves that the text treating of the altars made of mind, and so on, enjoins a meditation only. For that Brāhmaṇa (which begins 'This brick-built fire-altar is this world; the waters are its enclosing-stones,' &c.) declares further on 'whosoever knows this thus comes to be that whole Agni who is the space-filler,' and from this it appears that what is enjoined there is a meditation with a special result of its own. And further on (X, 6) there is another meditation enjoined, viz. one on Vaisvānara. All this shows that the Agnirahasya book (Sat. Br. X) is not solely concerned with the injunction of outward sacrificial acts.—But what then is the reason that such matters as the mental (meditative) construction of fire-altars which ought to be included in the Brīhad-āraṇyaka are included in the Agnirahasya?—'That connexion is on account of plurality,' i. e. the altars made of mind, and so on, are, in the sacred text, dealt with in proximity to the real altar made of bricks, because so many details of the latter are mentally to be accomplished in the meditation.—Here terminates the adhikaraṇa of 'option with the previous one.'

51. Some, on account of the existence of a Self within a body.

In all meditations on the highest Self the nature of the meditating subject has to be ascertained no less than the nature of the object of meditation and of the mode of meditation. The question then arises whether the meditating Self is to be viewed as the knowing, doing, and enjoying Self, subject to transmigration; or as that Self which Pragāpati describes (*Kh. Up. VIII, 1*), viz. a Self

free from all sin and imperfection.—Some hold the former view, on the ground that the meditating Self is within a body. For as long as the Self dwells within a body, it is a knower, doer, enjoyer, and so on, and it can bring about the result of its meditation only as viewed under that aspect. A person who, desirous of the heavenly world or a similar result, enters on some sacrificial action may, after he has reached that result, possess characteristics different from those of a knowing, doing, and enjoying subject, but those characteristics cannot be attributed to him as long as he is in the state of having to bring about the means of accomplishing those ends; in the latter state he must be viewed as an ordinary agent, and there it would be of no use to view him as something different. And the same holds equally good with regard to a person engaged in meditation.—But, an objection is raised, the text ‘as the thought of a man is in this world, so he will be when he has departed this life’ (*Kh. Up. III, 14, 1*) does declare a difference (between the agent engaged in sacrificial action, and the meditating subject), and from this it follows that the meditating Self is to be conceived as having a nature free from all evil, and so on.—Not so, the Pûrvapakshin replies; for the clause, ‘howsoever they meditate on him,’ proves that that text refers to the equality of the object meditated upon (not of the meditating subject).—To this the next Sûtra replies.

52. But this is not so, (but rather) difference; since it is of the being of that; as in the case of intuition.

It is not true that the meditating subject must be conceived as having the ordinary characteristics of knowing, acting, &c.; it rather possesses those characteristic properties—freedom from evil, and so on—which distinguish the state of Release from the *Samsâra* state. At the time of meditation the Self of the devotee is of exactly the same nature as the released Self. ‘For it is of the being of that,’ i. e. it attains the nature of that—as proved by the texts,

'as the thought of a man is in this world, so he will be when he has departed,' and 'howsoever he meditate on him, such he becomes himself.' Nor can it be maintained that these texts refer only to meditation on the highest Self (without declaring anything as to the personal Self of the devotee); for the personal Self constitutes the body of Brahman which is the object of meditation, and hence itself falls under the category of object of meditation. The character of such meditation, therefore, is that it is a meditation on the highest Self as having for its body the individual Self, distinguished by freedom from evil and the other qualities mentioned in the teaching of Pragāpati. And hence the individual Self is, in such meditation, to be conceived (not as the ordinary Self, but) under that form which it has to attain (i. e. the pure form which belongs to it in the state of Release). 'As in the case of intuition'—i. e. as in the case of intuition of Brahman. As the intuition of Brahman has for its object the essential nature of Brahman, so the intuition of the individual soul also has for its object its permanent essential nature. In the case of sacrificial works the conception of the true nature of the Self forms an auxiliary factor. An injunction such as 'Let him who is desirous of the heavenly world sacrifice,' enjoins the performance of the sacrifice to the end of a certain result being reached; while the conception of the Self as possessing characteristics such as being a knowing subject, and so on—which are separate from the body—has the function of proving its qualification for works meant to effect results which will come about at some future time. So much only (i. e. the mere cognition of the Self as something different from the body) is required for works (as distinguished from meditations).—Here terminates the adhikāraṇa of 'being in the body.'

53. But those (meditations) which are connected with members (of sacrifices) are not (restricted) to (particular) sâkhâs, but rather (belong) to all sâkhâs.

There are certain meditations connected with certain constituent elements of sacrifices—as e.g. ‘Let a man meditate on the syllable Om (as) the Udgītha’ (*Kh.* Up. I, 1, 1); ‘Let a man meditate on the fivefold Sāman as the five worlds’ (*Kh.* Up. II, 2, 1), &c. The question here arises whether those meditations are restricted to the members of those *sākhās* in whose texts they are mentioned; or to be connected with the Udgītha, and so on, in all *sākhās*. There is here a legitimate ground for doubt, in so far as, although the general agreement of all Vedānta-texts is established, the Udgītha, and so on, are different in each Veda since the accents differ in the different Vedas.—The Pūrvapakshin declares that those meditations are limited each to its particular *sākhā*; for, he says, the injunction ‘Let him meditate on the Udgītha’ does indeed, verbally, refer to the Udgītha in general; but as what stands nearest to this injunction is the special Udgītha of the *sākhā*, in whose text this injunction occurs, and which shares the peculiarities of accent characteristic of that *sākhā*, we decide that the meditation is enjoined on members of that *sākhā* only.—The Sūtra sets this opinion aside. The injunction of meditations of this type is valid for all *sākhās*, since the text expressly connects them with the Udgītha in general. They therefore hold good wherever there is an Udgītha. The individual Udgīthas of the several *sākhās* are indeed distinguished by different accentuation; but the general statement, ‘Let him meditate on the Udgītha,’ suggests to the mind not any particular Udgītha, but *the* Udgītha in general, and hence there is no reason to restrict the meditation to a particular *sākhā*. From the principle moreover that all *sākhās* teach the same doctrine, it follows that the sacrifice enjoined in the different *sākhās* is one only; and hence there is no reason to hold that the Udgītha suggested by the injunction of the meditation is a particular one. For the Udgītha is only an element in the sacrifice, and the sacrifice is one and the same. The meditations are not therefore limited to particular *sākhās*.

54. Or there is no contradiction as in the case of mantras and the rest.

The 'or' here has the sense of 'and.' The 'and the rest' comprises generic characteristics, qualities, number, similarity, order of succession, substances, and actions. As there is nothing contrary to reason in mantras and the rest, although mentioned in the text of one *sākhā* only, finding, on the basis of such means of proof as direct statement, and so on, their application in all *sākhās*, since the sacrifice to which they belong is one and the same in all *sākhās*; so there is likewise no contradiction in the meditations under discussion being undertaken by members of all *sākhās*.—Here terminates the *adhikarana* of 'what is connected with constituent elements of the sacrifice.'

55. There is pre-eminence of plenitude, as in the case of the sacrifice; for thus Scripture shows.

The sacred text (*Kh. Up. V, 12 ff.*) enjoins a meditation on *Vaiśvānara*, the object of which is the highest Self, as having for its body the entire threefold world, and for its limbs the heavenly world, the sun, the wind, and so on. The doubt here arises whether separate meditations have to be performed on the highest Being in its separate aspects, or in its aggregate as well as in its distributed aspect, or in its aggregate aspect only.—In its separate aspects, the *Pûrvapakshin* maintains; since at the outset a meditation of that kind is declared. For on the *Rîshis* in succession telling *Asvapati* the objects of their meditation, viz. the sky, the sun, and so on, *Asvapati* explains to them that these meditations refer to the head, eye, and so on, of the highest Being, and mentions for each of these meditations a special fruit. And the concluding explanation 'he who worships *Vaiśvānara* as a span long, &c.,' is merely meant to gather up into one, as it were, the preceding meditations on the parts of *Vaiśvānara*.—Another *Pûrvapakshin* holds that this very concluding passage enjoins a further meditation on *Vaiśvānara* in his collective aspect, in addition to the previously enjoined meditations

on his limbs ; for that passage states a separate result, 'he eats food in all worlds,' &c. Nor does this destroy the unity of the whole section. The case is analogous to that of the meditation on 'plenitude' (bhūman ; *Kh. Up. VII, 23*). There, in the beginning, separate meditations are enjoined on name, and so on, with special results of their own ; and after that a meditation is enjoined on bhūman, with a result of its own, 'He becomes a Self-ruler,' &c. The entire section really refers to the meditation on bhūman ; but all the same there are admitted subordinate meditations on name, and so on, and a special result for each.—These views are set aside by the Sūtra, 'There is pre-eminence of plenitude,' i. e. there is reason to assume that Vaisvānara in his fulness, i. e. in his collective aspect, is meant ; since we apprehend unity of the entire section. From the beginning of the section it is manifest that what the *Rishis* desire to know is the Vaisvānara Self ; it is that Self which *Asvapati* expounds to them as having the Universe for his body, and in agreement therewith the last clause of his teaching intimates that the intuition of Brahman (which is none other than the Vaisvānara Self)—which is there characterised as the food of all worlds, all beings, all Selves—is the fruit of the meditation on Vaisvānara. This summing up proves the whole section to deal with the same subject. And on the basis of this knowledge we determine that what the text says as to meditations on the separate members of the Vaisvānara Self and their special results is merely of the nature of explanatory comment (anuvāda) on parts of the meditation on the collective Self.—This decision is arrived at as in the case of the sacrifice. For to the injunction of certain sacrifices—such as 'Let a man, on the birth of a son, offer a cake on twelve potsherds to Vaisvānara'—the text similarly adds remarks on parts of the oblation, 'there is an oblation on eight potsherds,' and so on.—The meditation therefore has to be performed on the entire Vaisvānara Self only, not on its parts. This, moreover, Scripture itself intimates, in so far, namely, as declaring the evil consequences of meditation on parts of the Self only, 'your head would have

fallen off if you had not come to me'; 'you would have become blind,' and so on. This also shows that the reference to the text enjoining meditations on name, &c., proves nothing as to our passage. For there the text says nothing as to disadvantages connected with those special meditations; it only says that the meditation on plenitude (bhûman) has a more excellent result. The section, therefore, although really concerned with enjoining the meditation on the bhûman, at the same time means to declare that the special meditations also are fruitful; otherwise the meditation on the bhûman could not be recommended, for the reason that it has a more excellent result than the preceding meditations.—The conclusion, therefore, is that the text enjoins a meditation on the collective Vaisvânara Self only.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the pre-eminence of plenitude.'

56. (The meditations are) separate, on account of the difference of words, and so on.

The instances coming under this head of discussion are all those meditations on Brahman which have for their only result final Release, which consists in attaining to Brahman—such as the meditation on that which is, the meditation on the bhûman, the meditation on the small space within the heart, the Upakosala meditation, the Sândilya meditation, the meditation on Vaisvânara, the meditation on the Self of bliss, the meditation on the Imperishable, and others—whether they be recorded in one sâkhâ only or in several sâkhâs. To a different category belong those meditations which have a special object such as Prâna, and a special result.—The doubt here arises whether the meditations of the former class are all to be considered as identical, or as separate.—The Pûrvapakshin holds that they are all one; for, he says, they all have one and the same object of meditation, viz. Brahman. For the nature of all cognition depends on the object cognised; and the nature of the meditations thus being one, the meditations themselves are one.—This view the Sûtra controverts.

The meditations are different, on account of the difference of terms and the rest. The 'and the rest' comprises repetition (abhyāsa), number (saṃkhyā), quality (guṇa), subject-matter (prakriyā), and name (nāmadheya ; cp. Pū. Mī. Sū. II, 2, 1 ff.). We meet in those meditations with difference of connexion, expressing itself in difference of words, and so on ; which causes difference on the part of the meditations enjoined. The terms enjoining meditation, 'he knows,' 'he is to meditate' (veda ; upāsīta), and so on, do indeed all of them denote a certain continuity of cognition, and all these cognitions have for their object Brahman only, but all the same those cognitions differ in so far as they have for their object Brahman, as variously qualified by special characteristics mentioned in the meditation ; in one meditation he is spoken of as the sole cause of the world, in another as free from all evil, and so on. We therefore arrive at the decision that clauses which describe special forms of meditation having for their result the attainment to Brahman, and are complete in themselves, convey the idea of separate independent meditations, and thus effect separation of the vidyās. This entire question was indeed already decided in the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā-sūtras (II, 2, 1), but it is here argued again to the end of dispelling the mistaken notion that the Vedānta-texts aim at knowledge only, and not at the injunction of activities such as meditation. The meditations, therefore, are separate ones. —Here terminates the adhikaraṇa of 'difference of words and the rest.'

57. Option, on account of the non-difference of result.

It has been proved that the meditation on that which truly is, the meditation on the small ether within the heart, and so on—all of which have for their result the attainment to Brahman—are separate meditations. The question now arises whether all these meditations should be combined by each meditating devotee, on account of such combination being useful to him ; or whether, in the absence of any use of such combination, they should be

undertaken optionally.—They may be combined, the Pûrvapakshin holds; since it is observed that different scriptural matters are combined even when having one and the same result. The Agnihotra, the Darsapûrnamâsa oblation, and other sacrifices, all of them have one and the same result, viz. the possession of the heavenly world; nevertheless, one and the same agent performs them all, with a view to the greater fulness of the heavenly bliss aimed at. So the different meditations on Brahman also may be cumulated with a view to greater fulness of intuition of Brahman.—This view the Sûtra rejects. Option only between the several meditations is possible, on account of the non-difference of result. For to all meditations on Brahman alike Scripture assigns one and the same result, viz. intuitive knowledge of Brahman, which is of the nature of supreme, unsurpassable bliss. ‘He who knows Brahman attains the Highest’ (Taît. Up. II, 1, 1), &c. The intuitive knowledge of Brahman constitutes supreme, unsurpassable bliss; and if such intuition may be reached through one meditation, of what use could other meditations be? The heavenly world is something limited in respect of place, time, and essential nature, and hence a person desirous of attaining to it may cumulate works in order to take possession of it to a greater extent, and so on. But an analogous proceeding cannot be resorted to with regard to Brahman, which is unlimited in every sense. All meditations on Brahman tend to dispel Nescience, which stands in the way of the intuition of Brahman, and thus equally have for their result the attaining to Brahman; and hence there is option between them. In the case, on the other hand, of those meditations which aim at other results than Brahman, there may either be choice between the several meditations, or they may be cumulated—as one may also do in the case of sacrifices aiming at the attainment of the heavenly world;—for as those results are not of an infinite nature one may aim at realising them in a higher degree. This the next Sûtra declares.

58. But meditations aiming at objects of desire

may, according to one's liking, be cumulated or not; on account of the absence of the former reason.

The last clause means—on account of their results not being of an infinite nature.—Here terminates the *adhi-karana* of 'option.'

59. They belong to the constituent members, as the bases.

A doubt arises whether meditations such as the one enjoined in the text, 'Let him meditate on the syllable Om as the Udgîtha,' which are connected with constituent elements of the sacrifice such as the Udgîtha, contribute towards the accomplishment of the sacrifice, and hence must be performed at the sacrifice as part of it; or whether they, like the *godohana* vessel, benefit the agent apart from the sacrifice, and therefore may be undertaken according to desire.—But has it not been already decided under III, 3, 42 that those meditations are generally beneficial to man, and not therefore restricted to the sacrifices?—True; it is just for the purpose of further confirming that conclusion that objections are now raised against it on the ground of some inferential marks (*liṅga*) and reasoning. For there it was maintained on the strength of the text 'therefore he does both' that those meditations have results independent of the sacrifice. But there are several reasons favouring the view that those meditations must be connected with the sacrifices as subordinate members, just as the Udgîtha and the rest to which the meditations refer.

Their case is by no means analogous to that of the *godohana* vessel, for, while in the case of the latter, the text expressly declares the existence of a special result, 'For him who is desirous of cattle he is to bring water in a *godohana*,' the texts enjoining those meditations do not state special results for them. For clauses such as 'he is to meditate on the Udgîtha' intimate only that the Udgîtha is connected with the meditation; while their connexion with certain results is known from other clauses, such as 'whatever he does with knowledge, with faith, with the

Upanishad, that is more vigorous' (according to which the result of such meditations is only to strengthen the result of the sacrifices). And when a meditation of this kind has, on the ground of its connexion with the Udgîtha or the like—which themselves are invariably connected with sacrifices—been cognised to form an element of a sacrifice, some other passage which may declare a fruit for that meditation can only be taken as an arthavâda; just as the passage which declares that he whose sacrificial ladle is made of parṇa wood does not hear an evil sound. In the same way, therefore, as the Udgîtha and so on, which are the bases of those meditations, are to be employed only as constituent parts of the sacrifices, so the meditations also connected with those constituent parts are themselves to be employed as constituent parts of the sacrifices only.

60. And on account of injunction.

The above conclusion is further confirmed by the fact of injunction, i.e. thereby that clauses such as 'he is to meditate on the Udgîtha' enjoin the meditation as standing to the Udgîtha in the relation of a subordinate member. Injunctions of this kind differ from injunctions such as 'he is to bring water in the godohana vessel for him who desires cattle'; for the latter state a special qualification on the part of him who performs the action, while the former do not, and hence cannot claim independence.

61. On account of rectification.

The text 'from the seat of the Hotṛi he sets right the wrong Udgîtha' shows that the meditation is necessarily required for the purpose of correcting whatever mistake may be made in the Udgîtha. This also proves that the meditation is an integral part of the sacrificial performance.

62. And on account of the declaration of a quality being common (to all the Vedas).

The text 'By means of that syllable the threefold knowledge proceeds. With *Om* the Adhvaryu gives orders,

with *Om* the *Hotri* recites, with *Om* the *Udgātri* sings,' which declares the *praṇava*—which is a 'quality' of the meditation, in so far as it is its basis—to be common to the three Vedas, further shows that the meditation has to be employed in connexion with the sacrifice. For the meditation is connected with the *Udgītha*, and the *Udgītha* is an integral part of all sacrificial performances whatever.

Of the *primā facie* view thus far set forth the next *Sūtra* disposes.

63. Rather not, as the text does not declare their going together.

It is not true that the meditations on the *Udgītha* and the rest are bound to the sacrifices in the same way as the *Udgītha*, and so on, themselves are ; for Scripture does not declare that they go together with, i. e. are subordinate constituents of the *Udgītha*, and so on. The clause 'Let him meditate on the *Udgītha*' does not indeed itself state another qualification on the part of the agent (i. e. does not state that the agent in entering on the meditation is prompted by a motive other than the one prompting the sacrifice); but the subsequent clause, 'whatever he does with knowledge, with faith, with the *Upanishad*, that becomes more vigorous,' intimates that knowledge is the means to render the sacrificial work more efficacious, and from this it follows that the meditation is enjoined as a means towards effecting a result other than the result of the sacrifice. And hence the meditation cannot be viewed as a subordinate member of the *Udgītha*, which itself is a subordinate member of the sacrifice. It rather has the *Udgītha* for its basis only. He only indeed who is qualified for the sacrifice is qualified for the meditation, since the latter aims at greater efficaciousness of the sacrifice; but this does not imply that the meditation necessarily goes with the sacrifice. By the greater vigour of the sacrifice is meant its non-obstruction by some other sacrificial work of greater strength, its producing its effect without any delay.—The case of a statement such as 'he whose ladle is of *parṇa* wood hears no evil sound' is different. There the text does not declare that the quality

of consisting of parṇa wood is the direct means of bringing about the result of no evil sound being heard ; hence there is no valid reason why that quality should not be subordinate to the ladle, which itself is subordinate to the sacrifice ; and as it is not legitimate to assume for the mere subordinate constituents of a sacrifice special fruits (other than the general fruit of the sacrifice), the declaration as to no evil sound being heard is to be viewed as a mere arthavâda (i.e. a mere additional statement meant further to glorify the result of the sacrifice—of which the ladle made of parṇa wood is a subordinate instrument).

64. And because (Scripture) shows it.

A scriptural text, moreover, shows that the meditation is necessary for, and restricted to, the sacrificial performance. For the text 'A Brahman priest who knows this saves the sacrifice, the sacrificer, and all the officiating priests'—which declares that all priests are saved through the knowledge of the Brahman—has sense only on the understanding that that knowledge is not restricted to the Udgâtri, and so on (i.e. not to those priests who are engaged in carrying out the details of the sacrifices which are the 'bases' of the meditations).—The conclusion, therefore, is that those meditations are not restricted to the sacrifices, subordinate members of which serve as their 'bases.'—This terminates the adhikarṇa of 'like the bases.'

FOURTH PĀDA.

1. The benefit to man results from thence, on account of scriptural statement; thus Bādarāyaṇa thinks.

We have concluded the investigation into the oneness or diverseness of meditations—the result of which is to indicate in which cases the special points mentioned in several meditations have to be combined, and in which not. A further point now to be investigated is whether that advantage to the meditating devotee, which is held to accrue to him from the meditation, results from the meditation directly, or from works of which the meditations are subordinate members.—The Reverend Bādarāyaṇa holds the former view. The benefit to man results from thence, i. e. from the meditation, because Scripture declares this to be so. ‘He who knows Brahman reaches the Highest’ (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); ‘I know that great Person of sun-like lustre beyond the darkness. A man who knows him truly passes over death; there is no other path to go’ (Svet. Up. III, 8); ‘As the flowing rivers disappear in the sea, losing their name and their form, thus a man who possesses knowledge, freed from name and form, goes to the divine Person who is greater than the great’ (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8).—Against this view the Pūrvapakshin raises an objection.

2. On account of (the Self) standing in a complementary relation, they are arthavādas, as in other cases; thus Gaimini opines.

What has been said as to Scripture intimating that a beneficial result is realised through the meditations by themselves is untenable. For texts such as ‘he who knows Brahman reaches the Highest’ do not teach that the highest aim of man is attained through knowledge; their purport rather is to inculcate knowledge of Truth on the part of a Self which is the agent in works prescribed. Knowledge,

therefore, stands in a complementary relation to sacrificial works, in so far as it imparts to the acting Self a certain mystic purification; and the texts which declare special results of knowledge, therefore, must be taken as mere arthavādas. 'As in the case of other things; so Gaimini thinks,' i.e. as Gaimini holds that in the case of substances, qualities, and so on, the scriptural declaration of results is of the nature of arthavāda.—But it has been shown before that the Vedānta-texts represent as the object to be attained, by those desirous of Release, on the basis of the knowledge imparted by them, something different from the individual Self engaged in action; cp. on this point Sû. I, 1, 15; I, 3, 5; I, 2, 3; I, 3, 18. And Sû. II, 1, 22 and others have refuted the view that Brahman is to be considered as non-different from the personal soul, because in texts such as 'thou art that' it is exhibited in co-ordination with the latter. And other Sûtras have proved that Brahman must, on the basis of numerous scriptural texts, be recognised as the inner Self of all things material and immaterial. How then can it be said that the Vedānta-texts merely mean to give instruction as to the true nature of the active individual soul, and that hence all meditation is merely subservient to sacrificial works?—On the strength of numerous inferential marks, the Pûrvapakshin replies, which prove that in the Vedānta-texts all meditation is really viewed as subordinate to knowledge, and of the declarations of co-ordination of Brahman and the individual soul (which must be taken to imply that the two are essentially of the same nature), we cannot help forming the conclusion that the real purport of the Vedānta-texts is to tell us of the true nature of the individual soul in so far as different from its body.—But, again it is objected, the agent is connected no less with ordinary worldly works than with works enjoined by the Veda, and hence is not invariably connected with sacrifices (i.e. works of the latter type); it cannot, therefore, be maintained that meditations on the part of the agent necessarily connect themselves with sacrifices in so far as they effect a purification of the sacrificer's mind!—There

is a difference, the Pūrvapakshin rejoins. Worldly works can proceed also if the agent is non-different from the body; while an agent is qualified for sacred works only in so far as he is different from the body, and of an eternal non-changing nature. Meditations, therefore, properly connect themselves with sacrifices, in so far as they teach that the agent really is of that latter nature. We thus adhere to the conclusion that meditations are constituents of sacrificial actions, and hence are of no advantage by themselves. —But what then are those inferential marks which, as you say, fully prove that the Vedānta-texts aim at setting forth the nature of the individual soul?—To this the next Sūtra replies.

3. On account of (such) conduct being seen.

It is seen, viz. in Scripture, that those who knew Brahman busied themselves chiefly with sacrifices.—Asvapati Kaikeya had a deep knowledge of the Self; but when three Rishis had come to him to receive instruction regarding the Self, he told them 'I am about to perform a sacrifice, Sirs' (*Kh. Up. V, 11*). Similarly we learn from *Smṛiti* that Ganaka and other princes deeply versed in the knowledge of Brahman applied themselves to sacrificial works, 'By works only Ganaka and others attained to perfection'; 'He also, well founded in knowledge, offered many sacrifices.' And this fact—that those who know Brahman apply themselves to works chiefly—shows that knowledge (or meditation) has no independent value, but serves to set forth the true nature of the active Self, and thus is subordinate to work.—An even more direct proof is set forth in the next Sūtra.

4. On account of direct scriptural statement.

Scripture itself directly declares knowledge to be subordinate to works, 'whatever he does with knowledge, with faith, with the Upanishad, that is more vigorous.' Nor can it be said that this text refers, on the ground of leading subject-matter (*prakaraṇa*), to the Udgītha only; for direct scriptural statement (*śruti*) is stronger than subject-matter,

and the words 'whatever he does with knowledge' clearly refer to knowledge in general.

5. On account of the taking hold together.

The text 'then both knowledge and work take hold of him' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 2*) shows that knowledge and work go together, and this going together is possible only if, in the manner stated, knowledge is subordinate to work.

6. On account of injunction for such a one.

That knowledge is subordinate to works follows therefrom also that works are enjoined on him only who possesses knowledge. For texts such as 'He who has learnt the Veda from a family of teachers,' &c. (*Kh. Up. VIII, 15*), enjoin works on him only who has mastered the sacred texts so as fully to understand their meaning—for this is the sense of the term 'learning' (*adhyayana*). Hence the knowledge of Brahman also is enjoined with a view to works only: it has no independent result of its own.

7. On account of definite rule.

Another argument for our conclusion is that the text 'Doing works here let a man desire to live a hundred years,' &c. (*Īs. Up. II*), expressly enjoins lifelong works on him who knows the Self. The general conclusion, therefore, is that knowledge (meditation) is merely auxiliary to works. Of this view the next *Sūtra* finally disposes.

8. But on account of the teaching of the different one, *Bādarāyaṇa's* (view is valid); as this is seen.

Knowledge by itself benefits man; since Scripture teaches that the object of knowledge is the highest Brahman which, as it is of an absolutely faultless and perfect nature, is other than the active individual soul.

Bādarāyaṇa, therefore, holds that knowledge has an independent fruit of its own. Let the inferential marks (referred to by the *Pūrvapakshin*) be; the direct teaching of the texts certainly refers to a being different from the

Self that acts; for we clearly see that their object is the highest creative Brahman with all its perfections and exalted qualities, which cannot possibly be attributed to the individual Self whether in the state of Release or of bondage: 'Free from evil, free from old age,' &c. &c. In all those texts there is not the slightest trace of any reference to the wretched individual soul, as insignificant and weak as a tiny glow-worm, implicated in Nescience and all the other evils of finite existence. And the fruit of that knowledge of the highest Person the texts expressly declare, in many places, to be immortality—which consists in attaining to Him. The view of knowledge by itself benefiting man therefore is well founded.—The Sūtras proceed to dispose of the so-called inferential marks.

9. But the declarations are equal.

The argument that knowledge must be held subordinate to work because we learn from Scripture that those who know Brahman perform sacrificial works, will not hold good; since, on the other hand, we also see that men knowing Brahman abandoned all work; cp. texts such as 'The Rishis descended from Kavasha said: For what purpose should we study the Veda? for what purpose should we sacrifice?' As it thus appears that those who know Brahman give up works, knowledge cannot be a mere auxiliary to works.—But how can it be accounted for that those who know Brahman both do and do not perform works?—Works may be performed in so far as sacrifices and the like, if performed by one not having any special wish, stand in subordinate relation to the knowledge of Brahman; hence there is no objection to texts enjoining works. And as, on the other hand, sacrifices and such-like works when aiming at results of their own are opposed to the knowledge of Brahman which has Release for its only result, there is all the less objection to texts which suggest the non-performance of works. If, on the other hand, knowledge were subordinate to works, works could on no account be dispensed with.—Against the assertion that

Scripture directly declares knowledge to be subordinate to works the next Sûtra declares itself.

10. (It is) non-comprehensive.

The scriptural declaration does not refer to all meditations, but only to the meditation on the Udgîtha. In the clause 'what he does with knowledge,' the 'what' is in itself indefinite, and therefore must be defined as connecting itself with the Udgîtha mentioned in the previous clause, 'Let him meditate on the Udgîtha.' The sentence cannot be construed to mean 'whatever he does is to be done with knowledge,' but means 'that which he does with knowledge becomes more vigorous,' and *that which is* done with knowledge is the Udgîtha. The next Sûtra refutes the argument set forth in Sûtra 5.

11. There is distribution, as in the case of the hundred.

As knowledge and work have different results, the text 'of him knowledge and work lay hold' must be understood in a distributive sense, i. e. as meaning that knowledge lays hold of him to the end of bringing about its own particular result, and that so likewise does work. 'As in the case of a hundred,' i. e. as it is understood that, when a man selling a field and a gem is said to receive two hundred gold pieces, one hundred are given for the field and one hundred for the gem.

12. Of him who has merely read the Veda.

Nor is there any force in the argument that knowledge is only auxiliary to work because works are enjoined on him who possesses knowledge. For the text which refers to the man 'who has read the Veda' enjoins works on him who has merely *read* the texts, and *reading* there means nothing more than the apprehension of the aggregate of syllables called Veda, without any insight into their meaning. A man who has thus mastered the words of the Veda apprehends therefrom that it makes statements as to works having certain results, and then on his own account

applies himself to the enquiry into the meaning of those declarations; he who is desirous of work applies himself to the knowledge of works; he who is desirous of Release applies himself to the knowledge of Brahman. And even if the injunction of *reading* were understood as prompting to the understanding of the text also, all the same, knowledge would not be a subsidiary to works. For *knowledge*, in the sense of the Upanishads, is something different from mere cognition of sense. In the same way as the performance of such works as the *Gyotishṭoma* sacrifice is something different from the cognition of the true nature of those works; so that *vidyā*, which effects the highest purpose of man, i.e. devout meditation (*dhyāna*, *upāsana*), is something different from the mere cognition of the true nature of Brahman. Knowledge of that kind has not the most remote connexion even with works.

13. Not so, on account of non-specification.

Nor is it true that the text 'Doing works here,' &c., is meant to divert him who knows the Self from knowledge and restrict him to works. For there is no special reason to hold that that text refers to works as independent means of a desirable result: it may as well be understood to refer to works merely subordinate to knowledge. As he who knows the Self has to practise meditation as long as he lives, he may also have to practise, for the same period, works that are helpful to meditation. Having thus refuted the objection on the ground of the reason of the matter, the *Sūtrakāra* proceeds to give his own interpretation of the text.

14. Or the permission is for the purpose of glorification.

The *or* has assertive force. The introductory words of the Upanishad, 'Hidden in the Lord is all this,' show knowledge to be the subject-matter; hence the permission of works can aim only at the glorification of knowledge. The sense of the text therefore is—owing to the power of

knowledge a man although constantly performing works is not stained by them.

15. Some also, by proceeding according to their liking.

In some *sākhās*, moreover, we read that he who possesses the knowledge of Brahman may, according to his liking, give up the state of a householder, 'What shall we do with offspring, we who have this Self and this world?' (*Bṛi. Up. V, 4, 22.*) This text also proves knowledge not to be subsidiary to works; for if it were so subsidiary, it would not be possible for him who knows Brahman to give up householdership (with all the works obligatory on that state) according to his liking.

16. And destruction.

There is moreover a Vedānta-text which declares the knowledge of Brahman to destroy work—good and evil—which is the root of all the afflictions of transmigratory existence: 'The knot of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved, all his works perish when He has been beheld who is high and low' (*Mu. Up. II, 2, 8*). This also contradicts the view of knowledge being subordinate to works.

17. And of him who is chaste; for in Scripture (this is declared).

The knowledge of Brahman belongs to those who have to observe chastity, and men living in that state have not to perform the Agnihotra, the *Darsapûṛṇamāsa*, and similar works. For this reason also knowledge cannot be subsidiary to works.—But, it may be objected, there is no such condition of life; for texts such as 'he is to perform the Agnihotra as long as he lives,' declare men to be obliged to perform sacrifices and the like up to the end of their lives, and *Smṛiti* texts contradicting Scripture have no authority.—To meet this the *Sûtra* adds 'for in Scripture.' The three stages of life are recognised in Scripture only; cp. texts such as 'Those who in the forest practise penance and faith' (*Kṛ. Up. V, 10, 1*); 'Wishing for that

world only mendicants wander forth from their homes' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 22*). The text as to the lifelong obligatoriness of the Agnihotra is valid for those only who do not retire from worldly life.

18. A reference (only) Gaimini (holds them to be), on account of absence of injunction ; for (Scripture) forbids.

The argument for the three stages of life, founded on their mention in Vedic texts, has no force, since all those references are only of the nature of *anuvāda*. For none of those texts contain injunctive forms. The text 'There are three branches of sacred observance,' &c. (*Kh. Up. II, 23, 1*), is meant to glorify the previous meditation on Brahman under the form of the *prāṇāya*, as appears from the concluding clause 'he who is firmly grounded in Brahman obtains immortality'; it therefore cannot mean to enjoin the three conditions of life as valid states. In the same way the text 'And those who in the forest practise penance and faith' refers to the statements previously made as to the path of the gods, and cannot therefore be meant to make an original declaration as to another condition of life. Scripture moreover expressly forbids that other condition, 'a murderer of men is he who removes the fire,' &c. There are therefore no conditions of life in which men are bound to observe chastity. This is the opinion of the teacher Gaimini.

19. It is to be accomplished, Bādarāyaṇa holds, on account of scriptural statement of equality.

Bādarāyaṇa is of opinion that, in the same way as the condition of householdership, those other conditions of life also are obligatory ; since in the section beginning 'there are three branches of sacred duty' all the three conditions of life are equally referred to, with a view to glorifying him who is firmly grounded in Brahman. The reference there made to the condition of the householder necessarily presupposes that condition to be already established and

obligatory, and the same reasoning then holds good with regard to the other conditions mentioned. Nor must it be said that the special duties mentioned at the beginning of the section—sacrifice, study, charity, austerity, *Brahma-kārya*—all of them belong to the state of the householder (in which case the text would contain no reference to the other conditions of life); for on that supposition the definite reference to a threefold division of duties, 'Sacrifice, &c. are the first, austerity the second, *Brahma-kārya* the third,' would be unmeaning. The proper explanation is to take the words 'sacrifice, study, and charity' as descriptive of the condition of the householder; the word 'austerity' as descriptive of the duties of the *Vaikhāṇasa* and the wandering mendicant, who both practise mortification; and the word '*Brahma-kārya*' as referring to the duties of the *Brahma-kārin*. The term '*Brahmasaṁstha*' finally, in the concluding clause, refers to all the three conditions of life, as men belonging to all those conditions may be founded on Brahman. Those, the text means to say, who are destitute of this foundation on Brahman and only perform the special duties of their condition of life, obtain the worlds of the blessed; while he only who at the same time founds himself on Brahman attains to immortality.—In the text 'and those who in the forest,' &c. the mention made of the forest shows that the statement as to the path of the gods has for its presupposition the fact that that stage of life which is especially connected with the forest is one generally recognised.—So far it has been shown that the other stages of life are no less obligatory than that of the householder, whether we take the text under discussion as containing merely a reference to those stages (as established by independent means of proof) or as directly enjoining them. The next *Sūtra* is meant to show that the latter view is after all the right one.

20. Or an injunction, as in the case of the carrying.

As the second part of the text 'Let him approach carrying the firewood below the ladle; for above he carries

it for the gods' (which refers to a certain form of the Agnihotra), although having the form of an anuvāda, yet must be interpreted as an injunction, since the carrying of firewood above is not established by any other injunction; so the text under discussion also must be taken as an injunction of the different stages of life (which are not formally enjoined elsewhere). No account being taken of the text of the Gābālas, 'Having completed his studentship he is to become a householder,' &c., it is thus a settled conclusion that the texts discussed, although primarily concerned with other topics, must at the same time be viewed as proving the validity of the several conditions of life. From this it follows that the text enjoining the performance of the Agnihotra up to the end of life, and similar texts, are not universally binding, but concern those only who do not retire from worldly life.—The final conclusion therefore is that as the knowledge of Brahman is enjoined on those who lead a life of austerity (which does not require the performance of sacrifices and the like), it is not subordinate to works, but is in itself beneficial to man.—Here terminates the adhikaraṇa of 'benefit to man.'

21. If it be said that they are mere glorification, on account of their reference; not so, on account of the newness.

The following point is next enquired into. Are texts such as 'That Udgītha is the best of all essences, the highest, holding the supreme place, the eighth' (*Kā. Up. I, 1, 3*) meant to glorify the Udgītha as a constituent element of the sacrifice, or to enjoin a meditation on the Udgītha as the best of all essences, and so on? The Pūrvapakshin holds the former view, on the ground that the text declares the Udgītha to be the best of all essences in so far as being a constituent element of the sacrifice. The case is analogous to that of texts such as 'the ladle is this earth, the āhavanīya is the heavenly world,' which are merely meant to glorify the ladle and the rest as constituent members of the sacrifice.—This view the latter part of the Sūtra sets aside 'on account of newness.'

Texts, as the one referring to the Udgîtha, cannot be mere glorifications; for the fact of the Udgîtha being the best of essences is not established by any other means of proof, and the text under discussion cannot therefore be understood as a mere anuvâda, meant for glorification. Nor is there, in proximity, any injunction of the Udgîtha on account of connexion with which the clause declaring the Udgîtha to be the best of all essences could naturally be taken as an anuvâda (glorifying the thing previously enjoined in the injunctive text); while there is such an injunction in connexion with the (anuvâda) text 'The ladle is this earth,' and so on. We thus cannot but arrive at the conclusion that the text is meant to enjoin a meditation on the Udgîtha as being the best of all essences, and so on—the fruit of such meditation being an increase of vigour and efficacy on the part of the sacrifice.

22. And on account of the words denoting becoming.

That the texts under discussion have an injunctive purport also follows from the fact that they contain verbal forms denoting becoming or origination—'he is to meditate' and the like; for all such forms have injunctive force. All these texts therefore are meant to enjoin special forms of meditation.—Here terminates the *adhikarana* of 'mere glorification.'

23. Should it be said that (the stories told in the Upanishads) are for the purpose of the Pâriplava; not so, since (certain stories) are specified.

We meet in the Vedânta-texts with certain stories such as 'Pratardana the son of Divodâsa came to the beloved abode of Indra,' &c., and similar ones. The question here arises whether the stories are merely meant to be recited at the *Asvamedha* sacrifice or to convey knowledge of a special kind.—The *Pûrvapakshin* maintains that as the text 'they tell the stories' declares the special connexion of those stories with the so-called *pâriplava* performance,

they cannot be assumed to be mainly concerned with knowledge.—This view the Sūtra negatives, on the ground that not all stories of that kind are specially connected with the pāriplava. The texts rather single out special stories only as suitable for that performance; on the general injunction quoted above there follows an injunction defining *which* stories are to be told, 'King Manu, the son of Vivasvat,' &c. The stories told in the Vedānta-texts do not therefore form parts of the pāriplava performance, but are connected with injunctions of meditations.

24. This follows also from the textual connexion (of those stories with injunctions).

That those stories subserve injunctions of meditation is proved thereby also that they are exhibited in textual connexion with injunctions such as 'the Self is to be seen,' and so on. Their position therefore is analogous to that of other stories told in the texts, which somehow subserve injunctions of works, and are not merely meant for purposes of recitation.—Here terminates the adhikaraṇa of 'the pāriplava.'

25. For this very reason there is no need of the lighting of the fire and so on.

The Sūtras return, from their digression into the discussion of two special points, to the question as to those whose condition of life involves chastity. The above Sūtra declares that as persons of that class are referred to by Scripture as specially concerned with meditation ('He who is founded on Brahman reaches immortality'; 'those who in the forest,' &c.), their meditation does not presuppose a knowledge of the kindling of fire and so on, i. e. a knowledge of the Agnihotra, the Darsapûṛṇamāsa, and all those other sacrifices which require the preliminary establishment of the sacred fires, but a knowledge of those works only which are enjoined for their special condition of life.—Here terminates the adhikaraṇa of 'the kindling of the fire.'

26. And there is need of all (works), on account

of the scriptural statement of sacrifices and the rest ; as in the case of the horse.

If knowledge (meditation), without any reference to sacrifices and the like, is able to bring about immortality, it must be capable of accomplishing this in the case of householders also ; and the mention made of sacrifices and the rest in texts such as ' Brāhmaṇas seek to know him by the study of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts ' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 22*), does not prove sacrifices and so on to be auxiliary to knowledge, since the stress there lies (not on the sacrifices and so on, but) on the desire of knowledge.—Of this view the Sūtra disposes. In the case of householders, for whom the Agnihotra and so on are obligatory, knowledge presupposes all those works, since scriptural texts such as the one quoted directly state that sacrifices and the like are auxiliary to knowledge. ' They seek to know by means of sacrifices ' can be said only if sacrifices are understood to be a means through which knowledge is brought about ; just as one can say ' he desires to slay with a sword,' because the sword is admitted to be an instrument wherewith one can kill. What we have to understand by knowledge in this connexion has been repeatedly explained, viz. a mental energy different in character from the mere cognition of the sense of texts, and more specifically denoted by such terms as *dhyāna* or *upāsana*, i. e. meditation ; which is of the nature of remembrance (i. e. representative thought), but in intuitive clearness is not inferior to the clearest presentative thought (*pratyaksha*) ; which by constant daily practice becomes ever more perfect, and being duly continued up to death secures final Release. Such meditation is originated in the mind through the grace of the Supreme Person, who is pleased and conciliated by the different kinds of acts of sacrifice and worship duly performed by the Devotee day after day. This is what the text ' they seek to know through the sacrifice ' really means. The conclusion therefore is that in the case of householders knowledge has for its pre-requisite all sacrifices and other works of permanent

and occasional obligation. 'As a horse.' As the horse, which is a means of locomotion for man, requires attendants, grooming, &c., so knowledge, although itself the means of Release, demands the co-operation of the different works. Thus the Lord himself says, 'The work of sacrifice, giving, and austerities is not to be relinquished, but is indeed to be performed; for sacrifices, gifts, and austerities are purifying to the thoughtful.' 'He from whom all beings proceed and by whom all this is pervaded—worshipping Him with the proper works man attains to perfection' (Bha. Gī. XVIII, 5; 46).—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of 'the need of all.'

27. But all the same he must be possessed of calmness, subjection of the senses, &c., since those are enjoined as auxiliaries to that, and must necessarily be accomplished.

The question is whether the householder also must practise calmness and so on, or not. The *Pūrvapakṣin* says he must not, since the performance of works implies the activity of the outer and inner organs of action, and since calmness and so on are of an exactly opposite nature.—This view the *Sūtra* sets aside. The householder also, although engaged in outward activity, must, in so far as he possesses knowledge, practise calmness of mind and the rest also; for these qualities or states are by Scripture enjoined as auxiliaries to knowledge, 'Therefore he who knows this, having become calm, subdued, satisfied, patient, and collected, should see the Self in Self' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 23*). As calmness of mind and the rest are seen, in so far as implying composure and concentration of mind, to promote the origination of knowledge, they also must necessarily be aimed at and practised. Nor can it be said that between works on the one side and calmness and so on on the other, there is an absolute antagonism; for the two have different spheres of application. Activity of the organs of action is the proper thing in the case of works enjoined; quiescence in the case of works not enjoined and

such as have no definite purpose. Nor also can it be objected that in the case of works implying the activity of organs, calmness of mind and so on are impossible, the mind then being necessarily engrossed by the impressions of the present work and its surroundings; for works enjoined by Scripture have the power of pleasing the Supreme Person, and hence, through his grace, to cause the destruction of all mental impressions obstructive of calmness and concentration of mind. Hence calmness of mind and the rest are to be aimed at and practised by householders also.—Here terminates the *adhikāra* of ‘calmness’ and so on.

28. And there is permission of all food in the case of danger of life; on account of this being seen.

In the meditation on *prāṇa*, according to the *Vāgasaneyins* and the *Kāṇḍogas*, there is a statement as to all food being allowed to him who knows the *prāṇa*, ‘By him there is nothing eaten that is not food’ (*Bṛi. Up. VI, 1, 14*; and so on). A doubt here arises whether this permission of all food is valid for him who possesses the knowledge of *prāṇa*, in all circumstances, or only in the case of life being in danger.—The *Pūrvapakshin* holds the former view, on account of no special conditions being stated in the text.—This the *Sūtra* sets aside ‘in the case of danger to life’; for the reason that, as the text shows, the eating of food of all kinds is permitted even for those who know Brahman itself—the knowledge of which of course is higher than that of *prāṇa*—only when their life is in danger. The text alluded to is the one telling how *Ushasta Kākrāyana*, who was well versed in the knowledge of Brahman, once, when in great distress, ate unlawful food. We therefore conclude that what the text says as to all food being lawful for him who knows *prāṇa*, can refer only to occasions when food of any kind must be eaten in order to preserve life.

29. And on account of non-sublation.

The conclusion above arrived at is confirmed by the consideration that thus only those texts are not stultified

which enjoin, for those who know Brahman, purity in matters of food with a view to the origination of knowledge of Brahman. Cp. 'when the food is pure the mind becomes pure' (*Kh. Up. VII, 26, 2*).

30. This is said in *Smṛiti* also.

That for those as well who know Brahman, as for others, the eating of food of any kind is lawful only in case of extreme need, *Smṛiti* also declares, 'He who being in danger of his life eats food from anywhere is stained by sin no more than the lotus leaf by water.'

31. And hence also a scriptural passage as to non-proceeding according to liking.

The above conclusion is further confirmed by a scriptural passage prohibiting licence of conduct on the part of any one. The text meant is a passage in the *Samhitā* of the *Kaṭhas*, 'Therefore a *Brāhmaṇa* does not drink spirituous liquor, thinking "may I not be stained by sin."—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of 'the allowance of all food.'

32. The works of the *āśramas* also, on account of their being enjoined.

It has been said that sacrifices and other works are auxiliary to the knowledge of Brahman. The doubt now arises whether those works are to be performed by him also who merely wishes to fulfil the duties of his *āśrama*, without aiming at final Release, or not. They are not, the *Pūrvapakshin* holds, for that things auxiliary to knowledge should stand in subordinate relation to a certain state of life would imply the contradiction of permanent and non-permanent obligation.—Of this view the *Sūtra* disposes, 'The works of the *āśramas* also.' The works belonging to each *āśrama* have to be performed by those also who do not aim at more than to live according to the *āśrama*; for they are specifically enjoined by texts such as 'as long as life lasts he is to offer the *Agnihotra*'; this implies a permanent obligation dependent on life. And that the same works are also to be performed as being auxiliary to

knowledge appears from the texts enjoining them in that aspect, 'Him they seek to know by the study of the Veda' (*Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22*); this the next Sûtra declares.

33. And on account of co-operativeness.

These works are to be performed also on account of their being co-operative towards knowledge in so far, namely, as they give rise to the desire of knowledge; and their thus being enjoined for a double purpose does not imply contradiction any more than the double injunctions of the Agnihotra, which one text connects with the life of the sacrificer and another text with his desire to reach the heavenly world.—Nor does this imply a difference of works—this the next Sûtra declares.

34. In any case they are the same, on account of twofold inferential signs.

There is no radical difference of works; but in any case, i. e. whether they be viewed as duties incumbent on the âsrama or as auxiliary to knowledge, sacrifices and other works are one and the same. For Scripture, in enjoining them in both these aspects, makes use of the same terms, so that we recognise the same acts, and there is no means of proof to establish difference of works.

35. And Scripture also declares (knowledge) not to be overpowered.

Texts such as 'By works of sacred duty he drives away evil' declare that sacrifices and similar works have the effect of knowledge 'not being overpowered,' i. e. of the origination of knowledge not being obstructed by evil works. Sacrifices and similar works being performed day after day have the effect of purifying the mind, and owing to this, knowledge arises in the mind with ever increasing brightness. This proves that the works are the same in either case.—Here terminates the *adhikarâṇa* of 'the being enjoined' (of sacrifices, and so on).

36. Also in the case of those outside, as this is seen.

It has been declared that the members of the four āśramas have a claim to the knowledge of Brahman, and that the duties connected with each āśrama promote knowledge. A doubt now arises whether those men also who, on account of poverty and so on, stand outside the āśramas are qualified for the knowledge of Brahman, or not.—They are not, the Pūrvapakshin holds, since such knowledge is to be attained in a way dependent on the special duties of each āśrama; while those who do not belong to an āśrama are not concerned with āśrama duties.—This view the Sūtra rejects. Those also who do not stand within any āśrama are qualified for knowledge, 'because that is seen,' i. e. because the texts declare that men such as Raikva, Bhishma, Samvarta and others who did not belong to āśramas were well grounded in the knowledge of Brahman. It can by no means be maintained that it is āśrama duties only that promote knowledge; for the text 'by gifts, by penance, by fasting, and so on' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 22*) distinctly declares that charity also and other practices, which are not confined to the āśramas, are helpful towards knowledge. In the same way as in the case of those bound to chastity—who, as the texts show, may possess the knowledge of Brahman—knowledge is promoted by practices other than the Agnihotra and the like, so—it is concluded—in the case of those also who do not belong to any āśrama knowledge may be promoted by certain practices not exclusively connected with any āśrama, such as prayer, fasting, charity, propitiation of the divinity, and so on.

37. *Smṛiti* also states this.

Smṛiti also declares that men not belonging to an āśrama grow in knowledge through prayer and the like. 'Through prayer also a Brāhmaṇa may become perfect. May he perform other works or not, one who befriends all creatures is called a Brāhmaṇa' (*Manu Smṛi. II, 17*).

38. And there is the promotion (of knowledge) through special acts (of duty).

The above conclusion is founded not only on Reasoning and *Smṛiti*; but Scripture even directly states that knowledge is benefited by practices not exclusively prescribed for the *āśramas*, 'By penance, abstinence, faith, and knowledge he is to seek the Self' (Pr. Up. I, 10).

39. But better than that is the other also on account of an inferential mark.

Better than to be outside the *āśramas* is the condition of standing within an *āśrama*. The latter state may be due to misfortune; but he who can 'should be within an *āśrama*, which state is the more holy and beneficial' one. This follows from inference only, i. e. *Smṛiti*; for *Smṛiti* says, 'A *Brāhmaṇa* is to remain outside the *āśramas* not even for one day.' For one who has passed beyond the stage of *Brahmaçarya*, or whose wife has died, the impossibility to procure a wife constitutes the misfortune (which prevents him from belonging to an *āśrama*).—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of 'widowers.'

40. But of him who has become that there is no becoming not that, according to *Gaimini* also, on account of (Scripture) restraining from the absence of the forms of that.

The doubt here arises whether those also who have fallen from the state of life of a *Naishṭhika*, *Vaikhāṇasa* or *Pārivrāga* are qualified for the knowledge of Brahman or not.—They are so, since in their case, no less than in that of widowers and the like, the growth of knowledge may be assisted by charity and other practices not confined to *āśramas*.—This *primâ facie* view the *Sûtra* sets aside. 'He who has become that,' i. e. he who has entered on the condition of a *Naishṭhika* or the like 'cannot become not that,' i. e. may not live in a non-*āśrama* condition; since scriptural texts restrain men who once have entered the *Naishṭhika*, &c., state 'from the absence of the forms of that,' i. e. from the discontinuance of the special duties of their *āśrama*. Compare texts such as 'He is to go into

the forest, and is not to return from thence'; 'Having renounced the world he is not to return.' And hence persons who have lapsed from their āsrama are not qualified for meditation on Brahman. This view of his the Sūtra-kāra strengthens by a reference to the opinion of Gaimini. —But cannot a Naishṭhika who, through some sin, has lapsed from his duties and position, make up for his transgression by some expiatory act and thus again become fit for meditation on Brahman?—To this point the next Sūtra refers.

41. Nor the (expiatory performance) described in the chapter treating of qualification; that being impossible on account of the Smṛiti referring to such lapse.

Those expiatory performances which are described in the chapter treating of qualification (Pū. Mī. Sū. VI) are not possible in the case of him who has lapsed from the condition of a Naishṭhika; since such expiations do not apply to him, as is shown by a Smṛiti text referring to such lapse, viz. 'He who having once entered on the duties of a Naishṭhika lapses from them, for such a slayer of the Self I do not see any expiatory work by which he might become clean.' The expiatory ceremony referred to in the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā therefore applies to the case of other Brahma-kārins only.

42. A minor one, thus some; (and hence they hold) the existence (of expiation), as in the case of eating. This has been explained.

Some teachers are of opinion that even on the part of Naishṭhikas and the rest the lapse from chastity constitutes only a minor offence which can be atoned for by expiatory observances; in the same way as in the case of the eating of forbidden food the same prāyaścitta may be used by the ordinary Brahma-kārin and by Naishṭhikas and the rest. This has been stated by the Smṛiti writer, 'For the others also (i. e. the Naishṭhikas and so on) the same (rules and

practices as those for the Upakurvâna) hold good, in so far as not opposed to their âsrama.'

43. But in either case (such men) stand outside ; on account of Smṛiti and custom.

Whether the point under discussion constitutes a minor or a major offence, in any case those who have lapsed stand outside the category of those qualified for the knowledge of Brahman. For Smṛiti, i. e. the text quoted above, 'I see no expiatory performance by which he, a slayer of Brahman as he is, could become pure again,' declares that expiations are powerless to restore purity. And custom confirms the same conclusion ; for good men shun those Naishṭhikas who have lapsed, even after they have performed prâyaścittas, and do not impart to them the knowledge of Brahman. The conclusion, therefore, is that such men are not qualified for knowing Brahman.—Here terminates the adhikarâṇa of 'him who has become that.'

44. By the Lord (of the sacrifice), since Scripture declares a fruit—thus Âtreya thinks.

A doubt arises whether the meditations on such constituent elements of the sacrifice as the Udgîtha, and so on, are to be performed by the sacrificer (for whose benefit the sacrifice is offered), or by the officiating priests. Âtreya advocates the former view ; on the ground of Scripture showing that in the case of such meditations as the one on the small ether within the heart, fruit and meditation belong to the same person, and that in the case of such meditations as the one on the Udgîtha the fruit belongs to the sacrificer (whence we conclude that the meditation also is his). Nor can it be said that the sacrificer is not competent for such meditation, for the reason that like the godohana vessel it is connected with an element of the sacrifice (which latter the priests only can perform). For the godohana vessel serves to bring water, and this of course none else can do but the Adhvaryu ; while a meditation on the Udgîtha as being the essence of all essences can very well be performed by the Sacrificer—true though

it be that the Udgîtha itself can be performed by the Udgâtri priest only.—Against this view the next Sûtra declares itself.

45. (They are) the priest's work, Auḍulomi thinks ; since for that he is engaged.

The teacher Auḍulomi is of opinion that the meditation on the Udgîtha and the like is the work of the priest, since it is he who is engaged for the purpose of performing that which gives rise to the fruit, i. e. of the entire sacrifice with all its subordinate parts. Injunctions referring to the performance of the sacrifices such as 'he chooses the priests; he gives to the priests their fee' indicate that the entire sacrificial performance is the work of the priests, and that hence all activities comprised within it—mental as well as bodily—belong to the priests. Capability or non-capability does not constitute the criterion in this case. For although the meditations in question aim directly at the benefit of man (not at the greater perfection of the sacrifice), yet since they fall within the sphere of qualification of those who are qualified for the sacrifice, and since the sacrifice with all its subordinate elements has to be performed by the priests, and since the text 'whatever he does with knowledge that becomes more vigorous' declares knowledge to belong to the same agent as the works which are benefited by such knowledge, we conclude that those meditations also are the exclusive duty of the priests. In the case of the meditations on the small ether, &c, on the other hand, the text says nothing as to their having to be performed by priests, and we therefore assume in accordance with the general principle that 'the fruit belongs to the performer,' that the agent there is the person to whom Scripture assigns the fruit.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the lord (of the sacrifice).'

46. There is injunction of other auxiliary means for him who is such, as in the case of injunction and so on ; (the term *mauna* denoting) according to an alternative meaning a third something.

‘Therefore let a Brāhmaṇa after he has done with learning wish to stand by a childlike state; and after having done with the childlike state and learning (he is) a Muni’ (*Bṛi. Up. III, 5*). A doubt arises whether this text enjoins Muni-hood in the same way as it enjoins learning and the childlike state, or merely refers to it as something already established.—The Pūrvapakshin holds the latter view on the ground that as ‘Muni-hood’ and ‘learning’ both connote knowledge, the word ‘Muni’ merely refers back to the knowledge already enjoined in the phrase ‘after he has done with learning.’ For the text presents no word of injunctive force with regard to Muni-hood.—This view the Sūtra controverts. ‘For him who is such,’ i. e. for those who possess knowledge, ‘there is an injunction of a different co-operative factor’ ‘in the same way as injunctions and the rest.’ By the *injunctions* in the last clause we have to understand the special duties of the different āśramas, i. e. sacrifices and the like, and also such qualifications as quietness of mind and the like; and by the ‘and the rest’ is meant the learning of and pondering on the sacred texts. Stated at length, the meaning of the Sūtra then is as follows—in the same way as texts such as ‘him Brāhmaṇas seek to know through the reciting of the Veda, through sacrifices and charity, and so on,’ and ‘Quiet, subdued,’ &c. (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 23*) enjoin sacrifices and so on, and quietness of mind and the like, as helpful towards knowledge; and as texts such as ‘the Self is to be heard, to be pondered upon’ (*Bṛi. Up. II, 4, 5*) mention hearing and pondering as helpful towards knowledge; thus the text under discussion enjoins learning, a childlike state of mind, and Muni-hood as three further different auxiliaries of knowledge.—‘Muni-hood’ does *not* denote the same thing as ‘learning’—this the Sūtra intimates by the clause ‘alternatively a third,’ i. e. as the word muni is observed alternatively to denote persons such as Vyāsa distinguished by their power of profound reflection (*manana*), the abstract term munihood denotes a third thing different from *learning* and the ‘childlike state.’ Hence, although the phrase ‘then a Muni’ does not contain a word of directly

injunctive power, we must all the same understand it in an injunctive sense, viz. 'then let him be or become a Muni'; for Muni-hood is not something previously established. Such munihood is also something different from mere *reflection* (*manana*); it is the reiterated representation before the mind of the object of meditation, the idea of that object thus becoming more and more vivid. The meaning of the entire text therefore is as follows. A Brāhmaṇa is at first fully to master knowledge, i.e. he is to attain, by means of hearing and pondering, to the knowledge of Brahman in all its fulness and perfection. This is to be effected through the growth of purity of mind and heart, due to the grace of the Lord; for this Smṛiti declares, 'Neither by the Vedas nor by austerities, and so on, can I be so seen—; but by devotion exclusive I may be known' (Bha. Gī. XI, 53-54); and Scripture also says, 'Who has the highest devotion for God' (Svet. Up. VI, 23), and 'That Self cannot be gained by the study of the Veda,' &c. 'He whom the Self chooses by him the Self is to be attained' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 23). After that 'he is to stand by a childlike state'; what this means will be explained further on. And after that he is to be a Muni, i.e. he is to fix his thoughts so exclusively and persistently on Brahman as to attain to the mode of knowledge called meditation. Having by the employment of these three means reached true knowledge he—the text goes on to say—having done with *amauna* and *mauna* is a Brāhmaṇa. *Amauna*, i.e. non-*mauna*, denotes all the auxiliaries of knowledge different from *mauna*: employing these and *mauna* as well he reaches the highest goal of knowledge. And, the text further says, there is no other means but those stated whereby to become such, i.e. a true Brāhmaṇa. The entire text thus evidently means to enjoin on any one standing within any āśrama learning, a childlike state, and *mauna* as auxiliary means of knowledge, in addition to sacrifices and the other special duties of the āśramas.—But, an objection is raised, if knowledge, aided by *pāṇḍitya* and so on, and thus being auxiliary to the action of the special duties of the āśramas, is thus declared to be the

means of attaining to Brahman; how then are we to understand the *Khândogya*'s declaring that a man, in order to attain to Brahman, is throughout his life to carry on the duties of a householder¹?—To this the next *Sûtra* replies.

47. But on account of the existence (of knowledge) in all, there is winding up with the householder.

As knowledge belongs to the members of all *âsramas* it belongs to the householder also, and for this reason the *Upanishad* winds up with the latter. This winding up therefore is meant to illustrate the duties (not of the householder only, but) of the members of all *âsramas*. Analogously in the text under discussion (*Bri. Up.* III, 5) the clause 'A *Brâhmaṇa* having risen above the desire for sons, the desire for wealth, and the desire for worlds, wanders about as a mendicant,' intimates duties belonging exclusively to the condition of the wandering beggar, and then the subsequent clause 'therefore let a *Brâhmaṇa* having done with learning,' &c., enjoins *pânditya*, *bâlya*, and *mauna* (not as incumbent on the *pârivrâgaka* only, but) as illustrating the duties of all *âsramas*.—This the next *Sûtra* explicitly declares.

48. On account of the others also being taught, in the same way as the condition of the Muni.

The injunction, on him who has passed beyond all desire, of *mauna* preceded by *pârivrâgya* (wandering about as a mendicant), is meant to illustrate the duties of all *âsramas*. For the duties of the other *âsramas* are taught by Scripture no less than those of the Muni (and the householder). Similarly it was shown above that in the text 'There are three branches of sacred duty—he who is founded on Brahman goes to immortality,' the term 'founded on Brahman' applies equally to members of all *âsramas*.—It therefore remains a settled conclusion that

¹ *Kh. Up.* VIII, 13.

the text under discussion enjoins *pāṇḍitya*, *bālya*, and *mauna* as being auxiliaries to knowledge in the same way as the other duties of the *āśramas*, such as sacrifices and the rest.—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of ‘the injunction of other auxiliaries.’

49. Not manifesting itself; on account of the connexion.

In the text discussed above we meet with the word ‘*bālya*,’ which may mean either ‘being a child’ or ‘being and doing like a child.’ The former meaning is excluded, as that particular age which is called childhood cannot be assumed at will. With regard to the latter meaning, however, a doubt arises, viz. whether the text means to say that he who aims at perfect knowledge is to assume all the ways of a child, as e. g. its wilful behaviour, or only its freedom from pride and the like.—The former, the *Pūrvapakshin* maintains. For the text gives no specification, and texts enjoining restraints of different kinds (on the man desirous of knowledge) are sublated by this specific text which enjoins him to be in all points like a child.—This view the *Sūtra* disposes of. ‘Not manifesting itself.’ That aspect of a child’s nature which consists in the child not manifesting its nature (viz. in pride, arrogance, and so on), the man aiming at true knowledge is to make his own. ‘On account of connexion,’ i. e. because thus only the ‘*bālya*’ of the text gives a possible sense. The other characteristic features of ‘childhood’ the texts declare to be opposed to knowledge, ‘He who has not turned away from wicked conduct, who is not tranquil and attentive, or whose mind is not at peace, he can never attain the Self by knowledge’ (*Ka. Up. I, 2, 24*); ‘When food is pure, the whole nature becomes pure’ (*Kh. Up. VII, 26, 2*), and so on.—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of ‘non-manifestation.’

50. What belongs to this world, there being no obstruction at hand; as this is seen.

Knowledge, as enjoined by Scripture, is twofold, having

for its fruit either exaltation within the sphere of the *Samsāra*, or final Release. With regard to the former the question arises whether it springs up only immediately subsequent to the good works which are the means to bring it about; or, indefinitely, either subsequent to such works or at some later time.—The *Pûrvapakshin* holds the former view. A man reaches knowledge through his good deeds only, as the Lord himself declares, 'Four kinds of men doing good works worship me,' &c. (*Bha. Gî. VII, 16*); and when those works have been accomplished there is no reason why the result, i. e. knowledge, should be delayed.—This view the *Sûtra* disposes of. 'What is comprised in this world,' i. e. meditation, the result of which is worldly exaltation, springs up immediately after the works to which it is due, in case of there being no other works of greater strength obstructing the rise of knowledge; but if there is an obstruction of the latter kind, knowledge springs up later on only. 'For this is seen,' i. e. Scripture acknowledges the effects of such obstruction; for a statement such as 'what he does with knowledge, with faith, with the *Upanishad* that is more vigorous,' means that works joined with the knowledge of the *Udgîtha*, and so on, produce their results without obstruction (which implies that the action of other works is liable to be obstructed).—Here terminates the *adhikarṇa* of 'what belongs to this world.'

51. In the same way there is non-determination with regard to what has Release for its result; that condition being ascertained, that condition being ascertained.

So likewise in the case of the origination, through works of very great merit, of such knowledge as has for its result final Release, the time is not definitely fixed; for here also there is ascertained the same condition, viz. the termination of the obstruction presented by other works. A further doubt might in this case be raised on the ground that such works as give rise to knowledge leading to final Release are stronger than all other works, and therefore not

liable to obstruction. But this doubt is disposed of by the reflection that even in the case of a man knowing Brahman there may exist previous evil deeds of overpowering strength.—The repetition of the last words of the Sūtra indicates the completion of the adhyāya.—Here terminates the adhikaraṇa of 'what has Release for its result.'

FOURTH ADHYĀYA.

FIRST PĀDA.

1. Repetition, on account of the text teaching (what has to be done more than once).

The third adhyāya was concerned with the consideration of meditation, together with its means. The Sūtras now enter on a consideration of the results of meditation, after a further preliminary clearing up of the nature of meditation. The question here arises whether the act of knowledge of Brahman inculcated in Vedānta-texts, such as 'He who knows Brahman reaches the Highest,' 'Having known him thus he passes beyond death,' 'He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman,' is, in the view of Scripture, to be performed once only, or to be repeated more than once.—Once suffices, the Pûrvapakshin maintains; for as the text enjoins nothing more than knowing there is no authority for a repetition of the act. Nor can it be said that the act of knowing, analogous to the act of beating the rice-grains until they are freed from the husks, is a visible means towards effecting the intuition of Brahman, and hence must, like the beating, be repeated until the effect is accomplished; for knowing is not a visible means towards anything. Such acts as the Gyotishṭoma sacrifice and the knowledge inculcated in the Vedānta-texts are alike of the nature of conciliation of the Supreme Person; through whom thus conciliated man obtains all that is beneficial to him, viz. religious duty, wealth, pleasure, and final Release. This has been shown under III, 2, 38. The meaning of Scripture therefore is accomplished by performing the act of knowledge once only, as the Gyotishṭoma is performed once.—This view the Sūtra sets aside. The meaning of Scripture is fulfilled only by repeated acts of knowledge 'on account of teaching,' i. e. because the teaching of Scripture is conveyed

by means of the term 'knowing' (*vedana*), which is synonymous with meditating (*dhyāna*, *upāsana*). That these terms are so synonymous appears from the fact that the verbs *vid*, *upās*, *dhyāi* are in one and the same text used with reference to one and the same object of knowledge. A text begins, e.g. 'Let him meditate (*upāsita*) on mind as Brahman,' and concludes 'he who knows (*veda*) this shines, warms,' &c. (*Kh. Up.* III, 18). In the same way the knowledge of *Raikva* is at first referred to by means of *vid*, 'He who knows (*veda*) what he knows is thus spoken of by me,' and further on by means of *upās*, 'teach me the deity on which you meditate' (*Kh. Up.* IV, 1, 2). Similarly texts which have the same meaning as the text 'He who knows Brahman reaches the Highest'—viz. 'the Self should be seen, be heard, be reflected on, be meditated upon (*nididhyāsitavya*)'—'Then he sees him meditating (*dhyāyamāna*) on him as without parts' (*Mu. Up.* III, 1, 8), and others—use the verb *dhyāi* to express the meaning of *vid*. Now *dhyāi* means to think of something not in the way of mere representation (*smṛiti*), but in the way of *continued* representation. And *upās* has the same meaning; for we see it used in the sense of thinking with uninterrupted concentration of the mind on one object. We therefore conclude that as the verb '*vid*' is used interchangeably with *dhyāi* and *upās*, the mental activity referred to in texts such as 'he knows Brahman' and the like is an often-repeated continuous representation.

2. And on account of an inferential mark.

Inferential mark here means *Smṛiti*. *Smṛiti* also declares that that knowledge which effects Release is of the nature of continued representation. Meditation therefore has to be repeated.—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of 'repetition.'

3. But as the Self; this (the ancient Devotees) acknowledge (since the texts) make (them) apprehend (in that way).

The following point is now taken into consideration. Is Brahman to be meditated upon as something different from the meditating Devotee, or as the Self of the latter?—The Pûrvapakshin holds the former view. For, he says, the individual soul *is* something different from Brahman ; as has been proved under II, 1, 22 ; III, 4, 8 ; I, 1, 15. And Brahman must be meditated upon as it truly is ; for if it is meditated upon under an unreal aspect, the attaining to Brahman also will not be real, according to the principle expressed in the text, ‘ According as a man’s thought is in this world, so will he be when he has departed this life ’ (*Kh. Up.* III, 14, 1). This view the Sûtra sets aside. Brahman is rather to be meditated upon as being the Self of the meditating Devotee. As the meditating individual soul is the Self of its own body, so the highest Brahman is the Self of the individual soul—this is the proper form of meditation.—Why?—Because the great Devotees of olden times acknowledged this to be the true nature of meditation ; compare the text ‘ Then I am indeed thou, holy divinity, and thou art me.’—But how can the Devotees claim that Brahman which is a different being is their ‘ Ego ’?—Because the texts enable them to apprehend this relation as one free from contradiction. ‘ He who dwelling within the Self is different from the Self, whom the Self does not know, of whom the Self is the body, who rules the Self from within ; he is thy Self, the inner ruler, the immortal one ’ (*Bṛi. Up.* III, 7, 3) ; ‘ In the True all these beings have their root, they dwell in the True, they rest in the True ;—in that all that exists has its Self ’ (*Kh. Up.* VI, 8) ; ‘ All this indeed is Brahman ’ (*Kh. Up.* III, 14, 1)—all these texts teach that all sentient and non-sentient beings spring from Brahman, are merged in him, breathe through him, are ruled by him, constitute his body ; so that he is the Self of all of them. In the same way therefore as, on the basis of the fact that the individual soul occupies with regard to the body the position of a Self, we form such judgments of co-ordination as ‘ I am a god—I am a man ’ ; the fact of the individual Self being of the nature of Self justifies us in viewing our own Ego as belonging

to the highest Self. On the presupposition of all ideas being finally based on Brahman and hence all words also finally denoting Brahman, the texts therefore make such statements of mutual implication as 'I am thou, O holy divinity, and thou art me.' On this view of the relation of individual soul and highest Self there is no real contradiction between two, apparently contradictory, sets of texts, viz. those on the one hand which negative the view of the soul being different from the highest Self, 'Now if a man meditates upon another divinity, thinking "the divinity is one and I another," he does not know'; 'He is incomplete, let him meditate upon Him as the Self'; 'Everything abandons him who views anything apart from the Self' (*Bṛi. Up. I, 4, 10*; 7—*II, 4, 6*); and on the other hand those texts which set forth the view of the soul and the highest Self being different entities, 'Thinking of the (individual) Self and the Mover as different' (*Svet. Up. I, 6*). For our view implies a denial of difference in so far as the individual 'I' is of the nature of the Self; and it implies an acknowledgment of difference in so far as it allows the highest Self to differ from the individual soul in the same way as the latter differs from its body. The clause 'he is incomplete' (in one of the texts quoted above) refers to the fact that Brahman which is different from the soul constitutes the Self of the soul, while the soul constitutes the body of Brahman.—It thus remains a settled conclusion that Brahman is to be meditated upon as constituting the Self of the meditating Devotee.—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of 'meditation under the aspect of Self.'

4. Not in the symbol; for (the symbol) is not that one (i. e. the Self of the Devotee).

'Let a man meditate on mind as Brahman' (*Kṛ. Up. III, 18, 1*); 'He who meditates on name as Brahman' (*Kṛ. Up. VII, 15*)—with regard to these and similar meditations on outward symbols (*pratīka*) of Brahman there arises a doubt, viz. whether in them the symbols are to be thought of as of the nature of Self or not. The *Pūrva-*

pakshin holds the former view. For, he says, in form those injunctions do not differ from other injunctions of meditation on Brahman, and Brahman, as we have seen, constitutes the Self of the meditating Devotee.—This view the Sûtra sets aside. A pratika cannot be meditated on as being of the nature of Self; for the pratika is not the Self of the meditating Devotee. What, in those meditations, is to be meditated upon is the pratika only, not Brahman: the latter enters into the meditation only as qualifying its aspect. For by a meditation on a pratika we understand a meditation in which something that is not Brahman is viewed under the aspect of Brahman, and as the pratika—the object of meditation—is not the Self of the Devotee it cannot be viewed under that form.—But an objection is raised here also, it is Brahman which is the real object of meditation; for where Brahman *may* be viewed as the object of meditation, it is inappropriate to assume as objects non-sentient things of small power such as the mind, and so on. The object of meditation therefore is Brahman viewed under the aspect of mind, and so on.—This objection the next Sûtra disposes of.

5. The view of Brahman, on account of superiority.

The view of Brahman may appropriately be superimposed on mind and the like; but not the view of mind, and so on, on Brahman. For Brahman is something superior to mind, and so on; while the latter are inferior to Brahman. To view a superior person, a prince e.g., as a servant would be lowering; while, on the other hand, to view a servant as a prince is exalting.—Here terminates the *adhikarâṇa* of 'symbols.'

6. And the ideas of Âditya and the rest on the member; on account of this being rational.

'He who shines up there let a man meditate on him as the Udgitha' (*Kṛ. Up. I, 3, 1*).—With regard to this and similar meditations connected with subordinate parts of sacrificial performances there arises the doubt whether

the idea of Āditya and so on has to be superimposed on the subordinate part of the sacrifice, such as the Udgītha, or vice versâ (i. e. whether Āditya should be meditated upon under the aspect of the Udgītha, or vice versâ).—The Pūrvapakshin holds the former view. For the general principle is that the lower being should be viewed under the aspect of the higher, and the Udgītha and so on, which are parts of the sacrifices through which certain results are effected, are superior to the divinities who do not accomplish any result.—Of this view the Sūtra disposes. The ideas of Āditya and so on are to be superimposed on the 'members,' i. e. the Udgītha and so on, which are constituent members of the sacrifices; because of the gods only superiority can be established. For it is only through the propitiation of the gods that sacrifices are capable of bringing about their results. The Udgītha and the rest therefore are to be viewed under the aspect of Āditya and so on.—Here terminates the *adhikarṇa* of 'the ideas of Āditya and so on.'

7. Sitting; on account of possibility.

It has been shown that that special form of cognitional activity which the Vedānta-texts set forth as the means of accomplishing final Release and which is called meditation (*dhyāna*; *upāsana*) has to be frequently repeated, and is of the nature of continued representation. A question now arises as to the way in which it has to be carried on.—There being no special restrictive rule, the Pūrvapakshin holds that the Devotee may carry it on either sitting or lying down or standing or walking.—This view the Sūtra sets aside. Meditation is to be carried on by the Devotee in a sitting posture, since in that posture only the needful concentration of mind can be reached. Standing and walking demand effort, and lying down is conducive to sleep. The proper posture is sitting on some support, so that no effort may be required for holding the body up.

8. And on account of meditation.

Since, as intimated by the text, 'the Self is to be medi-

tated upon,' the mental activity in question is of the nature of meditation, it requires as its necessary condition concentration of mind. For by meditation is understood thought directed upon one object and not disturbed by the ideas of other things.

9. And with reference to immobility.

And it is with reference to their immobility that the earth and other inanimate things—the air, the sky, the waters, the mountains—may be spoken of as thinking, 'the earth thinks (dhyāyati) as it were,' and so on. Movelessness hence is characteristic of the intensely meditating person also, and such movelessness is to be realised in the sitting posture only.

10. And Smṛiti texts say the same.

Smṛiti texts also declare that he only who sits can meditate, 'Having placed his steady seat upon a pure spot, there seated upon that seat, concentrating his mind he should practise Yoga' (Bha. Gī. VI, 11-12).

11. Where concentration of mind (is possible), there; on account of there being no difference.

As the texts do not say anything as to special places and times, the only requisite of such places and times is that they should favour concentration of mind. This agrees with the declaration 'Let a man apply himself to meditation in a level and clean place, &c., favourable to the mind' (Svet. Up. II, 10).—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of 'the sitting one.'

12. Up to death; for there also it is seen.

The question now arises whether the meditation described which is the means of final Release is to be accomplished within one day, or to be continued day after day, until death.—The view that it is accomplished within one day, as this will satisfy the scriptural injunction, is disposed of by the Sūtra. Meditation is to be continued until death. For Scripture declares that meditation has to take place 'there,' i.e. in the whole period from the first effort after meditation up to death, 'Acting thus as

long as life lasts he reaches the world of Brahman.'—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of 'up to death.'

13. On the attainment of this, there result the non-clinging and the destruction of later and earlier sins; this being declared.

Having, so far, elucidated the nature of meditation, the Sūtras now begin to consider the result of meditation. Scripture declares that on the knowledge of Brahman being attained a man's later and earlier sins do not cling to him but pass away. 'As water does not cling to a lotus leaf, so no evil deed clings to him who knows this' (*Kh. Up. IV, 14, 3*); 'Having known that he is not sullied by any evil deed' (*Bri. Up. IV, 4, 23*); 'As the fibres of the Ishikā reed when thrown into the fire are burnt, thus all his sins are burnt' (*Kh. Up. V, 24, 3*); 'All his works perish when He has been beheld who is high and low' (*Mu. Up. II, 2, 8*).—The doubt here arises whether this non-clinging and destruction of all sins is possible as the result of mere meditation, or not.—It is not possible, the Pūrvapakshin maintains; for Scripture declares, 'no work the fruits of which have not been completely enjoyed perishes even in millions of aeons.' What the texts, quoted above, say as to the non-clinging and destruction of works occurs in sections complementary to passages inculcating knowledge as the means of final Release, and may therefore be understood as somehow meant to eulogize knowledge. Nor can it be said that knowledge is enjoined as an expiation of sins, so that the destruction of sins could be conceived as resulting from such expiation; for knowledge—as we see from texts such as 'He who knows Brahman reaches the Highest,' 'He knows Brahman and he becomes Brahman'—is enjoined as a means to reach Brahman. The texts as to the non-clinging and destruction of sins therefore can only be viewed as *arthavāda* passages supplementary to the texts enjoining knowledge of Brahman.—This view the Sūtra sets aside. When a man reaches knowledge, the non-clinging and destruction of all sins may be effected through the power of knowledge. For Scripture declares the power

of knowledge to be such that 'to him who knows this, no evil deed clings,' and so on. Nor is this in conflict with the text stating that no work not fully enjoyed perishes; for this latter text aims at confirming the power of works to produce their results; while the texts under discussion have for their aim to declare that knowledge when once sprung up possesses the power of destroying the capability of previously committed sins to produce their own evil results and the power of obstructing that capability on the part of future evil actions. The two sets of texts thus refer to different matters, and hence are not mutually contradictory. There is in fact no more contradiction between them than there is between the power of fire to produce heat and the power of water to subdue such heat. By knowledge effecting the non-clinging of sin we have to understand its obstructing the origination of the power, on the part of sin, to cause that disastrous disposition on the part of man which consists in unfitness for religious works; for sins committed tend to render man unfit for religious works and inclined to commit further sinful actions of the same kind. By knowledge effecting the destruction of sin, on the other hand, we understand its destroying that power of sin after it has once originated. That power consists, fundamentally, in displeasure on the part of the Lord. Knowledge of the Lord, which, owing to the supreme dearness of its object is itself supremely dear, possesses the characteristic power of propitiating the Lord—the object of knowledge—and thus destroys the displeasure of the Lord due to the previous commission of sins on the part of the knowing Devotee; and at the same time obstructs the origination of further displeasure on the Lord's part, which otherwise would be caused by sins committed subsequently to the origination of such knowledge. What Scripture says about sin not clinging to him who knows can however be understood only with regard to such sins as spring from thoughtlessness; for texts such as 'he who has not turned away from evil conduct' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 24) teach that meditation, becoming more perfect day after day, cannot be accomplished without the Devotee having previously broken

himself off from all evil conduct.—Here terminates the adhikaraṇa of ‘the reaching of that.’

14. Of the other also there is thus non-clinging; but at death.

It has been said that, owing to knowledge, earlier and subsequent sins do not cling and are destroyed. The same holds good also with regard to the other, i.e. to good works—they also, owing to knowledge, do not cling and are destroyed; for there is the same antagonism between knowledge and the fruit of those works, and Scripture moreover expressly declares this. Thus we read, ‘Day and night do not pass that bank—neither good nor evil deeds. All sins turn back from it’ (*Kh. Up. VIII, 4, 1*); ‘He shakes off his good and evil deeds’ (*Kau. Up. I, 4*). In the former of these texts good works are expressly designated as ‘sin’ because their fruits also are something not desirable for him who aims at Release; there is some reason for doing this because after all good works are enjoined by Scripture and their fruits are desired by men, and they hence might be thought not to be opposed to knowledge.—But even to him who possesses the knowledge of Brahman, the fruits of good deeds—such as seasonable rain, good crops, &c.—are desirable because they enable him to perform his meditations in due form; how then can it be said that knowledge is antagonistic to them and destroys them?—Of this point the Sūtra disposes by means of the clause ‘but on death.’ Good works which produce results favourable to knowledge and meditation perish only on the death of the body (not during the lifetime of the Devotee).—Here terminates the adhikaraṇa of ‘the other.’

15. But only those former works the effects of which have not yet begun; on account of that being the term.

A new doubt arises here, viz. whether all previous good and evil works are destroyed by the origination of knowledge, or only those the effects of which have not yet begun to operate.—All works alike, the Pūrvapakshin says; for the texts—as e.g. ‘all sins are burned’—declare the fruits

of knowledge to be the same in all cases ; and the fact of the body continuing to exist subsequently to the rise of knowledge may be accounted for by the force of an impulse once imparted, just as in the case of the revolution of a potter's wheel.—This view the Sûtra sets aside. Only those previous works perish the effects of which have not yet begun to operate ; for the text ' For him there is delay as long as he is not delivered from the body ' (*Kh. Up. VI, 14, 2*) expressly states when the delay of the body's death will come to an end (the body meanwhile continuing to exist through the influence of the *anārabdhakārya* works). There is no proof for the existence of an impetus accounting for the continuance of the body's life, other than the Lord's pleasure or displeasure caused by good or evil deeds.—Here terminates the *adhikāraṇa* of ' the works the operation of which has not yet begun.'

16. But the Agnihotra and the rest, (because they tend) to that effect only ; this being seen.

It might here be said that special works incumbent on the several āśramas, as e.g. the Agnihotra, need not be undertaken by those who are not desirous of their results, since these works also fall under the category of good works the result of which does not ' cling.'—This view the Sûtra sets aside. Such works as the Agnihotra must be performed, since there is no possibility of their results *not* clinging ; for him who knows, those works have knowledge for their exclusive effect. This we learn from Scripture itself : ' Him Brāhmaṇas seek to know by the study of the Veda, by sacrifices, gifts, austerities, and fasting.' This passage shows that works such as the Agnihotra give rise to knowledge, and as knowledge in order to grow and become more perfect has to be practised day after day until death, the special duties of the āśrama also, which assist the rise of knowledge, have daily to be performed. Otherwise, those duties being omitted, the mind would lose its clearness and knowledge would not arise.—But if good works such as the Agnihotra only serve the purpose of giving rise to knowledge, and if good works previous to the rise of know-

ledge perish, according to the texts 'Having dwelt there till their works are consumed' (*Kk.* Up. V, 10, 5) and 'having obtained the end of his deeds' (*Bri.* Up. IV, 4, 6), to what then applies the text 'His sons enter upon his inheritance, his friends upon his good works'?—This point is taken up by the next Sūtra.

17. According to some (a class of good works) other than these, of both kinds.

The text quoted above from one śākhā ('His friends enter upon his good deeds') refers to good works other than the Agnihotra and the rest, the only object of which is to give rise to knowledge, viz. to all those manifold good works, previous or subsequent to the attaining to knowledge, the results of which are obstructed by other works of greater strength. Those texts also which declare works not to cling or to be destroyed through knowledge refer to this same class of works.—The next Sūtra recalls the fact, already previously established, that the results of works actually performed may somehow be obstructed.

18. For (there is the text) 'whatever he does with knowledge.'

The declaration made in the text 'whatever he does with knowledge that is more vigorous,' viz. that the knowledge of the Udgītha has for its result non-obstruction of the result of the sacrifice, implies that the result of works actually performed *may* be obstructed. We thus arrive at the conclusion that the text of the Sātyāyanins, 'his friends enter upon his good works,' refers to those good works of the man possessing knowledge the results of which were somehow obstructed (and hence did not act themselves out during his lifetime, so that on his death they may be transferred to others).—Here terminates the adhikāraṇa of 'the Agnihotra and the rest.'

19. But having destroyed by fruition the other two sets he becomes one with Brahman.

There now arises the doubt whether the good and evil

works other than those the non-clinging and destruction of which have been declared, that is to say those works the results of which have begun to act, come to an end together with that bodily existence in which knowledge of Brahman originates, or with the last body due to the action of the works last mentioned, or with another body due to the action of the anârabdhakârya.—The second of these alternatives is the one to be accepted, for there is a text declaring that works come to an end with the deliverance of the Self from the current bodily existence: 'For him there is delay so long as he is not delivered (from the body), then he will become one with Brahman' (*Kh. Up.* VI, 14, 2).—This view the Sûtra sets aside. Having destroyed the other good and evil works the results of which had begun to operate by retributive experience he, subsequently to the termination of such retributive enjoyment, becomes one with Brahman. If those good and evil works are such that their fruits may be fully enjoyed within the term of one bodily existence, they come to an end together with the current bodily existence; if they require several bodily existences for the full experience of their results, they come to an end after several existences only. This being so, the deliverance spoken of in the text quoted by the Pûrvapakshin means deliverance from those works when completely destroyed by retributive enjoyment, not deliverance from bodily existence about which the text says nothing. All those works, on the other hand, good and evil, which were performed before the rise of knowledge and the results of which have not yet begun to operate—works which have gradually accumulated in the course of infinite time so as to constitute an infinite quantity—are at once destroyed by the might of the rising knowledge of Brahman. And works performed subsequently to the rise of such knowledge do not 'cling.' And, as Scripture teaches, the friends of the man possessing true knowledge take over, on his death, his good works, and his enemies his evil deeds. Thus there remains no contradiction.—Here terminates the adhikârâṇa of 'the destruction of the others.'

SECOND PĀDA.

1. Speech with mind, on account of this being seen and of scriptural statement.

The Sūtras now begin an enquiry into the mode of the going to Brahman of him who knows. At first the soul's departure from the body is considered. On this point we have the text, 'When a man departs from hence his speech is combined (sampadyate) with his mind, his mind with his breath, his breath with fire, fire with the highest deity' (*Kh. Up. VI, 6, 1*). The doubt here arises whether the speech's being combined with the mind, referred to in the text, means that the function of speech only is merged in mind, or the organ of speech itself.—The Pūrvapakshin holds the former view; for, he says, as mind is not the causal substance of speech, the latter cannot be merged in it; while the scriptural statement is not altogether irrational in so far as the functions of speech and other organs are controlled by the mind, and therefore may be conceived as being withdrawn into it.—This view the Sūtra sets aside. Speech itself becomes combined with mind; since that is seen. For the activity of mind is observed to go on even when the organ of speech has ceased to act.—But is this not sufficiently accounted for by the assumption of the mere function of speech being merged in mind?—To this the Sūtra replies 'and on account of the scriptural word.' The text says distinctly that speech itself, not merely the function of speech, becomes one with the mind. And when the function of speech comes to an end, there is no other means of knowledge to assure us that the function only has come to an end and that the organ itself continues to have an independent existence. The objection that speech cannot become one with mind because the latter is not the causal substance of speech, we meet by pointing out that the purport of the text is not that speech is merged in mind, but only that it is combined or connected with it.

2. And for the same reason all follow after.

Because speech's becoming one with mind means only conjunction with the latter, not merging within it ; there is also no objection to what Scripture says as to all other organs that follow speech being united with mind.—Here terminates the *adhikarāṇa* of 'speech.'

3. That mind in breath, owing to the subsequent clause.

That mind, i. e. mind united with all the organs unites itself with breath ; not merely the function of mind. This appears from the clause following upon the text quoted above, 'mind (unites itself) with breath.' Here, however, a further doubt suggests itself. The text 'Mind is made of earth' declares earth to be the causal substance of mind, and the text 'that (viz. water) sent forth earth' declares water to be the causal substance of earth ; while the further text 'breath is made of water' shows water to be the causal substance of breath. Considering therefore that in the text 'mind becomes united with breath' the term *breath* is naturally understood to denote the causal substance of breath, i. e. water, the appropriate sense to be given to the statement that mind is united with water is that mind is completely refunded into its own causal substance—so that the 'being united' would throughout be understood 'as being completely merged.'—The reply to this, however, is, that the clauses 'Mind is made of food, breath is made of water,' only mean that mind and breath are nourished and sustained by food and water, not that food and water are the causal substances of mind and breath. The latter indeed is impossible ; for mind consists of *ahamkāra*, and as breath is a modification of ether and other elements, the word *breath* may suggest water.—Here terminates the *adhikarāṇa* of 'mind.'

4. That (is united) with the ruler, on account of the going to it, and so on.

As from the statements that speech becomes united with mind and mind with breath it follows that speech and

mind are united with mind and breath only ; so we conclude from the subsequent clause 'breath with fire' that breath becomes united with fire only.—Against this *prīmā facie* view the Sūtra declares 'that breath becomes united with the ruler of the organs, i. e. the individual soul, on account of the going to it, and so on.' That breath goes to the individual soul, the following text declares, 'At the time of death all the *prāṇas* go to the Self of a man about to expire' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 3, 38*). Similarly Scripture mentions the departure of *prāṇa* together with the soul, 'after him thus departing the *prāṇa* departs'; and again its staying together with the soul, 'What is that by whose departure I shall depart, and by whose staying I shall stay?' (*Pr. Up. VI, 3*). We therefore conclude that the text 'breath with fire' means that breath joined with the individual soul becomes united with fire. Analogously we may say in ordinary life that the *Yamunā* is flowing towards the sea, while in reality it is the *Yamunā* joined with the *Gaṅgā* which flows on.—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of 'the ruler.'

5. With the elements, this being stated by Scripture.

There arises the further question whether breath joined with the soul unites itself with fire only or with all the elements combined.—With fire, so much only being declared by Scripture!—This view the Sūtra sets aside. Breath and soul unite themselves with all the elements; for Scripture declares the soul, when moving out, to consist of all the elements—'Consisting of earth, consisting of water, consisting of fire.'—But this latter text explains itself also on the assumption of breath and soul uniting themselves in succession with fire and the rest, one at a time!—This the next Sūtra negatives.

6. Not with one; for both declare this.

Not with one; because each element by itself is incapable of producing an effect. Such incapability is declared by Scripture and tradition alike. The text 'Having entered these beings with this *gīva* soul let me reveal names and forms—let me make each of these three tripartite' (*Kṛ. Up.*

VI, 3) teaches that the elements were rendered tripartite in order to be capable of evolving names and forms ; and of similar import is the following *Smṛiti* text, 'Possessing various powers these (elements), being separate from one another, were unable to produce creatures without combining. But having entered into mutual conjunction they, from the Mahat down to individual beings, produce the Brahma egg.' From this it follows that in the clause 'breath is united with fire' the word *fire* denotes fire mixed with the other elements. Breath and soul therefore are united with the aggregate of the elements.—Here terminates the *adhikarana* of 'the elements.'

7. And it is common up to the beginning of the way ; and the immortality (is that which is obtained), without having burned.

Is this departure of the soul common to him who knows and him who does not know ?—It belongs to him only who does not know, the *Pūrvapakshin* holds. For Scripture declares that for him who knows there is no departure, and that hence he becomes immortal then and there (irrespective of any departure of the soul to another place), 'when all desires which once dwelt in his heart are undone, then the mortal becomes immortal, then he obtains Brahman' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 7*). This view the *Sūtra* sets aside. For him also who knows there is the same way of passing out up to the beginning of the path, i. e. previously to the soul's entering the veins. For another text expressly declares that the soul of him also who knows passes out by way of a particular vein : 'there are a hundred and one veins of the heart ; one of them penetrates the crown of the head ; moving upwards by that a man reaches immortality, the others serve for departing in different directions' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 6, 5*). Scripture thus declaring that the soul of him who knows passes out by way of a particular vein, it must of course be admitted that it *does* pass out ; and as up to the soul's entering the vein no difference is mentioned, we must assume that up to that moment the departure of him who knows does not differ from that

of him who does not know. A difference however is stated with regard to the stage of the soul's entering the vein, viz. *Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 2*, 'By that light the Self departs, either through the eye, or through the skull, or through other parts of the body.' As this text must be interpreted in agreement with the text relative to the hundred and one veins, the departure by way of the head must be understood to belong to him who knows, while the other modes of departing belong to other persons. The last clause of the Sūtra 'and the immortality, without having burned' replies to what the *Pūrvapakshin* said as to the soul of him who knows being declared by Scripture to attain to immortality then and there. The immortality referred to in the text 'when all desires of his heart are undone' denotes that non-clinging and destruction of earlier and later sins which comes to him who knows, together with the rise of knowledge, without the connexion of the soul with the body, and the sense-organs being burned, i. e. dissolved at the time.—'He reaches Brahman' in the same text means that in the act of devout meditation the devotee has an intuitive knowledge of Brahman.

8. Since, up to the union with that (i. e. Brahman) the texts describe the *Samsāra* state.

The immortality referred to must necessarily be understood as not implying dissolution of the soul's connexion with the body, since up to the soul's attaining to Brahman the texts describe the *Samsāra* state. That attaining to Brahman takes place, as will be shown further on, after the soul—moving on the path the first stage of which is light—has reached a certain place. Up to that the texts denote the *Samsāra* state of which the connexion with a body is characteristic. 'For him there is delay so long as he is not delivered (from the body); then he will be united' (*Kh. Up. VI, 14, 2*); 'Shaking off all evil as a horse shakes his hairs, and as the moon frees herself from the mouth of Rāhu; having shaken off the body I obtain self, made and satisfied, the uncreated world of Brahman' (VIII, 13).

9. And the subtle (body persists), on account of

a means of knowledge, it being thus observed (in Scripture).

The bondage of him who knows is not, at that stage, dissolved, for this reason also that the subtle body continues to persist.—How is this known?—Through a means of knowledge, viz. because it is thus seen in Scripture. For Scripture states that he who knows, when on the path of the gods, enters into a colloquy with the moon and others, ‘he is to reply,’ &c. (Kau. Up. I, 3 ff.). This implies the existence of a body, and thence it follows that, at that stage, the subtle body persists. The state of bondage therefore is not yet dissolved.

10. Hence not in the way of destruction of bondage.

It thus appears that the text ‘when all desires which once entered his heart are undone, then does the mortal become immortal, then he obtains Brahman’ (Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 7), does not mean such immortality as would imply complete destruction of the state of bondage.

11. And to that very (subtle body) (there belongs) the warmth, this only being reasonable.

It is observed that when a man is about to die there is some warmth left in some part or parts of the gross body. Now this warmth cannot really belong to the gross body, for it is not observed in other parts of that body (while yet there is no reason why it should be limited to some part); but it may reasonably be attributed to the subtle body which may abide in some part of the gross body (and into which the warmth of the entire gross body has withdrawn itself). We therefore conclude that this partial perception of warmth is due to the departing subtle body. This confirms the view laid down in Sûtra 7.—The next Sûtra disposes of a further doubt raised as to the departure of the soul of him who knows.

12. If it be said that on account of the denial (it is not so); we deny this. From the embodied soul; for (that one is) clear, according to some.

The contention that the soul of him who knows departs from the body in the same way as other souls do cannot be upheld, since Scripture expressly negatives such departure. For *Bṛi. Up. IV, 4*, at first describes the mode of departure on the part of him who does not possess true knowledge ('He taking to himself those elements of light descends into the heart' up to 'after him thus departing the *Prāṇa* departs'); then refers to his assuming another body ('he makes to himself another, newer and more beautiful shape'); then concludes the account of him who does not possess true knowledge ('having attained the end of these works whatever he does here, he again returns from that world to this world of action. So much for the man who desires'); and thereupon proceeds explicitly to deny the departure from the body of him who possesses true knowledge, 'But he who does not desire, who is without desire, free from desire, who has obtained his desire, who desires the Self only, of him (*tasya*) the *prāṇas* do not pass forth,—being Brahman only he goes into Brahman.' Similarly a previous section also, viz. the one containing the questions put by *Ātabhāga*, directly negatives the view of the soul of him who knows passing out of the body. There the clause 'he again conquers death' introduces him who knows as the subject-matter, and after that the text continues: '*Yāgyavalkya*, he said, when that person dies, do the *prāṇas* pass out of him (*asmāt*) or not?—No, said *Yāgyavalkya*, they are gathered up in him (*atraiva*), he swells, inflated the dead lies' (*Bṛi. Up. III, 2, 10-11*). From these texts it follows that he who knows attains to immortality *here* (without his soul passing out of the body and moving to another place).—This view the *Sūtra* rejects. 'Not so; from the embodied soul.' What those texts deny is the moving away of the *prāṇas* from the embodied individual soul, not from the body. 'Of him (*tasya*) the *prāṇas* do not pass forth'—here the 'of him' refers to the subject under discussion, i. e. the embodied soul which is introduced by the clause 'he who does not desire,' not to the body which the text had not previously mentioned. The sixth case (*tasya*) here denotes the embodied soul as

that which is connected with the *prāṇas* ('the *prāṇas* belonging to that, i.e. the soul, do not pass out'), not as that from which the passing out takes its start.—But why should the '*tasya*' not denote the body as the point of starting ('the *prāṇas* do not pass forth from that (*tasya*), viz. the body')?—Because, we reply, the soul which is actually mentioned in its relation of connexion with the *prāṇas* (as indicated by *tasya*) suggests itself to the mind more immediately than the body which is not mentioned at all; if therefore the question arises as to the starting-point of the passing forth of the *prāṇas* the soul is (on the basis of the text) apprehended as that starting-point also (i.e. the clause 'the *prāṇas* of him do not pass forth' implies at the same time 'the *prāṇas* do not pass forth from him, i.e. from the soul'). Moreover, as the *prāṇas* are well known to be connected with the soul and as hence it would serve no purpose to state that connexion, we conclude that the sixth case which expresses connexion in general is here meant to denote the starting-point in particular. And no dispute on this point is really possible; since 'according to some' it is 'clear' that what the text means to express is the embodied soul as the starting-point of the *prāṇas*. The *some* are the Mādhyandinas, who in their text of the *Brīhad-Āraṇyaka* read '*na tasmāt prāṇā utkrāmanti*'—'the *prāṇas* do not pass forth from him' (the '*tasya*' thus being the reading of the *Kāṇva Sākhā* only).—But, an objection is raised, there is no motive for explicitly negating the passing away of the *prāṇas* from the soul; for there is no reason to assume that there should be such a passing away (and the general rule is that a denial is made of that only for which there is a presumption).—Not so, we reply. The *Khândogya*-text 'For him there is delay only as long as he is not delivered (from the body); then he will be united' declares that the soul becomes united with Brahman at the time of its separation from the body, and this suggests the idea of the soul of him who knows separating itself at that very time (i.e. the time of death) from the *prāṇas* also. But this would mean that the soul cannot reach union with Brahman by

means of proceeding on the path of the gods, and for this reason the *Bṛihad-āraṇyaka* ('of him the *prāṇas* do not pass forth') explicitly declares that the *prāṇas* do not depart from the soul of him who knows, before that soul proceeding on the path of the gods attains to union with Brahman.

The same line of refutation would have to be applied to the arguments founded by our opponent on the question of *Ārtabhāga*, if that question be viewed as referring to him who possesses true knowledge. The fact however is that that passage refers to him who does *not* possess that knowledge; for none of the questions and answers of which the section consists favours the presumption of the knowledge of Brahman being under discussion. The matters touched upon in those questions and answers are the nature of the senses and sense objects viewed as *graha* and *atigraha*; water being the food of fire; the non-separation of the *prāṇas* from the soul at the time of death; the continuance of the fame—there called *name*—of the dead man; and the attainment, on the part of the soul of the departed, to conditions of existence corresponding to his good or evil deeds. The passage immediately preceding the one referring to the non-departure of the *prāṇas* merely means that death is conquered in so far as it is a fire and fire is the food of water; this has nothing to do with the owner of true knowledge. The statement that the *prāṇas* of the ordinary man who does not possess true knowledge do not depart means that at the time of death the *prāṇas* do not, like the gross body, abandon the *gīva*, but cling to it like the subtle body and accompany it.

13. *Smṛiti* also declares this.

Smṛiti also declares that the soul of him who knows departs by means of an artery of the head. 'Of those, one is situated above which pierces the disc of the sun and passes beyond the world of Brahman; by way of that the soul reaches the highest goal' (*Yāgñ. Smṛi.* III, 167).—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of 'up to the beginning of the road.'

14. With the Highest; for thus it says.

It has been shown that at the time of departure from the body the soul together with the organs and *prāṇas* unites itself with the subtle elements, fire and the rest; and the notion that the soul of him who knows forms an exception has been disposed of. The further question now arises whether those subtle elements move on towards producing their appropriate effects, in accordance with the works or the nature of meditation (of some other soul with which those elements join themselves), or unite themselves with the highest Self.—The *Pūrvapakshin* holds that, as in the case of union with the highest Self, they could not give rise to their peculiar effects, i. e. the experience of pleasure and pain, they move towards some place where they can give rise to their appropriate effects.—Of this view the *Sūtra* disposes. They unite themselves with the highest Self; for Scripture declares ‘warmth in the highest Being’ (*Kh. Up. VI, 8, 6*). And the doings of those elements must be viewed in such a way as to agree with Scripture. As in the states of deep sleep and a *pralaya*, there is, owing to union with the highest Self, a cessation of all experience of pain and pleasure; so it is in the case under question also.—Here terminates the *adhikarāṇa* of ‘union with the Highest.’

15. Non-division, according to statement.

Is this union with the highest Self to be understood as ordinary ‘merging,’ i. e. a return on the part of the effected thing into the condition of the cause (as when the jar is reduced to the condition of a lump of clay), or as absolute non-division from the highest Self, such as is meant in the clauses preceding the text last quoted, ‘Speech is merged in mind’? &c.—The former view is to be adopted; for as the highest Self is the causal substance of all, union with it means the return on the part of individual beings into the condition of that causal substance.—This view the *Sūtra* rejects. Union here means non-division, i. e. connexion of such kind that those subtle elements are altogether incapable of being thought and spoken of as separate from Brah-

man. This the text itself declares, since the clause 'warmth in the highest Being' is connected with and governed by the preceding clause 'Speech is merged in mind.' This preceding clause intimates a special kind of connexion, viz. absolute non-separation, and there is nothing to prove that the dependent clause means to express something different; nor is there any reason why at the time of the soul's departure those elements should enter into the causal condition; nor is there anything said about their again proceeding from the causal substance in a new creation.—Here terminates the *adhikāraṇa* of 'non-separation.'

16. A lighting up of the point of the abode of that; having the door illuminated by that (the soul), owing to the power of its knowledge and the application of remembrance of the way which is an element of that (viz. of knowledge), being assisted by him who abides within the heart, (passes out) by way of the hundred and first artery.

So far it has been shown that, up to the beginning of the journey, the souls of them as well who possess true knowledge as of those who do not, pass out of the body in the same way. Now a difference is stated in the case of those who have true knowledge. We have on this point the following text: 'There are a hundred and one arteries of the heart; one of them penetrates the crown of the head; moving upwards by that a man reaches immortality; the others serve for departing in different directions' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 6, 5*). The doubt here arises whether he who knows departs by this hundred and first artery in the top of the head, while those who do not know depart by way of the other arteries; or whether there is no definite rule on this point.—There is no definite rule, the *Pūrva-pakṣin* holds. For as the arteries are many and exceedingly minute, they are difficult to distinguish, and the soul therefore is not able to follow any particular one. The text therefore (is not meant to make an original authoritative statement as to different arteries being followed by

different souls, but) merely refers in an informal way to what is already settled (viz. by the reason of the thing), i.e. the casual departure of any soul by any artery.—This view the Sûtra rejects ‘By way of the hundred and first.’ The soul of him who possesses true knowledge departs only by way of the hundred and first artery in the crown of the head. Nor is that soul unable to distinguish that particular artery. For, through the power of his supremely clear knowledge which has the effect of pleasing the Supreme Person, and through the application of remembrance of the way—which remembrance is a part of that knowledge—the soul of him who knows wins the favour of the Supreme Person who abides within the heart, and is assisted by him. Owing to this the abode of that, i. e. the heart which is the abode of the soul, is illuminated, lit up at its tip, and thus, through the grace of the Supreme Soul, the individual soul has the door (of egress from the body) lit up and is able to recognise that artery. There is thus no objection to the view that the soul of him who knows passes out by way of that particular artery only.—Here terminates the *adhikarana* of ‘the abode of that.’

17. Following the rays. •

Scripture teaches that the soul of him who knows, after having passed forth from the heart by way of the hundred and first artery, follows the rays of the sun and thus reaches the disc of the sun : ‘when he departs from this body he goes upwards by these rays only’ (eva) (*Kh. Up.* VIII, 6, 5). The idea here suggests itself that the going of the soul cannot be exclusively bound to those rays, since when a man dies during the night it *cannot* follow the rays of the sun. Hence the text quoted above can refer only to a part of the actual cases.—This view the Sûtra rejects. The soul moves upwards, following the rays only; the text expressly asserting this by means of the ‘eva’—which would be out of place were there any alternative. Nor is there any strength in the argument that the soul of him who dies at night cannot follow the rays as there are none. For in summer the experience of heat at night-time shows

that there are present rays then also ; while in winter, as generally in bad weather, that heat is overpowered by cold and hence is not perceived (although actually present). Scripture moreover states that the arteries and rays are at all times mutually connected : ' As a very long highway goes to two villages, so the rays of the sun go to both worlds, to this one and to the other. They stretch themselves forth from the sun and enter into these arteries ; they stretch themselves forth from these arteries and enter into yonder sun' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 6, 2*).—As thus there are rays at night also, the souls of those who know reach Brahman by way of the rays only.—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of ' the following up the rays.'

18. Should it be said, not in the night ; we say, no ; because the connexion persists as long as the body does. Scripture also declares this.

It is now enquired into whether the soul of him who, while having true knowledge, dies at night reaches Brahman or not. Although, as solar rays exist at night, the soul may move on at night also following those rays ; yet, since dying at night is spoken of in the Sūtras as highly objectionable, we conclude that he who dies at night cannot accomplish the highest end of man, viz. attainment to Brahman. The Sūtras eulogize death occurring in day-time and object to death at night-time : ' Day-time, the bright half of the month and the northern progress of the sun are excellent for those about to die ; the contrary times are unfavourable.' According to this, their different nature, dying in day-time may be assumed to lead to a superior state of existence, and dying at night to an inferior state. He who dies at night cannot therefore ascend to Brahman.—This view the Sūtra refutes : ' Because, in the case of him who knows, the connexion with works exists as long as the body does.' This is to say—since those works which have not yet begun to produce their results and which are the cause of future inferior states of existence are destroyed by the contact with knowledge, while at the same time later works do not

'cling' (also owing to the presence of true knowledge), and those works which have begun to act come to an end with the existence of the last body ; there is no reason why he who knows should remain in bondage, and hence he reaches Brahman even if dying at night-time. Scripture also declares this, 'for him there is delay only as long as he is not freed from the body, then he will be united.' The text which praises the advantages of night-time, the light half of the month, &c., therefore must be understood as referring to those who do not possess true knowledge.—Here terminates the *adhikāraṇa* of 'night.'

19. For the same reason also during the southern progress of the sun.

The reasoning stated above also proves that the owner of true knowledge who may happen to die during the southern progress of the sun reaches Brahman. A further doubt, however, arises here. The text 'He who dies during the sun's southern progress reaches the greatness of the Fathers and union with the moon' (*Mahânâr. Up.* 25) declares that he who dies during the southern progress reaches the moon ; and the other text 'when this ceases they return again the same way' (*Bṛi. Up.* VI, 2, 16) states that he returns again to the earth. We further know that Bhishma and others, although fully possessing the knowledge of Brahman, put off their death until the beginning of the northern progress. All this seems to prove that he who dies during the southern progress does not reach Brahman.—This doubt we dispose of as follows. Those only who do not possess true knowledge return from the moon ; while he who has such knowledge does not return even after he has gone to the moon. For a complementary clause in the *Mahânârāyaṇa Up.*, 'from there he reaches the greatness of Brahman,' shows that the abode in the moon forms for him, who having died during the southern progress wishes to reach Brahman, a mere stage of rest. And even if there were no such complementary passage, it would follow from the previously stated absence of any

reason for bondage that the going of the wise man's soul to the moon in no way precludes his reaching Brahman. Bhīṣma and others who through the power of Yoga were able to choose the time of their death put it off until the beginning of the northern progress in order to proclaim before the world the excellence of that season and thus to promote pious faith and practice.—But we also meet with an authoritative statement made with reference to wise men about to die, as to difference of time of death being the cause of a man either returning or not returning to this world, 'I will declare at which time the Yogins departing return not, and also the time at which they return. The fire, the light, the day, the bright fortnight, the six months of the sun's northern progress—the knowers of Brahman departing there go to Brahman. The smoke, the night, the dark fortnight, the six months of the southern progress—the Yogin departing there having reached the light of the moon returns again. These are held to be the perpetual paths of the world—the white and the black; by the one man goes not to return, by the other he returns again' (Bha. Gī. VIII, 23–26).—To this point the next Sūtra refers.

20. And those two (paths) are, with a view to the Yogins, mentioned as to be remembered.

The text quoted does not state an injunction for those about to die, of a special time of death; but there are rather mentioned in it those two matters belonging to *Smṛiti* and therefore to be remembered, viz. the two paths—the path of the Gods and the path of the Fathers—with a view to those who know and practise Yoga; the text intimating that Yogins should daily think of those paths which are included in Yoga meditation. In agreement herewith the text concludes, 'Knowing these two paths no Yogin is ever deluded. Hence in all times, O Arguna, be engaged in Yoga' (Bha. Gī. VIII, 27). Through the terms 'the fire, the light,' 'the smoke, the night,' &c. the path of the Gods and the path of the Fathers are recognised. Where, in the beginning, the text refers to

'the time when,' the word 'time' must be understood to denote the divine beings ruling time, since Fire and the rest cannot be time. What the Bha. Gi. aims at therefore is to enjoin on men possessing true knowledge the remembrance of that path of the Gods originally enjoined in the text, 'they go to light' (*Kh. Up.* IV, 15, 10); not to determine the proper time of dying for those about to die.—Here terminates the *adhikarâṇa* of 'the southern progress.'

THIRD PĀDA.

1. On the path beginning with light, that being known.

The Sūtras now go on to determine the road which the soul of the wise man follows, after having—assisted by the Person within the heart—passed out of the body by way of one particular artery. Now of that road various accounts are given in Scripture. There is a detailed account in the *Khândogya* (IV, 15), 'now whether people perform obsequies for him or not,' &c. Another account is given in the eighth book of the same Upanishad, 'then he moves upwards by those very rays' (VIII, 6, 5).

The Kaushitakins again give a different account: 'He having reached the path of the Gods comes to the world of Agni,' &c. (Kau. Up. I, 3). Different again in the *Bṛihad-āraṇyaka*: 'Those who thus know this and those who in the forest meditate on faith and the True,' &c. (*Bṛi.* Up. VI, 2, 15). The same Upanishad, in another place (V, 10), gives a different account: 'When the person goes away from this world he comes to the wind,' &c.—A doubt here arises whether all these texts mean to give instruction as to one and the same road—the first stage of which is light—having to be followed by the soul of the wise man; or whether they describe different roads on any of which the soul may proceed.—The *Pūrvapakshin* holds the latter view; for he says the roads described differ in nature and are independent one of the other.—This view the Sūtra disposes of. All texts mean one and the same road only, viz. the one beginning with light, and the souls proceed on that road only. For that road is known, i. e. is recognised in all the various descriptions, although it is, in different texts, described with more or less fulness. We therefore have to proceed here as in the case of the details (*guṇa*) which are mentioned in different meditations referring to one and the same object, i. e. we

have to combine the details mentioned in different places into one whole. The two *Khândogya*-texts—the one in the *Upakosala*vidyâ and the one in the *Vidyâ* of the five fires—describe exactly the same road. And in the *Vidyâ* of the five fires as given in the *Bṛihad-âraṇyaka* the same road, beginning with light, is also described, although there are differences in minor points ; we therefore recognise the road described in the *Khândogya*. And in the other texts also we everywhere recognise the divinities of certain stages of the road, Agni, Âditya, and so on.—Here terminates the *adhikarṇa* of ‘that which begins with light.’

2. From the year to Vâyu ; on account of non-specification and specification.

In their description of the path beginning with light the *Khândogas* mention the year between the months and the sun, ‘from the months to the year, from the year to the sun’ (*Kh. Up. V, 10, 1*) ; while the *Vâgasaneyins* mention, in that very place, the world of the Gods, ‘from the months to the world of the Gods, from the world of the Gods to the sun’ (*Bṛi. Up. VI, 2, 15*). Now, as the two paths are identical, we have to supplement each by the additional item given in the other (and the question then arises whether the order of the stages be 1. months, 2. year, 3. world of the Gods, 4. sun ; or 1. months, 2. world of the Gods, 3. year, 4. sun). The year and the world of the Gods are equally entitled to the place after the months in so far as textual declaration goes ; for both texts say ‘from the months.’ But we observe that the advance is throughout from the shorter periods of time to the longer ones (‘from the day to the bright fortnight, from the bright fortnight to the six months of the northern progress’), and as therefore the year naturally presents itself to the mind immediately after the six months, we decide that the order is—months, year, world of the Gods, sun.—In another place (*Bṛi. Up. V, 10*) the *Vâgasaneyins* mention the wind as the stage preceding the sun (‘the wind makes room for him—he mounts upwards ; he comes to the sun’). The *Kaushîtakins*, on the other hand, place the world of the

wind subsequent to light, referred to by them as the world of Agni ('Having entered on the path of the Gods he comes to the world of Agni, to the world of the wind,' &c., Kau. Up. I, 3). Now in this latter text the fact of the world of the wind following upon light is to be inferred only from the succession of the clauses ('to the world of Agni'—'to the world of the wind'), while the 'upwards' in the text of the Vāgasaneyins is a direct statement of succession given by the text itself; and as this latter order of succession has greater force than the former, we have to place, in the series of stages, the world of Vāyu directly before the world of the sun. But above we have determined that the same place (after the year and before the sun) has to be assigned to the world of the Gods also; and hence a doubt arises whether the world of the Gods and Vāyu are two different things—the soul of the wise man passing by them in optional succession—or one and the same thing—the soul coming, after the year, to Vāyu who is the world of the Gods.—They are different things, the Pūrvapakshin says; for they are generally known to be so. And there are definite indications in the text that the world of the Gods as well as Vāyu is to be placed immediately before the sun—this being indicated for Vāyu by the 'upwards' referred to above, and for the world of the Gods by the ablative case (*devalokāt*) in the *Khând.* text, 'from the world of the Gods he goes to the sun'—and as thus there is no difference between the two, we conclude that the soul passes by them in either order it may choose.—This view the Sūtra negatives: 'From the year to Vāyu.' The soul, having departed from the year, comes to Vāyu. This is proved 'by non-specification and specification.' For the term 'the world of the Gods' is a term of general meaning, and hence can denote Vāyu in so far as being the world of the Gods; while on the other hand the term Vāyu specifically denotes that divine being only. The Kaushitakins speak of 'the world of Vāyu'; but this only means 'Vāyu who at the same time is a world.' That Vāyu may be viewed as the world of the Gods is confirmed by another scriptural passage, viz.

‘he who blows (Vāyu) is the houses of the Gods.’—Here terminates the *adhikarāṇa* of ‘Vāyu.’

3. Beyond lightning there is Varuṇa, on account of connexion.

According to the text of the Kaushîtakins the soul goes on to the world of Vāyu, to the world of Varuṇa, to the world of Indra, to the world of Pragâpati, to the world of Brahman. The doubt here arises whether Varuṇa and the divinities of the following stages are to be inserted in the series after Vāyu, in agreement with the order of enumeration in the text of the Kaushîtakins; or at the end of the whole series as stated in the *Khândogya* Up. (IV, 15, 5), Varuṇa thus coming after lightning.—The decision is in favour of the latter view because Varuṇa, the god of waters, is naturally connected with lightning which dwells within the clouds.—This terminates the *adhikarāṇa* of ‘Varuṇa.’

4. Conductors, this being indicated.

The decision here is that light, Vāyu, and the rest mentioned in the texts as connected with the soul’s progress on the path of the Gods are to be interpreted not as mere marks indicating the road, nor as places of enjoyment for the soul, but as divinities appointed by the Supreme Person to conduct the soul along the stages of the road; for this is indicated by what the *Khândogya* says with regard to the last stage, viz. lightning, ‘There is a person not human, he leads them to Brahman.’ What here is said as to that person not human, viz. that he leads the soul, is to be extended to the other beings also, light and the rest.—But if that not-human person leads the souls from lightning to Brahman, what then about Varuṇa, Indra, and Pragâpati, who, as was decided above, are in charge of stages beyond lightning? Do they also lead the soul along their stages?

5. From thence by him only who belongs to lightning, the text stating that.

The only leader from lightning up to Brahman is the not-human person connected with lightning ; for the text states this directly. Varuṇa, Indra, and Pragāpati take part in the work in so far only as they may assist the person connected with lightning.—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of 'the conductors.'

6. (Him who meditates on) the effected Brahman, (thus opines) Bādari ; because for him going is possible.

The following question now presents itself for consideration. Does the troop of conducting divinities, Agni and the rest, lead on those who meditate on the effected Brahman, i.e. Hiraṇyagarbha ; or those only who meditate on the highest Brahman ; or those who meditate on the highest Brahman and those who meditate on the individual Self as having Brahman for its Self ?—The teacher Bādari is of opinion that the divinities lead on those only who meditate on the effected Brahman. For he only who meditates on Hiraṇyagarbha can move ; while a person meditating on the highest Brahman which is absolutely complete, all-knowing, present everywhere, the Self of all, cannot possibly be conceived as moving to some other place in order to reach Brahman ; for him Brahman rather is something already reached. For him the effect of true knowledge is only to put an end to that Nescience which has for its object Brahman, which, in reality, is eternally reached. He, on the other hand, who meditates on Hiraṇyagarbha may be conceived as moving in order to reach his object, which is something abiding within a special limited place. It is he therefore who is conducted on by Agni and the other escorting deities.

7. And on account of (Brahman) being specified.

The text 'a person not human leads them to the worlds of Brahman' (*Bṛi. Up. VI, 2, 15*) by using the word 'world,' and moreover in the plural, determines the specification that the not-human person leads those only who meditate on Hiraṇyagarbha, who dwells within some particular world.

Moreover, the text 'I enter the hall of Pragâpati, the house' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 14*) shows that he who goes on the path beginning with light aims at approaching Hiranyagarbha. But if this is so, there is a want of appropriate denotation in the clause, 'There is a person not human, he leads them to Brahman'; if Hiranyagarbha is meant, the text should say 'He leads them to Brahmâ (Brahmānam).'

8. But on account of nearness there is that designation.

Hiranyagarbha is the first created being (as declared by the text 'he who creates Brahmâ'); he thus stands near to Brahman, and therefore may be designated by the same term (viz. Brahman). This explanation is necessitated by the reasons set forth in the preceding Sûtras (which show that the real highest Brahman cannot be meant).—But, if the soul advancing on the path of the Gods reaches Hiranyagarbha only, texts such as 'This is the path of the Gods, the path of Brahman; those who proceed on that path do not return to the life of man' (*Kh. Up. IV, 15, 6*), and 'moving upwards by that a man reaches immortality' (*VIII, 6, 6*), are wrong in asserting that that soul attains to immortality and does not return; for the holy books teach that Hiranyagarbha, as a created being, passes away at the end of a dviparârdha-period; and the text 'Up to the world of Brahman the worlds return again' (*Bha. Gî. VIII, 16*) shows that those who have gone to Hiranyagarbha necessarily return also.

9. On the passing away of the effected (world of Brahmâ), together with its ruler, (the souls go) to what is higher than that; on account of scriptural declaration.

On the passing away of the effected world of Brahmâ, together with its ruler Hiranyagarbha, who then recognises his qualification for higher knowledge, the soul also which had gone to Hiranyagarbha attains to true knowledge and thus reaches Brahman, which is higher than that,

i.e. higher than the effected world of *Brahmā*. This is known from the texts declaring that he who proceeds on the path of light reaches immortality and does not return; and is further confirmed by the text, 'They all, reaching the highest immortality, become free in the world of Brahman (*Brahmā*) at the time of the great end' (*Mu. Up.* III, 2, 6).

10. And on account of *Smṛiti*.

This follows from *Smṛiti* also, which declares 'when the *pralaya* has come and the end of the Highest, they all together with Brahman enter the highest place.'—For all these reasons *Bādari* holds that the troop of the conducting deities, beginning with Light, leads the souls of those only who meditate on the effected Brahman, i.e. *Hiraṇyagarbha*.

11. The Highest, *Gaimini* thinks; on account of primariness of meaning.

The teacher *Gaimini* is of opinion that those deities lead on the souls of those only who meditate on the highest Brahman. For in the text 'a person not human leads them to Brahman' the word *Brahman* is naturally taken in its primary sense (i.e. the highest Brahman); the secondary sense (i.e. the effected Brahman) can be admitted only if there are other valid reasons to refer the passage to the effected Brahman. And the alleged impossibility of the soul's going is no such valid reason; for although Brahman no doubt is present everywhere, Scripture declares that the soul of the wise frees itself from Nescience only on having gone to some particular place. That the origination of true knowledge depends on certain conditions of caste, *āśrama*, religious duty, purity of conduct, time, place, and so on, follows from certain scriptural texts, as e.g. '*Brāhmaṇas* desire to know him through the study of the Veda' (*Bṛi. Up.* IV, 4, 22); in the same way it follows from the text declaring the soul's going to Brahman that the final realisation of that highest knowledge which implies the cessation of all Nescience depends on

the soul's going to some particular place. The arguments founded on texts alleged to declare that the soul of the wise does not pass out of the body at all we have refuted above. The argument that the specification implied in the text which mentions *Brahman-worlds* clearly points to the effected Brahman, i.e. Hiranyagarbha, is equally invalid. For the compound 'the Brahman-world' is to be explained as 'the world which is Brahman'; just as according to the Pûrva Mîmâmsâ the compound 'Nishâda-sthapati' denotes a sthapati who is a Nishâda (not a sthapati of the Nishâdas). A thing even which is known as one only may be designated by a plural form, as in a mantra one girdle is spoken of as 'the fetters of Aditi.' And as to the case under discussion, we know on the authority of Scripture, Smṛiti, Itihâsa, and Purâṇa, that the wonderful worlds springing from the mere will of a perfect and omnipresent being cannot be but infinite.

12. And because Scripture declares it.

And Scripture moreover directly declares that the soul which has departed by way of the artery in the upper part of the head and passed along the path of the Gods reaches the highest Brahman: 'This serene being having risen from the body, having reached the highest light manifests itself in its own shape' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 3*).—Against the contention that the text 'I enter the hall of Pragâpati, the house' shows that he who proceeds on the path beginning with light aims at the effected Brahman, the next Sûtra argues.

13. And there is no aiming at the effected (Brahman).

The aim of the soul is not at Hiranyagarbha, but at the highest Brahman itself. For the complementary sentence 'I am the glorious among Brâhmanas' shows that what the soul aims at is the condition of the universal Self, which has for its antecedent the putting off of all Nescience. For this appears from the preceding text, 'As a horse shakes his hairs and as the moon frees herself from the

mouth of Rāhu ; having shaken off the body may I obtain—the uncreated Brahman-world' declares that the Brahman-world, which is the thing to be reached, is something non-created, and explicitly states that reaching that world implies freedom from all bondage whatsoever.—It is for these reasons that Gaimini holds that the deities speeding the soul on its way lead on him only who has the highest Brahman for the object of his meditation.

Now the Reverend Bādarāyana declares his own view, which constitutes the final conclusion in this matter.

14. Those not depending on symbols he leads, thus Bādarāyana thinks ; there being a defect in both cases ; and he whose thought is that.

Bādarāyana is of opinion that the deities lead those not depending on symbols, i.e. all meditating devotees other than those depending on symbols. That is to say, the view that those are led who meditate on the effected Brahman cannot be upheld ; nor is there an exclusive rule that those only should be led on who meditate on the highest Brahman. The truth is that those are led who meditate on the highest Brahman, and also those who meditate on the Self (soul) as different from matter (*Prakṛiti*) and having Brahman for its true Self. Souls of both these kinds are led on to Brahman. Those on the other hand whose object of meditation is such things as name and so on, which fall within what is a mere effect of Brahman—such things being viewed either under the aspect of Brahman, just as some valiant man may be viewed under the aspect of a lion (which view expresses itself in the judgment 'Devadatta is a lion') ; or by themselves (without reference to Brahman)—all those are not led on to Brahman. Why so ? 'Because there is a defect in both cases,' i.e. in both the views rejected by Bādarāyana. The view that those are led who meditate on the effected Brahman is in conflict with texts such as 'having risen from this body and reached the highest light' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 3*)—for the nature of the fruit depends on the nature of the meditation ; and

the view that those only are led to the highest Brahman who meditate on the highest Brahman, would stultify texts such as the one which expressly declares Agni and the rest of the deities to lead on those who possess the knowledge of the five fires ('Those who know this, viz. the Vidyâ of the five fires, and those who in the forest meditate on faith and austerity go to light—there is a person not human, he leads them to Brahman,' *Kh. Up. V, 10*). Both these views thus being defective, we adhere to the conclusion that the deities lead on to Brahman the two classes of souls mentioned above.—This the Sûtra further declares in the words 'he whose thought is that' (*tatkratuḥ*), the sense of which is that he whose thought is that reaches that, i.e. that the nature of what is reached depends on the nature of the meditation. This argument is founded on the text, 'According to what his thought is (*yathâ-kratuḥ*) in this world, so will he be when he has departed this life' (*Kh. Up. III, 14*), which implies the principle that what a soul after death attains is according to its thought and meditation in this life; and moreover we have direct scriptural statements to the effect that those who possess the knowledge of the five fires proceed on the path of the Gods, and that those who proceed on that path reach Brahman and do not return. Analogous reasoning proves that meditation on the soul as free from matter and having Brahman for its true Self also leads to the highest Brahman. In the case of those, on the other hand, who rely on the symbols (in which they meditatively contemplate Brahman), beginning with name and terminating with *prâṇa* ('He who meditates on name as Brahman,' *Kh. Up. VII, 1 ff.*), the meditation is not proved by texts of the two kinds previously mentioned to lead to Brahman; it rather is contaminated by an element not of the nature of intelligence, and hence—according to the principle that the result of a meditation is the same in nature as the meditation itself—the soul of the inferior devotee practising such meditation does not proceed by the path of light and does not reach Brahman.—That this distinction is declared by Scripture itself, the next Sûtra shows.

15. And Scripture declares the difference.

The text, 'He who meditates on name as Brahman, for him there is movement as he wishes as far as name extends,' &c. (*Kh. Up. VII, 1 ff.*), declares that those who meditate on the series of symbols beginning with name and ending with *prāṇa* attain to a result of limited nature and not depending on any particular path. Those therefore who meditate on the Intelligent either as mixed with the Non-intelligent or by itself, viewing it either under the aspect of Brahman or as separated from Brahman, are not led on by the conducting deities. On the other hand, it remains a settled conclusion that the deities speed on their way those who meditate on the highest Brahman and on the soul as separated from *Prakṛiti* and having Brahman for its true Self.—Here terminates the *adhikāraṇa* of 'the effected.'

FOURTH PĀDA.

1. (On the soul's) having approached (the highest light) there is manifestation ; (as we infer) from the word 'own.'

The Sûtras now proceed to consider the *kind* of superior existence (*aisvarya*) which the released souls enjoy.—The text says, 'Thus does that serene being, having risen from the body and having approached the highest light, manifest itself in its own form' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 3*). Does this passage mean that the soul having approached the highest light assumes a new body, to be brought about then, as e.g. the body of a deva ; or that it only manifests its own natural character?—The text must be understood in the former sense, the *Pûrvapakshin* holds. For otherwise the scriptural texts referring to Release would declare what is of no advantage to man. We do not observe that its own nature is of any advantage to the soul. In the state of dreamless sleep the body and the sense-organs cease to act, and you may say the pure soul then abides by itself, but in what way does this benefit man ? Nor can it be said that mere cessation of pain constitutes the well-being of the soul which has approached the highest light, and that in this sense manifestation of its own nature may be called Release ; for Scripture clearly teaches that the released soul enjoys an infinity of positive bliss, 'One hundred times the bliss of *Pragâpati* is one bliss of Brahman and of a sage free from desires' ; 'for having tasted a flavour he experiences bliss' (*Taitt. Up. II, 7*). Nor can it be said that the true nature of the soul is consciousness of the nature of unlimited bliss which, in the *Samsâra* condition, is hidden by Nescience and manifests itself only when the soul reaches Brahman. For, as explained previously, intelligence which is of the nature of light cannot be hidden ; hiding in that case would be neither more nor less than destruction. Nor can that which is mere light be of the nature of bliss ; for bliss is pleasure, and to be of the nature

of pleasure is to be such as to agree with the Self. But, if the Self is mere light, where is the being by which light is to be apprehended as agreeable to its own nature? (i. e. where is the knowing subject conscious of bliss?) He, therefore, who holds the Self to be mere light, can in no way prove that it is of the nature of bliss. If, moreover, that which the soul effects on approaching the highest light is merely to attain to its own true nature, we point out that that nature is something eternally accomplished, and that hence the declaration that 'it manifests (accomplishes) itself in its own nature' would be purportless. We hence conclude that on approaching the highest light the soul connects itself with a new form only then brought about. On this view the term 'accomplishes itself' is taken in its direct sense, and the expression 'in its own shape' also is suitable in so far as the soul accomplishes itself in a nature specially belonging to it and characterised by absolute bliss.—This view the Sūtra rejects. That special condition into which the soul passes on having, on the path of the Gods, approached the highest light is a manifestation of its own true nature, not an origination of a new character. For this is proved by the specification implied in the term 'own,' in the phrase 'in its own nature.' If the soul assumed a new body, this specification would be without meaning; for, even without that, it would be clear that the new body belongs to the soul.—Against the assertion that the soul's own true nature is something eternally accomplished, and that hence a declaration of that nature 'accomplishing itself' would be unmeaning, the next Sūtra declares itself.

2. The released one ; on account of the promise.

What the text says about the soul accomplishing itself in its own form refers to the released soul which, freed from its connexion with works and what depends thereon, i. e. the body and the rest, abides in its true essential nature.—That essential nature no doubt is something eternally accomplished, but as in the *Samsāra* state it is obscured by Nescience in the form of *Karman* ; the text refers to the

cessation of such obscuration as 'accomplishment.'—How is this known?—'From the promise,' i. e. from the fact that the text promises to set forth such cessation. For Pragâpati when saying again and again, 'I will explain that further to you,' does so with a view to throw light on the individual soul—first introduced in the clause 'that Self which is free from sin, &c.' (VIII, 7, 1)—in so far as freed from all connexion with the three empirical conditions of waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep, and released from the body which is due to Karman and the cause of joy and sorrow. When, therefore, he concludes 'that serene being, i. e. the soul, having risen from this body and having approached the highest light accomplishes itself in its true form,' we understand that such 'accomplishment' means the final release, i. e. the cessation of all bondage, which is gained by the soul, previously connected with Karman, as soon as it approaches the highest light.—The Pûrvapakshin had said that as in the state of deep sleep the manifestation of the true nature of the soul is seen in no way to benefit man, Scripture, if declaring that Release consists in a manifestation of the true nature of the soul, would clearly teach something likewise not beneficial to man; and that hence the 'accomplishment in its own form' must mean the soul's entering on such a new condition of existence as would be a cause of pleasure, viz. the condition of a deva or the like. To this the next Sûtra replies.

3. The Self, on account of subject-matter.

The subject-matter of the whole section shows that by the Self manifesting itself in its own form there is meant the Self as possessing the attributes of freedom from all evil and sin and so on. For the teaching of Pragâpati begins as follows: 'the Self which is free from sin, free from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, whose desires and thoughts spontaneously realise themselves.' And that this Self which forms the subject-matter of the entire section is the individual Self we have shown under I, 3, 19. The manifestation of the true nature of the soul when

reaching the highest light therefore means the manifestation of that Self which has freedom from sin and so on for its essential attributes—that nature being in the *Sam-sāra* state obscured through Nescience. When therefore at the moment of Release those essential qualities assert themselves, the case is one of manifestation of what already exists, not one of origination. Thus the reverend Saunaka says, 'As the lustre of the gem is not created by the act of polishing, so the essential intelligence of the Self is not created by the putting off of imperfections. As the well is not the cause of the production of rain water, but only serves to manifest water which already exists—for whence should that originate which is not?—thus knowledge and the other attributes of the Self are only manifested through the putting off of evil qualities; they are not produced, for they are eternal.' Intelligence, therefore, bliss, and the other essential qualities of the soul which were obscured and contracted by *Karman*, expand and thus manifest themselves when the bondage due to *Karman* passes away and the soul approaches the highest light. On this view of 'manifestation' there remains no difficulty.—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of 'on approaching manifestation.'

4. In non-division; because that is seen.

Is the soul, when it has reached the highest light and freed itself from all bondage, conscious of itself as separate from the highest Self or as non-separate in so far as being a mere 'mode' (*prakāra*) of that Self?—The former view is the right one. For Scriptural and *Smṛiti* texts alike declare that the released soul stands to the highest Self in the relation of fellowship, equality, equality of attributes, and all this implies consciousness of separation. Compare 'He attains all desires together with the all-knowing Brahman' (*Taitt. Up.* II, 1, 1); 'When the seer sees the shining maker, the Lord, the Person who has his source in Brahman; then, possessing perfect knowledge, and shaking off good and evil, free from all passions he reaches the highest equality' (*Mu. Up.* III, 1, 3); 'Taking their stand upon this knowledge they, attaining to an equality of attri-

butes with me, are neither born at the time of a creation nor are they agitated when a pralaya takes place' (Bha. Gt. XIV, 2).—Against this view the Sûtra declares itself 'in non-division.' The released soul is conscious of itself as non-divided from the highest Brahman. 'For this is seen,' i. e. for the soul having reached Brahman and freed itself from the investment of Nescience sees itself in its true nature. And this *true nature* consists herein that the souls have for their inner Self the highest Self while they constitute the body of that Self and hence are *modes* (prakâra) of it. This is proved by all those texts which exhibit the soul and Brahman in co-ordination—'Thou art that,' 'this Self is Brahman'; 'In that all this has its Self'; 'All this in truth is Brahman'; and by other texts, such as 'He who dwells within the Self, whom the Self does not know, of whom the Self is the body,' &c.; and 'He who abides within, the ruler of creatures, he is thy Self'; as explained by us under Sûtra I, 4, 22. The consciousness of the released soul therefore expresses itself in the following form: 'I am Brahman, without any division.' Where the texts speak of the soul's becoming equal to, or having equal attributes with, Brahman, the meaning is that the nature of the individual soul—which is a mere mode of Brahman—is equal to that of Brahman, i. e. that on putting off its body it becomes equal to Brahman in purity. The text declaring that the soul 'attains all its desires together with Brahman' intimates that the soul, together with Brahman of which it is a mode, is conscious of the attributes of Brahman. The different texts are thus in no conflict. Nor, on this view of the soul being non-divided from Brahman in so far as being its mode, is there any difficulty on account of what is said about the soul under Sû. IV, 4, 8; or on account of the doctrines conveyed in II, 1, 22; III, 4, 8.—Here terminates the adhikarâṇa of 'non-division, on account of its being seen.'

5. In (a nature like) that of Brahman, thus Gaimini thinks; on account of suggestion and the rest.

Owing to the fact that different texts give different accounts, the question now arises of what character that essential nature of the Self is in which it manifests itself on reaching Brahman. Is that nature constituted by freedom from evil and sin and the rest (i. e. the attributes enumerated *Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1*); or by mere intelligence (*vigñāna*); or by both, there being no opposition between intelligence and those other attributes?—The teacher Gaimini holds that the soul manifests itself in its Brahman character, i. e. in a character constituted by freedom from sin, and so on. These latter attributes are, in the text of the ‘small lotus,’ mentioned as belonging to Brahman (*Kh. Up. VIII, 1, 5*), and may hence be referred to as the ‘Brahman’ character. And that this Brahman character is the character of the released soul also follows from ‘suggestion and the rest.’ For freedom from all evil and the rest are, in the teaching of Pragāpati, referred to as attributes of the soul (*VIII, 7, 1*). The ‘and the rest’ of the Sūtra refers to the activities of the released soul—laughing, playing, rejoicing, and so on (mentioned in *VIII, 12, 3*)—which depend on the power belonging to the soul in that state to realise all its ideas and wishes. It is for these reasons that Gaimini holds that mere intelligence does not constitute the true nature of the released soul.

6. In the sole nature of intelligence ; as that is its Self. Thus Auzulomi thinks.

Intelligence (consciousness ; *jaitanya*) alone is the true nature of the soul, and hence it is in that character only that the released soul manifests itself ; this is the view of the teacher Auzulomi. That intelligence only constitutes the true being of the soul, we learn from the express statement ‘As a lump of salt has neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of taste ; so this Self has neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of knowledge’ (*Bri. Up. IV, 5, 13*). When, therefore, the text attributes to the soul freedom from evil and the rest, it does not mean to predicate of it further positive qualities, but only

to exclude all the qualities depending on avidyâ—change, pleasure, pain, and so on.—For these reasons Audulomi holds that the released soul manifests itself as mere intelligence.—Next the teacher Bâdarâyana determines the question by propounding his own view.

7. Thus also, on account of existence of the former qualities (as proved) by suggestion, Bâdarâyana holds absence of contradiction.

The teacher Bâdarâyana is of opinion that even thus, i. e. although the text declares the soul to have mere intelligence for its essential nature, all the same the previously stated attributes, viz. freedom from all sin, and so on, are not to be excluded. For the authority of a definite statement in the Upanishads proves them to exist ('That Self which is free from sin,' &c.) ; and of authorities of equal strength one cannot refute the other. Nor must you say that the case is one of essential contradiction, and that hence we necessarily must conclude that freedom from sin, and so on (do not belong to the true nature of the soul, but) are the mere figments of Nescience (from which the released soul is free). For as there is equal authority for both sides, why should the contrary view not be held? (viz. that the soul is essentially free from sin, &c., and that the *kaitanya* is non-essential.) For the principle is that where two statements rest on equal authority, that only which suffers from an intrinsic impossibility is to be interpreted in a different way (i. e. different from what it means on the face of it), so as not to conflict with the other. But while admitting this we deny that the text which describes the Self as a mass of mere knowledge implies that the nature of the Self comprises nothing whatever but knowledge.—But what then is the purport of that text?—The meaning is clear, we reply; the text teaches that the entire Self, different from all that is non-sentient, is self-illuminated, i. e. not even a small part of it depends for its illumination on something else. The fact, vouched for in this text, of the soul in its entirety being a mere mass of knowledge in no way conflicts with the fact, vouched for by other texts, of its

possessing qualities such as freedom from sin and so on, which inhere in it as the subject of those qualities; not any more than the fact of the lump of salt being taste through and through—which fact is known through the sense of taste—conflicts with the fact of its possessing such other qualities as colour, hardness, and so on, which are known through the eye and the other sense-organs. The meaning of the entire text is as follows—just as the lump of salt has throughout one and the same taste, while other sapid things such as mangoes and other fruit have different tastes in their different parts, rind and so on; so the soul is throughout of the nature of knowledge or self-illuminedness.—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of ‘that which is like Brahman.’

8. By the mere will; Scripture stating that.

Concerning the released soul Scripture states, ‘He moves about there, laughing, playing, rejoicing, be it with women, or chariots, or relatives’ (*Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 3*). The doubt here arises whether the soul’s meeting with relatives and the rest presupposes an effort on its part or follows on its mere will—as things spring from the mere will of the highest Person.—An effort is required; for we observe in ordinary life that even such persons as kings and the like who are capable of realising all their wishes do not accomplish the effects desired without some effort.—Against this view the Sūtra says ‘by the mere will.’ For, in a previous passage, Scripture expressly says, ‘He who desires the world of the Fathers, by his mere will the Fathers rise to receive him,’ &c. (*VIII, 2, 1*). And there is no other text declaring the need of effort which would oblige us to define and limit the meaning of the text last quoted.

9. And for this very reason without another ruler.

Since the released soul realises all its wishes, it does not stand under another ruler. For to be under a ruler means to be subject to injunction and prohibition, and to be such is opposed to being free in the realisation of all one’s wishes. Hence Scripture says, ‘he is a Self-ruler’ (*Kh. Up. VII, 25*).—Here terminates the *adhikaraṇa* of ‘wishes.’

10. The absence, Bādari holds ; for thus Scripture says.

A doubt arises whether the Released has a body and sense-organs, or not ; or whether he has them or not just as he pleases. The teacher Bādari holds that body and sense-organs are absent ; since the text declares this. The text—‘ as long as he is embodied there is no freedom from pleasure and pain ; but when he is free from the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches him ’ (*Kh. Up.* VIII, 12, 1)—declares that pleasure and pain are necessarily connected with embodiedness ; and the text—‘ having risen from this body and reached the highest light he manifests himself in his own shape ’ (VIII, 12, 3)—declares that the Released one is without a body.

11. The presence, Gaimini holds ; because the text declares manifoldness.

The teacher Gaimini holds that the Released one has a body and senses ; because the text declares manifoldness—‘ He is onefold, he is threefold, he is fivefold, he is sevenfold ’ (*Kh. Up.* VII, 26, 2). The Self which is one and indivisible cannot be manifold, and the various forms of manifoldness of which the text speaks therefore must depend on the body. The text which speaks of the absence of a body refers to the absence of that body only which is due to Karman ; for this latter body only is the cause of pleasure and pain. Next the Reverend Bādarāyana decides this point by the declaration of his own view.

12. For this reason Bādarāyana (holds him to be) of both kinds ; as in the case of the twelve days’ sacrifice.

‘ For this reason,’ i. e. for the reason that the text refers to the wish of the Released, the Reverend Bādarāyana is of opinion that the Released may, at his liking, be with or without a body. This satisfies both kinds of texts. The case is analogous to that of the twelve days’ sacrifice which, on the basis of twofold texts—‘ Those desirous of pros-

perity are to celebrate the dvâdasâha,' and 'The priest is to offer the dvâdasâha for him who desires offspring'—belongs, according to difference of wish, either to the sattrâ or the ahîna class of sacrifices.—The next Sûtra declares that the body and the sense-organs of the Released are not necessarily created by the Released himself.

13. In the absence of a body, as in the state of dream ; that being possible.

As in the absence of a body and other instruments of enjoyment created by himself, the Released may undergo experiences of pleasure by means of instruments created by the highest Person, the Released, although capable of realising all his wishes, may not himself be creative. As in the state of dream the individual soul has experiences depending on chariots and other implements created by the Lord ('He creates chariots, horses,' &c., *Bṛi. Up. IV, 3, 10*) ; thus the released soul also may have experience of different worlds created by the Lord engaged in playful sport.

14. When there is a body, as in the waking state.

When, on the other hand, the released soul possesses a body created by its own will, then it enjoys its various delights in the same way as a waking man does.—In the same way as the highest Person creates out of himself, for his own delight, the world of the Fathers and so on ; so he sometimes creates such worlds for the enjoyment of the released souls. But sometimes, again, the souls using their own creative will-power themselves create their own worlds, which however are included within the sphere of sport of the highest Person (so that the souls in enjoying them do not pass beyond the intuition of Brahman).

But it has been taught that the soul is of atomic size ; how then can it connect itself with many bodies ?—To this question the next Sûtra replies.

15. The entering is as in the case of a lamp ; for thus Scripture declares.

Just as a lamp, although abiding in one place only, enters through the light proceeding from it into connexion with many places ; so the soul also, although limited to one place, may through its light-like consciousness enter into several bodies. It may do this as well as in this life the soul, although abiding in one spot of the body only, viz. the heart, pervades the whole body by means of its consciousness and thus makes it its own. There is however the following difference between the two cases. The non-released soul has its intellectual power contracted by the influence of Karman, and hence is incapable of that expansive pervasion without which it cannot identify itself with other bodies. The released soul, on the other hand, whose intellectual power is non-contracted is capable of extending as far as it likes, and thus to make many bodies its own. For Scripture declares, 'That living soul is to be known as part of the hundredth part of the point of a hair divided a hundred times, and yet it is capable of infinity' (Svet. Up. V, 9). The non-released soul is ruled by Karman, the released one only by its will—this is the difference.—But, a new difficulty is raised, Scripture declares that when the soul reaches Brahman all its inner and outer knowledge is stopped: 'Embraced by the highest Self the soul knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within' (Brî. Up. IV, 3, 21). How then can it be said to know all things?—To this the next Sûtra replies.

16. It refers either to dreamless sleep or to union (sampatti); for this is manifested.

Texts as the one last quoted do not refer to the released soul, but either to deep sleep or to 'union' (sampatti), i. e. the time of dying ; the latter in accordance with the text 'then his speech is united (sampadyate) with his mind,—heat with the highest divinity' (Kê. Up. VI, 15, 1). In both those states the soul attains to the highest Self and is unconscious. That in the states of deep sleep and dying the soul is unconscious and that the released soul is all-knowing, Scripture reveals. The text 'In truth he thus does not know himself that he is I, nor does he know any-

thing that exists. He is gone to utter annihilation. I see no good in this' (*Kh. Up.* VIII, 11, 1) declares that the soul is unconscious in the state of deep sleep; and a subsequent text in the same section declares the released soul to be all-knowing, 'He seeing these pleasures with the divine eye, i. e. the mind, rejoices' (VIII, 12, 5). The same is clearly stated in the text, 'He who sees this sees everything, and obtains everything everywhere' (VII, 26, 2). That at death there is unconsciousness appears from the text, 'having risen from these elements he vanishes again in them. When he has departed there is no more knowledge' (*Bri. Up.* IV, 5, 13). From all this it follows that the text as to the soul being held in embrace by the *prāgñā* Self refers either to deep sleep or death.—Here terminates the *adhikāraṇa* of 'non-being.'

17. With the exception of world-energy; on account of leading subject-matter and of non-proximity.

The doubt here presents itself whether the power of the released soul is a universal power such as belongs to the Supreme Person, extending to the creation, sustentation, and so on, of the worlds; or is limited to the intuition of the Supreme Person.—The *Pūrvapakshin* maintains the former view. For he says Scripture declares that the soul reaches equality with the Supreme Person: 'Free from stain he reaches the highest equality' (*Mu. Up.* III, 1, 3); and moreover Scripture ascribes to the released soul the power of realising all its thoughts. And these two conditions are not fulfilled unless the soul possess the special powers of the Lord with regard to the government, &c., of the world.—To this the *Sūtra* replies, 'with the exception of world-energy.' The released soul, freed from all that hides its true nature, possesses the power of intuitively beholding the pure Brahman, but does not possess the power of ruling and guiding the different forms of motion and rest belonging to animate and inanimate nature.—How is this known?—'From subject-matter.' For it is with special reference to the highest Brahman

only that the text mentions ruling and controlling power over the entire world. 'That from whence these beings are born, that through which they live when born, that into which they enter at death, endeavour to know that; that is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 1, 1). If such universal ruling and controlling power belonged to the released soul as well, it would not be used—as the text actually uses it—for defining Brahman; for all definition rests on special individual attributes. Analogously many other texts speak of universal ruling and controlling power with exclusive reference to the Supreme Person—'Being only this was in the beginning, &c.—it thought, may I be many' (*Kh.* Up. VI, 2); 'In the beginning this was Brahman, one only—it created the most excellent Kshattra,' &c. (*Bri.* Up. I, 4, 11); 'In the beginning all this was Self, one only—it thought, let me send forth these worlds' (*Ait. Âr.* II, 4, 1, 1); 'There was Nârâyana alone, not Brahmâ, and so on.' 'He who dwelling within the earth,' &c. (*Bri.* Up. III, 7, 3).—This also follows 'from non-proximity'; for in all those places which speak of world-controlling power the context in no way suggests the idea of the released soul, and hence there is no reason to ascribe such power to the latter.

18. If it be said that this is not so, on account of direct teaching; we reply not so, on account of the texts declaring that which abides within the spheres of those entrusted with special functions.

But, an objection is raised, certain texts directly declare that the released soul also possesses 'world-energy.' Compare 'He becomes a self-ruler; he moves in all worlds according to his wishes' (*Kh.* Up. VII, 25, 2); 'He moves through these worlds, enjoying any food he wishes, and assuming any shape he wishes' (Taitt. Up. III, 10, 5). We cannot therefore accept the restriction laid down in the last Sûtra.—Not so, the latter half of the present Sûtra declares, 'on account of the texts declaring that which abides in the spheres of those entrusted with special functions.' The meaning of the texts quoted is that the

released soul participates in the enjoyments connected with the spheres of *Hiraṇyagarbha* and other beings which are entrusted with special functions. The soul whose knowledge is no longer obstructed by *Karman* freely enjoys all the different worlds in which the power of *Brahman* manifests itself and thus is fully satisfied.—But if the released soul, no less than the soul implicated in the *Sam-sāra*, experiences enjoyments belonging to the sphere of change, it follows that the sum of its enjoyments is finite and limited, and that hence the released soul is no better off than the soul in the state of bondage!—Of this doubt the next *Sūtra* disposes.

19. That which is not within change; for thus Scripture declares the abiding (of the soul).

That which is not within change, i. e. the highest *Brahman* which is free from all change and of an absolutely perfect and blessed nature—this, together with the manifestations of its glory, is what forms the object of consciousness for the released soul. The worlds which are subject to change thus form objects for that soul's experience, in so far as they form part of *Brahman's* manifestation. For Scripture declares that the released soul thus abides within, i. e. is conscious of the changeless highest *Brahman*, 'when he finds freedom from fear and an abode in that which is invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported, then he obtains the fearless' (*Taitt. Up. II, 7*). And that the world is contained within *Brahman* as its manifestation is declared in the text, 'In that all the worlds abide, and no one goes beyond' (*Ka. Up. II, 5, 8*). The meaning of the text stating that the Released freely move in all worlds, and similar texts, therefore is only that the released soul while conscious of *Brahman* with its manifestations experiences also the enjoyments, lying within the sphere of change, which abide in the world of *Hiraṇyagarbha* and similar beings; not that it possesses the world-energies—creative, ruling, and so on—which are the distinctive attribute of the highest Lord.

20. And thus Perception and Inference show.

That the energies connected with the rule of the entire world are exclusive attributes of the highest Person, Scripture and Smṛiti alike declare. Compare scriptural texts such as 'From fear of him the wind blows,' &c. (Taitt. Up. II, 8, 1); 'By the command of that Imperishable one sun and moon stand, held apart' (Bṛi. Up. III, 9); 'He is the lord of all, the king of all beings, the protector of all beings' (Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 22). And Smṛiti texts such as 'With me as Supervisor, Prakṛiti brings forth the Universe of the movable and the immovable, and for this reason the world ever moves round'; 'Pervading this entire Universe by a portion of mine I do abide' (Bha. Gī. IX, 10; X, 42). Scripture and Smṛiti likewise declare that of the bliss which is enjoyed by the released soul the highest Person alone is the cause—'For he alone causes blessedness' (Taitt. Up. II, 7); 'He who serves me with unswerving devotion, surpasses these qualities and is fitted for becoming one with Brahman. For I am the abode of Brahman, of infinite immortality, of everlasting virtue, and of absolute bliss' (Bha. Gī. XIV, 26-27). The exalted qualities of the soul—freedom from evil and sin and so on—which manifest themselves in the state of Release no doubt belong to the soul's essential nature; but that the soul is of such a nature fundamentally depends on the Supreme Person, and on him also depends the permanency of those qualities; they are permanent in so far as the Lord himself on whom they depend is permanent. It is in the same way that all the things which constitute the means of enjoyment and sport on the part of the Lord are permanent in so far as the Lord himself is permanent. It thus appears that the equality to the Lord which the released soul may claim does not extend to the world-ruling energies.

21. And on account of the indication of the equality of enjoyment only.

The previous conclusion is confirmed by the further fact that the text directly teaches the released soul to be equal to Brahman in so far only as enjoying direct insight into the true nature of Brahman. 'He reaches all objects of

desire, together with the all-knowing Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1).—The conclusion thus is that we have to shape our ideas as to the powers of the released soul in accordance with what the texts say as to the Lord only possessing the power of ruling and controlling the entire world, and that hence the latter power cannot be attributed to the soul.—But if the powers of the released soul altogether depend on the Lord, it may happen that He, being independent in all his doings, may will the released soul to return into the *Samsāra*.—Of this doubt the next Sūtra disposes.

22. Non-return, according to Scripture; non-return, according to Scripture.

We know from Scripture that there is a Supreme Person whose nature is absolute bliss and goodness; who is fundamentally antagonistic to all evil; who is the cause of the origination, sustentation, and dissolution of the world; who differs in nature from all other beings, who is all-knowing, who by his mere thought and will accomplishes all his purposes; who is an ocean of kindness as it were for all who depend on him; who is all-merciful; who is immeasurably raised above all possibility of any one being equal or superior to him; whose name is the *highest Brahman*. And with equal certainty we know from Scripture that this Supreme Lord, when pleased by the faithful worship of his Devotees—which worship consists in daily repeated meditation on Him, assisted by the performance of all the practices prescribed for each caste and āśrama—frees them from the influence of Nescience which consists of karman accumulated in the infinite progress of time and hence hard to overcome; allows them to attain to that supreme bliss which consists in the direct intuition of His own true nature: and after that does *not* turn them back into the miseries of *Samsāra*. The text distinctly teaching this is 'He who behaves thus all his life through reaches the world of Brahman and does not return' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 15*). And the Lord himself declares 'Having obtained me great-souled men do not come into rebirth, the fleeting abode of misery; for they have

reached the highest perfection. Up to the world of Brahmā the worlds return again, O Arguna; but having attained to me, O son of Kunti, there is no rebirth' (Bha. Gī. VIII, 15-16). As, moreover, the released soul has freed itself from the bondage of karman, has its powers of knowledge fully developed, and has all its being in the supremely blissful intuition of the highest Brahman, it evidently cannot desire anything else nor enter on any other form of activity, and the idea of its returning into the Samsāra therefore is altogether excluded. Nor indeed need we fear that the Supreme Lord when once having taken to himself the Devotee whom he greatly loves will turn him back into the Samsāra. For He himself has said, 'To the wise man I am very dear, and dear he is to me. Noble indeed are all these, but the wise man I regard as my very Self. For he, with soul devoted, seeks me only as his highest goal. At the end of many births the wise man goes to me, thinking all is Vāsudeva. Such great-souled men are rarely met with' (Bha. Gī. VII, 17-19).—The repetition of the words of the Sūtra indicates the conclusion of this body of doctrine. Thus everything is settled to satisfaction.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'with the exception of the world-energies.'

Here terminates the fourth pāda of the fourth adhyāya of the commentary on the Sārīraka Mīmāṃsā, composed by the reverend teacher Rāmānuja. This completes the fourth adhyāya, and the whole work; and the entire body of doctrine is thus brought to a conclusion.

INDEX OF QUOTATIONS.

Aitareya-âraṇyaka

II, 4, 1, 1 . . .	71, 206, 391, 461, 767
4, 1, 2. . .	81, 201, 461
4, 2, 4. . .	417

Aitareya-upanishad

I, 1	240
----------------	-----

Âpastambîya-dharma-sûtra

I, 8, 22, 4; 23, 2	410
II, 1, 2, 3. . .	590
9, 13-17 . . .	187

Bhagavad-gîtâ

II, 12	71
III, 27	553
IV, 6	297
6; 8	241
V, 18; 19 . . .	96
VI, 11; 12 . . .	721
VII, 4; 5 . . .	139
4-7	359
6	71, 410
6; 7	86
14	22, 126
16	713
17	16
17-19	771
21-22	627
23	589, 627
26	71
VIII, 6	17
15; 16	771
16	749
22	16
23-26	742
24	652
27	742
IX, 4; 5	86
7; 8	140
7; 8; 10 . . .	365
10	140, 397, 612 sq., 769
23; 24	411
24	627

X, 3	86, 612 sq.
----------------	-------------

X, 8	71, 410
8; 10; 11 . . .	558
10	16
10; 11	489
20	21, 71, 102
39	21, 102
41; 42	102
42	86, 577, 612 sq., 769

XI, 53; 54 . . .	16, 617, 710
------------------	--------------

XII, 7	71
XIII, 1	58
2	21, 101
5	72, 571, 577
19	140, 479
19-21	365
20	553
21	554

XIV, 2	98, 325, 759
3	140
4	71
5	365
15	291
17	18
19	553
26, 27	769

XV, 7	503, 577
8	586
14	248
15	101, 356, 557
15; 19	263
16	101, 310
17	145, 612 sq.
17; 18	86
18	71

XVI, 8-19 . . .	558
19	488
XVIII, 5	700
14	356
16	554
46	411, 488, 700
61	101, 263, 557
61; 62	356

Bṛihad-âraṇyaka-upanishad

I, 3	633 sq.
3, 22	575

I, 4, 1 . . .	28	III, 8, 10 . . .	7
4, 7 . . .	14, 24, 141, 179, 374, 466, 479, 543, 718	9 . . .	769
4, 10 . . .	24, 71, 253, 589, 718	9, 28 . . .	24, 236, 240, 402
4, 11 . . .	461, 767	IV, 3, 1 . . .	601
4, 15 . . .	13, 179, 199	3, 7 . . .	60, 352, 546- 548
5, 3 . . .	575	3, 10 . . .	121, 601, 764
5, 13 . . .	572	3, 14; 30 . . .	60
5, 21 . . .	574, 578	3, 21 . . .	98, 192, 205, 352, 384, 469, 765
5, 22 . . .	568	3, 30 . . .	549
II, 1, 1 . . .	199	3, 32 . . .	318
1, 18 . . .	555, 576	3, 35 . . .	98, 192, 352, 469
1, 19 . . .	604	3, 38 . . .	730
2, 3 . . .	366	4 . . .	734
3, 3 . . .	568	4, 2 . . .	546, 689, 732
3, 6 . . .	611, 615-617, 624	4, 5 . . .	478
4, 5 . . .	151, 179, 188, 709	4, 6 . . .	726
4, 6 . . .	143, 399, 458, 718	4, 7 . . .	731, 733
4, 10 . . .	143	4, 13 . . .	547
4, 11 . . .	571	4, 16 . . .	336, 349, 366
4, 12 . . .	270, 388, 545, 551	4, 17 . . .	371
4, 13 . . .	192, 435, 458	4, 18 . . .	258
4, 14 . . .	143	4, 19 . . .	20, 84, 143, 180, 435, 458
4, 15 . . .	58, 399	4, 21 . . .	13, 151
5, 19 . . .	10, 22, 191, 435	4, 22 . . .	10, 16sq., 188, 284, 319, 352, 522, 547, 694, 699, 703 sq., 750, 769
III, 2, 1 . . .	571	4, 23 . . .	10, 17, 700, 709, 722
2, 10; 11 . . .	734	4, 24 . . .	626
2, 13 . . .	586	4, 24; 25 . . .	352
3, 23 . . .	436	4, 25 . . .	397, 402, 543, 621
4 . . .	655	5, 6 . . .	13, 385, 458
4, 2 . . .	20, 176, 184	5, 7 . . .	20
5 . . .	655, 709, 711	5, 13 . . .	60, 760, 766
5, 2 . . .	83	5, 15 . . .	20, 60, 84, 183, 546
7 . . .	214, 278-282, 307, 576	6, 12 . . .	60
7, 3 . . .	608, 717, 767	V, 4 . . .	659
7, 3 ff. . . .	537	4, 2 . . .	572, 575, 586
7, 3; 22 . . .	133	4, 6 . . .	590
7, 3-22 . . .	227	4, 22 . . .	693
7, 3-23 . . .	140, 399	4, 24 . . .	661
7, 9 ff. . . .	242	5 . . .	642
7, 16 . . .	214	5, 2 . . .	272, 659
7, 18 . . .	273, 278	9 . . .	287, 290 sq.
7, 22 . . .	98, 191, 252 sq., 319, 394, 468, 549	10 . . .	744 sq.
7, 23 . . .	191 sq., 319	VI, 1 . . .	636
8, 8 . . .	26, 308		
8, 9 . . .	319, 348, 398, 576, 653		

VI, 1, 14 . . .	701
2, 15 . . .	651, 744 sq., 748
2, 16 . . .	741
Dakṣa-smṛiti . . .	411
Gābāla-upanishad . . .	696
Garbha-upanishad 3 . . .	364
Gauḍapāda-kārikā ? . . .	126
I, 16 . . .	22
III, 24 . . .	241
Gautama- dharma-sūtra XI, 29 . . .	590
Īśā-upanishad 2 . . .	689
8 . . .	182
11 . . .	18
Kaṭha-upanishad I, 1, 17 . . .	269
1, 20 . . .	269
1, 23 . . .	601
1, 25 . . .	601
1, 26 . . .	361
2, 6 . . .	593
2, 10 . . .	7
2, 12 . . .	268, 272
2, 14 . . .	181
2, 16-17 . . .	362
2, 18 . . .	392, 479, 524, 541
2, 19 . . .	553
2, 20-25 . . .	362
2, 22 . . .	181, 267, 424
2, 23 . . .	15, 267, 617, 710
2, 24 . . .	712, 723
2, 25 . . .	266
3, 1 . . .	98, 124, 267, 269, 363
3, 2 . . .	269
3, 3 . . .	269
3, 3-9 . . .	355
3, 3-14 . . .	363
3, 4 . . .	182
3, 9 . . .	266, 269, 272
3, 11 . . .	354
3, 12 . . .	436

I, 3, 15 . . .	13, 262, 360, 363
II, 4, 7 . . .	268
4, 9 . . .	603
4, 10 . . .	20
4, 12 . . .	348
4, 12; 13 . . .	325
5, 8 . . .	121, 602, 768
5, 13 . . .	81, 191, 541, 543, 562
5, 15 . . .	348
6, 2; 3 . . .	348
6, 9 . . .	188, 258, 617
6, 10 . . .	570
6, 17 . . .	325, 348
Kaushītaki- upanishad I, 2 . . .	593
3 . . .	744, 746
3 ff. . . .	733
4 . . .	724
II, 14 . . .	417
III . . .	250-254
3 . . .	206, 258
8 . . .	18, 558
9 . . .	250, 414
IV, 19 . . .	378
Kena-upanishad I, 3 . . .	183
4 . . .	183, 188
II, 3 . . .	20, 83
Kbândogya- upanishad I, 1, 1 . . .	634, 676
1, 3 . . .	696
2 . . .	633 sq.
2, 7 . . .	574
2, 23 . . .	623
3, 1 . . .	719
6 . . .	635
6, 8 . . .	238
7 . . .	238
9 . . .	242, 635
9, 1 . . .	244, 320
10; 11 . . .	246
11, 5 . . .	258, 569
II, 2, 1 . . .	676
23, 1 . . .	694
III . . .	335, 369
12, 1 . . .	248
12, 6 . . .	562, 623
13, 7 . . .	247, 349, 366

III, 14	257-265, 312, 753	VI, 2-8	141
14, 1	17, 83, 85, 133, 204, 399, 458, 674, 717	2, 1	20, 28, 180, 240, 374, 460, 534
14, 2	476	2, 1 ff.	200
14, 3	264, 315	2, 1-3	158
18	716	2, 3	71, 81, 85, 202, 375, 521, 532 sq., 536 sq.
18, 1	197, 718	2, 3; 4	537
18, 1; 6	14	3	435, 730 sq.
18, 2	623	3-5	578-583
19, 1	374, 465	3, 1	595
IV, 1, 2	716	3, 2	81, 206, 252, 350, 377, 394, 417, 578
1, 6; 2, 2	14	3, 2-3	579
2, 3	338	3, 3	71, 369, 583
3, 8	248	3, 3-4	581
4	342	3, 4	582, 586
10, 3	274	5, 1	581
10, 5	273 sq.	5, 2	582
11-13	273	5, 4	582
11, 1	273	6, 1	728
11, 12	274	8	717
12, 2	274	8, 1	205, 384, 604
13, 2	274	8, 4	206
14, 3	722	8, 6	540, 737
15	744	8, 7	24, 180, 203, 206, 227, 252, 399, 435, 534
15, 1	272, 274, 313	9, 2	318
15, 5	747	9, 3	206
15, 6	749	9, 7	10
15, 10	743	10, 2	318, 605
V, 1	636	14, 2	187, 250, 649, 725, 727, 732
1, 7 ff.	574	15, 1	765
3-10	585	VII, 1 ff.	753 sq.
4, 2	587	1, 3	183, 300
9	588	2	527
10	588, 753	15	301, 718
10, 1	651, 693, 745	15, 1-3	300
10, 4	588	15, 4	304
10, 5	589, 726	18, 16; 19	652
10, 7	590	23	678
11	688	23 ff.	301
11, 6	287	23; 24	300
12 ff.	677	24, 1	307
12, 2	630	25	762
18, 1	287, 289, 293	25, 1	302, 307
18, 2	291, 294	25, 2	7, 300, 458, 551, 606, 650, 767
19, 1	291	26	17
24, 1-3	294	26, 1	304
24, 3	289, 722		
VI	191		
1 ff.	657		
1-8	454 sqq.		
1, 2	10		
1, 3	216, 398		
1, 4	20, 398		
2	143, 174, 767		

VII, 26, 2 . . .	7, 14, 23, 60, 183,423,428, 546,606,650, 702,712,763, 766	Mahānārāyaṇa- upanishad	? 625
VIII, 1	82, 420, 673	I, 1 461	6 241, 487
I ff.	665	6; 7 627	8-11 130
1, 1	151, 314, 384, 660	10 624	X 367, 666
1, 1 ff.	349, 631	7 151	23 632, 667
1, 3	207	XI 207, 666	3 139
1, 5	26, 81, 143, 195,207,239, 241,402,419, 476,546,608, 621,760	6 667	8-12 297
1, 6	7, 99, 315	XXV (?) 741	
2, 1	428, 762	Mahopanishad I. 522	
2, 9	315	Maitrāyaṇa- upanishad	
3, 1	22	IV, 6 458	
3, 2	102, 124 sq., 317	Manu-smṛiti	
3, 4	100, 302, 323, 392	I, 5 400	
4, 1	621, 724	5; 8-9 334	
6, 2	740	5-8 410	
6, 3	604	6-8 461	
6, 5	731, 738 sq., 744	8 407	
6, 6	749	II, 17 704	
7	608	X, 4 343	
7 ff.	328	126 343	
7, 1	13, 132, 151, 179,314,757, 760	XII, 106 426	
7, 3	320	Mundaka-upanishad	
11, 1	606, 766	I, 1, 5 20, 78, 282, 308,653	
12, 1	181, 210, 238, 321,428,763	1, 6 20, 264, 282, 360,407,625	
12, 1; 3	649	1, 7 407	
12, 3	60, 99, 320, 349,428,546, 606,650,661, 751 sq., 755, 760, 762 sq.	1, 8-9 533	
12, 3; 5	552	1, 9 26,81,143,195, 202,283,350, 405,419,462, 537,550,612	
12, 4	60	2, 1 285	
12, 4-5	546	2, 6 285	
12, 5	766	2, 7 7	
13	646, 711, 732	2, 7 ff. 286	
14	349, 749	2, 12; 13 7	
14, 1	244	II, 1 286	
15	689, 770	1, 1 391	
Kūlikā-upanishad	363 sq., 364 note, 399 sq.	1, 2 181, 282, 287, 420, 624	
		1, 3 524, 536, 538, 572, 577	
		1, 4 287, 289, 532	

II, 1, 8 . . .	570
2, 5 . . .	296, 622
2, 6 . . .	13
2, 7 . . .	258, 297
2, 8 . . .	15, 23, 693, 722
2, 10 . . .	325
3, 1 . . .	569
III, 1, 1 . . .	98, 182, 266, 299, 610
1, 2 . . .	299
1, 3 . . .	99 sq., 298, 324, 407, 758, 766
1, 4 . . .	17
1, 5 . . .	17
1, 8 . . .	188, 258, 617, 716
1, 9 . . .	547, 617
2, 3 . . .	284
2, 4 . . .	17
2, 6 . . .	750
2, 8 . . .	99 sq., 298, 392, 622, 624, 686
2, 9 . . .	23, 100, 183, 188, 192, 275
2, 10 . . .	629
Nyâya-sûtra	
I, 1, 5 . . .	162
Pânini	
II, 1, 50 . . .	372
3, 65 . . .	4
III, 2, 54 . . .	462
3, 113 . . .	454
IV, 3, 144 . . .	230
V, 2, 91 . . .	69
4, 21 . . .	93, 230
Prasna-upanishad	
I, 7 . . .	288
10 . . .	705
16 . . .	17
IV, 9 . . .	60, 546
V, 2 . . .	312
VI, 3 . . .	201, 730
5 . . .	60, 546
8 . . .	183
Pûrva-mîmâṃsâ-sûtra	
? . . .	120, 687
I, 3, 3 . . .	408, 523
II, 2, 1 ff. . .	680
4, 9 . . .	630
III . . .	19

III, 1, 12 . . .	222
3, 9 . . .	654
4, 17 . . .	152
5, 21 . . .	672
7, 18 . . .	554
IV, 3, 1 . . .	274
3, 17 . . .	151
VI . . .	706
5, 54 . . .	26
X, 8, 15 . . .	647
Rig-veda-saṃhitâ	
I, 98, 1 . . .	288
V, 129, 2 . . .	572
VI, 47, 18 . . .	126
X, 14, 1 . . .	593
81 . . .	475
88, 12 . . .	287
90, 1 . . .	292
129, 1 . . .	125
129, 3 . . .	125, 400
Sanatsugâtîya	
II, 5 . . .	23
Sâṅkhya-kârîkâ	
3 . . .	371
15 . . .	483
16 . . .	483, 486, 491
17 . . .	492
18 . . .	492
20; 21 . . .	492
21 . . .	490, 491
59 . . .	493
60 . . .	493
61 . . .	493
62 . . .	492
Satapatha-brâhmaṇa	
X . . .	668, 673
5, 4 . . .	673
6 . . .	673
6, 1, 11 . . .	292
6, 3, 2 . . .	263
Subâla-upanishad	
? . . .	229, 239, 280, 403 sq., 423, 537
VII . . .	202, 227, 242
1 . . .	133, 140
Svetârvatara- upanishad	
I, 1; 3 . . .	367

I, 6	7, 139, 145, 468, 566, 718	Taittiriya-âraṇyaka	
8	414, 419	III, 12, 7	7, 16, 207, 241
8-10	364	21	252
9	81, 139, 191, 469, 541, 559, 566	24	140, 207, 227
10	139, 144	Taittiriya-brâhmana	
12	139	III, 5, 10, 5	330
III, 8	16, 23, 90, 130, 183, 192, 241, 297, 387, 522, 686	Taittiriya-samhitâ	
8-9	624	I, 2, 1	330
9	249, 624 sq.	6, 7, 1	331
9-10	622	6, 8, 1	587
10	624	V, 3, 2, 5	571
15	292	Taittiriya-upanishad	
19	280, 420, 476	I, 6, 1	258
IV, 5	139, 365	11, 2	591
6	139, 191, 419 sq., 468 sq.	II, 1	10, 20, 23, 26- 29, 82, 99, 206, 209, 229, 375, 402, 532 sq., 550
7	414, 419	1, 1	7, 83, 99, 143, 188, 240, 244, 536 sq., 550, 681, 686, 758, 770
9	125, 139, 406, 469	2	214
9; 10	139, 397	3	230
10	22	4	60
V, 2	409	4, 1	550
6	566	5	209, 555, 637
7; 8	326	5, 1	545, 549
8	264, 547	5-6	229
9	259 sq., 547, 765	6	125, 133, 141, 143, 209, 213, 226, 236, 254, 280, 402, 404 sq., 576
9-10	365	6, 1	83, 414, 465, 521
9-11	367	7	20, 23, 85, 99, 233, 236, 320, 376, 390, 402, 626, 656, 755, 768 sq.
12	191	7, 1	244, 374, 550
VI, 7	81, 241	7; 8	603
7; 8	132, 462	8	212, 612, 755
7; 9	461	8, 1	232, 348, 576, 769
7-9	612	8, 4	84
8	26, 81, 143, 202, 241, 419, 462, 476	9	233, 612
9	139, 191, 207, 241, 468	9, 1	84
11	182, 436	III, 1	28, 91, 156, 240
13	139, 469		
15	7		
16	139, 191, 365, 469		
18	313, 334, 397		
19	10, 20, 241, 402, 612, 622		
23	710		

III, 1, 1 . . .	174, 540, 767	II, 3, 41 . . .	356
1; 2 . . .	237	3, 43; 46 . . .	620
6 . . .	260	4, 17 . . .	585
6, 1 . . .	20, 84, 550	III, 1, 1 . . .	422
10, 5 . . .	99, 237, 767	1, 3 . . .	120
Tāndya-mahā- brāhmaṇa		2, 1; 2 . . .	121
XX, 12, 5 . . .	342	2, 3 . . .	20
Vedānta-sūtras (cross-references)		2, 5 . . .	609
I, 1, 2 . . .	522	2, 6 . . .	607
1, 3 . . .	522	2, 11 . . .	20, 86
1, 5 ff. . .	480	2, 37 . . .	155
1, 12 ff. . .	307	2, 38 . . .	715
1, 15 . . .	687, 717	3, 11 . . .	99
1, 17 . . .	98	3, 21 . . .	659
1, 18 . . .	214	3, 42 . . .	682
1, 24 ff. . .	325	3, 59 . . .	99
1, 30 . . .	522	4, 8 . . .	717, 759
2, 3 . . .	687	4, 26 . . .	9, 16
2, 7 . . .	324	4, 33 . . .	16
2, 8 . . .	427, 607	IV, 1, 1 . . .	14
2, 21 . . .	98, 299	1, 3 . . .	24, 138, 659
2, 21 ff. . .	325	1, 12; 16 . . .	16
3, 1 ff. . .	325	2, 3 . . .	86
3, 2 . . .	99	4 . . .	323
3, 5 . . .	687	4, 1 . . .	192, 394
3, 14 . . .	661	4, 8 . . .	759
3, 18 . . .	687	4, 17 . . .	261, 350
3, 19 . . .	757	4, 17; 21 . . .	99, 192
4, 22 . . .	469, 759	Vishṇu-purāṇa	
4, 23 . . .	173, 619	?	411
II, 1, 4 . . .	117, 202, 493, 496	I, 1 . . .	92
1, 5 . . .	576	1, 35 . . .	93
1, 7 . . .	430, 471	2, 1 . . .	93
1, 8; 9 . . .	471	2, 6 . . .	21, 91, 93
1, 14 . . .	505, 619	2, 10 . . .	93
1, 21 . . .	424	2, 10-14 . . .	88
1, 22 . . .	98, 458, 559, 687, 717, 759	2, 50; 52 . . .	119
1, 24 . . .	486	3, 1 . . .	94
1, 27; 28 . . .	476	4, 38 ff. . .	21, 94
1, 33 . . .	406	19, 85 . . .	253
1, 33; 35 . . .	543	22, 53 . . .	87
1, 34; 35 . . .	470	23, 53-55 . . .	88
1, 35 . . .	404, 429	II, 12, 35 . . .	129
2, 6 . . .	425	12, 37; 38 . . .	127
2, 33 . . .	43	12, 38 . . .	126
3, 1 . . .	173	12, 39; 40; . . .	
3, 17 . . .	526	43-45 . . .	23, 127
3, 17; 18 . . .	58, 63	12, 41 . . .	128
3, 18 . . .	60, 562	12, 42 . . .	129
3, 32 . . .	567	12, 43 . . .	128
3, 37 . . .	567	12, 44 . . .	129
		12, 45 . . .	129
		13, 85 . . .	97
		13, 86 . . .	21, 96
		14, 31 . . .	21

II, 14, 31 ff.	96	VI, 7	100
14, 32.	21, 96	7, 30	99
14, 33.	101	7, 53	21, 89
14, 61.	101	7, 61-63	88
16, 23.	97	7, 69-71	87
16, 24.	21	7, 91	100
VI, 4, 38; 39	88	7, 94	21, 97
5, 72 ff.	87		
5, 82-87	87	Yāgyavalkya-smṛiti	
6, 12	18	III, 167	736

INDEX OF SANSKRIT WORDS.

- amṣa*, part, 88, 191, 559, 619 sq.
 akshara, the Imperishable, 125, 287, 309, 403, 653.
 akhyāti, the view that the attribute of one thing appears as that of another, 118.
 Agnirahasya, chapter in the Vāgasaneyaka (Sat. Brā. X), 668.
 Agnividya, knowledge of the Fires (i.e. *Kb. Up.* IV, 11-13), 274 sq.
 agnihotra, 635, 725 sq.
 aghātikarman, 517.
 aṅga, subordinate matter, 19.
 aṅgin, principal matter, 19.
 agada, intelligent, 60, 109.
 agadatva, intelligence, 61.
 agā, 'the unborn' principle, goat, 365-370.
 agñāna, non-knowledge, Nescience, 107 sq., 110-112, 114-118, 126 sq., 147, 468.
 agīva, non-soul, 516.
 ānu, of atomic size, 546 sq.
 atigraha, 736.
 ativādin, one who makes a final supreme declaration, 301, 303-305.
 Aditi, the individual soul, 268.
 adrishṭa, supersensuous, transcendental, the unseen principle, 345, 496 sq., 523, 552, 566.
 advitīya, without a second, 399.
 advaita-vādin, 436.
 advaitin, he who holds the view of non-duality, 445.
 adharma, demerit, 362, 516.
 adhikarāṇa, chapter, passim.
 adhipati, sense-organ, 504.
 adhyayana, learning, 689.
 adhyavasāya, the deciding, 571.
 adhyāsa, superimposition, 451, 492, 494.
 anavasāda, freedom from dejection, 17.
 anātmatva, absence of selfhood, 36.
 anārabdhakārya, (works) the effects of which have not yet begun, 725, 727.
 aniruddha, principle of egoity, 524-526.
 anirvāṇīyatā, inexplicability, 106.
 anirvāṇīyatva, 433.
 anirvāṇīyatva-vādin, 117 sq.
 anirā, 299.
 anukūla, agreeable, 152.
 anuddharsha, absence of exultation, 17.
 anupalabdhi, non-perception, 52, 107 sq.
 anubhūti, consciousness, 32, 48, 56.
 anumati, favour, permission, 557.
 anumāna, inference, 298.
 anuvāda, reference to what is established by other means, explanatory comment, 14, 45, 678, 694, 696 sq.
 anuraya, remainder, 589.
 anusmṛiti, recognition, 507.
 anṛita, untrue, 125.
 antaḥkarāṇa, internal organ, 447.
 antaram, difference, interval, break, 85.
 antariksha, ether, atmosphere, 533, 568.
 antaryāmin, the inner Ruler, 226.
 antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa, 214, 319, 356, 422, 457, 537, 544, 627.
 anna, food, 285, 374.
 anvaya, connexion, presence, 483 sq.
 apara, secondary, lowest, 89, 313.
 aparokṣatva, being that which does not transcend the senses, 656.
 apāna, 574 sq.
 apurushārtha, non-advantageous, 440.
 apūrva, unprecedented, new, the supersensuous result of an action which later on produces the sensible result, 153-155, 164, 330, 626 sq.
 apratisaṅkhyā, 505 sq.
 abhāva, absence of something, non-existence, 107 sq., 507.
 abhimāna, misconception, 571.
 abhivimāna, 293.
 abheda, non-distinction, 193.

- abhyāsa, repetition, 17, 680.
 amūrta, undefined, 89.
 amṛta, 585.
 amauna, non-mauna (see mauna), 710.
 arthavāda, an additional statement, 151, 155, 274, 327-330, 672, 683, 685-687, 722.
 arthāpatti, 117.
 avagati, consciousness, 56.
 avatāra, incarnation, 241.
 avidyā, Nescience, 22 sq., 101 (avidyā karmasamgā), 106 sq., 113 sq., 129, 146 sq., 180, 182 sq., 210, 212, 271, 438 sq., 441-445, 448-450, 453, 470, 502 sq., 544, 761.
 avivākya, (day of Soma sacrifice), 668.
 avyakta, the Unevolved, 125, 403, 483.
 avyākṛitam, unevolved matter, 309.
 arvatva, generic character of horses, 620.
 asatkārya, 456.
 asatkāryavāda, the theory that the effect does not exist before its origination, 431.
 asatkhyāti, the view that the non-existing appears as existing, 118.
 asatya, untrue, 129.
 astikāya, existing body, 516.
 ahamkātri, organ of Egoity, 182.
 ahamkāra, the 'I' egoity, 36-38, 61-67, 71 sq., 107, 333, 363, 403, 447, 481, 484, 535, 537 sq., 571, 729.
 aham, 'I' 71; a secret name of Brahman, 642.
 ahar, a secret name of Brahman, 642.
 ahina, class of sacrifices, 764.
 ākāṅkshā, expectancy, 414.
 ākāra, ether, 245, 320, 516, 522.
 ākāra, conduct, 591.
 ātmakhyāti, the view that the Self appears as a thing, 118.
 ātman, Self, 226, 243, 245, 297, 375 (from āpnoti), 571 (= manas).
 ātmabhāva, own being, 98.
 Āditya, Sun, 237 sq., 242, 719 sq.
 ādeśa, instruction, 398.
 ānanda, bliss, 212, 236 sq.
 ānandamaya, consisting of bliss, 211, 230 sq., 233, 236 sq.
 ānumāna, object of inference, 298.
 ānumānika, to be inferred, 236.
 ābhāsa, appearance, 565.
 ārambhana, that which is taken or touched, 430, 453 sq., 455 note, 458, 467.
 ārambhana-adhikarana, 78.
 Ārhatta, a Gaina, 520.
 ālambhana, 504.
 āsrama, stage of life, 147, 521, 702-711, 725, 770.
 āsrava, influx, 517.
 itikartavyatā, mode of procedure, 178.
 indriya, sense-organ, 577.
 iksh, to think, 201.
 īvara, the Lord, 620.
 utpatti, being originated, 182.
 udāna, 575.
 udgātri, 635 sq.
 udgītha, 8 sq., 19, 633-636, 664 sq., 676, 682-685, 691, 696 sq., 707 sq., 713, 719 sq., 726.
 udgītha-vidyā, 633, 635.
 unmāna, measure, 547.
 upakurvāna, a Brahmaṭārin who has completed his course of study and becomes a householder, 707.
 Upakośala-vidyā, 651 sq., 745.
 upalakshana, secondary mark, 157.
 upasāda, certain offerings, 652, 654.
 upādāna, material cause, 142.
 upādhi, limiting adjunct, 134 sq., 144, 193, 195 sq., 429, 459, 543, 559 sq., 566 sq.
 upās, to meditate, 630, 716.
 upāsana, meditation, 15, 699, 716, 720.
 upāsana, meditation, 12 sq., 16, 284, 692.
 ūha, a kind of cognitional activity, 414.
 ūta, 124, 267.
 ekavākyatva, syntactical unity, 223.
 airvarya, lordly power, superior existence, 306, 755.
 om, omkāra, the syllable Om, 311-313.

apūpādhika, limiting adjuncts, 191 sq.

karawa, instrument, 178; activity, action, 574; the instrumental case, 579.

karmakānda, 3, 144, 151, 409, 411.

karman, action, works, good and evil deeds, 63, 87 sq., 94, 101, 128 sq., 147, 152, 171 sq., 193, 209, 215, 232, 239 sq., 256, 259, 261, 280, 293, 306 sq., 313, 321 sq., 324, 326, 328, 350, 367, 378, 380 sq., 387, 420, 424, 428, 459, 478, 589-592, 597 sq., 607, 609-611, 616, 756-758, 763, 765, 768, 770.

karma-bhāvanā, 100.

karma-mīmāṃsā, 255.

kalpa, world period, 238.

kalpaka, the shaping agent, 440.

kalpana, formation, i.e. creation, 368.

kalyāna, virtuous conduct, 17.

kāpāla, skull, 521.

kāma, desired thing, 601.

kārya, thing to be done, 148, 152, 153; effected, 285, 313.

kāla, time, 516.

Kundapāyinām ayanam, 635.

kṛiti, action, 152.

kaivalya, isolation, 271.

kriyā, action, works, 17, 574.

kshetrageṇa, embodied soul, 63, 88, 89, 101.

khaṇḍa, a piece, 559.

khyāti, 514.

gati, the going, 570.

guṇa, quality, attribute, secondary matter, details, 126, 135, 365, 368, 400, 410, 413, 469, 475, 483-485, 491-493, 513, 553 sq., 632, 680, 744.

godohana, a sacrificial vessel, 665, 682 sq., 707.

graha, 571, 736.

ghanī-bhūta, concreted, 312.

ghātikarman, 517.

āturmukha, four-faced, 312 sq.

āmasa, cup, 366, 665.

karawa, conduct, works, 591 sq.

āitta, mind, 403, 500, 502, 571.

āid-rūpa, essentially intelligent, 59.

āintā, thinking, 571.

āaitanya, intelligence, 59, 108, 760 sq.

āaitta, mental, 500, 502.

gada, non-intelligent, 36 sq., 50, 60, 62, 109, 437, 552.

gāti, generic character, 46, 135, 518.

gīva, individual soul, 191, 205, 209 sq., 212 sq., 234, 312, 394, 457, 469 sq., 516, 526, 561, 563, 610, 619, 730, 736.

gīva ātmā, living Self, 226, 457, 578.

gīvaghana, 312 sq.

gīvanmukta, released in this life, 186.

gīvanmukti, release in this life, 186 sq.

gñā, knower, 63.

gñātri, knower, 146.

gñāna, knowledge, consciousness, 56, 126, 146, 241; pl. forms of knowledge, 571.

taggalān, 259, 260.

tatkratub, according to what his thought is, 753.

tattva of the Sāṅkhyas, 372, 475.

tat tvam asi, 129-138.

tanu, body, 88.

tan-maya, consisting of that, 405.

tanmātra, the subtle matter, 404, 481, 535.

tapas, austerity, 517; denotes Brahman, 652.

tamas, darkness, 11, 125, 413, 481, 483-485.

tarka, ratiocination, 414.

tuṭṭa, futile, 129; futile non-entity, 507.

tegas, fire or heat, 59, 620.

taigasa, active, 481.

tyat, that, 125, 226, 405.

dama, 19.

dahara-vidyā, 82, 665-667.

daharākāra, small ether, 323.

dikshā, initiatory ceremony, 521.

devamāyā, 602.

dera, place, 563.

dosha, imperfection, 22.

dravya, substance, 135, 516 sq.

dvādaśa, the twelve days' sacrifice, 764.

dviparārdha, 497, 749.

dvīpa, island, 477.

dvaita, duality, 445.

dvaitavādin, (the Vaisesika) who holds the view of duality, 445.

dharma, attribute, 32; merit, 181, 362, 516.

- dhâranâ, 89.
 dhyâna, devout meditation, 13, 692, 699, 716, 720.
 dhyâna-vidhi, 184.
 dhyai, to meditate or to know, 716.
- nâdi, vein, 604.
 nâda, tone, 77.
 nâmadheya, name, 455, 680.
 nitya, permanent, 520.
 nityânityavastuviveka, 19.
 nididhyâsana, meditation, 10.
 nididhyâsitavya, to be meditated upon, 716.
 nimitta, cause, 176 sq.
 niyoga, i.e. apûrva, supersensuous result of an action which later on produces the sensible result, 153, 178.
 niranvaya, absolute, 505.
 nirupâksha, non-entity, 507.
 nirgara, decay, 517.
 nirvikalpaka, non-determinate, 41.
 Nishâda-sthapati, 318.
 nivâra, wild rice, 120.
 naimittika, contingent, 333.
 naishvâbika, a perpetual religious student observing the vow of chastity, 705-707.
- pañkaganâb, 'five-people,' 371-374.
 pañâgni-vidyâ, 652.
 pada, word, 40.
 padârtha, a thing, 518.
 para, highest, 313.
 paramâtman, highest Self, 259.
 paramesvara, highest Lord, 259.
 parinâma, modification, 402, 404, 517.
 paryâya, particular states of substances, 517 sq., 519.
 pânditya, learning, 710, 711, 712.
 pâriplava, a performance of the Asvamedha sacrifice, 697 sq.
 pârivrâgaka, an ascetic, 705, 711.
 pârivrâgya, the wandering about as a mendicant, 711.
 putika, a plant, 120.
 pudgala, body, 516.
 purusha, soul, 360, 526, 530.
 purushavaśas, to be designated by the term 'man,' 585.
 purusha-vidyâ, 643 sq.
 purushottama, the highest Person, 4.
 pûrvapaksha, primâ facie view, 8 and passim.
- pûrvapakshin, he who holds the primâ facie view, passim.
 prakaraṇa, leading subject-matter, 667, 688.
 prakâra, mode, 138, 227, 400, 458, 542, 758 sq.
 prakâr, to shine forth, 34.
 prakâsa, light, 320.
 prakrîti, primeval matter, originating principle, nature, 62, 78, 81, 88 sq., 125-127, 139, 140, 209, 240, 241, 254, 256, 262, 299, 359, 363-370, 378, 380, 386, 396-398, 405, 406, 424 sq., 480, 481, 483, 487, 489-494, 526, 553, 555 sq., 612, 752, 754, 769.
 prakriyâ, subject-matter, 680.
 pragâamâtrâb, subjects, 251.
 pranava, the syllable Om, 314, 362, 634-636, 684, 694.
 Pratardana-vidyâ (i.e. Kâu. Up. III), 250, 382.
 pratikûla, disagreeable, 152.
 pratigñâ, initial statement, 201.
 pratibuddha âtmâ, the Self of intelligence, 547.
 pratisaṅkhyâ, 504-506.
 pratika, symbol, 718 sq.
 pratyaksha, perception, presentative thought, 41, 699.
 pratyakshatâ, immediate presentation, 15.
 pratyag-âtman, the individual soul, 212.
 pratyaya, consciousness, 511.
 pratyâhâra, complete restraining of the senses from receiving external impressions, 89.
 prathiman, solid extension, 482.
 pradeśa, space, 293.
 pradyumna, the internal organ, 524-526.
 pradhâna, principal matter, non-sentient principle, 139, 153, 200-205, 207-209, 236 sq., 242, 256 sq., 281-283, 286, 298, 308-310, 354-407, 413 sq., 417, 424 sq., 428, 469, 475, 482-487, 489-492, 495, 522 sq., 530, 533, 554 sq.
 pradhâna, a superior, 610.
 prabhâ, light, 59, 513.
 prayogana, final cause, 136, 153 sq.
 pralaya, destruction of the world, 205, 318, 333 sq., 368, 376, 400, 406, 460, 486, 491, 543, 569, 572, 603, 737, 750.

prākṛitika, elemental, 333.
 prāṅṣa, knowing, conscious, intelligent, the personal Self, the highest Self, 384, 469, 547, 549, 766.
 prāṇa, breath, 212, 213, 250-254, 373; breathing out, 232, 467; soul, 379, 382-384, 616; Breath, a name of Brahman, 206, 301, 303 sq., 522, 633 sq., 636 sq., 640 sq., 679, 701, 753 sq.
 prāṇa, pl. organs and vital breath, 60, 206, 554 sq., 568-578, 585 sq., 730, 734-736.
 prāṇamaya, consisting of breath, 92, 211-213, 231 sq.
 prāṇāgnihoṭra, 295.
 prāṇesamātra, 293.
 prāpti, the being obtained, 182.
 prāyaskitta, expiatory rite, 706 sq.
 prerakatva, prompting quality, 152.
 phala, result, 176, 177.
 phalavidhi, injunction of results, 274.
 bādha, sublation, 102.
 bādhitā, sublated, 32, 33.
 bālyā, childlike state, 711 sq.
 buddhi, internal organ, intellect, 210, 213, 267 sq., 356 sq., 403, 555, 570 sq.
 brimh, root from which 'Brahman' is derived, 158.
 brimhana, growth, 158.
 brīhat, great, 375.
 brīhattva, greatness, 158 sq., 259.
 brahmatārya, chastity, 695.
 brahmagigṇāsā, enquiry into Brahman, 4.
 brahmatva, Brahma-hood, 620.
 brahman, 4; from brīhat, 375.
 brahma-bhāvanā, 100.
 brahmadevīyā, knowledge of Brahman, 275.
 brahmasamsthā, founded on Brahman, 695.
 bhakti, devotion, devout meditation, 16, 284, 286, 363.
 bhagavat, the Lord, then a holy person, 4; a name of Vāsudeva, 87.
 bhagāsana, 520.
 bhākta, secondary or figurative, 540.
 bhāva, entity, 107.
 bhinna, separate, 444.
 bhinnatva, difference, 518.
 bhūta, beings, 279.

bhūta, element, 500.
 bhūtamātrāb, objects, 251.
 bhūtādi, originator of the elements, 481.
 bhūman, 'muchness,' fulness of bliss, 299-308, 678 sq.
 bhūma-vidyā (= Kb. Up. VII, 2), 527.
 bheda, difference, 31, 46, 193.
 bhedābheda, view that there is difference and absence of difference at the same time, 42 sq., 134 sq., 189-193, 195, 518.
 bhautika, elemental, 500.
 bhrama, erroneous cognition, error, 102, 560.
 bhrānti, illusion, 515.
 madhu, 'honey,' the sun, 335.
 madhuvidyā, 335-337, 369.
 manana, reflection, 10, 305, 709 sq.
 manas, internal organ, mind, 162, 169, 188, 210, 356 sq., 481, 497, 570-572, 577.
 mantavya, to be reflected on, 415.
 mantra, 233-236, 327-330, 562.
 -maya, consisting of, made of, 92, 213, 230-232.
 Mahat, the Great Principle (of the Sāṅkhya), 282, 287, 334, 357, 359, 371, 480 sq., 483 sq., 535-538, 731.
 mahāvratā-brāhmaṇa, 644.
 mātṛā, mora (metrical unit), 311 sq.
 mānasa, mental (offering of a Soma cup), 668 sq.
 mâyā, 125, 126, 138 sq., 241 (knowledge), 441 sq., 602.
 māyin, possessing mâyā, 125 sq.
 mithyā, false, 125, 129.
 mithyātva, falsehood, 22.
 mukta, released, 516.
 mukhya prāṇa, chief vital air, 572.
 mudrā, a badge, 520 sq.
 muni, 709-711.
 mūrta, defined, 89; solid, 165.
 mauna, Muni-hood, state of a Muni, 708-712.
 yathākratub, according as his thought is, 753.
 yushmad-artha, the objective element, 57.
 yoga, mystic concentration of mind, 89, 162, 273, 284, 412, 413.
 yogayug, practitioner of Yoga, 89.
 yogasiddha, perfected by Yoga, 516.

- yogyatâ, compatibility, 414.
yonî, female organ of generation, 600.
- ragas, passion, 11, 413, 481, 483-485.
rahasya-brâhmana, 644.
râga, passion, 598.
ruṭaka = nishka, 434 note.
rûpa, form, character, 88, 630.
- lakshana, implied meaning, implication, 29, 79, 130, 218, 381, 462.
lînga, inferential mark, 19, 51, 165, 645, 667, 671, 682.
- vastu, substance, 226.
vâkya, syntactical connexion, 645, 667, 670.
vâkyabheda, split of a sentence, 222 note.
vâyû, wind, 533, 745-747.
vâsanâ, a flow of ideas, states of consciousness, 511, 513.
vikâra, effected thing, effect, 364, 455.
vikrîti, being modified, 182.
vigñâna, understanding, knowledge, idea, 210, 213, 214, 226, 236, 279, 500, 502, 760.
vigñânâmaya, consisting of understanding, 213, 230, 236, 384 (the soul in deep sleep).
vid, to know or to meditate, 630, 633, 716.
vidyâ, form of meditation on Brahman, 99, 274 sq., 629-636, 647, 651 sq., 655, 657-661, 666, 680, 692, 745.
viniyoga, application, 19.
vipasṭit, intelligent, 234.
vipasṭitva, intelligence, 234.
vibhava, manifestation, 525.
vibhûti, manifestation of power, 88, 306.
vimoka, freeness of mind, 17.
vivrit, to manifest itself, 38, 445.
viveka, abstention, 17.
vîshana, determining attribute, 135, 563.
vishaya, object, 177.
vîrya, strength, 517.
vritta, conduct, 591.
vedana, knowledge, 15, 716.
vedanâ, sensation, 502.
veda-vrata, 631.
vaikârika, modified, 481, 571.
vaikhâna, hermit, 695, 705.
vairavarûpya, many-natured universe, 483.
- vairânara-vidyâ, 290.
vyavahâra, speech, 161.
vyashî, discrete aspect (of the world), 578.
vyâna, 575.
vyâvahârika, conventional, 450.
vyâvrittî, individual difference, 33.
vyûha, division, 525.
- śakti, power, potentiality, 88 sq., 459, 461 sq., 564.
śabda, sound, 40, 77.
śama, 19.
śarîra, body, 88.
śâkhâ, 629 sq., 635, 647, 675-677.
Śāṇḍilya-vidyâ, 641 sq.
śârîra, joined to a body, 209, 229.
śârîra (doctrine) of the embodied (self), 230.
śâstra, science, scriptural injunction, 525, 554.
śirovrata, vow of (carrying fire on the) head, 631.
śîla, conduct, 591.
śubhâsraya, perfect object, 89.
śûdra (etymology), 339.
śesha, supplementary, 153; exclusive subservient relation, 421.
śeshin, principal matter to be subserved by other things, 153.
śraddhâ, faith, belief, 585, 587, 596; water, 587 sq.
śravaṇa, hearing, 10.
śruti, scriptural statement, 19, 645, 688.
- samyamana, 593.
samyoga, conjunction, 513.
samvara, a kind of deep meditation, 517.
samvargavidyâ (i.e. Kb. Up. IV, 3, 8), 248, 338 sq., 341 sq.
samvid, consciousness, 56.
samsâra, 71, 90, 121, 181, 297 sq., 311, 355, 395, 551, 554, 561, 602, 662, 713, 732, 755 sq., 758, 768, 770 sq.
samskâra, impression, 6, 502 sq.
samskriti, the being made ready, 182.
samkarshana, the individual soul, 524-526.
samkhyâ, number, 680.
samgñâ, consciousness, 551.
sat, Being, 125, 203-206, 226, 405, 462.
satkārya, 456.

- sattā, Being, 32.
 sattra class of sacrifices, 764.
 sattva, goodness, 11, 171 sq., 481, 483-485; existence, 508.
 satya, true, 129, 323, 455.
 satyakāma, realising its desire, 663.
 satyakāmatva, power of realising one's desire, 661, 664.
 sad-vidyā, meditation on that which truly is (*Kb. Up. VI, 1 ff.*), 658.
 sannidhi, proximity, 414.
 sapta-bhaṅgī-nyāya, the system of the seven paralogisms, 517.
 samanantara, 504.
 samanvaya, connexion, 174.
 samavāya, intimate relation, reciprocal inherence, 163, 219, 498 sq.
 samavāyi-kāraṇa, intimate cause, 464.
 samashrī, collective aspect (of the world), 578.
 samashrī-purusha, the aggregate soul, 624.
 samātāra, a book of the *Ātharvavikas*, 631.
 samādhi, meditation, 517, 556.
 samāna, 575.
 sampatti, union, 765.
 sampad, to be combined, 728, 765.
 sampāta, yāvat sampātā, 589 sq.
 samprasāda, serenity, 302, 320.
 sambhūta, 533.
 sayuktvaṇ, 340.
 sarvagña, all-knowing, 462.
 savikalpaka, determinate, 41.
 sahakārin, 504.
 sākshāt, manifest, 69, 656.
 sākshātkāra, immediate presentation, 16.
 sākshin, the witnessing principle, 66, 69.
 sādhyā, effected, 182.
 sāmānādhikarāya, co-ordination, 79, 130, 223.
 sāyugya, equality, 99.
 siddhi, proof, definite well-established knowledge, 56, 449.
 sūtarita, good conduct, 591.
 sushira, a hollow place, 661.
 sūkshma, the Subtle, 525.
 setu, bank or bridge, 296 sq., 621 sq.
 somarāgan, 588.
 sparśa, touch, 502.
 smṛti, representation, 716.
 svayamprakāśa, self-proved, 33.
 svayamprakāśatva, self-luminousness, 47.
 svayamprakāśatā, 449.
 svarga, heaven, 313.
 svastika, 434, 447.
 svādhyāya, one's own text, 5.
 svābhāvika, essential, 191.
 Hara, 139.
 hita, arteries so called, 379, 384, 604.
 hetu, reason, 202.

INDEX OF NAMES AND SUBJECTS.

- Abhipratârin Kaitraratha, 341 sq.
 Âdityas and Vasus, 335-337.
 Agâtasatru and Bâlâki, 378-380, 383.
 Agni, etymology of, 292.
 — world of, 746, 748.
 Agnihotra offering to Prâsa, 294 sq.
 Agnirahasya, a book of the Vâgasaneyaka, 641.
 Akshapâda, 425 sq.
 Altars of mind, speech, &c., 668-673.
 Ângiras and Saunaka, 284.
 Animal killed at sacrifice goes to heaven, 599.
 Aparântatamas, the teacher of the Vedas, 529.
 Âpastamba quoted, 187, 410.
 Âranyakas and Vedas, their teaching, 530 sq.
 Arhat (Gina), the teaching of the, 517, 520.
 Âmarathya, a teacher, 293, 391.
 Asuras, their weapons real, 125.
 Âsvapati Kaikeya, 677 sq., 688.
 Atharvan, eldest son of Brahmâ, 284.
 Atoms, theory of, refuted, 495-500.
 — Bauddha theory of, 501.
 — Gaina theory of, 516-520.
 Âtreya quoted, 707.
 Audulomi quoted, 392, 394, 708, 760 sq.
 Avântaratamas, 650 sq.
 Bâdarâyana quoted, 326, 336, 529, 626, 686, 689, 694, 752, 761, 763.
 Bâdari, opinion of, 293, 592, 748, 750, 763.
 Bâlâki and Agâtasatru, 378-380, 383.
 Bauddhas, their views of the origination of the world refuted, 500-516.
 — take shelter under a pretended Vedic theory, 513.
 Being, pure, alone is real, 32 sq.
 — and Consciousness, 33, 47.
 Bhâgavatas, theory of the, 524-531.
 Bhârata-sawhitâ, i. e. the Mahâbhârata, 528.
 Bhâshyakâra quoted, 17, 100.
 Bhâskara quoted, 459.
 Bhîshma had knowledge of Brahman, 704.
 — put off his death, 741 sq.
 Bodhâyana, his explanation of the Brahma-sûtras abridged, 3.
 Body, definitions of, 420-424.
 Brahman, masc. (Nom. Brahmâ), the god, 90, 236, 238, 284, 312 sq., 328, 330.
 Brahman, neut. the highest, revealed in the Upanishads, 3.
 — the abode of Lakshmi, 3.
 — enquiry into, 3-156.
 — is that from which the origin, &c., of this world proceed, 3, 156-161; creation and reabsorption of the world its sport, 405 sq.; is the only cause of the world, 354-407, 413-479; it creates, 471 sq., 532-540, 767; it modifies itself into the world, 402-406; it is the world, 88, 430-467; the world its body, 93-95, 419-424; B. and the world related as the snake and its coils, 618-621.
 — fruit of its knowledge, 5, 7, 9, 83.
 — only is real, 20 sq., 127.
 — is non-differenced intelligence, 23, 81, 84; not non-differenced intelligence, but highest Person, 207 sq.
 — devoid of qualities, 26 sq.; devoid of form, 610 sq.
 — oneness of, 39, 73, 80.
 — highest, is pure Being, 71.
 — the subject of Scripture, 74 sq., 161-200.
 — not taught by Scripture to be devoid of all difference, 78-86.
 — free from all imperfections, &c., 88, 124, 607-618.

- Brahman, release not due to knowledge of the unqualified, 129-138.
- souls and matter, 138-145.
 - etymology of, 158.
 - and soul, relation of, 209-237, 257-353, 467-471, 558-567; the soul's aim, 748-754.
 - not connected with Prakṛiti, nor with Karman, 240.
 - is the True, 302-305, 616.
 - the Imperishable is, 308-311.
 - is the 'object of seeing,' 311-314.
 - small ether in the heart is, 314-325.
 - Person of the size of a thumb, 325 sq., 347-349.
 - gods capable of knowledge of, 326-335.
 - used in a double sense, 533 sq.
 - is of the nature of slaves, fishermen, &c., 559 sq.
 - light the essential nature of, 611 sq.
 - is 'not so, not so,' 611 sq., 615-617, 618.
 - compared to reflected image of the sun, 613 sq.
 - light and bliss constitute its nature, 618.
 - is absolutely supreme, 621-625.
 - its omnipresence, 624 sq.
 - meditations on, 637-685, 718-720.
 - the Imperishable and bliss, 653 sq.
 - as the Self of the devotee, 716-718.
- Brahman-egg, 127, 334, 731.
- Brahman-world, 312 sq., 317 sq., 747, 751 sq.
- Brahmasūktā quoted, 191.
- Brahma-sūtras, their explanation by Bodhāyana, 3.
- Brahma-upaniṣad, 336, 525.
- Breath is Brahman, 246.
- created, 572 sq.
 - what it is, 573-575.
 - five forms of, 574 sq.
 - is minute, 575.
 - not an 'organ,' 577 sq.
 - water a dress for, 640 sq.
- Bṛihad-āraṇyaka, in the Kāṇva and Mādhyandina texts, 403, 422 sq., 544, 735.
- Bṛihaspati, Smṛiti-writer, 409, 412.
- Buddha, 425 sq., 500, 515.
- Castes, difference of, 564 sq.
- Cause and effect, 415-419, 430-434, 445 sq., 453-455, 459, 463-466, 471, 482 sq., 503 sq., 541.
- Chariot, simile of the, 355 sq., 370, 638 sq.
- Consciousness itself is 'Being,' 33; is not 'Being,' 47.
- is eternal and incapable of change, 35 sq.; not eternal, 50-52; capable of change, 54 sq.
 - and conscious subject are not different, 36-38.
 - its self-luminousness, 47-50.
 - not without object, 52-54.
 - the attribute of a permanent conscious self, 56 sqq.
- Creation, 119, 206, 332-334, 374-377, 399, 401, 405, 410, 460 sq., 465 sq., 471 sq., 474 sq., 532-540, 568-570, 572, 578-583.
- a mere sport of Brahman, 405 sq., 476 sq.
 - from Prakṛiti and soul, 490-492.
- Death is Nescience, 23.
- of him who knows Brahman, 728-743.
 - favourable times of, 740 sq.
 - soul in, 765 sq.
- Demons possessing men's bodies, driven out, 168.
- Devas, 238. See also Gods.
- Dhṛishadyumna, 595.
- Difference cannot be logically defined, 31-33.
- can be proved, 39-46.
- Dramida-bhāṣya quoted, 99, 428.
- Dramiḍātāya, 487.
- Draupadī, 595.
- Dreams, unreal, yet portending real things, 75.
- things seen in, are Māyā, 86.
 - the creation of the Lord, 120 sq., 601-604.
 - foreshadow good and evil fortune, 604.
- Dvaipāyana, 406.
- Earth from water, 536.
- Elements, tripartition of, 119 sq., 578-583, 586.
- breath and soul combined with the, 730 sq.
- Ether is Brahman, 242-246, 349-353.
- the small, in the heart,

- Ether not a mere non-entity, 506 sq.
 — created, 532-535.
 Expiatory rites, 706 sq.
 Eye, Person within the, 237-242, 272-278.
- Fata Morgana, 449.
 Fathers, path of the, 594, 742.
 Fire from air, 535 sq.
 — rite of carrying it on the head, 629, 631.
 Fires, knowledge of the five, 273-277, 753.
 'Five-people,' the five senses, 371-374.
 Food is earth, 536.
 — unlawful, when permitted, 701 sq.
- Gābāla taught by Gautama, 343.
 Gaimini, 5, 292, 294, 335, 382 sq., 626, 686 sq., 694, 705 sq., 750, 752, 759 sq., 763.
 Gainas, their theory of the origination of the world, refuted, 516-520.
 Ganaka offered sacrifices, 688.
 Gāna-ruti and Raikva, 338-342.
 Gandharvas, 238.
 — town of, 449.
 Gautama teaches Gābāla, 343.
 Gāyatrī metre, 248 sq.
 Gina, 425 sq., 531.
 God (Lord of all), denoted by 'Brahman,' 4.
 — is intelligence and everlastingly one, 23.
 — knowledge of, 116.
 — the highest Self designated as, 352.
 — and Pradhāna, 396 sq., 522 sq.
 — not partial, nor cruel, 477 sq.
 — Gainas hold that there is no, 516.
 Gods capable of knowledge of Brahman, 326-335.
 — possess bodies and sense-organs, 328-330.
 — have several bodies, 330 sq.
 — create each in his own world, 472.
 — path of the, 594, 651 sq., 742-744, 747, 749, 751, 753, 756.
 — the cause of rewards of sacrifices, 626 sq.
 Grammarians quoted, 60, 79.
- Hari, a form of Vishṇu, the Lord and Creator, 87, 93, 527.
 — all beings a play of, 406.
 Heavenly world non-permanent, 177.
 Hells, seven, 593.
 Hiranyagarbha, a form of Vishṇu, 93.
 — created and creator, 334.
 — proclaims the Yoga-smṛiti, 413, 529.
 — and Brahman, 578-583, 748-750.
 — world of, 768.
- 'I,' unreality of the, 36-38.
 — in sleep, 53, 67-69.
 — and the Self, 57 sq., 61.
 — persists in the state of release, 69-72.
 Immortal, the, i.e. Brahman, 18.
 Immortality, Brahman the only cause of, 296 sq., 690.
 — according to Sāṅkhya system, 386.
 — means of, 387.
 — of him who knows, 731 sq.
 Indra, a divine being, 238.
 — is Prāṇa and Brahman, 250-254.
 — a term referring to the highest Reality, 522.
 — world of, 747 sq.
 Intelligence only is true, 23.
 Itihāsa and Purāṇa, 91, 126, 338 sq., 751.
- Kahola and Yāgñavalkya, 657.
 Kaitraratha, 341 sq.
 Kālmukhas, a class of adherents of Paṇupati, 520 sq.
 Kaṇāda, 425 sq., 430, 454, 500, 520, 544.
 Kāpālas, a class of adherents of Paṇupati, 520.
 Kāpeya, 342.
 Kapila, 201, 354 sq., 357, 363, 365, 371, 374, 385, 425, 480, 482, 500, 520, 524, 529, 544.
 — Smṛiti of, 408, 410-412.
 — the great Rishi, referred to in Scripture &c., 409.
 Kārshnāgini quoted, 591 sq.
 Kārvāka view, 196.
 Kārakṛtsna, a teacher, 392, 394 sq.
 Katurmukha, 90.
 Kaushitaki-brāhmaṇa, 250.
 Kavasha, Rishis descended from, 690.
 Knowledge and works, 9-11, 18 sq.,

- 686-696, 698-700, 703, 712 sq., 724-727.
 Knowledge is meditation, 15.
 — all, is of the Real, 119-124.
 — defined, 699.
 — auxiliaries to, 708-712.
 — sins destroyed by, 722-724.
Krishna, 525.
- Lakshmi, the highest Brahman the abode of, 3.
 Light is Brahman, 247-249.
 Lightning, on the soul's road, 747 sq.
 Lord. See God.
- Mādhyaṃika doctrine of a general void, 106, 514.
 Magician produces illusive states of consciousness, 75.
 Mahābhārata quoted, 241, 400, 410, 528.
 — philosophical systems in the, 529 sq.
 Maitreya questions Parāśara, 92.
 Maitreya and Yāgyavalkya, 387, 395 sq.
 Maitreya-brāhmaṇa of the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka*, 385 sq., 388, 395 sq.
 Manu, 410-412, 414.
 Māyā, diversity in Brahman through, 22.
 — things seen in dreams are, 86.
 — Lord of, 397, 406.
 Meditation on Brahman, 13-15, 17, 82 sq., 637-685.
 — threefoldness of, 253.
 — different forms of, 629-636.
 — must be repeated, 715 sq.
 — to be carried on sitting, 720 sq.
 — to be carried on up to death, 721 sq.
 Mīmāṃsā, the earlier and the latter part of, the, 5.
 — what it aims at, 6 sq.
 — an antecedent to enquiry into Brahman, 19.
 — opposed to the Vedāntin view, 148-153.
 Mirror does not manifest the face, 67.
 Moon, double, 123.
 — soul's passage to the, 741 sq.
Mundaka-upanishad explained, 282-287.
- Nāṭiketa rite, 269.
- Nāṭiketas, story of, 269-271, 361 sq.
 Nārāyaṇa, the one God, 227, 229, 239 sq., 242, 256, 280, 359, 461, 469, 472, 522.
 — the highest Self or Brahman, 279, 282, 335, 521, 530 sq., 667.
 — creator, 410, 521 sq., 767.
 — promulgator of *Pañkarātra*, 529-531.
 — pervades the whole world, 625.
 Nescience put an end to by knowledge of Brahman, 9 sq., 23 sq., 66, 145-147.
 — appearance of plurality due to it, 9, 22 sq.
 — is wrong imagination of difference, 25.
 — does not originate, 54.
 — final release opposed to, 71.
 — its essential nature, 72.
 — or *Karman*, 88, 101.
 — theory of, cannot be proved, 102-119.
 — the root of all error, 161.
 — all effects based on, 429, 432.
 Nirvāṇa, *Kāpāla* theory of, 520.
 Nothingness, Buddhist theory of, refuted, 514-516.
- Om, the sacred syllable, 362.
 Optical delusions, 121 sq., 123.
 Organs and vital breath, their origination, 568-570.
 — their number, 570-572.
 — their minuteness, 572 sq.
 — ruled by the soul and the divinities, 575-577.
 — vital breath not one of the, 577 sq.
- Pāṇini, 69.
Pañkarātra doctrine, 529-531.
Pañkarātra-sāstra, the work of Vāsudeva himself, 528.
Pañkarātra-tantra is authoritative, 524-531.
Parama-saṃhitā quoted, 526, 527.
 Parāśara quoted, 72, 90, 284, 406, 410, 474, 478, 564, 593.
 — questioned by Maitreya, 92.
 Pāsupata doctrine, 529; not to be rejected absolutely, 531.
 Pāsupatas, adherents of *Paśupati*, 520, 523.
Paśupati, doctrine of, 520-523, 529.
Patañjali, 425.
Paushkara-saṃhitā quoted, 525.

- Perception versus Scripture, 24-26, 30 sq., 73-78.
 — non-determinate and determinate, 41.
 — does not reveal mere Being, 44-46.
 Person, highest, release and rewards of works from the, 625-628.
 Pleasure and pain, 152-155.
 Plurality not unreal, 46 sq.
 Pradhāna. See Sanskrit Index, p. 785.
 Pragāpati, a being of great merit, 237.
 — the Creator, 332 sq.
 — the highest Reality, 522.
 — teaching of, 673, 675, 757, 760.
 — world of, 747 sq.
 Prahlāda, saying of, 253.
 Prakṛiti. See Sanskrit Index, p. 785.
 Prāṇa, offering to, 294 sq. See Sanskrit Index, p. 786.
 Pratardana and Indra, 250-254.
 Pravāhana, 585.
 Pravargya ceremony, 644 sq.
 Pulastya, teacher of Parāśara, 92.
 Purāṇa. See Itihāsa.
 — does not teach a Brahman devoid of all difference, 86-102.
 Putika plant, 120.
 Raikva and Gāṇarūti, 338-342.
 — possessed knowledge of Brahman, 704.
 Rākshasas, their weapons real, 125.
 Rāma, 525.
 Rāmānuga, p. ix sq., 771.
 Rāṇāyanīyas, Khilas of the, 643.
 Raurava, name of a hell, 593.
 Release, desire of, 4.
 — how to be obtained, 9, 58, 83, 129-138, 181, 625-628.
 — state of, 69-72, 551, 755-771.
 — in this life impossible, 186.
 — what it is, 203 sq., 270 sq., 392.
 — according to Buddha, 514.
 — Gaiṇa theory of, 517.
 — its time not fixed, 713 sq.
 Rishis make or see the hymns, 332 sq.
 — are the prāṇas, 568 sq.
 Sacrifice, the aśvamedha, 697 sq.
 — meditations on elements of the, 707 sq.
 — twelve days', 763 sq.
 Sacrifices, five great, 17.
 — please the highest Person, 155.
 — gods come to the, 330 sq.
 Sacrifices, imply injury to living beings, 598 sq.
 — are means to propitiate deities, 626.
 Saivas, a class of adherents of Paśupati, 520 sq., 523.
 Sākhās, the same doctrine conveyed by all, 80.
 Samhitopanishad of the Ātharvānas, 191.
 Samsāra. See Sanskrit Index, p. 787.
 Samvarta, 704.
 Sanaka, 90.
 Sanatsugāta quoted, 23.
 Sāṇḍilya, 526 sq.
 Saṅkara and Rāmānuga, p. ix sq.
 Saṅkara, a form of Viṣṇu, 93.
 Saṅkarshana, Mādhava proclaimed by, 528 sq.
 Sāṅkarshana quoted, 666.
 Sāṅkhyā system refuted, 282, 354-407, 424-427, 480-495.
 — twenty-five categories of, 371-374.
 — the atheistic and the theistic, 396.
 — the Smṛiti of Kapila, 408.
 — outline of, 480-482.
 — in Mahābhārata, 529-531.
 — not to be rejected absolutely, 531.
 Sāṅkhyā-Smṛiti, 409, 414.
 Sāṅkhyā-Mīmāṃsā, its aim, 7, 8 sq.
 Sāṅkhyā-jātra, its relation to other philosophical systems, 531.
 Śāstra constituted by the words of the Veda, 487.
 Sātvata doctrine, 529.
 Sātvata-samhitā quoted, 525.
 Sātyāyanins quoted, 726.
 Saubhari, a being of special powers, 331, 447.
 Saunaka quoted, 101, 758.
 — and Āṅgiras, 284.
 — Kāpeya, 342.
 Sautrāntikas, a school of Bauddhas, 510.
 Scripture of greater force than perception, 24-26, 30.
 — not stronger than perception, 73-78.
 — texts, how to be reconciled, 138-145.
 — the source of knowledge of Brahman, 161-200.
 — and Smṛiti, 408-412.
 — alone authoritative, 426, 473 sq.
 — of tender regard to man's welfare, 662.

- Self, its unity with Brahman, 23,
100 sq.
— and I, how related, 37 sq., 57 sq.,
61, 72.
— and Nescience one, 54.
— the abode of knowledge, 63.
— is eternal, 63.
— defined, 72.
— consisting of bliss is the highest
Self, 209-237.
— See also Soul.
Siddhas, 238.
Sins destroyed by knowledge, 722-
724.
Siva, a term referring to the highest
Reality, 522.
Sky-flower, 50, 55, 77, 532.
Sleep, soul in deep, 37 sq., 40, 52
sq., 67-69, 205 sq., 352, 379, 383
sq., 550 sq., 604-606, 765 sq.
Smṛiti does not teach a Brahman
devoid of all difference, 86-102.
— and Scripture, 119, 408-412.
— of Kapila, 408.
Snake and its coils, 618-621.
Snake-rope, 66, 73, 75, 148 sq., 433.
Soma, substitute for, 120.
Soul, its relation to Brahman, 88, 98,
133 sq., 138-145, 191, 209-237,
257-353, 391 sq., 394, 467-471,
556-567.
— released, its state, 100 sq., 755-
771.
— enters a body other than its own,
420.
— is not produced, 478 sq., 540-
544.
— its size, 520, 546-548, 551, 764.
— is a knower, 544-553.
— abides in the heart, 548 sq., 765.
— is an agent, 553-556.
— its imperfections are not Brah-
man's, 563 sq.
— enveloped by the subtle rudi-
ments of the elements, 584-589.
— followed by the prāṇas, 586.
— its journey to the world of the
fathers, 589-592; of evil-doer does
not ascend to the moon, 592-596;
its descent from the moon, 596-
600.
— in state of dream, 601-604.
— in state of swoon, 606 sq.,
— its journey to the world of
Brahman, 648-651, 728-745.
— in deep sleep. See Sleep.
Souls of gods, Asuras, &c., men,
beasts, trees, &c., 198.
Space. See Ether.
Śruti, 119 sq. See Scripture.
Stage curtain, 224.
Stages of life (āśramas), the three,
693-696, 698-700, 702-712.
Stories, their purpose in Vedānta-
texts, 697 sq.
Sūtras excluded from knowledge of
Brahman, 337-347.
Sugata, i.e. Buddha, 520, 544.
— his doctrine of Nothingness, 514.
— his teaching to be rejected, 531.
Sun, Person within the, 237-242.
— as honey, 368 sq.
— at night, 739 sq.
— knowers of Brahman go to the,
739-741.
Svetaketu, 583, 585.
Swoon, soul in state of, 606 sq.
Thou art that, 129-138, 759.
Uddālaka and Yāgyavalkya, 280.
Udgitha. See Sanskrit Index, p. 783.
Unevolved, the, 354 sq., 357, 358.
Upakōśa taught by the Fires, 273-
275, 276 sq.
Upanishad, Pañcārātra a great, 528.
Upanishads, doctrine of all, 135.
— the way of him who has heard
the, 277.
— mantras and sacrificial injunc-
tions in the, 644 sq.
— See also Scripture.
Ushasta and Yāgyavalkya, 656-658,
701.
Vāgasaneyins quoted, 263.
— of the Kāṇva and Mādhyandina
branch, 278 sq., 281.
Vaibhāshikas, a school of Buddhās,
510.
Vaiśeshikas refuted, 430-467, 495-
500, 517, 552.
Vaiśvānara is the highest Self, 287-
295.
— meditations on, 677-679.
Vākyakāra, 15-18, 24, 99, 138, 317.
Vāmadeva, Rishi, 71, 252 sq., 618.
Varuṇa, world of, 747 sq.
Vasishṭha, 332, 650 sq.
— teacher of Parāśara, 92.
Vāsudeva, the highest Brahman, 23,
87, 127.

- Vāsudeva, the world the body of, 129.
 — the highest cause, 524 sq., 527, 529.
 — See also Vishnu.
 Vasus and Ādityas, 335-337.
 Veda, its study enjoined, 5 sq.
 — supplemented by Itihāsa and Purāṇa, 91.
 — creation by means of the, 331 sq.
 — is eternal, 332 sq.
 — systems contrary to the, to be rejected, 523.
 Vedānta and Sāṅkhya, 409.
 Vedāntin view different from Mīmāṃsā theory, 148-156.
 Vedārtha-saṃgraha, 78, 138.
 Vedas taught to Hiraṇyagarbha, 334.
 — Aparāntatamas their teacher, 529.
 — and Āraṇyakas, 530 sq.
 Vidura, a Sūdra, 338 sq.
 Virajā river in the world of Brahman, 648.
 Vishnu, the highest abode, 87 sq., 313, 355, 358, 608.
 — the highest Brahman, 89, 93, 266, 359.
 — the stars are, 126 sq.
 — creator, 410, 461.
 — See also Vāsudeva, and Hari.
 Vṛttikāra quoted, 206, 261, 302, 337.
 Vyāsa, 3, 709.
 Water from fire, 536.
 Widowers do not belong to an Ārama, 705.
 Words denote something to be done, 148 sq.
 — and meanings, 150 sq.
 Works (karman), their fruit limited, 4, 5, 7.
 — and knowledge, relation of, 9-11, 18 sq., 686-696, 698-700, 703, 712 sq., 724-727.
 — to precede enquiry into Brahman, 147.
 — have a permanent result, 149 sq.
 — inequality and suffering due to, 478 sq.
 — souls return with a remainder of, 589-592.
 — rewards of, 625-628.
 — good and evil, shaken off by him who knows, 646-651.
 — good, perish on death of Devotee, 724.
 World and Brahman, 89, 413 sq., 417, 430-467, 618-621.
 — its creation, subsistence and re-absorption, from Brahman, 156-161, 266 sq., 333-335, 477.
 Yādavaprakāśa, 459.
 Yāgyavalkya, 280, 387, 395, 655 sq.
 Yama and Nāṭiketas, 270 sq.
 — evil-doers under the power of, 593.
 Yoga, practitioner of, 89.
 — system refuted, 412 sq.
 — in Mahābhārata, 529-531.
 — not to be rejected absolutely, 531.
 — power of, 742.
 Yogācāras, a school of Buddhists, 510-513.
 Yoga-smṛiti, 412 sq.
 Yogins, knowledge of, 51, 116.

CORRIGENDA.

Page 10, line 9		read	IV, 4, 22	for	XI, 4, 22
" 15,	" 7 from below	"	I, 2, 23	"	II, 23
" 18,	" 5 " "	"	Kau. Up.	"	Ka. Up.
" 23,	" 16 " "	"	VII, 26, 2	"	VI, 27
" 60,	" 5	"	IV, 5, 13	"	IV, 6, 12
"	" 16	"	VII, 26, 2	"	VIII, 26, 2
" 124,	" 2 from below	"	I, 3, 1	"	III, 1
" 143,	" 16	"	Mu. Up.	"	Ma. Up.
"	" 18	"	VI, 8	"	VI, 11, 8
" 151,	" 17	"	IV, 4, 21	"	XI, 4, 21
" 183,	" 13 from below	"	Ke. Up. I, 3	"	Ke. Up. III
"	" 10 " "	"	I, 4	"	IV, 4
" 188,	" 4 " "	"	Ke. Up. I, 4	"	Ke. Up. IV
" 206,	" 6	"	Kau. Up.	"	Ka. Up.
" 240,	" 10 from below	"	Taitt. Up. III, 1	"	Taitt. Up.
" 258,	" 15 " "	"	Kau. Up.	"	Ka. Up.
" 262,	" 16 " "	"	I, 3, 15	"	III, 15
" 268,	" 17	"	II, 4, 7	"	I, 4, 7
" 269,	" 8	"	I, 3, 2	"	I, 2, 3
" 292,	" 10	"	III, 15	"	I, 15
" 326,	" 3	"	V, 7; 8	"	V, 11, 7; 8
" 334,	" 5 from below	"	I, 5; 8-9	"	I, 1, 5; 8-9
" 360,	" 12	"	I, 3, 15	"	II, 3, 15
" 364,	" 3 from below	"	Sechzig Upanishad's	for	Seventy Upanishads
" 366,	" 10	"	kam	for	kam
"	" 5 from below	"	IV, 4, 16	"	X, 4, 16
" 372,	" 9 " "	"	Pāṇ. II, 1, 50	"	II, 1, 50
" 375,	" 16	"	āpnoti	"	apnoti
" 385,	" 6	"	adhikāraṇa	"	adhikāraṇa
" 522,	" 9	"	IV, 4, 22	"	XI, 4, 22
"	" 22	"	īśāna	"	īśāna
" 524,	" 14	"	I, 2, 18	"	II, 18
" 543,	" 13	"	IV, 4, 25	"	XI, 4, 25
" 553,	" 20	"	I, 2, 19	"	II, 18
" 565,	" 3 from below	"	ābhāsāt	"	ābhāsāt
" 576,	" 10 " "	"	III, 8, 9	"	II, 8, 9
" 595,	" 21	"	Dhrishadyumna	for	Driśhā°
" 601,	" 3 from below	"	Ka. Up. I, 1, 25; 23		

TRANSLITERATION OF ORIENTAL ALPHABETS ADOPTED FOR THE TRANSLATIONS
OF THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST.

CONSONANTS	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pehlvi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.	
	I Class. II Class. III Class.										
	I Class.	II Class.	III Class.								
Gutturales.											
1 Tenuis	k	.	.	क	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	k	
2 " aspirata	kh	.	.	ख	𐬖	𐬖	𐬖	𐬖	𐬖	kh	
3 Media	g	.	.	ग	𐬗	𐬗	𐬗	𐬗	𐬗	.	
4 " aspirata	gh	.	.	घ	𐬘	𐬘	𐬘	𐬘	𐬘	.	
5 Gutturo-labialis	q	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
6 Nasalis	h (ng)	.	.	ङ	{ 3 (ng) 𐬙 (N) 𐬛 (khr)	.	.	.	.	.	
7 Spiritus asper	h	.	.	ह	.	.	.	.	.	h, hs	
8 " lenis	,	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
9 " asper faucalis	'h	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
10 " lenis faucalis	'h	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
11 " asper fricatus	.	'h	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
12 " lenis fricatus	.	'h	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Gutturales modificatae (palatales, &c.)											
13 Tenuis	.	k	.	च	𐬑	𐬑	𐬑	𐬑	𐬑	k	
14 " aspirata	.	kh	.	छ	.	.	.	.	.	kh	
15 Media	.	g	.	ज	.	.	.	.	.	.	
16 " aspirata	.	gh	.	झ	.	.	.	.	.	.	
17 " Nasalis	.	ñ	.	ञ	.	.	.	.	.	.	

CONSONANTS (continued).	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zand.	Pahlavi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	I Chm.	II Chm.	III Chm.							
18 Semivocals	y	...	...	य	𐬶 ^{init.} 𐬶𐬶𐬶	𐬶	𐬶	𐬶	י	𐬶
19 Spiritus asper	...	(y)	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
20 " lenis	...	(y)	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
21 " asper asibilatus	...	s	...	𐬶	𐬶𐬶	𐬶𐬶	𐬶𐬶	𐬶𐬶	...	...
22 " lenis asibilatus	...	s	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Dentales.										
23 Tenuis	t	...	...	𐬵	𐬵𐬶	𐬵	𐬵	𐬵	ת	𐬵
24 " aspirata	th	...	...	𐬵	𐬵𐬶	𐬵	𐬵	𐬵	ת	𐬵
25 " asibilata	...	...	TH	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
26 Media	d	...	...	𐬵	𐬵𐬶	𐬵	𐬵	𐬵	...	...
27 " aspirata	dh	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
28 " asibilata	...	...	DH	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
29 Nasalis	n	...	...	𐬵	𐬵𐬶	𐬵	𐬵	𐬵	...	...
30 Semivocalis	l	...	...	𐬵	𐬵𐬶	𐬵	𐬵	𐬵	...	...
31 " mollis 1	...	l	...	𐬵	𐬵𐬶	𐬵	𐬵	𐬵	...	...
32 " mollis 2	...	...	L	𐬵	𐬵𐬶	𐬵	𐬵	𐬵	...	...
33 Spiritus asper 1	s	...	...	𐬵	𐬵𐬶	𐬵	𐬵	𐬵	...	...
34 " asper 2	...	...	s (S)	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
35 " lenis	z	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
36 " asperimus 1	...	...	z (z)	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
37 " asperimus 2	...	...	z (z)	...	...	...	...	...	...	...

Dentales modificatae (linguales, &c.)		f	th	d	dh	n	r	r	sh	zh	p	ph	b	bh	m	w	hw	f	v	m	h
38	Tenuis	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
39	" aspirata	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
40	Media	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
41	" aspirata	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
42	Nasalis	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
43	Semivocalis	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
44	" fricata	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
45	" diacritica	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
46	Spiritus asper	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
47	" lenis	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Labiales.																					
48	Tenuis	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
49	" aspirata	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
50	Media	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
51	" aspirata	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
52	Tenuisima	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
53	Nasalis	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
54	Semivocalis	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
55	" aspirata	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
56	Spiritus asper	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
57	" lenis	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
58	Anusvāra	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
59	Visarga	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...

VOWELS.	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pehlvi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	II Class.		III Class.							
	I Class.									
1 Neutralis	0			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
2 Laryngo-palatalis	ē			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
3 " labialis	ō			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
4 Gutturalis brevis	a			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
5 " longa	ā	(a)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
6 Palatalis brevis	i			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
7 " longa	ī	(i)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
8 Dentalis brevis	u			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
9 " longa	ū			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
10 Lingualis brevis	ri			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
11 " longa	ṛ			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
12 Labialis brevis	u			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
13 " longa	ū	(u)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
14 Gutturo-palatalis brevis	e			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
15 " longa	ē (ai)	(e)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
16 Diphthongus gutturo-palatalis	āi	(ai)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
17 " "	ei (ēi)			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
18 " "	oi (ōu)			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
19 Gutturo-labialis brevis	o			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
20 " longa	ō (au)	(o)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
21 Diphthongus gutturo-labialis	āu	(au)		...	...	...	...	...	...	...
22 " "	eu (ēu)			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
23 " "	ou (ōu)			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
24 Gutturalis fracta	ä			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
25 Palatalis fracta	ī			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
26 Labialis fracta	ü			...	...	...	...	...	...	...
27 Gutturo-labialis fracta	ö			...	...	...	...	...	...	...

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TRANSLATED BY VARIOUS ORIENTAL SCHOLARS

AND EDITED BY

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
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CONTENTS OF THE TWO PARTS.

BUDDHIST MAHÂVÂNA TEXTS.

PART I.

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	ix
THE BUDDHA-KARITA OF ASVAGHOSHA: BOOKS I-XVII	I
INDEX OF PROPER NAMES	203
NOTES AND CORRECTIONS	207

Translated by E. B. COWELL.

PART II.

INTRODUCTION	v
1. THE LARGER SUKHÂVATÎ-VYÔHA	I
INDEX OF WORDS	77
INDEX OF SUBJECTS	85
2. THE SMALLER SUKHÂVATÎ-VYÔHA	87
INDEX OF NAMES AND SUBJECTS	105
INDEX OF SANSKRIT WORDS	107
3. THE VAGRAKKHEDIKÂ	109
4. THE LARGER PRAGÑÂ-PÂRAMITÂ-HR/DAYA-SÛTRA	145
5. THE SMALLER PRAGÑÂ-PÂRAMITÂ-HR/DAYA-SÛTRA	151
INDEX OF NAMES AND SUBJECTS	155
INDEX OF SANSKRIT WORDS	157

Translated by F. MAX MÜLLER.

6. THE AMITÂYUR-DHYÂNA-SÛTRA	159
INDEX OF NAMES AND SUBJECTS	203

Translated by J. TAKAKUSU.

Transliteration of Oriental Alphabets adopted for the	
Translations of the Sacred Books of the East	205

BUDDHIST MAHÂYÂNA TEXTS

PART I

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OF

ASVAGHOSHA

TRANSLATED FROM THE SANSKRIT

BY

E. B. COWELL

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INTRODUCTION.

THE Sanskrit text of the *Buddha-karita* was published at the beginning of last year in the 'Anecdota Oxoniensia,' and the following English translation is now included in the series of 'Sacred Books of the East.' It is an early Sanskrit poem written in India on the legendary history of Buddha, and therefore contains much that is of interest for the history of Buddhism, beside its special importance as illustrating the early history of classical Sanskrit literature.

It is ascribed to Arsvaghosha; and, although there were several writers who bore that name, it seems most probable that our author was the contemporary and spiritual adviser of Kanishka in the first century of our era. Hiouen Thsang, who left India in A.D. 645, mentions him with Deva, Nāgārguna, and Kumāralabdha, 'as the four suns which illumine the world¹;' but our fullest account is given by I-tsing, who visited India in 673. He states that Arsvaghosha was an ancient author who composed the *Alamkāra-sāstra* and the *Buddha-karita-kāvya*,—the latter work being of course the present poem. Beside these two works he also composed the hymns in honour of Buddha and the three holy beings Amitābha, Avalokiteśvara, and Mahāsthāma, which were chanted at the evening service of the monasteries. 'In the five countries of India and in the countries of the Southern ocean they recite these poems, because they express a store of ideas and meaning in a few words².' A solitary stanza (VIII, 13) is

¹ Julien's Translation, vol. ii, p. 214.

² See M. Fujishama, *Journal Asiatique*, 1888, p. 425.

quoted from the *Buddha-karita* in Rāyamukuta's commentary on the *Amarakosha* I, 1. 1, 2, and also by Uggvaladatta in his commentary on the *Unādi-sūtras* I, 156; and five stanzas are quoted as from *Asvaghosha* in Vallabha-deva's *Subhāshitāvali*, which bear a great resemblance to his style, though they are not found in the extant portion of this poem¹.

The *Buddha-karita* was translated into Chinese² by Dharmaraksha in the fifth century, and a translation of this was published by the Rev. S. Beal in the present series; it was also translated into Tibetan in the seventh or eighth century. The Tibetan as well as the Chinese version consists of twenty-eight chapters, and carries down the life of Buddha to his entrance into Nirvāṇa and the subsequent division of the sacred relics. The Tibetan version appears to be much closer to the original Sanskrit than the Chinese; in fact from its verbal accuracy we can often reproduce the exact words of the original, since certain Sanskrit words are always represented by the same Tibetan equivalents, as for instance the prepositions prefixed to verbal roots. I may here express an earnest hope that we may still ere long have an edition and translation of the Tibetan version, if some scholar can be found to complete Dr. Wenzel's unfinished labour. He had devoted much time and thought to the work; I consulted him in several of my difficulties, and it is from him that I derived all my information about the Tibetan renderings. This Tibetan version promises to be of great help in restoring the many corrupt readings which still remain in our faulty Nepalese MSS.

Only thirteen books of the Sanskrit poem claim to be *Asvaghosha's* composition; the last four books are an attempt by a modern Nepalese author to supply the loss of the original. He tells us this honestly in the colophon,

¹ Professor Peterson has remarked that two stanzas out of the five occur in Bhartṛhari's *Nīti-sataka*.

² We have for the present classed the *Buddha-karita* with the *Mahāyāna Sūtras* in default of more exact information.

—‘having searched for them everywhere and not found them, four cantos have been made by me, Amṛitānanda,—the fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth.’ He adds the date 950 of the Nepalese era, corresponding to 1830 A.D.; and we have no difficulty in identifying the author. Rāgendralāl Mitra in his ‘Nepalese Buddhist Literature’ mentions Amṛitānanda as the author of two Sanskrit treatises and one in Newārī; he was probably the father of the old *pandit* of the Residency at Kātmāndu, Guṇānanda, whose son Indrānanda holds the office at present. Dr. D. Wright informs me that the family seem to have been the recognised historians of the country, and keepers of the MS. treasures of sundry temples. The four books are included in this translation as an interesting literary curiosity. The first portion of the fourteenth book agrees partly with the Tibetan and Chinese, and Amṛitānanda may have had access to some imperfect copy of this portion of the original; but after that his account is quite independent, and has no relation to the two versions.

In my preface to the edition of the Sanskrit text I have tried to show that Asvaghosha’s poem appears to have exercised an important influence on the succeeding poets of the classical period in India. When we compare the description in the seventh book of the Raghuvamśa of the ladies of the city crowding to see prince Aśvaś as he passes by from the Svayamvara where the princess Bhogya has chosen him as her husband, with the episode in the third book of the Buddha-karita (ślokas 13–24); or the description of Kāma’s assault on Siva in the Kumārasambhava with that of Māra’s temptation of Buddha in the thirteenth book, we can hardly fail to trace some connection. There is a similar resemblance between the description in the fifth book of the Rāmāyaṇa, where the monkey Hanumat enters Rāvaṇa’s palace by night, and sees his wives asleep in the seraglio and their various unconscious attitudes, and the description in the fifth book of the present poem where Buddha on the night of his leaving his home for ever sees the same unconscious sight in his own palace. Nor may

we forget that in the Rāmāyana the description is merely introduced as an ornamental episode; in the Buddhist poem it is an essential element in the story, as it supplies the final impulse which stirs the Bodhisattva to make his escape from the world. These different descriptions became afterwards commonplaces in Sanskrit poetry, like the catalogue of the ships in Greek or Roman epics; but they may very well have originated in connection with definite incidents in the Buddhist sacred legend.

The Sanskrit MSS. of Nepal are always negligently transcribed and abound with corrupt passages, which it is often very difficult to detect and restore. My printed text leaves many obscure lines which will have to be cleared up hereafter by more skilful emendations. I have given in the notes to the translation some further emendations of my own, and I have also added several happy conjectures which continental scholars have kindly suggested to me by letter; and I gladly take this opportunity of adding in a foot-note some which I received too late to insert in their proper places¹.

I have endeavoured to make my translation intelligible to the English reader, but many of the verses in the original are very obscure. Asvaghosha employs all the resources of Hindu rhetoric (as we might well expect if I-tsing is right in ascribing to him an 'alamkāra-sāstra'), and it is often difficult to follow his subtil turns of thought and remote allusions; but many passages no doubt owe their present obscurity to undetected mistakes in the text of our MSS. In the absence of any commentary (except so far as the diffuse Chinese translation and occasional reference to the Tibetan have supplied the want) I have been necessarily left to my own resources, and I cannot fail to have sometimes missed my author's meaning,

Prāmsulabhye phale mohād udbāhur iva vāmanaḥ ;

¹ Dr. von Boehtlingk suggests 'saugā vīṭakāra' in VIII, 3, and 'vilambakeryo' in VIII, 21,—two certain emendations. Professor Kielhorn would read 'nabhasy eva' in XIII, 47 for 'nayaty eva,' and 'tatraiva nāśnam rīshim' in XIII, 50. Professor Bühler would read 'priyatanayas tanayasya' in I, 87, and 'na tatyāga ka' in IV, 80.

but I have tried to do my best, and no one will welcome more cordially any light which others may throw on the passages which I have misunderstood.

The edition of the original text was dedicated to my old friend Professor F. Max Müller, and it is a sincere gratification to me that this translation will appear in the same volume with similar translations from his pen.

E. B. C.

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THE BUDDHA-KARITA
OF
ASVAGHOSHA.

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OF

ASVAGHOSHA.

BOOK I.

1. That Arhat is here saluted, who has no counterpart,—who, as bestowing the supreme happiness, surpasses (Brahman) the Creator,—who, as driving away darkness, vanquishes the sun,—and, as dispelling all burning heat, surpasses the beautiful moon.

2. There was a city, the dwelling-place¹ of the great saint Kapila, having its sides surrounded by the beauty of a lofty broad table-land as by a line of clouds, and itself, with its high-soaring palaces², immersed in the sky.

3. By its pure and lofty system of government it, as it were, stole the splendour of the clouds of Mount Kailâsa, and while it bore the clouds which came to it through a mistake, it fulfilled the imagination which had led them thither³.

4. In that city, shining with the splendour of gems, darkness like poverty could find no place;

¹ Vastu seems used here for vâstu.

^{2 3} They had thought that it was Kailâsa.

² Dhishnya.

prosperity shone resplendently, as with a smile, from the joy of dwelling with such surpassingly excellent citizens.

5. With its festive arbours, its arched gateways and pinnacles¹, it was radiant with jewels in every dwelling; and unable to find any other rival in the world, it could only feel emulation with its own houses.

6. There the sun, even although he had retired, was unable to scorn the moon-like faces of its women which put the lotuses to shame, and as if from the access of passion, hurried towards the western ocean to enter the (cooling) water.

7. 'Yonder Indra has been utterly annihilated by the people when they saw the glories² acquired by the Sākya,'—uttering this scoff, the city strove by its banners with gay-fluttering streamers to wipe away every mark of his existence.

8. After mocking the water-lilies even at night by the moonbeams which rest on its silver pavilions,—by day it assumed the brightness of the lotuses through the sunbeams falling on its golden palaces.

9. A king, by name Suddhodana, of the kindred of the sun, anointed to stand at the head of earth's monarchs,—ruling over the city, adorned it, as a bee-inmate a full-blown lotus³.

10. The very best of kings with his train ever

¹ Or towers? (*simhakaraiḥ*).

² For the genitive *yaśasām*, see *Pāṇ.* II, 3. 52 (*adhīgartha*).

³ *Vā* is used for *iva* in *Sūrup. Badha*, III, 63, IV, 35; *Meghad.* 82. (Cf. *infra*, IV, 44.) *Purādhirāgam* seems used adverbially. Cf. the line in *Vikramorv. kusumāny āserate śaśpadāḥ*. Could it mean 'as a thought the lotus of the heart?'

near him¹,—intent on liberality yet devoid of pride²; a sovereign, yet with an ever equal eye thrown on all³,—of gentle nature and yet with wide-reaching majesty⁴.

11. Falling smitten by his arm in the arena of battle, the lordly elephants of his enemies bowed prostrate with their heads pouring forth quantities of pearls as if they were offering handfuls of flowers in homage.

12. Having dispersed his enemies by his pre-eminent majesty as the sun disperses the gloom of an eclipse, he illuminated his people on every side, showing them the paths which they were to follow.

13. Duty, wealth, and pleasure under his guidance assumed mutually each other's object, but not the outward dress; yet as if they still vied together they shone all the brighter in the glorious career of their triumphant success.

14. He, the monarch of the Sākya, of native pre-eminence, but whose actual pre-eminence was brought about by his numberless councillors of exalted wisdom, shone forth all the more gloriously, like the moon amidst the stars shining with a light like its own⁵.

15. To him there was a queen, named Mâyā, as if free from all deceit (mâyā)—an effulgence proceeding

¹ Also 'though the highest of mountains, yet bearing his wings (uncut).'

² Or if applied to an elephant, 'not in rut.'

³ Or with a double meaning in *īśa*, 'though like Śiva, yet with even eyes,' i. e. not three.

⁴ Or 'like the moon, yet widely burning (like the sun).'

⁵ Or perhaps 'shining with undiminished splendour.' If we read *akṛitānyathābhaḥ* it would run, 'shining with its light undimmed by the stars.'

from his effulgence, like the splendour of the sun when it is free from all the influence of darkness,—a chief queen in the united assembly of all queens.

16. Like a mother to her subjects, intent on their welfare,—devoted to all worthy of reverence like devotion itself,—shining on her lord's family like the goddess of prosperity,—she was the most eminent of goddesses to the whole world.

17. Verily the life of women is always darkness, yet when it encountered her, it shone brilliantly; thus the night does not retain its gloom, when it meets with the radiant crescent of the moon.

18. 'This people, being hard to be roused to wonder in their souls, cannot be influenced by me if I come to them as beyond their senses,'—so saying, Duty abandoned her own subtile nature and made her form visible.

19. Then falling from the host of beings in the Tushita heaven¹, and illumining the three worlds, the most excellent of Bodhisattvas suddenly entered at a thought into her womb, like the Nāga-king entering the cave of Nandâ.

20. Assuming the form of a huge elephant white like Himâlaya, armed with six tusks², with his face perfumed with flowing ichor, he entered the womb of the queen of king Suddhodana, to destroy the evils of the world.

21. The guardians of the world hastened from heaven to mount watch over the world's one true ruler; thus the moonbeams, though they shine

¹ For tushitât kâyât, cf. tushite devanikâya upapannâ, Divyâvad. p. 83; and tushitakâyika, Lalitav. p. 142.

² Cf. the Pâli kâhaddanto, and the Lalitav. shaddanta.

everywhere, are especially bright on Mount Kailāsa.

22. Mâyā also, holding him in her womb, like a line of clouds holding a lightning-flash, relieved the people around her from the sufferings of poverty by raining showers of gifts.

23. Then one day by the king's permission the queen, having a great longing in her mind, went with the inmates of the gynaeceum into the garden Lumbini.

24. As the queen supported herself by a bough which hung laden with a weight of flowers, the Bodhisattva suddenly came forth, cleaving open her womb.

25. ¹At that time the constellation Pushya was auspicious, and from the side of the queen, who was purified by her vow, her son was born for the welfare of the world, without pain and without illness.

26. Like the sun bursting from a cloud in the morning,—so he too, when he was born from his mother's womb, made the world bright like gold, bursting forth with his rays which dispelled the darkness.

27. As soon as he was born the thousand-eyed (Indra) well-pleased took him gently, bright like a golden pillar; and two pure streams of water fell down from heaven upon his head with piles of Mandāra flowers.

28. Carried about by the chief suras, and delighting them with the rays that streamed from his body, he

¹ From this point the Tibetan and Chinese versions agree more or less closely with the Sanskrit text.

surpassed in beauty the new moon as it rests on a mass of evening clouds.

29. As was Aurva's birth from the thigh¹, and Prithu's from the hand², and Māndhātṛ's, who was like Indra himself, from the forehead³, and Kakshtvat's from the upper end of the arm⁴,—thus too was his birth (miraculous).

30. Having thus in due time issued from the womb, he shone as if he had come down from heaven, he who had not been born in the natural way,—he who was born full of wisdom, not foolish,—as if his mind had been purified by countless aeons of contemplation.

31. With glory, fortitude, and beauty he shone like the young sun descended upon the earth; when he was gazed at, though of such surpassing brightness, he attracted all eyes like the moon.

32. With the radiant splendour of his limbs he extinguished like the sun the splendour of the lamps; with his beautiful hue as of precious gold he illuminated all the quarters of space.

33. Unflurried, with the lotus-sign in high relief⁵, far-striding, set down with a stamp,—seven such firm footsteps did he then take,—he who was like the constellation of the seven *rishis*.

34. 'I am born for supreme knowledge, for the welfare of the world,—thus this is my last birth,'—

¹ Mahābh. I, 2610.

² Vishṇu Pur. I, 13.

³ According to the Mahābh. III, l. 10450, he was born from his father's left side, but cf. Vishṇu Pur. IV, 2.

⁴ The MSS. vary between *bhugâmsa* and *bhugâmsa*; we might conjecture *bhugâgradesât*, but *bhugâmsadesât* is the only reading in V, 56. Beal I, 10 has 'the armpit.'

⁵ *Abgasamudgatâni*. Cf. Beal I, 16, note.

thus did he of lion gait, gazing at the four quarters, utter a voice full of auspicious meaning.

35. Two streams of water bursting from heaven, bright as the moon's rays, having the power of heat and cold, fell down upon that peerless one's benign head to give refreshment to his body.

36. His body lay on a bed with a royal canopy and a frame shining with gold, and supported by feet of lapis lazuli, and in his honour the yaksha-lords stood round guarding him with golden lotuses in their hands.

37. The gods in homage to the son of Mâyâ, with their heads bowed at his majesty, held up a white umbrella in the sky and muttered the highest blessings on his supreme wisdom.

38. The great dragons¹ in their great thirst for the Law²,—they who had had the privilege of waiting on the past Buddhas,—gazing with eyes of intent devotion, fanned³ him and strewed Mandâra flowers over him.

39. Gladdened through the influence of the birth of the Tathâgata, the gods of pure natures and inhabiting pure abodes⁴ were filled with joy, though all passion was extinguished, for the sake of the world⁵ drowned in sorrow.

40. When he was born, the earth, though fastened down by (Himâlaya) the monarch of mountains, shook like a ship tossed by the wind; and from a cloudless sky there fell a shower full of lotuses and water-lilies, and perfumed with sandal-wood.

¹ Mahoragâh.

² Cf. *infra*, sloka 54.

³ Avyagan.

⁴ *Suddhâdhivâsâh*.

⁵ Reading *hitâya*.

41. Pleasant breezes blew soft to the touch, dropping down heavenly garments; the very sun, though still the same, shone with augmented light, and fire gleamed, unstirred, with a gentle lustre.

42. In the north-eastern part of the dwelling a well of pure water appeared of its own accord, wherein the inhabitants of the gynaeceum, filled with wonder, performed their rites as in a sacred bathing-place.

43. Through the troops of heavenly visitants, who came seeking religious merit, the pool itself received strength to behold Buddha, and by means of its trees bearing flowers and perfumes it eagerly offered him worship.

44. The flowering trees at once produced their blossoms, while their fragrance was borne aloft in all directions by the wind, accompanied by the songs of bewildered female bees, while the air was inhaled and absorbed by the many snakes (gathering near)¹.

45. Sometimes there resounded² on both sides songs mingled with musical instruments and tabours, and lutes also, drums, tambourines, and the rest,—from women adorned with dancing bracelets.

46. ³ That royal law which neither *Bhrigu* nor *Aṅgiras* ever made, those two great seers the founders of families, their two sons *Sukra* and *Vrihaspati* left revealed at the end.

¹ Serpents are called *vâyubhaksha*. See Ind. Sprüche, III, 4738, and *Raghuvamśa* XIII, 12. Cf. also *infra*, VII, 15.

² *Virâgitam*, 'it was manifested by.' Can *tat* mean 'then' or 'there?'

³ We learn from *sloka* 52 that this is a speech uttered by the Brahmins of the court.

47. 'Yea, the son of Sarasvatī¹ proclaimed that lost Veda which they had never seen in former ages,—Vyāsa rehearsed that in many forms, which Varishṭha helpless could not compile;

48. 'The voice of Vālmīki uttered its poetry which the great seer Kyavana could not compose; and that medicine which Atri never invented the wise son of Atri² proclaimed after him;

49. 'That Brahmanhood which Kusika never attained,—his son, O king, found out the means to gain it; (so) Sagara made a bound for the ocean, which even the Ikshvākus had not fixed before him.

50. 'Ganaka attained a power of instructing the twice-born in the rules of Yoga which none other had ever reached³; and the famed feats of the grandson of Sūra⁴ (*Kṛishṇa*) Sūra and his peers were powerless to accomplish.

51. 'Therefore it is not age nor years which are the criterion; different persons win pre-eminence in the world at different places; those mighty exploits worthy of kings and sages, when left undone by the ancestors, have been done by the sons.'

52. The king, being thus consoled and congratulated by those well-trusted Brahmans, dismissed from his mind all unwelcome suspicion and rose to a still higher degree of joy;

53. And well-pleased he gave to those most excellent of the twice-born rich treasures with all

¹ The Vishṇu Pur. (III, 3) says that Sārasvata arranged the Vedas in the ninth age, as Varishṭha in the eighth.

² Ātreya is the proclaimer of the *Karaka-samhitā*.

³ Cf. *Khândogya Upan.* V, 3, 7.

⁴ Read Saureḥ for Sauraiḥ.

due honour,—‘ May he become the ruler of the earth according to your words, and may he retire to the woods when he attains old age.’

54. Then having learned by signs and through the power of his penances this birth of him who was to destroy all birth, the great seer Asita in his thirst for the excellent Law¹ came to the palace of the Sākya king.

55. Him shining with the glory of sacred knowledge and ascetic observances, the king’s own priest,—himself a special student among the students of sacred knowledge,—introduced into the royal palace with all due reverence and respect.

56. He entered into the precincts of the king’s gynaeceum, which was all astir with the joy arisen from the birth of the young prince,—grave from his consciousness of power, his pre-eminence in asceticism, and the weight of old age.

57. Then the king, having duly honoured the sage, who was seated in his seat, with water for the feet and an arghya offering, invited him (to speak) with all ceremonies of respect, as did Antideva² in olden time to Vasistha :

58. ‘ I am indeed fortunate, this my family is the object of high favour, that thou shouldst have come to visit me ; be pleased to command what I should do, O benign one ; I am thy disciple, be pleased to show thy confidence in me.’

59. The sage, being thus invited by the king, filled with intense feeling as was due, uttered his

¹ Cf. sloka 38 a.

² See IX, 20, 60. C reads Atideva, i.e. Indra ? [The Tibetan reads Antadeva, ‘in the end dwelling god’ or ‘end having god.’ H. W.]

deep and solemn words, having his large eyes opened wide with wonder :

60. 'This is indeed worthy of thee, great-souled as thou art, fond of guests, liberal and a lover of duty,—that thy mind should be thus kind towards me, in full accordance with thy nature, family, wisdom, and age.

61. 'This is the true way in which those seer-kings of old, rejecting through duty all trivial riches¹, have ever flung them away as was right,—being poor in outward substance but rich in ascetic endurance.

62. 'But hear now the motive for my coming and rejoice thereat ; a heavenly voice has been heard by me in the heavenly path, that thy son has been born for the sake of supreme knowledge.

63. 'Having heard that voice and applied my mind thereto, and having known its truth by signs, I am now come hither, with a longing to see the banner of the Sākya race, as if it were Indra's banner being set up².'

64. Having heard this address of his, the king, with his steps bewildered with joy, took the prince, who lay on his nurse's side, and showed him to the holy ascetic.

65. Thus the great seer beheld the king's son with wonder,—his foot marked with a wheel, his fingers and toes webbed, with a circle of hair between his eyebrows, and signs of vigour like an elephant.

66. Having beheld him seated on his nurse's side,

¹ Or 'all riches which were trifling in comparison with duty.'

² In allusion to a festival in parts of India ; cf. Schol. *Raghuvamśa* IV, 3. (Cf. Mrs. Guthrie's *Year in an Indian Fort*, vol. ii.)

like the son of Agni (Skanda) seated on Devī's side, he stood with the tears hanging on the ends of his eyelashes¹, and sighing he looked up towards heaven.

67. But seeing Asita with his eyes thus filled with tears, the king was agitated through his love for his son, and with his hands clasped and his body bowed he thus asked him in a broken voice choked with weeping,

68. 'One whose beauty has little to distinguish it from that of a divine sage², and whose brilliant birth has been so wonderful, and for whom thou hast prophesied a transcendent future,—wherefore, on seeing him, do tears come to thee, O reverend one ?

69. 'Is the prince, O holy man, destined to a long life ? Surely he cannot be born for my sorrow³. I have with difficulty obtained a handful of water, surely it is not death which comes to drink it.

70. 'Tell me, is the hoard of my fame free from destruction ? Is this chief prize of my family secure ? Shall I ever depart happily to another life,—I who keep one eye ever awake, even when my son is asleep⁴ ?

71. 'Surely this young shoot of my family is not born barren, destined only to wither ! Speak quickly, my lord, I cannot wait ; thou well knowest the love of near kindred for a son.'

72. Knowing the king to be thus agitated through his fear of some impending evil, the sage thus ad-

¹ I adopt Prof. Kielhorn's suggestion, *pakshmântavilambitâsruḥ*. (*Añkita* might mean 'curved on his eyelashes.')

² Or, reading *mune*, 'one whose age is so small, O sage.'

³ *Kaṭkinna sokāya mama prasūtaḥ*.

⁴ Obscure.

dressed him: 'Let not thy mind, O monarch, be disturbed,—all that I have said is certainly true¹.

73. 'I have no feeling of fear as to his being subject to change, but I am distressed for mine own disappointment. It is my time to depart, and this child is now born,—he who knows that mystery hard to attain, the means of destroying birth.

74. 'Having forsaken his kingdom, indifferent to all worldly objects, and having attained the highest truth by strenuous efforts, he will shine forth as a sun of knowledge to destroy the darkness of illusion in the world.

75. 'He will deliver by the boat of knowledge the distressed world, borne helplessly along, from the ocean of misery which throws up sickness as its foam, tossing with the waves of old age, and rushing with the dreadful onflow of death.

76. 'The thirsty world of living beings will drink the flowing stream of his Law, bursting forth with the water of wisdom, enclosed by the banks of strong moral rules, delightfully cool with contemplation, and filled with religious vows as with ruddy geese.

77. 'He will proclaim the way of deliverance to those afflicted with sorrow, entangled in objects of sense, and lost in the forest-paths of worldly existence, as to travellers who have lost their way.

78. 'By the rain of the Law he will give gladness to the multitude who are consumed in this world with that fire of desire whose fuel is worldly objects, as a great cloud does with its showers at the end of the hot season.

¹ I take *asmi* as meaning *aham* (*aham ityarthâvyayam*), or should we read *asti*?

79. 'He will break open for the escape of living beings that door whose bolt is desire and whose two leaves are ignorance and delusion,—with that excellent blow of the good Law which is so hard to find.

80. 'He, the king of the Law, when he has attained to supreme knowledge, will achieve the deliverance from its bonds of the world now overcome by misery, destitute of every refuge, and enveloped in its own chains of delusion.

81. 'Therefore make no sorrow for him,—that belongs rather, kind sire, to the pitiable world of human beings, who through illusion or the pleasures of desire or intoxication refuse to hear his perfect Law.

82. 'Therefore since I have fallen short of that excellence, though I have accomplished all the stages of contemplation, my life is only a failure; since I have not heard his Law, I count even dwelling in the highest heaven a misfortune.'

83. Having heard these words, the king with his queen and his friends abandoned sorrow and rejoiced; thinking, 'such is this son of mine,' he considered that his excellence was his own.

84. But he let his heart be influenced by the thought, 'he will travel by the noble path,'—he was not in truth averse to religion, yet still he saw alarm at the prospect of losing his child.

85. Then the sage Asita, having made known the real fate which awaited the prince to the king who was thus disturbed about his son, departed by the way of the wind as he had come, his figure watched reverentially in his flight.

86. Having taken his resolution and having seen

the son of his younger sister¹, the saint, filled with compassion, enjoined him earnestly in all kinds of ways, as if he were his son, to listen to the sage's words and ponder over them.

87. The monarch also, being well-pleased at the birth of a son, having thrown off all those bonds called worldly objects, caused his son to go through the usual birth-ceremonies in a manner worthy of the family.

88. When ten days were fulfilled after his son's birth, with his thoughts kept under restraint, and filled with excessive joy, he offered for his son most elaborate sacrifices to the gods with muttered prayers, oblations, and all kinds of auspicious ceremonies.

89. And he himself gave to the brahmans for his son's welfare cows full of milk, with no traces of infirmity, golden-horned and with strong healthy calves, to the full number of a hundred thousand.

90. Then he, with his soul under strict restraint, having performed all kinds of ceremonies which rejoiced his heart, on a fortunate day, in an auspicious moment, gladly determined to enter his city.

91. Then the queen with her babe having worshipped the gods for good fortune, occupied a costly palanquin made of elephants' tusks, filled with all kinds of white flowers, and blazing with gems.

92. Having made his wife with her child² enter first into the city, accompanied by the aged attendants, the king himself also advanced, saluted by the

¹ This was Naradatta, see *Lalitavistara*, ch. vii. pp. 103, 110 (Foucaux).

² *Apatyanâthâm* might also mean 'having her child as her protector.'

hosts of the citizens, as Indra entering heaven, saluted by the immortals.

93. The Sākya king, having entered his palace, like Bhava¹ well-pleased at the birth of Kārttikeya², with his face full of joy, gave orders for lavish expenditure, showing all kinds of honour and liberality³.

94. Thus at the good fortune of the birth of the king's son, that city surnamed after Kapila, with all the surrounding inhabitants, was full of gladness like the city of the lord of wealth⁴, crowded with heavenly nymphs, at the birth of his son Nalakūvara.

¹ Sc. Siva.

² Shanmukha.

³ Bahuvidhapush/iyasaskaram seems used as an adverb to vyadhata, 'he made expenditure.'

⁴ Kuvera.

BOOK II.

1. From the time of the birth of that son of his, who, the true master of himself, was to end all birth and old age, the king increased day by day in wealth, elephants, horses, and friends as a river increases with its influx of waters.

2. Of different kinds of wealth and jewels, and of gold, wrought or unwrought, he found¹ treasures of manifold variety², surpassing even the capacity of his desires.

3. Elephants from Himavat, raging with rut, whom not even princes of elephants like Padma³ could teach to go round in circles, came without any effort and waited on him.

4. His city was all astir with the crowds of horses, some adorned with various marks and decked with new golden trappings, others undorned and with long flowing manes,—suitable alike in strength, gentleness, and costly ornaments⁴.

5. And many fertile cows, with tall calves, gathered in his kingdom, well nourished and happy,

¹ I suppose *avâpi* to be used as a middle aorist like *abodhi* (cf. *Sirup.* I, 3). Should we read *avâpa*?

² I take *naikâtman* as 'of manifold nature.'

³ *Mahâpadma* is the name of the elephant which supports the world in the south.

⁴ I read *âptaiḥ*.

gentle and without fierceness, and producing excellent milk.

6. His enemies became indifferent; indifference grew into friendship; his friends became specially united; were there two sides,—one passed into oblivion.

7. Heaven rained in his kingdom in due time and place, with the sound of gentle winds and clouds, and adorned with wreaths of lightning, and without any drawback of showers of stones or thunderbolts.

8. A fruitful crop sprang up according to season, even without the labour of ploughing¹; and the old plants grew more vigorous in juice and substance.

9. Even at that crisis which threatens danger to the body like the collision of battle, pregnant women brought forth in good health, in safety, and without sickness.

10. And whereas men do not willingly ask from others, even where a surety's property is available²,—at that time even one possessed of slender means turned not his face away when solicited.

11. There was no ruin nor murder³,—nay, there was not even one ungenerous to his kinsmen, no breaker of obligations, none untruthful nor injurious,—as in the days of Yayâti the son of Nahusha.

12. Those who sought religious merit performed sacred works and made gardens, temples, and

¹ *Tadâ-kṛtēnâpi kṛśhisramēna.*

² I read *pratibhvo*, though it should be *pratibhuvo*.

³ Could *nâsaubadho* (C) mean 'there was no murderer of any one?'

hermitages, wells, cisterns, lakes, and groves, having beheld heaven as it were visible before their eyes.

13. The people, delivered from famine, fear, and sickness, dwelt happily as in heaven; and in mutual contentment husband transgressed not against wife, nor wife against husband.

14. None pursued love for mere sensual pleasure; none hoarded wealth for the sake of desires; none practised religious duties for the sake of gaining wealth; none injured living beings for the sake of religious duty.

15. On every side theft and its kindred vices disappeared; his own dominion was in peace and at rest from foreign interference¹; prosperity and plenty belonged to him, and the cities in his realm were (healthy) like the forests².

16. When that son was born it was in that monarch's kingdom as in the reign of Manu the son of the Sun,—gladness went everywhere and evil perished; right blazed abroad and sin was still.

17. Since at the birth of this son of the king such a universal accomplishment of all objects took place, the king in consequence caused the prince's name to be Sarvārthasiddha³.

18. But the queen Mâyâ, having seen the great glory of her new-born son, like some *Rishi* of the

¹ The Tibetan seems to have read *parasokamuktam* for *paraṭakramuktam*.

² Cf. VIII, 13. If we read *aranyasya* we must translate these lines, 'the cities in his kingdom seemed part of the forest campaign.' This line appears to be untranslated in the Tibetan.

³ He by whom all objects are accomplished.

gods, could not sustain the joy which it brought ; and that she might not die she went to heaven.

19. Then the queen's sister, with an influence like a mother's, undistinguished from the real mother in her affection or tenderness, brought up as her own son the young prince who was like the offspring of the gods.

20. Then like the young sun on the eastern mountain or the fire when fanned by the wind, the prince gradually grew in all due perfection, like the moon in the fortnight of brightness.

21. Then they brought him as presents from the houses of his friends costly unguents of sandalwood, and strings of gems exactly like wreaths of plants, and little golden carriages yoked with deer ;

22. Ornaments also suitable to his age, and elephants, deer, and horses made of gold¹, carriages and oxen decked with rich garments, and carts² gay with silver and gold.

23. Thus indulged with all sorts of such objects to please the senses as were suitable to his years,—child as he was, he behaved not like a child in gravity, purity, wisdom, and dignity.

24. When he had passed the period of childhood and reached that of middle youth, the young prince learned in a few days the various sciences suitable to his race, which generally took many years to master.

25. But having heard before from the great seer Asita his destined future which was to embrace

¹ Cf. Satyavat's toy horses in Mahābh. III, 16670.

² *Gaṁṭrī* has this meaning in the Amarakośha and Hemaṇḍra.

transcendental happiness, the anxious care¹ of the king of the present Śākya race turned the prince to sensual pleasures.

26. Then he sought for him from a family of unblemished moral excellence a bride possessed of beauty, modesty, and gentle bearing, of wide-spread glory, Yasodharā by name, having a name well worthy of her, a very goddess of good fortune.

27. Then after that the prince, beloved of the king his father, he who was like Sanatkumāra, rejoiced in the society of that Śākya princess as the thousand-eyed (Indra) rejoiced with his bride Sāṅgī.

28. 'He might perchance see some inauspicious sight which could disturb his mind,'—thus reflecting the king had a dwelling prepared for him apart from the busy press in the recesses of the palace.

29. Then he spent his time in those royal apartments, furnished with the delights proper for every season, gaily decorated like heavenly chariots upon the earth, and bright like the clouds of autumn, amidst the splendid musical concerts of singing-women.

30. With the softly-sounding tambourines beaten by the tips of the women's hands, and ornamented with golden rims, and with the dances which were like the dances of the heavenly nymphs, that palace shone like Mount Kailāsa.

31. There the women delighted him with their soft voices, their beautiful pearl-garlands, their playful intoxication, their sweet laughter, and their stolen glances concealed by their brows.

¹ The last pāda seems spurious as it is only found in C. I have tried to make some sense by reading *buddhih* for *vṛddhih*.

32. Borne in the arms of these women well-skilled in the ways of love, and reckless in the pursuit of pleasure, he fell from the roof of a pavilion and yet reached not the ground, like a holy sage stepping from a heavenly chariot.

33. Meanwhile the king for the sake of ensuring his son's prosperity and stirred in heart by the destiny which had been predicted for him, delighted himself in perfect calm, ceased from all evil, practised all self-restraint, and rewarded the good.

34. He turned to no sensual pleasures like one wanting in self-control; he felt no violent delight in any state of birth¹; he subdued by firmness the restless horses of the senses; and he surpassed his kindred and citizens by his virtues.

35. He sought not learning to vex another; such knowledge as was beneficent, that only he studied; he wished well to all mankind as much as to his own subjects.

36. He worshipped also duly the brilliant (Agni) that tutelary god of the Āṅgirasas, for his son's long life; and he offered oblations in a large fire, and gave gold² and cows to the Brahmins.

37. He bathed to purify his body and mind with the waters of holy places and of holy feelings; and at the same time he drank the soma-juice as enjoined by the Veda, and the heartfelt self-produced happiness of perfect calm.

38. He only spoke what was pleasant and not unprofitable; he discoursed about what was true and not ill-natured; he could not speak even to himself

¹ Can *ganani* mean *mātrigrāma*?

² Or pearls? (*kṛisana*.)

for very shame a false pleasant thing or a harsh truth.

39. In things which required to be done, whether they were pleasant or disagreeable, he found no reason either for desire or dislike; he pursued the advantageous which could be attained without litigation¹; he did not so highly value sacrifice.

40. When a suppliant came to him with a petition, he at once hastened to quench his thirst with the water sprinkled on his gift²; and without fighting, by the battle-axe of his demeanour he smote down the arrogant armed with³ double pride.

41. Thus he took away the one, and protected the seven; he abandoned the seven and kept the five; he obtained the set of three and learned the set of three; he understood the two and abandoned the two⁴.

42. Guilty persons, even though he had sentenced them to death, he did not cause to be killed nor even looked on them with anger; he bound them with gentle words and with the reform produced in their character,—even their release was accompanied by no inflicted injury.

43. He performed great religious vows prescribed by ancient seers; he threw aside hostile feelings long cherished; he acquired glory redolent with the fragrance of virtue; he relinquished all passions involving defilement.

¹ Professor Max Müller would read *vyavahāralabdham*, 'all bliss which could be obtained in the lower or *vyāvahārika* sphere.'

² See Colebrooke's *Essays*, vol. ii, p. 230, note; *Manu* IX, 168.

³ Cf. *dviśavasam* (madam), *Rig-veda* IX, 104, 2. Professor Kielhorn would suggest *dviḍdarpam*.

⁴ The Tibetan, like the Chinese, gives no help here.

44. He desired not to take his tribute of one-sixth without acting as the guardian of his people¹; he had no wish to covet another's property; he desired not to mention the wrong-doing of his enemies; nor did he wish to fan wrath in his heart.

45. When the monarch himself was thus employed his servants and citizens followed his example, like the senses of one absorbed in contemplation whose mind is abstracted in profound repose.

46. In course of time to the fair-bosomed Yasodharâ,—who was truly glorious in accordance with her name,—there was born from the son of Sudhodana a son named Râhula, with a face like the enemy of Râhu².

47. Then the king who from regard to the welfare of his race had longed for a son and been exceedingly delighted [at his coming],—as he had rejoiced at the birth of his son, so did he now rejoice at the birth of his grandson.

48. 'O how can I feel that love which my son feels for my grandson?' Thus thinking in his joy he at the due time attended to every enjoined rite like one who fondly loves his son and is about to rise to heaven.

49. Standing in the paths of the pre-eminent kings who flourished in primæval ages, he practised austerities without laying aside his white garments, and he offered in sacrifice only those things which involved no injury to living creatures.

50. He of holy deeds shone forth gloriously, in

¹ Cf. *Indische Sprüche*, 568 (2nd ed.).

² I.e. the sun or the moon, as eclipsed by the demon Râhu.

the splendour of royalty and the splendour of penances, conspicuous by his family and his own conduct and wisdom, and desirous to diffuse brightness like the sun.

51. Having offered worship, he whose own glory was secure muttered repetitions of Vedic texts to Svayambhû for the safety of his son, and performed various ceremonies hard to be accomplished, like the god Ka in the first aeon wishing to create living beings.

52. He laid aside weapons and pondered the Sâstra, he practised perfect calm and underwent various observances, like a hermit he refused all objects of sense, he viewed all his kingdoms¹ like a father.

53. He endured the kingdom for the sake of his son, his son for his family, his family for fame, fame for heaven, heaven for the soul,—he only desired the soul's continuance for the sake of duty.

54. Thus did he practise the various observances as followed by the pious and established from revelation,—ever asking himself, 'now that he has seen the face of his son, how may my son be stopped from going to the forest?'

55. The prudent² kings of the earth, who wish to guard their prosperity, watch over their sons in the world; but this king, though loving religion, kept his son from religion and set him free towards all objects of pleasure.

¹ Vishayâh seems used here in two senses, 'kingdoms' and 'objects of sense.'

² Lit. 'self-possessed,' âtmasamsthâh. Or should we read âtmasamsthâm, 'wishing to keep their prosperity their own?'

56. But all Bodhisattvas, those beings of pre-eminent nature, after knowing the flavour of worldly enjoyments, have departed to the forest as soon as a son is born to them ; therefore he too, though he had accomplished all his previous destiny, even when the (final) motive had begun to germinate, still went on pursuing worldly pleasure up to the time of attaining the supreme wisdom.

BOOK III.

1. On a certain day he heard of the forests carpeted with tender grass, with their trees resounding with the kokilas, adorned with lotus-ponds, and which had been all bound up in the cold season.

2. Having heard of the delightful appearance of the city groves beloved by the women, he resolved to go out of doors, like an elephant long shut up in a house.

3. The king, having learned the character of the wish thus expressed by his son, ordered a pleasure-party to be prepared, worthy of his own affection and his son's beauty and youth.

4. He prohibited the encounter of any afflicted common person in the highroad; 'heaven forbid that the prince with his tender nature should even imagine himself to be distressed.'

5. Then having removed out of the way with the greatest gentleness all those who had mutilated limbs or maimed senses, the decrepit and the sick and all squalid beggars, they made the highway assume its perfect beauty.

6. Along this road thus made beautiful, the fortunate prince with his well-trained attendants came down one day at a proper time from the roof of the palace and went to visit the king by his leave.

7. Then the king, with tears rising to his eyes,

having smelt his son's head¹ and long gazed upon him, gave him his permission, saying, 'Go;' but in his heart through affection he could not let him depart.

8. He then mounted a golden chariot, adorned with reins bright like flashing lightning², and yoked with four gentle horses, all wearing golden trappings.

9. With a worthy retinue he entered the road which was strewn with heaps of gleaming flowers, with garlands suspended and banners waving, like the moon with its asterism entering the sky.

10. Slowly, slowly he passed along the highway, watched on every side by the citizens, and be-showered by their eyes opened wide with curiosity like blue lotuses.

11. Some praised him for his gentle disposition, others hailed him for his glorious appearance, others eulogised his beauty from his fine countenance and desired for him length of days.

12. Hump-backed men coming out from the great families, and troops of foresters and dwarfs³, and women coming out from the meaner houses bowed down like the banners of some procession of the gods.

13. ⁴ Hearing the news, 'the prince is going out,' from the attendants of the female apartments, the women hastened to the roofs of the different mansions, having obtained the leave of their lords.

¹ Cf. Wilson, *Hindu Drama*, vol. ii, p. 45, note.

² *Rasmi* may mean 'rays.' For *aklīva* cf. Soph. *Philoct.* 1455, ἀρσην.

³ These are all mentioned in the *Sāhitya-darpana* among the attendants in a *seraglio* (§ 81).

⁴ With this description cf. *Raghuv.* VII, 5-12; *Kādambarī*, p. 74.

14. Hindered by the strings of their girdles which had slipped down, with their eyes bewildered as just awakened from sleep, and with their ornaments hastily put on in the stir of the news, and filled with curiosity, they crowded round ;

15. Frightening the flocks of birds which lived in the houses, with the noise of their girdles and the jingling of their anklets which resounded on the staircases and roofs of the mansions, and mutually reproaching one another for their hurry.

16. Some of these women, even in their haste as they rushed longing to see, were delayed in their going by the weight of their hips and full bosoms.

17. Another, though well able to go herself, checked her pace and forbore to run, hiding with shame her ornaments hitherto worn only in seclusion, and now too boldly displayed.

18. There they were restlessly swaying about in the windows, crowded together in the mutual press, with their earrings polished by the continual collision and their ornaments all jingling.

19. The lotus-like faces of the women gleamed while they looked out from the windows with their earrings coming into mutual proximity¹, as if they were real lotuses fastened upon the houses.

20. With the palaces all alive with crowds of damsels, every aperture thrown open in eager curiosity, the magnificent city appeared on every side like heaven with its divine chariots thronged with celestial nymphs.

21. The faces of the beautiful women shone like lotuses wreathed in garlands, while through the

¹ Parasparopâsita?

narrowness of the windows their earrings were transferred to each other's cheeks.

22. Gazing down upon the prince in the road, the women appeared as if longing to fall to the earth; gazing up to him with upturned faces, the men seemed as if longing to rise to heaven¹.

23. Beholding the king's son thus radiant in his beauty and glory, those women softly whispered, 'happy is his wife,' with pure minds and from no baser feeling.

24. 'He with the long sturdy arms, who stands in his beauty like the flower-armed god visibly present, will leave his royal pomp and devote himself to religion,' thus thinking, full of kindly feelings towards him, they all offered reverence.

25. Beholding for the first time that high-road thus crowded with respectful citizens, all dressed in white sedate garments, the prince for a while did feel a little pleasure and thought that it seemed to promise a revival of his youth.

26. But then the gods, dwelling in pure abodes², having beheld that city thus rejoicing like heaven itself, created an old man to walk along on purpose to stir the heart of the king's son.

27. The prince having beheld him thus overcome with decrepitude and different in form from other men, with his gaze intently fixed on him, thus addressed his driver³ with simple confidence:

28. 'Who is this man that has come here, O charioteer, with white hair and his hand resting on a staff, his eyes hidden beneath his brows, his

¹ Cf. Uhland's 'Das Schloss am meere.'

² *Suddhâdhi vâsâh*.

³ Cf. *samgâhako* in Pâli.

limbs bent down and hanging loose,—is this a change produced in him or his natural state or an accident?’

29. Thus addressed, the charioteer revealed to the king’s son the secret that should have been kept so carefully, thinking no harm in his simplicity, for those same gods had bewildered his mind :

30. ‘That is old age by which he is broken down,—the ravisher of beauty, the ruin of vigour, the cause of sorrow, the destruction of delights, the bane of memories, the enemy of the senses.

31. ‘He too once drank milk in his childhood, and in course of time he learned to grope on the ground ; having step by step become a vigorous youth, he has step by step in the same way reached old age.’

32. Being thus addressed, the prince, starting a little, spoke these words to the charioteer, ‘What ! will this evil come to me also?’ and to him again spoke the charioteer :

33. ‘It will come without doubt by the force of time through multitude of years even to my long-lived lord ; all the world knows thus that old age will destroy their comeliness and they are content to have it so.’

34. Then he, the great-souled one, who had his mind purified by the impressions of former good actions, who possessed a store of merits accumulated through many preceding aeons, was deeply agitated when he heard of old age, like a bull who has heard the crash of a thunderbolt close by.

35. Drawing a long sigh and shaking his head, and fixing his eyes on that decrepit old man, and looking round on that exultant multitude he then uttered these distressed words :

36. 'Old age thus strikes down all alike, our memory, comeliness, and valour; and yet the world is not disturbed, even when it sees such a fate visibly impending.

37. 'Since such is our condition, O charioteer, turn back the horses,—go quickly home; how can I rejoice in the pleasure-garden, when the thoughts arising from old age overpower me?'

38. Then the charioteer at the command of the king's son turned the chariot back, and the prince lost in thought entered even that royal palace as if it were empty.

39. But when he found no happiness even there, as he continually kept reflecting, 'old age, old age,' then once more, with the permission of the king, he went out with the same arrangement as before.

40. Then the same deities created another man with his body all afflicted by disease; and on seeing him the son of Suddhodana addressed the charioteer, having his gaze fixed on the man:

41. 'Yonder man with a swollen belly, his whole frame shaking as he pants, his arms and shoulders hanging loose, his body all pale and thin, uttering plaintively the word "mother," when he embraces a stranger,—who, pray, is this?'

42. Then his charioteer answered, 'Gentle Sir, it is a very great affliction called sickness, that has grown up, caused by the inflammation of the (three) humours, which has made even this strong man¹ no longer master of himself.'

43. Then the prince again addressed him, looking upon the man compassionately, 'Is this evil peculiar

¹ Sakro-pi.

to him or are all beings alike threatened by sickness ?'

44. Then the charioteer answered, 'O prince, this evil is common to all ; thus pressed round by diseases men run to pleasure, though racked with pain¹.'

45. Having heard this account, his mind deeply distressed, he trembled like the moon reflected in the waves of water ; and full of sorrow he uttered these words in a low voice :

46. 'Even while they see all this calamity of diseases mankind can yet feel tranquillity ; alas for the scattered intelligence of men who can smile when still not free from the terrors of disease !

47. 'Let the chariot, O charioteer, be turned back from going outside, let it return straight to the king's palace ; having heard this alarm of disease, my mind shrinks into itself, repelled from pleasures.'

48. Then having turned back, with all joy departed, he entered his home, absorbed in thought ; and having seen him thus return a second time, the king himself entered the city.

49. Having heard the occasion of the prince's return he felt himself as deserted by him, and, although unused to severe punishment, even when displeased, he rebuked him whose duty it was to see that the road was clear.

50. And once more he arranged for his son all kinds of worldly enjoyments to their highest point ; imploring in his heart, 'Would that he might not be able to forsake us, even though rendered unable only through the restlessness of his senses².'

¹ Rugâturo. [The Tibetan seems to have read rugâmtare,—nad thar-phyin-na, 'having come to the end of illness.' H.W.]

² I would read api nâma sakto—.

51. But when in the women's apartments his son found no pleasure in the several objects of the senses, sweet sounds and the rest, he gave orders for another progress outside, thinking to himself¹, 'It may create a diversion of sentiment².'

52. And in his affection pondering on the condition of his son, never thinking of any ills that might come from his haste, he ordered the best singing-women to be in attendance, as well-skilled in all the soft arts that can please.

53. Then the royal road being specially adorned and guarded, the king once more made the prince go out, having ordered the charioteer and chariot to proceed in a contrary direction (to the previous one).

54. But as the king's son was thus going on his way, the very same deities created a dead man, and only the charioteer and the prince, and none else, beheld him as he was carried dead along the road.

55. Then spoke the prince to the charioteer, 'Who is this borne by four men, followed by mournful companions, who is bewailed, adorned but no longer breathing³?'

56. Then the driver,—having his mind overpowered by the gods who possess pure minds and pure dwellings,—himself knowing the truth, uttered to his lord this truth also which was not to be told:

57. 'This is some poor man who, bereft of his intellect, senses, vital airs and qualities, lying asleep

¹ I would read manyamānaḥ.

² A technical term in rhetoric. Cf. Sāhitya Darpa. § 220.

³ I would read asvâsy avarudyate.

and unconscious, like mere wood or straw, is abandoned alike by friends and enemies after they have carefully swathed and guarded him.'

58. Having heard these words of the charioteer he was somewhat startled and said to him, 'Is this an accident peculiar to him alone, or is such the end of all living creatures?'

59. Then the charioteer replied to him, 'This is the final end of all living creatures; be it a mean man, a man of middle state, or a noble, destruction is fixed to all in this world.'

60. Then the king's son, sedate though he was, as soon as he heard of death, immediately sank down overwhelmed, and pressing the end of the chariot-pole with his shoulder spoke with a loud voice,

61. 'Is this end appointed to all creatures, and yet the world throws off all fear and is infatuated! Hard indeed, I think, must the hearts of men be, who can be self-composed in such a road.

62. 'Therefore, O charioteer, turn back our chariot, this is no time or place for a pleasure-excursion; how can a rational being, who knows what destruction is, stay heedless here, in the hour of calamity¹?'

63. Even when the prince thus spoke to him, the charioteer did not turn the chariot back; but at his peremptorily reiterated command he retired to the forest Padmakhandā.

64. There he beheld that lovely forest like Nandana itself, full of young trees in flower, with intoxicated kokilas wandering joyously about, and

¹ The Tibetan has *ñam thag dus-su*, 'at the time of oppression (as by misfortune).' Does this imply a reading *ārtti-kāle*?

with its bright lakes gay with lotuses and well-furnished with watering-places¹.

65. The king's son was perforce carried away to that wood filled with troops of beautiful women, just as if some devotee who had newly taken his vow were carried off, feeling weak to withstand temptation, to the palace of the monarch of Alakâ², gay with the dancing of the loveliest heavenly nymphs.

¹ Sc. for cattle, cf. Mahâbh. XII, 9270 (in the text read -dîrghikam).

² Kuvera.

BOOK IV.

1. Then from that city-garden, with their eyes restless in excitement, the women went out to meet the prince as a newly-arrived bridegroom ;

2. And when they came up to him, their eyes wide open in wonder, they performed their due homage with hands folded like a lotus-calyx.

3. Then they stood surrounding him, their minds overpowered by passion, as if they were drinking him in with their eyes motionless and blossoming wide with love.

4. Some of the women verily thought that he was Kâma incarnate,—decorated as he was with his brilliant signs as with connate ornaments.

5. Others thought from his gentleness and majesty that it was the moon with its ambrosial beams as it were visibly come down to the earth.

6. Others, smitten by his beauty, yawned¹ as if to swallow him, and fixing their eyes on each other, softly sighed.

7. Thus the women only looked upon him, simply gazing with their eyes,—they spoke not, nor did they smile, controlled by his power.

8. But having seen them thus listless, bewildered in their love, the wise son of the family priest, Udāyin, thus addressed them :

9. 'Ye are all skilled in all the graceful arts,

¹ Cf. Sâhitya Darp. § 155, 13.

proficients in understanding the language of amorous sentiments, possessed of beauty and gracefulness, thorough masters in your own styles.

10. 'With these graces of yours ye may embellish even the Northern Kurus, yea, even the dances¹ of Kuvera, much more this little earth.

11. 'Ye are able to move even sages who have lost all their desires, and to ensnare even the gods who are charmed by heavenly nymphs.

12. 'By your skill in expressing the heart's feelings, by your coquetry, your grace, and your perfect beauty, ye are able to enrapture even women, how much more easily men.

13. 'You thus skilled as ye are, each set² in her own proper sphere,—such as this is your power,—I am not satisfied with your simplicity [when you profess to find him beyond your reach].

14. 'This timid action of yours would be fit for new brides, their eyes closed through shame,—or it might be a blandishment worthy even of the wives of the cowherds³.

15. 'What though this hero be great by his exalted glory, yet "great is the might of women," let this be your firm resolve.

16. 'In olden time a great seer, hard to be conquered even by the gods, was spurned by a harlot, the beauty of Kâsi, planting her feet upon him.

17. 'The Bhikshu Manthâlagautama was also formerly spurned by Bâlamukhyâ with her leg, and

¹ Professor Bühler suggests *kâkrîdam*, cf. sloka 28.

² I read *niyuktânâm* for *viyuktânâm*.

³ Is this a reference to *Krishna's* story? but cf. Weber, *Ind. Antiquary*, vol. v, p. 254.

wishing to please her he carried out dead bodies for her sake to be buried.

18. 'And a woman low in standing and caste fascinated the great seer Gautama, though a master of long penances and old in years.

19. 'So *Sāntā*¹ by her various wiles captivated and subdued the sage's son *Rishyasringa*, unskilled in women's ways.

20. 'And the great seer *Visvāmitra*, though plunged in a profound penance², was carried captive for ten years in the forests by the nymph *Ghrītāki*³.

21. 'Many such seers as these have women brought to shame,—how much more then a delicate prince in the first flower of his age?

22. 'This being so, boldly put forth your efforts that the prosperity of the king's family may not be turned away from him.

23. 'Ordinary women captivate similar lovers; but they are truly women who subdue the natures of high and low.'

24. Having heard these words of *Udāyin* these women as stung to the heart rose even above themselves for the conquest of the prince.

25. With their brows, their glances, their coquetries, their smiles, their delicate movements, they made all sorts of significant gestures like women utterly terrified.

26. But they soon regained their confidence⁴ through the command of the king and the gentle temperament of the prince, and through the power of intoxication and of love.

¹ *Rāmāy.* I, 10 (Schleg. ed.). ² I would read *mahat tapaḥ*.

³ *Rāmāy.* IV, 35. ⁴ Lit. 'dispelled their want of confidence.'

27. Then surrounded by troops of women the prince wandered in the wood like an elephant in the forests of Himavat accompanied by a herd of females.

28. Attended by the women he shone in that pleasant grove, as the sun surrounded by Apsarasas in his royal garden.

29. There some of them, urged by passion, pressed him with their full firm bosoms in gentle collisions.

30. Another violently embraced him after making a pretended stumble,—leaning on him with her shoulders drooping down, and with her gentle creeper-like arms dependent.

31. Another with her mouth smelling of spirituous liquor, her lower lip red like copper, whispered in his ear, 'Let my secret be heard.'

32. Another, all wet with unguents, as if giving him her command, clasped his hand eagerly and said, 'Perform thy rites of adoration here.'

33. Another, with her blue garments continually slipping down in pretended intoxication, stood conspicuous with her tongue visible like the night with its lightning flashing.

34. Others, with their golden zones tinkling, wandered about here and there, showing to him their hips veiled with thin cloth.

35. Others leaned, holding a mango-bough in full flower, displaying their bosoms like golden jars.

36. Another, coming from a lotus-bed, carrying lotuses and with eyes like lotuses, stood like the lotus-goddess Padmā, by the side of that lotus-faced prince.

37. Another sang a sweet song easily understood and with the proper gesticulations, rousing

him, self-subdued though he was, by her glances, as saying, 'O how thou art deluded!'

38. Another, having armed herself¹ with her bright face, with its brow-bow drawn to its full, imitated his action, as playing the hero.

39. Another, with beautiful full bosoms, and having her earrings waving in the wind², laughed loudly at him, as if saying, 'Catch me, sir, if you can!'

40. Some, as he was going away, bound him with strings of garlands,—others punished him with words like an elephant-driver's hook, gentle yet reproachful.

41. Another, wishing to argue with him, seizing a mango-spray, asked, all bewildered with passion, 'This flower, whose is it?'

42. Another, assuming a gait and attitude like those of a man, said to him, 'Thou who art conquered by women, go and conquer this earth!'

43. Then another with rolling eyes, smelling a blue lotus, thus addressed the prince with words slightly indistinct in her excitement,

44. 'See, my lord, this mango covered with its honey-scented flowers, where the kokila sings, as if imprisoned in a golden cage.

45. 'Come and see this asoka tree, which augments lovers' sorrows,—where the bees make a noise as if they were scorched by fire.

46. 'Come and see this tilaka tree, embraced by a slender mango-branch, like a man in a white garment by a woman decked with yellow unguents.

47. 'Behold this kuruvaka in flower, bright like

¹ *Prâvritya*.

² I read *vâtâghûrmita*.

fresh¹ resin-juice, which bends down as if it felt reproached by the colour of women's nails².

48. 'Come and see this young asoka, covered all over with new shoots, which stands as it were ashamed at the beauty of our hands.

49. 'See this lake surrounded by the sinduvâra shrubs growing on its banks³, like a fair woman reclining, clad in fine white cloth.

50. 'See the imperial power of females,—yonder ruddy-goose in the water goes behind his mate following her like a slave.

51. 'Come and listen to the notes of this intoxicated cuckoo as he sings, while another cuckoo sings as if consenting, wholly without care.

52. 'Would that thine was the intoxication of the birds which the spring produces,—and not the thought of a thinking man, ever pondering how wise he is!'

53. Thus these young women, their souls carried away by love, assailed the prince with all kinds of stratagems.

54. But although thus attacked, he, having his senses guarded by self-control, neither rejoiced nor smiled, thinking anxiously, 'One must die.'

55. Having seen them in their real condition⁴, that best of men pondered with an undisturbed⁵ and steadfast mind.

¹ I read *nirmuktam*, which might mean 'just exuded,' or the whole compound may mean (cf. Kum. Sambh. V, 34) 'like a lip which has given up the use of pungent.'

² Cf. Vikramorvaśi, Act II, *strī-nakha-pâ/alam kuruvakam*.

³ I read *tīragaiḥ sinduvâarakaiḥ*.

⁴ For *vasthānam* cf. Maitri Upan. (Comm.) VI, 1.

⁵ I would read *asamvignena*.

56. 'What is it that these women lack¹ that they perceive not that youth is fickle? for this old age will destroy whatever has beauty.

57. 'Verily they do not see any one's plunge into disease, and so dismissing fear, they are joyous in a world which is all pain.

58. 'Evidently they know nothing of death which carries all away; and so at ease and without distress they can sport and laugh.

59. 'What rational being, who knows of old age, death and sickness, could stand² or sit down at his ease or sleep, far less laugh?

60. 'But he verily is like one bereft of sense, who, beholding another aged or sick or dead, remains self-possessed and not afflicted.

61. '(So) even when a tree is deprived of its flowers and fruits, or if it is cut down and falls, no other tree sorrows.'

62. Seeing him thus absorbed in contemplation, with his desires estranged from all worldly objects, Udāyin, well skilled in the rules of policy, with kindly feelings addressed him :

63. 'Since I was appointed by the king as a fitting friend for thee, therefore I have a wish to speak to thee in this friendliness of my heart.

64. 'To hinder from what is disadvantageous,—to urge to what is advantageous,—and not to forsake in misfortune,—these are the three marks of a friend.

65. 'If I, after having promised my friendship, were not to heed when thou turnest away from the great end of man, there would be no friendship in me.

¹ *Kim vinā.*

² I would conjecture *tish/āen.*

66. 'Therefore I speak as thy friend,—such rudeness as this to women is not befitting for one young in years and graceful in person.

67. 'It is right to woo a woman even by guile,—this is useful both for getting rid of shame and for one's own enjoyment.

68. 'Reverential behaviour and compliance with her wishes are what binds a woman's heart; good qualities truly are a cause of love, and women love respect.

69. 'Wilt thou not then, O large-eyed prince, even if thy heart is unwilling, seek to please them with a courtesy worthy of this beauty of thine?

70. 'Courtesy is the balm of women, courtesy is the best ornament; beauty without courtesy is like a grove without flowers.

71. 'But of what use is courtesy by itself? let it be assisted by the heart's feelings; surely, when worldly objects so hard to attain are in thy grasp, thou wilt not despise them.

72. 'Knowing that pleasure was the best of objects, even the god Purāṃdara (Indra) wooed in olden time Ahalyā the wife of the saint Gautama.

73. 'So too Agastya wooed Rohini, the wife of Soma; and therefore, as Sruti saith, a like thing befell Lopāmudrā¹.

74. 'The great ascetic Vṛihaspati begot Bharadvāga on Mamatā the daughter of the Maruts, the wife of Autathya².

¹ Agastya's wife. This seems to refer to Lopāmudrā's words to her husband in Rig-veda I, 179; cf. also Mahābh. III, xcvi.

² This should be Utathya (cf. Mahābh. I, civ). Mamatā had Dīrghatamas by her husband and Bharadvāga by Vṛihaspati. The MSS. read Samatā.

75. 'The Moon, the best of offerers, begat Budha of divine nature on the spouse of *Vṛihaspati* as she was offering a libation ¹.

76. 'So too in old time *Parâsara*, overpowered by passion on the bank of the *Yamunâ*, lay with the maiden *Kâlti* who was the daughter of the son of the Water (*Agni*).

77. 'The sage *Vasishtha* through lust begot a son *Kapiṅgalâda* on *Akshamâlâ* a despised low-caste woman ².

78. 'And the seer-king *Yayâti*, even when the vigour of his prime was gone, sported in the *Kaitraratha* forest with the *Apsaras Visvâti*.

79. 'And the Kaurava king *Pându*, though he knew that intercourse with his wife would end in death, yet overcome by the beauty and good qualities of *Mâdri* yielded to the pleasures of love.

80. 'And so *Karâlaganaka*, when he carried off the *Brâhman's* daughter, incurred loss of caste thereby, but he would not give up his love.

81. 'Great heroes such as these pursued even contemptible desires for the sake of pleasure, how much more so when they are praiseworthy of their kind?

82. 'And yet thou, a young man, possessed of strength and beauty, despisest enjoyments which rightly belong to thee, and to which the whole world is devoted.'

83. Having heard these specious words of his, well-supported by sacred tradition, the prince made reply, in a voice like the thundering of a cloud :

¹ She is called *Târâ*, *Vishnu Pur.* IV, 6.

² *Manu* IX, 23.

84. 'This speech manifesting affection is well-befitting in thee; but I will convince thee as to where thou wrongly judgest me.

85. 'I do not despise worldly objects, I know that all mankind are bound up therein; but remembering that the world is transitory, my mind cannot find pleasure in them.

86. 'Old age, disease, and death—if these three things did not exist, I too should find my enjoyment in the objects that please the mind.

87. 'Yet even though this beauty of women were to remain perpetual, still delight in the pleasures of desire would not be worthy of the wise man.

88. 'But since their beauty will be drunk up by old age, to delight therein through infatuation cannot be a thing approved even by thyself¹.

89. 'He who himself subject to death, disease, and old age, can sport undisturbed with those whose very nature implies death, disease, and old age,—such a man is on a level with birds and beasts.

90. 'And as for what thou sayest as to even those great men having become victims to desire,—do not be bewildered by them, for destruction was also their lot.

91. 'Real greatness is not to be found there, where there is universally destruction, or where there is attachment to earthly objects, or a want of self-control.

92. 'And when thou sayest, "Let one deal with women even by guile," I know nought about guile, even if it be accompanied with courtesy.

93. 'That compliance too with a woman's wishes

¹ Or 'even by the soul.'

pleases me not, if truthfulness be not there ; if there be not a union with one's whole soul and nature, then "out upon it" say I.

94. 'A soul overpowered by passion, believing in falsehood, carried away by attachment and blind to the faults of its objects,—what is there in it worth being deceived ?

95. 'And if the victims of passion do deceive one another,—are not men unfit for women to look at and women for men ?

96. 'Since then these things are so, thou surely wouldest not lead me astray into ignoble pleasures,—me afflicted by sorrow, and subject to old age and death ?

97. 'Ah ! thy mind must be very firm and strong, if thou canst find substance in the transitory pleasures of sense ; even in the midst of violent alarm thou canst cling to worldly objects, when thou seest all created beings in the road of death.

98. 'But I am fearful and exceedingly bewildered, as I ponder the terrors of old age, death, and disease ; I can find no peace, no self-command, much less can I find pleasure, while I see the world as it were ablaze with fire.

99. 'If desire arises in the heart of the man, who knows that death is certain,—I think that his soul must be made of iron, who restrains it in this great terror and does not weep.'

100. Then the prince uttered a discourse full of resolve and abolishing the objects of desire ; and the lord of day, whose orb is the worthy centre of human eyes, departed to the Western Mountain.

101. And the women, having worn their garlands and ornaments in vain, with their graceful arts and

endearments all fruitless, concealing their love deep in their hearts¹, returned to the city with broken hopes.

102. Having thus seen the beauty² of the troop of women who had gone out to the city-garden, now withdrawn in the evening,—the prince, pondering the transitoriness which envelopes all things, entered his dwelling.

103. Then the king, when he heard how his mind turned away from all objects of sense, could not lie down all that night, like an elephant with an arrow in its heart; but wearied in all sorts of consultation, he and his ministers could find no other means beside these (despised) pleasures to restrain his son's purpose.

¹ Reading *sva eva bhâve* from the Tibetan.

² Reading *sriyam* for *striyam*.

BOOK V.

1. He, the son of the Sākya king, even though thus tempted by the objects of sense which infatuate others, yielded not to pleasure and felt not delight, like a lion deeply pierced in his heart by a poisoned arrow.

2. Then one day accompanied by some worthy sons of his father's ministers, friends full of varied converse,—with a desire to see the glades of the forest and longing for peace, he went out with the king's permission.

3. Having mounted his good horse *Kamthaka*, decked with bells and bridle-bit of new gold, with beautiful golden harness and the chowrie waving¹, he went forth like the moon² mounted on a comet.

4. Lured by love of the wood and longing for the beauties of the ground³, he went to a spot near at hand⁴ on the forest-outskirts; and there he saw a piece of land being ploughed, with the path of the plough broken like waves on the water.

¹ 'The white bushy tail of the Tibet cow, fixed on a gold or ornamented shaft, rose from between the ears of the horse.' Wilson, *Hindu Drama*, I, p. 200.

² The Tibetan has *tog-la ljon-dan chu-skyes tog-can*, 'like him who has the sign of a tree and water-born (lotus,) (mounted) on a comet,' but with no further explanation. Could this mean the moon as *oshadhipati* and as *kumu esa*?

³ Should we read *-gunekkkhu* for *-gunâkkha*?

⁴ *Nikrīśhātārām*; one MS. reads *vikrīśha-*, 'ploughed.'

5. Having beheld the ground in this condition, with its young grass scattered and torn by the plough, and covered with the eggs and young of little insects which were killed, he was filled with deep sorrow as for the slaughter of his own kindred.

6. And beholding the men as they were ploughing, their complexions spoiled by the dust, the sun's rays, and the wind, and their cattle bewildered with the burden of drawing, the most noble one felt extreme compassion.

7. Having alighted from the back of his horse, he went over the ground slowly, overcome with sorrow, —pondering the birth and destruction of the world, he, grieved, exclaimed, 'this is indeed pitiable.'

8. Then desiring to become perfectly lonely in his thoughts, having stopped those friends who were following him, he went to the root of a rose-apple in a solitary spot, which had its beautiful leaves all tremulous (in the wind).

9. There he sat down on the ground covered with leaves¹, and with its young grass bright like lapis lazuli; and, meditating on the origin and destruction of the world, he laid hold of the path that leads to firmness of mind.

10. Having attained to firmness of mind², and being forthwith set free from all sorrows such as the desire of worldly objects and the rest, he attained

¹ The MSS. add -*koravatyâm*, an obscure word, which may be connected with *khura* or perhaps should be altered to -*koravatyâm*, i.e. 'covered with sharp-pointed leaves,' or 'covered with leaves and buds.' [The Tibetan has *gcañ-mar ldan-pai sa-gzhi der-ni de zhugs-te*, 'on the pure ground here he sitting.' This might point to so-tra *saukavatyâm*. H.W.]

² Query, *samavāptamāṅsthitiḥ* for -*manāṅsthiteḥ*.

the first stage of contemplation, unaffected by sin, calm, and 'argumentative'¹.

11. Having then obtained the highest happiness sprung from deliberation², he next pondered this meditation,—having thoroughly understood in his mind the course of the world :

12. 'It is a miserable thing that mankind, though themselves powerless³ and subject to sickness, old age, and death, yet, blinded by passion and ignorant, look with disgust on another who is afflicted by old age or diseased or dead.

13. 'If I here, being such myself, should feel disgust for another who has such a nature, it would not be worthy or right in me who know this highest duty.'

14. As he thus considered thoroughly these faults of sickness, old age, and death which belong to all living beings, all the joy which he had felt in the activity of his vigour, his youth, and his life, vanished in a moment.

15. He did not rejoice, he did not feel remorse ; he suffered no hesitation, indolence, nor sleep ; he felt no drawing towards the qualities of desire ; he hated not nor scorned another.

16. Thus did this pure passionless meditation grow within the great-souled one ; and unobserved by the other men, there crept up a man in a beggar's dress.

17. The king's son asked him a question,—he said to him, 'Tell me, who art thou ?' and the other replied, 'Oh bull of men, I, being terrified at birth

¹ Savitarka, cf. Yoga-sūtras I, 42. (Read anāsrava-.)

² Two syllables are lost in this line.

³ Arasaḥ.

and death, have become an ascetic for the sake of liberation.

18. 'Desiring liberation in a world subject to destruction, I seek that happy indestructible abode,—isolated from mankind, with my thoughts unlike those of others, and with my sinful passions turned away from all objects of sense

19. 'Dwelling anywhere, at the root of a tree, or in an uninhabited house, a mountain or a forest,—I wander without a family and without hope, a beggar ready for any fare, seeking only the highest good.'

20. When he had thus spoken, while the prince was looking on, he suddenly flew up to the sky; it was a heavenly inhabitant who, knowing that the prince's thoughts were other than what his outward form promised, had come to him for the sake of rousing his recollection.

21. When the other was gone like a bird to heaven, the foremost of men was rejoiced and astonished; and having comprehended the meaning of the term *dharma*¹, he set his mind on the manner of the accomplishment of deliverance.

22. Then like Indra himself, and having tamed his senses,—desiring to return home he mounted his noble steed; and having made him turn back as he looked for his friends, from that moment he sought no more the desired forest.

23. Ever seeking to make an end of old age and death, fixing his thoughts in memory on dwelling in the woods, he entered the city again but with no feelings of longing, like an elephant entering an exercise-ground² after roaming in a forest-land.

24. 'Happy truly and blessed is that woman whose

¹ *Dharmasamgñâm ?*

² Cf. II, 3.

husband is such as thou, O long-eyed prince!' So, on seeing him, the princess exclaimed, folding her hands to welcome him, as he entered the road.

25. He whose voice was deep-sounding like a cloud heard this address and was filled with profound calm; and as he heard the word 'blessed'¹ he fixed his mind on the attainment of Nirvâṇa.

26. Then the prince whose form was like the peak of a golden mountain,—whose eye, voice, and arm resembled a bull, a cloud, and an elephant²,—whose countenance and prowess were like the moon and a lion,—having a longing aroused for something imperishable,—went into his palace.

27. Then stepping like a lion he went towards the king who was attended by his numerous counsellors, like Sanatkumâra in heaven waiting on Indra resplendent in the assembly³ of the Maruts.

28. Prostrating himself, with folded hands, he addressed him, 'Grant me graciously thy permission, O lord of men,—I wish to become a wandering mendicant for the sake of liberation, since separation is appointed for me.'

29. Having heard his words, the king shook like a tree struck by an elephant, and having seized his folded hands which were like a lotus, he thus addressed him in a voice choked with tears:

30. 'O my son, keep back this thought, it is not the time for thee to betake thyself to dharma; they say that the practice of religion is full of evils in the first period of life when the mind is still fickle.

¹ Sc. nirvr̥ta.

² Gagamegharshabhabâhunisvanâkshaṇḍ? So Chinese translation, Beal, st. 356.

³ I read samitau.

31. 'The mind of the thoughtless ignorant young man whose senses are eager for worldly objects, and who has no power of settled resolution for the hardships of vows of penance, shrinks back from the forest, for it is especially destitute of discrimination.

32. 'It is high time for me to practise religion, O my child of loved qualities¹, leaving my royal glory to thee who art well worthy to be distinguished by it; but thy religion, O firm-striding hero, is to be accomplished by heroism; it would be irreligion if thou wert to leave thine own father.

33. 'Do thou therefore abandon this thy resolution; devote thyself for the present to the duties of a householder; to a man who has enjoyed the pleasures of his prime, it is delightful to enter the penance-forest.'

34. Having heard these words of the king, he made his reply in a voice soft like a sparrow's: 'If thou wilt be my surety, O king, against four contingencies, I will not betake myself to the forest.

35. 'Let not my life be subject to death, and let not disease impair this health of mine; let not old age attack my youth, and let not misfortune destroy my weal.'

36. When his son uttered a speech so hard to be understood, the king of the Sākya thus replied: 'Abandon this idea bent upon departure; extravagant desires are only ridiculous.'

37. Then he who was firm as Mount Meru addressed his father: 'If this is impossible, then this course of mine is not to be hindered; it is not right to lay hold of one who would escape² from a house that is on fire.

¹ Or 'lover of religion.'

² Read *nirāṅkramishum*.

38. 'As separation is inevitable to the world, but not for Dharma¹, this separation is preferable; will not death sever me helplessly, my objects unattained, and myself unsatisfied?'

39. The monarch, having heard this resolve of his son longing for liberation, and having again exclaimed, 'He shall not go,' set guards round him and the highest pleasures.

40. Then having been duly instructed² by the counsellors, with all respect and affection, according to the śāstras, and being thus forbidden with tears by his father, the prince, sorrowing, entered into his palace.

41. There he was gazed at by his wives with restless eyes, whose faces were kissed by their dangling earrings, and whose bosoms were shaken with their thick-coming sighs,—as by so many young fawns.

42. Bright like a golden mountain, and bewitching the hearts of the noble women, he enraptured their ears, limbs, eyes, and souls by his speech, touch, form, and qualities.

43. When the day was gone, then, shining with his form like the sun, he ascended the palace, as the rising sun ascends Mount Meru, desiring to dispel the darkness by his own splendour.

44. Having ascended, he repaired to a special golden seat decorated with embellishments of diamond, with tall lighted candlesticks ablaze with gold, and its interior filled with the incense of black aloewood.

45. Then the noblest of women waited during the

¹ This accompanies the soul at death; cf. *Manu* VIII, 17.

² Does this allude to *Udāyin*? or should we translate it 'being shown the way?'

night on the noblest of men who was like Indra himself, with a concert of musical instruments, as the crowds of heavenly nymphs wait on the son of the Lord of wealth¹ upon the summit of Himavat, white like the moon.

46. But even by those beautiful instruments like heavenly music he was not moved to pleasure or delight; since his desire to go forth from his home to seek the bliss of the highest end was never lulled.

47. Then by the power of the heavenly beings most excellent in self-mortification, the Akanishṭhas, who knew the purpose of his heart, deep sleep was suddenly thrown on that company of women and their limbs and gestures became distorted².

48. One was lying there, resting her cheek on her trembling arm; leaving as in anger her lute, though dearly loved, which lay on her side, decorated with gold-leaf.

49. Another shone with her flute clinging to her hand, lying with her white garments fallen from her bosom,—like a river whose banks are smiling with the foam of the water and whose lotuses are covered with a straight line of bees³.

50. Another was sleeping⁴, embracing her drum as a lover, with her two arms tender like the shoot of a young lotus and bearing their bracelets closely linked, blazing with gold.

51. Others, decked with new golden ornaments

¹ Sc. Kuvera. I follow Professor Max Müller's suggested reading himavakḥkirasīva for the MS. himavadgirisīva.

² With this description of the sleeping women compare that in the Rāmāyaṇa, V, 10.

³ The bees represent the flute held in the lotus-like hand.

⁴ I would read tathāparā.

and wearing peerless yellow garments, fell down alas! helpless with sleep, like the boughs of the Karṣikāra broken by an elephant.

52. Another, leaning on the side of a window, with her willow-form bent like a bow, shone as she lay with her beautiful necklace hanging down, like a statue¹ in an archway made by art.

53. The lotus-face of another, bowed down, with the pinguent-lines on her person rubbed by the jewelled earrings, appeared to be a lotus with its stalk bent into a half-circle, and shaken by a duck standing on it².

54. Others, lying as they sat, with their limbs oppressed by the weight of their bosoms, shone in their beauty, mutually clasping one another with their twining arms decorated with golden bracelets.

55. And another damsel lay sound asleep, embracing her big lute as if it were a female friend, and rolled it about, while its golden strings trembled, with her own face bright with her shaken earrings.

56. Another lay, with her tabour, . . .

57. Others showed no lustre with their eyes shut, although they were really full-eyed and fair-browed, —like the lotus-beds with their buds closed at the setting of the sun.

58. Another, with her hair loose and dishevelled, and her skirts and ornaments fallen from her loins, lay with her necklace in confusion, like a woman crushed by an elephant and then dropped.

59. Others, helpless and lost to shame, though

¹ *Sālabhaṃgikā*?

² This is a hard verse, but the woman's face above the bent body seems to be compared to the duck standing on the flower and bending its stalk.

naturally self-possessed and endued with all graces of person, breathed violently as they lay and yawned with their arms distorted and tossed about.

60. Others, with their ornaments and garlands thrown off,—unconscious, with their garments spread out unfastened,—their bright eyes wide open and motionless,—lay without any beauty as if they were dead.

61. Another, with fully-developed limbs, her mouth wide open, her saliva dropping, and her person exposed, lay as though sprawling in intoxication,—she spoke not, but bore every limb distorted.

62. Thus that company of women, lying in different attitudes, according to their disposition and family, bore the aspect of a lake whose lotuses were bent down and broken by the wind.

63. Then having seen these young women thus lying distorted and with uncontrolled gestures,—however excellent their forms and graceful their appearance,—the king's son felt moved with scorn.

64. 'Such is the nature of women, impure and monstrous in the world of living beings; but deceived by dress and ornaments a man becomes infatuated by a woman's attractions.

65. 'If a man would but consider the natural state of women and this change produced in them by sleep, assuredly he would not cherish his folly; but he is smitten from a right will and so succumbs to passion.'

66. Thus to him having recognised that difference there arose a desire to escape in the night; and then the gods, knowing his purpose, caused the door of the palace to fly open.

67. Then he went down from the roof of the

palace, scorning those women who lay thus distorted; and having descended, undauntedly he went out first into the courtyard¹.

68. Having awakened his horse's attendant, the swift *Khamdaka*, he thus addressed him: 'Bring me quickly my horse *Kamthaka*², I wish to-day to go hence to attain immortality.

69. 'Since such is the firm content which to-day is produced in my heart, and since my determination is settled in calm resolve, and since even in loneliness I seem to possess a guide,—verily the end which I desire is now before me.

70. 'Since abandoning all shame and modesty these women lay before me as they did, and the two doors opened of their own accord, verily the time is come to depart for my true health.'

71. Then, accepting his lord's command, though he knew the purport of the king's injunctions, as being urged by a higher power in his mind, he set himself to bring the horse.

72. Then he brought out for his master that noble steed, his mouth furnished with a golden bit, his back lightly touched by the bed on which he had been lying, and endued with strength, vigour, speed, and swiftness³;

73. With a long chine, and root of the tail and heel,—gentle, with short hair, back, and ears,—with his back, belly, and sides depressed and elevated,—with broad nostrils, forehead, hips, and breast⁴.

74. The broad-chested hero, having embraced him,

¹ Cf. Mahābh. II, 32.

² Spelt in the MSS. sometimes *Kamthaka*, but not always clear.

³ Read *gavatvaropapannam* for MS. *gavatvalo-*.

⁴ Cf. the description in Shakespeare's *Venus and Adonis*.

and caressing him with his lotus-like hand, ordered him with a gentle-toned voice, as if he were desirous to plunge into the middle of an army :

75. ' Oftentimes have evil enemies been overthrown by the king when mounted on thee ; do thou, O best of steeds, so exert thyself that I too may obtain the highest immortality ¹.

76. ' Companions are easy to be found in battle or in the happiness obtained by winning worldly objects or in attaining wealth ; but companions are hard for a man to find who has fallen into misfortune or when he flies for refuge to Dharma.

77. ' And yet all those who in this world are companions, whether in sinful custom or in seeking for Dharma,—as my inner soul now recognises,—they too are verily sharers in the common aim.

78. ' Since then, when I attain this righteous end, my escape from hence will be for the good of the world,—O best of steeds, by thy speed and energy, strive for thine own good and the good of the world.'

79. Thus having exhorted the best of steeds like a friend to his duty, he, the best of men, longing to go to the forest, wearing a noble form, in brightness like fire ², mounted the white horse as the sun an autumnal cloud.

80. Then that good steed, avoiding all noises which would sound startling in the dead of night and awaken the household,—all sound of his jaws hushed and his neighing silenced,—went forth, planting his hurrying steps at full speed.

81. With their lotus-like hands, whose fore-arms

¹ Yathâvat=yathâ.

² Asitagati seems here used like *krîṣṇagati*, 'fire.'

were adorned with golden bracelets, the Yakshas, with their bodies bent down, threw lotuses and bore up his hoofs as he rushed in startled haste.

82. The city-roads which were closed with heavy gates and bars, and which could be with difficulty opened¹ even by elephants, flew open of their own accord without noise, as the prince went through.

83. Firm in his resolve and leaving behind without hesitation his father who turned ever towards him², and his young son, his affectionate people and his unparalleled magnificence, he then went forth out of his father's city.

84. Then he with his eyes long and like a full-blown lotus, looking back on the city, uttered a sound like a lion, 'Till I have seen the further shore of birth and death I will never again enter the city called after Kapila.'

85. Having heard this his utterance, the troops of the court of the Lord of wealth³ rejoiced; and the hosts of the gods, triumphing, wished him a successful accomplishment of his purpose.

86. Other heavenly beings with forms bright like fire, knowing that his purpose was hard to fulfil, produced a light on his dewy path like the rays of the moon issuing from the rift of a cloud.

87. But he with his horse like the horse of Indra, the lord of bay horses, hurrying on as if spurred in his mind, went over the leagues full of many conflicting emotions⁴,—the sky all the while with its cloud-masses checkered with the light of the dawn.

¹ Apâdhriyante MSS., but I read apâvri-.

² Abhimukham.

³ Sc. the Yakshas.

⁴ Or perhaps 'six leagues.'

BOOK VI.

1. Then when the sun, the eye of the world, was just risen, he, the noblest of men, beheld the hermitage of the son of *Bhrigu*,

2. Its deer all asleep in quiet trust, its birds tranquilly resting,—seeing it he too became restful, and he felt as if his end was attained.

3. For the sake of ending his wonder and to show reverence for the penances observed, and as expressing his own conformity therewith¹, he alighted from the back of his horse.

4. Having alighted, he stroked the horse, exclaiming, 'All is saved,' and he spoke well-pleased to *Khamdaka*, bedewing him as it were with tears from his eyes :

5. 'Good friend, thy devotion to me and thy courage of soul have been proved by thy thus following this steed whose speed is like that of *Tārکشya*².

6. 'Bent even though I am on other business, I am wholly won in heart by thee,—one who has such a love for his master, and at the same time is able to carry out his wish.

7. 'One can be able without affection, and affectionate though unable; but one like thee, at once affectionate and able, is hard to find in the world.

¹ *Svām kānuvartitām rakshan*. [The Tibetan has the obscure *rañ-gi rjes-su bsrūn-va la=sva+anu+rakshan?* H. W.]

² An old mythic representation of the sun as a horse.

8. 'I am pleased with this noble action of thine; this feeling is seen towards me, even though I am regardless of conferring rewards.

9. 'Who would not be favourably disposed to one who stands to him as bringing him reward? but even one's own people commonly become mere strangers in a reverse of fortune¹.

10. 'The son is maintained for the sake of the family, the father is honoured for the sake of our own (future) support; the world shows kindness for the sake of hope; there is no such a thing as unselfishness without a motive.

11. 'Why speak many words? in short, thou hast done me a very great kindness; take now my horse and return, I have attained the desired wood.'

12. Thus having spoken, the mighty hero in his desire to show perfect gentleness² unloosed his ornaments and gave them to the other, who was deeply grieved.

13. Having taken a brilliant jewel whose effect illumined his diadem, he stood, uttering these words, like the mountain *Mam̐dara* with the sun resting on it:

14. 'By thee with this jewel, O *Kham̐da*, having offered him repeated obeisance, the king, with his loving confidence still unshaken, must be enjoined to stay his grief.

15. "'I have entered the ascetic-wood to destroy old age and death,—with no thirst for heaven, with no lack of love nor feeling of anger.

¹ *Gant̐bhavati* may be a quaint expression for *paragano bhavati*,—this seems the meaning of the Tibetan. Or we might read *ganyo bhavati*.

² *Ān̐ṛisamsa* (for *ān̐ṛisamsya*), see *Pāṇini* V, 1, 130 *gana*.

16. "Do not think of mourning for me who am thus gone forth from my home ; union, however long it may last, in time will come to an end.

17. "Since separation is certain, therefore is my mind fixed on liberation ; how shall there not be repeated severings from one's kindred ?

18. "Do not think of mourning for me who am gone forth to leave sorrow behind ; it is the thralls of passion, who are attached to desires, the causes of sorrow, for whom thou shouldst mourn.

19. "This was the firm persuasion of our predecessors,—I as one departing by a common road am not to be mourned for by my heir.

20. "At a man's death there are doubtless heirs to his wealth ; but heirs to his merit are hard to find on the earth or exist not at all.

21. "Even though thou sayest, 'He is gone at a wrong time to the wood,'—there is no wrong time for religious duty (dharma), life being fragile as it is.

22. "Therefore my determination is, 'I must seek my supreme good this very day ;' what confidence can there be in life, when death stands as our adversary ?"

23. 'Do thou address the king, O friend, with these and such-like words ; and do thou use thy efforts so that he may not even remember me.

24. 'Yea, do thou repeat to the king our utter unworthiness ; through unworthiness affection is lost, —and where affection is lost, there is no sorrow.'

25. Having heard these words, *Khamda*, overwhelmed with grief, made reply with folded hands, his voice choked by tears :

26. 'At this state of mind of thine, causing afflic-

tion to thy kindred, my mind, O my lord, sinks down like an elephant in the mud of a river.

27. 'To whom would not such a determination as this of thine cause tears, even if his heart were of iron,—how much more if it were throbbing with love?

28. 'Where¹ is this delicacy of limb, fit to lie only in a palace,—and where is the ground of the ascetic-forest, covered with the shoots of rough kusa grass?

29. 'When, on hearing thy resolve, I first brought thee this horse,—it was fate only, O my lord, which made me do it, mastering my will.

30. 'But how could I, O king, by mine own will,—knowing this thy decision,—carry back the horse to the sorrow of Kapilavastu?

31. 'Surely thou wilt not abandon, O hero, that fond old king, so devoted to his son, as a heretic might the true religion?

32. 'And her, thy second mother, worn with the care of bringing thee up,—thou wilt not surely forget her, as an ingrate a benefit?

33. 'Thou wilt not surely abandon thy queen, endowed with all virtues, illustrious for her family, devoted to her husband and with a young son, as a coward the royal dignity within his reach?

34. 'Thou wilt not abandon the young son of Yasodharâ, worthy of all praise, thou the best of the cherishers of religion and fame, as a dissolute spend-thrift his choicest glory?

35. 'Or even if thy mind be resolved to abandon thy kindred and thy kingdom, thou wilt not, O master, abandon me,—thy feet are my only refuge.

¹ A common expression (which occurs also in Persian poetry) to imply the incompatibility of two things.

36. 'I cannot go to the city with my soul thus burning, leaving thee behind in the forest as Sumitra¹ left the son of Raghu.

37. 'What will the king say to me, returning to the city without thee? or what shall I say to thy queens by way of telling them good news?

38. 'As for what thou saidst, "thou must repeat my unworthiness to the king"—how shall I speak what is false of thee as of a sage without a fault?

39. 'Or even if I ventured to speak it with a heart ashamed and a tongue cleaving to my mouth, who would think of believing it?

40. 'He who would tell of or believe the fierceness of the moon, might tell of or believe thy faults, O physician of faults.

41. 'Him who is always compassionate and who never fails to feel pity, it ill befits to abandon one who loves;—turn back and have mercy on me.'

42. Having heard these words of *Khamda* overcome with sorrow,—self-possessed with the utmost firmness the best of speakers answered:

43. 'Abandon this distress, *Khamda*, regarding thy separation from me,—change is inevitable in corporeal beings who are subject to different births.

44. 'Even if I through affection were not to abandon my kindred in my desire for liberation, death would still make us helplessly abandon one another.

45. 'She, my mother, by whom I was borne in the womb with great thirst and pains,—where am I now with regard to her, all her efforts fruitless, and where is she with regard to me?

46. 'As birds go to their roosting-tree and then

¹ This is the Sumantra of the *Rāmāyana* II, 57.

depart, so the meeting of beings inevitably ends in separation.

47. 'As clouds, having come together, depart asunder again, such I consider the meeting and parting of living things.

48. 'And since this world goes away, each one of us deceiving the other,—it is not right to think anything thine own in a time of union which is a dream.

49. 'Since the trees are parted from the innate colour of their leaves, why should there not still more be the parting of two things which are alien to each other?

50. 'Therefore, since it is so, grieve not, my good friend, but go; or if thy love lingers, then go and afterwards return.

51. 'Say, without reproaching us, to the people in Kapilavastu, "Let your love for him be given up, and hear his resolve.

52. "'Either he will quickly come back, having destroyed old age and death; or else he will himself perish, having failed in his purpose and lost hold of every support."

53. Having heard his words, Kamthaka, the noblest of steeds, licked his feet with his tongue and dropped hot tears.

54. With his hand whose fingers were united with a membrane and which was marked with the auspicious svastika, and with its middle part curved¹, the prince stroked him and addressed him like a friend:

55. 'Shed not tears, Kamthaka, this thy perfect

¹ Professor Kielhorn suggests *ākra-madhyena*, 'with a wheel in its centre,' cf. VIII, 55.

equine nature has been proved,—bear with it, this thy labour will soon have its fruit.’

56. Then seizing the sharp jewelled sword which was in *Khamdaka*’s hand, he resolutely drew out from the sheath the blade decked with golden ornaments, like a serpent from its hole.

57. Having drawn it forth, dark blue like a blue lotus petal, he cut his decorated tiara and his hair, and he tossed it with its scattered muslin into the air as a grey goose into a lake.

58. And the heavenly beings, with a longing to worship it, seized it respectfully as it was thrown up; and the divine hosts paid it due adoration in heaven with celestial honours.

59. Having thus divorced his ornaments and banished all royal magnificence from his head, and seeing his muslin floating away like a golden goose, the stedfast prince desired a sylvan dress.

60. Then a celestial being, wearing the form of a hunter, pure in heart, knowing his thoughts, approached near him in dark-red garments; and the son of the *Sākya* king thus addressed him:

61. ‘Thy red garments are auspicious, the sign of a saint; but this destructive bow is not befitting; therefore, my good friend, if there is no strong preference in the matter, do thou give me that dress and take this of mine.’

62. The hunter replied, ‘It has given me my desire¹, O giver of desires, as by this I have inspired

¹ I have taken *ârât* as from *â + râ*, but Professor Kielhorn suggests that it might mean ‘near.’ ‘Although in this dress I make the deer come confidently close to me and then kill them, yet take it if you want it.’ [The Tibetan seems to have read *kâmasârât*,—*dod-pa sñin-po las*, ‘from essence of desire.’ H.W.]

animals with confidence and then killed them ; but if thou hast need of it, O thou who art like Indra, accept it at once and give me the white dress.'

63. With extreme joy he then took that sylvan dress and gave away the linen one ; and the hunter, assuming his heavenly form, having taken the white garment, went to heaven.

64. Then the prince and the attendant of the horse were filled with wonder as he was thus going, and forthwith they paid great honour anew to that sylvan dress.

65. Then the great-souled one, having dismissed the weeping *Khamda*, and wearing his fame veiled by the sign of the red garment, went towards the hermitage, like the king of mountains wrapped in an evening cloud.

66. While his master, thus regardless of his kingdom, was going to the ascetic-wood in mean garments, the groom, tossing up his arms, wailed bitterly and fell on the ground.

67. Having looked again he wept aloud, and embraced the horse *Kamthaka* with his arms ; and then, hopeless and repeatedly lamenting, he went in body to the city, not in soul.

68. Sometimes he pondered, sometimes he lamented, sometimes he stumbled, and sometimes he fell ; and so going along, wretched through his devoted attachment, he performed all kinds of actions in the road without conscious will.

BOOK VII.

1. Then having left the weeping tear-faced *Khamda*,—indifferent to all things in his longing for the forest, he by whom all objects are accomplished, overpowering the place by his beauty, entered that hermitage as if it were fully blessed.

2. He the prince with a gait like the lion's, having entered that arena of deer, himself like a deer,—by the beauty of his person, even though bereft of his magnificence, attracted the eyes of all the dwellers in the hermitage.

3. The drivers of wheeled carriages also, with their wives, stood still in curiosity, holding the yokes in their hands,—they gazed on him who was like Indra, and moved not, standing like their beasts of burden with their heads half bent down.

4. And the Brâhmans who had gone outside for the sake of fuel, having come with their hands full of fuel, flowers, and kusa grass,—pre-eminent as they were in penances, and proficients in wisdom, went to see him, and went not to their cells.

5. Delighted the peacocks uttered their cries, as if they had seen a dark-blue cloud rising up; and leaving the young grass and coming forward, the deer with restless eyes and the ascetics who grazed like deer¹ stood still.

¹ A form of ascetic observance, see *Mahâbh.* I, 3644; V, 4072. Cf. *infra*, *śloka* 15.

6. Beholding him, the lamp of the race of Ikshvāku, shining like the rising sun,—even though their milking was over, being filled with joy, the oblation-giving cows poured forth their milk.

7. 'It is one of the eight Vasus or one of the two Asvins, descended here,'—these words arose, uttered aloud by the sages in their astonishment at seeing him.

8. Like a second form of the lord of the gods¹, like the personified glory of the universe, he lighted up the entire wood like the sun come down of his own accord.

9. Then he, being duly honoured and invited to enter by those dwellers in the hermitage, paid his homage to the saints, with a voice like a cloud in the rainy season².

10. He, the wise one, longing for liberation, traversed that hermitage filled with the holy company desirous of heaven,—gazing at their strange penances.

11. He, the gentle one, having seen the different kinds of penance practised by the ascetics in that sacred grove,—desiring to know the truth, thus addressed one of the ascetics who was following him :

12. 'Since this to-day is my first sight of a hermitage I do not understand this rule of penance ; therefore will your honour kindly explain to me what resolve possesses each one of you.'

13. Then the Brāhman well-versed in penance told in order to that bull of the Sākya, a very bull in prowess, all the various kinds of penance and the fruit thereof.

¹ Lekharshabha is a rare name of Indra.

² A conjectural reading.

14. 'Uncultivated food, growing out of the water, leaves, water, and roots and fruits,—this is the fare of the saints according to the sacred texts; but the different alternatives of penance vary.

15. 'Some live like the birds on gleaned corn, others graze on grass like the deer, others live on air with the snakes, as if turned into ant-hills¹.

16. 'Others win their nourishment with great effort from stones, others eat corn ground with their own teeth; some, having boiled for others, dress for themselves what may chance to be left.

17. 'Others, with their tufts of matted hair continually wet with water, twice offer oblations to Agni with hymns; others plunging like fishes into the water dwell there with their bodies scratched by tortoises.

18. 'By such penances endured for a time,—by the higher they attain heaven, by the lower the world of men; by the path of pain they eventually dwell in happiness,—pain, they say, is the root of merit.'

19. The king's son, having heard this speech of the ascetic, even though he saw no lofty truth in it², was not content, but gently uttered these thoughts to himself:

20. 'The penance is full of pain and of many kinds, and the fruit of the penance is mainly heaven at its best, and all the worlds are subject to change; verily the labour of the hermitages is spent for but little gain.

¹ Cf. the legend of the princess Sukanyā, given in Wilson's note, *Hindu Drama*, I, p. 263.

² Cf. Beal, 517 (or perhaps 'though he had not himself yet attained the highest truth').

21. 'Those who abandoning wealth, kindred, and worldly objects, undertake vows for the sake of heaven,—they, when parted, only wish to go to a still greater wood of their own again ¹.

22. 'He who by all these bodily toils which are called penances, seeks a sphere of action for the sake of desire,—not examining the inherent evils of mundane existence, he only seeks pain by pain.

23. 'There is ever to living creatures fear from death, and they with all their efforts seek to be born again; where there is action, there must inevitably be death,—he is always drowned therein, just because he is afraid.

24. 'Some undergo misery for the sake of this world, others meet toil for the sake of heaven; all living beings, wretched through hope and always missing their aim, fall certainly for the sake of happiness into misery.

25. 'It is not the effort itself which I blame,—which flinging aside the base pursues a high path of its own; but the wise, by all this common toil, ought to attain that state in which nothing needs ever to be done again.

26. 'If the mortification of the body here is religion, then the body's happiness is only irreligion; but by religion a man obtains happiness in the next world, therefore religion here bears irreligion as its fruit.

27. 'Since it is only by the mind's authority that the body either acts or ceases to act, therefore to control the thought is alone befitting,—without the thought the body is like a log.

¹ Their desired heaven will only be a fresh penance-grove.

28. 'If merit is gained by purity of food, then there is merit also in the deer; and in those men also who live as outcasts from all enjoyments, through being estranged from them by the fault of their destiny.

29. 'If the deliberate choice of pain is a cause of merit, why should not that same choice be directed to pleasure? If you say that the choice of pleasure carries no authority, is not the choice of pain equally without authority?

30. 'So too those who for the sake of purifying their actions, earnestly sprinkle water on themselves, saying, "this is a sacred spot,"—even there this satisfaction resides only in the heart,—for waters will not cleanse away sin.

31. 'The water which has been touched by the virtuous,—that is the spot, if you wish for a sacred spot on the earth; therefore I count as a place of pilgrimage only the virtues of a virtuous man¹,—water without doubt is only water.'

32. Thus he uttered his discourse full of various arguments, and the sun went down into the west; then he entered the grove where penances had now ceased and whose trees were gray with the smoke of the (evening) oblations;

33. Where the sacred fires had been duly transferred when kindled to other spots,—all crowded with the holy hermits who had performed their ablutions, and with the shrines of the gods murmuring with the muttered prayers,—it seemed all alive like the full service of religion in exercise.

34. He spent several nights there, himself like

¹ *Guṇān eva?*

the moon, examining their penances; and he departed from that penance-field, feeling that he had comprehended the whole nature of penance.

35. The dwellers of the hermitage followed him with their minds fixed on the greatness of soul visible in his person, as if they were great seers beholding Religion herself, withdrawn from a land invaded by the base.

36. Then he looked on all those ascetics with their matted hair, bark garments, and rag-strips waving, and he stood considering their penances under an auspicious and noble tree by the way-side.

37. Then the hermits having approached stood surrounding the best of men; and an old man from among them thus addressed him respectfully in a gentle voice:

38. 'At thy coming the hermitage seems to have become full, it becomes as it were empty when thou art gone,—therefore, my son, thou wilt not surely desert it, as the loved life the body of one who wishes to live.

39. 'In front stands the holy mountain Himavat, inhabited by Brahmarshis, rāgarshis, and surarshis; by whose mere presence the merit of these penances becomes multiplied to the ascetics.

40. 'Near us also are holy spots of pilgrimage, which become ladders to heaven; loved by divine sages and saints whose souls are intent on devotion and who keep their souls in perfect control.

41. 'From hence, again, the Northern quarter is especially to be fitly followed for the sake of pre-eminent merit; even one who was wise starting towards the south could not advance one single step.

42. 'Hast thou seen in this sacred grove one who

neglects all ceremonies or who follows confused ceremonies or an outcast or one impure, that thou dost not desire to dwell here? Speak it out, and let the abode be welcomed.

43. 'These hermits here desire thee as their companion in penance, thee who art like a store-house of penance,—to dwell with thee who art like Indra would bring prosperity even to Vṛihaspati.'

44. He, the chief of the wise, when thus addressed in the midst of the ascetics by their chief—having resolved in his mind to put an end to all existence—thus uttered his inward thought :

45. 'The upright-souled saints, the upholders of religion, become the very ideal of our own kindred through their delight in showing hospitality; by all these kind feelings of thine towards me affection is produced in me and the path which regards the self as supreme¹ is revealed.

46. 'I seem to be all at once bathed by these gentle heart-touching words of thine, and the joy now throbs in me once more which I felt when I first grasped the idea of dharma.

47. 'There is sorrow to me when I reflect that I shall have to depart, leaving you who are thus engaged, you who are such a refuge and who have shown such excessive kindness to me,—just as there was when I had to leave my kindred behind.

48. 'But this devotion of yours is for the sake of heaven,—while my desire is that there may be no fresh birth; therefore I wish not to dwell in this wood; the nature of cessation is different from that of activity.

49. 'It is not therefore any dislike on my part or

¹ Obscure, cf. Mahābh. V, 1593.

the wrong conduct of another, which makes me go away from this wood ; for ye are all like great sages, standing fast in the religious duties which are in accordance with former ages.'

50. Then having heard the prince's discourse, gracious and of deep meaning, gentle, strong, and full of dignity, the ascetics paid him especial honour.

51. But a certain Brāhman who was lying there in the ashes, tall and wearing his hair in a tuft, and clothed in the bark of trees, with reddish eyes and a thin long nose, and carrying a pot with water¹ in his hand, thus lifted his voice :

52. 'O sage, brave indeed is thy purpose, who, young as thou art, hast seen the evils of birth; he who, having pondered thoroughly heaven and liberation, makes up his mind for liberation,—he is indeed brave !

53. 'By all those various sacrifices, penances, and vows the slaves of passion desire to go to heaven; but the strong, having battled with passion as with an enemy, desire to obtain liberation.

54. 'If this is thy settled purpose, go quickly to Vindhyakosh^t/_{ta}; the Muni Arāḍa lives there who has gained an insight into absolute bliss.

55. 'From him thou wilt hear the path to truth, and if thou hast a desire for it, thou wilt embrace it; but as I foresee, this purpose of thine will go on further, after having rejected his theory.

56. 'With the nose of a well-fed horse, large long eyes, a red lower lip, white sharp teeth, and a thin red tongue,—this face of thine will drink up the entire ocean of what is to be known.

¹ Conjectural. Dr. von Böhtlingk suggests *kumḍāvahasto*, 'the back of whose hand was like a *kumḍa*.'

57. 'That unfathomed depth which characterises thee, that majesty and all those signs of thine,— they shall win a teacher's chair in the earth which was never won by sages even in a former age.'

58. The prince replied, 'Very well,' and having saluted the company of sages he departed; the hermits also having duly performed to him all the rites of courtesy entered again into the ascetic-grove.

BOOK VIII.

1. Meanwhile the attendant of the horse, in deep distress, when his unselfish master thus went into the forest, made every effort in the road to dissolve¹ his load of sorrow, and yet in spite of it all not a tear dropped from him.

2. But the road which by his lord's command he had traversed in one night with that horse,—that same road he now travelled in eight days, pondering his lord's absence.

3. And the horse *Kamthaka*, though he still went on bravely, flagged and had lost all spirit in his heart; and decked though he was with ornaments, he had lost all his beauty when bereft of his master.

4. And turning round towards that ascetic-grove, he neighed repeatedly with a mournful sound; and though pressed with hunger, he welcomed not nor tasted any grass or water on the road, as before².

5. Slowly they two at last came back to the city called after *Kapila*, which seemed empty when deserted by that hero who was bent on the

¹ *Vigraha* seems here used in an unusual sense. Cf. Tennyson's 'Home they brought her warrior dead, &c.'

² I read *nâbhinananda*, supposing *na* to have been written on the margin and inserted in the wrong place, otherwise *abhis* must be used for *abhi*. [This is confirmed by the Tibetan, which translates *abhinananda* by *mñon-par ma dga*, where *mñon-par* is the usual translation of the preposition *abhi*. H.W.]

salvation of the world,—like the sky bereft of the sun.

6. Bright as it was with lotus-covered waters, adorned also with trees full of flowers, that garden of his, which was now like a forest, was no longer gay with citizens who had lost all their gladness.

7. Then those two,—who were as it were silently forbidden by the sad inhabitants who were wandering in that direction, their brightness gone and their eyes dim with tears,—slowly entered the city which seemed all bathed in gloom.

8. Having heard that they had returned with their limbs all relaxed, coming back without the pride of the Sākya race, the men of the city shed tears in the road, as when in old days the chariot of the son of Dasaratha came back.

9. Full of wrath, the people followed *Khamdaka* in the road, crying behind him with tears, 'Where is the king's son, the glory of his race and kingdom? he has been stolen away by thee.'

10. Then he said to those faithful ones, 'I have not left the king's son; but by him in the uninhabited forest I weeping and the dress of a householder were abandoned together.'

11. Having heard these words of his those crowds adopted a most difficult resolve; they did not wipe away the tears which fell from their eyes, and they blamed their own (evil) hearts on account of the consequences of their actions;

12. Then they said, 'Let us go this very day into that forest, whither he is gone, whose gait is like the king of elephants; without him we have no wish to live, like the senses when the souls depart.'

13. 'This city bereft of him is a forest, and that forest which possesses him is a city; the city without him has no charms for us, like heaven without the lord of the Maruts, when *Vṛitra* was slain¹.'

14. Next the women crowded to the rows of windows, crying to one another, 'The prince has returned;' but having heard that his horse had an empty back, they closed the windows again and wailed aloud.

15. But the king, having undertaken religious observances for the recovery of his son, with his mind distressed by the vow and the sorrow, was muttering prayers in the temple, and performing such rites as suited the occasion.

16. Then with his eyes filled with tears,—taking the horse, his whole soul fixed on the horse,—overcome with grief he² entered the palace as if his master had been killed by an enemy.

17. And entering the royal stable, looking about with his eyes full of tears, *Kamthaka* uttered a loud sound, as if he were uttering his woe to the people.

18. Then the birds that fed in the middle of the house, and the carefully cherished horses that were tied near by, re-echoed the sound of that horse, thinking that it might be the return of the prince.

19. And the people, deceived by an excessive joy, who were in the neighbourhood of the king's inner apartments, thought in their hearts, 'Since the horse *Kamthaka* neighs, it must be that the prince is coming.'

20. Then the women, who were fainting with

¹ Quoted by *Ugavaladatta*, on *Unādi-sūtras* I, 156.

² Sc. *Kṣandaka*.

sorrow, now in wild joy, with their eyes rolling to see the prince, rushed out of the palace full of hope, like flickering lightnings from an autumn cloud.

21. With their dress hanging down, and their linen garments soiled, their faces untouched by collyrium and with eyes dimmed by tears; dark and discoloured and destitute of all painting¹, like the stars in the sky, pale-red with the ending of night;

22. With their feet unstained by red, and undecked by anklets,—their faces without earrings, and their ears in their native simplicity,—their loins with only nature's fulness, and uncircled by any girdle,—and their bosoms bare of strings of pearls as if they had been robbed.

23. But when they saw *Khandaka* standing helpless, his eyes filled with tears, and the horse, the noble women wept with pale faces, like cows abandoned by the bull in the midst of the forest.

24. Then the king's principal queen Gautamī, like a fond cow that has lost her calf, fell bursting into tears on the ground with outstretched arms, like a golden plantain-tree with trembling leaves.

25. Some of the other women, bereft of their brightness and with arms and souls lifeless, and seeming to have lost their senses in their despondency, raised no cry, shed no tear, and breathed not, standing senseless as if painted².

26. Others as having lost all self-control, fainting in their sorrow for their lord, their faces pouring tears from their eyes, watered their bosoms from

¹ Is a *ṅganayā* used here irregularly in the fem. to distinguish it from a *ṅgana*, 'the pinguent?'

² Conjectural.

which all sandal-wood was banished, like a mountain the rocks with its streams.

27. Then that royal palace was illumined with their faces pelted by the tears from their eyes, as a lake in the time of the first rains with its dripping lotuses pelted by the rain from the clouds.

28. The noble women beat their breasts with their lotus-like hands, falling incessantly, whose fingers were round and plump, which had their arteries hidden and bore no ornaments,—as creepers tossed by the wind strike themselves with their shoots.

29. And again how those women shone forth, as their bosoms rose up together after the blow from the hand, and trembled with the shock,—like the streams, when their pairs of ruddy geese shake, as the lotuses on which they sit wave about with the wind from the wood¹.

30. As they pressed their breasts with their hands, so too they pressed their hands with their breasts,—dull to all feelings of pity, they made their hands and bosoms inflict mutual pains on each other.

31. Then thus spoke Yasodharâ, shedding tears with deep² sorrow, her bosom heaving with her sighs, her eyes discoloured with anger, and her voice choking with emotion through the influence of despondency:

32. 'Leaving me helplessly asleep in the night, whither, O *Khamdaka*, is he, the desire of my heart,

¹ This is an obscure verse,—*yathâpi* is not clear; I have taken *yathâ* as a 'how' of admiration. The latter lines seem to compare the hand swaying with the motion of the bosom to the bird seated on the tossed lotus.

² Is *vigâdha* for *agâdha*, or should we read *vigâdha*?

gone? and when thou and Kamthaka are alone come back, while three went away together, my mind trembles.

33. 'Why dost thou weep to-day, O cruel one, having done a dishonourable, pitiless, and unfriendly deed to me? Cease thy tears and be content in thy heart,—tears and that deed of thine ill agree.

34. 'Through thee, his dear obedient faithful loyal companion, always doing what was right, the son of my lord is gone never to return,—rejoice,—all hail! thy pains have gained their end.

35. 'Better for a man a wise enemy rather than a foolish friend unskilled in emergencies; by thee, the unwise self-styled friend, a great calamity has been brought upon this family.

36. 'These women are sorely to be pitied who have put away their ornaments, having their eyes red and dimmed with continuous tears, who are as it were desolate widows, though their lord still stands as unshaken as the earth or Mount Himavat.

37. 'And these lines of palaces seem to weep aloud, flinging up their dovecots for arms, with the long unbroken moan of their doves,—separated verily, with him, from all who could restrain them.

38. 'Even that horse Kamthaka without doubt desired my utter ruin; for he bore away from hence my treasure when all were sound asleep in the night,—like one who steals jewels.

39. 'When he was able to bear even the onsets of arrows, and still more the strokes of whips,—how then for fear of the fall of a whip, could he go carrying with him my prosperity and my heart together?

40. 'The base creature now neighs loudly, filling the king's palace with the sound; but when he

carried away my beloved, then this vilest of horses was dumb.

41. 'If he had neighed and so woke up the people, or had even made a noise with his hoofs on the ground, or had made the loudest sound he could with his jaws, my grief would not have been so great.'

42. Having thus heard the queen's words, their syllables choked with tears and full of lament, slowly *Kkamdaka* uttered this answer, with his face bent down, his voice low with tears, and his hands clasped in supplication :

43. 'Surely, O queen, thou wilt not blame *Kam-thaka* nor wilt thou show thy anger against me,—know that we two are entirely guiltless,—that god amongst men, O queen, is gone away like a god.

44. 'I indeed, though I well knew the king's command, as though dragged by force by some divine powers, brought quickly to him this swift steed, and followed him on the road unwearied.

45. 'And this best of horses as he went along touched not the ground with the tips of his hoofs as if they were kept aloft from it ; and so too, having his mouth restrained as by fate, he made no sound with his jaws and neighed not.

46. 'When the prince went out, then the gate was thrown open of its own accord ; and the darkness of the night was, as it were, pierced by the sun,—we may learn from hence too that this was the ordering of fate.

47. 'When also by the king's command, in palace and city, diligent guards had been placed by thousands, and at that time they were all overcome by sleep and woke not,—we may learn from hence too that this was the ordering of fate.

48. 'When also the garment, approved for a

hermit's dwelling in the forest, was offered to him at the moment by some denizen of heaven, and the tiara which he threw into the sky was carried off,—we may learn from hence too that this was the ordering of fate.

49. 'Do not therefore assume¹ that his departure arises from the fault of either of us, O queen; neither I nor this horse acted by our own choice; he went on his way with the gods as his retinue.'

50. Having thus heard the history of the prince's departure, so marvellous in many ways, those women, as though losing their grief, were filled with wonder, but they again took up their distress at the thought of his becoming an ascetic.

51. With her eyes filled with the tears of despondency, wretched like an osprey who has lost her young,—Gautamī abandoning all self-control wailed aloud,—she fainted, and with a weeping face exclaimed:

52. 'Beautiful, soft, black, and all in great waves, growing each from its own special root,—those hairs of his are tossed on the ground, worthy to be encircled by a royal diadem.

53. 'With his long arms and lion-gait, his bull-like eye, and his beauty bright like gold, his broad chest, and his voice deep as a drum or a cloud,—should such a hero as this dwell in a hermitage?

54. 'This earth is indeed unworthy as regards that peerless doer of noble actions, for such a virtuous hero has gone away from her,—it is the merits and virtues of the subjects which produce their king.

55. 'Those two feet of his, tender, with their

¹ Should we read *pratipattum* for *pratigantum*?

beautiful web spread between the toes, with their ankles concealed, and soft like a blue lotus,—how can they, bearing a wheel marked in the middle, walk on the hard ground of the skirts of the forest ?

56. 'That body, which deserves to sit or lie on the roof of a palace,—honoured with costly garments, aloes, and sandal-wood,—how will that manly body live in the woods, exposed to the attacks of the cold, the heat, and the rain ?

57. 'He who was proud of his family, goodness, strength, energy, sacred learning, beauty, and youth,—who was ever ready to give, not to ask,—how will he go about begging alms from others ?

58. 'He who, lying on a spotless golden bed, was awakened during the night by the concert of musical instruments,—how alas ! will he, my ascetic, sleep to-day on the bare ground with only one rag of cloth interposed ?'

59. Having heard this piteous lamentation, the women, embracing one another with their arms, rained the tears from their eyes, as the shaken creepers drop honey from their flowers.

60. Then Yasodharâ fell upon the ground, like the ruddy goose parted from her mate, and in utter bewilderment she slowly lamented, with her voice repeatedly stopped by sobs :

61. 'If he wishes to practise a religious life after abandoning me his lawful wife widowed,—where is his religion, who wishes to follow penance without his lawful wife to share it with him ?

62. 'He surely has never heard of the monarchs of olden times, his own ancestors, Mahâsudarsa¹ and

¹ Mahâsudassana is the name of a king in *Gâtaka* I, 95.

the rest,—how they went with their wives into the forest,—that he thus wishes to follow a religious life without me.

63. 'He does not see that husband and wife are both consecrated in sacrifices, and both purified by the performance of the rites of the Veda, and both destined to enjoy¹ the same results afterwards,—he therefore grudges me a share in his merit.

64. 'Surely it must be that this fond lover of religion, knowing that my mind was secretly quarrelling even with my beloved, lightly and without fear has deserted me thus angry, in the hope to obtain heavenly nymphs in Indra's world!

65. 'But what kind of a thought is this of mine? those women even there have the attributes which belong to bodies,—for whose sake he thus practises austerities in the forest, deserting his royal magnificence and my fond devotion.

66. 'I have no such longing for the joy of heaven, nor is that hard for even common people to win if they are resolute²; but my one desire is how he my beloved may never leave me either in this world or the next.

67. 'Even if I am unworthy to look on my husband's face with its long eyes and bright smile, still is this poor Râhula never to roll about in his father's lap?

68. 'Alas! the mind of that wise hero is terribly stern,—gentle as his beauty seems, it is pitilessly cruel,—who can desert of his own accord such an infant son with his inarticulate talk, one who would charm even an enemy.

69. 'My heart too is certainly most stern, yea,

¹ I read *bubhukshû* for *bubhukshuḥ*.

² *Api*, I think, should properly follow *ganasya*.

made of rock or fashioned even of iron, which does not break when its lord is gone to the forest, deserted by his royal glory like an orphan,—he so well worthy of happiness.’

70. So the queen, fainting in her woe, wept and pondered and wailed aloud repeatedly,—self-possessed as she was by nature, yet in her distress she remembered not her fortitude and felt no shame.

71. Seeing Yasodharā thus bewildered with her wild utterances of grief and fallen on the ground, all the women cried out with their faces streaming with tears like large lotuses beaten by the rain.

72. But the king, having ended his prayers, and performed the auspicious rites of the sacrifice, now came out of the temple; and being smitten by the wailing sound of the people, he tottered like an elephant at the crash of a thunderbolt.

73. Having heard (of the arrival) of both *Khamdaka* and *Kamthaka*, and having learned the fixed resolve of his son, the lord of the earth fell struck down by sorrow like the banner of Indra when the festival is over¹.

74. Then the king, distracted by his grief for his son, being held up for a moment by his attendants all of the same race, gazed on the horse with his eyes filled with tears, and then falling on the ground wailed aloud:

75. ‘After having done many dear exploits for me in battle, one great deed of cruelty, O *Kamthaka*, hast thou done,—for by thee that dear son of mine, dear for his every virtue, has been tossed down in the wood, dear as he was, like a worthless thing.

¹ Cf. I, 63.

76. 'Therefore either lead me to-day where he is, or go quickly and bring him back again; without him there is no life left to me, as to one plunged in sickness without the true medicine.

77. 'When Suvarnanishth¹vin was carried away by death, it seemed impossible that *Sringaya*¹ should not die; and shall I, when my duty-loving son is gone, fear to set my soul free, like any coward?

78. 'How should not the mind of Manu himself be distracted, when parted from his dear virtuous son², —(Manu) the son of Vivasvat, who knew the higher and the lower, the mighty lord of creatures, the institutor of the ten chieftains³.

79. 'I envy the monarch, that friend of Indra, the wise son of king Aga⁴, who, when his son went into the forest, went himself to heaven, and dragged out no miserable life here with vain tears.

80. 'Describe to me, O beloved one, the court of that hermitage, whither thou hast carried him who is as my funeral oblation of water; these my vital airs are all ready to depart, and are eager for it, longing to drink it.'

81. Thus the king, in his grief for his separation from his son,—losing all his innate firmness which was stedfast like the earth,—loudly lamented as one distraught, like Dasaratha, a prey to his sorrow for Râma.

¹ See Mahâbh. XII, 31. The MSS. read *Samgaya* for *Sringaya*.

² Does this refer to his losing his son Sudyumna, who was changed to a woman, Vishnu Pur. IV, 1?

³ *Dasakshatrakrit* is an obscure phrase; [the Tibetan renders it by *rgyal-rigs bcu byas*, 'king-race ten made;'⁴ *rgyal-rigs* is the ordinary translation of *kshatriya*. H. W.]

⁴ Dasaratha.

82. Then the wise counsellor, endued with religious learning, courtesy, and virtue, and the old family priest, spoke to him as was befitting in these well-weighed words, neither with their faces overwhelmed by grief nor yet wholly unmoved :

83. 'Cease, O noblest of men, thy grief, regain thy firmness,—surely thou wilt not, O firm hero, shed tears like one of no self-control ; many kings on this earth have gone into the forests, throwing away their royal pomp like a crushed wreath.

84. 'Moreover, this his state of mind was all pre-determined ; remember those words long ago of the holy sage Asita ; "He will never be made to dwell even for a moment contentedly in heaven or in an emperor's domain."

85. 'But if, O best of men, the effort must be made, quickly speak the word, we two will at once go together ; let the battle be waged in every way with thy son and his fate whatever it be.'

86. Then the king commanded them both, 'Do you both go quickly hence,—my heart will not return to quiet, any more than a bird's in the woods longing for its young.'

87. With a prompt acquiescence at the king's order the counsellor and the family priest went to that forest ; and then with his wives and his queen the king also, saying, 'It is done,' performed the remainder of the rites.

BOOK IX.

1. Then the two, the counsellor and the family priest, beaten by the king with his scourge of tears, went with every effort to that forest in the hurry of affection, like two noble horses goaded.

2. Having come at last full of weariness to that hermitage, accompanied by a fitting train,—they dismissed their royal pomp and with sober gestures entered the abode of Bhārgava.

3. Having saluted that Brāhman with due respect, and having been honoured by him with due reverence in return, having seated themselves, plunging at once into the subject, they addressed Bhārgava, who was likewise seated, concerning their errand.

4. ‘Let your honour know us to be respectively imperfect proficient in preserving the sacred learning and in retaining the state-counsels,—in the service of the monarch of the Ikshvāku race, pure in his valour and pure and wide in his glory.

5. ‘His son, who is like Gayanta, while he himself is like Indra, has come here, it is said, desirous to escape from the fear of old age and death,—know that we two are come here on account of him.’

6. He answered them, ‘That prince of the long arms did indeed come here, but not as one unawakened; “this dharma only brings us back again,”—recognising this, he went off forthwith towards Arāḍa, seeking liberation.’

7. Then they two, having understood the true

state of things, bade that Brâhman at once farewell, and wearied though they were, went on as if they were unwearied, thither whither the prince was gone.

8. As they were going, they saw him bereft of all ornaments¹, but still radiant with his beauty, sitting like a king in the road at the foot of a tree, like the sun under the canopy of a cloud.

9. Leaving his chariot, the family priest then went up to the prince with the counsellor, as the saint Aurvaseya² went with Vâmadeva, wishing to see Râma when he dwelt in the forest.

10. They paid him honour as was fitting, as Sukra and Amgiras honoured Indra in heaven; and he in return paid due honour to them, as Indra in heaven to Sukra and Amgiras.

11. Then they, having obtained his permission, sat down near him who was the banner of the Sâkya race; and they shone in his proximity like the two stars of the asterism Punarvasû in conjunction with the moon.

12. The family priest addressed the prince who shone brightly as he sat at the foot of the tree, as Vrihaspati addressed Indra's son Gayanta, seated in heaven under the heavenly tree pârigâta:

13. 'O prince, consider for a moment what the king with his eyes raining tears said to thee, as he lay fainting on the ground with the arrow of thy sorrow plunged into his heart.

14. "I know that thy resolve is fixed upon religion, and I am convinced that this purpose of thine is unchanging³; but I am consumed with a flame of

¹ Is *srigayâ* for *sragâ*?

² Agastya, the son of Urvarî. Vâmadeva was Dasaratha's counsellor.

³ Conjectural. [The Tibetan reads the second line, khyod-kyi

anguish like fire at thy flying to the woods at an inopportune time.

15. "Come, thou who lovest duty, for the sake of what is my heart's desire,—abandon this purpose for the sake of duty; this huge swollen stream of sorrow sweeps me away as a river's torrent its bank.

16. "That effect¹ which is wrought in the clouds, water, the dry grass, and the mountains by the wind, the sun, the fire, and the thunderbolt,—that same effect this grief produces in us by its tearing in pieces, its drying up, its burning, and its cleaving.

17. "Enjoy therefore for a while the sovereignty of the earth,—thou shalt go to the forest at the time provided by the *sâstras*,—do not show disregard for thy unhappy kindred,—compassion for all creatures is the true religion.

18. "Religion is not wrought out only in the forests, the salvation of ascetics can be accomplished even in a city; thought and effort are the true means; the forest and the badge are only a coward's signs.

19. "Liberation has been attained even by householders, Indras among men, who wore diadems, and carried strings of pearls suspended on their shoulders, whose garlands were entangled with bracelets, and who lay cradled in the lap of Fortune.

20. "Bali and Vagrabâhu, the two younger brothers of Dhruva, Vaibhrâga, Âshâdha, and Amti-

byuñ-var gyur-var don-ni ces-pao, 'I know thy purpose which is about to arise (or which has arisen) in thy mind.' Can they have read *bhâvinam* or *bhâvitam*? H.W.]

¹ I read *vr̥ttik*.

deva¹, and Ganaka also, the king of the Videhas, and king Senagit's son, his tree of ripe blessing²;

21. "Know that all these great kings who were householders were well skilled in attaining the merit which leads to final bliss,—do thou also therefore obtain both³ simultaneously—royal magnificence and the control over the mind.

22. "I desire,—when I have once closely embraced thee after thy kingly consecration is once performed, and while thou art still wet with the sacred water,—when I behold thee with the pomp of the royal umbrella,—in the fulness of that joy to enter the forest."

23. 'Thus did the king say to thee in a speech whose words were stopped by tears,—surely having heard it, for the sake of what is so dear to him, thou wilt with all affection follow his affection.

24. 'The king of the Sākya is drowned in a deep sea of sorrow, full of waves of trouble, springing from thee; do thou therefore deliver him helpless and protectorless like an ox drowning in the sea.

25. 'Having heard that Bhtshma who sprang from Gaṅgā's womb, Râma, and Râma the son of Bhrigu,—all did what would please their fathers;—surely thou too wilt do thy father's desire.

26. 'Consider also the queen, who brought thee

¹ Cf. I, 57; IX, 60.

² My reading *pâkadrumam* is conjectural, *Pâradrumau* as two old kings would be a possible reading. Senagit's son is praised for his philosophical depth in *Mahâbh.* XII, 6524, &c.; he is there called *Medhâvin*. [The Tibetan has *brtan-pai* (*dhruva*) *nu vo*, 'the firm one's younger brother (?);' it also has *gro dan ljon-çin-can* for *pâkadruma*, 'having a tree of—?' It takes *senagitaśka râgñāś* as acc. plural. H.W.]

³ *Ubhe=pi*, although with *pragrīhya* e.

up, who has not yet gone to the region inhabited by Agastya¹—wilt thou not take some heed of her, who ceaselessly grieves like a fond cow that has lost her calf?

27. 'Surely thou wilt succour thy wife by the sight of thee, who now mourns widowed yet with her lord still alive,—like a swan separated from her mate or a female elephant deserted in the forest by her companion.

28. 'Thy only son, a child little deserving such woe, distressed with sorrow, and² . . . —O deliver Râhula from the grief of his kindred like the full moon from the contact of Râhu!

29. 'Burned with the fire of anguish within him, to which thy absence adds fresh fuel,—a fire whose smoke is sighs and its flame despair,—he wanders for a sight of thee through the women's apartments and the whole city.'

30. The Bodhisattva,—whose perfection was absolute,—having heard the words of the family priest, reflected for a moment, knowing all the virtues of the virtuous, and then thus uttered his gentle reply:

31. 'I well know the paternal tenderness³ of the king, especially that which he has displayed towards me; yet knowing this as I do, still alarmed at sickness, old age, and death, I am inevitably forced to leave my kindred.

32. 'Who would not wish to see his dear kindred, if but this separation from beloved ones did not exist? but since even after it has been once, separa-

¹ The south,—the region of the god of death.

² Five syllables are here lost,—apakvasattvam?

³ Should we read tanayaprasaktam?

38. 'There may be an "ill time" in one's attaining a worldly object,—time indeed is described as

H

inseparably connected with all things¹; time drags the world into all its various times; but all time suits a bliss which is really worthy of praise².

39. 'That the king should wish to surrender to me his kingdom,—this is a noble thought, well worthy of a father; but it would be as improper for me to accept it, as for a sick man through greed to accept unwholesome food.

40. 'How can it be right for the wise man to enter royalty, the home of illusion, where are found anxiety, passion, and weariness, and the violation of all right through another's service?

41. 'The golden palace seems to me to be on fire; the daintiest viands seem mixed with poison; infested with crocodiles³ [is the tranquil lotus-bed].'

42. Having heard the king's son uttering this discourse, well suitable to his virtues and knowledge of the soul, freed from all desires, full of sound reasons, and weighty,—the counsellor thus made answer:

43. 'This resolve of thine is an excellent counsel, not unfit in itself but only unfit at the present time; it could not be thy duty, loving duty as thou dost, to leave thy father in his old age to sorrow.

44. 'Surely thy mind is not very penetrating, or it is ill-skilled in examining duty, wealth, and pleasure⁴,—when for the sake of an unseen result thou departest disregarding a visible end.

¹ Cf. *Pāṇ.* III, 3, 44.

² I.e. *mukti* can never be ill-timed. But this is an obscure *sloka*.

³ The remainder of the prince's speech is lost. By Beal's translation from the Chinese, fifteen verses are wanting.

⁴ The three well-known 'secular' ends of human action.

45. 'Again, some say that there is another birth,—others with confident assertion say that there is not; since then the matter is all in doubt, it is right to enjoy the good fortune which comes into thy hand.

46. 'If there is any activity hereafter, we will enjoy ourselves in it as may offer; or if there is no activity beyond this life, then there is an assured liberation to all the world without any effort.

47. 'Some say there is a future life, but they do not allow the possibility of liberation; as fire is hot by nature and water liquid, so they hold that there is a special nature in our power of action¹.

48. 'Some maintain that all things arise from inherent properties,—both good and evil and existence and non-existence; and since all this world thus arises spontaneously, therefore also all effort of ours is vain.

49. 'Since the action of the senses is fixed, and so too the agreeableness or the disagreeableness of outward objects,—then for that which is united to old age and pains, what effort can avail to alter it? Does it not all arise spontaneously?

50. 'The fire becomes quenched by water, and fire causes² water to evaporate; and different elements, united in a body, producing unity, bear up the world.

51. 'That the nature of the embryo in the womb is produced as composed of hands, feet, belly, back, and head, and that it is also united with the soul,—the wise declare that all this comes of itself spontaneously.

52. 'Who causes the sharpness of the thorn? or

¹ I.e. it cannot be abolished.

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H 2

² I read gamayanti.

the various natures of beasts and birds? All this has arisen spontaneously; there is no acting from desire, how then can there be such a thing as will?

53. 'Others say that creation comes from *Īśvara*,—what need then is there of the effort of the conscious soul¹? That which is the cause of the action of the world, is also determined as the cause of its ceasing to act.

54. 'Some say that the coming into being and the destruction of being are alike caused by the soul; but they say that coming into being arises without effort, while the attainment of liberation is by effort.

55. 'A man discharges his debt to his ancestors by begetting offspring, to the saints by sacred lore, to the gods by sacrifices; he is born with these three debts upon him,—whoever has liberation (from these,) he indeed has liberation.

56. 'Thus by this series of rules the wise promise liberation to him who uses effort; but however ready for effort with all their energy, those who seek liberation will find weariness.

57. 'Therefore, gentle youth, if thou hast a love for liberation, follow rightly the prescribed rule; thus wilt thou thyself attain to it, and the king's grief will come to an end.

58. 'And as for thy meditations on the evils of life ending in thy return from the forest to thy home,—let not the thought of this trouble thee, my son,—those in old time also have returned from the forests to their houses.

59. 'The king *Ambartīsha*², though he had

¹ Puruṣa.

² Probably the son of Nābhāga.

dwelt in the forest, went back to the city, surrounded by his children; so too Râma, seeing the earth oppressed by the base, came forth from his hermitage and ruled it again.

60. 'So too Drumâksha, the king of the Sâlvas, came to his city from the forest with his son; and Sâmkṛiti Amtideva¹, after he had become a Brahmarshi, received his royal dignity from the saint Vasishṭha.

61. 'Such men as these, illustrious in glory and virtue, left the forests and came back to their houses; therefore it is no sin to return from a hermitage to one's home, if it be only for the sake of duty.'

62. Then having heard the affectionate and loyal words of the minister, who was as the eye of the king,—firm in his resolve, the king's son made his answer, with nothing omitted or displaced², neither tedious³ nor hasty:

63. 'This doubt whether anything exists or not, is not to be solved for me by another's words; having determined the truth by asceticism or quietism, I will myself grasp whatever is ascertained concerning it.

64. 'It is not for me to accept a theory which depends on the unknown and is all controverted, and which involves a hundred prepossessions; what

¹ This might mean Amtideva (cf. I, 57, IX, 20) the son of Sâmkṛiti, but in Mahâbh. XII, 1013 we have Ramtideva the son of Sâmkṛiti; cf. Burnouf on Rudraka and Udraka, Introduction, p. 386. [The Tibetan takes sâmkṛiti as sbyin-sreg-dañ-bcas, 'together with burnt offering.' H.W.] Would this imply an old reading sâhuti?—For Amtideva's connection with Vasishṭha see Mahâbh. XII, 8591.

² I read avyastam.

³ Or 'prejudiced?'

wise man would go by another's belief? Mankind are like the blind directed in the darkness by the blind.

65. 'But even though I cannot discern the truth, yet still, if good and evil are doubted, let one's mind be set on the good; even a toil¹ in vain is to be chosen by him whose soul is good, while the man of base soul has no joy even in the truth.

66. 'But having seen that this "sacred tradition" is uncertain, know that that only is right which has been uttered by the trustworthy; and know that trustworthiness means the absence of faults; he who is without faults will not utter an untruth.

67. 'And as for what thou saidst to me in regard to my returning to my home, by alleging Rāma and others as examples, they are no authority,—for in determining duty, how canst thou quote as authorities those who have broken their vows?

68. 'Even the sun, therefore, may fall to the earth, even the mountain Himavat may lose its firmness; but never would I return to my home as a man of the world, with no knowledge of the truth and my senses only alert for external objects.

69. 'I would enter the blazing fire, but not my house with my purpose unfulfilled.' Thus he proudly made his resolve, and rising up in accordance with it, full of disinterestedness, went his way.

70. Then the minister and the Brāhman, both full of tears, having heard his firm determination, and having followed him awhile with despondent

¹ MSS. khedo.

looks, and overcome with sorrow, slowly returned of necessity to the city.

71. Through their love for the prince and their devotion to the king, they returned, and often stopped looking back¹; they could neither behold him on the road nor yet lose the sight of him,—shining in his own splendour and beyond the reach of all others, like the sun.

72. Having placed faithful emissaries in disguise to find out the actions of him who was the supreme refuge of all, they went on with faltering steps, saying to each other, 'How shall we approach the king and see him, who is longing for his dear son?'

¹ Another reading gives 'full of reproach.'

BOOK X.

1. The prince, he of the broad and lusty chest, having thus dismissed the minister and the priest, crossed the Ganges with its speeding waves and went to Rāgagriha with its beautiful palaces.

2. He reached the city distinguished by the five hills, well guarded and adorned with mountains, and supported and hallowed by auspicious sacred places¹,—like Brahman² in a holy calm going to the uppermost heaven.

3. Having heard of his majesty and strength, and his splendid beauty, surpassing all other men, the people of that region were all astonished as at him who has a bull for his sign and is immovable in his vow³.

4. On seeing him, he who was going elsewhere stood still, and he who was standing there followed him in the way; he who was walking gently and gravely ran quickly, and he who was sitting at once sprang up.

5. Some people revered him with their hands, others in worship saluted him with their heads, some addressed him with affectionate words,—not one went on without paying him homage.

6. Those who were wearing gay-coloured dresses were ashamed when they saw him, those who were talking on random subjects fell to silence on the

¹ Tapoda is the name of a tirtha in Magadha.

² Svayambhū.

³ Śiva.

road ; no one indulged in an improper thought, as at the presence of Religion herself embodied.

7. In the men and the women on the highway, even though they were intent on other business, that conduct alone with the profoundest reverence seemed proper which is enjoined by the rules of royal homage ; but his eyes never looked upon them.

8. His brows, his forehead, his mouth, or his eyes,—his body, his hands, his feet, or his gait,—whatever part of him any one beheld, that at once riveted his eyes.

9. Having beheld him with the beautiful circle of hair between his brows¹ and with long eyes, with his radiant body and his hands showing a graceful membrane between the fingers,—so worthy of ruling the earth and yet wearing a mendicant's dress,—the Goddess of Rāgagrīha was herself perturbed.

10. Then Srenya², the lord of the court of the Magadhas, beheld from the outside of his palace the immense concourse of people, and asked the reason of it ; and thus did a man recount it to him :

11. ' He who was thus foretold by the Brāhmins, " he will either attain supreme wisdom or the empire of the earth,"—it is he, the son of the king of the Sākya, who is the ascetic whom the people are gazing at.'

12. The king, having heard this and perceived its meaning with his mind, thus at once spoke to that man : ' Let it be known whither he is going ; ' and the man, receiving the command, followed the prince.

¹ So the Tibetan. The Sanskrit text seems corrupt here. Cf. I, 65 c.

² A name of Bimbisāra, see Burnouf, *Introd.* p. 165.

13. With unrestless eyes, seeing only a yoke's length before him¹, with his voice hushed, and his walk slow and measured, he, the noblest of mendicants, went begging alms, keeping his limbs and his wandering thoughts under control.

14. Having received such alms as were offered, he retired to a lonely cascade of the mountain; and having eaten it there in the fitting manner, he ascended the mountain *Pāṃḍava*².

15. In that wood, thickly filled with lodhra trees, having its thickets resonant with the notes of the peacocks, he the sun of mankind shone, wearing his red dress, like the morning sun above the eastern mountain.

16. That royal attendant, having thus watched him there, related it all to the king *Srenya*; and the king, when he heard it, in his deep veneration, started himself to go thither with a modest retinue.

17. He who was like the *Pāṃḍavas* in heroism, and like a mountain in stature, ascended *Pāṃḍava*, that noblest of mountains,—a crown-wearer, of lion-like gait, a lion among men, as a maned lion ascends a mountain.

18. There he beheld the Bodhisattva, resplendent as he sat on his hams, with subdued senses, as if the mountain were moving³, and he himself were a peak thereof,—like the moon rising from the top of a cloud.

19. Him, distinguished by his beauty of form and perfect tranquillity as the very creation of Religion

¹ Hardy explains this 'he does not look before him further than the distance of a plough or nine spans' (*Manual of Buddhism*, p. 371).

² Cf. *Lalitavistara*.

³ I.e. as if he, not the mountain, were entitled to the name *aśāla*.

herself,—filled with astonishment and affectionate regard the king of men approached, as Indra the self-existent (Brahman).

20. He, the chief of the courteous, having courteously drawn nigh to him, inquired as to the equilibrium of his bodily humours; and the other with equal gentleness assured the king of his health of mind and freedom from all ailments.

21. Then the king sat down on the clean surface of the rock, dark blue like an elephant's ear; and being seated¹, with the other's assent, he thus spoke, desiring to know his state of mind:

22. 'I have a strong friendship with thy family, come down by inheritance and well proved; since from this a desire to speak to thee, my son, has arisen in me, therefore listen to my words of affection.

23. 'When I consider thy widespread race, beginning with the sun, thy fresh youth, and thy conspicuous beauty,—whence comes this resolve of thine so out of all harmony with the rest, set wholly on a mendicant's life, not on a kingdom?

24. 'Thy limbs are worthy of red sandal-wood² perfumes,—they do not deserve the rough contact of red cloth; this hand is fit to protect subjects, it deserves not to hold food given by another.

25. 'If therefore, gentle youth, through thy love for thy father thou desirest not thy paternal kingdom in thy generosity,—then at any rate thy choice must not be excused,—accepting forthwith one half of my kingdom.

26. 'If thou actest thus there will be no violence

¹ *Nr̥ipopavisya*? with *ārsha* Sandhi.

² *Lohitaḥandana* may mean 'saffron.'

shown to thine own people, and by the mere lapse of time imperial power at last flies for refuge to the tranquil mind; therefore be pleased to do me a kindness,—the prosperity of the good becomes very powerful, when aided by the good¹.

27. 'But if from thy pride of race thou dost not now feel confidence in me, then plunge with thy arrows into countless armies, and with me as thy ally seek to conquer thy foes.

28. 'Choose thou therefore one of these ends, pursue according to rule religious merit, wealth, and pleasure; for these, love and the rest, in reverse order, are the three objects in life; when men die they pass into dissolution as far as regards this world.

29. 'That which is pleasure when it has overpowered wealth and merit, is wealth when it has conquered merit and pleasure; so too it is merit, when pleasure and wealth fall into abeyance; but all would have to be alike abandoned, if thy desired end² were obtained.

30. 'Do thou therefore by pursuing the three objects of life, cause this beauty of thine to bear its fruit; they say that when the attainment of religion, wealth, and pleasure is complete in all its parts, then the end of man is complete.

31. 'Do not thou let these two brawny arms lie useless which are worthy to draw the bow; they are well fitted like Māndhātṛi's to conquer the three worlds, much more the earth.

¹ [The Tibetan translates the fourth line, *dam-pa-rnams dan bcas-pas dam-pai dpal phel-lo*, 'by being with the good the prosperity of the good increases.' H. W.]

² Nirvāṇa.

32. 'I speak this to you out of affection,—not through love of dominion or through astonishment ; beholding this mendicant-dress of thine, I am filled with compassion and I shed tears.

33. 'O thou who desirest the mendicant's stage of life, enjoy pleasures now ; in due time, O thou lover of religion, thou shalt practise religion ;—ere old age comes on and overcomes this thy beauty, well worthy of thy illustrious race.

34. 'The old man can obtain merit by religion ; old age is helpless for the enjoyment of pleasures ; therefore they say that pleasures belong to the young man, wealth to the middle-aged, and religion to the old.

35. 'Youth in this present world is the enemy of religion and wealth,—since pleasures, however we guard them, are hard to hold, therefore, wherever pleasures are to be found, there they seize them.

36. 'Old age is prone to reflection¹, it is grave and intent on remaining quiet ; it attains unimpassionedness with but little effort, unavoidably, and for very shame.

37. 'Therefore having passed through the deceptive period of youth, fickle, intent on external objects, heedless, impatient, not looking at the distance,—they take breath like men who have escaped safe through a forest.

38. 'Let therefore this fickle time of youth first pass by, reckless and giddy,—our early years are the mark for pleasure, they cannot be kept from the power of the senses.

39. 'Or if religion is really thy one aim, then offer

¹ Vimarsayanti?

sacrifices,—this is thy family's immemorial custom, —climbing to highest heaven by sacrifices, even Indra, the lord of the winds, went thus to highest heaven.

40. 'With their arms pressed ¹ by golden bracelets, and their variegated diadems resplendent with the light of gems, royal sages have reached the same goal by sacrifices which great sages reached by self-mortification.'

41. Thus spoke the monarch of the Magadhas, who spoke well and strongly like Indra²; but having heard it, the prince did not falter, (firm) like the mountain Kailâsa, having its many summits variegated (with lines of metals).

¹ Vidash/a; cf. *samdash/a* in Raghuv. XVI, 65.

² Valabhid, 'the smiter of the demon Vala.'

BOOK XI.

1. Being thus addressed by the monarch of the Magadhas, in a hostile speech with a friendly face,—self-possessed, unchanged, pure by family and personal purity, the son of Suddhodana thus made answer :

2. ' This is not to be called a strange thing for thee, born as thou art in the great family whose ensign is the lion¹—that by thee of pure conduct, O lover of thy friends, this line of conduct should be adopted towards him who stands as one of thy friends.

3. ' Amongst the bad a friendship, worthy of their family, ceases to continue (and fades) like prosperity among the faint-hearted ; it is only the good who keep increasing the old friendship of their ancestors by a new succession of friendly acts.

4. ' But those men who act unchangingly towards their friends in reverses of fortune, I esteem in my heart as true friends ; who is not the friend of the prosperous man in his times of abundance ?

5. ' So those who, having obtained riches in the world, employ them for the sake of their friends and religion,—their wealth has real solidity, and when it perishes it produces no pain at the end.

6. ' This thy determination concerning me, O king, is prompted by pure generosity and friendship² ;

¹ So the Tibetan explains *haryamka*, *señ-ges mñan-pai*.

² The Sanskrit of this line is corrupt and does not scan. The

I will meet thee courteously with simple friendship ;
I would not utter aught else in my reply.

7. 'I, having experienced the fear of old age and death, fly to this path of religion in my desire for liberation ; leaving behind my dear kindred with tears in their faces,—still more than those pleasures which are the causes of evil.

8. 'I am not so afraid even of serpents nor of thunderbolts falling from heaven, nor of flames blown together by the wind, as I am afraid of these worldly objects.

9. 'These transient pleasures,—the robbers of our happiness and our wealth, and which float empty and like illusions through the world,—infatuate men's minds even when they are only hoped for,—still more when they take up their abode in the soul.

10. 'The victims of pleasure attain not to happiness even in the heaven of the gods, still less in the world of mortals ; he who is athirst is never satisfied with pleasures, as the fire, the friend of the wind, with fuel.

11. 'There is no calamity in the world like pleasures,—people are devoted to them through delusion ; when he once knows the truth and so fears evil, what wise man would of his own choice desire evil ?

12. 'When they have obtained all the earth girdled by the sea, kings wish to conquer the other side of the great ocean ; mankind are never satiated

Tibetan renders it as follows: *khyod-kyi (te) ñes-pa (vinisṣa-yaṇ) gañ-zhig bdag-la dmigs-pa ʼdi*, 'whatever a determination of thine imagines of me, to this (answering I would say).' I would read *vibhāvya mām eva*. The translation given above is conjectural.

with pleasures, as the ocean with the waters that fall into it.

13. 'When it had rained a golden shower from heaven, and when he had conquered the continents and the four oceans, and had even obtained the half of Sakra's throne¹, Māndhātṛi was still unsatisfied with worldly objects.

14. 'Though he had enjoyed the kingdom of the gods in heaven, when Indra had concealed himself through fear of Vṛitra, and though in his pride he had made the great Rishis bear his litter², Nahusha fell, unsatisfied with pleasures.

15. 'King (Purūravas) the son of Idā, having penetrated into the furthest heaven, and brought the goddess Urvast into his power,—when he wished in his greed to take away gold from the Rishis³,—being unsatisfied with pleasures, fell into destruction.

16. 'Who would put his trust in these worldly objects, whether in heaven or in earth, unsettled as to lot or family,—which passed from Bali to Indra, and from Indra to Nahusha, and then again from Nahusha back to Indra?

17. 'Who would seek these enemies bearing the name of pleasures, by whom even those sages have been overcome, who were devoted to other pursuits, whose only clothes were rags, whose food was roots, fruits, and water, and who wore their twisted locks as long as snakes?

18. 'Those pleasures for whose sake even Ugrāyudha⁴, armed terribly as he was with his weapon,

¹ Divyāvadāna, pp. 213-224.

² Mahābh. V, 532.

³ Mahābh. I, 3147.

⁴ See Harivaṃśa, ch. xx. He was armed with a discus.

found death at Bhiṣhma's hands,—is not the mere thought of them unlucky and fatal,—still more the thought of the irreligious whose lives are spent in their service?

19. 'Who that considers the paltry flavour of worldly objects,—the very height of union being only insatiety,—the blame of the virtuous, and the certain sin,—has ever drawn near this poison which is called pleasure?

20. 'When they hear of the miseries of those who are intent on pleasure and are devoted to worldly pursuits¹, such as agriculture and the rest, and the self-content of those who are careless of pleasure,—it well befits the self-controlled to fling it away².

21. 'Success in pleasure is to be considered a misery in the man of pleasure, for he becomes intoxicated when his desired pleasures are attained; through intoxication he does what should not be done, not what should be done; and being wounded thereby he falls into a miserable end.

22. 'These pleasures which are gained and kept by toil,—which after deceiving leave you and return whence they came,—these pleasures which are but borrowed for a time³, what man of self-control, if he is wise, would delight in them?

23. 'What man of self-control could find satisfaction in these pleasures which are like a torch of hay,—which excite thirst when you seek them and when you grasp them, and which they who abandon not keep only as misery⁴?

24. 'Those men of no self-control who are bitten by

¹ Dharmabhiḥ. (Cf. V, 5, 6.) ² I would read kāmāḥ.

³ For yākitaka cf. Pāṇ. IV, 4, 21. ⁴ I would read paripānti.

them in their hearts, fall into ruin and attain not bliss,—what man of self-control could find satisfaction in these pleasures, which are like an angry, cruel serpent?

25. 'Even if they enjoy them men are not satisfied, like dogs famishing with hunger over a bone,—what man of self-control could find satisfaction in these pleasures, which are like a skeleton composed of dry bones?

26. 'What man of self-control could find satisfaction in these pleasures which are like flesh that has been flung away, and which produce misery by their being held only in common with kings, thieves, water, and fire¹?

27. 'What man of self-control could find satisfaction in these pleasures, which, like the senses², are destructive, and which bring calamity on every hand to those who abide in them, from the side of friends even more than from open enemies?

28. 'What man of self-control could find satisfaction in those pleasures, which are like the fruit that grows on the top of a tree,—which those who would leap up to reach fall down upon a mountain or into a forest, waters, or the ocean?

29. 'What man of self-control could find satisfaction in those pleasures, which are like snatching up a hot coal,—men never attain happiness, however they pursue them, increase them, or guard them?

30. 'What man of self-control could find satisfaction in those pleasures, which are like the enjoyments in a dream,—which are gained by their recipients after manifold pilgrimages and labours, and then perish in a moment?

¹ I.e. any one of these can seize them from us.

² Âyatana.

31. 'What man of self-control could find satisfaction in those pleasures which are like a spear¹, sword, or club,—for the sake of which the Kurus, the *Vrishnis* and the *Amdhakas*, the *Maithilas* and the *Damdakas* suffered destruction ?

32. 'What man of self-control could find satisfaction in those pleasures which dissolve friendships and for the sake of which the two *Asuras Sumda* and *Upasumda* perished, victims engaged in mutual enmity ?

33. 'None, however their intellect is blinded with pleasure, give themselves up, as in compassion, to ravenous beasts²; so what man of self-control could find satisfaction in those pleasures which are disastrous and constant enemies ?

34. 'He whose intellect is blinded with pleasure does pitiable things; he incurs calamities, such as death, bonds, and the like; the wretch, who is the miserable slave of hope for the sake of pleasure, well deserves the pain of death even in the world of the living.

35. 'Deer are lured to their destruction by songs³, insects for the sake of the brightness fly into the fire, the fish greedy for the flesh swallows the iron hook,—therefore worldly objects produce misery as their end.

36. 'As for the common opinion, "pleasures are enjoyments," none of them when examined are

¹ The Chinese translation seems to take *sūla* as a stake for impaling criminals in ver. 864.

² The text is corrupt. I would read *kravyâtsu nâtmânam*. The *va* in line 1 is for *iva*, a rare form, but allowed by Sanskrit lexicographers. Perhaps we should translate *kâmândhasamgñā*, 'these men who are called "blinded with pleasure."'

³ Cf. *Kâdambarī* (Calc. ed.), p. 27, l. 6 *infra*.

worthy of being enjoyed ; fine garments and the rest are only the accessories of things,—they are to be regarded as merely the remedies for pain.

37. ' Water is desired for allaying thirst ; food in the same way for removing hunger ; a house for keeping off the wind, the heat of the sun, and the rain ; and dress for keeping off the cold and to cover one's nakedness.

38. ' So too a bed is for removing drowsiness ; a carriage for remedying the fatigue of a journey ; a seat for alleviating the pain of standing ; so bathing as a means for washing, health, and strength.

39. ' External objects therefore are to human beings means for remedying pain, not in themselves sources of enjoyment ; what wise man would allow that he enjoys those delights which are only used as remedial ?

40. ' He who, when burned with the heat of bilious fever, maintains that cold appliances are an enjoyment, when he is only engaged in alleviating pain,—he indeed might give the name of enjoyment to pleasures.

41. ' Since variableness is found in all pleasures, I cannot apply to them the name of enjoyment ; the very conditions which mark pleasure, bring also in its turn pain.

42. ' Heavy garments and fragrant aloe-wood are pleasant in the cold, but an annoyance in the heat¹ ; and the moonbeams and sandal-wood are pleasant in the heat, but a pain in the cold.

43. ' Since the well-known opposite pairs², such

¹ I have adopted Professor Kielhorn's suggested reading *sukhâya* *site* by *asukhâya* *gharme*.

² Cf. *ἡ ἀντιποιχία* of the Pythagoreans (Arist. Ethics, I, 6).

as gain and loss and the rest, are inseparably connected with everything in this world,—therefore no man is invariably happy on the earth nor invariably wretched.

44. 'When I see how the nature of pleasure and pain are mixed, I consider royalty and slavery as the same; a king does not always smile, nor is a slave always in pain.

45. 'Since to be a king involves a wider range of command, therefore the pains of a king are great; for a king is like a peg¹,—he endures trouble for the sake of the world.

46. 'A king is unfortunate, if he places his trust in his royalty which is apt to desert and loves crooked turns²; and on the other hand, if he does not trust in it, then what can be the happiness of a timid king?

47. 'And since after even conquering the whole earth, one city only can serve as a dwelling-place, and even there only one house can be inhabited, is not royalty mere labour for others?

48. 'And even in royal clothing one pair of garments is all he needs, and just enough food to keep off hunger; so only one bed, and only one seat; all a king's other distinctions are only for pride.

49. 'And if all these fruits are desired for the sake of satisfaction, I can be satisfied without a kingdom; and if a man is once satisfied in this world, are not all distinctions indistinguishable?

50. 'He then who has attained the auspicious road to happiness is not to be deceived in regard to pleasures; remembering thy professed friendship, tell me again and again, do they keep their promise?

¹ Cf. Isaiah xxii. 23, 24 (רִמָּה).

² Professor Kielhorn would read *ramkamitre*.

51. 'I have not repaired to the forest through anger, nor because my diadem has been dashed down by an enemy's arrows; nor have I set my desires on loftier objects¹, that I thus refuse thy proposal.

52. 'Only he who, having once let go a malignant incensed serpent, or a blazing hay-torch all on fire, would strive again to seize it, would ever seek pleasures again after having once abandoned them.

53. 'Only he who, though seeing, would envy the blind, though free the bound, though wealthy the destitute, though sound in his reason the maniac,—only he, I say, would envy one who is devoted to worldly objects.

54. 'He who lives on alms, my good friend, is not to be pitied, having gained his end and being set on escaping the fear of old age and death; he has here the best happiness, perfect calm, and hereafter all pains are for him abolished.

55. 'But he is to be pitied who is overpowered by thirst though set in the midst of great wealth,—who attains not the happiness of calm here, while pain has to be experienced hereafter.

56. 'Thus to speak to me is well worthy of thy character, thy mode of life, and thy family; and to carry out my resolve is also befitting my character, my mode of life, and my family.

57. 'I have been wounded by the enjoyment of the world, and I have come out longing to obtain peace; I would not accept an empire free from all ill even in the third heaven, how much less amongst men?

58. 'But as for what thou saidst to me, O king, that the universal pursuit of the three objects is the

¹ Sc. as rule in heaven, &c.

supreme end of man,—and ¹ thou saidst that what I regard as the desirable is misery,—thy three objects are perishable and also unsatisfying.

59. 'But that world in which there is no old age nor fear, no birth, nor death, nor anxieties ², that alone I consider the highest end of man, where there is no ever-renewed action.

60. 'And as for what thou saidst, "wait till old age comes, for youth is ever subject to change;"—this want of decision is itself uncertain; for age too can be irresolute and youth can be firm.

61. 'But since Fate ³ is so well skilled in its art as to draw the world in all its various ages into its power,—how shall the wise man, who desires tranquillity, wait for old age, when he knows not when the time of death will be?

62. 'When death stands ready like a hunter, with old age as his weapon, and diseases scattered about as his arrows, smiting down living creatures who fly like deer to the forest of destiny, what desire can there be in any one for length of life?

63. 'It well befits the youthful son or the old man or the child so to act with all promptitude that they may choose the action of the religious man whose soul is all mercy,—nay, better still, his inactivity.

64. 'And as for what thou saidst, "be diligent in sacrifices for religion, such as are worthy of thy race and bring a glorious fruit,"—honour to such sacrifices! I desire not that fruit which is sought by causing pain to others ⁴!

¹ I would read *anartha ity âttha* (for *ity artha*).

² *Âdhayañ*.

³ Ko, 'who?' seems here used for 'fate.' Professor Kielhorn would read—*Yadâmtako gagad vayahsu sarveshu vasam vikarshati*.

⁴ *Yad ishyate* is the true reading.

65. 'To kill a helpless victim through a wish for future reward,—it would be an unseemly action for a merciful-hearted good man, even if the reward of the sacrifice were eternal; but what if, after all, it is subject to decay?

66. 'And even if true religion did not consist in quite another rule of conduct, by self-restraint, moral practice and a total absence of passion,—still it would not be seemly to follow the rule of sacrifice, where the highest reward is described as attained only by slaughter.

67. 'Even that happiness which comes to a man, while he stays in this world, through the injury of another, is hateful to the wise compassionate heart; how much more if it be something beyond our sight in another life?

68. 'I am not to be lured into a course of action for future reward,—my mind does not delight, O king, in future births; these actions are uncertain and wavering in their direction, like plants beaten by the rain from a cloud.

69. 'I have come here with a wish to see next the seer Arāḍa who proclaims liberation; I start this very day,—happiness be to thee, O king; forgive my words which may seem harsh through their absolute freedom from passion¹.

70. 'Now therefore do thou guard (the world) like Indra in heaven; guard it continually like the sun by thy excellencies; guard its best happiness here;

¹ I read *samatattva*.

² This verse is obscure,—the division of the clauses is uncertain, the Chinese translation giving only six; but *ava* seems to occur eight times. The Tibetan has its equivalent *sruṃs* nine times.

guard the earth ; guard life by the noble¹ ; guard the sons of the good ; guard thy royal powers, O king ; and guard thine own religion.

71. 'As in the midst of a sudden catastrophe arising from the flame of (fire), the enemy of cold, a bird, to deliver its body, betakes itself to the enemy of fire (water),—so do thou, when occasion calls, betake thyself, to deliver thy mind, to those who will destroy the enemies of thy home².'

72. The king himself, folding his hands, with a sudden longing come upon him, replied, 'Thou art obtaining thy desire without hindrance ; when thou hast at last accomplished all that thou hast to do, thou shalt show hereafter thy favour towards me.'

73. Having given his firm promise to the monarch, he proceeded to the Vaisvāntara hermitage ; and, after watching him with astonishment, as he wandered on in his course, the king and³ his courtiers returned to the mountain (of Rāgagiri).

¹ So the Tibetan.

² This is a very hard verse, but the obscure Chinese translation helps to explain it, vv. 912–915. I read in *c*, himârisatrum, i.e. water, as the enemy of the enemy of cold (fire). The bird flies to water to stop the effects of fire ; as the king is to destroy his enemies by means of their enemies, cf. *Manu* VII, 158. Here, however, it seems to mean also that he is to destroy his passions by their opposites ; the home (*kshaya*) is the summum bonum, nirvāṇa.—I read *samplava* for *sambhava*, as the two words are confused in XII, 24 and 28.

³ *Ka* seems used in a very artificial manner with the ellipsis of the substantive which should follow it ; cf. *Amarakosha* III, 4, 1, 6 (we might also read *prâpad*).

BOOK XII.

1. Then the moon of the Ikshvāku race turned towards the hermitage of the sage Arāḍa¹ of tranquil life,—as it were, doing honour to it by his beauty.

2. He drew near, on being addressed in a loud voice 'Welcome' by the kinsman of Kālāma, as he saw him from afar.

3. They, having mutually asked after each other's health as was fitting, sat down in a clean place on two pure wooden seats.

4. The best of sages, having seen the prince seated, and as it were drinking in the sight of him with eyes opened wide in reverence, thus addressed him :

5. 'I know, gentle youth, how thou hast come forth from thy home, having severed the bond of affection, as a wild elephant its cord.

6. 'In every way thy mind is stedfast and wise, who hast come here after abandoning royal luxury like a creeper-plant with poisonous fruit.

7. 'It is no marvel that kings have retired to the forest who have grown old in years, having given up their glory to their children, like a garland left behind after being used.

8. 'But this is to me indeed a marvel that thou art come hither in life's fresh prime, set in the open field

¹ Arāḍa holds an early form of the Sāṃkhya doctrine.

of the world's enjoyments, ere thou hast as yet tasted of their happiness.

9. 'Verily thou art a worthy vessel to receive this highest religion ; having mastered it with full knowledge, cross at once over the sea of misery.

10. 'Though the doctrine is generally efficient only after a time, when the student has been thoroughly tested, thou art easy for me to examine from thy depth of character and determination.'

11. The prince, having heard these words of *Arâda*, was filled with great pleasure and thus made reply:

12. 'This extreme kindliness which thou showest to me, calmly passionless as thou art, makes me, imperfect as I am, seem even already to have attained perfection.

13. 'I feel at the sight of thee like one longing to see who finds a light,—like one wishing to journey, a guide,—or like one wishing to cross, a boat.

14. 'Wilt thou therefore deign to tell me that secret, if thou thinkest it should be told, whereby thy servant may be delivered from old age, death, and disease.'

15. *Arâda*, thus impelled by the noble nature of the prince, declared in a concise form the tenets of his doctrine :

16. 'O best of hearers, hear this our firmly-settled theory, how our mortal existence arises and how it revolves.

17. "The evolvent" and "the evolute," birth, old age, and death,—know that this has been called the reality by us ; do thou receive our words, O thou who art steadfast in thy nature.

18. 'But know, O thou who art deep in the search

into the nature of things, that the five elements¹, egoism, intellect, and "the unmanifested" are the "evolvents ;"

19. 'But know that the "evolutes" consist of intellect, external objects², the senses, and the hands, feet, voice, anus, and generative organ, and also the mind.

20. 'There is also a something which bears the name *kshetragñā*, from its knowledge of this "field" (*kshetra* or the body) ; and those who investigate the soul call the soul *kshetragñā*.

21. 'Kapila with his disciple became the illuminated,—such is the tradition ; and he, as the illuminated, with his son is now called here *Pragāpati*.

22. 'That which is born and grows old and is bound and dies,—is to be known as "the manifested," and "the unmanifested" is to be distinguished by its contrariety.

23. 'Ignorance, the merit or demerit of former actions, and desire are to be known as the causes of mundane existence ; he who abides in the midst of this triad does not attain to the truth of things,—

24. 'From mistake³, egoism, confusion, fluctuation, indiscrimination, false means, inordinate attachment, and gravitation.

25. 'Now "mistake" acts in a contrary manner, it does wrongly what it should do, and what it should think it thinks wrongly.

26. "'I say," "I know," "I go," "I am firmly

¹ These are the *tanmâtrâṇi* or subtile elements.

² *Vishayân*, corresponding to the gross elements. The intellect, *buddhi*, is both an evolver and an evolute.

³ Should we read *viparyayâd* ? Cf. *Sâmkhya*, aphor. III, 37.

fixed," it is thus that "egoism" shows itself here, O thou who art free from all egoism.

27. 'That state of mind is called "confusion," O thou who art all unconfused, which views under one nature, massed like a lump of clay, objects that thus become confused in their nature.

28. 'That state of mind which says that this mind, intellect, and these actions are the same as "I," and that which says that all this aggregate is the same as "I,"—is called "fluctuation."

29. 'That state of mind is called "indiscrimination," O thou who art discriminating, which thinks there is no difference between the illuminated and the unwise, and between the different evolvents.

30. 'Uttering "namas" and "vashat," sprinkling water upon sacrifices, &c. with or without the recital of Vedic hymns, and such like rites,—these are declared by the wise to be "false means," O thou who art well skilled in true means.

31. 'That is called "inordinate attachment," by which the fool is entangled in external objects through his mind, speech, actions, and thoughts, O thou who hast shaken thyself free from all attachments.

32. 'The misery which a man imagines by the ideas "This is mine," "I am connected with this," is to be recognised as "gravitation,"—by this a man is borne downwards into new births.

33. 'Thus Ignorance, O ye wise, being fivefold in its character, energises towards torpor, delusion, the great delusion, and the two kinds of darkness¹.

34. 'Know, that among these indolence is "torpor," death and birth are "delusion," and be it clearly

¹ Cf. *Sāmkhyakārikā*, 48.

understood, O undeluded one, that desire is the "great delusion."

35. 'Since by it even the higher beings are deluded, therefore, O hero, is this called the "great delusion."

36. 'They define anger, O thou angerless one, as "darkness;" and despondency, O undesponding, they pronounce to be the "blind darkness."

37. 'The child, entangled in this fivefold ignorance, is effused in his different births in a world abounding with misery.

38. 'He wanders about in the world of embodied existence, thinking that I am the seer, and the hearer, and the thinker,—the effect and the cause.

39. 'Through these causes¹, O wise prince, the stream of "torpor" is set in motion; be pleased to consider that in the absence of the cause there is the absence of the effect.

40. 'Let the wise man who has right views know these four things, O thou who desirest liberation,—the illuminated and the unilluminated, the manifested and the unmanifested.

41. 'The soul, having once learned to distinguish these four properly, having abandoned all (ideas of) straightness or quickness², attains to the immortal sphere.

42. 'For this reason the Brāhmans in the world, discoursing on the supreme Brahman, practise here a rigorous course of sacred study and let other Brāhmans live with them to follow it also.'

43. The prince, having heard this discourse from the seer, asked concerning the means and the final state.

¹ Cf. ver. 23.

² It rises above all relative ideas? The text may be corrupt.

44. 'Wilt thou please to explain to me how, how far, and where this life of sacred study is to be led, and the limit of this course of life¹ ?'

45. Then Arāḍa, according to his doctrine, declared to him in another way that course of life clearly and succinctly.

46. 'The devotee, in the beginning, having left his house, and assumed the signs of the mendicant, goes on, following a rule of conduct which extends to the whole life.

47. 'Cultivating absolute content with any alms from any person, he carries out his lonely life, indifferent to all feelings, meditating on the holy books, and satisfied in himself.

48. 'Then having seen how fear arises from passion and the highest happiness from the absence of passion, he strives, by restraining all the senses, to attain to tranquillity of mind.

49. 'Then he reaches the first stage of contemplation, which is separated from desires, evil intentions and the like, and arises from discrimination and which involves reasoning².

50. 'And having obtained this ecstatic contemplation, and reasoning on various objects, the childish mind is carried away by the possession of the new unknown ecstasy.

51. 'With a tranquillity of this kind, which disdains desire or dislike, he reaches the world of Brahman, deceived by the delight.

52. 'But the wise man, knowing that these reasonings bewilder the mind, reaches a (second) stage of contemplation separate from this, which has its own pleasure and ecstasy.

¹ Dharma.

² Cf. Yoga-sūtras I, 42.

53. 'And he who, carried away by this pleasure, sees no further distinction, obtains a dwelling full of light, even amongst the *Ābhāsura* deities.

54. 'But he who separates his mind from this pleasure and ecstasy, reaches the third stage of contemplation ecstatic but without pleasure.

55. 'Upon this stage some teachers make their stand, thinking that it is indeed liberation, since pleasure and pain have been left behind and there is no exercise of the intellect.

56. 'But he who, immersed in this ecstasy, strives not for a further distinction, obtains an ecstasy in common with the *Subhakṛitsna* deities.

57. 'But he who, having attained such a bliss desires it not but despises it, obtains the fourth stage of contemplation which is separate from all pleasure or pain.

58. 'The fruit of this contemplation which is on an equality with the *Vṛihatphala* deities, those who investigate the great wisdom call the *Vṛihatphala* ¹.

59. 'But rising beyond this contemplation, having seen the imperfections of all embodied souls, the wise man climbs to a yet higher wisdom in order to abolish all body.

60. 'Then, having abandoned this contemplation, being resolved to find a further distinction, he becomes as disgusted with form itself as he who knows the real is with pleasures.

61. 'First he makes use of all the apertures of his body; and next he exerts his will to experience a feeling of void space even in the solid parts ².

62. 'But another wise man, having contracted his soul which is by nature extended everywhere like

¹ The great fruit.

² An obscure verse; cf. *Pāli Dict.*

the ether,¹—as he gazes ever further on, detects a yet higher distinction.

63. 'Another one of those who are profoundly versed in the supreme Self, having abolished himself by himself, sees that nothing exists and is called a Nihilist².

64. 'Then like the Muñga-reed's stalk³ from its sheath or the bird from its cage, the soul, escaped from the body, is declared to be "liberated."

65. 'This is that supreme Brahman, constant, eternal, and without distinctive signs; which the wise who know reality declare to be liberation.

66. 'Thus have I shown to thee the means and liberation; if thou hast understood and approved it, then act accordingly.

67. 'Gaigishavya⁴ and Ganaka, and the aged Parāśara, by following this path, were liberated, and so were others who sought liberation.'

68. The prince having not accepted his words but having pondered them, filled with the force of his former arguments, thus made answer :

69. 'I have heard this thy doctrine, subtil and pre-eminently auspicious, but I hold that it cannot be final, because it does not teach us how to abandon this soul itself in the various bodies.

70. 'For I consider that the embodied soul, though freed from the evolutes and the evolvents, is still subject to the condition of birth and has the condition of a seed⁵.

71. 'Even though the pure soul is declared to be

¹ Cf. Bhāṣhāparīkṣheda, sloka 25.

² Ākimkāya.

³ Cf. Kaṭha Up. VI, 17.

⁴ Mahābh. IX, § 50; Tattvakaumudī, § 5.

⁵ This is expanded in the Chinese, vv. 984, 985.

"liberated," yet as long as the soul remains there can be no absolute abandonment of it.

72. 'If we abandon successively all this triad, yet "distinction" is still perceived; as long as the soul itself continues, there this triad continues in a subtil form.

73. 'It is held (by some) that this is liberation, because the "imperfections" are so attenuated, and the thinking power is inactive, and the term of existence is so prolonged;

74. 'But as for this supposed abandonment of the principle of egoism,—as long as the soul continues, there is no real abandonment of egoism.

75. 'The soul does not become free from qualities as long as it is not released from number and the rest; therefore, as long as there is no freedom from qualities, there is no liberation declared for it.

76. 'There is no real separation of the qualities and their subject; for fire cannot be conceived, apart from its form and heat.

77. 'Before the body there will be nothing embodied, so before the qualities there will be no subject; how, if it was originally free, could the soul ever become bound¹?

78. 'The body-knower (the soul) which is unembodied, must be either knowing or unknowing; if it is knowing, there must be some object to be known, and if there is this object, it is not liberated.

79. 'Or if the soul is declared to be unknowing, then of what use to you is this imagined soul? Even without such a soul, the existence of the absence of knowledge is notorious as, for instance, in a log of wood or a wall.

¹ I read *kasmât* for *tasmât*.

80. 'And since each successive abandonment is held to be still accompanied by qualities, I maintain that the absolute attainment of our end can only be found in the abandonment of everything.'

81. Thus did he remain unsatisfied after he had heard the doctrine of *Arâda*; then having decided it to be incomplete, he turned away.

82. Seeking to know the true distinction, he went to the hermitage of Udraka¹, but he gained no clear understanding from his treatment of the soul.

83. For the sage Udraka, having learned the inherent imperfections of the name and the thing named, took refuge in a theory beyond Nihilism, which maintained a name and a non-name.

84. And since even a name and a non-name were substrata, however subtil, he went even further still and found his restlessness set at rest in the idea that there is no named and no un-named;

85. And because the intellect rested there, not proceeding any further,—it became very subtil, and there was no such thing as un-named nor as named.

86. But because, even when it has reached this goal it yet returns again to the world, therefore the Bodhisattva, seeking something beyond, left Udraka.

87. Having quitted his hermitage, fully resolved in his purpose, and seeking final bliss, he next visited the hermitage, called a city, of the royal sage Gaya.

88. Then on the pure bank of the *Nairâṅganâ* the saint whose every effort was pure fixed his dwelling, bent as he was on a lonely habitation.

89. Five mendicants, desiring liberation, came

¹ Cf. Burnouf, *Introd.* p. 386 n. It is written Rudraka in XV, 89.

up to him when they beheld him there, just as the objects of the senses come up to a percipient who has gained wealth and health by his previous merit.

90. Being honoured by these disciples who were dwelling in that family, as they bowed reverently with their bodies bent low in humility, as the mind is honoured by the restless senses,

91. And thinking, 'this may be the means of abolishing birth and death,' he at once commenced a series of difficult austerities by fasting.

92. For six years, vainly trying to attain merit¹, he practised self-mortification, performing many rules of abstinence, hard for a man to carry out.

93. At the hours for eating, he, longing to cross the world whose farther shore is so difficult to reach, broke his vow with single jujube fruits, sesame seeds, and rice.

94. But the emaciation which was produced in his body by that asceticism, became positive fatness through the splendour which invested him.

95. Though thin, yet with his glory and his beauty unimpaired, he caused gladness to other eyes, as the autumnal moon in the beginning of her bright fortnight gladdens the lotuses.

96. Having only skin and bone remaining, with his fat, flesh and blood entirely wasted, yet, though diminished, he still shone with undiminished grandeur like the ocean.

97. Then the seer, having his body evidently emaciated to no purpose in a cruel self-mortifica-

¹ This is the Tibetan reading [las-ni thob-bzhed lo drug-tu, 'wishing to obtain (the fruits of good) works, during six years.' H.W.]

tion,—dreading continued existence, thus reflected in his longing to become a Buddha :

98. 'This is not the way to passionlessness, nor to perfect knowledge, nor to liberation ; that was certainly the true way which I found at the root of the Gambu¹ tree.

99. 'But that cannot be attained by one who has lost his strength,'—so resuming his care for his body, he next pondered thus, how best to increase his bodily vigour :

100. 'Wearied with hunger, thirst, and fatigue, with his mind no longer self-possessed through fatigue, how should one who is not absolutely calm reach the end which is to be attained by his mind ?

101. 'True calm is properly obtained by the constant satisfaction of the senses ; the mind's self-possession is only obtained by the senses being perfectly satisfied.

102. 'True meditation is produced in him whose mind is self-possessed and at rest,—to him whose thoughts are engaged in meditation the exercise of perfect contemplation begins at once.

103. 'By contemplation are obtained those conditions² through which is eventually gained that supreme calm, undecaying, immortal state, which is so hard to be reached.'

104. Having thus resolved, 'this means is based upon eating food,' the wise seer of unbounded wisdom, having made up his mind to accept the continuance of life,

105. And having bathed, thin as he was, slowly

¹ The rose apple, see V, 8.

² Dharmāḥ.

came up the bank of the Nairāṅganā, supported as by a hand by the trees on the shore, which bent down the ends of their branches in adoration.

106. Now at that time Nandabalā, the daughter of the leader of the herdsmen, impelled by the gods, with a sudden joy risen in her heart, had just come near,

107. Her arm gay with a white shell, and wearing a dark blue woollen cloth, like the river Yamunā, with its dark blue water and its wreath of foam.

108. She, having her joy increased by her faith, with her lotus-like eyes opened wide, bowed down before him and persuaded him to take some milk.

109. By partaking that food having made her obtain the full reward of her birth, he himself became capable of gaining the highest knowledge, all his six senses being now satisfied,

110. The seer, having his body now fully robust, together with his glorious fame, one beauty and one majesty being equally spread in both, shone like the ocean and the moon¹.

111. Thinking that he had returned to the world the five mendicants left him, as the five elements leave the wise soul when it is liberated.

112. Accompanied only by his own resolve, having fixed his mind on the attainment of perfect knowledge, he went to the root of an Asvattha tree², where the surface of the ground was covered with young grass.

113. Then Kāla³, the best of serpents, whose

¹ Fame is often compared for its brightness to the moon.

² *Ficus religiosa* or pipul tree.

³ He is the Nāga king, *Gātaka* I, 72.

majesty was like the lord of elephants, having been awakened by the unparalleled sound of his feet, uttered this praise of the great sage, being sure that he was on the point of attaining perfect knowledge :

114. 'Inasmuch as the earth, pressed down by thy feet, O sage, resounds repeatedly, and inasmuch as thy splendour shines forth like the sun, thou shalt assuredly to-day enjoy the desired fruit.

115. 'Inasmuch as lines of birds fluttering in the sky offer thee reverential salutation, O lotus-eyed one, and inasmuch as gentle breezes blow in the sky, thou shalt certainly to-day become the Buddha.'

116. Being thus praised by the best of serpents, and having taken some pure grass from a grass-cutter, he, having made his resolution, sat down to obtain perfect knowledge at the foot of the great holy tree.

117. Then he sat down on his hams in a posture, immovably firm and with his limbs gathered into a mass like a sleeping serpent's hood, exclaiming, 'I will not rise from this position on the earth¹ until I have obtained my utmost aim.'

118. Then the dwellers in heaven burst into unequalled joy; the herds of beasts and the birds uttered no cry; the trees moved by the wind made no sound, when the holy one took his seat firm in his resolve.

¹ For tāvat read yāvat.

BOOK XIII.

1. When the great sage, sprung from a line of royal sages, sat down there with his soul fully resolved to obtain the highest knowledge, the whole world rejoiced; but Mâra, the enemy of the good law, was afraid.

2. He whom they call in the world Kâmadeva, the owner of the various weapons, the flower-arrowed, the lord of the course of desire,—it is he whom they also style Mâra the enemy of liberation.

3. His three sons, Confusion, Gaiety, and Pride, and his three daughters, Lust, Delight, and Thirst¹, asked of him the reason of his despondency, and he thus made answer unto them:

4. 'This sage, wearing the armour of resolution, and having drawn the arrow of wisdom with the barb of truth, sits yonder intending to conquer my realms,—hence is this despondency of my mind.

5. 'If he succeeds in overcoming me and proclaims to the world the path of final bliss, all this my realm will to-day become empty, as did that of the disembodied lord when he violated the rules of his station².

6. 'While, therefore, he stands within my reach

¹ For these cf. also ver. 14, and XV, 13.

² This probably refers to the legend of Nimi-videha, see Vishnu Pur. IV, 5; it might be 'the king of the Videhas.' There may be also a secondary allusion to the legend of Ananga and Siva.

and while his spiritual eyesight is not yet attained, I will assail him to break his vow as the swollen might of a river assails a dam.'

7. Then having seized his flower-made bow and his five infatuating arrows, he drew near to the root of the Asvattha tree with his children, he the great disturber of the minds of living beings.

8. Having fixed his left hand on the end of the barb and playing with the arrow, Māra thus addressed the calm seer as he sat on his seat, preparing to cross to the further side of the ocean of existence :

9. 'Up, up, O thou Kshatriya, afraid of death ! follow thine own duty and abandon this law of liberation ! and having conquered the lower worlds by thy arrows, proceed to gain the higher worlds of Indra.

10. 'That is a glorious path to travel, which has been followed by former leaders of men ; this mendicant life is ill-suited for one born in the noble family of a royal sage to follow.

11. 'But if thou wilt not rise, strong in thy purpose,—then be firm if thou wilt and quit not thy resolve,—this arrow is uplifted by me,—it is the very one which was shot against Sūryaka¹, the enemy of the fish.

12. 'So too, I think, when somewhat probed by this weapon, even the son of Idā², the grandson of the moon, became mad ; and Sāmtanu³ also lost

¹ The sun, alluding to his amour with Vadavā. (The lake is called vipannamīnam in *Rātusambhāra* I, 20.)

² Purūravas. (Professor Bühler suggests *sprishak*.)

³ Does this mean Vikitravīrya the grandson of Sāmtanu, see Vishṇu Pur. IV, 20 ?

his self-control,—how much more then one of feeblar powers now that the age has grown degenerate?

13. 'Therefore quickly rise up and come to thyself,—for this arrow is ready, darting out its tongue, which I do not launch even against the *ĥakravāka* birds, tenderly attached as they are and well deserving the name of lovers.'

14. But when, even though thus addressed, the *Sākya* saint unheeding did not change his posture, then *Māra* discharged his arrow at him, setting in front of him his daughters and his sons¹.

15. But even when that arrow was shot he gave no heed and swerved not from his firmness; and *Māra*, beholding him thus, sank down, and slowly thus spoke, full of thought:

16. 'He does not even notice that arrow by which the god *Sambhu* was pierced with love for the daughter of the mountain² and shaken in his vow; can he be destitute of all feeling? is not this that very arrow?

17. 'He is not worthy of my flower-shaft, nor my arrow "gladdener," nor the sending of my daughter *Rati* (to tempt him); he deserves the alarms and rebukes and blows from all the gathered hosts of the demons.'

18. Then *Māra* called to mind his own army, wishing to work the overthrow of the *Sākya* saint; and his followers swarmed round, wearing different forms and carrying arrows, trees, darts, clubs, and swords in their hands;

19. Having the faces of boars, fishes, horses, asses,

¹ See ver. 3.

² *Umā*.

and camels, of tigers, bears, lions, and elephants,—one-eyed, many-faced, three-headed,—with protuberant bellies and speckled bellies ;

20. Blended with goats, with knees swollen like pots, armed with tusks and with claws, carrying headless trunks in their hands, and assuming many forms, with half-mutilated faces, and with monstrous mouths ;

21. Copper-red, covered with red spots, bearing clubs in their hands, with yellow or smoke-coloured hair, with wreaths dangling down, with long pendulous ears like elephants, clothed in leather or wearing no clothes at all ;

22. Having half their faces white or half their bodies green,—red and smoke-coloured, yellow and black,—with arms reaching out longer than a serpent, and with girdles jingling with rattling bells.

23. Some were as tall as palm-trees, carrying spears,—others were of the size of children with projecting teeth, others birds with the faces of rams, others with men's bodies and cats' faces ;

24. With dishevelled hair, or with topknots, or half-bald, with rope-garments or with head-dress all in confusion,—with triumphant faces or frowning faces,—wasting the strength or fascinating the mind.

25. Some as they went leaped about wildly, others danced upon one another, some sported about in the sky, others went along on the tops of the trees.

26. One danced, shaking a trident, another made a crash, dragging a club, another bounded for joy like a bull, another blazed out flames from every hair.

27. Such were the troops of demons who encircled the root of the Bodhi tree on every side, eager to

seize it and to destroy it, awaiting the command of their lord.

28. Beholding in the first half of the night that battle of Māra and the bull of the Sākya race, the heavens did not shine and the earth shook and the (ten) regions of space flashed flames and roared.

29. A wind of intense violence blew in all directions¹, the stars did not shine, the moon gave no light, and a deeper darkness of night spread around, and all the oceans were agitated.

30. The mountain deities² and the Nāgas who honoured the Law, indignant at the attack on the saint, rolling their eyes in anger against Māra, heaved deep sighs and opened their mouths wide.

31. But the god-sages, the Suddhādhivāsas³, being as it were absorbed in the perfect accomplishment of the good Law, felt only a pity for Māra in their minds and through their absolute passionlessness were unruffled by anger.

32. When they saw the foot of the Bodhi tree crowded with that host of Māra, intent on doing harm,—the sky was filled with the cry raised by all the virtuous beings who desired the world's liberation.

33. But the great sage⁴ having beheld that army of Māra thus engaged in an attack on the knower of the Law⁵, remained untroubled and suffered no perturbation, like a lion seated in the midst of oxen.

¹ Virvak should be corrected vishvak.

² Mahābhṛtāḥ. This might mean simply 'the rulers of the earth.'

³ In Pāli Suddhāvāsā. Cf. III, 26.

⁴ Buddha himself, viewing all this ab extra.

⁵ The Tibetan seems to read dharmavidheḥ for dharmavidaḥ, as it has chos-kyi cho-ga de-ni, '(injurer) of that law of dharma.'

34. Then Māra commanded his excited army of demons to terrify him ; and forthwith that host resolved to break down his determination with their various powers.

35. Some with many tongues hanging out and shaking, with sharp-pointed savage teeth and eyes like the disk of the sun, with wide-yawning mouths and upright ears like spikes,—they stood round trying to frighten him.

36. Before these monsters standing there, so dreadful in form and disposition, the great sage remained unalarmed and untroubled, sporting with them as if they had been only rude children ¹.

37. Then one of them, with his eyes rolling wildly, lifted up a club against him ; but his arm with the club was instantly paralysed, as was Indra's of old with its thunderbolt ².

38. Some, having lifted up stones and trees, found themselves unable to throw them against the sage ; down they fell, with their trees and their stones, like the roots of the Vindhya shattered by the thunderbolt.

39. Others, leaping up into the sky, flung rocks, trees, and axes ; these remained in the sky and did not fall down, like the many-coloured rays of the evening clouds.

40. Another hurled upon him a mass of blazing straw as big as a mountain-peak, which, as soon as it was thrown, while it hung poised in the sky, was shattered into a hundred fragments by the sage's power.

41. One, rising up like the sun in full splendour, rained down from the sky a great shower of live

¹ Prof. Bühler suggests *svabālebhyaḥ*, 'as with his own tossed hair.'

² Cf. Satap. Br. XII, 7, 3; Vishṇu Pur. V, 30; Kum. Sambh. II, 20.

embers, as at the end of an aeon blazing Meru showers down the pulverised scoriae of the golden valleys.

42. But that shower of embers full of sparks, when scattered at the foot of the Bodhi tree, became a shower of red lotus-petals through the operation of the great saint's boundless charity.

43. But with all these various scorching assaults on his body and his mind, and all these missiles showered down upon him, the Śākya saint did not in the least degree move from his posture, clasping firmly his resolution as a kinsman.

44. Then others spat out serpents from their mouths as from old decayed trunks of trees; but, as if held fast by a charm, near him they neither breathed nor discharged venom nor moved.

45. Others, having become great clouds, emitting lightning and uttering the fierce roar of thunderbolts, poured a shower of stones upon that tree,—but it turned to a pleasant shower of flowers.

46. Another set an arrow in his bow,—there it gleamed but it did not issue forth, like the anger which falls slack¹ in the soul of an ill-tempered impotent man.

47. But five arrows shot by another stood motionless and fell not, through the saint's ruling guidance,—like the five senses of him who is well experienced in the course of worldly objects and is afraid of embodied existence.

48. Another, full of anger, rushed towards the great saint, having seized a club with a desire to

¹ Dhûryamāno is a difficult word, connected with √dhvri or √dhûrv.

smite him ; but he fell powerless without finding an opportunity, like mankind in the presence of faults which cause failure ¹.

49. But a woman named Meghakālā, bearing a skull in her hand, in order to infatuate the mind of the sage, flitted about unsettled and stayed not in one spot, like the mind of the fickle student over the sacred texts.

50. Another, fixing a kindling eye, wished to burn him with the fire of his glance like a poisonous serpent ; but he saw the sage and lo ! he was not there, like the votary of pleasure when true happiness is pointed out to him ².

51. Another, lifting up a heavy rock, wearied himself to no purpose, having his efforts baffled,—like one who wishes to obtain by bodily fatigue that condition of supreme happiness which is only to be reached by meditation and knowledge.

52. Others, wearing the forms of hyenas and lions, uttered loudly fierce howls, which caused all beings round to quail with terror, as thinking that the heavens were smitten with a thunderbolt and were bursting.

53. Deer and elephants uttering cries of pain ran about or lay down,—in that night as if it were day screaming birds flew around disturbed in all directions.

54. But amidst all these various sounds which they made, although all living creatures were shaken, the saint trembled not nor quailed, like Garuḍa at the noise of crows.

¹ Cf. randhropanipâtino • narthâḥ, Sakunt. VI.

² He had not eyes to see the object which he looked for.

55. The less the saint feared the frightful hosts of that multitude, the more did Māra, the enemy of the righteous, continue his attacks in grief and anger.

56. Then some being of invisible shape, but of pre-eminent glory, standing in the heavens,—beholding Māra thus malevolent against the seer,—addressed him in a loud voice, unruffled by enmity:

57. 'Take not on thyself, O Māra, this vain fatigue,—throw aside thy malevolence and retire to peace¹; this sage cannot be shaken by thee any more than the mighty mountain Meru by the wind.

58. 'Even fire might lose its hot nature, water its fluidity, earth its steadiness, but never will he abandon his resolution, who has acquired his merit by a long course of actions through unnumbered aeons.

59. 'Such is that purpose of his, that heroic effort, that glorious strength, that compassion for all beings, —until he attains the highest wisdom, he will never rise from his seat, just as the sun does not rise, without dispelling the darkness.

60. 'One who rubs the two pieces of wood obtains the fire, one who digs the earth finds at last the water,—and to him in his perseverance there is nothing unattainable,—all things to him are reasonable and possible.

61. 'Pitying the world lying distressed amidst diseases and passions, he, the great physician, ought not to be hindered, who undergoes all his labours for the sake of the remedy knowledge.

62. 'He who toilsomely pursues the one good path, when all the world is carried away in devious

¹ Or 'go to thy home.'

tracks,—he the guide should not be disturbed, like a right informant when the caravan has lost its way.

63. 'He who is made a lamp of knowledge when all beings are lost in the great darkness,—it is not for a right-minded soul to try to quench him,—like a lamp kindled in the gloom of night.

64. 'He who, when he beholds the world drowned in the great flood of existence and unable to reach the further shore, strives to bring them safely across,—would any right-minded soul offer him wrong?

65. 'The tree of knowledge, whose roots go deep in firmness, and whose fibres are patience,—whose flowers are moral actions and whose branches are memory and thought,—and which gives out the law as its fruit,—surely when it is growing it should not be cut down.

66. 'Him whose one desire is to deliver mankind bound in soul by the fast snares of illusion,—thy wish to overthrow him is not worthy, wearied as he is for the sake of unloosing the bonds of the world.

67. 'To-day is the appointed period of all those actions which have been performed by him for the sake of knowledge,—he is now seated on this seat just as all the previous saints have sat.

68. 'This is the navel of the earth's surface, endued with all the highest glory; there is no other spot of the earth than this,—the home of contemplation, the realm of well-being.

69. 'Give not way, then, to grief but put on calm; let not thy greatness, O Mâra, be mixed with pride; it is not well to be confident,—fortune

is unstable,—why dost thou accept a position on a tottering base?’

70. Having listened to his words, and having seen the unshaken firmness of the great saint, Māra departed dispirited and broken in purpose¹ with those very arrows by which, O world, thou art smitten in thy heart.

71. With their triumph at an end, their labour all fruitless, and all their stones, straw, and trees thrown away, that host of his fled in all directions, like some hostile army when its camp has been destroyed by the enemy.

72. When the flower-armed god² thus fled away vanquished with his hostile forces and the passionless sage remained victorious, having conquered all the power of darkness, the heavens shone out with the moon like a maiden with a smile, and a sweet-smelling shower of flowers fell down wet with dew.

73.³ When the wicked one thus fled vanquished, the different regions of the sky grew clear, the moon shone forth, showers of flowers fell down from the sky upon the earth, and the night gleamed out like a spotless maiden⁴.

¹ I read *hatodyamo*.

² Māra as identified with Kāmadeva, cf. ver. 2.

³ Should we read *tathâ hi* for *tathâpi*?

⁴ Here the original work of Arsvaghosha ends according to the gloss at the close of the Cambridge MS. C; the four remaining books were added, to supply an old lacuna, by Amṛitānanda, a modern Nepalese author. The Chinese and Tibetan translations seem to agree with the Sanskrit for part of the fourteenth book, but they soon diverge widely from it. The four books are included in the translation as a literary curiosity.

BOOK XIV.

1. Then, having conquered the hosts of Māra by his firmness and calmness, he the great master of meditation set himself to meditate, longing to know the supreme end.

2. And having attained the highest mastery in all kinds of meditation, he remembered in the first watch the continuous series of all his former births.

3. 'In such a place I was so and so by name, and from thence I passed and came hither,' thus he remembered his thousands of births, experiencing each as it were over again.

4. And having remembered each birth and each death in all those various transmigrations, the compassionate one then felt compassion for all living beings.

5. Having wilfully rejected the good guides in this life and done all kinds of actions in various lives, this world of living beings rolls on helplessly, like a wheel.

6. As he thus remembered, to him in his strong self-control came the conviction, 'All existence is unsubstantial, like the fruit of a plantain.'

7. When the second watch came, he, possessed of unequalled energy, received a pre-eminent divine sight, he the highest of all sight-gifted beings.

8. Then by that divine perfectly pure sight he beheld the whole world as in a spotless mirror.

9. As he saw the various transmigrations and rebirths of the various beings with their several lower or higher merits from their actions, compassion grew up more within him.

10. 'These living beings, under the influence of evil actions, pass into wretched worlds,—these others, under the influence of good actions, go forward in heaven.

11. 'The one, being born in a dreadful hell full of terrors, are miserably tortured, alas! by many kinds of suffering;

12. 'Some are made to drink molten iron of the colour of fire, others are lifted aloft screaming on a red-hot iron pillar;

13. 'Others are baked like flour, thrown with their heads downwards into iron jars; others are miserably burned in heaps of heated charcoal;

14. 'Some are devoured by fierce dreadful dogs with iron teeth, others by gloating crows with iron beaks and all made as it were of iron;

15. 'Some, wearied of being burned, long for cold shade; these enter like bound captives into a dark blue wood with swords for leaves.

16. 'Others having many arms are split like timber with axes, but even in that agony they do not die, being supported in their vital powers by their previous actions.

17. 'Whatever deed was done only to hinder pain with the hope that it might bring pleasure, its result is now experienced by these helpless victims as simple pain.

18. 'These who did something evil for the sake

of pleasure and are now grievously pained,—does that old taste produce even an atom of pleasure to them now?

19. 'The wicked deed which was done by the wicked-hearted in glee,—its consequences are reaped by them in the fulness of time with cries.

20. 'If only evil doers could see the fruits of their actions, they would vomit hot blood as if they were smitten in a vital part.

21. 'And worse still than all these bodily tortures in hell seems to me the association of an intelligent man with the base.

22. 'Others also, through various actions arising from the spasmodic violence of their minds, are born miserable in the wombs of various beasts.

23. 'There the poor wretches are killed even in the sight of their kindred, for the sake of their flesh, their skin, their hair, or their teeth, or through hatred or for mere pleasure.

24. 'Even though powerless and helpless, oppressed by hunger, thirst, and fatigue, they are driven along as oxen and horses, their bodies wounded with goads.

25. 'They are driven along, when born as elephants, by weaker creatures than themselves for all their strength,—their heads tormented by the hook and their bodies kicked by foot and heel.

26. 'And with all these other miseries there is an especial misery arising from mutual enmity and from subjection to a master.

27. 'Air-dwellers are oppressed by air-dwellers, the denizens of water by the denizens of water, those that dwell on dry land are made to suffer by the dwellers on dry land in mutual hostility.

28. 'And others there are who, when born again, with their minds filled with envy, reap the miserable fruit of their actions in a world of the *Pitr̥is* destitute of all light ;

29. ' Having mouths as small as the eye of a needle and bellies as big as a mountain, these miserable wretches are tortured with the pains of hunger and thirst.

30. ' If a man only knew that such was the consequence of selfishness, he would always give to others even pieces of his own body like *Sibi*.

31. ' Rushing up filled with hope but held back by their former deeds, they try in vain to eat anything large, however impure.

32. ' Others, having found a hell in an impure lake called the womb, are born amongst men and there suffer anguish.

33. ' Others, ascetics, who have performed meritorious actions go to heaven ; others, having attained widely extended empire, wander about on the earth¹ ;

34. ' Others as *Nāgas* in the subterranean regions become the guardians of treasures,—they wander in the ocean of existence, receiving the fruits of their deeds.'

35. Having pondered all this, in the last watch he thus reflected, ' Alas for this whole world of living beings doomed to misery, all alike wandering astray !

36. ' They know not that all this universe, destitute of any real refuge, is born and decays through that existence which is the site of the *skandhas* and pain ;

¹ Heaven and earthly empire are alike transient.

37. 'It dies and passes into a new state and then is born anew.' Then he reflected, 'What is that which is the necessary condition for old age and death?'

38. He saw that when there is birth, there is old age and death, then he pondered, 'What is that which is the necessary condition for a new birth¹?''

40. He perceived that where there has been the attachment to existence² there arises a (previous) existence; then he pondered, 'What is that which is the necessary condition for the attachment to existence?'

41. Having ascertained this to be desire, he again meditated, and he next pondered, 'What is that which is the necessary condition for desire?'

42. He saw that desire arises where there is sensation, and he next pondered, 'What is that which is the necessary condition for sensation?'

43. He saw that sensation arises where there is contact³, and he next pondered, 'What is that which is the necessary condition for contact?'

44. He saw that contact arises through the six organs of sense; he then pondered, 'Where do the six organs of sense arise?'

45. He reflected that these arise in the organism⁴, he then pondered, 'Where does the organism arise?'

¹ A verse (39) is omitted here containing the third step bhava (cf. Chinese translation, 1150, 1151), 'He perceived that when there has been a (previous) existence [involving previous actions] there is a new birth; then he pondered, "What is that which is the necessary condition for a previous existence arising?"' (Cf. Burnouf, *Introd.* pp. 485-506; Childers in *Colebrooke's Essays*, vol. i, 1873.)

² Upādānam.

³ Sc. between the senses and their objects.

⁴ Nāmarūpa, sc. 'name and form,' i.e. the individual consisting of mind and body, as the embryo in the womb.

46. He saw that the organism arises where there is incipient consciousness; he then pondered, 'Where does incipient consciousness arise?'

47. He reflected that incipient consciousness arises where there are the latent impressions left by former actions; and he next pondered, 'Where do the latent impressions arise?'

48. He reflected exhaustively that they arise in ignorance; thus did the great seer, the Bodhisattva, the lord of saints,

49. After reflecting, pondering, and meditating, finally determine, 'The latent impressions start into activity after they are once developed from ignorance.

50. 'Produced from the activity of the latent impressions incipient consciousness starts into action; (the activity) of the organism starts into action on having an experience¹ of incipient consciousness;

51. 'The six organs of sense become active when produced in the organism; sensation is produced from the contact of the six organs (with their objects);

52. 'Desire starts into activity when produced from sensation; the attachment to existence springs from desire; from this attachment arises a (continued) existence;

53. 'Birth is produced where there has been a (continued) existence; and from birth arise old age, disease, and the rest; and scorched by the flame of old age and disease the world is devoured by death;

54. 'When it is thus scorched by the fire of

¹ *Samparīkṣhya* is a doubtful reading; I supply *vṛttiḥ* with *nāmarūpasya*.

death's anguish great pain arises ; such verily is the origin of this great trunk of pain.'

55. Thus having ascertained it all, the great Being was perfectly illuminated ; and having again meditated and pondered, he thus reflected,

56. 'When old age and disease are stopped, death also is stopped ; and when birth is stopped, old age and disease are stopped ;

57. 'When the action of existence is stopped, birth also is stopped ; when the attachment to existence is stopped, the action of existence is stopped ;

58. 'So too when desire is stopped, the attachment to existence is stopped ; and with the stopping of sensation desire is no longer produced ;

59. 'And when the contact of the six organs is stopped, sensation is no longer produced ; and with the stopping of the six organs their contact (with their objects) is stopped ;

60. 'And with the stopping of the organism the six organs are stopped ; and with the stopping of incipient consciousness the organism is stopped ;

61. 'And with the stopping of the latent impressions incipient consciousness is stopped ; and with the stopping of ignorance the latent impressions have no longer any power.

62. 'Thus ignorance is declared to be the root of this great trunk of pain by all the wise ; therefore it is to be stopped by those who seek liberation.

63. 'Therefore by the stopping of ignorance all the pains also of all existing beings are at once stopped and cease to act.'

64. The all-knowing Bodhisattva, the illuminated one, having thus determined, after again pondering and meditating thus came to his conclusion :

65. 'This is pain, this also is the origin of pain in the world of living beings; this also is the stopping of pain; this is that course which leads to its stopping.' So having determined he knew all as it really was.

66. Thus he, the holy one, sitting there on his seat of grass at the root of the tree, pondering by his own efforts attained at last perfect knowledge.

67. Then bursting the shell of ignorance, having gained all the various kinds of perfect intuition, he attained all the partial knowledge of alternatives which is included in perfect knowledge¹.

68. He became the perfectly wise, the Bhagavat, the Arhat, the king of the Law, the Tathâgata, He who has attained the knowledge of all forms, the Lord of all science.

69. Having beheld all this, the spirits standing in heaven spoke one to another, 'Strew flowers on this All-wise Monarch of Saints.'

70. While other immortals exclaimed, who knew the course of action of the greatest among the former saints, 'Do not now strew flowers—no reason for it has been shown.'

71. Then the Buddha, mounted on a throne, up in the air to the height of seven palm-trees, addressed all those Nirmîtâ Bodhisattvâh², illumining their minds,

72. 'Ho! ho! listen ye to the words of me who have now attained perfect knowledge; everything is achieved by meritorious works, therefore as long as existence lasts³ acquire merit.'

¹ Doubtful. I suppose it means that he knew all hypothetical as well as categorical propositions.

² These Nirmîtâ Bodhisattvâh seem to be the nim-mânaratt devâ of the southern Buddhists with their nimmitâ kâma or self-created pleasures.

³ Âbhavam.

73. 'Since I ever acted as liberal, pure-hearted, patient, skilful, devoted to meditation and wisdom,—by these meritorious works I became a Bodhisattva.

74. 'After accomplishing in due order the entire round of the preliminaries of perfect wisdom,—I have now attained that highest wisdom and I am become the All-wise Arhat and Gīna.

75. 'My aspiration is thus fulfilled; this birth of mine has borne its fruit; the blessed and immortal knowledge which was attained by former Buddhas, is now mine.

76. 'As they through the good Law achieved the welfare of all beings, so also have I; all my sins are abolished, I am the destroyer of all pains.

77. 'Possessing a soul now of perfect purity, I urge all living beings to seek the abolition of worldly existence through the lamps of the Law.' Having worshipped him as he thus addressed them, those sons of the Gīnas disappeared.

78. The gods then with exultation paid him worship and adoration with divine flowers; and all the world, when the great saint had become all-wise, was full of brightness.

79. Then the holy one descended and stood on his throne under the tree; there he passed seven days filled with the thought, 'I have here attained perfect wisdom.'

80. When the Bodhisattva had thus attained perfect knowledge, all beings became full of great happiness; and all the different universes were illumined by a great light.

81. The happy earth shook in six different ways like an overjoyed woman, and the Bodhisattvas, each

dwelling in his own special abode, assembled and praised him.

82. 'There has arisen the greatest of all beings, the Omniscient All-wise Arhat—a lotus, unsoiled by the dust of passion, sprung up from the lake of knowledge ;

83. 'A cloud bearing the water of patience, pouring forth the ambrosia of the good Law, fostering all the seeds of merit, and causing all the shoots of healing to grow ;

84. 'A thunderbolt with a hundred edges, the vanquisher of Māra, armed only with the weapon of patience ; a gem fulfilling all desires, a tree of paradise, a jar of true good fortune¹, a cow that yields all that heart can wish ;

85. 'A sun that destroys the darkness of delusion, a moon that takes away the scorching heat of the inherent sins of existence,—glory to thee, glory to thee, glory to thee, O Tathāgata ;

86. 'Glory to thee, O Lord of the whole world, glory to thee, who hast gone through the ten (Balas²) ; glory to thee, O true hero amongst men, O Lord of righteousness, glory to thee !'

87. Thus having praised, honoured, and adored him, they each returned to their several homes, after making repeated reverential circumambulations, and recounting his eulogy.

88. Then the beings of the Kāmāvaśāra worlds, and the brilliant inhabitants of the Pure Abodes, the

¹ The bhadrakumbha was the golden jar filled with consecrated water, used especially at the inauguration of a king.

² The ten balas are ten kinds of spiritual knowledge peculiar to a Buddha ; but 'the ten' may be the ten dharmas, see Childers.

Brahmakâyika gods, and those sons of Mâra who favoured the side of truth¹,

89. The Paranirmitavasavarti beings, and the Nirmânarataya^h; the Tushita beings, the Yâmas, the Trayastrimsad Devas, and the other rulers of worlds,

90. The deities who roam in the sky, those who roam on the earth or in forests, accompanying each their own king, came to the pavilion of the Bodhi tree,

91. And having worshipped the Gina with forms of homage suitable to their respective positions, and having praised him with hymns adapted to their respective degrees of knowledge, they returned to their own homes.

¹ These terms are all explained in Childers' Dict. sattaloko. For the better-inclined sons of Mâra, cf. the dialogue between those of the right side and the left side before Mâra in the Lalitav. XXI, cf. also XXIII.

BOOK XV.

1. Daily praised by all the various heavenly beings, the perfectly Wise One¹ thus passed that period of seven days which is designated 'the aliment of joy'.²

2. He then passed the second week, while he was bathed with jars full of water by the heavenly beings, the Bodhisattvas and the rest.

3. Then having bathed in the four oceans and being seated on his throne, he passed the third week restraining his eyes from seeing.

4. In the fourth week, assuming many forms, he stood triumphant on his throne, having delivered a being who was ready to be converted.

5. A god named Samantakusuma, bearing an offering of flowers, thus addressed with folded hands the great Buddha who was seated there :

6. 'What is the name, O holy one, of this meditation, engaged in which thou hast thus passed four whole weeks with joy, deeply pondering ?'

7. 'This is designated, O divine being, "the array³ of the aliment of great joy," like an inaugurated king, who has overcome his enemies and enjoys prosperity.'

8. Having said this, the saint possessing the ten

¹ Sambuddha.

² Prītyāhāra; this book corresponds closely with Lalitav. XXIV.

³ Vyūha.

pre-eminent powers, full of joy, continued, 'The former perfect Buddhas also did not leave the Bodhi tree.

9. 'Here the Klesas and the Māras together with ignorance and the Āsravas have been conquered by me; and perfect wisdom has been attained able to deliver the world.

10. 'I too, resolved to follow the teaching of the former Buddhas, remained four whole weeks in the fulfilment of my inauguration¹.'

11. Then Māra, utterly despondent in soul, thus addressed the Tathāgata, 'O holy one, be pleased to enter Nirvāṇa, thy desires are accomplished.'

12. 'I will first establish in perfect wisdom worlds as numerous as the sand, and then I will enter Nirvāṇa,' thus did the Buddha reply, and with a shriek Māra went to his home.

13. Then the three daughters of Māra, Lust, Thirst, and Delight², beholding their father with defeated face, approached the Tathāgata.

14. Lust, with a face like the moon and versed in all the arts of enchantment, tried to infatuate him by her descriptions of the pleasures of a householder's life.

15. 'Think, "If I abandon an emperor's happiness, with what paltry happiness shall I have to content myself? When success is lost, what shall I have to enjoy?"—and come and take refuge with us.

16. 'Else, in bitter repentance, thou wilt remember me hereafter, when thou art fallen.'—But he listened

¹ Query abhishekādikāryatah?

² Cf. XIII, 3 and 14. Cf. also Lalitav. XXIV (arati?).

not to her words, closing his eyes in deep meditation like one who is sleepy.

17. Then Thirst, shameless like one distressed with thirst, thus addressed him who was free from all thirst: 'Fie, fie, thou hast abandoned thy family duties, thou hast fallen from all social obligations;

18. 'Without power no asceticism, sacrifice, or vow can be accomplished,—those great *Rishis* Brahman and the rest, because they were endowed with power, enjoy their present triumph.

19. 'Know me to be the power called Thirst¹, and worship thirst accordingly; else I will clasp thee with all my might and fling away thy life.'

20. Motionless as one almost dead, he continued in meditation, remembering the former Buddhas; then Delight next tried to win him who was indeed hard to be won by evil deeds.

21. 'O holy one, I am Delight by name, fostering all practicable delights,—therefore making me the female mendicant's tutelary power, bring delight within thy reach.'

22. But whether flattered or threatened, whether she uttered curses or blessings, he remained absorbed in meditation, perfectly tranquil like one who has entered *Nirvāṇa*.

23. Then the three, with despondent faces, having retired together on one side, consulted with one another and came forward wearing the appearance of youthful beauty.

24. Folding their hands in reverence they thus addressed the Tathâgata, 'O holy one, receive us as religious mendicants, we are come to thy one refuge.

¹ Sc. Desire.

25. 'Having heard the fame of thy achievements, we, the daughters of Namukī, have come from the golden city, abandoning the life of a household.

26. 'We are desirous of repressing the teaching of our five hundred brothers,—we would be freed from a master, as thou thyself art freed from all passions.'

27. Having his mind continually guided by the conduct which leads to Nirvāṇa, and setting himself to remember the (former) Buddhas, he kept his eyes closed, absorbed in meditation.

28. Then again, having resolved on their new plan in concert, these enchantresses, assuming an older aspect, approached once more to delude him.

29. 'We have come here after wandering under the dismal avatāra of slaves¹,—thou art the avatāra of Buddha,—do thou establish us, mature, in the true Bauddha doctrine.

30. 'We are women of older age, much to be pitied, bewildered by the fear of death,—we are therefore worthy to be established in that doctrine of Nirvāṇa which puts an end to all future births.'

31. These words of the enchantresses were heard by him, yet he felt no anger; but they all became the victims of old age, through the manifestation of his divine power.

32. Having beheld him plunged in meditation, immovable like the mountain Meru,—they turned away their faces and they could not retain their beauty.

33. Bending their feet, with decrepit limbs, they

¹ I read dāsa- for dāsa-; could there be a reference to the ten avatāras?

thus addressed their father: 'O father, do thou, the lord of the world of Desire, restore us to our own forms.'

34. His daughters were dear, but he had no power to alter the effect of the will of Buddha; then their father said to them, 'Go to the refuge which he gives.'

35. Then they in various guises, bent humbly at his feet, implored the perfect Buddha, 'Pardon our transgression, whose minds were intoxicated with youth.'

36. The teacher, that mine of Forgiveness, in silence restored them by his will; and having repeatedly worshipped and praised him they went joyfully to their home.

37. Then again Mâra, the lord of the world of Desire, lost to shame, taking the form of the head of a family, thus addressed him from the sky:

38. 'I worshipped thee long ago, foretelling that thou wouldest become a Buddha; and by my blessings thou hast to-day become Buddha Tathâgata.

39. 'As thou didst come from thine own kingdom, so now having returned as Tathâgata, with a name corresponding to the reality be a king Tathâgata.

40. 'Having gone to that royal station, do thou meditate on the three jewels, and cherish thy father and mother, and delight Yasodharâ,—

41. 'Possessed of a thousand sons, and able to deliver the world, be successively the supreme lord of every world from the Yâma heaven onwards¹.

42. 'Having become also the supreme lord of all

¹ Mâra rules the four heavens from the Yâma to the Paranirmîtavaśavartin, Mahâbrahman the twenty Brahmaloкас above them.

Bodhisattvas, thou shalt attain Nirvāṇa ; O wise seer, repair to the hermitage of Kapila in order to beget those sons.

43. 'As thou art the king of the Law, so shall thy sons also be all Tathāgatas, and all the activity and cessation of existence shall depend upon thee, O Gina.'

44. To him thus speaking the All-wise replied, 'Hear, O shameless one ; thou art Māra, not the head of a clan, the upholder of the race of the Sākyas.

45. 'A host like thee, though they came in myriads, could not harm me,—I will go to my kingdom gradually, I will bring the world to perfect happiness.

46. 'Thou art utterly vanquished, O Namuḍi, go back to thy own home ; I will go hence to turn the wheel of the Law in Vārāṇasī.'

47. He, on hearing this command, saying with a deep sigh, 'Alas ! I am crushed,' left him and went despondent and companionless through the sky to his home.

48. Then he, the conqueror of Māra, rising from that throne, set forth to journey alone to the holy Vārāṇasī.

49. The heavens became covered with clouds when they saw the chief of saints, and the king of the Nāgas Muḍilinda made a petition in reverential faith :

50. 'O holy one, thou art all-wise, there will be stormy weather for seven days,—wind, rain, and darkness,—dwell for the time in my abode.'

51. Though himself possessed of all supernatural power, the holy one thought of the world still involved in embodied existence, and sitting on that jewel-seat he remained absorbed in contemplation,

52. That king of the Nāgas there protected the Buddha, who is himself the source of all protection, from the rain, wind, and darkness, covering his body with his own hood.

53. When the seven days were past and the Nāga had paid his homage and was gone, the Gīna proceeded to the bank of a river, near a forest of goat-herds¹.

54. As the Sugata stayed there during the night, a deity, who bore the name of the Indian fig-tree, came up to him, illumining the spot where he was, and thus addressed him with folded hands:

55. 'The fig-tree was planted by me when I was born as a man, bearing the name of Buddha; and it has been fostered like the Bodhi tree in the hope of delivering myself from evil.

56. 'By the merit of that action I myself have been born in heaven; in kindness to me, O my lord, do thou dwell seven days in triumph here.'

57. 'So be it,' said the chief of all saints, the true Kalpa tree to grant the wishes of the faithful votary, and he stayed under the fig-tree, absorbed in contemplation, spreading lustre around like a full moon.

58. There he dwelt seven days; and then in a forest of Datura trees, sitting at the foot of a palm, he remained absorbed in contemplation.

59. Spending thus in different spots his weeks of meditation, day and night, the great saint, pondering and fasting, went on in his way, longing to accomplish the world's salvation.

60. Then two wealthy merchants from the land

¹ Agapālaka is in Pāli *Costus speciosus*; but it may here be a proper name.

of Uttara Utkala¹, named Trapusha and Bhallika, journeying with five hundred waggons,

61. Being freed from a sin which involved a birth as pretas², both joyfully worshipped Buddha with an offering of the three sweet substances³ and milk; and they obtained thereby auspicious blessings.

62. They obtained pieces of his nails and hairs for a Kaitya and they also received a prophecy of their future birth, and having received the additional promise, 'Ye shall also obtain a stone⁴,' they then proceeded on their way elsewhere.

63. Then Buddha accepted alms in his bowl, offered by the goddess who dwelt in the Datura grove, and he blessed her with benedictions.

64. The Gina then blessed the four bowls as one, which were offered by the four Mahârâgas⁵, and ate with pleasure the offering of milk.

65. Then one day the Gina ate there an Haritakti fruit⁶ which was offered to him by Sakra, and having planted the seed he caused it to grow to a tree.

66. The king of the Devas carried the news thereof joyfully to the Deva-heavens; and gods, men, and demons watered it with reverential circumambulations.

67. On hearing the news of the Haritakti seed, and remembering the whole history from first to last, a daughter of the gods named Bhadrîkâ, who had been a cow in her former birth⁷, came from heaven.

¹ Northern Orissa.

² Pretadosha? or the evil inflicted by a preta?

³ Sc. sugar, honey, and ghee.

⁴ With the mark of Buddha's feet on it?

⁵ The rulers of the lowest devaloka.

⁶ Terminalia chebula.

⁷ Cf. Mahâbh. V, 7553.

68. She, the daughter of the gods, smiling with her companions, thus addressed the *Gina*, bringing him a garment of rags, dependent from a bough :

69. 'I beg to bring to thy notice—what? O Buddha!—accept this garment of rags, by whose influence I am now a daughter of heaven named *Bhadrikā*.'

70. 'By the further development of this merit thou shalt become a *Bodhisattva*'—uttering this blessing the Teacher accepted the rags.

71. Beholding the tattered rags, the gods, crowding in the sky, filled with wonder, and uttering cries of *hī hī*, flung down upon him garments of heavenly silk.

72. 'These are not fit for a religious mendicant,'—so saying, he did not accept even one of them,—only thinking in his calm apathy, 'these are fit for imperial pomp and a householder's luxury.'

73. He desired a stone slab and some water in order to wash the dirt away,—*Sakra* at that moment dug out a great river full of water ;

74. And four stones are brought to him by the four *Mahārāgas*,—on one he himself sat, on another he performed the washing ;

75. On another he performed the drying, and another he flung up into the sky ; the stone as it flew up reached the blazing city¹ and astonished all the worlds.

76. After paying their worship in many ways, *Trapusha* and *Bhallika* duly raised an excellent *Kaitya* and they called it *Silāgarbha*.

77. The ascetics of that neighbourhood paid their

¹ The sun? or the sphere of fire?

homage to the 'Three Stones' when they were made into a *Kaitya*, and the noble stream flowed widely-known as the 'Holy River.'

78. Those who bathe and offer their worship in the holy river and reverence the *Kaitya* of the three stones, become great-souled Bodhisattvas and obtain *Nirvāṇa*.

79. Then seated under a palm-tree the holy one pondered: 'The profound wisdom so hard to be understood is now known by me.'

80. 'These sin-defiled worlds understand not this most excellent (Law), and the unenlightened shamelessly censure both me and my wisdom.'

81. 'Shall I proclaim the Law? It is only produced by knowledge; having attained it thus in my lonely pondering, do I feel strong enough to deliver the world?'

82. Having remembered all that he had heard before, he again pondered; and resolving, 'I will explain it for the sake of delivering the world,'

83. Buddha, the chief of saints, absorbed in contemplation, shone forth, arousing¹ the world, having emitted in the darkness of the night a light from the tuft of hair between his eyebrows.

84. When it became dawn, Brahman and the other gods, and the various rulers of the different worlds, besought Sugata to turn the wheel of the Law.

85. When the *Gina* by his silence uttered an assenting 'so be it,' they returned to their own abodes; and the lion of the *Sākya*s also shone there, still remaining lost in contemplation.

86. Then the four divinities (of the Bodhi tree),

¹ Cf. *sloka* 118.

Dharmarukī and the rest, addressed him, 'Where, O teacher of the world, will the holy one turn the wheel of the Law?'

87. 'In Vārāṇasī, in the Deer Park will I turn the wheel of the Law; seated in the fourth posture¹, O deities, I will deliver the world.'

88. There the holy one, the bull of the Sākya race, pondered, 'For whom shall I first turn the wheel of the Law?'

89. The glorious one reflected that ²Rudraka and Arāḍa were dead³, and then he remembered those others, the five men united in a worthy society⁴, who dwelt at Kāśī.

90. Then Buddha set out to go joyfully to Kāśī, manifesting as he went the manifold supernatural course of life of Magadha.

91. Having made a mendicant (whom he met) happy in the path of those who are illustrious through the Law, the glorious one went on, illuminating the country which lies to the north of Gayā.

92. (Having stayed) in the dwelling of the prince of the Nāgas, named Sudarsana, on the occurrence of night, he ate a morning meal consisting of the five kinds of ambusia, and departed, gladdening him with his blessing.

93. Near Varanāsi⁵ he went under the shadow

¹ Sc. the padmāsana (Yoga-sūtras II, 46), described as that in which the left foot is bent between the right leg and thigh, and the right foot is bent between the left foot and thigh.

² It is written thus here, cf. XII, 86.

³ Nirvātau.

⁴ Bhadravargīyāḥ, also called Paṁṣavargīyāḥ, cf. XII, 89.

⁵ Query Varanāsi, one of the rivers from which Benares is said to derive its name,—or is it a village near Vārāṇasī, the Anāla of the Lalitav. p. 528?

of a tree and there he established a poor Brāhman named Nandin in sacred knowledge.

94. In *Varāra* in a householder's dwelling he was lodged for the night; in the morning he partook of some milk and departed, having given his blessing.

95. In the village called *Vumdadvitra* he lodged in the abode of a Yaksha named *Vumda*¹, and in the morning after taking some milk and giving his blessing he departed.

96. Next was the garden named *Rohitavastuka*, and there the Nāga-king *Kamandalu* with his courtiers also worshipped him.

97. Having delivered various beings in every place, the compassionate saint journeyed on to *Gandhapura* and was worshipped there by the Yaksha *Gandha*.

98. When he arrived at the city *Sārathi*, the citizens volunteered to be charioteers in his service; thence he came to the Ganges, and he bade the ferryman cross.

99. 'Good man, convey me across the Ganges, may the seven blessings be thine.' 'I carry no one across unless he pays the fee.'

100. 'I have nothing, what shall I give?' So saying he went through the sky like the king of birds; and from that time *Bimbisāra* abolished the ferry-fee for all ascetics.

101. Then having entered *Vārānaśi*, the *Gīna*, illumining the city with his light, filled the minds of all the inhabitants of *Kāśi* with excessive interest.

¹ This may be *Kumda*.

102. In the Saṅkhamedhīya garden, the king of righteousness, absorbed in meditation, passed the night, gladdening like the moon all those who were astonished at his appearance.

103. The next day at the end of the second watch¹, having gone his begging round collecting alms, he, the unequalled one, like Hari, proceeded to the Deer Park.

104. The five disciples united in a worthy society², when they beheld him, said to one another, 'This is Gautama who has come hither, the ascetic who has abandoned his self-control.

105. 'He wanders about now, greedy³, of impure soul, unstable and with his senses under no firm control, devoted to inquiries regarding the frying-pan.

106. 'We will not ask after his health, nor rise to meet him, nor address him, nor offer him a welcome, nor a seat, nor bid him enter into our dwelling.'

107. Having understood their agreement, with a smiling countenance, spreading light all around, Buddha advanced gradually nearer, holding his staff and his begging-pot.

108. Forgetful of their agreement, the five friends, under his constraining majesty, rose up like birds in their cages when scorched by fire.

109. Having taken his begging-bowl and staff, they gave him an arghya, and water for washing his feet and rinsing his mouth; and bowing

¹ Does this yāmadvaye mean at noon, counting the ahorātra from sunrise to sunrise?

² Cf. *supra*, 89.

³ Or perhaps 'irregular.'

reverentially they said to him, 'Honoured Sir, health to thee.'

110. 'Health in every respect is ours,—that wisdom has been attained which is so hard to be won,'—so saying, the holy one thus spoke to the five worthy associates :

111. 'But address me not as "worthy Sir,"—know that I am a *Gina*,—I have come to give the first wheel of the Law to you. Receive initiation from me,—ye shall obtain the place of *Nirvāna*.'

112. Then the five, pure in heart, begged leave to undertake his vow of a religious life ; and the Buddha, touching their heads, received them into the mendicant order.

113. Then at the mendicants' respectful request the chief of saints bathed in the tank, and after eating ambrosia he reflected on the field of the Law¹.

114. Remembering that the Deer Park and the field of the *Gina* were there, he went joyfully with them and pointed out the sacred seats.

115. Having worshipped three seats, he desired to visit the fourth, and when the worthy disciples asked about it, the teacher thus addressed them :

116. 'These are the four seats of the Buddhas of the (present) Bhadra Age,—three Buddhas have passed therein, and I here am the fourth possessor of the ten powers.'

117. Having thus addressed them the glorious one bowed to that throne of the Law, decked with tapestries of cloth and silk, and having its stone

¹ Does this mean the country round Benares, as the land where all Buddhas turned the wheel of the Law ?

inlaid with jewels, like a golden mountain, guarded by the kings of kings,

In the former fortnight of *Āshāḍha*, on the day consecrated to the Regent of Jupiter, on the lunar day sacred to *Vishṇu*, and on an auspicious conjunction, under the asterism *Anurādhā*¹, and in the *muhūrta* called the Victorious, in the night,—he took his stand on the throne.

118. The five worthy disciples stood in front, with joyful minds, paying their homage, and the son of *Suddhodana* performed that act of meditation which is called the Arouser of all worlds;

Brahman and the other gods came surrounded by their attendants, summoned each from his own world; and *Maitriya*² with the deities of the *Tushita* heaven came for the turning of the wheel of the Law.

119. So too when the multitude of the sons of the *Ginas* and the *Suras* gathered together from the ten directions of space, there came also the noble chief of the sons of the *Ginas*, named *Dharma-ākra*³, carrying the wheel of the Law;

With head reverentially bowed, having placed it, a mass of gold and jewels, before the Buddha and having worshipped him, he thus besought him, 'O thou lord of saints, turn the wheel of the Law as it has been done by (former) *Sugatas*.'

¹ The seventeenth *Nakshatra*.

² Is this the same as *Maitreya*, who is to be the future Buddha and who now awaits his time in the *Tushita* heaven? The Cambridge MS. interchanges *Maitreya* and *Maitriya* in XVI, 53.

³ 'Ein Buddha (der das Rad des Gesetzes in Bewegung setzt), *Trikaṇḍas*. I, 1, 8.' St. Petersburg Dict.

BOOK XVI.

1. The omniscient lion of the Sākya then caused all the assembly, headed by those who belonged to the company of Maitrīya¹, to turn the wheel of the Law.

2. 'Listen, O company belonging to Maitrīya¹, ye who form one vast congregation,—as it was proclaimed by those past arch-saints, so is it now proclaimed by Me.

3. 'These are the two extremes, O mendicants, in the self-control of the religious ascetic,—the one which is devoted to the joys of desire, vulgar and common,

4. 'And the other which is tormented by the excessive pursuit of self-inflicted pain in the mortification of the soul's corruptions,—these are the two extremes of the religious ascetic, each devoted to that which is unworthy and useless.

5. 'These have nothing to do with true asceticism, renunciation of the world, or self-control, with true indifference or suppression of pain, or with any of the means of attaining deliverance.

6. 'They do not tend to the spiritual forms of knowledge, to wisdom, nor to Nirvāṇa; let him who is acquainted with the uselessness of inflicting pain and weariness on the body,

¹ The Maitrīya-vargīyāḥ?

7. 'Who has lost his interest¹ in any pleasure or pain of a visible nature, or in the future, and who follows this middle Path for the good of the world,—

8. 'Let him, the Tathâgata, the teacher of the world, proclaim the good Law, beginning that manifestation of the good Law which consists of the (four) noble truths,

9. 'And let the Buddha proclaim the Path with its eight divisions. I too who am now the perfectly wise, and the Tathâgata in the world,

10. 'Will proclaim the noble Law, beginning with those sublime truths and the eightfold Path which is the means to attain perfect knowledge.

11. 'Instructing all the world I will show to it Nirvâṇa; those four noble truths must be heard first and comprehended by the soul.

12. 'That must be understood and thoroughly realised by the true students of wisdom, which has been known here by me, through the favour of all the Buddhas.

13. 'Having known the noble eightfold Path, and embraced it as realised with joy,—thus I declare to you the first means for the attainment of liberation.

14. 'Having thus commenced the noble truths, I will describe the true self-control; this noble truth is the best of all holy laws.

15. 'Walk as long as existence lasts, holding fast the noble eightfold Path,—this noble truth is the highest law for the attainment of true liberation.

16. 'Having pondered and held fast the noble

¹ Nirata seems used here for virata.

eightfold Path, walk in self-control; others, not understanding this, idle talkers full of self-conceit,

17. 'Say according to their own will that merit is the cause of corporeal existence, others maintain that the soul must be preserved (after death) for its merit is the cause of liberation.

18. 'Some say that everything comes spontaneously; others that the consequence was produced before; others talk loudly that all also depends on a Divine Lord.

19. 'If merit and demerit are produced by the good and evil fortune of the soul, how is it that good fortune does not always come to all embodied beings (at last), even in the absence of merit?

20. 'How is the difference accounted for, which we see in form, riches, happiness, and the rest,—if there are no previous actions, how do good and evil arise here?

21. 'If karman is said to be the cause of our actions, who would imagine cogency in this assumption? If all the world is produced spontaneously, who then would talk of the ownership of actions?

22. 'If good is caused by good, then evil will be the cause of evil,—how then could liberation from existence be produced by difficult penances¹?

23. 'Others unwisely talk of *Īsvara* as a cause,—how then is there not uniformity in the world if *Īsvara* be the uniformly acting cause?

24. 'Thus certain ignorant people, talking loudly "he is," "he is not,"—through the demerits of their false theories, are at last born wretched in the different hells.

¹ I. e. viewed as an evil in themselves.

25. 'Through the merits of good theories virtuous men, who understand noble knowledge, go to heavenly worlds, from their self-restraint as regards body, speech, and thought.

26. 'All those who are devoted to existence are tormented with the swarms of its evils, and being consumed by old age, diseases, and death, each one dies and is born again.

27. 'There are many wise men here who can discourse on the laws of coming into being; but there is not even one who knows how the cessation of being is produced.

28. 'This body composed of the five skandhas, and produced from the five elements, is all empty and without soul, and arises from the action of the chain of causation.

29. 'This chain of causation is the cause of coming into existence, and the cessation of the series thereof is the cause of the state of cessation.

30. 'He who knowing this desires to promote the good of the world, let him hold fast the chain of causation, with his mind fixed on wisdom;

31. 'Let him embrace the vow of self-denial for the sake of wisdom, and practise the four perfections¹, and go through existence always doing good to all beings.

32. 'Then having become an Arhat and conquered all the wicked, even the hosts of Māra, and attained the threefold wisdom, he shall enter Nirvāṇa.

33. 'Whosoever therefore has his mind indifferent

¹ The four brahmavihārāḥ, sc. charity, compassion, sympathy with others' joy, and stoicism.

and is void of all desire for any further form of existence, let him abolish one by one the several steps of the chain of causation¹.

34. 'When these effects of the chain of causation are thus one by one put an end to, he at last, being free from all stain and substratum, will pass into a blissful Nirvāṇa.

35. 'Listen all of you for your own happiness, with your minds free from stain,—I will declare to you step by step this chain of causation.

36. 'The idea of ignorance is what gives the root to the huge poison-tree of mundane existence with its trunk of pain.

37. 'The impressions² are caused by this, which produce [the acts of] the body, voice, and mind; and consciousness arises from these impressions, which produces as its development the five senses and the mind (or internal sense).

38. 'The organism³ which is sometimes called *sangñā* or *samdarsana*⁴, springs from this; and from this arises the six organs of the senses, including mind.

39. 'The association of the six organs with their objects is called "contact;" and the consciousness of these different contacts is called "sensation⁵;"

40. 'By this is produced thirst, which is the desire

¹ Cf. Childers in Colebrooke's Essays, I, p. 453.

² These *samskāraḥ* constitute predispositions or tendencies.

³ Literally 'the name and the form,' the individual, consisting of mind and body.

⁴ The *Nāmarūpa* is properly the organised body (*rūpa*) and the three mental skandhas, *vedanā*, *sangñā*, and the *samskāraḥ*, which are together called *nāma*.

⁵ *Vedanā*.

of being troubled¹ by worldly objects ; “ attachment to continued existence,” arising from this, sets itself in action towards pleasure and the rest ;

41. ‘ From attachment springs continued existence, which is sensual, possessing form, or formless² ; and from existence arises birth through a returning to various wombs.

42. ‘ On birth is dependent the series of old age, death, sorrow and the like ; by putting a stop to ignorance and what follows from it, all these successively surcease.

43. ‘ This is the chain of causation, having many turns, and whose sphere of action is created by ignorance,—this is to be meditated upon by you who enjoy the calm of dwelling tranquilly in lonely woods³ ;

‘ He who knows it thoroughly reaches at last to absolute tenuity ; and having become thus attenuated he becomes blissfully extinct.

44. ‘ When you have thus learned this, in order to be freed from the bond of existence, you must cut down with all your efforts the root of pain, ignorance.

45. ‘ Then, being set free from the bonds of the prison-house of existence, as Arhats, possessing natures perfectly pure, you shall attain Nirvāṇa.’

46. Having heard this lesson preached by the chief of saints, all the mendicants comprehended the course and the cessation of embodied existence.

¹ *Samklesa*,—should we read *saṃśleṣa* ?

² I.e. in the eleven *kāmalokas*, the sixteen *rūpabrahmalokas*, and the four *arūpabrahmalokas*.

³ The metre shows that two short syllables are wanting in the line, *vigāṇa* (*vāṇa*) *visrāmasamibhiḥ*.

47. As these five ascetics listened to his words, their intellectual eye was purified for the attainment of perfect wisdom :

48. The eye of dharma¹ was purified in six hundred millions of gods, and the eye of wisdom in eight hundred millions of Brahmans².

49. The eye of dharma was purified in eighty thousand men, and even in all beings an ardour for the Law was made visible.

50. Everywhere all kinds of evil became tranquillised, and on every side an ardour for all that helps on the good Law manifested itself.

51. In the heavens everywhere the heavenly beings with troops of Apsarases uttered forth great shouts, 'Even so, O noble being of boundless energy!'

52. Then Maitreya addressed the holy one, 'O great mendicant, in what form has the wheel been turned by thee?'

53. Having heard this question asked by the great-souled Maitreya, the holy one looked at him and thus addressed him :

54. 'The profound subtil wheel of the Law, so hard to be seen, has been turned by me, into which the disputatious Tirthikas cannot penetrate.

55. 'The wheel of the Law has been turned, which has no extension, no origin, no birth, no home, isolated, and free from matter ;

56. 'Having many divisions, and not being without divisions³, having no cause, and susceptible of no definition,—that wheel, which is described as

¹ Dharma^{ak}ak^{hu}h, the eye to discern the Law?

² The divine inhabitants of the Brahmalo^{ka}s.

³ Anirvy^uham?

possessing perfect equilibrium, has been proclaimed by the Buddha.

57. 'Everything subject to successive causation is like a delusion, a mirage, or a dream, like the moon seen in water or an echo,—it lies stretched out on the surface, not to be extirpated, but not eternal.

58. 'The wheel of the Law has been described as that in which all false doctrines are extirpated; it is always like the pure ether, involving no doubts, ever bright.

59. 'The wheel of the Law is described as without end or middle, existing apart from "it is" or "it is not," separated from soul or soullessness.

60. 'The wheel of the Law has been here set forth, with a description according to its real nature,—as it has a limit and as it has not a limit, in its actual quantity and quality.

61. 'The wheel of the Law has been here set forth, described as possessing unique attributes, apart from the power of the eye and so too as regards the sense of hearing or smell;

62. 'Apart from the tongue, the touch, or the mind,—without soul or exertion;

'Such is this wheel of the Law which has been turned by me;

63. 'He makes wise all the ignorant,—therefore is he called the Buddha¹; this knowledge of the laws of reality has been ascertained by me of myself,

64. 'Apart from all teaching by another, therefore is he called the self-existent,—having all laws under his control, therefore is he called the lord of Law.

65. 'He knows what is right (naya) and wrong (anaya) in laws, therefore is he called Nāyaka; he

¹ Buddha seems here to identify himself with his Law.

teaches unnumbered beings as they become fit to be taught.

66. 'He has reached the furthest limit of instruction, therefore is he called Vinâyaka, from his pointing out the best of good paths to beings who have lost their way.

67. 'He has reached the furthest limit of good teaching, he is the guide to all the Law,—attracting all beings by his knowledge of all the means of conciliation ;

68. 'He has passed through the forest of mundane existence, therefore is he called the Leader of the Caravan ; the absolute ruler over all law, therefore he is the *Gina*, the lord of Law.

69. 'From his turning the wheel of the Law he is the lord of all the sovereigns of Law ; the master-giver of the Law, the teacher, the master of the Law, the lord of the world ;

70. 'He who has offered the sacrifice, accomplished his end, fulfilled his hope, achieved his success, the consoler, the loving regarnder, the hero, the champion, the victorious one in conflict ;

71. 'He has come out from all conflict, released himself and the releaser of all,—he is become the light of the world, the illuminator of the knowledge of true wisdom ;

72. 'The dispeller of the darkness of ignorance, the illuminer of the great torch, the great physician, the great seer, the healer of all evils,

73. 'The extractor of the barb of evil from all those who are wounded by evil,—he who is possessed of all distinctive marks and adorned with all signs,

74. 'With his body and limbs every way perfect,

of pure conduct and perfectly clear mind, possessed of the ten powers, having great fortitude, learned with all learning,

75. 'Endowed with all the independent states¹, he who has attained the great Yâna, the lord of all Dharma, the ruler, the monarch of all worlds, the sovereign,

76. 'The lord of all wisdom, the wise, the destroyer of the pride of all disputers, the omniscient, the Arhat, possessed of the perfect knowledge, the great Buddha, the lord of saints ;

77. 'The victorious triumphant overthrower of the insolence and pride of the evil Mâra, the perfect Buddha, the Sugata, the wise one, he who brings the desired end to all beings,

78. 'Ever cognisant of past acts, never speaking falsely, a mine of perfect excellence and of all good qualities, the destroyer of all evil ways, the guide in all good ways²,

79. 'The ruler of the world, the bearer of the world, the master of the world, the sovereign of the world, the teacher of the world, the preceptor of the world, he who brings to the world the Law, virtue, and its true end,

80. 'The fount of an ambrosia which quenches the scorching of the flame of all pain, and the powerful luminary which dries up the great ocean of all pain,

81. 'He who brings all virtue and all true wealth, the possessor of perfect excellence and all good qualities, the guide on the road of wisdom, he who shows the way to Nirvâna,

¹ Eighteen in all. See Burnouf, Lotus, pp. 648, &c.

² Query *sadvṛtti* for *saṃvṛtti*?

82. 'The Tathâgata, without stain, without attachment, without uncertainty.—This is the compendious declaration in the turning of the wheel of the Law.

83. 'A concise manifestation of a Tathâgata's qualities is now declared by me; for a Buddha's knowledge is endless, unlimited like the ether;

84. 'A narrator might spend a Kalpa, but the virtues of the Buddha would not come to an end,—thus by me has the multitude of the virtues of the Buddha been described.

85. 'Having heard this and welcomed it with joy go on ever in happiness; this, Sirs, is the Mahâyâna, the instrument of the Law of the perfect Buddha, which is the establisher of the welfare of all beings, set forth by all the Buddhas.

86. 'In order that this methodical arrangement of the Law may be always spread abroad, do you yourselves always proclaim it and hand it on.

87. 'Whosoever, Sirs, hears, sees, and welcomes with joy this methodical arrangement of the Law, which is a mine of happiness and prosperity, and honours it with folded hands,

88. 'Shall attain pre-eminent strength with a glorious form and limbs, and a retinue of the holy, and an intelligence of the highest reach,

89. 'And the happiness of perfect contemplation, with a deep calm¹ of uninterrupted bliss, with his senses in their highest perfection, and illuminated by unclouded knowledge.

90. 'He shall assuredly attain these eight pre-eminent perfections, who hears and sees this Law

¹ I read *naishkarmya* for *naishkramya*.

with a serene soul and worships it with folded hands.

91. 'Whosoever in the midst of the assembly shall gladly offer a pulpit to the high-minded teacher of the great Law,

92. 'That virtuous man shall assuredly attain the seat of the most excellent, and also the seat of a householder, and the throne of a universal monarch;

93. 'He shall also attain the throne of one of the guardian-spirits of the world, and also the firm throne of Sakra, and also the throne of the Vasavartina¹ gods, aye, and the supreme throne of Brahman ;

94. 'And also with the permission of the Bodhi-sattva who is seated on the Bodhi throne he shall obtain the throne of a teacher of the good Law who has risen to perfect knowledge.

95. 'These eight seats shall the pure-souled one attain who offers joyfully a seat to him who proclaims the Law.

96. 'Whosoever with a believing heart, after examination, shall utter applause to the pious man who proclaims this carefully arranged Law ;

97. 'Shall become a truthful and pure speaker, and one whose words are to be accepted,—one whose utterances are welcome and delightful, whose voice is sweet and gentle ;

98. 'Having a voice like a Kalaviṅka bird¹, with a deep and sweet tone, having also a pure voice like Brahman's², and a loud voice with a lion's sound.

99. 'He as an all-wise and truthful speaker shall

¹ A kind of sparrow.

² Or 'having a voice of pure spiritual truth?'

obtain these eight excellences of speech, who utters applause to one who proclaims the good Law.

100. 'And whosoever, after writing this method of the Law in a book, shall set it in his house and always worship it and honour it with all reverential observances,

101. 'And uttering its praises shall hand the doctrine onward on every side, he, the very pious man, shall obtain a most excellent treasure of memory,

102. 'And a treasure of insight¹, and a treasure of prudence², and a treasure of good spells, and a treasure full of intelligence,

103. 'And a treasure of the highest wisdom, and the most excellent treasure of the Law, and a treasure of knowledge, the means to attain the excellences of the good Law,—

104. 'These eight treasures shall that high-minded man attain who joyfully writes this down and sets it in a sure place and always worships it.

105. 'And he who, himself holding this method of the Law in his mind, sets it going around him, shall obtain a complete supply for liberality for the good of the world,

106. 'Next, a complete supply of virtuous dispositions, a most excellent supply of sacred knowledge, a supply of perfect calmness, and that which is called spiritual insight,

107. 'A supply of the merit caused by the good Law, a most excellent supply of knowledge, a supply of boundless compassion, which is the means to attain the virtues of the perfect Buddha.

¹ I read mahāmatinidhānam for mahāprati-.

² Gati? 'resources?'

108. 'He, full of joy, shall obtain these eight supplies who himself holds this method of the Law in his mind and sets it going abroad.

109. 'And he who shall declare this method of the Law to others, shall have himself purified by great merit and shall be prosperous and possessed of supernatural powers.

110. 'He shall become a universal monarch, a king of kings, and even a ruler among the guardians of the world ¹, an Indra ruler of the gods ², and even the ruler of the Yâma heaven ³,

111. 'Yea, the ruler of the Tushita heaven, and the ruler of the Sunirmitâh, and the king of the Vasavartina⁴, and the lord of the Brahmaloka ;

112. 'Yea, Mahâbrahman, the highest of Sages,—and in the end he shall even become a Buddha,—he, possessing a thoroughly pure intelligence, shall obtain these eight sublime rewards of merit.

113. 'And he who, thoroughly intent, with a believing heart, and filled with faith and devotion, shall hear this method of the Law as it is preached,

114. 'He shall have his intellect made perfectly pure, his mind calmed with boundless charity, and his soul happy with boundless compassion, and he shall be filled with boundless joy;

115. 'His soul constantly calm with universal indifference, rejoicing in the four contemplations, having reached the ecstatic state of absolute indifference ⁵, and with his senses abolished,

116. 'With the five transcendent faculties attained,

¹ Sc. the Mahârâgas of the first heaven.

² In the second Devaloka.

³ The third Devaloka.

⁴ These are the fourth, fifth, and sixth Devalokas.

⁵ Samârûpya?

and destroying the aggregate of latent impressions, he, endowed with supernatural powers, will attain the samādhi called *Sūramgama*.

117. 'He, having his soul pure, will attain these eight forms of absolute spotlessness; yea, wherever this method of the Law will prevail universally,

118. 'There will be no fear of any disturbance in the kingdom, no fear of evil-minded thieves, nor fear of evil beasts;

119. 'There will be no fear of plagues, famines, or wildernesses; and no alarm shall spread, caused by quarrel or war;

120. 'There shall be no fear from the gods nor from Nāgas, Yakshas, and the like, nor shall there be anywhere any fear of any misfortune.

121. 'These eight fears shall not be found there where this Law extends; it is all briefly explained, my friends,—all that arises from holding it steadfastly.

122. 'A yet higher and most excellent merit is declared by all the Buddhas, even although all living beings were to practise complete self-restraint.

123. 'Let a man worship the Buddhas, honouring them always with faith; from that comes this pre-eminent merit, as is declared by the Ginas.

124. 'And whosoever joyfully worships a Pratyeka-Buddha, they shall become themselves Pratyeka-Buddhas; therefore let every one worship them.

125. 'There is pre-eminent merit from the worship of one Bodhisattva, and they shall all themselves become Bodhisattvas, let every one worship them;

126. 'Therefore there is pre-eminent merit from the worship of one Buddha,—they shall all them-

selves become Ginas, let every one devoutly worship them; and he too shall obtain this pre-eminent merit who hears this or causes others to hear it.

127. 'And whosoever in days when the good Law is abolished abandons love for his own body and life and proclaims day and night these good words, —pre-eminent is his merit from this.

128. 'He who wishes to worship constantly the lords of saints, the Pratyeka-Buddhas and the Arhats, let him resolutely produce in his mind the idea of true wisdom and proclaim these good words and the Law.

129. 'This jewel of all good doctrines, which is uttered by the Buddhas for the good of all beings, —even one who lives in a house will be a Tathāgata for it, where this good doctrine prevails.

130. 'He obtains a glorious and endless splendour who teaches even one word thereof; he will not miss one consonant nor the meaning who gives this Sūtra to others.

131. 'He is the best of all guides of men, no other being is like unto him; he is like a jewel, of imperishable glory, who hears this Law with a pure heart.

132. 'Therefore let those who are endowed with lofty ambitions, always hear this Law which causes transcendent merit; let them hear it and gladly welcome it and lay it up in their minds and continually worship the three jewels with faith.'

BOOK XVII.

[1¹. When the heavenly beings with Brahman at their head and the Bodhisattvas intent on self-mortification² heard this glorification of the Law uttered by the lion of the Sâkyas, they were desirous to hear again this which is so difficult to find, and they went to the city and worshipped him, propitiating his favour; in the dark fortnight of the month *Âshadha* on the lunar day sacred to Agni, with the moon in the constellation called *Karṇa* (?) and on an auspicious day,—he, remembering the Buddha worlds and being desirous to save all creatures, set off on his journey, longing for disciples with his father at their head.]

2. The associated Brâhmans, accompanied by the inhabitants of *Kâśī* who had gone to the Deer Park, and the mendicants to the number of thirty, were rendered resplendent by the chief of saints; *Kâśikâ* the harlot of *Kâśī* went to the heaven of the gods, after she had worshipped the *Gina* and attached her sons to the service of the glorious one; the conqueror of the world then made thirty rejoicing officiating priests of *Kâśī* his disciples, initiating them in the course of perfect wisdom; and the son of *Maitrâyaṇī*³ and *Maitra*, the preceptor of hosts of the twice-born, named *Pûrṇa*, obtained true wisdom from the chief of saints and became a noble mendicant.

3. The priest of the lord of the city *Marakata*, a

¹ This is a doubtful verse, the metre is faulty.

² I read *tapasyâpare*.

³ Burnouf, *Lotus*, p. 489.

Brāhman named Agaya, and his son Nālaka, well versed in sacred learning and full of answers to questions, and an ascetic named Dhṛiti, dwelling in the Vindhya, and an invincible Brāhman ascetic Saṃgayin with his disciples,—these all, dwellers in the Vindhya,—when they came to him for refuge, the chief of saints initiated as mendicants, touching them with his hand bearing the mark of a wheel; moreover the Nāga Elapatra came to the abode of the best of saints, and stood resplendent there, perfectly calm in his demeanour and worshipping him with his rosaries.

4. There was also a female ascetic of Mathurā named Trikavyaṃgikā, and a Brāhman named Vid-yākara,—their son was named Sabhya, a dweller in the district called Svetaśālārka, a wise ascetic, proud of his wisdom,—he went into the Deer Park, wearing the aspect of one perfectly illumined, and desiring the highest wisdom from the chief of mendicants; seeking from the omniscient admission to the noble life, he became renowned as the mendicant Sabhya in all assemblies.

5. The son of Lalitāprabudhā, born after worship paid to the best of trees on the bank of the stream Varanā,—renowned in the world as Yasoda,—wise from the besprinkling of the ambrosia of the words of the king of heaven,—remembering all former discourses which he had heard, came with his friends to the wood in the Deer Park, accompanied by his glory; and the holy one, touching his head with his hand, made him the guru of the chief Bhikshus.

6. The glorious one, named the great Buddha, proceeded with the mendicants in an auspicious company, and having manifested his triumphal march for the salvation of the world, entered the city of Kāśī.

A poor Brâhman, named Svastika, a native of Vârânasi, obtained riches from heaven through the favour of the glorious one, and having received adoption as a slave in the *Gina* faith, became a mendicant and an Arhat at the hands of the great teacher.

7. Blessing the king of Kâsi¹ Divodâsa and the citizens with gold, corn, and other riches,—taking up his abode in different places in forests, caves, mountains, he at last came in his rambles to the river Gâhnavi. The boatman who conveyed the *Gina* across the Ganges worshipped him and offered him milk with due services of reverence, and became a mendicant through his favour and by the *Gina*'s command found a dwelling in the Buddha's hermitage in the grove.

8. The glorious one, after he had crossed the Ganges, went to the hermitage of Kâsyapa at Gayâ, called Uruvilva; there, having shown his supernatural power, he received as Bhikshus the Kâsyapas, Uruvilva, and others, with more than a thousand of their disciples, having endued them forthwith with all kinds of spiritual knowledge and with the power to abandon all worldly action; then accompanied by three hundred disciples Upasena at the command of his maternal uncle became an ascetic.

9. The glorious one made seven hundred ascetics enter Nirvâna who dwelt in the wood Dharma; and the lord of the Law also caused the daughters of Namdika, Sugâtâ and others, who dwelt in the village, to become the first female ascetics; and in the city of Râgageha, having enlightened in right action and in activity the king Bimbisâra,

¹ Kâsikâ.

the monarch, who is to be considered as the elder-born in perfect knowledge, he made him who was the devoted follower of the Buddha, a Bodhisattva and a *Sakridāgāmin*.

10. In another village named *Nāradya* there was a *Brāhman* *Dharmapālin* and a *Brāhman* woman named *Sālyā*; their seventh son named *Upatishya*¹, who had studied the entire *Veda*, became a Buddhist mendicant; so too there was a great *paṇḍit*, a *Brāhman* named *Dhānyāyana*, who dwelt in the village *Kolata*, and his son;—him and the son of *Sāl* named *Maudgalya* the great saint received as the best of *Bhikshus*, pre-eminent disciples.

11. Next he ordained as a mendicant the keen-witted maternal uncle of *Sāliputra*¹, *Dīrghānakha* by name; then travelling in the realm of *Magadha*, the glorious one, being honoured by the inhabitants with alms and other signs of devotion, and delivering them from evil, dwelt in the convent given by the seer *Geta*, attracting to himself many of the monks; and after ordaining as a mendicant a native of *Mithilā*, named *Ānanda*, with his companions, he dwelt there a year.

12. The *Brāhman* named *Kāsyapa*, a very *Kuvera* for wealth, and a master in all the sciences connected with the *Veda*, an inhabitant of *Rāgageha*, being pure-minded and wearing only one garment, left all his kindred and came seeking wisdom in asceticism;—when this noble youth came to the *Bodhi* tree and practised for six years a penance hard to carry out, then he paid worship to the chief of saints who had attained perfect knowledge, and he became the well-

¹ Sc. *Sāriputra*.

known Kâsyapa, the chief of ascetics, the foremost of the Arhats.

13. The saint Naradatta, dwelling on Mount Himavat, remembering the wholesome words of his maternal uncle, came to the Sugata with his disciples, and the holy one admitted them all into the order of the *Gina*; then a woman named *Sakti*, and another named *Kamalâ*, pre-eminent in Brâhmanical power, came to the Sugata and fell down at his feet, and then standing before him they were received by the saint, and made happy with the staff and begging-bowl.

14. Seven hundred disciples of the ascetic Rudraka, remembering the noble words of their teacher, becoming mendicants according to the doctrine of the *Gina*, flocked round him paying him their homage and carrying their staves; next a seer, named *Raivata*, joyfully uttering his praises, having finished his course of discipline, became a mendicant, full of devotion to the guru, counting gold and clay as the same, well versed in sacred spells and meditation, and able to counteract the three kinds of poisons and other fatal harms.

15. Having received as followers and disciples certain householders of *Srâvastî*, *Pûrna* and others, and given them alms-vessels,—and having made many poor wretches as rich as *Kuvera*, and maimed persons with all their limbs perfect, and paupers and orphans affluent,—and having proclaimed the Law, and dwelt two years in the forest *Getaka* delivering the suppliants, the glorious one, having taught again the saint *Geta*, and established the Bhikshu *Pûrna*, once more proceeded on his way.

16. Then the glorious one went on, protecting

the merchant-caravans by the stores of his own treasures from the troops of robbers, next he went into the neighbourhood of Rāgageha wandering with his begging-vessel which had been given by the merchants. In the wood called *Venu*, filled with *Sāl* trees, he ate an offering of food prepared by the enriched robbers, and he received as mendicants five hundred of them and gave them their begging-vessels and the other requisites.

17. At the invitation of Buddha's son, *Suddhodana* gave this message to his envoys *Khandaka* and *Udāyin*, 'Thy father and mother, some noble ladies, headed by *Yasodrih*, and this my young son have come in the hope of seeing thee, under the idea that thou art devoted to the world's salvation ; what shall I tell them ?' They two went, and reverentially saluting the Buddha in the *vihāra* called *Venu*, they told him the message with their eyes filled with tears.

18. *Khandaka* and *Udāyin* accepted his counsel, and, being delighted at the mighty power of Buddha, became great ascetics ; and the great *Gina* took them with him and proceeded from that wood with the disciples, the mendicants, and the saints. Going on from place to place, and dwelling in each for a while and conferring deliverance and confirming the disciples, the mendicants, and the Arhats, he at last reached the wood *Nigrodha*, illuminating the district by his glory, shaking the earth and putting an end to misery.

19. ¹ He again stirred up his followers in the doctrine of the Buddha, and then went on with the

¹ Several phrases are obscure in this verse.

crowds of inhabitants gathered round him, instructing his shaven mendicant-followers, as they begged alms, while the gods brought his precepts to their minds¹. He forbade the mendicants to enter the city and went to Rāgageha himself with his own followers; and then the king who dwells apart from all doubt², the Gina, who knows at once all the history of every Bhikshu, instructed the ascetic (Udāyin) in proclaiming wisdom to others.

20. In accordance with the Gina's command that prince of ascetics, Udāyin, went to the city of Kapila; there he, the lord of all possessors of supernatural powers, instructed the king as he stood in the assembly in the boon of the eight hundred powers; and coming down from heaven he uttered to the king and his court a discourse on the four sublime truths, and the king, with his mind enlightened, having worshipped him, held intercourse with him, attended by his courtiers, offering every form of homage.

21. The monarch, rejoiced at the sight of the Gina, praised his feet, worshipping them with eight hundred presents; and the Sugata departed, and made manifest in the sky in his one person a form comprehending the universe; first as fire, then ambrosia, then the king of beasts, an elephant, the king of horses, the king of peacocks³, the king of birds, Maghavan, the ten rulers of the world headed by Yama, the sun, the moon, the hosts of stars, Brahman, Viṣṇu, and Śiva.

22. The sons of Diti, the four (Mahârâgas) with

¹ Obscure.

² Dvâpare-stha?

³ Sikkhirâ? might mean 'the king of flames,' &c.

Dhr̥itarāsh̥tra at their head, the hosts of Yogins with the king Drumasiddha, the (heavenly) ascetics, the Vasus, the Manus, the sons of the forest, the creatures of the waters headed by the makara, the birds headed by Garuḍa, and all the kings in the different worlds with the lord of the Tushita heaven at their head, and those in the world of the dead¹ the domain of Bali,—whatever is conspicuous in the universe the holy one created it all, becoming the universal one.

23. When the king had thus been instructed, the lord of saints went to the Satya heaven, and then from the sky, seated on his own throne², he proclaimed the twelvefold Law; then he restored Gautamī and Anugopā and many other women to sight, and filled all the assembled people with joy; and established others in Nirvāṇa and in the Law. Then Suddhodana full of joy invited him to a feast given to the whole assembly, and he accepted it by his silence.

24. The lion of the Sākya, having been thus invited, went with the congregation of his followers to the place, after having shown a mighty miracle. Then the earth shook, a shower of flowers fell, the various quarters of space became illumined and a wind blew; and the heavenly beings, Brahman, Siva, Vishṇu, Indra, Yama, Varuṇa, Kuvera, the lord of Bhūtas, the lord of the winds, Nirṛiti, Fire with his seven flames, and the rest, stood resting their feet on the serpent Sesha, and followed leading the gods and gandharvas in their dance in the sky.

25. Making millions of ascetics, disciples, Arhats,

¹ Martya seems here to be used for mṛita.

² Or must we take sva as put for svar, 'in heaven?'

sages, mendicants, and fasters,—and delivering from their ills the blind, the humpbacked, the lame, the insane, the maimed as well as the destitute,—and having established many persons of the fourth caste in the true activity and inaction and in the three yānas¹, with the four *saṃgrahas*² and the eight *aṃgas*³,—going on from place to place, delivering, and confirming the Bhikshus, in the twelfth year he went to his own city.

26. Day by day confirming the Bhikshus, and providing food for the congregation, in an auspicious moment he made a journey to Lumbinī with the Bhikshus and the citizens, Brahman and Rudra being at their head, with great triumph and noise of musical instruments. There he saw the holy fig-tree and he stood by it remembering his birth, with a smile; and rays of light streamed from his mouth and went forth illumining the earth; and he uttered a discourse to the goddess of the wood, giving her the serenity of faith.

27. ⁴ Having come to the Lumbinī fig-tree he spoke to Paurvikā the daughter of Rāhula, and Gopikā the daughter of Maitra, and his own Saudhanī Kausikā; and he uttered an affectionate discourse honouring his mother by the tank Vasatya; then speaking with Ekasāṃgtī the daughter of Mahākautuka and Sautasomī in the wood Nigrodha, he received into the community some members of his own family, headed by Sundarānanda, and one hundred and seven citizens.

¹ Burnouf, *Lotus*, p. 315.

² Apparently the four means of conciliating dependents.

³ The eightfold path of Buddhist morality.

⁴ Much of this stanza is obscure.

28. Having declared the glory of the Law of Buddha, he built a round Stûpa and gave a royal coronation to Saunu¹, sending him into the wood pre-eminent with the holiest saints and *Kaityas*, and bidding him worship the sacred relics; and having commanded Râhula, Gautamî, and the other women led by Gopikâ, with staves in their hands, as shaven ascetics, to practise the vow of fasting called *ahoratra*², and after that the *Lakshakaitya* ceremony³ and then the rite called *Sringabheri*⁴, and that called *Vasumdhârikâ*⁵.

29. The *Ash/asâhasrikâ* of sacred authority⁶,—the *Geya*⁷ and the *Gâthâ*, the *Nidâna* and the *Avadâna*, and that which is called the *Sûtra* of the great *Yâna*, the *Vyâkara*⁸ and the *Ityukta*, the *Gâtaka*, the work called *Vaipulya*, the *Adbhuta*⁹ and the *Upadesa*, and also the *Udânaka*¹⁰ as the twelfth.—Teaching (these sacred texts) and making current the *Yâna* for common disciples, that for *Pratyeka Buddhas*, and the *Mahâyâna*, and proclaiming them all around, accompanied by thirteen and a half bodies of mendicants, the conqueror of the world went out of the city of *Kapila*.

30. After displaying miracles in the city of *Ka-*

¹ Or the grandson of the king?

² See Râgendralâl Mitra, *Nepalese Buddhist Literature*, p. 221.

³ Ibid. p. 275.

⁴ Ibid. p. 230.

⁵ Ibid. p. 271.

⁶ *Naigamâ*? The *Ash/asâhasrikâ* seems not to be reckoned here among the following twelve texts of peculiar authority with the Northern Buddhists. But Burnouf's authorities include it in that called '*Sûtra*.'

⁷ For the following twelve names see Burnouf, *Introd.* pp. 51-66.

⁸ More properly *Vyâkarana*.

⁹ Burnouf calls it *adbhutadharma*.

¹⁰ Burnouf, *Introd.* p. 58.

pila, and having paid honour to his father, and having made Râhula and his companions Arhats, and also the Bhikshus with Gautami and Gopikâ at their head, and various women of all the four castes; and having established Saunu¹ on his imperial throne, and the people in the Gina doctrine, and having abolished poverty and darkness, and then remembering his mother, he set forth, after worshipping Svayambhû, towards the northern region with Brahman, Vishnu, and Siva as mendicants in his train.

31. The glory of the Avadâna of the birth of the lion of the Sâkyas has thus been described by me at length and yet very concisely; it must be corrected by *pandits* wherever anything is omitted,—my childish speech is not to be laughed at, but to be listened to with pleasure.

Whatever virtue I may have acquired from describing the king of the Law, the deliverer from mundane existence, who assumes all forms,—may it become a store of merit for the production of right activity and inactivity in others, and for the diffusion of delight among the six orders of beings².

Thus ends the seventeenth sarga, called the Progress to Lumbini, in the great poem made by Asvaghosha, the Buddha-karita³.

¹ Or Saunava, see sloka 28.

² Sc. the *śaḍ gatayas*, the 'six paths,' are gods, men, Asuras, &c., Pretas, brutes, and the inhabitants of the different hells.

³ C adds here on the last page the following lines: 'The poem about Buddha, very difficult to obtain, was written by Amrîtânanda in the year indicated by a cipher, the arrows (of Kâma), and a nine [=Newâr Samvat 950, or A.D. 1830], in the dark fortnight of the month Mârgasîrsha (Nov.-Dec.) and on the day ruled by the

seventh astrological house Smara. Having searched for them everywhere and not found them, four sargas have been made by me,—the fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth.' The beginning of another version of these lines is given in P, but D omits them. The name of Amṛtānanda occurs in Rāgendralāl Mitra's Nepalese Buddhist Literature as the author of three treatises,—two in Sanskrit, the *Khando-mṛtālatā* (p. 79), the *Kalyāṇapamkavimsatikā* (p. 99), translated in Wilson's Works, vol. ii, and the *Vīrakusāvadāna* (p. 274) in Newārī. Compare Cowell and Eggeling's Catalogue, pp. 18, 24; in p. 18 he is associated with the date N. S. 916 (A. D. 1796).

INDEX OF PROPER NAMES¹.

- Akanish**tâb**, the, book V, verse 47.
 Akshamâlâ, IV, 77.
 Agastya, IV, 73; IX, 9, 26.
 Agni, IV, 76; VII, 17.
 Agni, son of, (Skanda), I, 66.
 Amgiras, I, 46; IX, 10.
 Amgirasas, the, II, 36.
 Aga, VIII, 79.
 Agapâla-vana, XV, 53.
 Agaya, XVII, 3.
 Atri, I, 48.
 Anugopâ, XVII, 23.
 Amtideva, I, 57; IX, 20, 60.
 Amdhakas, the, XI, 31.
 Apsaras, I, 94; IV, 11, 28, &c.
 Ambarisha, IX, 59.
 Arâda, VII, 54; IX, 6; XI, 69;
 XII, 1-81; XV, 89.
 Alakâ, III, 65.
 Asvinau, the, VII, 7.
 Asita, I, 54, 67, 85; II, 25; VIII,
 84.
 Ahalyâ, IV, 72.
 Âkim**kanyâb**, XII, 63 (cf. 83).
 Âtreya, I, 48.
 Ananda, XVII, 11.
 Âbhasurâb, the, XII, 53.
 Âshâdba, IX, 20.
 Ikshvâkavas, the, I, 49; VII, 6;
 IX, 4; XII, 1.
 Indra (Maghavat, Sakra, &c.), I, 7,
 27, 29, 63, 92; II, 27; IV, 72;
 V, 22, 27, 87; VI, 62; VII, 3,
 43; VIII, 13, 64, 73, 79; IX, 5,
 10, 12; X, 19, 39, 41; XI, 13,
 14, 16, 70; XIII, 9, 37; XV, 65,
 73; XVI, 93, 110.
 Îvara, Îra, IX, 53; X, 3; XVII,
 21, 24, 30.
 Ugrâyudha, XI, 18.
 Uttare kuravab, the, IV, 10.
 Udâyin, IV, 8, 24, 62; XVII, 17,
 18, 20.
 Udraka, XII, 82-86 (cf. Rudraka).
 Upatishya, XVII, 10.
 Upasumda, XI, 32.
 Upasena, XVII, 8.
 Uruvilva, XVII, 8.
 Urvasî, XI, 15.
 Rishyasringa, IV, 19.
 Ekasâmgî, XVII, 27.
 Elapatra, XVII, 3.
 Aida, XI, 15; XIII, 12.
 Autathya, IV, 74.
 Aurva, I, 29.
 Aurvaseya, IX, 9.
 Ka, II, 51; XI, 61 (?).
 Kakshîvat, I, 29.
 Kamthaka, V, 3, 68; VI, 53, 55, 67;
 VIII, 3, 17, 19, 32, 38, 43, 73, 75.
 Kapimgalâda, IV, 77.
 Kapila, I, 2; XII, 21.
 Kapilavastu, I, 2 (?), 94; V, 84; VI,
 30, 51; VIII, 5; XVII, 20, 30.
 Kamandalu, XV, 96.
 Kamalâ, XVII, 13.
 Karâlaganaka, IV, 80.
 Kâma, III, 24; IV, 4; XIII, 2, 72.
 Kâmâvatarâb, the, XIV, 88.
 Kârttikeya (sharmukha), I, 93.
 Kâla, XII, 113.
 Kâlâma, XII, 2.
 Kâlî, IV, 76.
 Kârikâ, XVII, 2.
 Kârisumdari, IV, 16.
 Kâsî, Kâsi, XV, 89, 90, 101; XVII,
 2, 6.

¹ This Index omits some of the obscure names in the last book.

Kâsyapa, XVII, 12.
 Kâsyapas, the, XVII, 8.
 Kurus, the, XI, 31.
 Kuvera, I, 94; IV, 10; V, 45, 85;
 XVII, 15.
 Kusika, I, 49.
 Kailâsa, I, 3, 21; II, 30; X, 41.
 Kolata, XVII, 10.
 Kaurava, IV, 79.
 Gamgâ, IX, 25; XV, 98; XVII, 7.
 Gamdha, XV, 97.
 Gamdhapura, XV, 97.
 Gaya, XII, 87.
 Gayâ, XV, 91; XVII, 8.
 Garuda, XII, 54; XVII, 22.
 Gopikâ, XVII, 27, 28, 30.
 Gautama, IV, 18, 72.
 Gautama (Buddha), XV, 104.
 Gautamî, VIII, 24, 51; XVII, 23,
 28, 30.
 Ghrîtâkî, IV, 20.
 Kamdramas, IV, 75.
 Kaitraratha, IV, 78.
 Kyavana, I, 48.
 Kbanda, Kbandakâ, V, 68; VI, 4, 14,
 25, 43, 65; VII, 1; VIII, 9, 23,
 32, 42, 73; XVII, 17, 18.
 Ganaka, I, 50; IX, 20; XII, 67.
 Gayamta, IX, 5, 12.
 Ginakshetra, XV, 114.
 Geta, XVII, 11, 15.
 Getakâranya, XVII, 15.
 Gaigîshavya, XII, 67.
 Târکشya, VI, 5.
 Tushita, Tushitâb, the, I, 19; XIV,
 89; XVI, 111.
 Trayastrimsad-devâb, XIV, 89.
 Trikavyamgikâ, XVII, 4.
 Damdakas, the, XI, 31.
 Dasaratha, VIII, 79, 81.
 Dâsarathi, VIII, 8.
 Divodâsa, XVII, 7.
 Dirghânakha, XVII, 11.
 Deer-park, the, XV, 87, 103, 114;
 XVII, 5.
 Devî, I, 66.
 Drumasiddha, XVII, 22.
 Drumâksha, IX, 60.
 Drumâbgaketu, the Moon? V, 3.

Dharmakakra (ginaga), XV, 119.
 Dharmapâlin, XVII, 10.
 Dharmaruî, XV, 86.
 Dharmâsavî, XVII, 9.
 Dhânyâyana, XVII, 10.
 Dhritarâshtra, XVII, 22.
 Dhriti, XVII, 3.
 Namdana, III, 64.
 Namdabalâ, XII, 106.
 Namdâguhâ, I, 19.
 Namdika, XVII, 9.
 Namdin, XV, 93.
 Namuî, XV, 25, 46.
 Naradatta, XVII, 13.
 Nalakûvara, I, 94.
 Nahusha, II, 11; XI, 14, 16.
 Nâlaka, XVII, 3.
 Nigrodha-vana (niyagrodha), XVII,
 18, 27.
 Nirmânaratayab, the, XIV, 89.
 Nirmitâ bodhisattvâb, the, XIV, 71.
 Nairamganâ, XII, 88, 105.
 Pamka bhikshavab, pamka-vargîyâb,
 the, XII, 89, 111; XV, 89, 104,
 118 (cf. Bhadravargîyâb).
 Padma, II, 3.
 Padmakhamdâ, III, 63.
 Padmâ (?), IV, 36.
 Paranirmita-varavartinab, the, XIV,
 89.
 Parâsara, IV, 76; XII, 67.
 Pâmdava (mountain), X, 14, 17.
 Pâmdavas, the, X, 17.
 Pâmdu, IV, 79.
 Punarvasû, IX, 11.
 Puramdara, IV, 72; XIII, 37.
 Pushya, I, 25.
 Pûrva, XVII, 2, 15.
 Prîthu, I, 29.
 Paurvikâ, XVII, 27.
 Pragâpati, XII, 21.
 Bali, IX, 20; XI, 16; XVII, 22.
 Bâlamukhyâ, IV, 17.
 Bimbisâra, XV, 100 (cf. Srenya);
 XVII, 9.
 Buddhâb (atîtâb), I, 38; XIV, 75;
 XV, 8.
 Budha, IV, 75.
 Bodhidruma, XII, 112, 116; XIII,
 7, 27, 32, 42, 68; XIV, 90; XVII,
 12.
 Bodhisattva, I, 19, 24; II, 56; IX,
 30; X, 18, &c.

- Brahmakāyikāb, the, XIV, 88.
 Brahman, I, 1; XII, 42, 51, 65; XV, 18, 84, 118; XVI, 93, 111; XVII, 1, 24, 30.
 Bhadravargīyāb, the five, XII, 89, 111; XV, 89, 104, 115 (cf. *Pamka bhikshavaḥ*).
 Bhadrāsānāni, XV, 114.
 Bharadvāga, IV, 74.
 Bhava, I, 93.
 Bhārgava, VI, 1; IX, 2, 3.
 Bhishma, IX, 25; XI, 18.
 Bhrigu, I, 46.
 Magadhas, the, X, 10, 41; XI, 1; XVII, 11.
 Maghavat, see Indra.
 Mathurā, XVII, 4.
 Manu (Vaivasvata), II, 16; VIII, 78.
 Maṃthālagautama, IV, 17.
 Māmdara, VI, 13.
 Mamatā (?), IV, 74.
 Marakata, XVII, 3.
 Marutvat (Indra), VIII, 13; X, 39.
 Maruts, the, IV, 74; V, 27.
 Mahākautuka, XVII, 27.
 Mahārāgāb, the, XV, 64, 74; XVII, 22.
 Mahāsudara, VIII, 62.
 Mahendra, see Indra.
 Mahoragāb, the, I, 38.
 Mādri, IV, 79.
 Māmdhātṛi, I, 29; X, 31; XI, 13.
 Māyā, I, 15, 22, 37; II, 18.
 Māra, XIII, 1-73; XV, 11, 37.
 Māra's sons, XIII, 3, 14.
 Māra's daughters, XIII, 3, 14; XV, 13.
 Meghakālī, XIII, 49.
 Meru, V, 37, 43; XIII, 41, 57; XV, 32.
 Maitra, XVII, 2, 27.
 Maitrāyaṇi, XVII, 2.
 Maitriya, XV, 118; XVI, 1.
 Maitreya, XVI, 53.
 Maithilas, the, XI, 31.
 Maudgalya, XVII, 10.
 Yakshādhipāb, the, I, 36.
 Yamunā, IV, 76; XII, 107.
 Yayāti, II, 11; IV, 78.
 Yaśoda, XVII, 5.
 Yaśodhī, XVII, 17.
 Yaśodharā, II, 26, 46; VI, 34; VIII, 31, 60, 71.
 Yāmāb, the, XIV, 89; XVI, 110.
 Raghu, VI, 36.
 Rāgagrīha, X, 1, 9.
 Rāgageha, XVII, 9, 12, 16.
 Rāma (Dāsarathi), VI, 36; VIII, 81; IX, 9, 25, 59, 67.
 Rāma (Bhārgava), IX, 25.
 Rāhu, II, 46; IX, 28.
 Rāhula, II, 46; VIII, 67; IX, 28; XVII, 27, 28, 30.
 Rudraka, XV, 89; XVII, 14 (cf. *Udraka*).
 Raivata, XVII, 14.
 Rohini, IV, 73.
 Rohitavastuka, XV, 96.
 Lumbini, I, 23; XVII, 27.
 Lopamudrā, IV, 73.
 Vagrabāhu, IX, 20.
 Vanārā, XV, 94.
 Varanā, XVII, 5.
 Valabhid (Indra), X, 41.
 Varavartinaḥ, the, XVI, 111.
 Varishṭha, I, 47, 57; IV, 77; IX, 60.
 Vasus, the, VII, 7.
 Vāmadeva, IX, 9.
 Vārāṇasī, XV, 87, 101; XVII, 6.
 Vālmīki, I, 48.
 Videhas, the, IX, 20.
 Vidyākara, XVII, 4.
 Vindhya, XIII, 38; XVII, 3.
 Vindhya-koshṭha, VII, 54.
 Virvāṇi, IV, 78.
 Virvāmītra, IV, 20.
 Vishnu, XVII, 21, 24, 30.
 Vumda, XV, 95.
 Vumdadvira, XV, 95.
 Vṛitra, VIII, 13; XI, 14.
 Vṛishnis, the, XI, 31.
 Vṛihatphalāb, the, XII, 58.
 Vrihaspati, I, 46; IV, 74, 75; VII, 43; IX, 12.
 Venuvana, XVII, 16.
 Venuvihāra, XVII, 17.
 Vaibhṛāga, IX, 20.
 Vairavamtara hermitage, the, XI, 73.
 Vyāsa, I, 47.
 Sakti, XVII, 13.
 Sakra, see Indra.
 Samkhamedhīya (udyāna), XV, 102.
 Saṭi, II, 27.
 Sākya, Sākyas, the, I, 7, 14, 54, 63, 93; II, 25, 27; V, 1, 36; VI, 60; VII, 13; VIII, 8; IX, 11, 24; X, 11; XIII, 43; XV, 44, 85, 88; XVII, 1, 24.

- Sāmtanu*, XIII, 12.
Sāmtā, IV, 19.
Sāliputra, XVII, 11.
Sāli, XVII, 10.
Sālyā, XVII, 10.
Sālvās, the, IX, 60.
Sibi, XIV, 30.
Siva, see *Īsvara*.
Sukra, I, 46; IX, 10.
Suddhādhivāsāb, the, I, 39; III, 26, 56; XIII, 31.
Suddhāvāsāb, the, XIV, 88.
Suddhodana, I, 9, 20; XVII, 17, 23.
Subhakkṛtsnāb, the, XII, 56.
Sūra, I, 50.
Sauddhodani, II, 46; III, 40; XI, 1.
Sauri (*Kṛishna*), I, 50.
Śrāvastī, XVII, 15.
Śreṇya, X, 10, 16 (cf. *Bimbisāra*).
Svetabālārka, XVII, 4.

Sagara, I, 49.
Samgayin, XVII, 3.
Sanatkumāra, II, 27; V, 27.
Saptarshitārā, I, 33.
Sabhya, XVII, 4.

Samantakusuma, XV, 5.
Sarvārthasiddha, II, 17; VII, 1.
Sāmkṛiti, IX, 60.
Sārathi (pura), XV, 98.
Sārasvata, I, 47.
Sugātā, XVII, 9.
Sudarśana, XV, 92.
Sunirmitāb, the, XVI, 111.
Sumda, XI, 32.
Sumdarānanda, XVII, 27.
Sumitra (*Sumantra*?), VI, 36.
Suvarṇanishṭhivin, VIII, 77.
Sūryaka, XIII, 11.
Sringaya (*Samgaya*?), VIII, 77.
Senagit, IX, 20.
Soma, IV, 73.
Sautasomī, XVII, 27.
Saunu, *Saunava* (?), XVII, 28, 30.
Svayambhū, II, 51; X, 2, 19; XVII, 30.
Svastika, XVII, 6.

Hari (see *Vishṇu*), XV, 103.
Himavat, I, 20; II, 3; IV, 27; V, 45; VIII, 36; IX, 68; XVII, 13.

NOTES AND CORRECTIONS.

Page 11, note 2 (I, 63). Professor Jacobi writes, 'Indra's banner is intimately connected with the Gaiṇa legend of king Domuḥa (see my *Ausgew. Erzähl. in Māhārāṣṭrī*, p. 40); the old Gaiṇa legends originated in the East; cf. also Rāmāy. II, 74, 36; IV, 16, 37; 17, 2 (Bombay ed.).'

P. 21, l. 30 (II, 31 *b*). I have read in the translation *madaiḥ* for the printed *maṁdaiḥ*.

P. 33, l. 30 (III, 50 *c*). If we read *api nāma sakto*, the translation should run, 'would that he might not be able to forsake us, even though he remained attached to us only through the restlessness of the senses.'

P. 49, note 2, l. 4, read *kumudeśa*.

P. 60, l. 31 (V, 80 *d*). This might be rendered 'planting his footsteps without alarm,' but I have taken *ḥakita* as meaning 'hurrying' from the *ḥakitagateḥ* of the next *sloka*.

P. 83 (VIII, 31 *d*), add to note 2, 'there is a similar confusion of *vigādha* and *vigādḥa* in the MSS. in VIII, 76.'

BUDDHIST MAHÂYÂNA TEXTS

PART II

THE LARGER SUKHÂVATÎ-VYÛHA
THE SMALLER SUKHÂVATÎ-VYÛHA
THE VAGRAKKHEDIKÂ

THE LARGER
PRAGÑÂ-PÂRAMITÂ-HR/DAYA-SÛTRA

THE SMALLER
PRAGÑÂ-PÂRAMITÂ-HR/DAYA-SÛTRA

TRANSLATED BY F. MAX MÜLLER

THE AMITÂYUR-DHYÂNA-SÛTRA

TRANSLATED BY J. TAKAKUSU

Oxford

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

1894

CONTENTS TO PART II.

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	V
Translated by F. Max Müller.	
1. THE LARGER SUKHĀVATĪ-VYŪHA	1
INDEX OF WORDS	77
INDEX OF SUBJECTS.	85
2. THE SMALLER SUKHĀVATĪ-VYŪHA	87
INDEX OF NAMES AND SUBJECTS	105
INDEX OF SANSKRIT WORDS	107
3. THE VAGRAKKHEDIKĀ	109
4. THE LARGER PRAGŪĀ-PĀRAMITĀ-HR/ĀDAYA-SŪTRA	145
5. THE SMALLER PRAGŪĀ-PĀRAMITĀ-HR/ĀDAYA-SŪTRA	151
INDEX OF NAMES AND SUBJECTS	155
INDEX OF SANSKRIT WORDS	157
Translated by J. Takakusu.	
6. THE AMITĀYUR-DHYĀNA-SŪTRA	159
INDEX OF NAMES AND SUBJECTS	203

Transliteration of Oriental Alphabets adopted for the Translations of the Sacred Books of the East.	205
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INTRODUCTION.

THE LARGER SUKHÂVATĪ-VYŪHA.

ACCORDING to the census of 1891 Japan has about forty millions of inhabitants, of whom more than thirty millions are Buddhists. Of these Buddhists the Shin-shiu sect claims about ten millions of followers, with 19,208 temples, and 11,958 preachers, with ten chief priests, and 3,593 students. The books on which the members of this sect chiefly found their faith are the two Sukhâvatî-vyûhas, the large and the small, and the Amitâyur-dhyâna-sûtra. They are sometimes called the Large Sûtra, the Small Sûtra, and the Sûtra of Meditation¹.

According to the Buddhists of Japan, Buddha preached the Amitâyur-dhyâna-sûtra to queen Vaidehî in the city of Râgagrîha. This was during the fifth period of his life ; i. e. when he was between the age of seventy-one and seventy-nine.

The outline given of this Sûtra is as follows : 'Vaidehî, consort of king Bimbisâra of Magadha, seeing the wicked actions of her son Agâtasatru, began to feel weary of this world Sahâ (here as elsewhere explained as the patient, much-enduring earth). Sâkyamuni then taught her how to be born in the Pure Land Sukhâvatî, instructing her in the method of being born in that world, enumerating three kinds of good actions. The first is worldly goodness, which includes good actions in general, such as filial piety, respect

¹ See Sukhâvatî-vyûha, in *Anecdota Oxoniensia*, p. ix.

for elders, loyalty, faithfulness, &c. The second is the goodness of *Sīla* or morality, in which there are differences between the priesthood and the laity. In short, however, all who do not oppose the general rule of reproving wickedness and exhorting to the practice of virtue are included in this goodness. The third is the goodness of practice, which includes that of the four *Satyas* or truths, and the six *Pāramitās* or perfections. Besides these, all other pure and good actions, such as the reading and recital of the *Mahāyāna-sūtras*, persuading others to hear the Law, and thirteen kinds of goodness to be practised by fixed thought, are comprised in this. Towards the end of the *Sūtra*, Buddha says: "Let not one's voice cease, but ten times complete the thought, and repeat the words *Namo-mitābhāya Buddhāya*, or adoration to *Amitābha Buddha*. This practice is the most excellent of all."

'At seventy-eight years of age Buddha is said ¹ to have composed the *Samanta-bhadra-bodhisattva-kāryā-dharma-sūtra*, in the city of *Vaisālī*. At the age of seventy-nine he is supposed to have ascended to the *Trayastrimsa* heaven in order to preach to his mother, and after descending on earth again, he only published two more *Sūtras*, the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* and the *Sukhāvatī-vyūha*. Very soon after he died.'

The same three books, that is, the two *Sukhāvatī-vyūhas* and the *Amitāyur-dhyāna-sūtra*, form also the chief authority of the *Gōdoshū* sect, the sect of the Pure Land. The followers of this sect state ² that in the year 252 A. D. *Saṅghavarman*, an Indian student of the *Tripiṭaka*, came to China and translated the great *Amitāyus-sūtra*, i. e. the *Larger Sukhāvatī-vyūha*, in two volumes. This is the first and largest of their sacred books.

In the year 400 A. D. another teacher, *Kumāragīva*, came from India to China, and produced a translation of the

¹ These are the statements of the Buddhists in Japan as recorded by *Bunjin Nanjio* in 'Short History of the Twelve Japanese Buddhist Sects,' Tokyo, 1886, p. xviii.

² Loc. cit. p. 104.

small Amitâyuz-sûtra, or Smaller Sukhâvatî-vyûha, in one volume. This is the smallest of the three sacred books.

In 424 A. D. Kâlayasas arrived in China from India, and translated the Amitâyur-dhyâna-sûtra in one volume.

Chinese translations of these texts were known to exist not only in China, but also in Japan, and there were in several cases more than one translation of the same text. But it was not known, nor even suspected, that the Sanskrit originals of some of them had been preserved in the temples and monasteries of that distant island.

In the year 1880 I read a paper before the Royal Asiatic Society in London, 'On Sanskrit Texts discovered in Japan' (Selected Essays, vol. ii, pp. 213-271), and in it and in the preface to my edition of the Sanskrit texts of the Sukhâvatî-vyûha in the *Anecdota Oxoniensia*, 1883, I explained how I discovered the existence and came into the possession of Sanskrit MSS. and copies of Sanskrit MSS. from the Buddhist monasteries in Japan.

I had long suspected the existence of old Sanskrit MSS. in China, and had asked my friends there to search for them, and as it was well known from the works of Siebold and others that there were short invocations in Sanskrit of Buddha hung up in the Buddhist temples of Japan or written on their walls, I entertained a hope that in Japan also some real and ancient MSS. might still be discovered. The alphabet in which these short invocations are written was known by the name of Shidda, the Sanskrit Siddha¹. It may be seen in Siebold's works and in an article published in 1880 in the *Annales du Musée Guimet*, vol. i, pp. 322-336, by MM. Ymaizoumi and Yamata. What was not known, however, was that there had been a period in

¹ Siddham, lit. what is successfully achieved, seems to have been used by Buddhists like *siddhi*, success, as an auspicious invocation at the beginning of literary works. Thus we see that the alphabet on the Hôriuzhi palm-leaves begins with *siddham*, and this *siddham* may afterwards have become the name of the alphabet itself. In *Siddhânta*, meaning dogma, grammar, *siddha* conveys the sense of settled; in *Siddhârtha*, a name of Buddha, it means fulfilled, i. e. he whose desires have all been fulfilled, the perfect man, free from desires and passions.

the history of Japan when Sanskrit was studied systematically by native priests, nay, that some of the MSS. which had travelled from India to China, and from China to Japan were still in existence there. Of these MSS. I gave an account in 1884 in the *Anecdota Oxoniensia*, 'The Ancient Palm-Leaves.' Though hitherto no new discoveries of Sanskrit MSS. have been made, it is most desirable that the search for them should not be given up in China, in Japan, and in Corea also. But even thus a new and important chapter has been added to the history of Buddhism, and the fact been established once for all that Buddhist literature found a home in Japan, and was studied there for many generations not only in Chinese translations, but in the original Sanskrit also. Let us hope that through the efforts of my pupils, such as Bunyiu Nanjio, Kenjiu Kasawara (died 1883), and others, a new school of Sanskrit students has been planted in Japan which will enable the followers of Buddha there to derive their knowledge of his doctrine from the original and undefiled source of the ancient Tripitaka.

I thought it best for the sake of completeness, and in compliance with the wishes of my friends in Japan, to give in this volume the translation both of the Larger and the Smaller Sukhâvatî-vyûha. They differ from each other on several smaller points. The Larger Sukhâvatî-vyûha is represented as having been preached on the *Grîdhra-kûta* hill near *Râgagrîha*, the Smaller Sukhâvatî-vyûha in the *Geta*-grove near *Srâvastî*. In the former the chief interlocutors are the Bhagavat, i. e. the Buddha Sâkyamuni, Ananda, and Agita; in the latter the Bhagavat and Sâriputra. There is one point, however, which is of great importance in the eyes of the followers of the Shin-shiu sect, on which the two treatises differ.

The Smaller Sukhâvatî-vyûha lays great stress on the fact that people can be saved or can be born in the Land of Bliss, if only they remember and repeat the name of Buddha Amitâbha two, three, four, five, six or more nights before their death, and it distinctly denies that people are born in the Paradise of Amitâbha as a reward or necessary result of good works performed in the present life. This

would seem to take away one of the fundamental doctrines of Buddhism, namely the doctrine of *karman*, or of the continuous working of our deeds whether good or bad. Instead of the old doctrine, As a man soweth, so he shall reap, a new and easier way of salvation is here preached, viz. As a man prayeth, so he shall be saved. It is what is known to us as salvation by faith rather than by works. The Larger *Sukhāvatī-vyūha* lays likewise great stress on prayer and faith in *Amitābha*, but it never neglects 'the stock of merit' as essential for salvation. It would almost seem as if this popular and easy doctrine had secured to itself the name of *Mahāyāna*, as meaning the Broad Way, in opposition to the Narrow Way, the *Hīnayāna*.

The historical relation between the *Hīnayāna* and the *Mahāyāna* schools of Buddhism is to me as great a puzzle as ever. But that the teaching of *Sākyamuni* as represented in the *Hīnayāna* comes first in time seems to be shown by the *Mahāyāna-sūtras* themselves. Even in our *Sukhāvatī-vyūha* the teacher, the *Bhagavat*, is *Sākyamuni*, whom we know as the son of the Lord of *Kapilavastu*, the husband of *Yasodharā*, the father of *Rāhula*. We begin with a dialogue between this Buddha and his famous disciple *Ānanda*. *Ānanda* observes that Buddha is in a state of spiritual exaltation and asks him what he is seeing or thinking. Thereupon Buddha relates how there was a line of eighty-one *Tathāgatas* or Buddhas beginning with *Dīpaṅkara* and ending with *Lokesvararāga*. During the period of this *Tathāgata Lokesvararāga*, a *Bhikṣu* or Buddhist mendicant of the name of *Dharmākara* formed the intention of becoming a Buddha. He therefore went to the *Tathāgata Lokesvararāga*, praised him in several verses, and then asked him to become his teacher and to describe to him what a Buddha and a Buddha country ought to be. After having received instruction, *Dharmākara* comprehended all the best qualities of all the Buddha countries, and prayed that they should all be concentrated in his own country when he himself had become a Buddha. After long meditations *Dharmākara* returns to Buddha *Lokesvararāga* and tells him in a long prayer what he

wishes and wills his own Buddha country to be. This prayer forms really the nucleus of the Sukhāvatī-vyūha; it is in fact, under the form of a prayer, a kind of prophecy of what, according to Dharmākara's ideas, Sukhāvatī or the Land of Bliss ought to be. Dharmākara then became a Bodhisattva, a candidate for Buddhahood, and lastly a real Buddha (§ 9). All this is related by Buddha Sākyamuni to Ānanda, as a kind of vision of what happened ten kalpas ago (§ 14, s. f.). When Ānanda asks Sākyamuni what has become of this Bodhisattva Dharmākara, Buddha answers that this original mendicant is now reigning in Sukhāvatī as the Buddha Amitābha. He then proceeds to describe Sukhāvatī where Amitābha dwells, and his description of Amitābha's country is very much the fulfilment of all that Dharmākara has prayed for. Once (§ 17) Ānanda is reproved by Buddha for not implicitly believing all he says about the marvels of Sukhāvatī, but afterwards the praises of Sukhāvatī and of its inhabitants are continued till nearly the end. In some verses recited by Buddha Sākyamuni, Amitābha himself, when questioned by the Buddha-son Avalokiteśvara, explains that Sukhāvatī is what it is in fulfilment of his prayers, when he was as yet living on earth (§§ 31, 13; 17). At last Ānanda expresses a wish to see Amitābha, whereupon that Buddha sends a ray of light from the palm of his hand so that the whole world was inundated by its light, and not only Ānanda, but every living being could see Amitābha and his retinue of Bodhisattvas in the Land of Bliss, while they in Sukhāvatī could see Sākyamuni and the whole world Sahā. Then begins the conversation between Sākyamuni and Agita (instead of Ānanda). Buddha explains to him how some of the blessed spirits in Sukhāvatī sit cross-legged in lotus-flowers, while others dwell shut up in the calyx of these flowers, the former being the firm believers in Amitābha, the latter those who have entertained some doubt, and who have therefore to wait for five hundred years inside the calyx before they become full-blown, being debarred during all that time from seeing and hearing the Buddha.

In conclusion Buddha Sākyamuni exhorts Agita to teach

this treatise, the Sukhâvatî-vyûha, to all beings, and promises great rewards to all who will learn it, copy it, teach and explain it.

I need not repeat here what I have said in the preface to my edition of the Sanskrit text of the Sukhâvatî-vyûha about the difficulties of translating a text which in many places is corrupt and imperfect. But I may point out another difficulty, namely how almost impossible it is to find in English a sufficient number of nouns and adjectives to render the superabundant diction of this Description of the Land of Bliss. An exact rendering of all the words of its gushing eloquence is out of the question. Often I should have liked to shorten some turgid sentence, but I was afraid of exposing myself once more to the frivolous charge of representing the Sacred Books of the East as more beautiful, as more free from blemishes, than they really are. No more unfounded charge could have been brought against these translations of the Sacred Books of the East. Whatever else they may be or not be, they are certainly faithful, as faithful as an English translation of an Oriental original can possibly be. That they are free from mistakes, I should not venture to say, and no Oriental scholar would expect it. Those who venture to translate Oriental texts that have never been translated before are few in number, and they have to do the work of pioneers. Those who follow in their track find it very easy, no doubt, to do over again what has been done before, and even to point out here and there what they consider and represent as mistakes; nay, they evidently imagine that because they can discover a mistake, they themselves could have done the pioneer's work as well or much better. If only they would try for once to find their way through the jungle and the brushwood of an unexplored forest they would become more just to their predecessors, and more humble in judging of their own performances. Nay, they might possibly find that often when they differ from the translation of others, they themselves may be wrong, and their precursors right.

This at all events I may say in my own name and in the name of my fellow-workers, that the idea of representing

the Sacred Books of the East as better, purer, and more beautiful than they are, could never enter into the head of a scholar, and has never proved even a temptation to the translators of the Sacred Books of the East.

THE SMALLER SUKHÂVATÎ-VYÛHA.

The translation of the Smaller Sukhâvatî-vyûha has been published by me before in my Selected Essays, vol. ii, p. 348, where a fuller account may be found of the discovery of Sanskrit MSS. in Japan, and of the way by which they travelled from India to China, and from China to Japan. I have made a few corrections in my translation, and have added some notes and omitted others.

THE VAGRAKKHEDIKÂ.

In order to make this collection of Mahâyâna works more complete and useful to students in Japan I have added a translation of the *Vagrakkhedikâ*, which is much studied in Japan, and the Sanskrit text of which was published by me in an editio princeps—in the *Anecdota Oxoniensia*, 1881.

The *Vagrakkhedikâ*, or the Diamond-cutter, is one of the most widely read and most highly valued metaphysical treatises in Buddhist literature. In Japan the *Vagrakkhedikâ* and the *Pragñâpâramitâ-hridaya* are read chiefly by the followers of the Shin-gon sect, founded by Kô-Bô, the great disciple of the famous Hiouen-thsang, in 816 A. D. The temples of this sect in Japan amount to 12,943. Written originally in Sanskrit, it has been translated into Chinese, Tibetan, Mongol, and Mandshu. Its full title is *Vagrakkhedikâ Pragñâ-pâramitâ*, i.e. the Diamond-cutter, the perfection of wisdom, or, as it has sometimes been rendered, 'the

Transcendent Wisdom.' Mr. Bunyiu Nanjio in his Catalogue of the Tripitaka, p. 1, has shown that it forms the ninth section of the Mahāpragñā-pāramitā-sūtra, and that it agrees with the Tibetan translation of the text in 300 slokas.

An account of the Tibetan translation was given as far back as 1836 by Csoma Körösi in his Analysis of the Sher-chiu, the second division of the Kanjur, published in the Asiatic Researches, vol. xx, p. 393 seq. Our text is there described as the Diamond-cutter or the Sūtra of wonderful effects, in which Sākya in a colloquial manner instructs Subhūti, one of his principal disciples, in the true meaning of the Pragñā-pāramitā. The Tibetans, we are told, pay great respect to this Sūtra, and copies of it are found in consequence in great abundance¹.

The first Chinese translation² is ascribed to Kumāragīva of the latter Tsin dynasty (A.D. 384-417). An English translation of this Chinese translation was published by the Rev. S. Beal in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1864-5.

There are several more Chinese translations, one by Bodhiruḥi (A.D. 509), one by Paramārtha (A.D. 562), one by Hiouen-thsang (A.D. 648), one by I-tsing (A.D. 703), one by Dharmagupta of the Sui dynasty (A.D. 589-618).

The text and German translation of the Tibetan translation were published in 1837 by M. Schmidt in the Mémoires de l'Académie de St. Pétersbourg, tom. iv, p. 186.

The Mongolian translation was presented by the Baron Schilling de Canstadt to the Library of the Institut de France.

The Mandshu translation is in the possession of M. de Harlez, who with the help of the Tibetan, Mandshu, and Chinese versions has published a valuable French translation of the Sanskrit text of the Vagracchedikā in the Journal Asiatique, 1892.

¹ See also L. Feer in Annales du Musée Guimet, vol. ii, p. 201.

² See preface to my edition of the Vagracchedikā, Anecd. Oxon., 1881.

At first sight it may seem as if this metaphysical treatise hardly deserved the world-wide reputation which it has attained. Translated literally into English it must often strike the Western reader as sheer nonsense, and hollow repetition. Nor can anything be said in defence of the form or style adopted in this treatise by the Buddhist philosophers who wished to convince their hearers of the truth of their philosophy. This philosophy, or, at least, its underlying doctrine, is not unknown to us in the history of Western philosophy. It is simply the denial of the reality of the phenomenal world. Considering how firmly a belief in phenomenal objects is established in the ordinary mind, it might well have seemed that such a belief could not be eradicated except by determined repetition. But that the theory had been fully reasoned out before it was stated in this practical, but by no means attractive form, may be gathered from the technical terminology which pervades our treatise. There are two words, in particular, which are of great importance for a right apprehension of its teaching, dharma and *samgñā*. Dharma, in the ordinary Buddhist phraseology, may be correctly rendered by law. Thus the whole teaching of Buddha is called the Good Law, Sad-dharma. But in our treatise dharma is generally used in a different sense. It means form (*eidos*), and likewise what is possessed of form, what is therefore different from other things, what is individual, in fact, what we mean by a thing or an object. This meaning has escaped most of the translators, both Eastern and Western, but if we were always to translate dharma by law, it seems to me that the whole drift of our treatise would become unintelligible. What our treatise wishes to teach is that all objects, differing one from the other by their dharmas, are illusive, or, as we should say, phenomenal and subjective, that they are in fact of our own making, the products of our own mind. When we say that something is large or small, sweet or bitter, these dharmas or qualities are subjective, and cannot be further defined. What is large to me, may be small to another. A mile may seem short or long, according to the state of our muscles, and no one can determine the point where

more like
"on to" "why"

smallness ends and length begins. This applies to all things which we are supposed to know, that is, which we are able to name. And hence the Buddhist metaphysician tells us that all things are but names, *samgñās*¹, and that being names they are neither what they seem to be nor what they do not seem to be. This extreme Pyrrhonism is afterwards applied to everything. Dust is not dust, because we cannot draw a line between the smallest molecules, the smallest granules, the smallest dust, and the smallest gravel. There are no signs (no *τεκμήρια* or *σημεία*) by which we can know or distinguish these objects. There are in fact no objects, independent of us ; hence whoever speaks of things, of beings, of living beings, of persons, &c., uses names only, and the fact that they are names implies that the normal things are not what they seem to be. This, I believe, is the meaning of the constantly recurring phrase : What is spoken of as 'beings, beings indeed' that was preached or called by Buddha as no-beings ; that is, every name and every concept is only a makeshift, if it is not altogether a failure ; it is certainly not true. We may speak of a dog, but there is no such thing as a dog. It is always either a greyhound or a spaniel, this or that dog, but dog is only an abstraction, a name, a concept of our mind. The same applies to quadruped, animal, living being, and being ; they are all names with nothing corresponding to them. This is what is meant by the highest perfect knowledge, in which nothing, not even the smallest thing, is known, or known to be known (par. 22). In that knowledge there is no difference, it is always the same and therefore perfect (par. 23). He who has attained this knowledge believes neither in the idea, i. e. the name of a thing, nor in the idea of a no-thing, and Buddha by using the expression, the idea, or name (*samgñā*) of a thing, implies thereby that it is not the idea of a thing (par. 31). This metaphysical Agnosticism is represented as perfectly familiar even to children and ignorant persons (par. 30),

¹ *Samgñā* and *dharma* correspond in many respects to the Vedāntic *nāmarūpe*.

and if it was meant to be so, the endless repetition of the same process of reasoning may find its explanation.

That this extreme scepticism or Pyrrhonism is really the popular view of the present followers of the Mahāyāna Buddhism, was clearly stated at the Congress of Religions, held in Chicago, in September, 1893. A Deputy sent by the leading sects in Japan, submitted to the Congress an outline of the doctrines of the Mahāyāna Buddhists drawn up by Mr. S. Kuroda. This outline had been carefully examined and approved by scholars belonging to six of the Buddhist sects in Japan, and was published with authority at Tokyo in 1893. This is what he writes of the Mahāyāna metaphysics :

‘The distinction between pure and impure is made by the mind; so are also all the changes in all things around us. All things that are produced by causes and conditions, are inevitably destined to extinction. There is nothing that has any reality; when conditions come things begin to appear, when conditions cease these things likewise cease to exist. Like the foam of the water, like the lightning flash, and like the floating, swiftly vanishing clouds they are only of momentary duration¹. As all things have no constant nature of their own, so there is no actuality in pure and impure, rough and fine, large and small, far and near, knowable and unknowable, &c. On this account it is sometimes said that all things are nothing. The apparent phenomena around us are, however, produced by mental operations within us, and thus distinctions are established.

‘These distinctions produced by mental operations are, however, caused by fallacious reasoning nurtured by the habits of making distinctions between ego and non-ego, good and bad, and by ignorance of the fact that things have no constant nature of their own and are without distinctions (when things thought of have no corresponding reality, such thinking is called fallacious. It may be compared to the action of the ignorant monkey that tries to catch the image of the moon upon water). Owing to this fallacious reasoning, a variety of phenomena constantly

¹ Cf. *Vagrabhikkhediḥā*, par. 32.

appear and disappear, good and bad actions are done, and the wanderings through the six ways or states of life are thus caused and maintained.

‘All things are included under subject and object. The subject is an entity in which mental operations are awakened whenever there are objects, while the object consists of all things, visible and invisible, knowable and unknowable, &c. The subject is not something that occupies some space in the body alone, nor does the object exist outside of the subject. The innumerable phenomena of subject and object, of ego and non-ego, are originated by the influence of fallacious thinking, and consequently various principles, sciences, and theories are produced.

‘To set forth the principle of “Vidyāmātra” (all things are nothing but phenomena in mind), phenomena of mind are divided into two kinds :—“Gosshiki” (unknowable) and “Fumbetsujishiki” (knowable). They are also divided into eight kinds :—1. *Kakshur-vigñāna* (mental operations depending on the eye), 2. *Srotra-vigñāna* (those depending on the ear), 3. *Ghrāna-vigñāna* (those depending on the olfactory organs), 4. *Gihvā-vigñāna* (those depending on the taste), 5. *Kāya-vigñāna* (those depending on the organs of touch), 6. *Manovigñāna* (thinking operations), 7. *Klishṭa-mano-vigñāna* (subtile and ceaseless operations), 8. *Ālaya-vigñāna* (all things come from and are contained in this operation ; hence its name, meaning receptacle).

‘According to the former division, the various phenomena which appear as subjects and objects are divided into two kinds :—the perceptible and knowable, the imperceptible and unknowable. The imperceptible and unknowable phenomena are called “Gosshiki,” while the perceptible and knowable phenomena are called “Fumbetsujishiki.” Now what are the imperceptible and unknowable phenomena? Through the influence of habitual delusions, boundless worlds, innumerable varieties of things spring up in the mind. This boundless universe and these subtile ideas are not perceptible and knowable ; only Bodhisattvas believe, understand, and become perfectly convinced of these

through the contemplation of "Vidyāmātra;" hence they are called imperceptible and unknowable. What are the knowable and perceptible phenomena? Not knowing that these imperceptible and unknowable phenomena are the productions of their own minds, men from their habitual delusions invest them with an existence outside of mind, as perceptible mental phenomena, as things visible, audible, &c. These phenomena are called perceptible and knowable. Though there are thus two kinds, perceptible and imperceptible phenomena, they occur upon the same things, and are inseparably bound together even in the smallest particle. Their difference in appearance is caused only by differences both in mental phenomena, and in the depth of conviction. Those who know only the perceptible things without knowing the imperceptible, are called the unenlightened by Buddha. Of the eight mental operations, the eighth, *Ālaya-viṣṇāna*, has reference to the imperceptible, while the first six (sic) refer to the perceptible phenomena. All these, however, are delusive mental phenomena.

'In contradistinction to the fallacious phenomena, there is the true essence of mind. Underlying the phenomena of mind, there is an unchanging principle which we call the essence of mind; the fire caused by fagots dies when the fagots are gone, but the essence of fire is never destroyed. The essence of mind is the entity without ideas and without phenomena, and is always the same. It pervades all things, and is pure and unchanging. It is not untrue or changeable, so it is also called "*Bhūtataṭatā*" (permanent reality).

'The essence and the phenomena of mind are inseparable; and as the former is all-pervading and ever-existing, so the phenomena occur everywhere and continually, wherever suitable conditions accompany it. Thus the perceptible and imperceptible phenomena are manifestations of the essence of mind that, according to the number and nature of conditions, develop without restraint. All things in the universe, therefore, are mind itself. By this we do not mean that all things combine into a mental unity called mind, nor that all things are emanations from it, but that without

changing their places or appearance, they are mind itself everywhere. Buddha saw this truth and said that the whole universe was his own. Hence it is clear that where the essence of mind is found, and the necessary conditions accompany it, the phenomena of mind never fail to appear. So the essence of mind is compared to water, and its phenomena to waves. The water is the essence, the waves are the phenomena ; for water produces waves when a wind of sufficient strength blows over its surface. The waves, then, are the phenomena, the water is the essence ; but both are one and the same in reality. Though there is a distinction between the essence and the phenomena of mind, yet they are nothing but one and the same substance, that is, mind. So we say that there exists nothing but mind. Though both the world of the pure and impure, and the generation of all things, are very wide and deep, yet they owe their existence to our mind. Men, however, do not know what their own minds are ; they do not clearly see the true essence, and, adhering to their prejudices, they wander about between birth and death. They are like those who, possessing invaluable jewels, are, nevertheless, suffering from poverty. Heaven and hell are but waves in the great sea of the universe ; Buddhas and demons are not different in their essence. Let us, therefore, abide in the true view and reach the true comprehension of the causality of all things.'

I hope that this will justify the view I have taken of the *Vaggrakkhedikâ*, and that my translation, though it differs considerably from former translations, will be found to be nearest to the intentions of the author of this famous metaphysical treatise.

THE PRAGÑĀ-PĀRAMITĀ-HR/DAYA-SŪTRA.

(THE LARGER AND THE SMALLER TEXT.)

As the short text and translation of these Sūtras were published in the *Anecdota Oxoniensia*, 1884, with Introduction and full notes, I did not at first intend to include them in this volume. But as I was told that this Sūtra is really the most widely read Buddhist text in Japan, to be seen everywhere on shrines, temples and monasteries, more admired, it may be, than understood by the Buddhist laity, I yielded to the wishes of my Buddhist friends, and have reprinted it so as to make this volume a really complete repository of all the important sacred texts on which Buddhism takes its stand in Japan. We have heard so much of late of a Buddhist propaganda for the conversion of the East and the West to the doctrines of Buddha, that it may be useful to see what the doctrines of the historical Buddha have become in the Mahāyāna-school, more particularly in the monasteries of Japan.

THE AMITĀYUR-DHYĀNA-SŪTRA.

As I did not succeed in getting possession of a MS. of the original Sanskrit text of this Sūtra, I had given up all hope of being able to give in this volume a translation of all the classical texts used by the two leading sects of the Buddhists in Japan. Fortunately at the last moment a young Japanese scholar who is reading Sanskrit with me at Oxford, Mr. J. Takakusu, informed me that he possessed the Chinese translation of this Sūtra, and that he felt quite competent to translate it. It so happens that the style of this Sūtra is very simple, so that there is less fear of the Chinese translator, Kālayāsa, having misunderstood the Sanskrit original. But though I feel no doubt that this

translation from the Chinese gives us on the whole a true idea of the Sanskrit original, I was so much disappointed at the contents of the Sûtra, that I hesitated for some time whether I ought to publish it in this volume.

What determined me at last to do so was partly the wish of my friends in Japan who expected a complete translation of their three sacred books, partly my own wish that nothing should be suppressed that might lead us to form a favourable or unfavourable, if only a correct judgment of Buddhism in its Mahâyâna dress, as professed by millions of people in China and Japan.

What gives to these Sûtras their highest interest in the eyes of Sanskrit scholars is their date, which can be determined with considerable certainty. Those who know how few certain dates there are in the history of Sanskrit literature will welcome these Mahâyâna Sûtras as a new sheet-anchor in the chronology of Sanskrit literature. We have as yet only three, the date of *Kandragupta* (*Sandrokyptos*) as fixed by Greek historians, and serving to determine the dates of *Asoka* and his inscriptions in the third, and indirectly of *Buddha* in the fifth century. The second was supplied by *Hiouen-thsang's* travels in India, 629–645 A. D., and the third by *I-tsing's* travels in India in the years 671–690 A. D.

I was able to show in my lectures on 'India, what can it teach us?' delivered at Cambridge in 1882, that *Hiouen-thsang*, while in India, had been the pupil of *Gayasena* and *Mitrasena*, which supplied scholars with a fixed date for the literary activity of *Guruprabha*, *Vasubandhu*, and their contemporaries and immediate predecessors and successors. Still more important was the date which *I-tsing* supplied for *Bhartrihari* and the literary period in which he moved. *Bhartrihari's* death, fixed by *I-tsing* at 650 A. D., has served as a rallying-point for a number of literary men belonging to what I called the Renaissance of Sanskrit literature.

I pointed out at the same time that the period between the end of the Vedic literature, represented in its last efforts by the numerous Sûtra-works, and the beginning of the Renaissance in the fourth century A. D., would have to be filled to a great extent by Buddhist works. I hardly

thought then that Mahâyâna texts like the Sukhâvatî-vyûha, which seemed to be of so secondary a character, would claim a foremost place in that period. But there can be little doubt that the first Chinese translation of it by Lokaraksha was made between the years 147-186 A. D. ; the second by K' K'ien between 223-253 A. D. ; and the third and best by Saṅghavarman, an Indian Sramana of Tibetan origin, in 252 A. D., whereas the first translation of a Sanskrit text into Chinese, that of the Sûtra in forty-two sections by Kâśyapa Mâtāṅga, is ascribed to the year 67 A. D. I need hardly say that there are no Sanskrit texts the date of which can be fixed with so much certainty as those of the Sanskrit originals of the Chinese translations.

The doctrine of Amitâbha and his paradise Sukhâvatî seems to have acquired great popularity in China and afterwards in Japan. We need not wonder when we see how easy salvation was made by it, particularly according to the teaching of the Smaller Sukhâvatî-vyûha and the Amitâyur-dhyâna-sûtra.

The Buddhists who, as I have pointed out on several occasions, are the debtors of the Brâhmanas in almost all their philosophical speculations, seem to me to have borrowed also their half-mythological conception of Sukhâvatî or the Land of Bliss from the same source. In the Vishṇu and other Purâṇas, when the cities of the Lokapâlagods are mentioned, in the different quarters of the sky, the city of Varuṇa is placed in the West, and it is called Mukhyâ, the chief, or Sukhâ, the happy, or Nimlokaṇî, the city of sunset. This Sukhâ is, I think, the prototype of Sukhâvatî¹. Though it would be rash to conclude that therefore the Purâṇas, as we now possess them, because they mention the Land of Bliss or Sukhâ, must be older than our text of the Sukhâvatî, say 100 A. D., we may say that Paurâṇik legends must certainly have existed at that early time, and this is a matter of some importance. I have not found any Brahmanic antecedents of Avalokitesvara,

¹ See also Ānandagiri on Saṅkara's commentary on the Kṛāṇḍogya-upaniṣad, III, 10, 4, ed. Calc. p. 172.

but the occurrence of his name in the Sukhâvatî-vyûha shows that he was known much earlier than is commonly supposed, that is about 100 A. D.

In Japan, where Buddhism was introduced by way of Corea in 552 A. D., we hear of the Sukhâvatî-vyûha for the first time in 640 A. D., when the emperor Jōmei held a religious service at his palace to hear an exposition of the Sûtra on Sukhâvatî from the lips of Ye-yin, a Sramana invited from China. Many works were composed in Japan as well as in China on Amitâbha and his Paradise, as may be seen from the Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, published by my friend and former pupil Bunyiu Nanjio in 1883 (Clarendon Press).

I have to thank Dr. Winternitz and Mr. Takakusu for their kind help in preparing the indices and reading the proof-sheets of this volume.

F. MAX MÜLLER.

OXFORD:

Jan. 26, 1894.

THE FOLLOWING LIST OF BUDDHIST TEXTS, TRANSLATED IN THE
SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST, MAY BE USEFUL TO STUDENTS IN
CHINA AND JAPAN :

SANSKRIT TITLE.	CHINESE TITLE.	NUMBER IN THE CATALOGUE OF THE TRIPITAKA ¹ .
I. <i>Buddhaṣarita</i> (-kāvyā), 'Life of Buddha,' a poem, by Arvaghoṣa, of India. See <i>Anecdota Oxoniensia</i> , Aryan Series, vol. i, part vii, 1893. Translated by E. B. Cowell, S. B. E., vol. xlix.	佛所行讚經 Translated into Chinese by Dharmarakṣa, A. D. 420. From Chinese into English by S. Beal, Fo-sho-hing-tsan-king, S. B. E., vol. xix.	No. 1351; another of the same name No. 680. To be found in the India Office and the Bodleian Library. The Nishi-Hongwanji (大學林) Library possesses a very good separate copy.
II. Larger <i>Sukhāvati</i> (-vyūha), 'The Land of Bliss.' See <i>Anecdota Oxoniensia</i> , Aryan Series, vol. i, part ii, 1883. Translation by F. Max Müller, S. B. E., vol. xlix.	大無量壽經 Translated into Chinese by Saṅghavarman, A. D. 252. The chief of the three Sūtras of the Pure Land sects in China and Japan.	No. 27; for comparison of the five existing texts (out of twelve) see <i>Anecdota Oxoniensia</i> , vol. i, part ii, Introduction, vii seq.
III. Smaller <i>Sukhāvati</i> (-vyūha). See Appendix to the (Larger) <i>Sukhāvati</i> , <i>Anecdota Oxoniensia</i> , also Max Müller's <i>Selected Essays</i> , pp. 348-362. Translation by F. Max Müller, S. B. E., vol. xlix.	阿彌陀經 Translated by Kumāragīva, A. D. 402. Into French, by Imaizumi and Yamata, <i>Annales M. G.</i> , vol. ii, 1881.	No. 200; another of the same name by K' K'ien, i. e. No. 26.
IV. <i>Vaṅṅkheḍikā</i> , 'The Diamond-cutter.' See <i>Anecdota Oxoniensia</i> , Aryan Series, vol. i, part i, 1881. Translation by F. Max Müller, S. B. E., vol. xlix.	金剛般若波羅蜜經 Translated by Kumāragīva, A. D. 384-417. From Chinese into English, by S. Beal, J. R. A. S., 1864-65, Art. I. Into French, by Mons. C. de Harlez, 1892. Translation by F. Max Müller, S. B. E., vol. xlix.	No. 10; another of the same name by Bodhiruki, i. e. No. 11; and many others under different names.
V. <i>Pragṇā-pāramitā-hri-daya</i> (two texts, shorter and fuller). See <i>Anecdota Oxoniensia</i> , Aryan Series, vol. i, part iii. Translation by F. Max Müller, S. B. E., vol. xlix.	般若心經 1. By Kumāragīva (No. 19), A. D. 400. 2. By Hsiuen-thsang (No. 20), A. D. 649. 3. By Sh-hu, A. D. 980-1000 (No. 935). 4. By <i>Pragṇā</i> , A. D. 785-810. The most popular text, but not found in the India Office collection. Translation by F. Max Müller, S. B. E., vol. xlix.	
VI. <i>Amitāyur-dhyāna-sūtra</i> , 'Meditation on Buddha Amitāyus.' For this, see <i>Anecdota Oxoniensia</i> , Aryan Series, vol. i, part ii, Introduction, ix. Translated by J. Takakusu, S. B. E., vol. xlix.	觀無量壽經 Translated by Kālayāras, A. D. 424, only translation that exists.	No. 198; another lost.

¹ Published by Bunyiu Nanjio (Clarendon Press, 1883).

OTHER BUDDHIST TEXTS TRANSLATED IN THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST:

SANSKRIT TITLE.

Dhammapada, by F. Max Müller,
vol. x. Sutta-Nipāta, by Fausböll.

Buddhist Suttas, by Rhys Davids,
vol. xi.

1. Mahāparinibbāna Suttanta.
2. Dhamma-kakka-ppavattana.
3. Teviggā Suttanta.
4. Ākaṅkeya Sutta.
5. Ketokhila Sutta.
6. Mahāsudassana Suttanta.
7. Sabbāsava Sutta.

Vinaya Texts, by Rhys Davids and
Oldenberg, vol. xiii.

1. The Pātimokkha.
2. The Mahāvagga.

Vinaya Texts, by Rhys Davids and
Oldenberg, vol. xvii.

1. The Mahāvagga.
2. The Kullavagga.

Vinaya Texts (Kullavagga), by Rhys
Davids and Oldenberg, vol. xx.

Fo-sho-hing-tsan-king, 'Life of
Buddha,' by S. Beal, vol. xix.

Saddharmapundarika, 'Lotus of the
True Law,' by Kern, vol. xxi.

Milinda Praṇa, 'Questions of King
Milinda.' From Pāli, by Rhys Davids,
vols. xxxv and xxxvi.

CHINESE TITLE.

法句經

Nos. 1321, 1353, 1365, 1439. Some
parts of Max Müller's translation were
retranslated into Japanese by S. Katō,
Nanjo's pupil.

1. 大般涅槃經

Nos. 113, 114, 115, 120, 123, 118,
119, 552, though they do not agree.

2. 轉法輪經

Nos. 657, 658.

3. 三明經

4. 阿康祇經

5. 心愚經

6. 大善見經

7. 總煩惱經

1. 解脫戒本經

See No. 1108. Cf. also 1110 and
1160.

2. 大會部

1. 大會部

2. 小會部

小會部

佛所行讚經

No. 1351, also 680. See above.

妙法蓮華經

Nos. 134, 136, 138, 139. It is this
book which gave birth to a Japanese
sect called Nichiren—the number of
temples being about 5,000. It is also
read by many other sects. Into French
by Julien; the same from Sanskrit by
Burnouf.

那先比丘經

No. 1358. Very interesting dia-
logue between Greek King Menander
and Bhikṣu Nāgasena. The Pāli
text is far more interesting and fuller
than the Chinese.

SACRED BOOKS OF CHINA:

Sacred Books of China, Texts of Confucianism, by James Legge, vol. iii.

Sacred Books of China, Texts of Confucianism, by James Legge, vol. xvi.

Sacred Books of China, Texts of Confucianism, by James Legge, vols. xxvii and xxviii.

Sacred Books of China, Texts of Tãoism, by James Legge, vols. xxxix and xl. The doctrine of Tão, its history, its influence, and its relation to the other two religions of China are fully treated in these volumes.

書經, 詩經, 孝經

易經

禮記

老子道德經, 莊子書, 太上感應篇, 清淨經, 陰符經, 玉樞經, 日用經, 林西仲評論莊子數篇, 薛道衡老子廟碑, and 蘇軾莊子祠堂記. Legge's translation practically includes all the evidences of 司馬遷, 列子, 韓非子, and 班固.

THE LARGER
SUKHÂVATÎ-VYÛHA.

THE LARGER SUKHÂVATÎ-VYÛHA.

DESCRIPTION OF SUKHÂVATÎ, THE LAND OF BLISS.

OM. Adoration to the Three Treasures! Om. Adoration to all the glorious Buddhas and Bodhisattvas! Adoration to all Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, Âryas, Srâvakas, and Pratyekabuddhas, past, present, and to come, who dwell in the unlimited and endless Lokadhâtus of the ten quarters! Adoration to Amitâbha! Adoration to him whose soul is endowed with incomprehensible virtues!

Adoration to Amitâbha, to the Gina, to thee, O Muni!

I go to Sukhâvatî through thy compassion also;
To Sukhâvatî, with its groves, resplendent with gold,
The delightful, adorned with the sons of Sugata,—
I go to it, which is full of many jewels and treasures;
And the refuge of thee, the famous and wise.

§ 1. Thus it was heard by me. At one time the Bhagavat¹ dwelt in Râgagrîha, on the mountain Gridhrakûta, with a large assembly of Bhikshus,

¹ The Blessed, i. e. Buddha Sâkyamuni.

with thirty-two thousands of Bhikshus, all holy (arhat), free from frailties and cares, who had performed their religious duties, whose thoughts had been thoroughly freed through perfect knowledge, with inquiring thoughts, who had broken the fetters of existence, who had obtained their desires, who had conquered, who had achieved the highest self-restraint, whose thoughts and whose knowledge were unfettered, Mahânâgas (great heroes), possessed of the six kinds of knowledge, self-controlled, meditating on the eight kinds of salvation, possessed of the powers, wise in wisdom, elders, great disciples, viz. 1. *Āgñātakaundaṇya*, 2. *Asvagit*, 3. *Vāshpa*, 4. *Mahānāman*, 5. *Bhadragit*, 6. *Yasodeva*, 7. *Vimala*, 8. *Subāhu*, 9. *Pūrṇa Maitrāyaṇīputra*¹, 10. *Uruvilvā-kāsyapa*, 11. *Nadī-kāsyapa*, 12. *Gayā-kāsyapa*, 13. *Kumāra-kāsyapa*, 14. *Mahā-kāsyapa*, 15. *Sāriputra*², 16. *Mahāmaudgalyāyana*, 17. *Mahākaushhīlyā*, 18. *Mahākaphila*, 19. *Mahākūṇḍa*, 20. *Aniruddha*³, 21. *Nandika*, 22. *Kampila*⁴, 23. *Subhūti*, 24. *Revata*, 25. *Khadiravanika*⁵, 26. *Vakula*, 27. *Svāgata*, 28. *Amogharāga*, 29. *Pārāyanika*, 30. *Patka*, 31. *Kullapatka*, 32. *Nanda*, 33. *Rāhula*, and 34. the blessed *Ānanda*,—with these and with other elders, and great disciples, who were wise in wisdom, with the exception of one person who had still to be advanced on the path of the disciples, viz. the blessed *Ānanda*;—and with many noble-minded Bodhisattvas, led by *Maitreya*.

¹ These two names refer to one and the same person.

² Nos. 15 and 16 are taken as one in the MSS. A B.

³ Frequently called *Anuruddha*.

⁴ *Kimbila* is mentioned with *Anuruddha* and *Nandiya* in the *Mahāvagga* X, 4, 2.

⁵ See *Pāṇ.* VIII, 4, 5.

§ 2. Then the blessed Ānanda, having risen from his seat, having put his cloak on one shoulder, and knelt on the earth with his right knee, making obeisance with folded hands in the direction of the Bhagavat, spoke thus to the Bhagavat : ' Thy organs of sense, O Bhagavat, are serene, the colour of thy skin is clear, the colour of thy face bright and yellowish. As an autumn cloud is pale, clear, bright and yellowish, thus the organs of sense of the Bhagavat are serene, the colour of his face is clear, the colour of his skin bright and yellowish. And as, O Bhagavat, a piece of gold coming from the Gāmbû river, having been thrown into a furnace by a clever smith or by his apprentice, and well fashioned, when thrown on a pale cloth, looks extremely clear, bright and yellowish, thus the organs of sense of the Bhagavat are serene, the colour of his face is clear, and the colour of his skin bright and yellowish. Moreover, I do not know, O Bhagavat, that I have ever seen the organs of sense of the Tathâgata so serene, the colour of his face so clear, and the colour of his skin so bright and yellowish before now. This thought occurs to me, O Bhagavat : probably, the Tathâgata¹ dwells to-day in the state of a Buddha, probably the Tathâgata dwells to-day in the state of a Gina, in the state of omniscience, in the state of a Mahânâga ; and he contemplates the holy and fully enlightened Tathâgatas of the past, future, and present.'

After these words, the Bhagavat thus spoke to the blessed Ānanda : ' Well said ! well said ! Ānanda. Did the gods suggest this matter to you ? or the

¹ That is, Buddha Sâkyamuni.

blessed Buddhas? Or do you know this through the philosophical knowledge which you possess?’

After these words the blessed Ânanda spoke thus to the Bhagavat: ‘The gods, O Bhagavat, do not suggest this matter to me, nor the blessed Buddhas, but this thought occurs to me by my own philosophy alone, viz. that probably the Tathâgata dwells to-day in the state of a Buddha, probably the Tathâgata dwells to-day in the state of a *Gina*, in the state of omniscience, [in the state of a *Mahânâga*]¹; or he contemplates [the venerable Buddhas] of the past, future, and present.’

After these words the Bhagavat spoke thus to the blessed Ânanda: ‘Well said! well said! Ânanda; excellent indeed is your question², good your philosophy, and beautiful your understanding! You, O Ânanda, have arrived for the benefit and happiness of many people, out of compassion for the world, for the sake of the great body of men, for the benefit and happiness of gods and men, as you think it right to ask the Tathâgata this matter³: Thus, indeed, Ânanda might pile up⁴ intellectual knowledge under immeasurable and innumerable blessed, holy, and fully enlightened Tathâgatas, and yet the knowledge of the Tathâgata would not be exceeded thereby. And why? Because, O Ânanda, one who possesses the knowledge of a Tathâgata possesses an intellectual knowledge of causes that cannot be

¹ This is left out here. *Mahânâga*, technical term for greatness.

² *Unmiṣṭga*, all the Chinese translators translate as ‘question.’

³ One expects *tathâgatam etam artham*.

⁴ I have adopted the reading of B, in order to have a subject for *upasaṃharet*, but A C P read *ânanda*.

exceeded¹. If² the Tathâgata wished, O Ânanda, he could live for a whole kalpa (age) on one alms-gift, or for a hundred kalpas, or for a thousand kalpas, or for a hundred thousand kalpas, to a hundred thousand niyutas of koṭis of kalpas³, nay, he could live beyond, and yet the organs of nature of the Tathâgata would not perish, the colour of his face would not be altered, nor would the colour of his skin be injured. And why? Because, O Ânanda, the Tathâgata has so fully obtained the Pâramitâs⁴ which arise from Samâdhi⁵. The appearance of fully enlightened Buddhas is very difficult to be obtained in this world, O Ânanda. As the appearance of Audumbara-flowers is very difficult to be obtained in this world; thus, O Ânanda, the appearance of Tathâgatas who desire welfare, wish for what is beneficial, are compassionate, and have arrived at the highest compassion, is very difficult to be obtained. But, O Ânanda, it is (owing to) the grace of the Tathâgata himself that you think that the Tathâgata should be asked this question, so that there may arise in this world beings who can be teachers of all the world, for the sake of noble-minded Bodhisattvas. Therefore, O Ânanda, listen, and take it well and rightly to heart! I shall tell you.'

¹ I am not satisfied with this translation, but I do not think that *gñâna*, even in Buddhist Sanskrit, could ever be used as a masculine, and I therefore take *tathâgata gñâna* as a Bahuvrîhi.

² Read *gñâna*. Âkâṅkshan.

³ Large numbers, constantly recurring in the text. Niyuta is explained as a million, koṭi as ten millions.

⁴ The highest perfection.

⁵ Deep meditation.

‘Yes, O Bhagavat,’ so did the blessed Ānanda answer the Bhagavat.

§ 3. The Bhagavat then spoke to Ānanda : ‘At the time, O Ānanda, which was long ago in the past, in an innumerable and more than innumerable, enormous, immeasurable, and incomprehensible kalpa before now,—at that time, and at that moment, there arose in the world a holy and fully enlightened Tathāgata called 1. Dīpaṅkara. Following after Dīpaṅkara, O Ānanda, there was a Tathāgata 2. Pratāpavat, and after him, 3. Prabhākara, 4. Kandanagandha, 5. Sumerukalpa, 6. Kādana, 7. Vimalānana, 8. Anupalīpta, 9. Vimalaprabha, 10. Nāgābhībhū, 11. Sūryodana, 12. Girirāgaghosha, 13. Merukūṭa, 14. Suvarṇaprabha, 15. Gyotishprabha, 16. Vaidūryanirbhāsa, 17. Brahmaghosha, 18. Kāndābhībhū, 19. Tūryaghosha, 20. Muktakusumapratiman-*ā*itaprabha, 21. Srikūṭa, 22. Sāgaravarabuddhivikrīḍitābhigñā, 23. Varaprabha, 24. Mahāgandharāganirbhāsa, 25. Vyapagatakhilamalapratighosha, 26. Sūrakūṭa, 27. Ranaṅgaha, 28. Mahāguṇadharabuddhiprāptābhigñā, 29. Kāndrasūryagihmīkaraṇa, 30. Ut-taptavaidūryanirbhāsa, 31. Kīttadhārābuddhisaṅkūsumitābhyudgata, 32. Pushpāvattvanarāgasāṅkūsumitābhigñā, 33. Pushpākara, 34. Udaakaṇḍra, 35. Avidyāndhakāravidhvamsanakara, 36. Lokendra, 37. Muktakāhatrapravātasadrīsa, 38. Tishya, 39. Dharmamativinanditarāga, 40. Simhasāgarakūṭavinanditarāga, 41. Sāgaramerukāṇḍra, 42. Brahmaśvaranāḍābhīnandita, 43. Kusumasambhava, 44. Prāptasena, 45. Kāndrabhānu, 46. Merukūṭa, 47. Kāndraprabha, 48. Vimalanetra, 49. Girirāgaghoshaśvara, 50. Kusumaprabha, 51. Kusumavṛiṣṭyabhiprakṛta, 52. Ratnaṇḍra, 53. Padmabimbūpasobhita, 54.

Kandanagandha, 55. *Ratnâbhibhâsa*, 56. *Nimi*, 57. *Mahâvyûha*, 58. *Vyapagatakhiladosha*, 59. *Brahmaghosha*, 60. *Saptaratnâbhivriśha*, 61. *Mahâgunadhara*, 62. *Mahâtamâlapatra* *kandanakardama*, 63. *Kusumâbhigñā*, 64. *Agñānavidhvamsana*, 65. *Kesarin*, 66. *Muktakhatra*, 67. *Suvarnagarbha*, 68. *Vaidûryagarbha*, 69. *Mahâketu*, 70. *Dharmaketu*, 71. *Ratnaketu*, 72. *Ratnasrī*, 73. *Lokendra*, 74. *Narendra*, 75. *Kârūnika*, 76. *Lokasundara*, 77. *Brahmaketu*, 78. *Dharmamati*, 79. *Simha*, 80. *Simhamati*. After *Simhamati*, a holy and fully enlightened Tathâgata arose in the world, *Lokesvararâga* by name, perfect in knowledge and conduct, a *Sugata*, knowing the world, without a superior, charioteer of men whose passions have to be tamed, teacher of gods and men, a Buddha, a *Bhagavat*. And again during the time of the preaching of this holy and fully enlightened Tathâgata *Lokesvararâga*, O *Ânanda*, there was a *Bhikshu*, *Dharmâkara* by name, richly endowed with memory, with understanding, prudence, and wisdom,—richly endowed with vigour, and of noble character.

§ 4. 'Then, O *Ânanda*, that *Bhikshu Dharmâkara*, having risen from his seat, having put his cloak on one shoulder, and knelt on the earth with his right knee, stretching forth his folded hands to where the *Bhagavat Tathâgata Lokesvararâga* was, and, after worshipping the *Bhagavat*, he, at that very time, praised him in his presence with these *Gâthâs*¹:

"O thou of immeasurable light, whose knowledge

¹ As the text of these *Gâthâs* is far from satisfactory, I have given a translation of the Chinese translation by Saṅghavarman at the end of my edition, *Anecdota Oxoniensia*, I, part ii, p. 79.

is endless and incomparable; not any other light can shine here (where thou art)! The rays of the moon of Śiva and of the jewel of the sun, were not bright here in the whole world. (1)

“The form also is infinite in the best of beings¹; thus also the voice of Buddha is of infinite sound; his virtue likewise, with meditation, knowledge², strength; like unto thee there is no one in this world. (2)

“The Law (dharma) is deep, wide, and subtle; the best of Buddhas is incomprehensible, like the ocean; therefore there is no further exaltation of the teacher; having left all faults, he is gone to the other shore³. (3)

“Then the best of Buddhas⁴, of endless light, lights up all regions, he the king of kings; and I, having become Buddha, and a master of the Law, may I deliver mankind from old age and death! (4)

“And I, on the strength of generosity, equanimity, virtue, forbearance, power, meditation and absorption, undertake here the first and best duties, and shall become a Buddha, the saviour of all beings. (5)

“And I, seeking for the knowledge of the best of the Blessed Ones, shall always worship many hundred thousands of koṭis of Buddhas, endless like the sand of the Gaṅgā, the incomparable lords. (6)

¹ It would be better to read *sattvasāra* as a vocative. See p. 22, l. 5.

² I have translated as if the reading were *pragñā*, which would, however, have spoiled the metre.

³ The text has *-dhikālam*, and *-bdhipāram* is suggested as a conjecture only.

⁴ I translate *buddhāvāra*.

"Whatever worlds there are, similar (in number) to the sand of the Gaṅgā, and the endless countries which exist besides, there everywhere I shall send out light, because I have attained such power¹. (7)

"My land is (to be) noble, the first and the best; the Bodhi-tree excellent in this world². There is incomparable happiness arising from Nirvāṇa, and this also I shall explain as vain. (8)

"Beings³ come hither from the ten quarters; having arrived there they quickly show my happiness. May Buddha there teach me the truth,—I form a desire full of true strength and vigour. (9)

"I, knowing the worlds of the ten quarters, possessed of absolute knowledge—they also always proclaim my thought! May I, gone to Avīci hell, always abide there, but I shall never cease to practise the power of prayer! [i.e. May I remain in hell, if I cease to pray.]" (10)

§ 5. 'Then, O Ānanda, that Bhikshu Dharmākara, having praised the Bhagavat, the Tathāgata Lokeshvararāga, in his presence, with those Gāthās, spoke thus: "O Bhagavat, I wish to know the highest perfect knowledge. Again and again I raise and incline my thoughts towards the highest perfect knowledge. May therefore the Bhagavat, as a teacher, thus teach me the Law, that I may quickly know the highest perfect knowledge. May I become in the world a Tathāgata, equal to the

¹ The text is obscure, Saṅghavarman translates: 'My light will shine over all these countries, thus my strength and power will be immeasurable.'

² According to the Chinese translation.

³ Should it be sattvā?

unequaled. And may the Bhagavat proclaim those signs by which I may comprehend the perfection of all good qualities of a Buddha country."

'After this, O Ânanda, the Bhagavat Lokeshvara-râga, the Tathâgata, thus spoke to that Bhikshu :

"Do you by yourself, O Bhikshu, know the perfection of all excellences and good qualities of a Buddha country?"

'He said : "O Bhagavat, I could not do this, but the Bhagavat alone. Explain the perfection of the excellences and all the good qualities of Buddha countries of the other Tathâgatas, after hearing which we may fulfil every one of their signs."

'Then, O Ânanda, the Tathâgata Lokeshvararâga, holy and fully enlightened, knowing the good disposition of that Bhikshu, taught for a full koṭi of years the perfection of all the excellences and good qualities of Buddha countries belonging to eighty-one hundred thousand niyutas of koṭis of Buddhas, together with the signs, indication, and description, desiring welfare, wishing for benefits, compassionate, full of compassion, so that there might never be an end of Buddha countries, having conceived great pity for all beings. The measure of life of that Tathâgata was full forty kalpas.

§ 6. 'Then, O Ânanda, that Bhikshu Dharmâkara, taking the perfections of all the excellences and good qualities of those Buddha countries, of those eighty-one hundred thousand niyutas of koṭis of Buddhas, and concentrating them all on one Buddha country, worshipped with his head the feet of the Bhagavat Lokeshvararâga, the Tathâgata, turned respectfully round him to the right, and walked away from the presence of this Bhagavat. And

afterwards, for the space of five kalpas, he thus concentrated the perfection of all the excellences and good qualities of the Buddha countries, such as had never been known before in the ten quarters of the whole world, more excellent, and more perfect than any, and composed the most excellent prayer.

§ 7. 'Thus, O Ānanda, that Bhikshu concentrated in his mind a perfection of a Buddha country eighty-one times more immeasurable, noble, and excellent than the perfection of the eighty-one hundred thousand niyutas of koṭis of Buddha countries that had been told him by the Bhagavat Lokesvararāga, the Tathāgata. And then, proceeding to where the Tathāgata was, he worshipped the feet of the Bhagavat with his head, and said: "O Bhagavat, the perfection of all the excellences and good qualities of the Buddha countries has been concentrated by me."

'After this, O Ānanda, the Tathāgata Lokesvararāga thus spoke to the Bhikshu: "Preach then, O Bhikshu;—the Tathāgata allows it. Now is the proper time, O Bhikshu. Delight the assembly, produce joy, let the lion's voice be heard, so that now and hereafter, noble-minded Bodhisattvas, hearing it, may comprehend the different subjects (or occasions) of the prayers for the perfection of the good qualities of a Buddha country."

'Then, O Ānanda, that Bhikshu Dharmākara thus spoke at that time to the Bhagavat: "May the Bhagavat thus listen to me, to what my own prayers are, and how, after I shall have obtained the highest perfect knowledge, my own Buddha country will then be endowed with all inconceivable excellences and good qualities."

§ 8. 1. "O Bhagavat, if in that Buddha country of mine there should be either hell, brute-creation¹, the realm of departed spirits, or the body of Asuras, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

2. "O Bhagavat, if in that Buddha country of mine the beings who are born there should fall away (die), and fall into hell, the brute-creation, the realm of departed spirits, or into the body of Asuras, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

3. "O Bhagavat, if in that Buddha country of mine the beings who are born there should not all be of one colour, viz. a golden colour, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

4. "O Bhagavat, if in that Buddha country of mine there should be perceived any difference between gods and men, except when people count and tell, saying: 'These are gods and men, but only in ordinary and imperfect parlance,' then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

5. "O Bhagavat, if in that Buddha country of mine the beings who are born there should not be possessed of the highest Pâramitâs of miraculous power and self-control, so that they could at least in the shortest moment of one thought step over a hundred thousand niyutas of koṭis of Buddha countries, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

6. "O Bhagavat, if in that Buddha country of mine the beings who are born there should not all be possessed of the recollection of their former births, so as at least to remember a hundred thousand

¹ Birth as an animal.

niyutas of koṭis of kalpas, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

7. "O Bhagavat, if in that Buddha country of mine the beings who are born there should not all acquire the divine eye, so as at least to be able to see a hundred thousand niyutas of koṭis of worlds, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

8. "O Bhagavat, if in that Buddha country of mine the beings who are born there should not all acquire the divine ear, so as at least to be able to hear at the same time the good Law from a hundred thousand niyutas of koṭis of Buddha countries, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

9. "O Bhagavat, if in that Buddha country of mine the beings who are born there should not all be skilled in the knowledge of the thoughts of other people, so as at least to be able to know the deeds and thoughts of beings belonging to a hundred thousand niyutas of koṭis of Buddha countries, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

10. "O Bhagavat, if in that Buddha country of mine the beings who are born there should form any idea of property, even with regard to their own body, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

11. "O Bhagavat, if in that Buddha country of mine the beings who are born there should not all be firmly established, viz. in absolute truth, till they have reached Mahāparinirvāṇa, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

12. "O Bhagavat, if any being should be able to count the pupils belonging to me after I have

obtained the highest perfect knowledge in that Buddha country of mine, even if all beings who are contained in those three millions of spheres of worlds¹, after having become Pratyekabuddhas², should be counting for a hundred thousand niyutas of koṭis of kalpas, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

13. "O Bhagavat, if, after I have obtained the highest perfect knowledge, my light should be liable to be measured in this Buddha country of mine, even by the measure of a hundred thousand niyutas of koṭis of Buddha countries, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

14. "O Bhagavat, if the measure of the life of the beings in that Buddha country of mine, after I have obtained the highest perfect knowledge, should be liable to be measured, excepting always by their own power of prayer, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

15. "O Bhagavat, if the measure of my life after I have obtained Bodhi (Buddha knowledge) should be limited, even by numbering a hundred thousand niyutas of koṭis of kalpas, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

16. "O Bhagavat, if, for the beings in this Buddha country of mine, after I have obtained Bodhi, even the name of sin should exist, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

17. "O Bhagavat, if immeasurable and innumerable blessed Buddhas in immeasurable Buddha

¹ Trisâhasra mahâsâhasra.

² Men ready for Buddhaship, but who decline to preach or communicate their knowledge.

countries do not glorify my name, after I have obtained the Bodhi (knowledge); if they do not preach my fame and proclaim my praise, and utter it together, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

18¹. "O Bhagavat, if those beings who have directed their thought towards the highest perfect knowledge in other worlds, and who, after having heard my name, when I have obtained the Bodhi (knowledge), have meditated on me with serene thoughts; if at the moment of their death, after having approached them, surrounded by an assembly of Bhikshus, I should not stand before them, worshipped by them, that is, so that their thoughts should not be troubled, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

19. "O Bhagavat, if those beings who in immeasurable and innumerable Buddha countries, after they have heard my name, when I shall have obtained Bodhi, should direct their thought to be born in that Buddha country of mine, and should for that purpose bring their stock of merit to maturity, if these should not be born in that Buddha country, even those who have only ten times repeated the thought (of that Buddha country), barring always those beings who have committed the (five) *Ānantarya* sins², and who have caused an obstruction and abuse of the good Law, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

20. "O Bhagavat, if those beings who have been

¹ On *Pravīdhānas* 18 to 21, see note at the end.

² The five sins which bring immediate retribution. Cf. Childers, s. v.

born in that Buddha country of mine, after I have obtained Bodhi, should not all be bound to one birth only, before reaching the highest perfect knowledge, barring always the special prayers of those very noble-minded Bodhisattvas who have put on the whole armour (of the Law), who understand the welfare of all beings, who are devoted to all beings, who work for the attainment of Nirvâṇa of all beings, who wish to perform the duty of a Bodhisattva in all worlds, who wish to serve all Buddhas, and to bring beings, in number like grains of sand of the river Gaṅgā, to the highest perfect knowledge, and who besides are turned towards the higher practice¹, and perfect in the practice of the Samantabhadra² discipline, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

21. "O Bhagavat, if the Bodhisattvas who are born in that Buddha country of mine, after I have obtained Bodhi, should not all be able, after having gone to other Buddha countries, after their one morning-meal, to worship many hundreds of Buddhas, many thousands of Buddhas, many hundred thousands of Buddhas, many koṭis of Buddhas, &c., till up to many hundred thousand niyutas of koṭis of Buddhas, with objects which give every kind of pleasure, and this through the grace of the Buddha, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

22. "O Bhagavat, if those Bodhisattvas in that Buddha country of mine, after I have obtained Bodhi, should wish their stock of merit to grow

¹ Possibly the same as the *uttarimagga*, Arhatship.

² See note at the end.

in the following shapes, viz. either in gold, in silver, in jewels, in pearls, in beryls, in shells, in stones, in corals, in crystal, in amber, in red pearls, in diamond, &c., or in any one of the other jewels; or in all kinds of perfumes, in flowers, in garlands, in ointment, in incense-powder, in cloaks, in umbrellas, in flags, in banners, or in lamps; or in all kinds of dancing, singing, and music;—and if such gifts should not appear for them, from being produced as soon as thought of, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

23. “O Bhagavat, if those beings who are born in that Buddha country of mine, after I have obtained Bodhi, should not all recite the story of the Law which is accompanied by omniscience, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

24. “O Bhagavat, if the Bodhisattvas in that Buddha country of mine, after I have obtained Bodhi, should think thus: May we, remaining in this world, honour, revere, esteem, and worship the blessed Buddhas in immeasurable and innumerable Buddha countries, viz. with cloaks, alms-bowls, beds, stools, refreshments, medicines, utensils, with flowers, incense, lamps, perfumes, garlands, ointment, powder, cloaks, umbrellas, flags, banners, with different kinds of dancing, singing, and music, and with showers of jewels,—and if the blessed Buddhas should not accept them, when they are produced as soon as thought of, viz. from compassion, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

25. “O Bhagavat, if the Bodhisattvas who are born in that Buddha country of mine, after I have obtained Bodhi, should not all be in possession of strength of body as strong as the diamond (or thunderbolt?) of

Nârâyana, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

26. "O Bhagavat, if any being in that Buddha country of mine, after I have obtained Bodhi, should learn the limit of the beauty of (its) ornament, even if he be possessed of the divine eye, and should know (its) various beauty, saying: 'That Buddha country possesses so much beauty and so much magnificence,' then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

27. "O Bhagavat, if in that Buddha country of mine, after I have obtained Bodhi, a Bodhisattva possessed even of a very small stock of merit, should not perceive the Bodhi-tree of noble beauty, at least a hundred yoganas in height, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

28. "O Bhagavat, if in that Buddha country of mine, after I have obtained Bodhi, either teaching or learning should have to be made by any being, and they should not all be in possession of the perfect knowledge, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

29. "O Bhagavat, if that Buddha country of mine, after I have obtained Bodhi, should not be so brilliant, that in it could be seen on all sides immeasurable, innumerable, inconceivable, incomparable, immense Buddha countries, as a round face is seen in a highly burnished round mirror, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

30. "O Bhagavat, if in that Buddha country of mine, after I have obtained Bodhi, there should not be a hundred thousand of vases full of different sweet perfumes, made of all kinds of jewels, always smoking with incense, fit for the worship of Bodhi-

sattvas and Tathāgatas, rising into the sky beyond gods, men, and all things, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

31. "O Bhagavat, if in that Buddha country of mine, after I have obtained Bodhi, there should not be showers of sweet jewel-flowers, always pouring down, and if there should not be sweet-sounding music-clouds, always playing, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

32. "O Bhagavat, if the beings belonging to me, after I have obtained Bodhi, who are visible by their splendour, in immeasurable, innumerable, inconceivable, incomparable worlds, should not all be filled with pleasure, far beyond gods and men, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

33. "O Bhagavat, if, after I have obtained Bodhi, the noble-minded Bodhisattvas in immeasurable, inconceivable, incomparable, immense Buddha countries on all sides, after having heard my name, should not be delivered from birth, through the merit arising from that hearing, and should not be strong in the knowledge of Dhāraṇīs, until they have obtained the very throne of Bodhi, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

34. "O Bhagavat, if, after I have obtained Bodhi, women in immeasurable, innumerable, inconceivable, incomparable, immense Buddha countries on all sides, after having heard my name, should allow carelessness to arise, should not turn their thoughts towards Bodhi, should, when they are free from birth, not despise their female nature; and if they, being born again, should assume a second female nature, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

35. "O Bhagavat, if, after I have obtained Bodhi, the Bodhisattvas who in immeasurable, innumerable, inconceivable, incomparable, immense Buddha countries round about in the ten quarters having heard my name, and having fallen down, shall worship me with prostrate reverence, should not, when performing the duty of Bodhisattvas, be honoured by the world and by the gods, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

36. "O Bhagavat, if, after I have obtained Bodhi, the work of dyeing, sewing, drying, washing of his cloaks should have to be performed by any Bodhisattva, and they should not perceive themselves, as quick as thought, covered by newly-produced excellent cloaks, granted to them by the Tathâgata, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

37. "O Bhagavat, if the beings who are born at the same time in that Buddha country, after I have obtained Bodhi, should not obtain such happiness as that of the holy Bhikshu who is free from pain and has obtained the third meditation, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

38. "O Bhagavat, if those Bodhisattvas who are born in that Buddha country of mine, after I have obtained Bodhi, should not produce from different jewel-trees such a mass of excellent ornaments in that Buddha country, as they should wish for, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

39. "O Bhagavat, if the Bodhisattvas who are born in other Buddha countries, when they have heard my name, after I shall have obtained Bodhi, should suffer any diminution in the strength of their senses, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

40. "O Bhagavat, if, after I have obtained Bodhi, the Bodhisattvas, from hearing my name in a place of a different Buddha country, should not obtain the Samādhi (ecstasy) called Suvibhaktavatt, in which Samādhi the Bodhisattvas will see immeasurable, innumerable, inconceivable, incomparable, immense, blessed Buddhas one moment after another; and if that Samādhi of theirs should come to an end meanwhile, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

41. "O Bhagavat, if, after I have obtained Bodhi, beings, having heard my name in Buddha countries different from this, should not, through the stock of merit which follows on that hearing, obtain birth in a noble family, till they arrive at Bodhi, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

42. "O Bhagavat, if, after I have obtained Bodhi, the Bodhisattvas who live in other Buddha countries, after hearing my name, till they have reached Bodhi by the stock of merit which follows on that hearing, should not all obtain a combination of their stock of merit with the joy and gladness of their Bodhisattva life, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

43. "O Bhagavat, if, after I have obtained Bodhi, the Bodhisattvas, as soon as they have heard my name, in other worlds, should not obtain the Samādhi called Samantānugata, in which Bodhisattvas honour one moment after another immeasurable, innumerable, inconceivable, incomparable, immense, blessed Buddhas, and if that Samādhi of theirs should come to an end before they have reached the throne of Bodhi, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

44. "O Bhagavat, if the beings who are born in that Buddha country of mine, after I have obtained Bodhi, should not hear, as quick as thought, such a teaching of the Law as they wish to hear, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

45. "O Bhagavat, if, after I have obtained Bodhi, the Bodhisattvas in this and other Buddha countries, as soon as they have heard my name, should ever turn back from the highest perfect knowledge, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge.

46. "O Bhagavat, if, after I have obtained Bodhi, and have become a Buddha-teacher, the Bodhisattvas who hear my name in Buddha countries, and obtain the first, the second, and the third degrees of endurance, as soon as they have heard my name, should turn away again from Buddha, the Law, and the Church, then may I not obtain the highest perfect knowledge."

§ 9. 'And again, O Ânanda, when he had spoken such prayers, that Bhikshu Dharmâkara, at that time, through the grace of Buddha spoke these verses¹:

1. "If, when I have obtained Bodhi, there should not be for me an excellent Prañidhâna of such a character, then, O Prince, O Best of beings, may I not be endowed with the ten powers, incomparable, worthy of offerings².

2. "If there should not be for me such a country, endowed with many and various mighty and divine

¹ The translation of these verses, owing to the imperfect state of the text, is in many places tentative only.

² See verse 10.

endowments, I should gladly go to hell, suffering pain, and not be a King of treasures¹.

3. "If, when I have approached the Bodhi throne, my name should not quickly reach the ten quarters, the broad and many endless Buddha countries, may I not be a lord of the world, endowed with power.

4. "If indeed I should delight in the enjoyments of love, being deprived of zeal, understanding and prudence, even after having reached the incomparable and blessed Bodhi, may I not be a teacher in the world, endowed with power.

5. "The lord of vast light, incomparable and infinite, has illuminated all Buddha countries in all the quarters, he has quieted passions, all sins and errors, he has quieted the fire in the walk of hell.

6. "After making his broad eye lustrous, after driving away the darkness from all men, after removing all untimely misfortunes, he led hither those who dwell in Svarga (heaven) and who shine with endless light.

7. "The splendour of sun and moon does not shine in heaven, nor the fiery splendour of the maze of jewels of the gods; the Lord overcomes all splendour, he, the bright one, who has performed his former discipline.

8. "He is the best of men, the treasure of all who suffer; there is no one like him in all the quarters. Having completed a hundred thousand of good works, he, in his assembly, raised the lion-voice of Buddha.

9. "After having worshipped former self-existing Ginās, after having performed immeasurable koṭis

¹ A Nāga king?

of vows and penances, he became in this, his best of spiritual existences, the best of beings, possessed of the full power of prayers.

10. "As the Bhagavat, the Lord, who is possessed of unlimited light of knowledge, knows the three kinds of knowledge in the world, may I also be worthy of equal offerings¹, the best of sages, the leader of men.

11. "If, O Lord, this my prayer succeeds, after I have obtained Bodhi, may this sphere of a thousand worlds tremble, and may a shower of flowers descend on the hosts of gods."

12. 'Then the earth trembled, flowers were showered down, hundreds of instruments resounded in the sky, powder of heavenly sweet sandal-wood was scattered, and there was a voice saying: "Thou wilt be a Buddha in the world."

§ 10. 'That Bhikshu Dharmākara, the noble-minded Bodhisattva, O Ānanda, was possessed of this perfection of prayers. And a few Bodhisattvas only, O Ānanda, are possessed of such a perfection of prayers. There is on this earth an appearance of a few only of such prayers. Of a few, however, existence cannot be denied.

'Then again, O Ānanda, this Bhikshu Dharmākara having recited these peculiar prayers before the Bhagavat Lokeshvararāga, the Tathāgata, and before the world including gods, Māra, and Brahman, and before people consisting of Sramanas and Brāhmanas with gods, men, and Asuras, was established in the attainment of the true promise. And proclaiming this purity of the Buddha country, this

¹ See verse 1.

greatness and excellency of the Buddha country, and performing the duty of a Bodhisattva, he never conceived the remotest thoughts of lust, malevolence, and cruelty, during a hundred thousand *niyutas* of *koṭis* of years, immeasurable, innumerable, inconceivable, incomparable, measureless, immense, inexpressible; and he never conceived the idea of lust, malevolence, and cruelty, nay, he never conceived the idea of form, sound, smell, taste, and touch. He was gentle, charming indeed, and compassionate; pleasant to live with, agreeable, amiable, content, of few wishes, satisfied, retired, not evil, not foolish, not suspicious, not crooked, not wicked, not deceitful, tender¹, kindly speaking, always zealous, docile in the searching after the pure Law. And for the good of all beings, he recited the great prayer, showing respect to friends, teachers, masters, the Church, the Law, and Buddha, always girded for the performance of the duties of the Bodhisattva, righteous, gentle, not deceitful, not flattering, virtuous, a leader for the sake of rousing others to perform all good laws, producing by his activity the ideas of emptiness, causelessness, and purposelessness, and he was well guarded in his speech. Then, performing the duties of a Bodhisattva, after having given up all speaking which, when spoken, serves to injure one's self or others or both, he employed only such speech as served the pleasure and benefit of himself, others, or both. And he was so wise that, when entering into capitals, kingdoms, countries, towns, cities, and villages, he was always perfectly restrained with regard to all objects of sense. Performing

¹ Sukhiloma, for *sukhulâma* or *sukhumâla* (i.e. *sukumâra*).

himself the duties of the Bodhisattva without interruption, he walked himself in the highest perfection (pāramitā) of liberality, and he also roused others to walk in the same. And himself walking in the highest perfections of knowledge, meditation, strength, patience, and virtue, he roused others also to walk in the same. And he has collected so large a stock of merit that, wherever he is born, there arise for him many hundreds of thousands of *niyutas* of *koṭis* of treasures from out the earth.

‘By him, while he was thus performing the duties of a Bodhisattva, immeasurable and innumerable hundreds of thousands of *niyutas* of *koṭis* of beings were established in perfect enlightenment, of whom it is not easy to know the limit by means of speech. So many immeasurable and innumerable holy Buddhas were honoured, revered, esteemed, and worshipped, and enabled to touch whatever causes pleasure, such as cloaks, alms-bowls, couches, seats, refreshments, medicines, and other furniture. It is not easy to know the limit by pointing it out in words, as to how many beings were established by him in the noble families of Brāhmaṇas, Kshatriyas, ministers, householders, and merchants. In the same manner they were established in the sovereignty of Gambūdvīpa (India), and they were established in the character of *Kakravartins*, *Lokapālas*, *Sakras*, *Suyāmas*, *Sutushitas*, *Sunirmitas*, *Vasavartins*, *Devarāgas*, and *Mahābrahmans*. So many immeasurable and innumerable Buddhas were honoured, revered, esteemed, and worshipped, and requested to turn the wheel of the Law, of whom it is not easy to know the limit by means of words.

‘And he collected such virtue, that out of his

mouth, while performing the duties of a Bodhisattva, during immeasurable, innumerable, inconceivable, incomparable, immense, measureless, inexpressible koṭis of kalpas, there breathed a sweet and more than heavenly smell of sandal-wood. From all the pores of his hair there arose the smell of lotus, and he was pleasing to everybody, gracious and beautiful, endowed with the fulness of the best bright colour¹. As his body was adorned with all the good signs and marks, there arose from the pores (of his hair) and from the palms of his hands all sorts of precious ornaments in the shape of all kinds of cloaks and vestments, in the shape of all kinds of flowers, incense, scents, garlands, ointments, umbrellas, flags, and banners, and in the shape of all kinds of instrumental music. And there appeared also, streaming forth from the palms of his hands, all kinds of viands and drink, food, hard and soft, and sweetmeats, and all kinds of enjoyments and pleasures. Thus then that Bhikshu Dharmākara, O Ānanda, had obtained the command of all necessities, after performing the duties of a Bodhisattva.'

§ 11. After this, the blessed Ānanda thus spoke to the Bhagavat: 'O Bhagavat, has that Bhikshu Dharmākara, the noble-minded Bodhisattva, after having obtained the highest perfect knowledge, passed away, having entered Nirvāṇa, or has he not yet been enlightened, or is he now living and enlightened, and does he dwell now, remain, support himself, and teach the Law?'

The Bhagavat said: 'Not indeed, O Ānanda, has

¹ See Lal. Vist. p. 337.

that Tathâgata passed away, nor has he not yet come, but the Tathâgata, the holy, after having obtained the highest perfect knowledge, dwells now, remains, supports himself, and teaches the Law, in the western quarter, in the Buddha country, distant from this world by a hundred thousand niyutas of koṭis of Buddha countries, in the world which is called Sukhâvatī, being called Amitâbha, the Tathâgata, holy and fully enlightened. He is surrounded by innumerable Bodhisattvas, and worshipped by endless Srâvakas, and in possession of the endless perfection of his Buddha country.

§ 12. 'And his light is immeasurable, so that it is not easy to know the limit of its measure, saying, he stands illuminating so many hundreds of Buddha countries, so many thousands of Buddha countries, so many hundred thousands of Buddha countries, so many koṭis of Buddha countries, so many hundred koṭis of Buddha countries, so many thousand koṭis of Buddha countries, so many hundred thousands of koṭis of Buddha countries, so many hundred thousands of niyutas of koṭis of Buddha countries. But indeed, O Ānanda, to put it briefly, a hundred thousand niyutas of koṭis of Buddha countries, equal to the sands of the river Gaṅgā, are always lighted up in the eastern quarter, by the light of that Bhagavat Amitâbha. Thus on every side in the southern, western, northern quarter, in the zenith and nadir, in every one of these quarters, there are a hundred thousand niyutas of koṭis of Buddha countries, like the sands of the river Gaṅgā, always lighted up by the light of that Bhagavat Amitâbha, excepting the Buddhas, the Bhagavats, who, through the practice of their former

prayers, have lighted up the world by their own light, which is a fathom in length, or by their light which is one, two, three, four, five, ten, twenty, thirty, forty, or fifty *yoganas* in length, or a hundred or thousand or hundred thousand *yoganas* in length, until their brightness reaches many hundred thousand *niyutas* of *koṭis* of *yoganas* in length. There is not, O *Ānanda*, any case of likeness, by which the extent of the light of that *Tathāgata Amitābha* could be understood. Hence, O *Ānanda*, for that reason that *Tathāgata* is called *Amitābha* (possessed of infinite light), and he is called *Amita-prabha* (possessed of infinite splendour), *Amita-prabhāsa* (possessed of infinite brilliancy), *Asamāptaprabha* (whose light is never finished), *Asaṅgata-prabha* (whose light is not conditioned), *Prabhā-sikhotsrīṣhaprabha* (whose light proceeds from flames of light), *Sadivya-maniprabha* (whose light is that of heavenly jewels), *Apratihatara-smirāga-prabha* (whose light has the colour of unimpeded rays), *Rāgantya-prabha* (possessed of beautiful light), *Premantya-prabha* (possessed of lovely light), *Pramodantya-prabha* (possessed of delightful light), *Saṅgamantya-prabha* (possessed of attractive light), *Upa-shantya-prabha* (possessed of pleasant light), *Anibandhan-tya-prabha*¹ (possessed of light that cannot be stopped), *Ativīrya-prabha* (possessed of extremely powerful light), *Atulya-prabha* (possessed of incomparable light), *Abhibhūyanarendrābhūtrayendra-prabha*² (possessed of light greater than that of

¹ This seems better than *nibandhan-tya-prabha*, as printed in the text.

² This reading is conjectural and the translation doubtful. Perhaps the text was *anabhibhūyanarendrābhūtrayendra-prabhaḥ*.

the lords of men, nay, the lords of the three worlds), *Srântasāñkayendusūryagihmkarānaprabha* (possessed of light which bends the full moon and the sun), *Abhibhūyalokapālasakrabrahmasuddhāvāsamahesvarasarvadevagihmkarānaprabha* (possessed of light which bends all the conquered gods, Mahesvara, the *Suddhāvāsas*, Brahman, Sakra, and the *Lokapālas*).

‘This splendour of the Ārya (noble) is pure, great, producing bodily pleasure, happiness of mind, producing happiness, delight, and joy for men and not-men, Kinnaras, Mahoragas, *Garudas*, Gandharvas, Yakshas, Nāgas, Asuras, and Devas; and producing the pleasure of beings of good disposition¹.

‘And in this manner, O Ānanda, the Tathāgata² might speak for a whole kalpa on the work of the Tathāgata Amitābha, beginning with his light, and yet he would not be able to reach the end of the virtues of that light of that Tathāgata, neither would there be any failure of the self-confidence in the Tathāgata himself. And why? Because, O Ānanda, both these things are immeasurable, innumerable, inconceivable, and endless, viz. first, the greatness of the excellence of the light of that Tathāgata Amitābha, the Bhagavat, and secondly, the unsurpassed light of the knowledge possessed by the Tathāgata (by myself).

¹ Here the text adds (p. 30, l. 4), *kalyakusalamimīzeva-dviprāmodyakaraṇī*. The whole sentence is unintelligible.

² This refers to the Bhagavat Sākyamuni himself, who speaks of himself as the Tathāgata. What he means to say is that the light of Amitābha is infinite and that therefore even the Tathāgata could not finish the description of it. Yet this would not detract from the infinite power of the Tathāgata or diminish his *vaiśāradya* because that power too is infinite.

§ 13. 'And, O Ānanda, the assembly of the hearers of that Tathāgata Amitābha is immeasurable, so that it is not easy to learn its measure, so as to be able to say, there are so many koṭis of the hearers, so many hundreds, thousands, hundred-thousands, kaṅkaras, vimbaras, nayutas (niyutas?), ayutas, akshobhyas, vivāhas (masc.), srotas (?), oḡas¹, so many periods, called immeasurable, innumerable, countless, incomparable, inconceivable. Now, for instance, O Ānanda, the Bhikṣu Maudgalyāyana having obtained miraculous power, might, if he wished, count² in one day and night, how many kinds of stars there are in the universal world. Then, let there be a hundred thousand niyutas of koṭis of such men, endowed with miraculous powers, and let them do nothing else but count the first company (only) of the hearers of the Tathāgata Amitābha, during a hundred thousand niyutas of koṭis of years, and yet by them thus counting even the hundredth part would not be counted, even the thousandth, even the hundred thousandth; nay, not even so far as the minutest part, or likeness, or approach³ towards it would have been counted.

'Thus, for instance, O Ānanda, a man might throw out from the great ocean, which is not to be measured across by less than eighty-four thousand yoganās, one single drop of water by the sharp end of hair, which is divided a hundred times. What do you think then, Ānanda,—which would be greater, one drop of water which has been thrown up by the

¹ All these are names of fanciful measures.

² Nāgareṇa, 'with an instrument' or 'by some clever contrivance.'

³ See Kern's translation of the *Saddharmapundarīka*, p. 317, note 2.

sharp pointed hair divided a hundred times, or the mass of water left in the great ocean ?'

Ânanda said : ' Even a thousand yoganas, O Bhagavat, would be a small portion of the great ocean, how much more then one drop of water thrown out by the sharp pointed hair divided a hundred times !'

Bhagavat said : ' As that one drop of water, exactly so large (so small in proportion) was the first company of the hearers. And let there be reckoning made by those Bhikshus, who are like Maudgalyâyana, counting for a hundred thousand niyutas of koṭis of years, and yet, as to the mass of water left in the great ocean, it would even then have to be considered as not counted. How much more with regard to the second, third, and the rest of the companies of the hearers ! Therefore the mass of hearers of the Bhagavat is endless and boundless, and receives the name of "immeasurable and innumerable."

§ 14. ' And, O Ânanda, the length of the life of that Bhagavat Amitâbha, the Tathâgata, is immeasurable, so that it is not easy to know its length, so as to be able to say (that it comprises) so many hundreds of kalpas, so many thousands of kalpas, so many hundred thousands of kalpas, so many koṭis of kalpas, so many hundreds of koṭis of kalpas, so many thousands of koṭis of kalpas, so many hundred thousands of koṭis of kalpas, so many hundred thousands of niyutas of koṭis of kalpas. Therefore, O Ânanda, the limit of the measure of the life of that Bhagavat is immeasurable indeed. Therefore that Tathâgata is called Amitâyus.

' And as, O Ânanda, the rule of making known the reckoning of kalpas exists here in this world, ten kalpas have passed now since Bhagavat Amitâyus,

the Tathāgata, arose and awoke to the highest perfect knowledge.

§ 15. 'And, O Ānanda, the world called Sukhāvati belonging to that Bhagavat Amitābha is prosperous, rich, good to live in, fertile, lovely, and filled with many gods and men. Then, O Ānanda, in that world there are neither hells, nor the brute creation, nor the realm of departed spirits, nor bodies of Asuras, nor untimely births¹. And there do not appear in this world such gems as are known in the world Sukhāvati.

§ 16. 'Now, O Ānanda, that world Sukhāvati is fragrant with several sweet-smelling scents, rich in manifold flowers and fruits, adorned with gem trees, and frequented by tribes of manifold sweet-voiced birds, which have been made by the Tathāgata (on purpose²). And, O Ānanda, those gem trees are of several colours, of many colours, and of many hundred thousand colours. There are gem trees there of golden-colour, and made of gold. There are those of silver-colour, and made of silver. There are those of beryl-colour, and made of beryl. There are those of crystal-colour, and made of crystal. There are those of coral-colour, and made of coral. There are those of red pearl-colour, and made of red pearls. There are those of diamond-colour, and made of diamonds.

'There are some trees of two gems, viz. gold and silver. There are some of three gems, viz. gold, silver, and beryl. There are some of four gems,

¹ These untimely births, i. e. being born out of time, when there are no Buddhas to listen to, are not mentioned in the first *Prāzidhāna*; nor the jewels.

² Cf. the eighth paragraph in the Smaller *Sukhāvati-vyūha*.

viz. gold, silver, beryl, and crystal. There are some of five gems, viz. gold, silver, beryl, crystal, and coral. There are some of six gems, viz. gold, silver, beryl, crystal, coral, and red pearls. There are some of seven gems, viz. gold, silver, beryl, crystal, coral, red pearls, and diamonds as the seventh.

‘And there, O Ânanda, of the trees made of gold, the flowers, leaves, small branches, branches, trunks, and roots are made of gold, and the fruits are made of silver. Of trees made of silver, the flowers, leaves, small branches, branches, trunks, and roots are made of silver only, and the fruits are made of beryl. Of trees made of beryl, the flowers, leaves, small branches, branches, trunks, and roots are made of beryl, and the fruits are made of crystal. Of trees made of crystal, the flowers, leaves, small branches, branches, trunks, and roots are made of crystal only, and the fruits are made of coral. Of trees made of coral, the flowers, leaves, small branches, branches, trunks, and roots are made of coral only, and the fruits are made of red pearls. Of trees made of red pearls, the flowers, leaves, small branches, branches, trunks, and roots are made of red pearls only, and the fruits are made of diamonds. Of trees made of diamonds, the flowers, leaves, small branches, branches, trunks, and roots are made of diamonds only, and the fruits are made of gold.

‘Of some trees, O Ânanda, the roots are made of gold, the trunks of silver, the branches of beryl, the small branches of crystal, the leaves of coral, the flowers of red pearls, and the fruits of diamonds. Of some trees, O Ânanda, the roots are made of

silver, the trunks of beryl, the branches of crystal, the small branches of coral, the leaves of red pearls, the flowers of diamonds, and the fruits of gold. Of some trees, O Ânanda, the roots are made of beryl, the trunks of crystal, the branches of coral, the small branches of red pearls, the leaves of diamonds, the flowers of gold, and the fruits of silver. Of some trees, O Ânanda, the roots are made of crystal, the trunks of coral, the branches of red pearls, the small branches of diamonds, the leaves of gold, the flowers of silver, and the fruits of beryl. Of some trees, O Ânanda, the roots are made of coral, the trunks of red pearls, the branches of diamonds, the small branches of gold, the leaves of silver, the flowers of beryl, and the fruits of crystal. Of some trees, O Ânanda, the roots are made of red pearls, the trunks of diamonds, the branches of gold, the small branches of silver, the leaves of beryl, the flowers of crystal, and the fruits of coral. Of some trees, O Ânanda, the roots are made of diamonds, the trunks of gold, the branches of silver, the small branches of beryl, the leaves of crystal, the flowers of coral, and the fruits of red pearls. Of some trees, O Ânanda, the roots are made of the seven gems, the trunks of the seven gems, the branches of the seven gems, the small branches of the seven gems, the leaves of the seven gems, the flowers of the seven gems, and the fruits of the seven gems.

‘And, O Ânanda, the roots, trunks, branches, small branches, leaves, flowers, and fruits of all those trees are pleasant to touch, and fragrant. And, when those (trees) are moved by the wind, a sweet and delightful sound proceeds from them, never

tiring, and never disagreeable to hear. That Buddha country, O Ānanda, is always on every side surrounded by such trees made of the seven gems, by masses of Kadālī (banana) trees, and rows of palm-trees made of the seven gems, and entirely surrounded with golden nets, and wholly covered with lotus flowers, made of all kinds of gems.

‘There are lotus flowers there, half a yogana in circumference. There are others, one yogana in circumference; and others, two, three, four, or five yoganās in circumference; nay, there are some, as much as ten yoganās in circumference. And from each gem-lotus there proceed thirty-six hundred thousand koṭīs of rays of light. And from each ray of light there proceed thirty-six hundred thousand koṭīs of Buddhas, with bodies of golden-colour, possessed of the thirty-two marks of great men, who go and teach the Law to beings in the immeasurable and innumerable worlds in the eastern quarter. Thus also in the southern, western, and northern quarters, above and below, in the cardinal and intermediate points, they go their way to the immeasurable and innumerable worlds and teach the Law to beings in the whole world.

§ 17. ‘And again, O Ānanda, there are no black mountains anywhere in that Buddha country, nor anywhere jewel mountains, nor anywhere Sumerus, kings of mountains, nor anywhere *Kakravāḍas*, great *Kakravāḍas*, kings of mountains. And that Buddha country is level on every side, lovely, like the palm of the hand, with districts full of jewels and treasures of every kind.’

After this, the blessed Ānanda spoke thus to the Bhagavat: ‘But in that case, O Bhagavat, where

do the gods consisting of the companies of the four Mahârâgas who dwell on the side of the Sumeru, and where do the Trâyastriṃśa gods who dwell on the top of the Sumeru, find their place ?'

Bhagavat said : 'What do you think, O Ânanda, where do these other beings find their place, who in this world dwell above the king of mountains, Sumeru, namely, the Yâmadevas, Tushitas, Nir-mânaratis, Paranirmitavaśavartins, Brahmakâyikas, Brahmapurohitas, Mahâbrahmans, as far as the Akanishṭhas ?'

Ânanda replied : 'O Bhagavat, the result of works and the outcome of works are inconceivable' (i.e. I do not understand it).

Bhagavat said : 'Here, you see, the result of works and the outcome of works are inconceivable. But to the blessed Buddhas the position of Buddhas is not inconceivable, while to thee the holy and miraculous power of virtuous beings, whose stock of merit has become ripened, seems inconceivable.'

Ânanda said : 'I had no doubt on this, no difference of opinion, or hesitation ; on the contrary, I ask only the Tathâgata about this matter in order to destroy the doubts, the differences of opinion, and the hesitations of future beings.'

Bhagavat said : 'All right, Ânanda, this is what you ought to do.

§ 18. 'In that world Sukhâvatī, O Ânanda, there flow different kinds of rivers ; there are great rivers there, one yogana in breadth ; there are rivers up to twenty, thirty, forty, fifty yoganās in breadth, and up to twelve yoganās in depth. All these rivers are delightful, carrying water of different sweet odour, carrying bunches of flowers adorned with various

gems, resounding with sweet voices. ¹ And, O Ānanda, there proceeds from an instrument which consists of hundred thousand koṭis of parts, which embodies heavenly music and is played by clever people, the same delightful sound which proceeds from those great rivers, the sound which is deep, unknown, incomprehensible, clear, pleasant to the ear, touching the heart, beloved, sweet, delightful, never tiring, never disagreeable, pleasant to hear, as if it always said, "Non-eternal, peaceful, unreal." Such a sound comes to be heard by these beings.

‘ And again, O Ānanda, the borders of those great rivers on both sides are filled with jewel trees of various scents, from which bunches of flowers, leaves, and branches of all kinds hang down. And if the beings, who are on the borders of those rivers, wish to enjoy sport full of heavenly delights, the water rises to the ankle only after they have stepped into the rivers, if they wish it to be so; or if they wish it, the water rises to their knees, to their hips, to their sides, and to their ears. And heavenly pleasures arise. Again, if the beings then wish the water to be cold, it is cold; if they wish it to be hot, it is hot; if they wish it to be hot and cold, it is hot and cold, according to their pleasure.

‘ And those great rivers flow along, full of water scented with the best perfumes of the Urugasāra sandal-wood, of Tagaras, Kālānusārin (dark, fragrant sandal-wood) trees, Agarus, and heavenly Tamālapatras; covered with flowers of the white water-lilies, and heavenly Utpalas, Padmas, Kumudas, and Pundarikas; full of delightful sounds of peacocks,

¹ Instead of tāsām, it is better to read tathā.

sparrows, *kunālas*, cuckoos, *sārikas*, parrots, ducks, geese, herons, cranes, swans ¹ and others; with small islands inhabited by flocks of birds, created by the Tathāgata; adorned with fields, full of metals; with fords on which it is easy to drink, free from mud, and covered with gold dust. And when these beings there desire, thinking what kind of wishes should be fulfilled for them, then exactly such wishes are fulfilled for them according to the Law ².

‘And, O Ānanda, the sound which rises from that water is delightful, and the whole Buddha country is aroused by it. And if beings, who stand on the borders of the river, wish that the sound should not come within their ear-shot, then it does not come within their ear-shot, even if they are possessed of the heavenly ear. And whatever sound a man wishes to hear, exactly that delightful sound he hears, as for instance, the sound “Buddha, Dharma (the Law), Saṅgha (the Church), the Pāramitās (highest perfections), the Bhūmis (stages), the Balas (powers), Vaisāradya (perfections), Āvenikabuddhadharma (freedom from attachment), Pratisamvit (consciousness); Sūnyatā (emptiness), Animitta (unconditioned), Apraṇihita (free from desire), Anabhisamskāra (not made), Agāta (not born), Anutpāda (without origin), Abhāva (not being), and Nirodha (cessation); Sānta, prasānta, and upasānta (peace); Mahāmaitrī (great love), Mahākaruṇā (great pity), Mahāmuditā (great rejoicing), and Mahopekshā (great forgiveness); Anutpattikadharmakshānti

¹ The Tibetan translation puts these birds as follows: geese, swans, cranes, ducks, *kārandāvas*, parrots, *grouse* (*kokilas*), *kunālas*, *kalaviṅkas*, and peacocks.

² Instead of Dharmāḥ, the Tibetan translator seems to have read Dharmavat.

(resignation to consequences which have not yet arisen), and Abhishekabhûmipratilambha (attainment of the royal stage)."

'And having heard these sounds, everybody feels the highest delight and pleasure accompanied by retirement, passionlessness, quiet, cessation, law, and a stock of merit leading to the perfect knowledge.

'And, O Ânanda, there is nowhere in that Sukhâvatt world any sound of sin, obstacle, misfortune, distress, and destruction; there is nowhere any sound of pain, even the sound of perceiving what is neither pain nor pleasure is not there, O Ânanda, how much less the sound of pain. For that reason, O Ânanda, that world is called Sukhâvatt, shortly, but not in full. For, O Ânanda, the whole kalpa would come to an end, while the different causes of the pleasure of the world Sukhâvatt are being praised, and even then the end of those causes of happiness could not be reached.

§ 19. 'And again, O Ânanda, the beings, who have been and will be born in that world Sukhâvatt, will be endowed with such colour, strength, vigour, height and breadth, dominion, accumulation of virtue¹; with such enjoyments of dress, ornaments, gardens, palaces, and pavilions; and such enjoyments of touch, taste, smell, and sound; in fact with all enjoyments and pleasures, exactly like the Paranirmitavasavartin gods.

'And again, O Ânanda, in that world Sukhâvatt, beings do not take food consisting of gross materials of gravy or molasses; but whatever food they desire, such food they perceive, as if it were taken,

¹ Here the text seems corrupt.

and become delighted in body and mind. Yet they need not put it into their mouth.

‘And if, after they are satisfied, they wish different kinds of perfumes, then with these very heavenly kinds of perfumes the whole Buddha country is scented. And whosoever wishes to perceive there such perfume, every perfume of every scent of the Gandharvarāga does always reach his nose¹.

‘And in the same manner, if they desire musical instruments, banners, flags, umbrellas, cloaks, powders, ointments, garlands, and scents, then the whole Buddha country shines with such things. If they desire cloaks of different colours and many hundred thousand colours, then with these very best cloaks the whole Buddha country shines. And the people feel themselves covered with them.

‘And if they desire such ornaments, as for instance, head-ornaments, ear-ornaments, neck-ornaments, hand and foot ornaments, namely, diadems, earrings, bracelets, armlets, necklaces, chains, ear-jewels, seals, gold strings, girdles, gold nets², pearl nets, jewel nets, nets of bells made of gold and jewels, then they see that Buddha country shining with such ornaments adorned with many hundred thousand jewels, that are fastened to ornament-trees. And they perceive themselves to be adorned with these ornaments.

‘And if they desire a palace, with colours and emblems of such and such height and width, adorned with hundred thousand gates made with different

¹ The Tibetan translator seems to have read: *tatra yas tam gandham āghrātukāmo na bhavati, tasya sarvaso gandhasaṅgā vāsanaḥ ka na samudākarati.*

² The Tibetan translation suggests the reading *svaragālā*.

jewels, covered with different heavenly flowers¹, full of couches strewn with beautiful cushions, then exactly such a palace appears before them. And in these delightful palaces they dwell, play, sport, walk about, being honoured, and surrounded by seven times seven thousands of Apsarases.

§ 20. 'And in that world, there is no difference between gods and men, except when they are spoken of in ordinary and imperfect parlance as gods and men. And, O Ânanda, as a low man and impotent man, before the face of the mighty king, is neither bright, nor warm, nor brilliant, nor is he self-confident and radiant,—thus Sakra, king of the Devas, if before the face of the Paranirmitavasavartin gods, is neither bright, nor warm, nor brilliant, namely, with regard to his gardens, palaces, dresses, ornaments, his dominion, his perfection, his miraculous power, or his supremacy, his comprehension of the Law, and his full enjoyment of the Law. And, O Ânanda, as the Paranirmitavasavartin gods are there, thus men must be considered in the world Sukhâvatī.

§ 21. 'And again, O Ânanda, in that world Sukhâvatī, when the time of forenoon has come, the winds are greatly agitated and blowing everywhere in the four quarters. And they shake and drive many beautiful, graceful, and many-coloured stalks of the gem trees, which are perfumed with sweet heavenly scents, so that many hundred beautiful flowers of delightful scent fall down on the great earth, which is all full of jewels. And with these flowers that

¹ Instead of *pushpa* the Tibetan translator seems to have read *dûshya*, 'garment.'

Buddha country is adorned on every side seven fathoms deep. As a clever man might spread out a flower-bed on the earth and make it even with both his hands, beautiful and charming, even thus with those flowers of various scents and colours that Buddha country is shining on every side seven fathoms deep. And these many flowers are soft, pleasant to touch, if one may use a comparison, like *Kāṭilindika* (some kind of soft substance). If one puts one's foot on them, they sink down four inches; if one raises one's foot, they rise again four inches. When the time of the forenoon has gone again, those flowers vanish without leaving anything behind. Then that Buddha country is again clean, pleasant, beautiful, and without fading flowers. The winds blow again everywhere in the four quarters, and scatter down fresh flowers as before. And as it is in the forenoon, so it is at noon, at twilight, in the first, middle, and last watch of the night. And the beings, if touched by those winds which blow perfume with various scents, are as full of happiness as a Bhikshu (mendicant) who has obtained *Nirvāṇa*.

§ 22. 'And in that Buddha country, O Ānanda, no mention is ever made of the names of fire, sun, moon, planets, *Nakshatras* (constellations), and stars, or of blinding darkness. There is no mention even of day and night, except in the conversation of the Tathāgata. Nor is there any idea of predial property belonging to monasteries.

§ 23. 'And again, O Ānanda, in that world *Sukhāvati* at the proper time clouds full of heavenly perfumed water pour down heavenly flowers of all colours; heavenly seven jewels, heavenly sandalwood-powder, and heavenly umbrellas, flags, and

banners are poured down. And in the sky, the heavenly flowers of all colours, and heavenly canopies are held, likewise heavenly excellent umbrellas and all kinds of ornaments, heavenly musical instruments are played, and heavenly Apsarases dance.

§ 24. 'And again, O Ânanda, in that Buddha country whatever beings have been born, and are being born, and will be born, are always constant in absolute truth, till they have reached Nirvâna. And why is that? Because there is no room or mention there of the other two divisions (râsis), such as beings not constant or constant in falsehood.

'On this wise, O Ânanda, that world is briefly called Sukhâvatī, not at full length. Even a kalpa, O Ânanda, would come to an end, while the causes of happiness which exist in that world Sukhâvatī are being praised, and yet it would be impossible to reach the end of them.'

§ 25. Then the Bhagavat at that time spoke the following verses¹:

'Thus, O Ânanda, the world Sukhâvatī is endowed with immeasurable good qualities and excellences.

§ 26. 'And again, O Ânanda, in the ten quarters, and in each of them, in all the Buddha countries equal in number to the sand of the Gaṅgā, the

¹ The text of these verses is so corrupt that I thought it best to follow the example of the five Chinese translators, all of whom leave them out. They only repeat what was said before, that people might go on for ever praising the excellences of Sukhâvatī, yet they would never reach the end of them, and that the merit of hearing even the name of Sukhâvatī is greater than all other blessings on earth. The best thing, however, is to have faith in Gīna, and to drive away all doubt. The Tibetan translator gives a translation of seven verses, but his translation also seems as obscure as the original.

blessed Buddhas equal in number to the sand of the Gaṅgā, glorify the name of the blessed Amitābha, the Tathāgata, they preach his fame, they proclaim his glory, they extol his virtue. And why? Because all beings who hear the name of the blessed Amitābha, and having heard it, raise their thought with joyful longing, even for once only, will not turn away again from the highest perfect knowledge.

§ 27. 'And before the eyes of those beings, O Ānanda, who again and again think of the Tathāgata reverently, and who make the great and unmeasured stock of good works grow, turning their thought towards Bodhi (knowledge), and who pray to be born in that world, Amitābha, the Tathāgata, holy and fully enlightened, when the time of their death has approached, will appear, surrounded by many companies of Bhikshus and honoured by them. And then these beings, having seen the Bhagavat, their thoughts filled with joy, will, when they have died, be born in that world of Sukhāvati. And if, O Ānanda, any son or daughter of a good family should wish—What?—How then may I see that Tathāgata Amitābha visibly, then he must raise his thought on to the highest perfect knowledge, he must direct his thought with perseverance and excessive desire towards that Buddha country, and direct the stock of his good works towards being born there.

§ 28. 'But before the eyes of those who do not care much about the Tathāgata Amitābha, and who do not vigorously increase the great and unmeasured stock of their good works, the Tathāgata Amitābha, holy and fully enlightened, will appear, at the time of death, with the company of Bhikshus, in breadth

and height and form and beauty, very like (the former), and very like (the real Tathâgata), but only created by thought. And they, through their meditation that dwells on perceiving the sight of the Tathâgata, and with unfailing memory, will, when they have died, be born in the same Buddha country.

§ 29. 'And again, O Ānanda, those beings who meditate on the Tathâgata by giving him the ten thoughts, and who will direct their desire towards that Buddha country, and who will feel satisfaction when the profound doctrines are being preached, and who will not fall off, nor despair, nor fail, but will meditate on that Tathâgata, if it were by one thought only, and will direct their desire toward that Buddha country, they also will see the Tathâgata Amitâbha, while they are in a dream, they will be born in the world Sukhâvatī, and will never turn away from the highest perfect knowledge.

§ 30. 'And, O Ānanda, after thus seeing the cause and effect, the Tathâgatas of the ten quarters, in immeasurable and innumerable worlds, glorify the name of the Tathâgata Amitâbha, preach his fame, and proclaim his praise. And again, O Ānanda, in that Buddha country, Bodhisattvas equal in number to the sand of the Gaṅgâ approach, from the ten quarters, and in each quarter towards that Tathâgata Amitâbha, in order to see him, to bow before him, to worship him, to consult him, and likewise in order to see that company of Bodhisattvas, and the different kinds of perfection in the multitude of ornaments and excellences belonging to that Buddha country.'

§ 31. Then at that time, the Bhagavat, in order

to illustrate this matter in fuller measure, recited these verses¹:

1. 'As there are Buddha countries equal to the sand of the river Gaṅgā in the eastern quarter, whence all the Bodhisattvas come to worship the Buddha, the lord Amitāyu ;

2. 'And they having taken many bunches of flowers of different colours, sweetly-scented and delightful, shower them down on the best leader of men, on Amitāyu, worshipped by gods and men ;—

3. 'In the same manner there are as many Buddha countries in the southern, western, and northern quarters, whence they come with the Bodhisattvas to worship the Buddha, the lord Amitāyu.

4. 'And they having taken many handfulls of scents of different colours, sweetly-scented and delightful, shower them down on the best leader of men, on Amitāyu, worshipped by gods and men.

5. 'These many Bodhisattvas having worshipped and revered the feet of Amitaprabha, and having walked round him respectfully, speak thus : "Oh, the country of Buddha shines wonderfully !"

6. 'And they cover him again with handfulls of flowers, with thoughts jubilant, with incomparable joy, and proclaim their wish before that lord : "May our country also be such as this."

7. 'And what was thrown there as handfulls of flowers arose in the form of an umbrella extending over a hundred yoganās, and the beautiful country shines and is well adorned, and flowers cover the whole body of Buddha.

¹ In these verses there are again many doubtful passages which could be rendered tentatively only.

8. 'These Bodhisattvas having thus honoured him, how do they act?—Delighted they pronounce this speech: "Gains by those people are well gained, by whom the name of the best man has been heard."

9. "'By us also all the gain has been well gained, because we have come to this Buddha country. See this dream-like country¹ how beautiful it is, which was made by the teacher during a hundred thousand kalpas."

10. "'Look, the Buddha possessed of a mass of the best virtues shines, surrounded by Bodhisattvas. Endless is his splendour², and endless the light, and endless the life, and endless the assembly."

11. 'And the lord Amitāyu makes a smile of thirty-six niyutas of koṭis of rays, which rays having issued from the circle of his mouth light up the thousand koṭis of Buddha countries.

12. 'And all these rays having returned there again settle on the head of the lord; gods and men produce (perceive) the delight, because they have seen there this light of him.

13. 'There rises the Buddha-son, glorious, he indeed the mighty Avalokitesvara, and says: "What is the reason there, O Bhagavat, what is the cause, that thou smilest, O lord of the world?"

14. "'Explain this, for thou knowest the sense, and art full of kind compassion, the deliverer of many living beings. All beings will be filled with joyful thoughts, when they have thus heard this excellent and delightful speech."

15. "'And the Bodhisattvas who have come from

¹ Maitra, 'love,' possibly 'kindness,' or was it kshetra?

² Amitā asyābhā?

many worlds to Sukhâvatī in order to see the Buddha, having heard it and having perceived the great joy, will quickly inspect this country.

16. "And beings, come to this noble country, (quickly) obtain miraculous power, divine eye and divine ear, they remember their former births, and know the highest wisdom."

17. 'Then Buddha Amitāyu preaches: "This prayer was mine formerly, so that beings having in any way whatever heard my name should for ever go to my country."

18. "And this my excellent prayer has been fulfilled, and beings having quickly come here from many worlds into my presence, never return from here, not even for one birth."

19. 'If a Bodhisattva wishes here that his country should be such as this, and that he also should deliver many beings, through his name, through his preaching, and through his sight,

20. 'Let him quickly and with speed go to the world Sukhâvatī, and having gone near Amita-prabha, let him worship a thousand koṭis of Buddhas.

21. 'Having worshipped many koṭis of Buddhas, and having gone to many countries by means of their miraculous power, and having performed adoration in the presence of the Sugatas, they will go to Sukhâvatī with devotion¹.

§ 32. 'And again, O Ānanda, there is a Bodhi-tree belonging to Amitāyus, the Tathāgata, holy and fully enlightened. That Bodhi-tree is ten hun-

¹ The Tibetan translation has 'in the morning,' as if the text had been pūrvabhakṭa.

dred yoganas in height, having petals, leaves, and branches spread over eight hundred yoganas, having a circumference near the base of the root of five hundred yoganas, always in leaf, always in flower, always in fruit, of different colours, of many hundred thousand colours, of different leaves, of different flowers, of different fruits, adorned with many beautiful ornaments, shining with precious jewels, bright like the moon, beautified with precious jewels (such as are) fastened on Sakra's head, strewn with *Kintâmani*¹ jewels, well adorned with the best jewels of the sea, more than heavenly, hung with golden strings, adorned with hundreds of gold chains, jewel-garlands, necklaces, bracelets, strings of red pearls and blue pearls, lion twists (*Simhalatâ*), girdles, bunches, strings of jewels, and all kinds of jewels, covered with nets of bells, nets of all kinds of jewels, nets of pearls, and nets of gold, adorned with the emblems of the dolphin, the Svastika, the Nandyâvarta, and the moon, adorned with nets of jewels and of bells, and with ornaments of gold and of all kinds of jewels, in fact adorned according to the desires of beings whatever their wishes may be.

'And again, O Ânanda, the sound and noise of that Bodhi-tree, when it is moved by the wind, reaches immeasurable worlds. And, O Ânanda, for those beings whose hearing that Bodhi-tree reaches, no disease of the ear is to be feared until they reach Bodhi (highest knowledge). And for those immeasurable, innumerable, inconceivable, incomparable, measureless, immense, and inexpressible beings, whose sight that Bodhi-tree reaches, no disease of the eye

¹ Jewels yielding every wish.

is to be feared until they reach Bodhi. And again, O Ānanda, for those beings who smell the scent of that Bodhi-tree, no disease of the nose is to be feared until they reach Bodhi. For those beings who taste the fruits of that Bodhi-tree, no disease of the tongue is to be feared until they reach Bodhi. For those beings who are lighted up by the light of that Bodhi-tree, no disease of the body is to be feared until they reach Bodhi. And again, O Ānanda, for those beings who meditate on that Bodhi-tree according to the Law, henceforward until they reach the Bodhi, no perplexity of their thought is to be feared. And all those beings, through the seeing of that Bodhi-tree, never turn away, namely, from the highest perfect knowledge. And they obtain three kinds of kshānti or resignation, namely, Ghoshā-nugā, Anulomikī (resignation to natural consequences), and Anutpattika-dharma-kshānti (resignation to consequences which have not yet arisen), through the power of the former prayers of that same Tathāgata Amitāyus, through the service rendered by them to the former Gīnas, and through the performance of the former prayers, to be well accomplished, and to be well conceived, without failure or without flaw.

§ 33. 'And again, O Ānanda, those Bodhisattvas who have been born, are being born, or will be born there, are all bound to one birth only¹, and will thence indeed obtain the highest perfect knowledge; barring always the power of prayers, as in the case of those Bodhisattvas who are preaching with the voice of lions, who are girded with the noble armour

¹ Their present birth.

(of the Law), and who are devoted to the work of helping all people to attain Parinirvāṇa.

§ 34. 'And again, O Ānanda, in that Buddha country, those who are Śrāvakas are possessed of the light of a fathom, and those who are Bodhisattvas are possessed of the light of a hundred thousand koṭis of yoganās; barring always the two Bodhisattvas, by whose light that world is everywhere shining with eternal splendour.'

Then the blessed Ānanda said this to the Bhagavat: 'What are the names, O Bhagavat, of those two noble-minded Bodhisattvas?'

The Bhagavat said: 'One of them, O Ānanda, is the noble-minded Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara, and the second is Mahāsthāmaprāpta by name. And, O Ānanda, these two were born there, having left this Buddha country here¹.

§ 35. 'And, O Ānanda, those Bodhisattvas who have been born in that Buddha country are all endowed with the thirty-two marks of a great man, possessed of perfect members, skilled in meditation and wisdom, clever in all kinds of wisdom, having sharp organs, having well-restrained organs, having organs of sense capable of thorough knowledge, not mean, possessed of the five kinds of strength, of patience under censure, and of endless and boundless good qualities.

¹ Saṅghavarman translates this passage: 'These two Bodhisattvas practised the discipline of Bodhisattva in this country, and after death they were miraculously born in that Buddha country.' Bodhiruṭi translates: 'O Ānanda, these two Bodhisattvas went to be born in that country from the world Sahā, when they had exhausted the measure of their life (here).' The world Sahā belongs to the Buddha Śākyamuni.

§ 36. 'And again, O Ânanda, all those Bodhisattvas who have been born in that Buddha country are not deprived of the sight of Buddha, nor liable to fall down (to the evil states), until they reach the Bodhi. Henceforward they all will never be forgetful of their former births¹; barring always those who are devoted to their former place, during the disturbances of the kalpas, and while the five kinds of corruption prevail, when there is the appearance of blessed Buddhas in the world, as for instance, that of me at present.

§ 37. 'And again, O Ânanda, all the Bodhisattvas who have been born in that Buddha country, having gone during one morning meal to the other world, worship many hundred thousand niyutas of koṭis of Buddhas, as many as they like, through the favour of Buddha. They consider in many ways that they should worship (Buddhas) with such and such flowers, incense, lamps, scents, garlands, ointments, powder, cloaks, umbrellas, flags, banners, ensigns, music, concerts, and musical instruments; and, as soon as they have considered this, there arise also on their hands exactly such materials for every kind of worship. And while performing worship for those blessed Buddhas with those materials, beginning with flowers and ending with musical instruments, they lay up for themselves much immeasurable and innumerable merit. Again, if they wish that such handfulls of flowers should be produced on their hands, then such handfulls of heavenly flowers, of different colours, of many colours, of different scents, are produced on their hands as soon as thought of. They shower

¹ 'Na' must be left out, or we must read nagâtavagâtismarâ.

again and again such handfulls of flowers upon those blessed Buddhas. And the very smallest handfull of flowers, being thrown on high, appears above in the sky as an umbrella of flowers ten *yoganas* in circumference. And when the second has been thrown after it, the first does not fall down on the earth. There are handfulls of flowers there, which having been thrown up, appear in the sky as umbrellas of flowers twenty *yoganas* in circumference. There appear in the sky some flower-umbrellas, thirty, forty, or fifty *yoganas* in circumference, as far as a hundred thousand *yoganas* in circumference. Those (Bodhisattvas) there who perceive the noble pleasure and joy, and obtain the noble strength of thought, having caused a great and immeasurable and innumerable stock of good works to ripen, and having worshipped many hundred thousand *niyutas* of *koṭis* of Buddhas, turn again to the world *Sukhâvatî* in one morning, through the favour of practising the former prayers of the same *Tathâgata Amitâyus*, owing to the hearing of the Law formerly given, owing to the stock of good works produced under former *Ginas*, owing to the perfect completion in the success of former prayers, owing to the well-ordered state of mind¹.

§ 38. 'And again, O *Ânanda*, all those beings who have been born in that Buddha country recite the story of the Law, which is accompanied by omniscience². And for the beings in that Buddha

¹ The text of this passage is very imperfect in all the MSS. Comparing the sentence with the last sentence of Chapter XXXII, it might seem possible to read *paripûrṇânûnatayâ*, or *paripûryatayânûnatayâ*, for *paripûryâtmabhûtayâ*. On *suviḥbhakta*, see Childers, s. v. *vibhagati*.

² See the twenty-third *Pravṛddhâna*.

country there exists no idea of property whatever¹. And all those going and walking through that Buddha country feel neither pleasure nor pain; stepping forward they have no desire, and with desire they do not step forward. They give no thought to any beings. And again, O Ānanda, for those beings who have been born in that world Sukhāvati, there is no idea of others, no idea of self, no idea of inequality, no strife, no dispute, no opposition. Full of equanimity, of benevolent thought, of tender thought, of affectionate thought, of useful thought, of serene thought, of firm thought, of unbiassed thought, of undisturbed thought, of unagitated thought, of thought (fixed on) the practice of discipline and transcendent wisdom, having entered on knowledge which is a firm support to all thoughts, equal to the ocean in wisdom, equal to the mountain Meru in knowledge, rich in many good qualities, delighting in the music of the Bodhyaṅgas², devoted to the music of Buddha, they discard the eye of flesh, and assume the heavenly eye. And having approached the eye of wisdom, having reached the eye of the Law, producing the eye of Buddha, showing it, lighting it, and fully exhibiting it, they attain perfect wisdom. And being bent on the equilibrium of the three elements³, having subdued and calmed their thoughts, endowed with a perception of the causes of all

¹ See the tenth Praṇidhāna.

² 'Requisites for attaining the supreme knowledge of a Buddha.'—Childers, Pāli Dictionary, p. 93 b.

³ Probably the three dhātus, Kāmadhātu, Rūpadhātu, and Arūpadhātu; see Childers, s. v. dhātu.

things, clever in explanation of causes, endowed with the power of explaining the Law (or things such as they really are), clever in taking and refusing, clever in leading and not leading, clever in resting¹, they, being regardless of worldly stories, derive true pleasures from stories transcending the world. They are clever in examining all things, familiar with the knowledge of the cessation of the working of all things, perceiving even what cannot be seen, caring for nothing, attached to nothing, without cares, without pain, free without clinging to anything, free from impurity², of blameless behaviour, not clinging to anything, intent on the deep or profound laws, they do not sink, elevated to the entrance into the knowledge of Buddha difficult to comprehend, having obtained the path of one vehicle³, free from doubt, beyond the reach of questionings, knowing the thoughts of others, free from self-confidence. Being elevated in knowledge, they are like the Sumeru; being imperturbable in thought, they are like the ocean; they surpass the light of the sun and moon, by the light of wisdom, and by the whiteness, brilliancy, purity, and beauty of their knowledge; by their light and splendour, they are like the colour of molten gold; by their patiently bearing the good and evil deeds of all beings, they are like the earth; by their cleaning and carrying off the taint⁴ of all sins, they are

¹ The text may originally have been *sthânâsthânakusalâh*.

² The next words *aparyasthâyinah* and *abhiġâsvamûla-sthâyinah* seem to have a technical meaning, but neither the Tibetan nor the Chinese translators give an intelligible rendering.

³ Saṅghavarman translates 'one vehicle.'

⁴ The Tibetan translation presupposes *mala* instead of *mûla*.

like water ; by their burning the evil of pride¹ in anything, they are like the king of fire ; by not clinging to anything, they are like the wind ; by pervading all things and yet not caring for anything, they are like the ether ; by not being tainted by the whole world, they are like lotuses ; by their shouting forth the Law, they are like the great cloud at the rainy season ; by showering down the whole ocean of the Law, they are like the great rain ; by overpowering great troops, they are like bulls ; by the highest restraint of their thoughts, they are like great elephants ; by being well trained, they are like noble horses ; by their fearlessness, confidence, and heroism, they are like the lion, the king of beasts ; by affording protection to all beings, they are like the Nyagrodha (fig-tree), the king of trees ; by not being shaken by any calumniators, they are like the (Sumeru), the king of mountains ; by their feeling of unlimited love, they are like the sky ; by their precedence, owing to their command of the Law, and their stock of all merit, they are like the great Brahman ; by their not dwelling in what they have accumulated, they are like birds ; by their scattering all calumniators, they are like Garuḍa, king of birds ; by their not being averse to our obtaining difficult things, they are like the Udumbara flowers ; calm like elephants², because their senses are neither crooked nor shaken ; clever in decision, full of the sweet flavour of patience ; without envy, because they do not hanker after the happiness of others ; wise, because in their search after the Law, never

¹ Māna, 'pride,' is one of the Klesas.

² The Tibetan translator seems to have read *sagaravat*, instead of *nāgavat*.

tired of discussions on the Law; like the precious beryl, through their value; (like) jewel-mines¹, by their sacred knowledge; sweet-sounding by the noise of the great drum of the Law, striking the great kettledrum of the Law, blowing the great trumpet-shell of the Law, raising the great banner of the Law, lighting the torch of the Law, looking for wisdom, not foolish, faultless, passionless, pure, refined, not greedy, fond of distributing, generous, open-handed, fond of distributing gifts, not stingy in giving instruction and food, not attached, without fear, without desires, wise, patient, energetic, bashful, orderly, fearless², full of knowledge, happy, pleasant to live with, obliging, enlightening the world³, free from sorrow, free from taint, having left off the winking of the eye, possessing lightly acquired knowledge, strong in reasoning, strong in prayer, not crooked, not perverse; then, having accumulated a hundred thousand *niyutas* of *koṭis* of *lakshas*⁴ of virtue, delivered from the thorns of pride, free from illusion, hatred, and passion; pure, devoted to what is pure, famous by the *Gina*-power, learned in the world, elevated by their purified knowledge, sons of the *Gina*, endowed with the vigour of thought, heroes, firm, unselfish⁵, free from faults, unequalled, free from anger, collected, noble, heroes, bashful, energetic, possessed of memory, understanding, and prudence;

¹ The Tibetan translation seems to have read *ratnâkarasa-drīṣāḥ*.

² If the same as *nirgahana*.

³ The next words are unintelligible in their present form.

⁴ The Tibetan translation has *Buddha* for *laksha*.

⁵ *Asamāḥ* in the Tibetan translation.

sending forth the weapons of knowledge, possessed of purity, shining, free from faults and taints, endowed with memory, resting on serene knowledge. And such, O Ânanda, are the beings in that Buddha country, stated briefly. But if the Tathâgatas should describe them fully, even in a length of life that should last for a hundred thousand niyutas of koṭis of kalpas, yet the end of the virtues of those good people would not be reached, and yet there would be no failure of the self-confidence of the Tathâgata. And why? Because, O Ânanda, both are indeed inconceivable and incomparable, viz. first, the virtues of those Bodhisattvas, and secondly, the unsurpassed light of knowledge of the Tathâgata¹.

§ 39. 'And now, O Ânanda, stand up, facing westward, and having taken a handful of flowers, fall down. This is the quarter where that Bhagavat Amitâbha, the Tathâgata, holy and fully enlightened, dwells, remains, supports himself, and teaches the Law, whose spotless and pure name, famed in every quarter of the whole world with its ten quarters, the blessed Buddhas, equal to (the grains of) the sand of the river Gaṅgâ, speaking and answering again and again without stopping, extol, praise, and eulogize.'

After this, the blessed Ânanda said this to the Bhagavat: 'I wish, O Bhagavat, to see that Amitâbha, Amitaprabha, Amitâyus, the Tathâgata, holy and fully enlightened, and those noble-minded Bodhisattvas, who are possessed of a stock of merit amassed under many hundred thousand niyutas of koṭis of Buddhas.'

¹ For these passages, see the end of Chapter XII.

At that moment this speech was spoken by the blessed Ānanda, and immediately that Amitābha, the Tathāgata, holy and fully enlightened, let such a ray of light go out of the palm of his own hand, that even the most distant Buddha country was shining with the great splendour. And again at that time, whatever black mountains, or jewel-mountains, or Merus, great Merus, Muṭilindas, great Muṭilindas, *Kakra-vāḍas*, great *Kakravāḍas*, or erections, or pillars, trees, woods, gardens, palaces, belonging to the gods and men, exist everywhere in hundred thousand *koṭis* of Buddha countries; all these were pervaded and overcome by the light of that Tathāgata. And as a man, followed by another at a distance of a fathom only, would see the other man, when the sun has risen, exactly in the same manner the Bhikshus, Bhikṣuṇīs, Upāsakas (laymen), Upāsikās (laywomen), gods, Nāgas, Yakshas, Rākshasas, Gandharvas, Asuras, Garuḍas, Kinnaras, Mahoragas, men and not-men, in this Buddha country, saw at that time that Amitābha, the Tathāgata, holy and fully enlightened, like the Sumeru, the king of mountains, elevated above all countries, surpassing all quarters, shining, warming, glittering, blazing; and they saw that great mass of Bodhisattvas, and that company of Bhikshus, viz. by the grace of Buddha, from the pureness of that light. And as this great earth might be, when all covered with water, so that no trees, no mountains, no islands, no grasses, bushes, herbs, large trees, no rivers, chasms, water-falls, would be seen, but only the one great earth which had all become an ocean, in exactly the same manner there is neither mark nor sign whatever to be seen in that Buddha country, except Srāvakas,

spreading their light over a fathom, and those Bodhisattvas, spreading their light over a hundred thousand koṭis of yoganās. And that Bhagavat Amitābha, the Tathāgata, holy and fully enlightened, overshadowing that mass of Srāvakas and that mass of Bodhisattvas, is seen, illuminating all quarters. Again at that time all those Bodhisattvas, Srāvakas, gods and men in that world Sukhāvati, saw this world Sahā and Sākyamuni, the Tathāgata, holy and fully enlightened, surrounded by a holy company of Bhikshus, teaching the Law.

§ 40. Then, the Bhagavat addressed the noble-minded Bodhisattva Agita, and said: 'Do you see, O Agita, the perfection of the array of ornaments and good qualities in that Buddha country; and above in the sky (places) with charming parks¹, charming gardens, charming rivers and lotus lakes, scattered with many precious Padmas, Utpalas, Kumudas, and Pundarikas; and below, from the earth to the abode of the Akanishṭhas, the surface of the sky, covered with flowers, ornamented with wreaths of flowers, shining on the rows of many precious columns, frequented by flocks of all kinds of birds created by the Tathāgata?'

The Bodhisattva Agita said: 'I see, O Bhagavat.'

The Bhagavat said: 'Do you see again, O Agita, those flocks of immortal birds, making the whole Buddha country resound with the voice of Buddha, so that those Bodhisattvas are never without meditating on Buddha?'

Agita said: 'I see, O Bhagavat.'

¹ A substantive seems to be wanting to which all these adjectives would refer.

The Bhagavat said: 'Do you see again, O Agita, those beings, who have ascended to the palaces which extend over a hundred thousand yōjanas in the sky, walking about respectfully?'

Agita said: 'I see, O Bhagavat.'

The Bhagavat said: 'What do you think, O Agita, is there any difference between the gods called Paranirmitavasavartins, and men in the world Sukhāvati?'

Agita said: 'I do not, O Bhagavat, perceive even one difference, so far as the men in that world of Sukhāvati are endowed with great supernatural powers.'

The Bhagavat said: 'Do you see again, O Agita, those men dwelling within the calyx of excellent lotus-flowers in that world Sukhāvati?'

He said: 'As gods called Trāyastrimsas or Yāmas, having entered into palaces of fifty or hundred or five hundred yōjanas in extent, are playing, sporting, walking about, exactly in the same manner I see, O Bhagavat, these men dwelling within the calyx of excellent lotus-flowers in the world Sukhāvati.'

§ 41. 'Again there are, O Bhagavat, beings who, being born miraculously, appear sitting cross-legged in the lotus-flowers. What is there, O Bhagavat, the cause, what the reason, that some dwell within the calyx, while others, being born miraculously, appear sitting cross-legged in the lotus-flowers?'

The Bhagavat said: 'Those Bodhisattvas, O Agita, who, living in other Buddha countries, entertain doubt about being born in the world Sukhāvati, and with that thought amass a stock of merit, for them there is the dwelling within the calyx. Those, on the contrary, who are filled with faith, and being

free from doubt, amass a stock of merit in order to be born in the world Sukhāvatt, and conceive, believe, and trust in the perfect knowledge of the blessed Buddhas, they, being born miraculously, appear sitting cross-legged in the flowers of the lotus. And those noble-minded Bodhisattvas, O Agita, who, living in other Buddha countries, raise their thought in order to see Amitābha, the Tathāgata, holy and fully enlightened, who never entertain a doubt, believe in the perfect knowledge of Buddha and in their own stock of merit, for them, being born miraculously, and appearing cross-legged, there is, in one minute, such a body as that of other beings who have been born there long before. See, O Agita, the excellent, immeasurable, unailing, unlimited wisdom, that namely for their own benefit they are deprived during five hundred years of seeing Buddhas, seeing Bodhisattvas, hearing the Law, speaking about the Law (with others), and thus collecting a stock of merit; they are indeed deprived of the successful attainment of every stock of merit, and that through their forming ideas tainted with doubt.

‘And, O Agita, there might be a dungeon belonging to an anointed Kshatriya king, inlaid entirely with gold and beryl, in which cushions, garlands, wreaths and strings are fixed, having canopies of different colours and kind, covered with silk cushions, scattered over with various flowers and blossoms, scented with excellent scents, adorned with arches, courts, windows, pinnacles, fire-places, and terraces, covered with nets of bells of the seven kinds of gems, having four angles, four pillars, four doors, four stairs; and the son of that king having been

thrown into the dungeon for some misdeed is there, bound with a chain made of the Gâmbûnada gold. And suppose there is a couch prepared for him, covered with many woollen cloths, spread over with cotton and feather cushions, having Kâliṅga coverings, and carpets, together with coverlids¹, red on both sides, beautiful and charming. There he might be then either sitting or resting. And there might be brought to him much food and drink, of various kinds, pure and well prepared. What do you think, O Agita, would the enjoyment be great for that prince ?'

Agita said: 'Yes², it would be great, O Bhagavat.'

The Bhagavat said: 'What do you think, O Agita, would he even taste it there, and notice it, or would he feel any satisfaction from it ?'

He said: 'Not indeed, O Bhagavat; but on the contrary, when he had been led away by the king and thrown into the dungeon, he would only wish for deliverance from there. He would seek for the nobles, princes, ministers, women³, elders (rich merchants), householders, and lords of castles, who might deliver him from that dungeon. Moreover, O Bhagavat, there is no pleasure for that prince in that dungeon, nor is he liberated, until the king shows him favour.'

The Bhagavat said: 'Thus, O Agita, it is with those Bodhisattvas who, having fallen into doubt, amass a stock of merit, but doubt the knowledge of Buddha. They are born in that world Sukhâ-

¹ The text is corrupt. One might begin a new word with *sottarapada* ~~kk~~ *h* *ada* *h*.

² One expects, No.

³ Stryâgâra, like the German Frauenzimmer.

vatt, through the hearing of Buddha's name, and through the serenity of thought only; they do not, however, appear sitting cross-legged in the flowers of the lotus, being born miraculously, but dwell only in the calyx of the lotus-flowers. Moreover for them there exist ideas of palaces and gardens¹. There is no discharge, there is no phlegm or mucus, there is nothing disagreeable to the mind. But they are deprived of seeing Buddhas, hearing the Law, seeing Bodhisattvas, speaking about and ascertaining the Law, (gathering) any (new) stock of merit, and practising the Law, during five hundred years. Moreover they do not rejoice there or perceive satisfaction. But they wish to remove one another, and then they step out behind. And it is not known whether their exit takes place above, below, or across. See, O Agita, there might be worshippings of many hundred thousand niyutas of koṭis of Buddhas during those five hundred years, and also many, immense, innumerable, immeasurable stocks of merit to be amassed. But all this they destroy by the fault of doubt. See, O Agita, to how great an injury the doubt of the Bodhisattvas leads. Therefore now, O Agita, after the Bodhisattvas without doubting have quickly raised their thoughts towards the Bodhi, in order to obtain power of conferring happiness for the benefit of all creatures, their stock of merit should be turned towards their being born in the world Sukhâvatī, where the blessed Amitâbha, the Tathâgata, holy and fully enlightened, dwells.'

§ 42. After these words, the Bodhisattva Agita

¹ They imagine they are living in palaces and gardens.

thus spoke to the Bhagavat : ' O Bhagavat, will the Bodhisattvas, who have gone away from this Buddha country, or from the side of other blessed Buddhas, be born in the world Sukhâvatī ? '

The Bhagavat said : ' Indeed, O Agita, seventy-two niyutas of koṭis of Bodhisattvas are gone away from this Buddha country, who will be born in the world Sukhâvatī ; Bodhisattvas, who will never return, thanks to the stock of merit, which they have accumulated under many hundred thousand niyutas of koṭis of Buddhas. What then shall be said of those with smaller stocks of merit ¹ ?

1. Eighteen hundred niyutas of koṭis of Bodhisattvas will be born in the world Sukhâvatī from the place of the Tathâgata Dushprasaha.
2. There lives in the Eastern quarter the Tathâgata named Ratnâkara. From his place ninety koṭis of Bodhisattvas will be born in the world Sukhâvatī.
3. Twenty-two koṭis of Bodhisattvas will be born in the world Sukhâvatī from the place of the Tathâgata Gyotishprabha.
4. Twenty-five koṭis of Bodhisattvas will be born in the world Sukhâvatī from the place of the Tathâgata Amitaprabha.
5. Sixty koṭis of Bodhisattvas will be born in the world Sukhâvatī from the place of the Tathâgata Lokapradîpa.
6. Sixty-four koṭis of Bodhisattvas will be born in the world Sukhâvatī from the place of the Tathâgata Nâgâbhibhû.
7. Twenty-five koṭis of Bodhisattvas will be born in the world Sukhâvatī from the place of the Tathâgata Viragaḥprabha.
8. Sixteen koṭis of Bodhisattvas will be born in the world Sukhâvatī from the place of the Tathâgata Simha.
9. Eighteen thousand

¹. What is meant is that their number is much larger.

Bodhisattvas will be born in the world Sukhāvati from the place of the Tathāgata Simha (sic). 10. Eighty-one niyutas of koṭis of Bodhisattvas will be born in the world Sukhāvati from the place of the Tathāgata Śrīkūṭa. 11. Ten niyutas of koṭis of Bodhisattvas will be born in the world Sukhāvati from the place of the Tathāgata Narendrarāga. 12. Twelve thousand Bodhisattvas will be born in the world Sukhāvati from the place of the Tathāgata Balābhigṇa. 13. Twenty-five koṭis of Bodhisattvas¹, who have obtained strength, having gone to one place in one week of eight days, and having turned to the West during ninety hundred thousand niyutas of koṭis of kalpas², will be born in the world Sukhāvati from the place of the Tathāgata Pushpadhvaga. 14. Twelve koṭis of Bodhisattvas will be born in the world Sukhāvati from the place of the Tathāgata Gvalanādhipati. 15. From the place of the Tathāgata Vaisāradypaprāpta, sixty-nine koṭis of Bodhisattvas will be born in the world Sukhāvati, in order to see the Tathāgata Amitābha, to bow before him, to worship him, to ask questions of him, and to consult him. For this reason, O Agita, I might proclaim during a full niyuta of koṭis of kalpas the names of those Tathāgatas, from whom the Bodhisattvas proceed in order to see that Tathāgata Amitābha in the world Sukhāvati, to

¹ It should be *pañcaviṃsatir*.

² Saṅghavarman's translation of this passage is: 'Within seven days they can take hold of the firm conditions (dharma) practised by a noble-minded one during hundred thousands of koṭis of kalpas.' Bodhiruṅgi's is: 'Within seven days they can cause beings to separate from their state of transmigration during hundred thousands of niyutas of koṭis.'

bow before him, and to worship him, and yet the end could not be reached.

§ 43. 'See, O Agita, what easy gains are gained by those beings who will hear the name of the Tathâgata Amitâbha, holy and fully enlightened. Nor will those beings be of little faith¹, who will obtain at least one joyful thought of that Tathâgata and of this treatise of the Law. Therefore now, O Agita, I invite you, and command you to proclaim this treatise of the Law, before the world together with the gods. Having plunged into the vast universe full of fire, no one ought to turn back, if he has but once conceived the thought of going across. And why? Because *koṭis* of Bodhisattvas indeed, O Agita, return from the highest perfect knowledge, on account of not hearing such treatises of the Law as this. Therefore, from a wish for this treatise of the Law, a great effort should be made to hear, learn, and remember it, and to study it for the sake of fully grasping it and widely making it known. A good copy of it should be kept, after it has been copied in a book, if only during one night and day, or even during the time necessary for milking a cow. The name of Master should be given to a teacher who desires to conduct quickly innumerable beings to the state of never returning from the highest perfect knowledge, namely, in order that they may see the Buddha country of that blessed Amitâbha, the Tathâgata, and to acquire the excellent perfection of the array of good qualities peculiar to his own Buddha country.

¹ Hînâdhimuktika, see *Vagracchedikâ* XV; or 'following the lower Law.'

‘ And, O Agita, such beings will have easily gained their gains who, having amassed a stock of merit, having performed service under former Ginas, and having been guided by Buddhas, shall hear in future, until the destruction of the good Law, such-like excellent treatises of the Law, treatises which are praised, eulogized, and approved of by all Buddhas, and convey quickly the great knowledge of omniscience. And those also who, when they have heard it, shall obtain excellent delight and pleasure, and will learn, retain, recite and grasp, and wisely preach it to others, and be delighted by its study, or, having copied it at least, will worship it, will certainly produce much good work, so that it is difficult to count it.

‘ Thus indeed, O Agita, I have done what a Tathâgata ought to do. It is now for you to devote yourself to it without any doubt. Do not doubt the perfect and unfailing knowledge of Buddha. Do not enter into the dungeon made of gems built up in every way. For indeed, the birth of a Buddha, O Agita, is difficult to be met with, so is the instruction in the Law, and also a timely birth¹. O Agita, the way to gain the perfection (pâramitâ) of all stocks of merit has been proclaimed by me. Do now exert yourselves and move forward. O Agita, I grant indeed a great favour to this treatise of the Law. Be valiant so that the laws of Buddhas may not perish or disappear. Do not break the command of the Tathâgata.’

§ 44. Then at that time, the Bhagavat spoke these verses :

¹ Of the hearer ; so that the student should be born at a time when there is a Buddha on earth.

1. 'Such hearings of me will not be for people who have not done good ; but those who are heroes and perfect, they will hear this speech.

2. 'And those by whom the Lord of the world, the enlightened and the light-giver, has been seen, and the law been heard reverentially, will obtain the highest joy.

3. 'Low people of slothful minds cannot find any delight in the laws of Buddha ; those who have worshipped in the Buddha countries learn the service of the Lords of the three worlds.

4. 'As a blind man in darkness does not know the way, and much less can show it, so also he who is (only) a *Srāvaka*¹ in the knowledge of Buddha ; how then should beings who are ignorant !

5. 'The Buddha only knows the virtues of a Buddha ; but not gods, *Nāgas*, *Asuras*, *Yakshas*, and *Srāvakas* (disciples) ; even for *Anekabuddhas*² there is no such way, as when the knowledge of a Buddha is being manifested.

6. 'If all beings had attained bliss, knowing the highest meaning in pure wisdom, they would not in *koṭis* of kalpas or even in a longer time tell all the virtues of one Buddha.

7. 'Thereupon they would attain *Nirvāṇa*, preaching for many *koṭis* of kalpas, and yet the measure of the knowledge of a Buddha would not be reached, for such is the wonderfulness of the knowledge of the *Gīnas*.

8. 'Therefore a learned man of an intelligent race³ who believes my words, after having perceived

¹ Those who are as yet hearers only of the Law.

² Should it be *Pratyekabuddhas* ?

³ The text is evidently corrupt, and the translation conjectural.

all paths of the knowledge of the *Ginas*, should utter speech, saying, "Buddha is wise."

9. 'Now and then a man is found, now and then a Buddha appears, knowledge of the object of faith is acquired after a long time,—therefore one should strive to acquire (the knowledge of) the object (of faith) ¹.'

§ 45. And while this treatise of the Law was being delivered, twelve *koṭis* of *niyutas* of beings obtained the pure and spotless eye of the Law with regard to Laws. Twenty-four hundred thousand *niyutas* of *koṭis* of beings obtained the *Anâgâmin*² reward. Eight hundred *Bhikshus* had their thoughts delivered from faults so as to cling no more to anything. Twenty-five *koṭis* of *Bodhisattvas* obtained resignation to things to come. And by forty hundred thousand *niyutas* of *koṭis* of the human and divine race, thoughts such as had never risen before were turned toward the highest perfect knowledge, and their stocks of merit were made to grow toward their being born in the world *Sukhâvatī*, from a desire to see the *Tathâgata*, the blessed *Amitâbha*. And all of them having been born there, will in proper order be born in other worlds, as *Tathâgatas*, called *Mañgusvara* (sweet-voiced). And eighty *koṭis* of *niyutas* having acquired resignation under the *Tathâgata* *Dīpaṅkara*, never turning back again from the highest perfect knowledge, rendered perfect by the

¹ The tenth verse is again unintelligible, but may have meant something like that 'those who having heard the best Laws, are joyful in remembering *Sugata*, are our friends in time past, and they also who wish for enlightenment.'

² One who is not born again, except in the *Brahma* world, and then may obtain *Nirvâṇa*.

Tathâgata Amitâyus, practising the duties of former Bodhisattvas, will carry out, after they are born in the world SukhâvatĪ, the duties enjoined in the former *Pravīdhânas* (prayers).

§ 46. At that time this universe (the three millions of worlds) trembled in six ways. And various miracles were seen. On earth everything was perfect, and human and divine instruments were played, and the shout of joy was heard as far as the world of the *Akanishthas*.

§ 47. Thus spoke the Bhagavat enraptured, and the noble-minded Bodhisattva Agita, and the blessed Ānanda, the whole Assembly, and the world, with gods, men, spirits, mighty birds, and fairies, applauded the speech of the Bhagavat.

The praise of the beauty of the excellences of SukhâvatĪ, the country of the blessed Amitâbha, the Tathâgata, the entry of the Bodhisattva on the stage of 'never returning,' the story of Amitâbha, the Mahâyânasûtra of the Description of SukhâvatĪ is finished.

NOTE

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ON THE TWO PRAVIDHÂNAS,
THE 18TH AND 21ST, MISSING IN THE TEXT.

IN the Chinese translations of the Larger Sukhâvatî-vyûha, made by Saṅghavarman, A. D. 252, and Bodhiruḥi, A. D. 693-713, there are altogether 48 Praṇidhânas, not 46, as in the Sanskrit text. The 18th and the 21st in the translations are evidently wanting in the Sanskrit text, and the latter part of the 19th Praṇidhâna in that text is the latter part of the lost 18th, according to the translations. This 18th Praṇidhâna, however, is so important that it is called by Gen-ku, the teacher of Shin-ran, the founder of the Shin-shiu sect, 'the king of the Praṇidhânas.'

Saṅghavarman's translation of the 18th, 20th, and 21st is as follows:—

18. 'When I have obtained Buddhahood, if those beings who are in the ten quarters should believe in me with serene thoughts, and should wish to be born in my country, and should have say ten times thought of me (or repeated my name),—if they should not be born there, may I not obtain the perfect knowledge;—barring only those beings who have committed the five deadly sins, and who have spoken evil of the good Law.'

The 18th Praṇidhâna in the Sanskrit text agrees with the 19th in both Chinese translations; but the 20th in these translations is somewhat shorter than the 19th in the Sanskrit text. The shorter translation is as follows:—

20. 'When I have obtained Buddhahood, if those beings who are in the ten quarters, after they have heard my name, should direct their thoughts towards my country and should plant the roots of merit (or prepare their stock of merit), and should bring them to maturity with their serene thoughts, and wish to be born in my country,—if they should not accomplish (their desire), may I not obtain the perfect knowledge.

21. 'When I have obtained Buddhahood, if gods and men in my country should not all be endowed perfectly with the thirty-two marks of the great man, may I not obtain the perfect knowledge.'

I have tried to restore the Sanskrit text for the above three Prañidhānas, in accordance with the Chinese translations.

The 18th may be formed chiefly out of the 19th in the text, something as follows:—

॥ १८ ॥ सवैश्वे मगवन्बोधिप्राप्तस्य ये सत्त्वा चक्षेयुः शोकधातुषु मम नामधेयं श्रुत्वा तत्र बुद्धचैवे चित्तं प्रेरयेयुः पपत्तये प्रसन्नचित्ता माम-
नुसरेयुषी तत्र बुद्धचैवे नोपपत्तेरन्नतश्चो दशमिच्छित्तोत्पादपरिवर्तेः
स्थापयित्वा नन्तर्यकारिणः सर्वमप्रतिषेधावरणकृतांश्च सत्त्वाश्च तावद्-
हमनुत्तरां सम्बन्धबोधिममिसंयुज्येयं ॥

Note.—The fulfilment of this Prañidhāna is given in the text (p. 47, ll. 1-4), as the reason of the fulfilment of the 17th:—

•। तत्कस्य हेतोः। ये केचित्सत्त्वास्य मगवतोऽमिताभस्य नामधेयं
श्रुत्वा चांतश्च एकचित्तोत्पादमप्यध्याश्रयेण प्रसादसहयतेन
चित्तमुत्पादयन्ति ते सर्वेऽविवर्तिकाश्च संलग्नतरायाः सम्बन्ध-
बोधिः ॥ २६ ॥

In the Chinese translations, the exception of two kinds of beings is repeated at the end of this fulfilment.

The 20th (i. e. 19th in the text) may then be shortened like this :—

॥ २० ॥ सर्वेक्षे मनवन्बोधिप्राप्तस्त्वाप्रमेयासंक्षेपेण बुद्धचेष्टेण ये सत्त्वा मम नामधेयं श्रुत्वा तत्र बुद्धचेष्टे चित्तं प्रेरयेयुष्यपपत्तये कुशल-
मूलानि च परित्यामयेयुस्ते तत्र बुद्धचेष्टे नोपपक्षेरन्ता तावद्दहमनुत्तरां
सम्यक्संबोधिमभिसंबुध्येयं ॥

The fulfilment of this Prañidhāna may be the 27th chapter in the text, with the exception of some portion on the appearance of Amitābha before a dying man, which belongs to the 19th (i. e. 18th in the text) Prañidhāna.

ये चानंद केचित्सत्त्वास्तं तचानतं पुनः सत्कारमनसिकरिष्यन्ति
बहुपरिमितं कुशलमूलमवरोपयिष्यन्ति बोधये चित्तं परित्याम्य तत्र
च शोकधातावुपपत्तये प्रविधास्यन्ति ° । (ततस्)ते (तं) मनवतं ब्रूया
प्रसन्नचित्ताश्रयुताः संतस्तथैव सुखावत्त्वां शोकधातावुपपत्स्यन्ति । (p. 47.)

The 21st may be like this :—

॥ २१ ॥ सर्वेक्षे मनवन्बोधिप्राप्तस्त तत्र बुद्धचेष्टे ये सत्त्वाः प्रत्वाजाता
मवेयुस्ते सर्वे न द्वाविंशत्यहापुष्यलक्षसमन्वागता मवेयुर्मा तावद्दह-
मनुत्तरां सम्यक्संबोधिमभिसंबुध्येयं ॥

This Prañidhāna is found in the Tibetan translation.

The fulfilment of this Prañidhāna is to be found in chap. 35 (p. 56) as follows :—

तत्र चानंद बुद्धचेष्टे ये बोधिसत्त्वाः प्रत्वाजाताः सर्वे ते द्वाविंशत्य-
हापुष्यलक्षसमन्वागताः ° ।

B. N.

INDEX OF WORDS.

Roman numerals refer to the chapters, Arabic figures with p. to the pages of the edition of the Sanskrit text in the *Anecdota Oxoniensia*, without p. to the verses in certain chapters. Arabic figures in parentheses give the number in the lists of names.

- Akanishṭha, XVII.
 Akanishṭha-bhavana, the abode of the Akanishṭhas, XL, p. 64 ; XLVI.
 akwala, sin, XVIII, p. 40.
 akṣhaṇopapatti, of untimely birth, XV.
 agāta, not born, XVIII, p. 40.
 agātismara, forgetful of former births, XXXVI (conjecture).
 Agita, the Bodhisattva Agita, XL, p. 64.
 Agñānavidhvamsana, N. of a Tathāgata, III (64).
 Ativīryaprabha = Amitābha, XII, p. 29.
 Atulyaprabha = Amitābha, XII, p. 29.
 aduḥkhasukhavedanā, perceiving what is neither pain nor pleasure, XVIII, p. 40.
 Anantarya, crimes (five), VIII, 19.
 anabhisamskāra, not made, XVIII, p. 40.
 Anāgāmi-(phala), the Anāgāmin's (reward), reward of not being born again on earth, XLV, p. 76 (conjectural reading).
 Anibandhanīyaprabha = Amitābha, XII, p. 29.
 animitta, causelessness, X, p. 26.
 animitta,unconditioned,XVIII,p.40.
 aniyata, not bent on anything (?), XXIV.
 Aniruddha, N. pr., I (20).
 anutpattikadharmakṣānti, resignation to consequences which have not yet arisen, XVIII, p. 40 ; XXXII end ; XLV, p. 76.
 anutpāda, without origin, XVIII, p. 40.
 Anupalīpta, N. of a Tathāgata, III (8).
 anulomikī kṣānti, resignation to natural consequences, XXXII end.
 Anekabuddha, pl. Pratyekabuddhas ? XLIV, 5.
 apāya, misery, XVIII, p. 40.
 apraṇihita, purposelessness, X, p. 26.
 apraṇihita, free from desire, XVIII, p. 40.
 Apratihataṛaṁmirāgaprabha = Amitābha, XII, p. 29.
 Apsaras, the Apsarases, XIX, p. 42 ; XXIII.
 abhāva, not-being, XVIII, p. 40.
 Abhibhūyanarendrābhūtrayendra-prabha [by conjecture] = Amitābha, XII, p. 29.
 Abhibhūyalokapālasakrabrahmasuddhāvāsamaheṣvarasarvadevagih-mikaravaprabha = Amitābha, XII, p. 29.
 abhishekabhūmipratilambha, attainment of the royal stage, XVIII, p. 40.
 abhisambudh (samyaksambodhim), obtain the highest perfect knowledge, XI ; XIV.
 amanushya, not-man, XXXIX, p. 63.
 amātya, minister, X, p. 27.
 Amitaprabha, Amitaprabhāsa = Amitābha, XII, p. 29 ; XXXI, 5, 20 ; XXXIX, p. 62 ; XLII (4).
 Amitābha, I ; XI to XV ; XXVI to XXXI ; XXXIX ; XLV, p. 76.
 Amitāyu, XXXI, 1-4, 11, 17.

- Amitāyus = Amitābha, XIV ; XXXII ; XXXVII, p. 58 ; XXXIX, p. 62 ; XLV, p. 76.
- Amogharāga, N. pr., I (28).
- arthavaśa, cause and effect, XXX.
- Arhat, holy, I ; XI ; XXVII ; XXVIII ; XXXII ; XXXIX, p. 62.
- Avalokiteśvara, Buddha's son, XXXI, 13 ; XXXIV.
- Avīki, hell, IV, 10.
- Avidyāndhakāravīdhvaṃsanakara, N. of a Tathāgata, III (35).
- avaivartika, never returning (for a new birth), XXXI, 18. See also XXXII, p. 55 ; XLII, p. 69 ; XLV, p. 76.
- avaivartikatva, the state of never returning, XLIII, p. 72.
- Avagat, N. pr., I (2).
- Aśaṅgataprabha = Amitābha, XII, p. 29.
- Asamāptaprabha = Amitābha, XII, p. 29.
- Asura, Asuras, VIII, 1, 2 ; X, p. 25 ; XII, p. 30 ; XXXIX, p. 63 ; XLIV, 5 ; XLVII.
- ātāryopādhyāya, teachers and masters, X, p. 26.
- Āgātakaundīnya, N. pr., I (1).
- Ānanda, N. pr., I (34) ; II, &c. ; XI, &c. &c.
- ārāmaparigraha, predial property with regard to monasteries, XXII.
- Ārya, XII, p. 30.
- āveśikabuddhadharma, freedom from attachment, XVIII, p. 40.
- āśrava, fault, XLV, p. 76.
- āsura-kāya, the body of Asuras, VIII, 1, 2 ; XV.
- Uttaptavaidūryanirbhāsa, N. of a Tathāgata, III (30).
- uttarīkaryā, the higher practice, VIII, 20.
- Udakaandra, N. of a Tathāgata, III (34).
- unmiṣṭa, question, II, p. 4.
- upaśānta, peace, XVIII, p. 40.
- upādhyāya, teacher, X, p. 26 ; XLIII, p. 72.
- Upāsaka, layman, } XXXIX, p. 63.
- Upāsikā, laywoman, }
- Upośaṇīyaprabha = Amitābha, XII, p. 29.
- Uruvilvākāśyapa, N. pr., I (10).
- riddhi, miraculous power, VIII, 5.
- riddhimat, endowed with miraculous power, XIII, p. 31.
- riddhivasitā, miraculous power, VIII, 5 ; XIII, p. 31.
- riddhībala, miraculous power, XXXI, 16, 21.
- ekagātipratibaddha, bound to one birth only, VIII, 20 ; XXXIII.
- ekagātiya, of one birth only, XXXI, 18.
- ekāyanamārga, the path of one vehicle, XXXVIII, p. 59.
- aupapāduka, born miraculously, XLI, p. 65.
- Kampila, N. pr., I (22).
- karman (karmavāṇam vipākab, karmābhisaṃskārab, the result of works, and the outcome of works), XVII, p. 37.
- kāma, lust, X, p. 25.
- Kāruṇika, N. of a Tathāgata, III (75).
- Kālaparvata, black mountain, XVII beg. ; XXXIX, p. 63.
- Kinnara, Kinnaras, XII, p. 30 ; XXXIX, p. 63.
- Kumārakāśyapa, N. pr., I (13).
- kusalamūla, stock of merit, VIII, 19, 22, 27, 41, 42 ; XVII ; XVIII, p. 40 ; XXVII ; XXVIII ; XXXVII, p. 58 ; XXXVIII, p. 60, &c.
- Kusumaprabha, N. of a Tathāgata, III (50).
- Kusumavṛiṣṭyabhiprakīrṇa, N. of a Tathāgata, III (51).
- Kusumasambhava, N. of a Tathāgata, III (43).
- Kusumābhigṛā, N. of a Tathāgata, III (63).
- Keśarin, N. of a Tathāgata, III (65).
- kshatriya, Kshatriyas, X, p. 27.
- kshānti, endurance, VIII, 46 ; patience (pāramitā), X, p. 26 ; three kinds of resignation, XXXII, p. 55.
- Khadiravaśika, N. pr., I (25).

- Gandharva, XII, p. 30; XXXIX, p. 63; XLVII.
- gandharvarāga (doubtful, text probably corrupt), XIX, p. 41.
- Gayākāryapa, N. pr., I (12).
- Garudā and Garuḍas, XII, p. 30; XXXIX, p. 63; XLVII.
- gāthā, verse, IV; IX; XXV; XXXI; XLIV.
- Girirāgaghosha, N. of a Tathāgata, III (12).
- Girirāgaghosheśvara, N. of a Tathāgata, III (49).
- Grīdhraḥkūṭa, the mountain G., I.
- gṛhpati, householder, X, p. 27.
- ghoshānugā (kshānti, resignation), following the sound, XXXII end.
- ākavartitva, sovereignty, X, p. 27.
- Kakravāḍa (mountains), XVII; XXXIX, p. 63.
- Kandana, N. of a Tathāgata, III (6).
- Kandanagandha, N. of a Tathāgata, III (4, 54).
- Kandābbibbū, N. of a Tathāgata, III (18).
- Kandraprabha, N. of a Tathāgata, III (47).
- Kandrabbānu, N. of a Tathāgata, III (45).
- Kandrasūryagihmīkarana, N. of a Tathāgata, III (29).
- kāryākaraṇa, practice of discipline, XXXVIII, p. 59.
- kāturmahārāgākāyika (gods), consisting of the companies of the four Mahārāgas, XVII.
- Kittadhārābuddhisankusmitābhyudgata, N. of a Tathāgata, III (31).
- kintāmaniratna, jewel which yields every wish, XXXII.
- Kullapatka, N. pr., I (31).
- Gambūdvipeśvara, sovereign of India, X, p. 27.
- gātismara, possessed of the recollection of former births, VIII, 6; XXXI, 16; XX XVI.
- Gāmbūnadasuvarṇa, gold coming from the river G., II, p. 3.
- Gina=Buddha, II, p. 3; IX, 9; XXV, 5; XLIII, p. 72; XLIV, 7, 8.
- Ginabala, Gina-power, XXXVIII, p. 61.
- Ginasutāb, sons of the Gina, XXXVIII, p. 61.
- gñānadarsana, intellectual knowledge, II, p. 4.
- Gyotishprabha, N. of a Tathāgata, III (15); XLII (3).
- Gvalanādhipati, a Tathāgata, XLII (14).
- Tathāgata, list of eighty-one T's, III; XI; XII; XXXVIII, p. 62, &c. &c.
- tiryagyoni, brute-creation, VIII, 1, 2; XV.
- Tishya, N. of a Tathāgata, III (38).
- Tushita, XVII.
- Tūryaghosha, N. of a Tathāgata, III (19).
- Trāyastriṃsa (gods), XL, p. 63.
- trisāhasramahāsahasra, the three millions of spheres of worlds, VIII, 12; XLIII, p. 71; XLVI.
- traidhātukasamatā, equilibrium of the three elements, XX XVIII, p. 59.
- dāna, liberality, X, p. 26 (pāramitā).
- divyaṃ ākshuṣ, the divine eye, VIII, 7, 26; XXXI, 16; XXXVIII, p. 59 (opp. māṃsa-ākshuṣ).
- divyaṃ śrotam, the divine ear, VIII, 8; XXXI, 16.
- Dīpankara, N. of a Tathāgata, III (1).
- duḥkha, pain, XVIII, p. 40.
- durgati, distress, XVIII, p. 40.
- Dushprasaha, a Tathāgata, XLII (1).
- deva, god, XII, p. 30; XXXIX, p. 63; XLVII, &c.
- devanāgāsuraśaśvāvakāb, XLIV, 5.
- devarāgatva, sovereignty of the gods, X, p. 27.
- dharma, Law, XVIII, pp. 39, 40; dharmam deśayati, XI.
- dharma, a thing, XXXVIII, p. 59.
- dharmā, plur. (gambhīra, profound), doctrines, XXIX.
- dharmakathā, the story of the Law, XXXVIII beg.
- Dharmaketu, N. of a Tathāgata, III (70).

dharmakakrapravartana, turning the wheel of the Law, X, p. 27.
 dharmakakshus, eye of the Law, XXXVIII, p. 59; XLV, p. 76.
 Dharmamati, N. of a Tathâgata, III (78).
 Dharmamativinanditarâga, N. of a Tathâgata, III (39).
 Dharmâkara, N. of a Bhikshu, III end; IV; V; VI; VII; X, p. 25; XI.
 dharmolkâ, torch of the Law, XXXVIII, p. 61.
 dhâtu, cause, XXXVIII, p. 59.
 Dhâraṇis, VIII, 33.
 dhyâna (pâramitâ), meditation, X, p. 26.

Nadikâryapa, N. pr., I (11).
 Nanda, N. pr., I (32).
 Nandika, N. pr., I (21).
 Narendra, N. of a Tathâgata, III (74).
 Narendrarâga, a Tathâgata, XLII (11).
 Nâga and Nâgas, XII, p. 30; XXXIX, p. 63; XLIV, 5.
 Nâgâbhibhû, N. of a Tathâgata, III (10); XLII (6).
 Nârâyanavâgra, the diamond (or thunderbolt?) of N., VIII, 25.
 Nimi, N. of a Tathâgata, III (56).
 niraya, hell, VIII, 1, 2; XV.
 nirodha, cessation, XVIII, p. 40.
 nirodha, Nirvâna, XXI, p. 44.
 Nirmânarati, XVII.
 nirvâna, XXIV.
 nirvrita bhû, to attain Nirvâna, XLIV, 7.
 nishparidâha, free from pain, VIII, 37.
 nivarana, obstacle, XVIII, p. 40.

paṅkamandalanamaskâra, prostrate reverence, VIII, 35.
 Patka, N. pr., I (30).
 padma, lotus (men born in lotus-flowers), XL; XLI.
 Padmabimbyuparobhita, N. of a Tathâgata, III (53).
 paraṅkittagñâna, knowledge of the thoughts of other people, VIII, 9.
 Paranirmitavaravartin (gods), XVII; XIX, p. 41; XX; XL, p. 65.
 paramârtha, highest truth, XXV, 1.

parigrahasamgñâ, idea of possession, VIII, 10.
 parinam, causat., to bring to maturity, VIII, 19.
 parinirvâna, the Nirvâna, VIII, 20; XXXIII.
 parinirvrita, having entered Nirvâna, XI.
 parikshaṭitta (kshâ?), having inquiring thoughts, I.
 parshad, the Assembly, VII; IX, 8; XLVII.
 pâramikovida, knowing the highest wisdom, XXXI, 16.
 Pâramitâ, highest perfection, II, p. 4; VIII, 5; X, p. 26; XVIII, p. 40.
 Pârâyanika, N. pr., I (29).
 purushadamyasârathi, III, p. 7.
 Pushpadhvaga, a Tathâgata, XLII (13).
 Pushpâkara, N. of a Tathâgata, III (33).
 Pushpâvatîvanarâgasaukusumitâbhigñâ, N. of a Tathâgata, III (32).
 Pûrva-Maitrâyanîputra, N. pr., I (9).
 pûrvagina, former Ginas, XXXII end; XXXVII end.
 pûrvadattadharmaśravaṇa, hearing of the Law formerly given, XXVII end.
 pûrvapranidhâna, former prayers, XXXII end; XXXVII end; XLV end.
 pragñâ (pâramitâ), knowledge, X, p. 26.
 pragñâkakshus, eye of wisdom, XXXVIII, p. 59.
 pragñâpâramitâ, transcendental wisdom, XXXVIII, p. 59.
 pranidhâ, to pray, XXVII.
 pranidhâna, prayer, VI; VII, p. 11; VIII, 14, 20; IX; XII, p. 29; see pûrvapranidhâna.
 pranidhânavâsa, the power of prayer, XXXIII.
 pranidhânasampad, perfection of prayer, X, p. 25.
 pranidhi, prayer, IV, 10; IX, 9, 11; X, p. 25; XXXI, 17, 18.
 pranidhisthâna, subject of prayer, VII, p. 11.
 Pratâpavat, N. of a Tathâgata, III (2).
 pratibhâna, understanding, II, p. 4.

- pratisamvit, perfect knowledge, VIII, 28; consciousness, XVIII, p. 40.
- Pratyekabuddha, VIII, 12.
- pradakṣiṇīkṛi, to walk round respectfully, XXXI, 5.
- Prabhākara, N. of a Tathāgata, III (3).
- Prabhārikhotsrīṣhaprabha = Amitābha, XII, p. 29.
- Pramodanīyaprabha = Amitābha, XII, p. 29.
- praśānta, peace, XVIII, p. 40.
- prātihārya, miracle, XLVI.
- Prāptasena, N. of a Tathāgata, III (44).
- pretavishaya, the realm of the departed spirits, VIII, 1, 2; XV.
- Premanīyaprabha = Amitābha, XII, p. 29.
- bala, the Balas or powers, XVIII, p. 40.
- Balābhigṇa, a Tathāgata, XLII (12).
- Buddha, II, &c., sing. and plur.; XII, p. 29; XXXI, 1, &c. &c.
- buddhakṣhetra, a Buddha country, V; VI; VII; XI; XII, &c. &c.
- buddhaśakṣus, eye of Buddha, XXXVIII, p. 59.
- buddhagṇāna, knowledge of Buddha, XXXVIII, p. 59.
- buddhadharmasaṅghāḥ, Buddha, the Law, and the Church, VIII, 46; X, p. 26; XVIII, p. 39.
- buddhaśāstri, Buddha teacher, VIII, 46.
- buddhasaṃgīti, music of Buddha, XXXVIII, p. 59.
- bodhi, knowledge, VIII, 15 seqq.; XXVII; XXXII, p. 55; XXXVI; XLI, p. 69.
- bodhiparinīṣpatti, perfect knowledge, XVIII, p. 40.
- bodhivṛkṣa, a Bodhi tree, VIII, 27; XXXII.
- Bodhisattva, I; X, p. 25, sing. and plur.; XXX; XXXI; XXXIX, &c. &c.
- bodhyaṅgasamgīti, music of the Bodhyaṅgas, XXXVIII, p. 59.
- Brahmakāyika, XVII.
- Brahmaketu, N. of a Tathāgata, III (77).
- Brahmaghoṣa, N. of a Tathāgata, III (17, 59).
- Brahman, X, p. 25; XII, p. 29.
- Brahmapurohita, XVII.
- Brahmasvaranādābhinandita, N. of a Tathāgata, III (42).
- brāhmaṇa, Brāhmaṇa, X, pp. 25, 27.
- Bhagavat, I; II, &c.
- Bhadragit, N. pr., I (5).
- bhikṣhu, a mendicant (nīrodhasa-māpanna), XXI, p. 44, &c.; XXXIX, p. 63.
- bhikṣhuṇī, nun, XXXIX, p. 63.
- bhūmi, the Bhūmis or stages, XVIII, p. 40.
- Maṅgusvara, 'sweet-voiced' (Tathāgatas), XLV, p. 76.
- manuṣyāmanuṣyāḥ, men and not men, XII, p. 30; XXXIX, p. 63.
- mañi? IV, 8.
- mahārddhika, endowed with great supernatural powers, XL, p. 65.
- Mahākaphila, N. pr., I (18).
- mahākaruṇā, highest compassion, II, p. 4; XVIII, p. 40.
- Mahākāyapa, N. pr., I (14).
- Mahāketu, N. of a Tathāgata, III (69).
- Mahākauṣṭhīlīya, N. pr., I (17).
- Mahāgandharāgaṇirbhāsa, N. of a Tathāgata, III (24).
- Mahāgusadhara, N. of a Tathāgata, III (61).
- Mahāgusadharabuddhiprāptābhigṇa, N. of a Tathāgata, III (28).
- mahāśakravāḍa, Great Kakravāḍa mountains, XVII; XXXIX, p. 63.
- Mahātunda, N. pr., I (19).
- Mahātāmālapatraśāndanakardama, N. of a Tathāgata, III (62).
- mahādharmaḍundubhi, the great drum of the Law, XXXVIII, p. 61.
- mahādharmaḍvaga, the great banner of the Law, XXXVIII, p. 61.
- mahādharmaḍherī, the great kettle-drum of the Law, XXXVIII, p. 61.
- mahādharmaśaṅkha, the great trumpet-shell of the Law, XXXVIII, p. 61.
- Mahānāga, I, p. 2; II, p. 3.
- Mahānāman, N. pr., I (4).

- mahâparinirvâṇa, VIII, 11.
 mahâpurushalakṣhaṇa, the (thirty-two) marks of a great man, XVI, p. 36; XXXV.
 mahâpramīdhâna, the great prayer, X, p. 25.
 mahâbrahmatva, X, p. 27.
 Mahâbrahman, the great Brahman, XVII; XXXVIII, p. 60.
 Mahâmuṭtilinda, XXXIX, p. 63.
 mahâmuditâ, great rejoicing, XVIII, p. 40.
 Mahâmeru, the great Meru, XXXIX, p. 63.
 mahâmaitrî, great love, XVIII, p. 40.
 Mahâmaudgalyâna, N. pr., I (16).
 Mahârâgas (four), XVII, p. 37.
 Mahâvyūha, N. of a Tathâgata, III (57).
 Mahârâvaka, great disciple, I, p. 2 (bis).
 mahâsammâṇa, the whole armour (of the Law), VIII, 20.
 Mahâsthâmaprâpta, name of a Bodhisattva, XXXIV.
 Maheśvara, XII, p. 29 end.
 Mahopekṣhâ, great forgiveness, XVIII, p. 40.
 mahoraga, XII, p. 30; XXXIX, p. 63.
 mânusha, men, XLVII.
 Mâra (samâraka), X, p. 25.
 mithyâtvanīyata, bent on falsehood, XXIV.
 mīmāṃsâ, philosophy, II, p. 4.
 mīmāṃsâgñâna, philosophical knowledge, II, p. 3.
 Muktakusumapratimandītaprabha, N. of a Tathâgata, III (20).
 Muktaḥḥatratra, N. of a Tathâgata, III (66).
 Muktaḥḥatratrapravâtasadrīsa, N. of a Tathâgata, III (37).
 Muṭtilinda, XXXIX, p. 63.
 Meru, XXXVIII, p. 59; XXXIX, p. 63.
 Merukūṭa, N. of a Tathâgata, III (13, 46).
 Maitrâyanīputra, see Pūrṇa-Maitrâyanīputra.
 Maitreya, N. of a Bodhisattva, I end.
 Maudgalyâna, XIII, p. 31.
 Yaksha, Yakshas, XII, p. 30; XXXIX, p. 63; XLIV, 5.
 yathâbhūtapratigñâ, the true promise, X, p. 25.
 Yasodeva, N. pr., I (6).
 Yâmâ devâb, the Yâmadevas, XVII, p. 37; XL, p. 65.
 Raṇaḥḡgaha, N. of a Tathâgata, III (27).
 Ratnaketu, N. of a Tathâgata, III (71).
 Ratnâkandra, N. of a Tathâgata, III (52).
 ratnaparvata, jewel-mountain, XVII; XXXIX, p. 63.
 ratnavriksha, gem-tree, XVI, p. 33.
 Ratnaśrî, N. of a Tathâgata, III (72).
 Ratnâkara, a Tathâgata, XLII (2).
 Ratnâbhibhâsa, N. of a Tathâgata, III (55).
 Râkshasa, XXXIX, p. 63.
 râgadveshamohâb, illusion, hatred, and passion, XXXVIII, p. 61.
 Râgagrîha, the city, I.
 Râganiyaprabha = Amitâbha, XII, p. 29.
 râsi, division (two divisions of beings), XXIV.
 Râhula, N. pr., I (33).
 rūpaḥḡbdagandharasasprashavya-dharmâb, all qualified objects of senses, X, p. 26.
 rūpaḥḡbdagandharasasprashavya-samgñâ, the idea of form, sound, smell, taste, and touch, X, p. 25.
 Revata, N. pr., I (24).
 lokadhātu, world, VIII, 7, 18, &c.
 lokanâtha, protector of the world, IX, 3.
 Lokapâla, XII, p. 29.
 lokapâlatva, X, p. 27.
 Lokapradīpa, a Tathâgata, XLII (5).
 Lokasundara, N. of a Tathâgata, III (76).
 Lokendra, N. of a Tathâgata, III (36, 73).
 Lokeśvararâga, N. of a Tathâgata, III (81); IV; V; VI; VII.
 Vakula, N. pr., I (26).
 Varaprabha, N. of a Tathâgata, III (23).
 varavartitva, X, p. 27.
 varitâ, self-control, VIII, 5.

- vas, to perform one's religious duties, I, p. 1.
 Vāshpa, N. pr., I (3).
 vinipāta, destruction, XVIII, p. 40.
 vibhūti (puṣyā), (holy) miraculous power (of Buddhas), XVII.
 Vimala, N. pr., I (7).
 Vimalanetra, N. of a Tathāgata, III (48).
 Vimalaprabha, III (9).
 Vimalānana, N. of a Tathāgata, III (7).
 Viragaprabha, a Tathāgata, XLII (7).
 virāga, passionlessness, XVIII, p. 40.
 viveka, retirement, XVIII, p. 40.
 vihiṃsā, cruelty, X, p. 25.
 vīrya, strength, X, p. 26 (pāramitā).
 Vaidūryagarbha, N. of a Tathāgata, III (68).
 Vaidūryanirbhāsa, N. of a Tathāgata, III (16).
 vaiśārya, experience, fearlessness, XVIII, p. 40.
 Vaiśāryaprabha, a Tathāgata, XLII (15).
 Vyapagatakhiladosha, N. of a Tathāgata, III (58).
 Vyapagatakhilamalapatighosha, N. of a Tathāgata, III (25).
 vyāpāda, malevolence, X, p. 25.
 Sakra, king of Devas, XII, p. 29; XX; XXXII, p. 54.
 Sakratva, X, p. 27.
 Sākyamuni, XXXIX, p. 64.
 śānta (prasāntoparāntam), peace, XVIII, p. 40; śāntasahagatam, ibid.
 Śāriputra, N. pr., I (15).
 Śāstri (saṃgṛhā, the name of) Master, XLIII, p. 72.
 śīla (pāramitā), virtue, X, p. 26.
 śukladharma, the pure Law, X, p. 25.
 Suddhāvāsa, XII, p. 29.
 śūnyatā, emptiness, X, p. 26; XVIII, p. 40.
 Sūrakūṣa, N. of a Tathāgata, III (26).
 śraddhā, faith, XXV, 5.
 Śramaṇa, X, p. 25.
 Śrāntasaṃskṛtyendusūryagihmīkarana-prabha = Amitābha, XII, p. 29.
 śrāvaka, pupil, VIII, 12; XI; XXXIV; XXXIX, p. 63 seq.; XLIV, 4, 5.
 Śrīkūṣa, N. of a Tathāgata, III (21); XLII (10).
 śruta, sacred knowledge, XXXVIII, p. 61.
 śreshṭhin, merchant, X, p. 27.
 Saṅgamanīyaprabha = Amitābha, XII, p. 29.
 saṅgha, the Church, XVIII, p. 39.
 Sadvīyamāṣiprabha = Amitābha, XII, p. 29.
 sadevaka, together with the gods, X, p. 25.
 saddharma, the good Law, VIII, 8.
 Saptaratnābhivṛṣṭa, N. of a Tathāgata, III (60).
 sabrahmaka, together with Brahman, X, p. 25.
 samantabhadraśāryā, Samantabhadra discipline, VIII, 20.
 Samantānugata, N. of a Samādhi, VIII, 43.
 Samādhi, ecstasy, II, p. 4; VIII, 40, 43; XXXVIII.
 samāra, together with Māra, X, p. 25.
 samyaktva, absolute truth, VIII, 11.
 samyaksambuddha, fully enlightened, II, p. 4; V; XXVII; XXVIII; XXXII beg.; XXXIX.
 samyaksambodhi (anuttarā), highest perfect knowledge, V; VII; VIII; X, p. 26; XI; XIV; XXVI; XXVII; XXIX; XXXII, p. 55; XXXIII; XLIII, p. 72; XLV, p. 76.
 samyagāgṛhā, perfect knowledge, I.
 sarvakusalamūlapāramitā, perfection of all stocks of merit, XLIII, p. 73.
 sarvagṛhāṇa, the knowledge of omniscience, XLIII, p. 72.
 sarvagṛhātā, omniscience, II, p. 3; VIII, 23; XXXVIII beg.
 śaṣṭamaṇḍābhīmanika, together with Śramaṇas and Brāhmanas, X, p. 25.
 Sahāloka dhātu, the world Sahā, XXXIX, p. 64.
 Sāgarameruśāndra, N. of a Tathāgata, III (41).
 Sāgaravarabuddhivikrāntābhigṛhā, N. of a Tathāgata, III (22).
 Simha, N. of a Tathāgata, III (79); XLII (8, 9).

- simhanāda*, the lion's voice, VII ; IX, 8.
Simhamati, N. of a Tathāgata, III (80).
Simhasāgarakūṭavinanditarāga, N. of a Tathāgata, III (40).
Sukhāvati, I ; XI ; XV ; XVIII ; XXXIX ; XL, &c.
Sugata, the sons of S., I, p. 1 ; III, p. 7 ; XXXI, 21 (the Sugatas) ; XLIV, 10.
sutushitva, X, p. 27.
Sunirmitatva, X, p. 27.
Subāhu, N. pr., I (8).
Subhūti, N. pr., I (23).
Sumeru, XVII, p. 37 ; XXXVIII, p. 59, plur. ; XXXIX, p. 63.
Sumerukalpa, N. of a Tathāgata, III (5).
suyāmatva, X, p. 27.
sulikhita, a good copy, XLIII, p. 72.
Suvarṇagarbha, N. of a Tathāgata, III (67).
Suvarṇaprabha, N. of a Tathāgata, III (14).
Suvibhaktavati, name of a Samādhi, VIII, 40.
Sūryodana, N. of a Tathāgata, III (11).
stryāgāra, room for women (Frauenzimmer), XLI, p. 67.
Sthavira, elder, I, p. 2 (bis).
Svāgata, N. pr., I (27).
svādhyāya, learning, VIII, 28.
hetubalika, strong in argument, XXXVIII, p. 61.

INDEX OF SUBJECTS.

- Bodhisattvas, II ; VII ; VIII, 20.
 Bodhi-tree, IV, 8 ; VIII, 27.
 Brâhmanas, X, p. 25.
 Buddha country, V ; VI ; VII, &c. ;
 X, p. 25 ; XI ; XII.
 Buddha, the Law and the Church,
 VIII, 46.
 Buddhas, X, p. 26 end.
 — possessed of thirty-two marks,
 XVI, p. 36.
 — proceeding from the rays of light
 that proceed from gem-lotuses,
 XVI, p. 36.
 — XVII.
 — praise Amitâbha, XXVI.
 Buddha's death, XXVII ; XXVIII.
 — son, XXXI, 13.

 Endurance, degrees of, VIII, 46.

 Gods, X, p. 25 ; XL, p. 65.
 — (thirty-three), XVII.
 — Buddhas, II.
 — and men, VIII, 4, 30, 32, 35.
 — no difference between them,
 XX.

 Jewel-flowers, VIII, 31.
 Jewel-trees, VIII, 38.

 Knowledge, six kinds of (*shada-*
 bhigñā), I.
 — highest perfect (*samyaksambo-*
 dhi), V, &c.
 — perfect (*pratisamvit*), VIII, 28.
 — three kinds of, IX, 10.

 Lion voice (*simhanâda*), IX, 8.
 Lotus, men living in lotus-flowers,
 XL, p. 65.

 Meditation, the third, VIII, 37.
 Music-clouds, VIII, 31.

 Nirvâṇa, IV, 8 ; VIII, 20 ; XI ;
 XXI ; XXIV ; XLIV, 7.

 Offerings, IX, 1, 10.

 Powers (ten), IX, 1.
 Prayer, IV, 10 ; VI ; VIII, 14, 20.

 Salvation, eight kinds of (*ashravi-*
 moksha), I.
 Shower of flowers, IX, 11.

 Women, VIII, 34.

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THE SMALLER
SUKHÂVATÎ-VYÛHA.

THE SMALLER SUKHÂVATÎ-VYÛHA.

ADORATION TO THE OMNISCIENT !

§ 1. Thus it was heard by me : At one time the Blessed (Bhagavat, i.e. Buddha) dwelt at Srāvastī¹, in the Geta-grove, in the garden of Anāthapīṇḍaka, together with a large company of Bhikshus (mendicant friars), viz. with twelve hundred and fifty Bhikshus, all of them acquainted with the five kinds of knowledge², elders, great disciples³, and Arhats⁴,

¹ Srāvastī, capital of the Northern Koras, residence of king Prasenagit. It was in ruins when visited by Fa-hian (init.V. Saec.); not far from the modern Fizabad. Cf. Burnouf, Introduction, p. 22.

² Abhigñānābhigñātaiḥ. The Japanese text reads abhigñātābhāgñātaiḥ, i.e. abhigñātābhigñātaiḥ. If this were known to be the correct reading, we should translate it by 'known by known people,' notus a viris notis, i.e. well known, famous. Abhigñāta in the sense of known, famous, occurs in Lalitavistara, p. 25, and the Chinese translators adopted the same meaning here. Again, if we preferred the reading abhigñānābhigñātaiḥ, this, too, would admit of an intelligible rendering, viz. known or distinguished by the marks or characteristics, i.e. the good qualities which belong to a Bhikshu. But the technical meaning is 'possessed of a knowledge of the five abhigñās.' It would be better in that case to write abhigñātābhigñānāiḥ, but no MSS. seem to support that reading. The five abhigñās or abhigñānas which an Arhat ought to possess are the divine sight, the divine hearing, the knowledge of the thoughts of others, the remembrance of former existences, and magic power. See Burnouf, Lotus, Appendice, No. xiv. The larger text of the Sukhāvati-vyūha has

^{3 4} See next page.

such as Sâriputra, the elder, Mahâmaudgalyâyana, Mahâkâsyapa, Mahâkapphina, Mahâkâtyâyana, Mahâkaushika, Revata, Suddhipanthaka, Nanda, Ânanda, Râhula, Gavâmpati, Bharadvâga, Kâlo-dayin, Vakkula, and Aniruddha. He dwelt together with these and many other great disciples, and together with many noble-minded Bodhisattvas, such as Mañgusri, the prince, the Bodhisattva Agita, the Bodhisattva Gandhahastin, the Bodhisattva Nityodyukta, the Bodhisattva Anikshiptadhura. He dwelt together with them and many other noble-minded Bodhisattvas, and with Sakra, the Indra or King⁵

abhiḡñânâbhiḡñaiḥ, and afterwards abhiḡñâtâbhiḡñaiḥ. The position of the participle as the uttara-pada in such compounds as abhiḡñânâbhiḡñâtaiḥ is common in Buddhist Sanskrit. Mr. Bendall has called my attention to the Pâli abhiññâta-abhiññâta (Vinaya-piṭaka, ed. Oldenberg, vol. i, p. 43), which favours the Chinese acceptance of the term.

⁵ Mahâsrâvaka, the great disciples; sometimes the eighty principal disciples.

⁴ Arhaddhiḥ. I have left the correct Sanskrit form, because the Japanese text gives the termination adbhīḥ. Hôgô's text has the more usual form arhantaiḥ. The change of the old classical arhat into the Pâli arahāṇa, and then back into Sanskrit arhanta, arahanta, and at last arihanta, with the meaning of 'destroyer of the enemies,' i.e. the passions, shows very clearly the different stages through which Sanskrit words passed in the different phases of Buddhist literature. In Tibet, in Mongolia, and in China, Arhat is translated by 'destroyer of the enemy,' i.e. ari-hanta. See Burnouf, Lotus, p. 287, Introduction, p. 295. Arhat is really the title of the Bhikshu on reaching the fourth degree of perfection. Cf. Sûtra of the 42 Sections, cap. 2. Clemens of Alexandria (d. 220) speaks of the *Σεμνοί* who worshipped a pyramid erected over the relics of a god. This may be a translation of Arhat, as Lassen ('De nom. Ind. philosoph.' in Rhein. Museum, vol. i, p. 187) and Burnouf (Introduction, p. 295) supposed, or a transliteration of Samana. Clemens also speaks of *Σεμνοί* (Stromat. p. 539, Potter).

⁵ Indra, the old Vedic god, has come to mean simply lord, and

of the Devas, and with Brahman Sahâmpati. With these and many other hundred thousand nayutas¹ of sons of the gods, Bhagavat dwelt at Srâvasti.

§ 2. Then Bhagavat addressed the honoured Sâriputra and said, 'O Sâriputra, after you have passed from here over a hundred thousand koṭis of Buddha countries there is in the Western part a Buddha country, a world called Sukhâvatī (the happy country). And there a Tathâgata, called Amitâyus, an Arhat, fully enlightened, dwells now, and remains, and supports himself, and teaches the Law².

'Now what do you think, Sâriputra, for what reason is that world called Sukhâvatī (the happy)? In that world Sukhâvatī, O Sâriputra, there is neither bodily nor mental pain for living beings. The sources of happiness are innumerable there. For that reason is that world called Sukhâvatī (the happy).

§ 3. 'And again, O Sâriputra, that world Sukhâvatī is adorned with seven terraces, with seven rows of

in the *Kanda Paritta* (Journal Asiatique, 1871, p. 220) we actually find Asurinda, the Indra or Lord of the Asuras.

¹ The numbers in Buddhist literature, if they once exceed a koṭi or koṭi, i. e. ten millions, become very vague, nor is their value always the same. Ayuta, i. e. a hundred koṭis; niyuta, i. e. a hundred ayutas; and nayuta, i. e. 1 with 22 zeros, are often confounded; nor does it matter much so far as any definite idea is concerned which such numerals convey to our mind. See Prof. H. Schubert, 'On large numbers,' in *Open Court*, Dec. 14, 1893.

² Tish/hati dhriyate yâpayati dharmam ka desayati. This is an idiomatic phrase, which occurs again and again in the Nepalese text of the Sukhâvatī-vyūha (MS. 26 b, ll. 1, 2; 55 a, l. 2, &c.). It seems to mean, he stands there, holds himself, supports himself, and teaches the law. Burnouf translates the same phrase by, 'ils se trouvent, vivent, existent' (Lotus, p. 354). On yâpeti in Pâli, see Fausbøll, *Dasaratha-gâtaka*, pp. 26, 28; and yâpana in Sanskrit.

palm-trees, and with strings of bells¹. It is enclosed on every side², beautiful, brilliant with the four gems, viz. gold, silver, beryl, and crystal³. With

¹ *Kiṅkiṅgāla*. The texts read *kaṅkaṇagalais ka* and *kaṅkaṇigalais ka*, and again later *kaṅkaṇigalunām* (also *lū*) and *kaṅkaṇigalānām*. Mr. Beal translates from Chinese 'seven rows of exquisite curtains,' and again 'gemmous curtains.' First of all, it seems clear that we must read *gāla*, net, web, instead of *gala*. Secondly, *kaṅkana*, bracelet, gives no sense, for what could be the meaning of nets or strings of bracelets? I prefer to read *kiṅkiṅgāla*, nets or strings or rows of bells. Such rows of bells served for ornamenting a garden, and it may be said of them that, if moved by the wind, they give forth certain sounds. In the commentary on *Dhammapada* 30, p. 191, we meet with *kiṅkinikagāla*, from which likewise the music proceeds; see Childers, s.v. *gāla*. In the MSS. of the Nepalese *Sukhāvātī-vyūha* (R.A.S.), p. 39 a, l. 4, I likewise find *svānaratnakīṅkiṅgālāni*, which settles the matter, and shows how little confidence we can place in the Japanese texts.

² *Anuparikshipta*, enclosed; see *parikkhepo* in Childers' Dictionary, and compare *pairidaēza*, paradise.

³ The four and seven precious things in Pāli are (according to Childers):—

1. <i>suvaṇṇam</i> ,	gold.
2. <i>ragatam</i> ,	silver.
3. <i>muttā</i> ,	pearls.
4. <i>maṇi</i> ,	gems (as sapphire, ruby).
5. <i>veḥuriyam</i> ,	cat's eye.
6. <i>vagiram</i> ,	diamond.
7. <i>pavālam</i> ,	coral.

Here Childers translates cat's eye; but s.v. *veḥuriyam*, he says, a precious stone, perhaps lapis lazuli.

In Sanskrit (Burnouf, *Lotus*, p. 320):—

1. <i>suvarṇa</i> ,	gold.
2. <i>rūpya</i> ,	silver.
3. <i>vaizūrya</i> ,	lapis lazuli.
4. <i>sphaṭika</i> ,	crystal.
5. <i>lohitamukti</i> ,	red pearls.
6. <i>asmagarbha</i> ,	diamond.
7. <i>musāragalva</i> ,	coral.

such arrays of excellences peculiar to a Buddha country is that Buddha country adorned.

§ 4. 'And again, O Sâriputra, in that world Sukhâvatî there are lotus lakes, adorned with the seven gems, viz. gold, silver, beryl, crystal, red pearls, diamonds, and corals as the seventh. They are full of water which possesses the eight good qualities¹, their waters rise as high as the fords and bathing-places, so that even crows² may drink there; they are

Julien (Pèlerin Buddhistes, vol. ii, p. 482) gives the following list:—

- | | |
|-----------------|---------------|
| 1. sphatika, | rock crystal. |
| 2. vaidûrya, | lapis lazuli. |
| 3. asmagarbha, | cornaline. |
| 4. musâragalva, | amber. |
| 5. padmarâga, | ruby. |

Vaidûrya (or Vaidûrya) is mentioned in the Tathâgataguna-gñânakîntyaavishayâvatâranirdera (Wassilief, p. 161) as a precious stone which, if placed on green cloth, looks green, if placed on red cloth, red. The fact that vaidûrya is often compared with the colour of the eyes of a cat would seem to point to the cat's eye (see Borooah's Engl.-Sanskrit Dictionary, vol. ii, preface, p. ix), certainly not to lapis lazuli. Cat's eye is a kind of chalcedony. I see, however, that vaidûrya has been recognised as the original of the Greek *βήρυλλος*, a very ingenious conjecture, either of Weber's or of Pott's, considering that lingual *d* has a sound akin to *r*, and *ry* may be changed to *ly* and *ll* (Weber, Omina, p. 326). The Persian billaur or ballûr, which Skeat gives as the etymon of *βήρυλλος*, is of Arabic origin, means crystal, and could hardly have found its way into Greek at so early a time. See 'India, what can it teach us?' p. 267.

¹ The eight good qualities of water are limpidity and purity, refreshing coolness, sweetness, softness, fertilising qualities, calmness, power of preventing famine, productiveness. See Beal, Catena, p. 379.

² Kâkâpeya. One text reads kâkapeya, the other kâkâpeya. It is difficult to choose. The more usual word is kâkapeya, which is explained by Pâzini, II, 1, 33. It is uncertain, however, whether kâkapeya is meant as a laudatory or as

strewn with golden sand. And in these lotus-lakes there are all around on the four sides four stairs, beautiful and brilliant with the four gems, viz. gold, silver, beryl, crystal. And on every side of these lotus-lakes gem-trees are growing, beautiful and brilliant with the seven gems, viz. gold, silver, beryl, crystal, red pearls, diamonds, and corals as the seventh. And in those lotus-lakes lotus-flowers are growing, blue, blue-coloured, of blue splendour, blue to behold; yellow, yellow-coloured, of yellow splendour, yellow to behold; red, red-coloured, of red splendour, red to behold; white, white-coloured, of white splendour, white to behold; beautiful, beautifully-coloured, of beautiful splendour, beautiful to behold, and in circumference as large as the wheel of a chariot.

a depreciatory term. Böhlingk takes it in the latter sense, and translates *nadī kākapeyā*, by a shallow river that could be drunk up by a crow. Tārānātha takes it in the former sense, and translates *nadī kākapeyā*, as a river so full of water that a crow can drink it without bending its neck (*kākair anatakandharaiḥ pīyate; pūrṇodakatvena prarasye kākaiḥ peye nadyādaḥ*). In our passage *kākapeya* must be a term of praise, and we therefore could only render it by 'ponds so full of water that crows could drink from them.' But why should so well known a word as *kākapeya* have been spelt *kākāpeya*, unless it was done intentionally? And if intentionally, what was it intended for? We must remember that Pāṇini, II, 1, 42 schol., teaches us how to form the word *tīrthakāka*, a crow at a *tīrtha*, which means a person in a wrong place. It would seem therefore that crows were considered out of place at a *tīrtha* or bathing-place, either because they were birds of ill omen, or because they defiled the water. From that point of view, *kākāpeya* would mean a pond not visited by crows, free from crows. Professor Pischel has called my attention to *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* (J. R. A. S. 1875, p. 67, p. 21), where *kākapeyā* clearly refers to a full river. *Samatikkhika*, if this is the right reading, occurs in the same place as an epithet of

§ 5. 'And again, O Sāriputra, in that Buddha country there are heavenly musical instruments always played on, and the earth is lovely and of golden colour. And in that Buddha country a flower-rain of heavenly Māṇḍārava blossoms pours down three times every day, and three times every night. And the beings who are born there worship before their morning meal¹ a hundred thousand koṭis of Buddhas by going to other worlds; and having showered a hundred thousand koṭis of flowers upon each Tathāgata, they return to their own world in time for the afternoon rest². With such arrays of excellences peculiar to a Buddha country is that Buddha country adorned.

§ 6. 'And again, O Sāriputra, there are in that Buddha country swans, curlews³, and peacocks. Three times every night, and three times every day, they

a river, by the side of kākapeya, and I think it most likely that it means rising to a level with the tīrthas, the fords or bathing-places. Mr. Rhys Davids informs me that the commentary explains the two words by samatittikā ti samaharitā, kākapeyyā ti yatthatattha⁴ ti tīre /hitena kākēna sakkā patum ti.

¹ Purobhaktena. The text is difficult to read, but it can hardly be doubtful that purobhaktena corresponds to Pāli purebhattam (i.e. before the morning meal), opposed to pak-kābhattam, after the noonday meal (i.e. in the afternoon). See Childers, s.v. Pūrvabhaktikā would be the first repast, as Prof. Cowell informs me.

² Divāvihārāya, for the noonday rest, the siesta. See Childers, s.v. vihāra.

³ Krauñkâḥ. Snipe, curlew. Is it meant for Kuravīka, or Karavīka, a fine-voiced bird (according to Kern, the Sk. karāyikā), or for Kalaviṅka, Pāli Kalavīka? See Childers, s.v. opapātiko; Burnouf, Lotus, p. 566. I see, however, the same birds mentioned together elsewhere, as hamsakrauñkamayūrasukasālikakokila, &c. On mayūra see Mahāv., Introd. p. xxxix; Rv. I, 191, 14.

come together and perform a concert, each uttering his own note. And from them thus uttering proceeds a sound proclaiming the five virtues, the five powers, and the seven steps leading towards the highest knowledge¹. When the men there hear that sound, remembrance of Buddha, remembrance of the Law, remembrance of the Church, rises in their mind.

‘Now, do you think, O Sâriputra, that there are beings who have entered into the nature of animals (birds, &c.)? This is not to be thought of. The

¹ Indriyabalabodhyaṅgarabda. These are technical terms, but their meaning is not quite clear. Spence Hardy, in his *Manual*, p. 498, enumerates the five indrayas, viz. (1) sardhâwa, purity (probably śraddhâ, faith); (2) wiraya, persevering exertion (vīrya); (3) sati or smirti, the ascertainment of truth (smṛiti); (4) samâdhi, tranquillity; (5) pragnâwa, wisdom (pragñâ).

The five balayas (bala), he adds, are the same as the five indrayas.

The seven bowdyāṅga (bodhyaṅga) are according to him: (1) sihi or smirti, the ascertainment of the truth by mental application; (2) dharmmawicha, the investigation of causes; (3) wiraya, persevering exertion; (4) prîti, joy; (5) passadhi, or prasrabdhi, tranquillity; (6) samâdhi, tranquillity in a higher degree, including freedom from all that disturbs either body or mind; (7) upekshâ, equanimity.

It will be seen from this that some of these qualities or excellences occur both as indriyas and bodhyaṅgas, while balas are throughout identical with indriyas.

Burnouf, however, in his *Lotus*, gives a list of five balas (from the *Vocabulaire Pentaglotte*) which correspond with the five indriyas of Spence Hardy; viz. śraddhâ-bala, power of faith; vīrya-bala, power of vigour; smṛiti-bala, power of memory; samâdhi-bala, power of meditation; pragñâ-bala, power of knowledge. They precede the seven bodhyaṅgas both in the *Lotus*, the *Vocabulaire Pentaglotte*, and the *Lalita-vistara*.

To these seven bodhyaṅgas Burnouf has assigned a special treatise (*Appendice xii*, p. 796). They occur both in Sanskrit and Pâli. See also *Dharmasaṅgraha* s.v. in the *Anecdota Oxoniensia*.

very name of hells is unknown in that Buddha country, and likewise that of (descent into) animal bodies and of the realm of Yama (the four apâyas)¹. No, these tribes of birds have been made on purpose by the Tathâgata Amitâyus, and they utter the sound of the Law. With such arrays of excellences, &c.

§ 7. 'And again, O Sâriputra, when those rows of palm-trees and strings of bells in that Buddha country are moved by the wind, a sweet and enrapturing sound proceeds from them. Yes, O Sâriputra, as from a heavenly musical instrument consisting of a hundred thousand koṭis of sounds, when played by Âryas, a sweet and enrapturing sound proceeds, a sweet and enrapturing sound proceeds from those rows of palm-trees and strings of bells moved by the wind. And when the men hear that sound, reflection on Buddha arises in them, reflection on the Law, reflection on the Church. With such arrays of excellences, &c.

§ 8. 'Now what do you think, O Sâriputra, for what reason is that Tathâgata called Amitâyus? The length of life (âyus), O Sâriputra, of that Tathâgata and of those men there is immeasurable (amita). Therefore is that Tathâgata called Amitâyus. And ten kalpas have passed, O Sâriputra, since that Tathâgata awoke to perfect knowledge.

§ 9. 'And what do you think, O Sâriputra, for what reason is that Tathâgata called Amitâbha? The

¹ Niraya, the hells, also called Naraka. Yamaloka, the realm of Yama, the judge of the dead, is explained as the four apâyas, i. e. Naraka, hell; Tiragyoni, birth as animals; Pretaloka, realm of the departed; Asuraloka, realm of evil spirits. The three terms which are here used together occur likewise in a passage translated by Burnouf, Introduction, p. 544.

splendour (ābhā), O Sâriputra, of that Tathâgata is unimpeded over all Buddha countries. Therefore is that Tathâgata called Amitâbha.

‘And there is, O Sâriputra, an innumerable assembly of disciples with that Tathâgata, purified and venerable persons, whose number it is not easy to count. With such arrays of excellences, &c.

§ 10. ‘And again, O Sâriputra, of those beings also who are born in the Buddha country of the Tathâgata Amitâyus as purified Bodhisattvas, never to return again and bound by one birth only, of those Bodhisattvas also, O Sâriputra, the number is not easy to count, except they are reckoned as infinite in number ¹.

‘Then again all beings, O Sâriputra, ought to make fervent prayer for that Buddha country. And why? Because they come together there with such excellent men. Beings are not born in that Buddha country of the Tathâgata Amitâyus as a reward and result of good works performed in this present life ².

¹ Iti saṅkhyāṃ gaṇṇhanti, they are called; cf. Childers, s.v. saṅkhyā. Asaṅkhyeya, even more than aprameya, is the recognised term for infinity. Burnouf, Lotus, p. 852.

² Avaramâtraka. This is the Pâli oramattako, ‘belonging merely to the present life,’ and the intention of the writer seems to be to inculcate the doctrine, that salvation can be obtained by mere repetitions of the name of Amitâbha, in direct opposition to the original doctrine of Buddha, that as a man soweth, so he reapeth. Buddha would have taught that the kusalamûla, the root or the stock of good works performed in this world (avaramâtraka), will bear fruit in the next, while here ‘vain repetitions’ seem all that is enjoyed. The Chinese translators take a different view of this passage. But from the end of this section, where we read kulaputrena vâ kuladuhitrâ vâ tatra buddhakshetre kṛttaprâṇidhânâṃ kartavyam, it seems clear that the locative (buddhakshetre) forms the object of the prâṇidhâna, the fervent prayer or longing. The Satpurushas already in the Buddhakshetra would be the innumerable men (manushyâs) and Bodhisattvas mentioned before.

No, whatever son or daughter of a family shall hear the name of the blessed Amitâyus, the Tathâgata, and having heard it, shall keep it in mind, and with thoughts undisturbed shall keep it in mind for one, two, three, four, five, six or seven nights,—when that son or daughter of a family comes to die, then that Amitâyus, the Tathâgata, surrounded by an assembly of disciples and followed by a host of Bodhi-sattvas, will stand before them at their hour of death, and they will depart this life with tranquil minds. After their death they will be born in the world Sukhâvatī, in the Buddha country of the same Amitâyus, the Tathâgata. Therefore, then, O Sâriputra, having perceived this cause and effect¹, I with reverence say thus, Every son and every daughter of a family ought with their whole mind to make fervent prayer for that Buddha country.

§ 11. 'And now, O Sâriputra, as I here at present glorify that world, thus in the East, O Sâriputra, other blessed Buddhas, led by the Tathâgata Akshobhya, the Tathâgata Merudhvaga, the Tathâgata Mahâmeru, the Tathâgata Meruprabhâsa, and the Tathâgata Mañgudhvaga, equal in number to the sand of the river Gaṅgâ, comprehend their own Buddha countries in their speech, and then reveal them².

¹ Arthavasa, lit. the power of the thing; cf. Dhammapada, p. 388, v. 289.

² I am not quite certain as to the meaning of this passage, but if we enter into the bold metaphor of the text, viz. that the Buddhas cover the Buddha countries with the organ of their tongue and then unroll it, what is intended can hardly be anything but that they first try to find words for the excellences of those countries, and then reveal or proclaim them. Burnouf, however (Lotus, p. 417), takes the expression in a literal sense, though he is shocked by its grotesqueness. On these Buddhas and their countries, see Burnouf, Lotus, p. 113.

Accept this repetition of the Law, called the "Favour of all Buddhas," which magnifies their inconceivable excellences.

§ 12. 'Thus also in the South do other blessed Buddhas, led by the Tathâgata *Kandrasûryapradîpa*, the Tathâgata *Yasakprabha*, the Tathâgata *Mahârêiskandha*, the Tathâgata *Merupradîpa*, the Tathâgata *Anantavîrya*, equal in number to the sand of the river *Gaṅgâ*, comprehend their own Buddha countries in their speech, and then reveal them. Accept, &c.

§ 13. 'Thus also in the West do other blessed Buddhas, led by the Tathâgata *Amitâyus*, the Tathâgata *Amitaskandha*, the Tathâgata *Amitadhvaga*, the Tathâgata *Mahâprabha*, the Tathâgata *Mahâratnaketu*, the Tathâgata *Suddharasmiprabha*, equal in number to the sand of the river *Gaṅgâ*, comprehend, &c.

§ 14. 'Thus also in the North do other blessed Buddhas, led by the Tathâgata *Mahârêiskandha*, the Tathâgata *Vaisvânaranirghosha*, the Tathâgata *Dundubhisvaranirghosha*, the Tathâgata *Dushpradharsha*, the Tathâgata *Âdityasambhava*, the Tathâgata *Galeniprabha* (*Gvalanaprabha* ?), the Tathâgata *Prabhâkara*, equal in number to the sand, &c.

§ 15. 'Thus also in the Nadir do other blessed Buddhas, led by the Tathâgata *Simha*, the Tathâgata *Yasas*, the Tathâgata *Yasakprabhâva*, the Tathâgata *Dharma*, the Tathâgata *Dharmadhara*, the Tathâgata *Dharmadhvaga*, equal in number to the sand, &c.

§ 16. 'Thus also in the Zenith do other blessed Buddhas, led by the Tathâgata *Brahmaghosha*, the Tathâgata *Nakshatrarâga*, the Tathâgata *Indraketudhvagarâga*, the Tathâgata *Gandhottama*, the Tathâgata *Gandhaprabhâsa*, the Tathâgata *Mahârêiskandha*, the Tathâgata *Ratnakusumasampushpitagâtra*,

the Tathāgata Sālendrarāga, the Tathāgata Ratnotpalasrī, the Tathāgata Sarvārthadarsa, the Tathāgata Sumerukalpa, equal in number to the sand, &c.¹

§ 17. 'Now what do you think, O Sāriputra, for what reason is that repetition (treatise) of the Law called the Favour of all Buddhas? Every son or daughter of a family who shall hear the name of that repetition of the Law and retain in their memory the names of those blessed Buddhas, will be favoured by the Buddhas, and will never return again, being once in possession of the transcendent true knowledge. Therefore, then, O Sāriputra, believe², accept, and do not doubt of me and those blessed Buddhas!

'Whatever sons or daughters of a family shall make mental prayer for the Buddha country of that blessed Amitāyus, the Tathāgata, or are making it now or have made it formerly, all these will never return again, being once in possession of the transcendent true knowledge. They will be born in that Buddha country, have been born, or are being born

¹ It should be remarked that the Tathāgatas here assigned to the ten quarters differ entirely from those assigned to them in the Lalita-vistara, Book XX. Not even Amitābha is mentioned there.

² Pratiyatha. The texts give again and again pratiyatha, evidently the Pāli form, instead of pratiyata. I have left tha, the Pāli termination of the 2 p. pl. in the imperative, instead of ta, because that form was clearly intended, while pa for pra may be an accident. Yet I have little doubt that pratiyatha was in the original text. That it is meant for the imperative, we see from sraddadhādhvam, &c., further on. Other traces of the influence of Pāli or Prākṛit on the Sanskrit of our Sūtra appear in arhantaiḥ, the various reading for arhadbhiḥ, which I preferred; sambahula for bahula; dhriyate yāpayati; purobhaktena; anyatra; saṅkhyāṃ gakkhanti; avaramātraka; veshana instead of veshana, in nirveshana; dharmaparyāya (Corp. Inscript. plate xv), &c.

now. Therefore, then, O Sâriputra, mental prayer is to be made for that Buddha country by faithful sons and daughters of a family.

§ 18. 'And as I at present magnify here the inconceivable excellences of those blessed Buddhas, thus, O Sâriputra, do those blessed Buddhas magnify my own inconceivable excellences.

'A very difficult work has been done by Sâkyamuni, the sovereign of the Sâkyas. Having obtained the transcendent true knowledge in this world Sahâ, he taught the Law which all the world is reluctant to accept, during this corruption of the present kalpa, during this corruption of mankind, during this corruption of belief, during this corruption of life, during this corruption of passions.

§ 19. 'This is even for me, O Sâriputra, an extremely difficult work that, having obtained the transcendent true knowledge in this world Sahâ, I taught the Law which all the world is reluctant to accept, during this corruption of mankind, of belief, of passion, of life, and of this present kalpa.'

§ 20. Thus spoke Bhagavat joyful in his mind. And the honourable Sâriputra, and the Bhikshus and Bodhisattvas, and the whole world with the gods, men, evil spirits and genii, applauded the speech of Bhagavat.

This is the Mahâyânasûtra ¹
called Sukhâvatî-vyûha.

¹ The Sukhâvatî-vyûha, even in its shortest text, is called a Mahâyâna-sûtra, nor is there any reason why a Mahâyâna-sûtra should not be short. The meaning of Mahâyâna-sûtra is simply a Sûtra belonging to the Mahâyâna school, the school of the Great Boat. It was Burnouf who, in his Introduction to the History of Buddhism, tried very hard to establish a distinction between the

Vaipulya or developed Sūtras, and what he calls the simple Sūtras. Now, the Vaipulya Sūtras may all belong to the Mahāyāna school, but that would not prove that all the Sūtras of the Mahāyāna school are Vaipulya or developed Sūtras. The name of simple Sūtra, in opposition to the Vaipulya or developed Sūtras, is not recognised by the Buddhists themselves; at least, I know no name for simple Sūtras. No doubt there is a great difference between a Vaipulya Sūtra, such as the Lotus of the Good Law, translated by Burnouf, and the Sūtras which Burnouf translated, for instance, from the Divyāvadāna. But what Burnouf considers as the distinguishing mark of a Vaipulya Sūtra, viz. the occurrence of Bodhisattvas, as followers of the Buddha Śākyamuni, would no longer seem to be tenable *, unless we classed our short Sukhāvatī-vyūha as a Vaipulya or developed Sūtra. For this there is no authority. Our Sūtra is a Mahāyāna Sūtra, but never called a Vaipulya Sūtra, and yet in this Sūtra the Bodhisattvas constitute a very considerable portion among the followers of Buddha. But more than that, Amitābha, the Buddha of Sukhāvatī, another personage whom Burnouf looks upon as peculiar to the Vaipulya Sūtras, who is, in fact, one of the Dhyāni-buddhas, though not called by that name in our Sūtra, forms the chief object of its teaching, and is represented as known to Buddha Śākyamuni, nay, as having become a Buddha long before the Buddha Śākyamuni †. The larger text of the Sukhāvatī-vyūha would certainly, according to Burnouf's definition, seem to fall into the category of the Vaipulya Sūtras. But it is not so called in the MSS. which I have seen, and Burnouf himself gives an analysis of that Sūtra (Introduction, p. 99) as a specimen of a Mahāyāna, but not of a Vaipulya Sūtra.

* 'La présence des Bodhisattvas ou leur absence intéresse donc le fonds même des livres où on la remarque, et il est bien évident que ce seul point trace une ligne de démarcation profonde entre les Sūtras ordinaires et les Sūtras développés.'—Burnouf, Introduction, p. 112.

† 'L'idée d'un ou de plusieurs Buddhas surhumains, celle de Bodhisattvas créés par eux, sont des conceptions aussi étrangères à ces livres (les Sūtras simples) que celle d'un Âdibuddha ou d'un Dieu.'—Burnouf, Introduction, p. 120.

INDEX OF NAMES AND SUBJECTS

IN THE SMALLER SUKHÂVATÎ-VYŪHA.

- Âdityasambhava, the Tathâgata, page 100.
 Agita, the Bodhisattva, 90.
 Akshobhya, the Tathâgata, 99.
 Amitâbha, the Tathâgata, 97 seq.; 103.
 Amitadhvaga, the Tathâgata, 100.
 Amitaskandha, the Tathâgata, 100.
 Amitâyus, the Tathâgata, 91; 97 seqq.; 100 seq.; repetition of the name of A., 98 seq.
 Ânanda, 90.
 Anantavîrya, the Tathâgata, 100.
 Anâthapîndaka, 89.
 Anikshiptadhura, the Bodhisattva, 90.
 Animal bodies, descent into, 96 seq.
 Aniruddha, 90.
 Arhat, 89, see note 4; 91.
 Bharadvâga, 90.
 Bhikshus, 89; 102.
 Bodhisattvas, 90; 98; 99; 102; 103.
 Brahmaghosha, the Tathâgata, 100.
 Brahman Sahâmpati, 91.
 Buddha countries, 91 seqq.
 Buddhas, 95; 99 seqq.; Buddha, the Law, the Church, 96; 97; 'Favour of all Buddhas,' 100; 101.
 Burnouf, on the Mahâyâna-sûtras, 102 seq.
 Cause and effect (arthavaśa), 99.
 Devas, king of the, 91.
 Dharma, the Tathâgata, 100.
 Dharmadhara, the Tathâgata, 100.
 Dharmadhvaga, the Tathâgata, 100.
 Dhyâni-buddhas, 103.
 Dundubhisvaranirghosha, the Tathâgata, 100.
 Dushpradharsha, the Tathâgata, 100.
 Galeniprabha, the Tathâgata, 100.
 Gandhahastin, the Bodhisattva, 90.
 Gandhaprabhâsa, the Tathâgata, 100.
 Gandhottama, the Tathâgata, 100.
 Gavâmpati, 90.
 Gems, four and seven, 92 seq., see note 3; 94.
 Gem-trees, 94.
 Genii, 102.
 Gods, 102.
 Great disciples (mahârâvaka), 89, see note 3.
 Gvalanaprabha, see Galeniprabha.
 Hells, 97.
 Indra or King, 90, see note 5.
 Indraketudhvagarâga, the Tathâgata, 100.
 Kâlodayin, 90.
 Kândrasûryapradîpa, the Tathâgata, 100.
 Knowledge, five kinds of, 89, see note 2; steps leading towards the highest k., 96; transcendent true k., 101; 102.
 Mahâkapphina, 90.
 Mahâkâśyapa, 90.
 Mahâkâtâyâna, 90.
 Mahâkaushika, 90.
 Mahâmaudgalyâyana, 90.
 Mahâmeru, the Tathâgata, 99.
 Mahâprabha, the Tathâgata, 100.
 Mahâratnaketu, the Tathâgata, 100.

- Mahârîskandha, the Tathâgata, 100 (tris).
 Mahâyâna-sûtra, 102 seq.
 Mañgudhvaga, the Tathâgata, 99.
 Mañgusri, the prince, 90.
 Men and gods, 102.
 Merudhvaga, the Tathâgata, 99.
 Meruprabhâsa, the Tathâgata, 99.
 Merupradipa, the Tathâgata, 100.

 Nakshatrarâga, the Tathâgata, 100.
 Nanda, 90.
 Nityodyukta, the Bodhisattva, 90.
 Numbers in Buddhist literature, 91, note 1.

 Pâli, its influence on Sanskrit, 101, note 2.
 Powers, five, 96.
 Prabhâkara, the Tathâgata, 100.
 Prayer, 98 ; 101 seq.

 Râhula, 90.
 Ratnakusumasampushpitagâtra, the Tathâgata, 100.
 Ratnotpalasrî, the Tathâgata, 101.
 Revata, 90.

 Sahâ, the world S., 102.
 Sakra, the king of the Devas, 90.

 Sâkyamuni, the sovereign of the Sâkyas, 102.
 Sâlendrarâga, the Tathâgata, 101.
 Sâriputra, the elder, 90 seqq.
 Sarvârthadarsa, the Tathâgata, 101.
 Zepuoi, 90, note 4.
 Simha, the Tathâgata, 100.
 Spirits, evil, 102.
 Srâvastî, 89 ; 91.
 Steps (seven) leading to the highest knowledge (bodhyaṅga), 96.
 Sudharasmiprabha, the Tathâgata, 100.
 Suddhipanthaka, 90.
 Sukhâvatî, 91 seqq. ; 99.
 Sumerukalpa, the Tathâgata, 101.

 Tathâgata, 91 ; 95 ; 97 seqq.

 Vaipulya Sûtras, 103.
 Vaisvânaranirghosha, the Tathâgata, 100.
 Vakkula, 90.
 Virtues, five, 96.

 Water, eight good qualities of, 93.

 Yama, realm of, 97.
 Yasabprabha, the Tathâgata, 100.
 Yasabprabhâva, the Tathâgata, 100.
 Yajas, the Tathâgata, 100.

INDEX OF SANSKRIT WORDS,

CHIEFLY THOSE EXPLAINED IN THE NOTES.

- anuparikshipta, enclosed, page 92, note 2.
 apāya, the four apāyas, i. e. hell, 97, see note.
 aprameya, infinite, 98, n. 1.
 abhigñā and abhigñāna, the five kinds of knowledge, 89, n. 2.
 abhigñānābhigñāta, 89, n. 2.
 ayuta, a hundred koṣis, 91, n. 1.
 arahanta and arihanta = arhat, 90, n. 4.
 arthavaśa, cause and effect, 99, n. 1.
 arhat, 90, n. 4.
 arhanta = arhat, 90, n. 4; 101, n. 2.
 avaramātraka, belonging merely to the present life, 98, n. 2; 101, n. 2.
 asaṅkhyeya, infinite, 98, n. 1.
 asuraloka, realm of evil spirits, 97 note.
 Asurinda, lord of the Asuras, 90, n. 5.
 indra, lord, 90, n. 5.
 indriya, five virtues, 96 note.
 kaṅkaṇagala, see kiṅkiṇigāla.
 kākāpeya (kākāpeya), to be drunk even by crows, 93, n. 2.
 kiṅkiṇigāla, string of bells, 92, n. 1.
 koṣi, ten millions, 91, n. 1.
 krauñka, snipe, curlew, 95, n. 3.
 tiryagyoni, birth as animals, 97 note.
 tishṭhati dhriyate yāpayati, 'he stands there, holds himself, supports himself,' 91, n. 2.
 tīrthakāka, 'a crow at a tīrtha,' 94 note.
 divāvihāra, noonday rest, siesta, 95, n. 2.
 dharmam deśayati, he teaches the law, 91, n. 2.
 dharmaparyāya, 101, n. 2.
 nayuta, 1 with 22 zeros, 91, n. 1.
 naraka, hell, 97 note.
 niyuta, a hundred ayutas, 91, n. 1.
 niraya, hell, 97 note.
 nirvetana, 101, n. 2.
 purobhaktena, before the morning meal, 95, n. 1; 101, n. 2.
 prati, pratiyatha, 101, n. 2.
 pretaloka, realm of the departed, 97 note.
 bala, five powers, 96 note.
 bodhyaṅga, seven steps leading towards the highest knowledge, 96 note.
 mahā-rāvaka, great disciple, 90, n. 3.
 yamaloka, realm of Yama, 97 note.
 yāpayati, 'he supports himself,' 91, n. 2; 101, n. 2.
 vaidūrya, lapis lazuli, or cat's eye, 92 seq., n. 3.
 saṅkhyā, iti saṅkhyāṃ gaṇṭhanti, they are called, 98, n. 1; 101, n. 2.
 sambahula = bahula, 101, n. 2.
 sthā, see tishṭhati.

THE
VAGRAKKHEDIKÂ.

THE
VAGRAKKHEDIKÂ
OR
DIAMOND-CUTTER.

ADORATION to the blessed Ārya-pragñā-pāramitā
(perfection of wisdom).

I.

Thus it was heard by me : At one time Bhagavat (the blessed Buddha) dwelt in Srāvastī, in the grove of Geta ¹, in the garden of Anāthapīṇḍada ², together with a large company of Bhikshus (mendicants), viz. with 1250 Bhikshus ³, with many noble-minded Bodhi-sattvas ⁴.

¹ Geta, son of king Prasenajit, to whom the park belonged before it was sold to Anāthapīṇḍada.

² Another name of Sudatta, meaning, literally, he who gives food to the poor.

³ The number of 1250 is explained by a Chinese priest Luñ-hiñ, in his commentary on the Amitāyur-dhyāna-sūtra. According to the Dharmagupta-vinaya, which he quotes, the number consisted of 500 disciples of Urūvilva-kāśyapa, 300 of Gayā-kāśyapa, 200 of Nadi-kāśyapa, 150 of Śāriputra, and 100 of Maudgalyāyana. The Chinese translators often mistook the Sanskrit expression 'half-thirteen hundred,' i. e. 1250. See Bunyiu Nanjio, Catalogue of Tripitaka, p. 6.

⁴ Higher beings on the road to Bodhi or perfect knowledge. They are destined hereafter to become Buddhas themselves.

Then Bhagavat having in the forenoon put on his undergarment¹, and having taken his bowl and cloak, entered the great city of Srāvastī to collect alms. Then Bhagavat, after he had gone to the great city of Srāvastī to collect alms, performed the act of eating², and having returned from his round in the afternoon³, he put away his bowl and cloak, washed his feet, and sat down on the seat intended⁴ for him, crossing his legs⁵, holding his body upright, and turning his reflection upon himself. Then many Bhikshus approached to where Bhagavat was, saluted his feet with their heads, turned three times round him to the right, and sat down on one side. (I)

II.

At that time again the venerable Subhūti came to that assembly and sat down. Then rising from his seat and putting his robe over one shoulder, kneeling on the earth with his right knee, he stretched out his folded hands towards Bhagavat and said to him: 'It is wonderful, O Bhagavat, it is exceedingly wonderful, O Sugata, how much the noble-minded Bodhisattvas have been favoured with the highest favour by the Tathāgata, the holy and

¹ In Pāli *pubbamhasamayam nivāsetva*, the technical expression for putting on the robes early in the morning; see Childers, s. v. *nivāseti*.

² In Pāli *katabhattakikkō*, see Childers, s. v.

³ In Pāli *paṭṭhābhaddham pīṇapāṭapaṭikkānta*, see Childers, s. v. *pīṇapāṭa*. Vig. observes that *paṭṭhābhaddham pīṇapāṭapaṭikkānto* is a *ῥοτερον πρότερον*, as it means, having returned from his rounds, and then made his meal on the food obtained on his rounds.

⁴ Pāli *paññata*.

⁵ Burnouf, *Lotus*, p. 334.

fully enlightened! It is wonderful how much the noble-minded Bodhisattvas have been instructed¹ with the highest instruction by the Tathâgata, the holy and fully enlightened! How then, O Bhagavat, should the son or the daughter of a good family, after having entered on the path of the Bodhisattvas, behave, how should he advance, and how should he restrain his thoughts?’

After the venerable Subhûti had thus spoken, Bhagavat said to him: ‘Well said, well said, Subhûti! So it is, Subhûti, so it is, as you say. The noble-minded Bodhisattvas have been favoured with the highest favour by the Tathâgata, the noble-minded Bodhisattvas have been instructed with the highest instruction by the Tathâgata. Therefore, O Subhûti, listen and take it to heart, well and rightly. I shall tell you, how any one who has entered on the path of Bodhisattvas should behave, how he should advance, and how he should restrain his thoughts.’ Then the venerable Subhûti answered the Bhagavat and said: ‘So be it, O Bhagavat.’ (2)

III.

Then the Bhagavat thus spoke to him: ‘Any one, O Subhûti, who has entered here on the path of the Bodhisattvas must thus frame his thought: As many beings as there are in this world of beings, comprehended under the term of beings (either born of eggs, or from the womb, or from moisture, or miraculously), with form or without form, with name or without name, or neither with nor without name, as far as

¹ I have followed the Chinese translator, who translates *parindita* by instructed, entrusted, not by protected.

any known world of beings is known, all these must be delivered by me in the perfect world of Nirvâṇa. And yet, after I have thus delivered immeasurable beings, not one single being has been delivered. And why? If, O Subhûti, a Bodhisattva had any idea of (belief in) a being, he could not be called a Bodhisattva (one who is fit to become a Buddha). And why? Because, O Subhûti, no one is to be called a Bodhisattva, for whom there should exist the idea of a being, the idea of a living being, or the idea of a person.' (3)

IV.

'And again, O Subhûti, a gift should not be given by a Bodhisattva, while he believes¹ in objects; a gift should not be given by him, while he believes in anything; a gift should not be given by him, while he believes in form; a gift should not be given by him, while he believes in the special qualities of sound, smell, taste, and touch. For thus, O Subhûti, should a gift be given by a noble-minded Bodhisattva, that he should not believe even in the idea of cause. And why? Because that Bodhisattva, O Subhûti, who gives a gift, without believing in anything, the measure of his stock of merit is not easy to learn.'—'What do you think, O Subhûti, is it easy to learn the measure of space in the eastern quarter?' Subhûti said: 'Not indeed, O Bhagavat.'—Bhagavat said: 'In like manner, is it easy to learn the measure of space in the southern, western, northern quarters, below and above (nadir and zenith), in quarters and subquarters, in the ten quarters all round?' Subhûti said: 'Not indeed,

¹ To believe here means to depend on or to accept as real.

O Bhagavat.' Bhagavat said : 'In the same manner, O Subhûti, the measure of the stock of merit of a Bodhisattva, who gives a gift without believing in anything, is not easy to learn. And thus indeed, O Subhûti, should one who has entered on the path of Bodhisattvas give a gift, that he should not believe even in the idea of cause.' (4)

V.

'Now, what do you think, O Subhûti, should a Tathâgata be seen (known) by the possession of signs¹?' Subhûti said : 'Not indeed, O Bhagavat, a Tathâgata is not to be seen (known) by the possession of signs. And why? Because what has been preached by the Tathâgata as the possession of signs, that is indeed the possession of no-signs.'

After this, Bhagavat spoke thus to the venerable Subhûti : 'Wherever there is, O Subhûti, the possession of signs, there is falsehood ; wherever there is no possession of signs, there is no falsehood. Hence the Tathâgata is to be seen (known) from no-signs as signs².' (5)

VI.

After this, the venerable Subhûti spoke thus to the Bhagavat : 'Forsooth, O Bhagavat, will there be any beings in the future, in the last time, in the last moment, in the last 500 years³, during the time

¹ Qualities by which he could be known.

² It would be easier to read *lakṣhaṇālakṣhaṇatvataḥ*, from the signs having the character of no-signs. M. de Harlez translates rightly, 'c'est par le non-marque de marquer que la Tathâgata doit être vu et reconnu.'

³ I have changed *Paññâsatī* into *Paññāsati*, because what is

of the decay of the good Law, who, when these very words of the Sûtras are being preached, will frame a true idea¹? The Bhagavat said: 'Do not speak thus, Subhûti. Yes, there will be some beings in the future, in the last time, in the last moment, in the last 500 years, during the decay of the good Law, who will frame a true idea when these very words are being preached.

'And again, O Subhûti, there will be noble-minded Bodhisattvas, in the future, in the last time, in the last moment, in the last 500 years, during the decay of the good Law, there will be strong and good and wise beings, who, when these very words of the Sûtras are being preached, will frame a true idea. But those noble-minded Bodhisattvas, O Subhûti, will not have served one Buddha only, and the stock

intended here is evidently the last of the periods of 500 years each, which, according to the Mahâyâna-Buddhists, elapsed after the death of Buddha. The following extract from the Mahâsannipâta-sûtra (Ta-tsi-king, No. 61 in Tripiṭaka), given to me by Mr. B. Nanjio, fully explains the subject. 'It is stated in the fifty-first section of the Mahâsannipâta-sûtra, that Buddha said: "After my Nirvâṇa, in the first 500 years, all the Bhikshus and others will be strong in deliberation in my correct Law. (Those who first obtain the 'holy fruit,' i.e. the Srota-âpannas, are called those who have obtained deliberation.) In the next or second 500 years, they will be strong in meditation. In the next or third 500 years, they will be strong in 'much learning,' i.e. bahusruta, religious knowledge. In the next or fourth 500 years, they will be strong in founding monasteries, &c. In the last or fifth 500 years, they will be strong in fighting and reproving. The pure (lit. white) Law will then become invisible."'

The question therefore amounts to this, whether in that corrupt age the law of Buddha will still be understood? and the answer is, that there will be always some excellent Bodhisattvas who, even in the age of corruption, can understand the preaching of the Law.

¹ Will understand them properly.

of their merit will not have been accumulated under one Buddha only; on the contrary, O Subhûti, those noble-minded Bodhisattvas will have served many hundred thousands of Buddhas, and the stock of their merit will have been accumulated under many hundred thousands of Buddhas; and they, when these very words of the Sûtras are being preached, will obtain one and the same faith¹. They are known, O Subhûti, by the Tathâgata through his Buddha-knowledge; they are seen, O Subhûti, by the Tathâgata through his Buddha-eye; they are understood, O Subhûti, by the Tathâgata. All these, O Subhûti, will produce and will hold fast an immeasurable and innumerable stock of merit. And why? Because, O Subhûti, there does not exist in those noble-minded Bodhisattvas the idea of self, there does not exist the idea of a being, the idea of a living being, the idea of a person. Nor does there exist, O Subhûti, for these noble-minded Bodhisattvas the idea of quality (dharma), nor of no-quality. Neither does there exist, O Subhûti, any idea (*samgñâ*) or no-idea. And why? Because, O Subhûti, if there existed for these noble-minded Bodhisattvas the idea of quality, then they would believe in a self, they would believe in a being, they would believe in a living being, they would believe in a person. And if there existed for them the idea of no-quality, even then they would believe in a self,

¹ I am doubtful about the exact meaning of *ekaḥittaprasâda*. Childers gives *ekaḥitta*, as an adjective, with the meaning of 'having the same thought,' and *ḥittaprasâda*, as faith in Buddha. But *ekaḥittaprasâda* may also be 'faith produced by one thought,' 'immediate faith,' and this too is a recognised form of faith in Buddhism. See Sukhâvatī, pp. 71, 108.

they would believe in a being, they would believe in a living being, they would believe in a person. And why? Because, O Subhūti, neither quality nor no-quality is to be accepted by a noble-minded Bodhisattva. Therefore this hidden saying has been preached by the Tathāgata: "By those who know the teaching of the Law, as like unto a raft, all qualities indeed must be abandoned; much more no-qualities¹." (6)

VII.

And again Bhagavat spoke thus to the venerable Subhūti: 'What do you think, O Subhūti, is there anything (dharma) that was known by the Tathāgata under the name of the highest perfect knowledge, or anything that was taught by the Tathāgata?'

After these words, the venerable Subhūti spoke thus to Bhagavat: 'As I, O Bhagavat, understand the meaning of the preaching of the Bhagavat, there is nothing that was known by the Tathāgata under the name of the highest perfect knowledge, nor is there anything that is taught by the Tathāgata. And why? Because that thing which was known or taught by the Tathāgata is incomprehensible and inexpressible. It is neither a thing nor no-thing. And why? Because the holy persons² are of imperfect power³.' (7)

¹ The same line is quoted in the *Abhidharmakosha-vyākhyā*.

² *Āryapudgala* need not be Bodhisattvas, but all who have entered on the path leading to *Nirvāṇa*.

³ Harlez: 'Parceque les entités supérieures sont produites telles sans être réelles et parfaites pour cela.' If *samskrīta* can be used in Buddhist literature in the sense of perfect, and *prabhāvitā* as power, my translation might pass, but even then the 'because' remains difficult.

VIII.

Bhagavat said : ' What do you think, O Subhûti, if a son or daughter of a good family filled this sphere of a million millions of worlds¹ with the seven gems or treasures, and gave it as a gift to the holy and enlightened Tathâgatas, would that son or daughter of a good family on the strength of this produce a large stock of merit ? ' Subhûti said : ' Yes, O Bhagavat, yes, O Sugata, that son or daughter of a good family would on the strength of this produce a large stock of merit. And why ? Because, O Bhagavat, what was preached by the Tathâgata as the stock of merit, that was preached by the Tathâgata as no-stock of merit. Therefore the Tathâgata preaches : " A stock of merit, a stock of merit² indeed ! " ' Bhagavat said : ' And if, O Subhûti, the son or daughter of a good family should fill this sphere of a million millions of worlds with the seven treasures and should give it as a gift to the holy and enlightened Tathâgatas, and if another after taking from this treatise of the Law one Gâthâ of four lines only should fully teach others and explain it, he indeed would on the strength of this produce a larger stock of merit immeasurable and innumerable. And why ? Because, O Subhûti, the highest perfect knowledge of the holy and enlightened Tathâgatas is produced from it ; the blessed Buddhas are produced from it. And why ? Because, O Subhûti, when the Tathâgata preached :

¹ See Childers, s. v. Lokadhâtu.

² Or should it be, bhâshate-puṇyaskandhaḥ puṇyaskandha iti, i. e. he preaches no-stock of merit is the stock of merit ? It would not be applicable to later passages, but the style of the Sûtras varies.

“The qualities of Buddha, the qualities of Buddha indeed!” they were preached by him as no-qualities of Buddha. Therefore they are called the qualities of Buddha.’ (8)

IX.

Bhagavat said¹: ‘Now, what do you think, O Subhûti, does a Srota-âpanna² think in this wise: The fruit of Srota-âpatti has been obtained by me?’ Subhûti said: ‘Not indeed, O Bhagavat, a Srota-âpanna does not think in this wise: The fruit of Srota-âpatti has been obtained by me. And why? Because, O Bhagavat, he has not obtained any particular state (dharma). Therefore he is called a Srota-âpanna. He has not obtained any form, nor sounds, nor smells, nor tastes, nor things that can be touched. Therefore he is called a Srota-âpanna. If, O Bhagavat, a Srota-âpanna were to think in this wise: The fruit of Srota-âpatti has been obtained by me, he would believe in a self, he would believe in a being, he would believe in a living being, he would believe in a person.’

Bhagavat said: ‘What do you think, O Subhûti, does a Sakridâgâmin think in this wise: The fruit of a Sakridâgâmin has been obtained by me?’ Subhûti said: ‘Not indeed, O Bhagavat, a Sakri-

¹ This phrase is wanting in the Sanskrit MSS., but it is found in the Chinese translation of Dharmagupta, of the Sui dynasty (A. D. 589-618).

² Srota-âpanna, a man who has obtained the first grade of sanctification, literally, who has entered the stream. The second grade is that of the Sakridâgâmin, who returns once. The third grade is that of the Anâgâmin, who does not return at all, but is born in the Brahman world from whence he becomes an Arhat and may obtain Nirvâṇa.

dāgāmin does not think in this wise: The fruit of a Sakridāgāmin has been obtained by me. And why? Because he is not an individual being (dharma), who has obtained the state of a Sakridāgāmin. Therefore he is called a Sakridāgāmin.'

Bhagavat said: 'What do you think, O Subhūti, does an Anāgāmin think in this wise: The fruit of an Anāgāmin has been obtained by me?' Subhūti said: 'Not indeed, O Bhagavat, an Anāgāmin does not think in this wise: The fruit of an Anāgāmin has been obtained by me. And why? Because he is not an individual being, who has obtained the state of an Anāgāmin. Therefore he is called an Anāgāmin.'

Bhagavat said: 'What do you think, O Subhūti, does an Arhat think in this wise: The fruit of an Arhat has been obtained by me?' Subhūti said: 'Not indeed, O Bhagavat, an Arhat does not think in this wise: The fruit of an Arhat has been obtained by me. And why? Because he is not an individual being, who is called an Arhat. Therefore he is called an Arhat. And if, O Bhagavat, an Arhat were to think in this wise: The state of an Arhat has been obtained by me, he would believe in a self, he would believe in a being, he would believe in a living being, he would believe in a person.

'And why? I have been pointed out, O Bhagavat, by the holy and fully enlightened Tathāgata, as the foremost of those who dwell in virtue¹.

¹ Araṇāvihārin. Rana is strife, then sin, therefore a rana might be peace and virtue, only the a would be short. Probably arana-vihārin was formed with reference to āraṇya-vihārin, living in

I, O Bhagavat, am an Arhat, freed from passion. And yet, O Bhagavat, I do not think in this wise: I am an Arhat, I am freed from passion. If, O Bhagavat, I should think in this wise, that the state of an Arhat has been obtained by me, then the Tathâgata would not have truly prophesied of me, saying: "Subhûti, the son of a good family, the foremost of those dwelling in virtue, does not dwell anywhere, and therefore he is called a dweller in virtue, a dweller in virtue indeed!"' (9)

X.

Bhagavat said: 'What do you think, O Subhûti, is there anything (dharma) which the Tathâgata has adopted from the Tathâgata Dîpaṅkara¹, the holy and fully enlightened?' Subhûti said: 'Not indeed, O Bhagavat; there is not anything which the Tathâgata has adopted from the Tathâgata Dîpaṅkara, the holy and fully enlightened.'

Bhagavat said: 'If, O Subhûti, a Bodhisattva should say: "I shall create numbers of worlds," he would say what is untrue. And why? Because, O Subhûti, when the Tathâgata preached: "Numbers of worlds, numbers of worlds indeed!" they were preached by him as no-numbers. Therefore they are called numbers of worlds.'

'Therefore, O Subhûti, a noble-minded Bodhisattva should in this wise frame an independent

the forest, retired from the world, and in peace, just as arhan, worthy, was changed into arahan, the destroyer of sin. Beal translates, 'one who delights in the mortification of an Aranyaka (forest devotee).' De Harlez: 'chef de ceux qui ne sont plus attachés à la jouissance.'

¹ A former Buddha.

mind, which is to be framed as a mind not believing in anything, not believing in form, not believing in sound, smell, taste, and anything that can be touched. Now, for instance, O Subhûti, a man might have a body and a large body, so that his size should be as large as the king of mountains, Sumeru. Do you think then, O Subhûti, that his selfhood (he himself) would be large?' Subhûti said: 'Yes, O Bhagavat, yes, O Sugata, his selfhood would be large. And why? Because, O Bhagavat, when the Tathâgata preached: "Selfhood, selfhood indeed!" it was preached by him as no-selfhood. Therefore it is called selfhood.' (10)

XI.

Bhagavat said: 'What do you think, O Subhûti, if there were as many Gaṅgâ rivers as there are grains of sand in the large river Gaṅgâ, would the grains of sand be many?' Subhûti said: 'Those Gaṅgâ rivers would indeed be many, much more the grains of sand in those Gaṅgâ rivers.' Bhagavat said: 'I tell you, O Subhûti, I announce to you, If a woman or man were to fill with the seven treasures as many worlds as there would be grains of sand in those Gaṅgâ rivers and present them as a gift to the holy and fully enlightened Tathâgatas—What do you think, O Subhûti, would that woman or man on the strength of this produce a large stock of merit?' Subhûti said: 'Yes, O Bhagavat, yes, O Sugata, that woman or man would on the strength of this produce a large stock of merit, immeasurable and innumerable.' Bhagavat said: 'And if, O Subhûti, a woman or man having filled so many worlds with the seven treasures should give them as a gift to the holy and enlightened Tathâgatas,

and if another son or daughter of a good family, after taking from this treatise of the Law one Gāthā of four lines only, should fully teach others and explain it, he, indeed, would on the strength of this produce a larger stock of merit, immeasurable and innumerable.' (11)

XII.

'Then again, O Subhūti, that part of the world in which, after taking from this treatise of the Law one Gāthā of four lines only, it should be preached or explained, would be like a *Kaitya* (holy shrine) for the whole world of gods, men, and spirits; what should we say then of those who learn the whole of this treatise of the Law to the end, who repeat it, understand it, and fully explain it to others? They, O Subhūti, will be endowed with the highest wonder¹. And in that place, O Subhūti, there dwells the teacher², or one after another holding the place of the wise preceptor³.' (12)

XIII.

After these words, the venerable Subhūti spoke thus to Bhagavat: 'O Bhagavat, how is this treatise of the Law called, and how can I learn it?' After this, Bhagavat spoke thus to the venerable Subhūti: 'This treatise of the Law, O Subhūti, is called the *Pragñā-pāramitā* (Transcendent wisdom), and you should learn it by that name. And why? Because, O Subhūti, what was preached by the Tathāgata as the *Pragñā-pāramitā*, that was preached by the

¹ With what excites the highest wonder.

² *Sastā*, often the name of Buddha, Pāli *satt ha*.

³ This may refer to a succession of teachers handing down the tradition one to the other.

Tathâgata as no-Pâramitâ. Therefore it is called the Pragñâ-pâramitâ.

'Then, what do you think, O Subhûti, is there anything (dharma) that was preached by the Tathâgata?' Subhûti said: 'Not indeed, O Bhagavat, there is not anything that was preached by the Tathâgata.'

Bhagavat said: 'What do you think then, O Subhûti,—the dust of the earth which is found in this sphere of a million millions of worlds, is that much?' Subhûti said: 'Yes, O Bhagavat, yes, O Sugata, that dust of the earth would be much. And why? Because, O Bhagavat, what was preached by the Tathâgata as the dust of the earth, that was preached by the Tathâgata as no-dust. Therefore it is called the dust of the earth. And what was preached by the Tathâgata as the sphere of worlds, that was preached by the Tathâgata as no-sphere. Therefore it is called the sphere of worlds.'

Bhagavat said: 'What do you think, O Subhûti, is a holy and fully enlightened Tathâgata to be seen (known) by the thirty-two signs of a hero?' Subhûti said: 'No indeed, O Bhagavat; a holy and fully enlightened Tathâgata is not to be seen (known) by the thirty-two signs of a hero. And why? Because what was preached by the Tathâgata as the thirty-two signs of a hero, that was preached by the Tathâgata as no-signs. Therefore they are called the thirty-two signs of a hero.'

Bhagavat said: 'If, O Subhûti, a woman or man should day by day sacrifice his life (selfhood¹) as

¹ Âtmabhâva seems to refer here to the living body, not to the spiritual Âtman, which, according to Buddha, can be got rid of by

many times as there are grains of sand in the river Gaṅgā, and if he should thus sacrifice his life for as many kalpas as there are grains of sand in the river Gaṅgā, and if another man, after taking from this treatise of the Law one Gāthā of four lines only, should fully teach others and explain it, he indeed would on the strength of this produce a larger stock of merit, immeasurable and innumerable.' (13)

XIV.

At that time, the venerable Subhūti was moved by the power of the Law, shed tears, and having wiped his tears, he thus spoke to Bhagavat: 'It is wonderful, O Bhagavat, it is exceedingly wonderful, O Sugata, how fully this teaching of the Law has been preached by the Tathāgata for the benefit of those beings who entered on the foremost path (the path that leads to Nirvāṇa), and who entered on the best path, from whence, O Bhagavat, knowledge has been produced in me. Never indeed, O Bhagavat, has such a teaching of the Law been heard by me before. Those Bodhisattvas, O Bhagavat, will be endowed with the highest wonder¹, who when this Sūtra is being preached hear it and will frame to themselves a true idea. And why? Because what is a true idea is not a true idea. Therefore the Tathāgata preaches: "A true idea, a true idea indeed!"

'It is no wonder to me, O Bhagavat, that I accept and believe this treatise of the Law, which has been preached. And those beings also, O Bhagavat,

knowledge only. Buddha himself sacrificed his life again and again, and a willingness to die would probably be accepted for the deed.

¹ Will possess miraculous powers, and will be admired.

who will exist in the future, in the last time, in the last moment, in the last 500 years, during the time of the decay of the good Law, who will learn this treatise of the Law, O Bhagavat, remember it, recite it, understand it, and fully explain it to others, they will indeed be endowed with the highest wonder.

‘But, O Bhagavat, there will not arise in them any idea of a self, any idea of a being, of a living being, or a person, nor does there exist for them any idea or no-idea. And why? Because, O Bhagavat, the idea of a self is no-idea, and the idea of a being, or a living being, or a person is no-idea. And why? Because the blessed Buddhas are freed from all ideas.’

After these words, Bhagavat thus spoke to the venerable Subhûti: ‘So it is, O Subhûti, so it is. Those beings, O Subhûti, who when this Sûtra was being recited here will not be disturbed or frightened or become alarmed, will be endowed with the highest wonder. And why? Because, O Subhûti, this was preached by the Tathâgata, as the Paramapâramitâ, which is no-Pâramitâ. And, O Subhûti, what the Tathâgata preaches as the Paramapâramitâ, that was preached also by immeasurable blessed Buddhas. Therefore it is called the Paramapâramitâ.

‘And, O Subhûti, the Pâramitâ or the highest perfection of endurance (kshânti) belonging to a Tathâgata, that also is no-Pâramitâ. And why? Because, O Subhûti, at the time when the king of Kaliṅga¹ cut my flesh from every limb, I had no idea of a self, of a being, of a living being, or of

¹ The Chinese text points to Kalirâgâ. On this Kalirâgâ or Kalinrîpa see Lalita-vistara, p. 191.

a person ; I had neither an idea nor no-idea. And why? Because, O Subhûti, if I at that time had had an idea of a self, I should also have had an idea of malevolence. If I had had an idea of a being, or of a living being, or of a person, I should also have had an idea of malevolence. And why? Because, O Subhûti, I remember the past 500 births, when I was the *Rîshi Kshântivâdin* (preacher of endurance). At that time also, I had no idea of a self, of a being, of a living being, of a person. Therefore then, O Subhûti, a noble-minded Bodhisattva, after putting aside all ideas, should raise his mind to the highest perfect knowledge. He should frame his mind so as not to believe (depend) in form, sound, smell, taste, or anything that can be touched, in something (dharma), in nothing or anything. And why? Because what is believed is not believed (not to be depended on). Therefore the Tathâgata preaches: "A gift should not be given by a Bodhisattva¹ who believes in anything, it should not be given by one who believes in form, sound, smell, taste, or anything that can be touched."

'And again, O Subhûti, a Bodhisattva should in such wise give his gift for the benefit of all beings. And why? Because, O Subhûti, the idea of a being is no-idea. And those who are thus spoken of by the Tathâgata as all beings are indeed no-beings. And why? Because, O Subhûti, a Tathâgata says what is real, says what is true, says the things as they are ; a Tathâgata does not speak untruth.

' But again, O Subhûti, whatever doctrine has been

¹ See before, chap. iv.

perceived, taught, and meditated on by a Tathâgata, in it there is neither truth nor falsehood. And as a man who has entered the darkness would not see anything, thus a Bodhisattva is to be considered who is immersed in objects, and who being immersed in objects gives a gift. But as a man who has eyes would, when the night becomes light, and the sun has risen, see many things, thus a Bodhisattva is to be considered who is not immersed in objects, and who not being immersed in objects gives a gift.

‘And again, O Subhûti, if any sons or daughters of good families will learn this treatise of the Law, will remember, recite, and understand it, and fully explain it to others, they, O Subhûti, are known by the Tathâgata through his Buddha-knowledge, they are seen, O Subhûti, by the Tathâgata through his Buddha-eye. All these beings, O Subhûti, will produce and hold fast an immeasurable and innumerable stock of merit.’ (14)

XV.

‘And if, O Subhûti, a woman or man sacrificed in the morning as many lives as there are grains of sand in the river Gaṅgâ and did the same at noon and the same in the evening, and if in this way they sacrificed their lives for a hundred thousands of *niyutas* of *koṭis* of ages, and if another, after hearing this treatise of the Law, should not oppose it, then the latter would on the strength of this produce a larger stock of merit, immeasurable and innumerable. What should we say then of him who after having written it, learns it, remembers it, understands it, and fully explains it to others?

‘And again, O Subhûti, this treatise of the Law is

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incomprehensible and incomparable. And this treatise of the Law has been preached by the Tathâgata for the benefit of those beings who entered on the foremost path (the path that leads to Nirvâna), and who entered on the best path. And those who will learn this treatise of the Law, who will remember it, recite it, understand it, and fully explain it to others, they are known, O Subhûti, by the Tathâgata through his Buddha-knowledge, they are seen, O Subhûti, by the Tathâgata through his Buddha-eye. All these beings, O Subhûti, will be endowed with an immeasurable stock of merit, they will be endowed with an incomprehensible, incomparable, immeasurable and unmeasured stock of merit. All these beings, O Subhûti, will equally remember the Bodhi (the highest Buddha-knowledge), will recite it, and understand it. And why? Because it is not possible, O Subhûti, that this treatise of the Law should be heard by beings of little faith, by those who believe in self, in beings, in living beings, and in persons. It is impossible that this treatise of the Law should be heard by beings who have not acquired the knowledge of Bodhisattvas, or that it should be learned, remembered, recited, and understood by them. The thing is impossible.

‘And again, O Subhûti, that part of the world in which this Sûtra will be propounded, will have to be honoured by the whole world of gods, men, and evil spirits, will have to be worshipped, and will become like a *Kaitya* (a holy sepulchre).’ (15)

XVI.

‘And, O Subhûti, sons or daughters of a good family who will learn these very Sûtras, who will

remember them, recite them, understand them, thoroughly take them to heart, and fully explain them to others, they will be overcome¹, they will be greatly overcome. And why? Because, O Subhûti, whatever evil deeds these beings have done in a former birth, deeds that must lead to suffering, those deeds these beings, owing to their being overcome, after they have seen the Law, will destroy, and they will obtain the knowledge of Buddha.

‘I remember, O Subhûti, in the past, before innumerable and more than innumerable kalpas, there were eighty-four hundred thousands of niyutas of koṭis of Buddhas following after the venerable and fully enlightened Tathâgata Dīpaṅkara, who were pleased by me, and after being pleased were not displeased. And if, O Subhûti, these blessed Buddhas were pleased by me, and after being pleased were not displeased, and if on the other hand people at the last time, at the last moment, in the last 500 years, during the time of the decay of the good Law, will learn these very Sûtras, remember them, recite them, understand them, and fully explain them to others, then, O Subhûti, in comparison with their stock of merit that former stock of merit will not come to one hundredth part, nay, not to one thousandth part, not to a hundred thousandth part, not to a ten millionth part, not to a hundred millionth part, not to a hundred thousand ten millionth part, not to a hundred thousands of niyutas ten millionth part. It will not bear number, nor fraction, nor counting, nor comparison, nor approach, nor analogy.

‘And if, O Subhûti, I were to tell you the stock of

¹ Paribhûta is explained by despised, but the sense, or even the non-sense, is difficult to understand.

merit of those sons or daughters of good families, and how large a stock of merit those sons or daughters of good families will produce, and hold fast at that time, people would become distracted and their thoughts would become bewildered. And again, O Subhûti, as this treatise of the Law preached by the Tathâgata is incomprehensible and incomparable, its rewards also must be expected (to be) incomprehensible.' (16)

XVII.

At that time the venerable Subhûti thus spoke to the Bhagavat: 'How should a person, after having entered on the path of the Bodhisattvas, behave, how should he advance, and how should he restrain his thoughts?' Bhagavat said: 'He who has entered on the path of the Bodhisattvas should thus frame his thought: All beings must be delivered by me in the perfect world of Nirvâna; and yet after I have thus delivered these beings, no being has been delivered. And why? Because, O Subhûti, if a Bodhisattva had any idea of beings, he could not be called a Bodhisattva, and so on¹ from the idea of a living being to the idea of a person; if he had any such idea, he could not be called a Bodhisattva. And why? Because, O Subhûti, there is no such thing (dharma) as one who has entered on the path of the Bodhisattvas.

'What do you think, O Subhûti, is there anything which the Tathâgata has adopted from the Tathâgata Dîpaṅkara with regard to the highest perfect knowledge?' After this, the venerable Subhûti

¹ See chap. iii, p. 114.

spoke thus to the Bhagavat: 'As far as I, O Bhagavat, understand the meaning of the preaching of the Bhagavat, there is nothing which has been adopted by the Tathâgata from the holy and fully enlightened Tathâgata Dîpaṅkara with regard to the highest perfect knowledge.' After this, Bhagavat thus spoke to the venerable Subhûti: 'So it is, Subhûti, so it is. There is not, O Subhûti, anything which has been adopted by the Tathâgata from the holy and fully enlightened Tathâgata Dîpaṅkara with regard to the highest perfect knowledge. And if, O Subhûti, anything had been adopted by the Tathâgata, the Tathâgata Dîpaṅkara would not have prophesied of me, saying¹: "Thou, O boy, wilt be in the future the holy and fully enlightened Tathâgata called Sâkyamuni." Because then, O Subhûti, there is nothing that has been adopted by the holy and fully enlightened Tathâgata with regard to the highest perfect knowledge, therefore I was prophesied by the Tathâgata Dîpaṅkara, saying: "Thou, boy, wilt be in the future the holy and fully enlightened Tathâgata called Sâkyamuni."

'And why, O Subhûti, the name of Tathâgata? It expresses true suchness. And why Tathâgata, O Subhûti? It expresses that he had no origin. And why Tathâgata, O Subhûti? It expresses the destruction of all qualities. And why Tathâgata, O Subhûti? It expresses one who had no origin whatever. And why this? Because, O Subhûti, no-origin is the highest goal.

'And whosoever, O Subhûti, should say that, by the holy and fully enlightened Tathâgata, the highest

¹ This prophecy is supposed to have been addressed by Dîpaṅkara to Sâkyamuni, before he had become a Buddha.

perfect knowledge has been known, he would speak an untruth, and would slander me, O Subhûti, with some untruth that he has learned. And why? Because there is no such thing, O Subhûti, as has been known by the Tathâgata with regard to the highest perfect knowledge. And in that, O Subhûti, which has been known and taught by the Tathâgata, there is neither truth nor falsehood. Therefore the Tathâgata preaches: "All things are Buddha-things." And why? Because what was preached by the Tathâgata, O Subhûti, as all things, that was preached as no-things; and therefore all things are called Buddha-things.

'Now, O Subhûti, a man might have a body and a large body.' The venerable Subhûti said: 'That man who was spoken of by the Tathâgata as a man with a body, with a large body, he, O Bhagavat, was spoken of by the Tathâgata as without a body, and therefore he is called a man with a body and with a large body.'

Bhagavat said: 'So it is, O Subhûti; and if a Bodhisattva were to say: "I shall deliver all beings," he ought not to be called a Bodhisattva. And why? Is there anything, O Subhûti, that is called a Bodhisattva?' Subhûti said: 'Not indeed, Bhagavat, there is nothing which is called a Bodhisattva.' Bhagavat said: 'Those who were spoken of as beings, beings indeed, O Subhûti, they were spoken of as no-beings by the Tathâgata, and therefore they are called beings. Therefore the Tathâgata says: "All beings are without self, all beings are without life, without manhood¹, without a personality."

¹ Sans croissance, Harlez; see Childers, s. v. poriso.

‘If, O Subhûti, a Bodhisattva were to say: “I shall create numbers of worlds,” he would say what is untrue. And why? Because, what were spoken of as numbers of worlds, numbers of worlds indeed, O Subhûti, these were spoken of as no-numbers by the Tathâgata, and therefore they are called numbers of worlds.

‘A Bodhisattva, O Subhûti, who believes that all things are without self, that all things are without self, he has faith, he is called a noble-minded Bodhisattva by the holy and fully enlightened Tathâgata.’ (17)

XVIII.

Bhagavat said: ‘What do you think, O Subhûti, has the Tathâgata the bodily eye?’ Subhûti said: ‘So it is, O Bhagavat, the Tathâgata has the bodily eye.’

Bhagavat said: ‘What do you think, O Subhûti, has the Tathâgata the heavenly eye?’ Subhûti said: ‘So it is, O Bhagavat, the Tathâgata has the heavenly eye.’

Bhagavat said: ‘What do you think, O Subhûti, has the Tathâgata the eye of knowledge?’ Subhûti said: ‘So it is, O Bhagavat, the Tathâgata has the eye of knowledge.’

Bhagavat said: ‘What do you think, O Subhûti, has the Tathâgata the eye of the Law?’ Subhûti said: ‘So it is, O Bhagavat, the Tathâgata has the eye of the Law.’

Bhagavat said: ‘What do you think, O Subhûti, has the Tathâgata the eye of Buddha?’ Subhûti said: ‘So it is, O Bhagavat, the Tathâgata has the eye of Buddha.’

Bhagavat said: ‘What do you think, O Subhûti, as many grains of sand as there are in the great river Gaṅgâ—were they preached by the Tathâgata

‘as grains of sand?’ Subhûti said: ‘So it is, O Bhagavat, so it is, O Sugata, they were preached as grains of sand by the Tathâgata.’ Bhagavat said: ‘What do you think, O Subhûti, if there were as many Gaṅgâ rivers as there are grains of sand in the great river Gaṅgâ; and, if there were as many worlds as there are grains of sand in these, would these worlds be many?’ Subhûti said: ‘So it is, O Bhagavat, so it is, O Sugata, these worlds would be many.’ Bhagavat said: ‘As many beings as there are in all those worlds, I know the manifold trains of thought of them all. And why? Because what was preached as the train of thoughts, the train of thoughts indeed, O Subhûti, that was preached by the Tathâgata as no-train of thoughts, and therefore it is called the train of thoughts. And why? Because, O Subhûti, a past thought is not perceived, a future thought is not perceived, and the present thought is not perceived.’ (18)

XIX.

‘What do you think, O Subhûti, if a son or a daughter of a good family should fill this sphere of a million millions of worlds with the seven treasures, and give it as a gift to holy and fully enlightened Buddhas, would that son or daughter of a good family produce on the strength of this a large stock of merit?’ Subhûti said: ‘Yes, a large one.’ Bhagavat said: ‘So it is, Subhûti, so it is; that son or daughter of a good family would produce on the strength of this a large stock of merit, immeasurable and innumerable. And why? Because what was preached as a stock of merit, a stock of merit indeed, O Subhûti, that was preached as no-stock

of merit by the Tathâgata, and therefore it is called a stock of merit. If, O Subhûti, there existed a stock of merit, the Tathâgata would not have preached: "A stock of merit, a stock of merit indeed!"' (19)

XX.

'What do you think then, O Subhûti, is a Tathâgata to be seen (known) by the shape of his visible body?' Subhûti said: 'Not indeed, O Bhagavat, a Tathâgata is not to be seen (known) by the shape of his visible body. And why? Because, what was preached, O Bhagavat, as the shape of the visible body, the shape of the visible body indeed, that was preached by the Tathâgata as no-shape of the visible body, and therefore it is called the shape of the visible body.'

Bhagavat said: 'What do you think, O Subhûti, should a Tathâgata be seen (known) by the possession of signs?' Subhûti said: 'Not indeed, O Bhagavat, a Tathâgata is not to be seen (known) by the possession of signs. And why? Because, what was preached by the Tathâgata as the possession of signs, that was preached as no-possession of signs by the Tathâgata, and therefore it is called the possession of signs.' (20)

XXI.

Bhagavat said: 'What do you think, O Subhûti, does the Tathâgata think in this wise: The Law has been taught by me?' Subhûti said: 'Not indeed, O Bhagavat, does the Tathâgata think in this wise: The Law has been taught by me.' Bhagavat said: 'If a man should say that the Law has been taught by the Tathâgata, he would say what is not true; he

would slander me with untruth which he has learned. And why? Because, O Subhûti, it is said the teaching of the Law, the teaching of the Law indeed. O Subhûti, there is nothing that can be perceived by the name of the teaching of the Law.'

After this, the venerable Subhûti spoke thus to the Bhagavat: 'Forsooth, O Bhagavat, will there be any beings in the future, in the last time, in the last moment, in the last 500 years, during the time of the decay of the good Law, who, when they have heard these very Laws, will believe?' Bhagavat said: 'These, O Subhûti, are neither beings nor no-beings. And why? Because, O Subhûti, those who were preached as beings, beings indeed, they were preached as no-beings by the Tathâgata, and therefore they are called beings.' (21)

XXII.

'What do you think then, O Subhûti, is there anything which has been known by the Tathâgata in the form of the highest perfect knowledge?' The venerable Subhûti said: 'Not indeed, O Bhagavat, there is nothing, O Bhagavat, that has been known by the Tathâgata in the form of the highest perfect knowledge.' Bhagavat said: 'So it is, Subhûti, so it is. Even the smallest thing is not known or perceived there, therefore it is called the highest perfect knowledge.' (22)

XXIII.

'Also, Subhûti, all is the same there, there is no difference there, and therefore it is called the highest perfect knowledge. Free from self, free from being, free from life, free from personality, that

highest perfect knowledge is always the same, and thus known with all good things. And why? Because, what were preached as good things, good things indeed, O Subhûti, they were preached as no-things by the Tathâgata, and therefore they are called good things.' (23)

XXIV.

'And if, O Subhûti, a woman or man, putting together as many heaps of the seven treasures as there are Sumerus, kings of mountains, in the sphere of a million millions of worlds, should give them as a gift to holy and fully enlightened Tathâgatas; and, if a son or a daughter of a good family, after taking from this treatise of the Law, this *Pragñâpâramitâ*, one *Gâthâ* of four lines only, should teach it to others, then, O Subhûti, compared with his stock of merit, the former stock of merit would not come to the one hundredth part,' &c.¹, till 'it will not bear an approach.' (24)

XXV.

'What do you think then, O Subhûti, does a Tathâgata think in this wise: Beings have been delivered by me? You should not think so, O Subhûti. And why? Because there is no being, O Subhûti, that has been delivered by the Tathâgata. And, if there were a being, O Subhûti, that has been delivered by the Tathâgata, then the Tathâgata would believe in self, believe in a being, believe in a living being, and believe in a person. And what is called a belief in self, O Subhûti, that is preached

¹ As before, in chap. xvi.

as no-belief by the Tathâgata. And this is learned by children and ignorant persons; and they who were preached as children and ignorant persons, O Subhûti, were preached as no-persons by the Tathâgata, and therefore they are called children and ignorant persons.' (25)

XXVI.

'What do you think then, O Subhûti, is the Tathâgata to be seen (known) by the possession of signs?' Subhûti said: 'Not indeed, O Bhagavat. So far as I know the meaning of the preaching of the Bhagavat, the Tathâgata is not to be seen (known) by the possession of signs.' Bhagavat said: 'Good, good, Subhûti, so it is, Subhûti; so it is, as you say; a Tathâgata is not to be seen (known) by the possession of signs. And why? Because, O Subhûti, if the Tathâgata were to be seen (known) by the possession of signs, a wheel-turning king also would be a Tathâgata¹; therefore a Tathâgata is not to be seen (known) by the possession of signs.' The venerable Subhûti spoke thus to the Bhagavat: 'As I understand the meaning of the preaching of the Bhagavat, a Tathâgata is not to be seen (known) by the possession of signs.' Then the Bhagavat at that moment preached these two Gâthâs:

They who saw me by form, and they who heard
me by sound,

They engaged in false endeavours, will not see me.

¹ This probably refers to the auspicious signs discovered in Sâkyamuni at his birth, which left it open whether he should become a king or a Buddha.

A Buddha is to be seen (known) from the Law; for the Lords (Buddhas) have the Law-body; And the nature of the Law cannot be understood, nor can it be made to be understood. (26)

XXVII.

‘What do you think then, O Subhûti, has the highest perfect knowledge been known by the Tathâgata through the possession of signs? You should not think so, O Subhûti. And why? Because, O Subhûti, the highest perfect knowledge would not be known by the Tathâgata through the possession of signs. Nor should anybody, O Subhûti, say to you that the destruction or annihilation of any thing is proclaimed by those who have entered on the path of the Bodhisattvas.’ (27)

XXVIII.

‘And if, O Subhûti, a son or a daughter of a good family were to fill worlds equal to the number of grains of sand of the river Gaṅgâ with the seven treasures, and give them as a gift to holy and fully enlightened Tathâgatas; and if a Bodhisattva acquired endurance in selfless and uncreated things, then the latter will on the strength of this produce a larger stock of merit, immeasurable and innumerable.

‘But, O Subhûti, a stock of merit should not be appropriated by a noble-minded Bodhisattva.’ The venerable Subhûti said: ‘Should a stock of merit, O Bhagavat, not be appropriated by a Bodhisattva?’ Bhagavat said: ‘It should be appropriated, O Subhûti; it should not be appropriated; and therefore it is said: It should be appropriated.’ (28)

XXIX.

‘ And again, O Subhûti, if anybody were to say that the Tathâgata goes, or comes, or stands, or sits, or lies down, he, O Subhûti, does not understand the meaning of my preaching. And why? Because the word Tathâgata means one who does not go to anywhere, and does not come from anywhere; and therefore he is called the Tathâgata (truly come), holy and fully enlightened.’ (29)

XXX.

‘ And again, O Subhûti, if a son or a daughter of a good family were to take as many worlds as there are grains of earth-dust in this sphere of a million millions of worlds, and reduce them to such fine dust as can be made with immeasurable strength, like what is called a mass of the smallest atoms, do you think, O Subhûti, would that be a mass of many atoms?’ Subhûti said: ‘ Yes, Bhagavat, yes, Sugata, that would be a mass of many atoms. And why? Because, O Bhagavat, if it were a mass of many atoms, Bhagavat would not call it a mass of many atoms. And why? Because, what was preached as a mass of many atoms by the Tathâgata, that was preached as no-mass of atoms by the Tathâgata; and therefore it is called a mass of many atoms. And what was preached by the Tathâgata as the sphere of a million millions of worlds, that was preached by the Tathâgata as no-sphere of worlds; and therefore it is called the sphere of a million millions of worlds. And why? Because, O Bhagavat, if there were a sphere of worlds, there would exist a belief in matter; and what was preached as a belief in matter by the Tathâgata, that was

preached as no-belief by the Tathâgata; and therefore it is called a belief in matter.' Bhagavat said: 'And a belief in matter itself, O Subhûti, is unmentionable and inexpressible; it is neither a thing nor no-thing, and this is known by children and ignorant persons.' (30)

XXXI.

'And why? Because, O Subhûti, if a man were to say that belief in self, belief in a being, belief in life, belief in personality had been preached by the Tathâgata, would he be speaking truly?' Subhûti said: 'Not indeed, Bhagavat, not indeed, Sugata; he would not be speaking truly. And why? Because, O Bhagavat, what was preached by the Tathâgata as a belief in self, that was preached by the Tathâgata as no-belief; therefore it is called belief in self.'

Bhagavat said: 'Thus then, O Subhûti, are all things to be perceived, to be looked upon, and to be believed by one who has entered on the path of the Bodhisattvas. And in this wise are they to be perceived, to be looked upon, and to be believed, that a man should believe neither in the idea of a thing nor in the idea of a no-thing. And why? Because, by saying: The idea of a thing, the idea of a thing indeed, it has been preached by the Tathâgata as no-idea of a thing.' (31)

XXXII.

'And, O Subhûti, if a noble-minded Bodhisattva were to fill immeasurable and innumerable spheres of worlds with the seven treasures, and give them as a gift to holy and fully enlightened Tathâgatas;

and if a son or a daughter of a good family, after taking from this treatise of the Law, this *Pragñâ-pâramitâ*, one *Gâthâ* of four lines only, should learn it, repeat it, understand it, and fully explain it to others, then the latter would on the strength of this produce a larger stock of merit, immeasurable and innumerable. And how should he explain it? As in the sky:

Stars, darkness, a lamp, a phantom, dew, a bubble.

A dream, a flash of lightning, and a cloud—thus
we should look upon the world (all that was
made).

Thus he should explain; therefore it is said: He should explain.'

Thus spoke the *Bhagavat* enraptured. The elder *Subhûti*, and the friars, nuns, the faithful laymen and women, and the *Bodhisattvas* also, and the whole world of gods, men, evil spirits and fairies, praised the preaching of the *Bhagavat*. (32)

Thus is finished the Diamond-cutter, the
blessed *Pragñâpâramitâ*.

THE LARGER
PRAGÑÂ-PÂRAMITÂ-
HR/DAYA-SÛTRA.

THE LARGER PRAGÑĀ-PĀRAMITĀ- HRIDAYA-SŪTRA.

ADORATION TO THE OMNISCIENT !

This I heard : At one time the Bhagavat dwelt at Rāgagrīha, on the hill Grīdhṛakūṭa, together with a large number of Bhikshus and a large number of Bodhisattvas.

At that time the Bhagavat was absorbed in a meditation, called Gambhīrāvasambodha. And at the same time the great Bodhisattva Āryāvalokiteśvara, performing his study in the deep Praḡñāpāramitā, thought thus : 'There are the five Skandhas, and those he (the Buddha ?) considered as something by nature empty.'

Then the venerable Śāriputra, through Buddha's power, thus spoke to the Bodhisattva Āryāvalokiteśvara : 'If the son or daughter of a family wishes to perform the study in the deep Praḡñāpāramitā, how is he to be taught ?'

On this the great Bodhisattva Āryāvalokiteśvara thus spoke to the venerable Śāriputra : 'If the son or daughter of a family wishes to perform the study in the deep Praḡñāpāramitā, he must think thus :

'There are five Skandhas, and these he considered as by their nature empty. Form is emptiness, and

emptiness indeed is form. Emptiness is not different from form, form is not different from emptiness. What is form that is emptiness, what is emptiness that is form. Thus perception, name, conception, and knowledge also are emptiness. Thus, O Sâriputra, all things have the character of emptiness, they have no beginning, no end, they are faultless and not faultless, they are not imperfect and not perfect. Therefore, O Sâriputra, here in this emptiness there is no form, no perception, no name, no concept, no knowledge. No eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind. No form, sound, smell, taste, touch, and objects. There is no eye, &c., till we come to 'there is no mind, no objects, no mind-knowledge. There is no knowledge, no ignorance, no destruction (of ignorance),' till we come to 'there is no decay and death, no destruction of decay and death; there are not (the Four Truths, viz.) that there is pain, origin of pain, stoppage of pain, and the path to it. There is no knowledge, no obtaining, no not-obtaining of Nirvâna. Therefore, O Sâriputra, as there is no obtaining (of Nirvâna), a man who has approached the Pragñâpâramitâ of the Bodhisattvas, dwells (for a time) enveloped in consciousness. But when the envelopment of consciousness has been annihilated, then he becomes free of all fear, beyond the reach of change, enjoying final Nirvâna.

'All Buddhas of the past, present, and future, after approaching the Pragñâpâramitâ, have awoke to the highest perfect knowledge.

'Therefore we ought to know the great verse of the Pragñâpâramitâ, the verse of the great wisdom, the unsurpassed verse, the verse which appeases

all pain—it is truth, because it is not false¹—the verse proclaimed in the *Pragñāpāramitā*²: “O wisdom, gone, gone, gone to the other shore, landed at the other shore, Svāhā!”

‘Thus, O Śāriputra, should a Bodhisattva teach in the study of the deep *Pragñāpāramitā*.’

Then when the Bhagavat had risen from that meditation, he gave his approval to the venerable Bodhisattva Avalokitesvara, saying: ‘Well done, well done, noble son! So it is, noble son. So indeed must this study of the deep *Pragñāpāramitā* be performed. As it has been described by thee, it is applauded by Arhat Tathāgatas.’ Thus spoke Bhagavat with joyful mind. And the venerable Śāriputra, and the honourable Bodhisattva Avalokitesvara, and the whole assembly, and the world of gods, men, demons, and fairies praised the speech of the Bhagavat.

Here ends the *Pragñāpāramitāhrīdayasūtra*.

¹ It is truth, not falsehood, W text.

² Fit for obtaining *Pragñāpāramitā*, W text.

THE SMALLER
P R A G ÑÂ-PÂRAMITÂ-
HR/DAYA-SÛTRA.

THE SMALLER
PRAGÑĀ-PĀRAMITĀ-
HRIDAYA-SŪTRA.

ADORATION TO THE OMNISCIENT !

The venerable Bodhisattva Avalokitesvara, performing his study in the deep Pragñāpāramitā (perfection of wisdom), thought thus: 'There are the five Skandhas, and these he considered as by their nature empty (phenomenal).'

'O Sāriputra,' he said, 'form here is emptiness, and emptiness indeed is form. Emptiness is not different from form, form is not different from emptiness. What is form that is emptiness, what is emptiness that is form.'

'The same applies to perception, name, conception, and knowledge.'

'Here, O Sāriputra, all things have the character of emptiness, they have no beginning, no end, they are faultless and not faultless, they are not imperfect and not perfect. Therefore, O Sāriputra, in this emptiness there is no form, no perception, no name, no concepts, no knowledge. No eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind. No form, sound, smell, taste, touch, objects.'

'There is no eye,' &c., till we come to 'there is no mind.'

(What is left out here are the eighteen Dhātus or aggregates, viz. eye, form, vision; ear, sound, hearing; nose, odour, smelling; tongue, flavour, tasting; body, touch, feeling; mind, objects, thought.)

‘There is no knowledge, no ignorance, no destruction of knowledge, no destruction of ignorance,’ &c., till we come to ‘there is no decay and death, no destruction of decay and death; there are not (the four truths, viz. that there) is pain, origin of pain, stoppage of pain, and the path to it. There is no knowledge, no obtaining (of Nirvāṇa).’

‘A man who has approached the Pragñāpāramitā of the Bodhisattva dwells enveloped in consciousness¹. But when the envelopment of consciousness has been annihilated, then he becomes free of all fear, beyond the reach of change, enjoying final Nirvāṇa.’

‘All Buddhas of the past, present, and future, after approaching the Pragñāpāramitā, have awoke to the highest perfect knowledge.’

‘Therefore one ought to know the great verse of the Pragñāpāramitā, the verse of the great wisdom, the unsurpassed verse, the peerless verse, which appeases all pain—it is truth, because it is not false—the verse proclaimed in the Pragñāpāramitā: “O wisdom, gone, gone, gone to the other shore, landed at the other shore, Svāhā!”’

Thus ends the heart of the Pragñāpāramitā.

¹ See Childers, s.v. *kittam*.

INDEX OF NAMES AND SUBJECTS

IN THE VAGRAKKHEDIKÂ AND THE PRAGÑÂ- PÂRAMITÂ-HR/DAYA-SÛTRA.

- Anâgâmin, one who does not return at all, page 120, note 2; 121.
 Anâthapindada, 111.
 Arhat, 120, n. 2; 121 seq.; A. Tathâgatas, 149.
 Ārya-pragñâ-pâramitâ, perfection of wisdom, 111.
 Āryâvalokiteśvara, N. of a Bodhisattva, 147; 149; 153.
 Atoms, 142.
 Avalokiteśvara, see Āryâvalokiteśvara.
 Being, term of, 113 seq.; belief in, idea of a b., 117, &c. &c.; see Self, 134.
 Bhagavat (Buddha), 111, &c. &c.; 147; 149.
 Bhikṣus, 111 seq.; 144; 147.
 Bodhi, highest knowledge, 111, n. 4; 130; 131.
 Bodhisattvas, 111, &c.; 126; 128; 134 seq.; 147 seqq.; 154; knowledge of B., 130; path of the B., 132; 141; 143.
 Brahman world, 120, n. 2.
 Buddha, 116 seq.; 125, n. 1; 147; qualities of B., 120; eye of B., 135; B. to be seen from the Law, 141; many Buddhas, 117; 119; 127; 131; 136; 148; 154; knowledge of B., 131.
 Buddha-eye, 117; 129; 130.
 Buddha-knowledge, 117; 129; 130; 131.
 Buddha-things, 134.
 Cause, idea of, 114 seq.
 Demons, see Spirits.
 Dhâtus, eighteen aggregates, 154.
 Dīpaṅkara, the Tathâgata, 122; 131; 132 seq.
 Emptiness, 147 seq.; 153.
 Eye (bodily, heavenly, &c.), 135.
 Fairies, 144; 149.
 Faith, 117; 135.
 Four Truths, 148; 154.
 Gambhīrâvasambodha, a kind of meditation, 147.
 Gâthâ of four lines, 119; 124; 126; 139; 144; two Gâthâs, 140 seq.
 Gayâ-kāśyapa, 111, n. 3.
 Geta, the grove of, 111.
 Gods, 130; 144; 149.
 Grīdhra-kūṭa, N. of a hill, 147.
 Hero, signs of a, 125.
 Holy persons (āryapudgala), 118.
 Idea (*samgñâ*), 117; 126 seq.; 128; idea of a thing, and no-idea, 143.
 Kaitya, holy shrine, 124; 130.
 Kālīṅga, king of, 127.
 Kalirāgan or *“nṛpa*, 127, n. 1.
 Knowledge, highest perfect, 118; 119; 128; 132 seqq.; 138 seq.; 141; 148; 154; eye of k., 135; there is no k., 148.
 Kṣāntivādin, Rishi, 128.
 Law, decay of the good L., 116; 127; 131; 138; teaching of the L., 118; 138; treatise of the L., 119; 124; 126; 129 seq.; eye of the L., 135; Law taught by

- the Tathāgata, 137; Buddha seen from the L., 141.
 Law-body, 141.
 Laymen and women, 144.
 Matter, belief in, 142 seq.
 Maudgalyāyana, 111, n. 3.
 Men, gods, and evil spirits, 130; 144; 149.
 Merit, stock of, 114, &c. &c.
 Nadī-kāyapa, 111, n. 3.
 Nirvāṇa, 116 note; 148; 154; world of N., 114; 132; 120, n. 2; path leading to N., 126; 130.
 No-origin the highest goal, 133.
 Nuns, 144.
 Parama-pāramitā, 127.
 Pāramitā, 127.
 Person, personality, 117, &c. &c.; see Self.
 Pragñā-pāramitā (transcendent wisdom), 124 seq.; 139; 144; 147 seqq.; 153 seq.
 Prasenagit, 111, n. 1.
 Preceptor, the wise, 124.
 Quality (dharma), idea of, 117; qualities of Buddha, 120.
 Rāgagrīha, 147.
 Sakridāgāmin, a man who returns once, 120 seq.
 Sākyamuni, 133; 140, n. 1.
 Śāriputra, 111, n. 3; 147 seqq.; 153.
 Self, idea of and belief in a, 117; 120 seq.; 127 seq.; 130; 132; 138; 139; 143; all things are without self, 134.
 Selfhood, 123; 125.
 Signs, possession of, 115; 137; 140; 141; thirty-two signs of a hero, 125.
 Skandhas, five, 147; 153.
 Spirits, evil, 130; 144; 149.
 Srāvastī, 111 seq.
 Srota-āpanna, a man who has obtained the first grade of sanctification, 116 note; 120.
 Srota-āpatti, 120.
 Subhūti, 112, &c. &c.
 Sudatta, 111, n. 2.
 Sugata (Buddha), 112; 119; 123; 125; 126; 143.
 Sumeru, king of mountains, 123; plur., 139.
 Tathāgata, 112, &c. &c.; the name of T., 133; 142; Arhat Tathāgatas, 149.
 Teacher, i. e. Buddha, 124.
 Thoughts, train of, 136.
 Treasures, seven, 119; 123; 136; 139; 141; 143.
 Uruvilva-kāyapa, 111, n. 3.
 Wheel-turning king, 140.
 Worlds, sphere of a million millions of, 119; 125; 136; 139; 142; numbers of worlds, 122; 134 seq.; 143.

INDEX OF SANSKRIT WORDS,

CHIEFLY THOSE EXPLAINED IN THE NOTES.

araṇyāvihārin, dwelling in virtue, page 121, note 1.	state, 120; an individual being, 121.
âtmabhāva, selfhood, life, 125, n. 1.	nivas, 112, n. 1.
âraṇya-vihārin, living in the forest, 121, n. 1.	paribhûta, overcome, despised (?), 131, n. 1.
Âryapudgala, one who has entered on the path leading to Nirvâṇa, 118, n. 2.	parîṇḍita, instructed, 113, n. 1.
ekakīttaprasāda, 117, n. 1.	parîkâdbhakta, 112, n. 3.
Kṛitabhaktakṛīya, 112, n. 2.	pindapâta, 112, n. 3.
kshānti, endurance, 127.	punyaskandha, 119, n. 2.
kīttaprasāda, faith in Buddha, 117, n. 1.	pûrvâhṇakâlasamayê nivâsya, 112, n. 1.
dharma, quality, 117; thing, 118; 122; 125; 128; 132; particular	pragñapta, 112, n. 4.
	prabhâvitâ, power, 18, n. 3.
	raṇa, strife, sin, 121, n. 1.
	śâstri, teacher = Buddha, 124, n. 2.
	samskrīta, perfect (?), 118, n. 3.
	samgñâ, idea, 117.

AMITÂYUR-DHYÂNA-
SÛTRA,

THE SÛTRA OF THE MEDITATION ON AMITÂYUS.

MEDITATION

ON

BUDDHA AMITÂYUS¹.

PART I.

§ 1. Thus it was heard by me: At one time the Buddha dwelt in Râgagriha, on the mountain Gridhrakûta, with a large assembly of Bhikshus and with thirty-two thousands of Bodhisattvas; with Mañgusri, Prince of the Law², at the head of the assembly.

§ 2. At that time, in the great city of Râgagriha there was a prince, the heir-apparent, named Agâ-tasatru. He listened to the wicked counsel of Devadatta and other friends and forcibly arrested Bimbisâra his father, the king, and shut him up by himself in a room with seven walls, proclaiming to all the courtiers that no one should approach (the king). The chief consort of the king, Vaidehi by

¹ Nanjio's Catalogue of Tripiṭaka, No. 198; translated into Chinese A. D. 424, by Kālayāsa, a Sramana from India.

² Sanskrit Kumārabhūta, 'prince' or 'princely,' but Chinese has 'prince of the law;' according to the commentator, K'-kō, he was called so because he was (skilled in) converting men by (teaching) the Law. K'-kō seems to have understood that Mañgusri was not a royal prince, but the name Kumārabhūta was given him as an honorific title. Max Müller, 'the prince' (p. 350, vol. ii, Selected Essays); Kern, 'the prince royal,' but he gives an alternative 'still a youth' (p. 4, Sadharmapundarika).

name, was true and faithful to her lord, the king. She supported him in this wise: having purified herself by bathing and washing, she anointed her body with honey and ghee mixed with corn-flour, and she concealed the juice of grapes in the various garlands she wore (in order to give him food without being noticed by the warder). As she stole in and made an offering to him, he was able to eat the flour and to drink the juice (of grapes). Then he called for water and rinsed his mouth. That done, the king stretched forth his folded hands towards the Mount *Gridhrakûta* and worshipped duly and respectfully the World-Honoured One, who at that time abode there. And he uttered the following prayer: 'Mahâmaudgalyâyana is my friend and relative; let him, I pray, feel compassion towards me, and come and communicate to me the eight prohibitive precepts¹ (of Buddha).' On this, Mahâmaudgalyâyana at once appeared before the king, coming with a speed equal to the flight of a falcon or an eagle, and communicated to him the eight precepts.

Day after day did he come. The World-Honoured One sent also his worthy disciple *Pûrna* to preach the Law to the king. Thus a period of three weeks passed by. The king showed by his countenance that he was happy and contented when he had an opportunity of hearing the Law as well as of enjoying the honey and flour.

§ 3. At that time, *Agâtasatru* asked the warder

¹ According to the commentator, *Shân-tão*, 'killing, stealing, adultery, lying, drinking, applying ointment, &c., music, and using ornamented chairs, &c.'

of the gate whether his father was yet alive. On this, the warder answered him : ' O Exalted king, the chief consort (of thy father) brought (food) and presented it to him by anointing her body with honey and flour and filling her garlands with the juice (of grapes), and the *Sramanas*, *Mahâmaudgalyâyana* and *Pûrṇa*, approached the king through the sky in order to preach the Law to him. It is, O king, impossible to prevent them coming.' When the prince heard this answer his indignation arose against his mother : ' My mother,' he cried, ' is, indeed, a rebel, for she was found in company with that rebel. Wicked people are those *Sramanas*, and it is their art of spells causing illusion and delusion that delayed the death of that wicked king for so many days.' Instantly he brandished his sharp sword, intending to slay his mother. At that moment, there intervened a minister named *Kāndraprabha*, who was possessed of great wisdom and intelligence, and *Gṛīva* (a famous physician). They saluted the prince and remonstrated with him, saying : ' We, ministers, O Great king, heard that since the beginning of the kalpas there had been several wicked kings, even to the number of eighteen thousand, who killed their own fathers, coveting the throne of (their respective) kingdoms, as mentioned in the *Sûtra* of the discourse of the *Veda*¹. Yet never have we heard of a man killing his mother, though he be void of virtue. Now, if thou, O king, shouldst dare to commit such a deadly sin, thou wouldst bring a stain upon the blood of the *Kshatriyas* (the kingly race). We cannot even

¹ This is non-Buddhistic, according to *Shân-tào*.

bear to hear of it. Thou art indeed a *Kandâla* (the lowest race); we shall not stay here with thee.' After this speech, the two great ministers retired stepping backward, each with his hand placed on his sword. *Agâtasatru* was then frightened, and greatly afraid of them, and asked *Glva*, saying: 'Wilt thou not be friendly to me?' In reply *Glva* said to him: 'Do not then, O Great king, by any means think of injuring thy mother.' On hearing this, the prince repented and sought for mercy, and at once laid down his sword and did his mother no hurt. He finally ordered the officers of the inner chambers to put the queen in a hidden palace and not to allow her to come out again.

§ 4. When *Vaidehi* was thus shut up in retirement she became afflicted by sorrow and distress. She began to do homage to Buddha from afar, looking towards the Mount *Grîdhra-kûta*. She uttered the following words: 'O Tathâgata! World-Honoured One! In former times thou hast constantly sent *Ânanda* to me for enquiry and consolation. I am now in sorrow and grief. Thou, O World-Honoured One, art majestic and exalted; in no way shall I be able to see thee. Wilt thou, I pray thee, command *Mahâmaudgalyâyana* and thy honoured disciple, *Ânanda*, to come and have an interview with me?' After this speech, she grieved and wept, shedding tears like a shower of rain. Before she raised her head from doing homage to the distant Buddha, the World-Honoured One knew what *Vaidehi* was wishing in her mind, though he was on the Mount *Grîdhra-kûta*. Therefore, he instantly ordered *Mahâmaudgalyâyana* and *Ânanda* to go to her through the sky. Buddha

himself disappeared from that mountain and appeared in the royal palace.

When the queen raised her head as she finished homage to Buddha, she saw before her the World-Honoured Buddha Śākyamuni, whose body was purple gold in colour, sitting on a lotus-flower which consists of a hundred jewels, with Mahāmaudgalyāyana attending on his left, and with Ānanda on his right. Sakra (Indra), Brahman, and other gods that protect the world were seen in the midst of the sky, everywhere showering heavenly flowers with which they made offerings to Buddha in their worship. Vaidehī, at the sight of Buddha the World-Honoured One, took off her garlands and prostrated herself on the ground, crying, sobbing, and speaking to Buddha : 'O World-Honoured One! what former sin of mine has produced such a wicked son? And again, O Exalted One, from what cause and circumstances hast thou such an affinity (by blood and religion) with Devadatta (Buddha's wicked cousin and once his disciple)?'

§ 5. 'My only prayer,' she continued, 'is this : O World-Honoured One, mayst thou preach to me in detail of all the places where there is no sorrow or trouble, and where I ought to go to be born anew. I am not satisfied with this world of depravities¹, with Gambudvīpa (India)², which is full of hells, full of hungry spirits (pretas), and of the brute creation. In this world of depravities, there is many an assemblage of the wicked. May I not

¹ For five depravities vide Smaller Sukhāvatī, § 18 ; Saddharmapundarikā by Kern, p. 58, § 140 note.

² But Japanese Buddhists take this in a wider sense.

hear, I pray, the voice of the wicked in the future ; and may I not see any wicked person.

‘ Now I throw my five limbs down to the ground before thee, and seek for thy mercy by confessing my sins. I pray for this only that the Sun-like Buddha may instruct me how to meditate on a world wherein all actions are pure.’ At that moment, the World-Honoured One flashed forth a golden ray from between his eyebrows. It extended to all the innumerable worlds of the ten quarters. On its return the ray rested on the top of Buddha’s head and transformed itself into a golden pillar just like the Mount Sumeru, wherein the pure and admirable countries of the Buddhas in the ten quarters appeared all at once illuminated.

One was a country consisting of seven jewels, another was a country all full of lotus-flowers ; one was like the palace of Mahesvara Deva (god Siva), another was like a mirror of crystal, with the countries in the ten quarters reflected therein. There were innumerable countries like these, resplendent, gorgeous, and delightful to look upon. All were meant for Vaidehi to see (and choose from).

Thereupon Vaidehi again spoke to Buddha : ‘ O World-Honoured One, although all other Buddha countries are pure and radiant with light, I should, nevertheless, wish myself to be born in the realm of Buddha Amitâyus (or Amitâbha), in the world of Highest Happiness (Sukhâvati). Now I simply pray thee, O World-Honoured One, to teach me how to concentrate my thought so as to obtain a right vision (of that country).’

§ 6. Thereupon the World-Honoured One gently smiled upon her, and rays of five colours issued

forth out of his mouth, each ray shining as far as the head of king Bimbisâra.

At that moment, the mental vision of that exalted king was perfectly clear though he was shut up in lonely retirement, and he could see the World-Honoured One from afar. As he paid homage with his head and face, he naturally increased and advanced (in wisdom), whereby he attained to the fruition of an Anâgâmin (the third of the four grades to Nirvâṇa).

§ 7. Then the World-Honoured One said: 'Now dost thou not know, O Vaidehī, that Buddha Amitâyus is not very far from here? Thou shouldst apply thy mind entirely to close meditation upon those who have already perfected the pure actions necessary for that Buddha country.

'I now proceed to fully expound them for thee in many parables, and thereby afford all ordinary persons of the future who wish to cultivate these pure actions an opportunity of being born in the Land of Highest Happiness (Sukhâvatī) in the western quarter. Those who wish to be born in that country of Buddha have to cultivate a threefold goodness. Firstly, they should act filially towards their parents and support them; serve and respect their teachers and elders; be of compassionate mind, abstain from doing any injury, and cultivate the ten virtuous actions¹. Secondly, they should take and observe the vow of seeking refuge with the Three Jewels, fulfil all moral precepts, and not lower their dignity or neglect any ceremonial observance. Thirdly, they should give their whole mind

¹ I. e. observe the ten prohibitive precepts of Buddha.

to the attainment of the Bodhi (perfect wisdom), deeply believe in (the principle of) cause and effect, study and recite (the Sûtras of) the Mahâyâna doctrine, and persuade and encourage others who pursue the same course as themselves.

‘These three groups as enumerated are called the pure actions (leading to the Buddha country).’ ‘O Vaidehi!’ Buddha continued, ‘dost thou not understand now? These three classes of actions are the efficient cause of the pure actions taught by all the Buddhas of the past, present, and future.’

§ 8. Buddha then addressed Ânanda as well as Vaidehi : ‘Listen carefully, listen carefully! Ponder carefully on what you hear! I, Tathâgata, now declare the pure actions needful (for that Buddha country) for the sake of all beings hereafter, that are subject to the misery (inflicted) by the enemy, i. e. passion. Well done, O Vaidehi! Appropriate questions are those which thou hast asked¹! O Ânanda, do thou remember these words of me, of Buddha, and repeat them openly to many assemblies. I, Tathâgata, now teach Vaidehi and also all beings hereafter in order that they may meditate on the World of Highest Happiness (Sukhâvatî) in the western quarter.

‘It is by the power of Buddha only that one can see that pure land (of Buddha) as clear as one sees the image of one’s face reflected in the transparent mirror held up before one.

‘When one sees the state of happiness of that country in its highest excellence, one greatly re-

¹ Vide supra, § 4; but those two questions, though appropriate, have not after all been answered by Buddha in this Sûtra.

joices in one's heart and immediately attains a spirit of resignation prepared to endure whatever consequences may yet arise¹. Buddha, turning again to Vaidehi, said: 'Thou art but an ordinary person; the quality of thy mind is feeble and inferior.

'Thou hast not as yet obtained the divine eye and canst not perceive what is at a distance. All the Buddhas, Tathâgatas have various means at their disposal and can therefore afford thee an opportunity of seeing (that Buddha country).' Then Vaidehi rejoined: 'O World-Honoured One, people such as I, can now see that land by the power of Buddha, but how shall all those beings who are to come after Buddha's Nirvâṇa, and who, as being depraved and devoid of good qualities, will be harassed by the five worldly sufferings²—how shall they see the World of Highest Happiness of the Buddha Amitâyus?'

PART II.

§ 9. Buddha then replied: 'Thou and all other beings besides ought to make it their only aim, with concentrated thought, to get a perception of the western quarter. You will ask how that perception is to be formed. I will explain it now. All beings, if not blind from birth, are uniformly possessed of sight, and they all see the setting sun. Thou shouldst sit down properly, looking in the western direction, and prepare thy thought for a close medi-

¹ Anutpatikadharmakshânti, cf. Larger Sukhâvatî, § 19, p. 39, and § 32, p. 5. Kern, 'the acquiescence in the eternal law,' *Saddharmapundarikâ* XI, p. 254.

² 1. Birth, 2. Old age, 3. Sickness, 4. Death, 5. Parting.

tation on the sun; cause thy mind to be firmly fixed (on it) so as to have an unwavering perception by the exclusive application (of thy thought), and gaze upon it (more particularly) when it is about to set and looks like a suspended drum.

‘After thou hast thus seen the sun, let (that image) remain clear and fixed, whether thine eyes be shut or open;—such is the perception of the sun, which is the First Meditation.

§ 10. ‘Next thou shouldst form the perception of water; gaze on the water clear and pure, and let (this image) also remain clear and fixed (afterwards); never allow thy thought to be scattered and lost.

‘When thou hast thus seen the water thou shouldst form the perception of ice. As thou seest the ice shining and transparent, thou shouldst imagine the appearance of lapis lazuli.

‘After that has been done, thou wilt see the ground consisting of lapis lazuli, transparent and shining both within and without. Beneath this ground of lapis lazuli there will be seen a golden banner with the seven jewels, diamonds and the rest, supporting the ground¹. It extends to the eight points of the compass, and thus the eight corners (of the ground) are perfectly filled up. Every side of the eight quarters consists of a hundred jewels, every jewel has a thousand rays, and every ray has eighty-four thousand colours which, when reflected in the ground of lapis lazuli, look like a thousand millions of suns, and it is difficult to see them all one by one. Over the surface of that ground of lapis lazuli there are

¹ ‘A banner supporting or lifting up the ground’ is rather strange, but there is no other way of translating it.

stretched golden ropes intertwined crosswise ; divisions are made by means of (strings of) seven jewels with every part clear and distinct.

‘ Each jewel has rays of five hundred colours which look like flowers or like the moon and stars. Lodged high up in the open sky these rays form a tower of rays, whose storeys and galleries are ten millions in number and built of a hundred jewels. Both sides of the tower have each a hundred millions of flowery banners furnished and decked with numberless musical instruments. Eight kinds of cool breezes proceed from the brilliant rays. When those musical instruments are played, they emit the sounds “suffering,” “non-existence,” “impermanence,” and “non-self;”—such is the perception of the water, which is the Second Meditation.

§ 11. ‘When this perception has been formed, thou shouldst meditate on its (constituents) one by one and make (the images) as clear as possible, so that they may never be scattered and lost, whether thine eyes be shut or open. Except only during the time of thy sleep, thou shouldst always keep this in thy mind. One who has reached this (stage of) perception is said to have dimly seen the Land of Highest Happiness (Sukhâvatī).

‘One who has obtained the Samâdhi (the state of supernatural calm) is able to see the land (of that Buddha country) clearly and distinctly: (this state) is too much to be explained fully;—such is the perception of the land, and it is the Third Meditation.

‘Thou shouldst remember, O Ânanda, the Buddha words of mine, and repeat this law for attaining to the perception of the land (of the Buddha country)

for the sake of the great mass of the people hereafter who may wish to be delivered from their sufferings. If any one meditates on the land (of that Buddha country), his sins (which bind him to) births and deaths during eighty millions of kalpas shall be expiated ; after the abandonment of his (present) body, he will assuredly be born in the pure land in the following life. The practice of this kind of meditation is called the "right meditation." If it be of another kind it is called "heretical meditation."

§ 12. Buddha then spoke to Ānanda and Vaidehi : 'When the perception of the land (of that Buddha country) has been gained, you should next meditate on the jewel-trees (of that country). In meditating on the jewel-trees, you should take each by itself and form a perception of the seven rows of trees ; every tree is eight hundred yoganās high, and all the jewel-trees have flowers and leaves consisting of seven jewels all perfect. All flowers and leaves have colours like the colours of various jewels :— from the colour of lapis lazuli there issues a golden ray ; from the colour of crystal, a saffron ray ; from the colour of agate, a diamond ray ; from the colour of diamond, a ray of blue pearls. Corals, amber, and all other gems are used as ornaments for illumination ; nets of excellent pearls are spread over the trees, each tree is covered by seven sets of nets, and between one set and another there are five hundred millions of palaces built of excellent flowers, resembling the palace of the Lord Brahman ; all heavenly children live there quite naturally ; every child has a garland consisting of five hundred millions of precious gems like those that are fastened

on Sakra's (Indra's) head¹, the rays of which shine over a hundred yoganas, just as if a hundred millions of suns and moons were united together; it is difficult to explain them in detail. That (garland) is the most excellent among all, as it is the commixture of all sorts of jewels. Rows of these jewel-trees touch one another; the leaves of the trees also join one another.

'Among the dense foliage there blossom various beautiful flowers, upon which are miraculously found fruits of seven jewels. The leaves of the trees are all exactly equal in length and in breadth, measuring twenty-five yoganas each way; every leaf has a thousand colours and a hundred different pictures on it, just like a heavenly garland. There are many excellent flowers which have the colour of Gâmbûnada gold and an appearance of fire-wheels in motion, turning between the leaves in a graceful fashion. All the fruits are produced just (as easily) as if they flowed out from the pitcher of the God Sakra. There is a magnificent ray which transforms itself into numberless jewelled canopies with banners and flags. Within these jewelled canopies the works of all the Buddhas of the Great Chiliocosm appear illuminated; the Buddha countries of the ten quarters also are manifested therein. When you have seen these trees you should also meditate on them one by one in order. In meditating on the trees, trunks, branches, leaves, flowers, and fruits, let them all be distinct and clear;—such is the perception of the trees (of that Buddha country), and it is the Fourth Meditation.

¹ The text has *Sakrâbhilagnamaziratna*, vide *infra*, §§ 16, 19.

§ 13. 'Next, you should perceive the water (of that country). The perception of the water is as follows :—

'In the Land of Highest Happiness there are waters in eight lakes; the water in every lake consists of seven jewels which are soft and yielding. Deriving its source from the king of jewels that fulfils every wish¹, the water is divided into fourteen streams; every stream has the colour of seven jewels; its channel is built of gold, the bed of which consists of the sand of variegated diamonds.

'In the midst of each lake there are sixty millions of lotus-flowers, made of seven jewels; all the flowers are perfectly round and exactly equal (in circumference), being twelve yoganās. The water of jewels flows amidst the flowers and rises and falls by the stalks (of the lotus); the sound of the streaming water is melodious and pleasing, and propounds all the perfect virtues (Parāmitās), "suffering," "non-existence," "impermanence," and "non-self;" it proclaims also the praise of the signs of perfection², and minor marks of excellence² of all Buddhas. From the king of jewels that fulfils every wish, stream forth the golden-coloured rays excessively beautiful, the radiance of which transforms itself into birds possessing the colours of a hundred jewels, which sing out harmonious notes, sweet and delicious, ever praising the remembrance of Buddha, the remembrance of the Law, and the remembrance of the Church ;—such is the perception

¹ Sanskrit *Kīntāmaṇi*, i. e. 'wishing-pearl.'

² For thirty-two signs and eighty minor marks vide *Dharma-saṅgraha* by Kasawara, p. 53 seq. (vol. i, part v, *Anecdota Oxoniensia*, Aryan Series, 1885).

of the water of eight good qualities, and it is the Fifth Meditation.

§ 14. 'Each division of that (Buddha) country, which consists of several jewels, has also jewelled storeys and galleries to the number of five hundred millions; within each storey and gallery there are innumerable Devas engaged in playing heavenly music. There are some musical instruments that are hung up in the open sky, like the jewelled banners of heaven; they emit musical sounds without being struck, which, while resounding variously, all propound the remembrance of Buddha, of the Law and of the Church, Bhikshus, &c. When this perception is duly accomplished, one is said to have dimly seen the jewel-trees, jewel-ground, and jewel-lakes of that World of Highest Happiness (Sukhâvati);—such is the perception formed by meditating on the general (features of that Land), and it is the Sixth Meditation.

'If one has experienced this, one has expiated the greatest sinful deeds which would (otherwise lead one) to transmigration for numberless millions of kalpas; after his death he will assuredly be born in that land.

§ 15¹. 'Listen carefully! listen carefully! Think over what you have heard! I, Buddha, am about to explain in detail the law of delivering one's self from trouble and torment. Commit this to your memory in order to explain it in detail before a great assembly.' While Buddha was uttering these words, Buddha Amitâyus stood in the midst of the sky

¹ § 15. Hereafter, for brevity's sake, I take the liberty of omitting several passages which seem to be unnecessary repetitions.

with Bodhisattvas Mahāsthāma and Avalokitesvara, attending on his right and left respectively. There was such a bright and dazzling radiance that no one could see clearly; the brilliance was a hundred thousand times greater than that of gold (*Gāmbūnada*). Thereupon Vaidehī saw Buddha Amitāyus and approached the World-Honoured One, and worshipped him, touching his feet; and spoke to him as follows: 'O Exalted One! I am now able, by the power of Buddha, to see Buddha Amitāyus together with the two Bodhisattvas. But how shall all the beings of the future meditate on Buddha Amitāyus and the two Bodhisattvas?'

§ 16. Buddha answered: 'Those who wish to meditate on that Buddha ought first to direct their thought as follows: form the perception of a lotus-flower on a ground of seven jewels, each leaf of that lotus exhibits the colours of a hundred jewels, and has eighty-four thousand veins, just like heavenly pictures; each vein possesses eighty-four thousand rays, of which each can be clearly seen. Every small leaf and flower is two hundred and fifty *yoganas* in length and the same measurement in breadth. Each lotus-flower possesses eighty-four thousand leaves, each leaf has the kingly pearls to the number of a hundred millions, as ornaments for illumination; each pearl shoots out a thousand rays like bright canopies. The surface of the ground is entirely covered by a mixture of seven jewels. There is a tower built of the gems which are like those that are fastened on Sakra's head. It is inlaid and decked with eighty thousand diamonds, *Kimsuka* jewels, *Brahma-maṇi* and excellent pearl nets.

‘On that tower there are miraculously found four posts with jewelled banners; each banner looks like a hundred thousand millions of Sumeru mountains.

‘The jewelled veil over these banners is like that of the celestial palace of Yama, illuminated with five hundred millions of excellent jewels, each jewel has eighty-four thousand rays, each ray has various golden colours to the number of eighty-four thousand, each golden colour covers the whole jewelled soil, it changes and is transformed at various places, every now and then exhibiting various appearances; now it becomes a diamond tower, now a pearl net, again clouds of mixed flowers, freely changing its manifestation in the ten directions it exhibits the state of Buddha;—such is the perception of the flowery throne, and it is the Seventh Meditation.’

Buddha, turning to Ānanda, said: ‘These excellent flowers were created originally by the power of the prayer of Bhikshu, Dharmākara¹. All who wish to exercise the remembrance of that Buddha ought first to form the perception of that flowery throne. When engaged in it one ought not to perceive vaguely, but fix the mind upon each detail separately. Leaf, jewel, ray, tower, and banner should be clear and distinct, just as one sees the image of one’s own face in a mirror. When one has achieved this perception, the sins which would produce births and deaths during fifty thousand kalpas are expiated, and he is one who will most assuredly be born in the World of Highest Happiness.

§ 17. ‘When you have perceived this, you should

¹ Vide Larger Sukhāvatī, p. 7, § 3.

next perceive Buddha himself. Do you ask how? Every Buddha Tathâgata is one whose (spiritual) body is the principle of nature (Darmadhâtu-kâya), so that he may enter into the mind of any beings. Consequently, when you have perceived Buddha, it is indeed that mind of yours that possesses those thirty-two signs of perfection and eighty minor marks of excellence (which you see in Buddha). In fine, it is your mind that becomes Buddha, nay, it is your mind that is indeed Buddha. The ocean of true and universal knowledge of all the Buddhas derives its source from one's own mind and thought. Therefore you should apply your thought with an undivided attention to a careful meditation on that Buddha Tathâgata, Arhat, the Holy and Fully Enlightened One. In forming the perception of that Buddha, you should first perceive the image of that Buddha; whether your eyes be open or shut, look at an image like Gâmbûnada gold in colour, sitting on that flower (throne mentioned before).

‘When you have seen the seated figure your mental vision will become clear, and you will be able to see clearly and distinctly the adornment of that Buddha country, the jewelled ground, &c. In seeing these things, let them be clear and fixed just as you see the palms of your hands. When you have passed through this experience, you should further form (a perception of) another great lotus-flower which is on the left side of Buddha, and is exactly equal in every way to the above-mentioned lotus-flower of Buddha. Still further, you should form (a perception of) another lotus-flower which is on the right side of Buddha. Perceive that an image of Bodhisattva Avalokitesvara is sitting on the left-

hand flowery throne, shooting forth golden rays exactly like those of Buddha. Perceive then that an image of Bodhisattva Mahâsthâma is sitting on the right-hand flowery throne.

‘When these perceptions are gained the images of Buddha and the Bodhisattvas will all send forth brilliant rays, clearly lighting up all the jewel-trees with golden colour. Under every tree there are also three lotus-flowers. On every lotus-flower there is an image, either of Buddha or of a Bodhisattva; thus (the images of the Bodhisattvas and of Buddha) are found everywhere in that country. When this perception has been gained, the devotee should hear the excellent Law preached by means of a stream of water, a brilliant ray of light, several jewel-trees, ducks, geese, and swans. Whether he be wrapped in meditation or whether he has ceased from it, he should ever hear the excellent Law. What the devotee hears must be kept in memory and not be lost, when he ceases from that meditation; and it should agree with the Sûtras, for if it does not agree with the Sûtras, it is called an illusory perception, whereas if it does agree, it is called the rough perception of the World of Highest Happiness;—such is the perception of the images, and it is the Eighth Meditation.

‘He who has practised this meditation is freed from the sins (which otherwise involve him in) births and deaths for innumerable millions of kalpas, and during this present life he obtains the Samâdhi due to the remembrance of Buddha.

§ 18. ‘Further, when this perception is gained, you should next proceed to meditate on the bodily marks and the light of Buddha Amitâyus.

‘Thou shouldst know, O Ânanda, that the body of Buddha Amitâyus is a hundred thousand million times as bright as the colour of the Gâmbûnada gold of the heavenly abode of Yama ; the height of that Buddha is six hundred thousand niyutas of koṭis of yoganas innumerable as are the sands of the river Gaṅgâ.

‘The white twist of hair between the eyebrows all turning to the right, is just like the five Sumeru mountains.

‘The eyes of Buddha are like the water of the four great oceans ; the blue and the white are quite distinct.

‘All the roots of hair of his body issue forth brilliant rays which are also like the Sumeru mountains.

‘The halo of that Buddha is like a hundred millions of the Great Chiliocosms ; in that halo there are Buddhas miraculously created, to the number of a million of niyutas of koṭis innumerable as the sands of the Gaṅgâ ; each of these Buddhas has for attendants a great assembly of numberless Bodhisattvas who are also miraculously created.

‘Buddha Amitâyus has eighty-four thousand signs of perfection, each sign is possessed of eighty-four minor marks of excellence, each mark has eighty-four thousand rays, each ray extends so far as to shine over the worlds of the ten quarters, whereby Buddha embraces and protects all the beings who think upon him and does not exclude (any one of them). His rays, signs, &c., are difficult to be explained in detail. But in simple meditation let the mind’s eye dwell upon them.

‘If you pass through this experience, you will at the same time see all the Buddhas of the ten quarters. Since you see all the Buddhas it is called the Samâdhi of the remembrance of the Buddhas.

‘Those who have practised this meditation are said to have contemplated the bodies of all the Buddhas. Since they have meditated on Buddha’s body, they will also see Buddha’s mind. It is great compassion that is called Buddha’s mind. It is by his absolute compassion that he receives all beings.

‘Those who have practised this meditation will, when they die, be born in the presence of the Buddhas in another life, and obtain a spirit of resignation wherewith to face all the consequences which shall hereafter arise.

‘Therefore those who have wisdom should direct their thought to the careful meditation upon that Buddha Amitâyus. Let those who meditate on Buddha Amitâyus begin with one single sign or mark—let them first meditate on the white twist of hair between the eyebrows as clearly as possible; when they have done this, the eighty-four thousand signs and marks will naturally appear before their eyes. Those who see Amitâyus will also see all the innumerable Buddhas of the ten quarters. Since they have seen all the innumerable Buddhas, they will receive the prophecy of their future destiny (to become Buddha), in the presence of all the Buddhas;—such is the perception gained by a complete meditation on all forms and bodies (of Buddha), and it is the Ninth Meditation.

§ 19. ‘When you have seen Buddha Amitâyus distinctly, you should then further meditate upon Bodhisattva Avalokitesvara, whose height is eight

hundred thousands of *niyutas* of *yoganas*; the colour of his body is purple gold, his head has a turban (*ushṛtshasiraskatā*), at the back of which there is a halo; (the circumference of) his face is a hundred thousand *yoganas*. In that halo, there are five hundred Buddhas miraculously transformed just like those of *Sākyamuni* Buddha, each transformed Buddha is attended by five hundred transformed *Bodhisattvas* who are also attended by numberless gods.

‘Within the circle of light emanating from his whole body, appear illuminated the various forms and marks of all beings that live in the five paths¹ of existence.

‘On the top of his head is a heavenly crown of gems like those that are fastened (on Indra’s head), in which crown there is a transformed Buddha standing, twenty-five *yoganas* high.

‘The face of *Bodhisattva Avalokitesvara* is like *Gāmbūnada* gold in colour.

‘The soft hair between the eyebrows has all the colours of the seven jewels, from which eighty-four kinds of rays flow out, each ray has innumerable transformed Buddhas, each of whom is attended by numberless transformed *Bodhisattvas*; freely changing their manifestations they fill up the worlds of the ten quarters; (the appearance) can be compared with the colour of the red lotus-flower.

‘(He wears) a garland consisting of eight thousand rays, in which is seen fully reflected a state of perfect beauty. The palm of his hand has a mixed colour of five hundred lotus-flowers. His hands have ten

¹ Men, gods, hell, the departed spirits, the brute creation.

(tips of) fingers, each tip has eighty-four thousand pictures, which are like signet-marks, each picture has eighty-four thousand colours, each colour has eighty-four thousand rays which are soft and mild and shine over all things that exist. With these jewel hands he draws and embraces all beings. When he lifts up his feet, the soles of his feet are seen to be marked with a wheel of a thousand spokes (one of the thirty-two signs) which miraculously transform themselves into five hundred million pillars of rays. When he puts his feet down to the ground, the flowers of diamonds and jewels are scattered about, and all things are simply covered by them. All the other signs of his body and the minor marks of excellence are perfect, and not at all different from those of Buddha, except the signs of having the turban on his head and the top of his head invisible, which two signs of him are inferior to those of the World-Honoured One;—such is the perception of the real form and body of Bodhisattva Avalokitesvara, and it is the Tenth Meditation.'

Buddha, especially addressing Ānanda, said: 'Who-soever wishes to meditate on Bodhisattva Avalokitesvara must do so in the way I have explained. Those who practise this meditation will not suffer any calamity; they will utterly remove the obstacle that is raised by Karma, and will expiate the sins which would involve them in births and deaths for numberless kalpas. Even the hearing of the name of this Bodhisattva will enable one to obtain immeasurable happiness. How much more, then, will the diligent contemplation of him!

'Whosoever will meditate on Bodhisattva Avalo-

kitesvara should first meditate on the turban of his head, and then on his heavenly crown.

‘All the other signs should also be meditated on according to their order, and they should be clear and distinct just as one sees the palms of one’s hands.

‘Next you should meditate on Bodhisattva Mahâsthâma, whose bodily signs, height, and size are equal to those of Avalokitesvara; the circumference (lit. surface) of his halo is one hundred and twenty-five yoganâs, and it shines as far as two hundred and fifty yoganâs. The rays of his whole body shine over the countries of the ten quarters, they are purple gold in colour, and can be seen by all beings that are in favourable circumstances.

‘If one but sees the ray that issues from a single root of the hair of this Bodhisattva, he will at the same time see the pure and excellent rays of all the innumerable Buddhas of the ten quarters.

‘For this reason this Bodhisattva is named the Unlimited Light; it is with this light of wisdom that he shines over all beings and causes them to be removed from the three paths of existence (Hells, Pretas, and the brute creation), and to obtain the highest power. For the same reason this Bodhisattva is called the Bodhisattva of Great Strength (Mahâsthâma). His heavenly crown has five hundred jewel-flowers; each jewel-flower has five hundred jewel-towers; in each tower are seen manifested all the pure and excellent features of the far-stretching Buddha countries in the ten quarters. The turban on his head is like a padma- (lotus) flower; on the top of the turban there is a jewel-pitcher, which is filled with various brilliant rays

fully manifesting the state of Buddha. All his other bodily signs are quite equal to those of Avalokitesvara. When this Bodhisattva walks about, all the regions of the ten quarters tremble and quake. Wherever the earth quakes there appear five hundred millions of jewel-flowers; each jewel-flower with its splendid dazzling beauty looks like the World of Highest Happiness (Sukhâvati).

‘When this Bodhisattva sits down, all the countries of seven jewels at once tremble and quake: all the incarnate (lit. divided) Âmitâyus’s, innumerable as the dust of the earth, and all the incarnate Bodhisattvas (Aval. and Mahâs.) who dwell in the middlemost Buddha countries (situated) between the Buddha country of the lower region (presided over) by a Buddha called the “Golden Light,” and the country of the upper region (presided over) by a Buddha called the “King of Light,”—all these assemble in the World of Highest Happiness (Sukhâvati), like gathering clouds, sit on their thrones of lotus-flowers, which fill the whole sky, and preach the excellent Law in order to deliver all the beings that are plunged in suffering;—such is the perception of the form and body of Bodhisattva Mahâsthâma, and it is the Eleventh Meditation.

‘Those who practise this meditation are freed from the sins (which would otherwise involve them) in births and deaths for innumerable asaṅkhyā kalpas.

‘Those who have practised this meditation do not live in an embryo state but obtain free access to the excellent and admirable countries of Buddhas. Those who have experienced this are said to have

perfectly meditated upon the two Bodhisattvas Avalokitesvara and Mahâsthâma.

§ 20. 'After thou hast had this perception, thou shouldst imagine thyself to be born in the World of Highest Happiness in the western quarter, and to be seated, cross-legged, on a lotus-flower there. Then imagine that the flower has shut thee in and has afterwards unfolded; when the flower has thus unfolded, five hundred coloured rays will shine over thy body, thine eyes will be opened so as to see the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas who fill the whole sky; thou wilt hear the sounds of waters and trees, the notes of birds, and the voices of many Buddhas preaching the excellent Law, in accordance with the twelve divisions¹ of the scriptures. When thou hast ceased from that meditation, thou must remember the experience ever after.

'If thou hast passed through this experience thou art said to have seen the World of Highest Happiness in the realm of the Buddha Amitâyus;—this is the perception obtained by a complete meditation on that Buddha country, and is called the Twelfth Meditation.

'The innumerable incarnate bodies of Amitâyus, together with those of Aval. and Mahâs., constantly come and appear before such devotees (as above mentioned).'

§ 21. Buddha then spoke to Ânanda and Vaidehi: 'Those who wish, by means of their serene thoughts, to be born in the western land, should first meditate on an image of the Buddha, who is sixteen cubits

¹ Vide Max Müller, *Dhammapada*, Introduction, p. xxxiii, and Kasawara, *Dharmasaṅgraha*, LXII, p. 48.

high¹, seated on (a lotus-flower in) the water of the lake. As it was stated before, the (real) body and its measurement are unlimited, incomprehensible to the ordinary mind.

‘But by the efficacy of the ancient prayer of that Tathâgata, those who think of and remember him shall certainly be able to accomplish their aim.

‘Even the mere perceiving of the image of that Buddha brings to one immeasurable blessings. How much more, then, will the meditating upon all the complete bodily signs of that Buddha! Buddha Amitâyus has supernatural power; since everything is at his disposal, he freely transforms himself in the regions of the ten quarters. At one time he shows himself as possessing a magnificent body, which fills the whole sky, at another he makes his body appear small, the height being only sixteen or eighteen cubits. The body he manifests is always pure gold in colour; his halo—(bright with) transformed Buddhas—and his jewel lotus-flowers are as mentioned above. The bodies of the two Bodhisattvas are the same always.

‘All beings can recognise either of the two Bodhisattvas by simply glancing at the marks of their heads. These two Bodhisattvas assist Amitâyus in his work of universal salvation;—such is the meditation that forms a joint perception of the Buddha and Bodhisattvas, and it is the Thirteenth Meditation.’

¹ This is said to have been the height of Sâkyamuni; the cubit is Chinese, but as it varied from time to time, it is difficult to determine his real height. Spence Hardy, in his *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 364, says, ‘Buddha is sometimes said to be twelve cubits in height, and sometimes eighteen cubits.’

PART III.

§ 22. Buddha then spoke to Ānanda and Vaidehi: 'The beings who will be born in the highest form of the highest grade (i. e. to Buddhahood) are those, whoever they may be, who wish to be born in that country and cherish the threefold thought whereby they are at once destined to be born there. What is the threefold thought, you may ask. First, the True Thought; second, the Deep Believing Thought; third, the Desire to be born in that Pure Land by bringing one's own stock of merit to maturity. Those who have this threefold thought in perfection shall most assuredly be born into that country.

'There are also three classes of beings who are able to be born in that country. What, you may ask, are the three classes of beings? First, those who are possessed of a compassionate mind, who do no injury to any beings, and accomplish all virtuous actions according to Buddha's precepts; second, those who study and recite the Sûtras of the Mahâyâna doctrine, for instance, the Vaipulya Sûtras¹; third, those who practise the sixfold remembrance². These three classes of beings who wish to be born in that country by bringing (their respective stocks of merit) to maturity, will become destined to be born there if they have accomplished any of those meritorious deeds for one day or even for seven days.

¹ Nanjio's Catalogue of Tripiṭaka, Nos. 23, 24-28, and many others.

² Sixfold remembrance, i. e. of the Three Jewels, the precepts, the charity of Buddha, and Bodhisattvas and the world of Devas.

‘When one who has practised (these merits) is about to be born in that country, Buddha Amitâyus, together with the two Bodhisattvas Aval. and Mahâs., also numberless created Buddhas, and a hundred thousand Bhikshus and Śrāvakas, with their whole retinue, and innumerable gods, together with the palaces of seven jewels, will appear before him out of regard for his diligence and courage; Aval., together with Mahâs., will offer a diamond seat to him; thereupon Amitâyus himself will send forth magnificent rays of light to shine over the dying person’s body. He and many Bodhisattvas will offer their hands and welcome him, when Aval., Mahâs., and all the other Bodhisattvas will praise the glory of the man who practised the meritorious deeds, and convey an exhortation to his mind. When the new-comer, having seen these, rejoicing and leaping for joy, looks at himself, he will find his own body seated on that diamond throne; and as he follows behind Buddha he will be born into that country, in a moment. When he has been born there, he will see Buddha’s form and body with every sign of perfection complete, and also the perfect forms and signs of all the Bodhisattvas; he will also see brilliant rays and jewel-forests and hear them propounding the excellent Law, and instantly be conscious of a spirit of resignation to whatever consequences may hereafter arise. Before long he will serve every one of the Buddhas who live in the regions of the ten quarters. In the presence of each of those Buddhas he will obtain successively a prophecy of his future destiny. On his return to his own land (Sukhâvatt, in which he has just been born)

he will obtain countless hundreds of thousands of Dhâraṇī formulas (mystic form of prayer);—such are those who are to be born in the highest form of the highest grade (to Buddhahood).

§ 23. 'Next, the beings who will be born in the middle form of the highest grade are those who do not necessarily learn, remember, study, or recite those Vaipulya Sûtras, but fully understand the meaning of the truth (contained in them), and having a firm grasp of the highest truth do not speak evil of the Mahâyâna doctrine, but deeply believe in (the principle of) cause and effect; who by bringing these good qualities to maturity seek to be born in that Country of Highest Happiness. When one who has acquired these qualities is about to die, Amitâyus, surrounded by the two Bodhisattvas Aval. and Mahâs., and an innumerable retinue of dependents, will bring a seat of purple gold and approach him with words of praise, saying: "O my son in the Law! thou hast practised the Mahâyâna doctrine; thou hast understood and believed the highest truth; therefore I now come to meet and welcome thee." He and the thousand created Buddhas offer hands all at once.

'When that man looks at his own body, he will find himself seated on that purple gold seat; he will, then, stretching forth his folded hands, praise and eulogise all the Buddhas. As quick as thought he will be born in the lake of seven jewels, of that country. That purple gold seat on which he sits is like a magnificent jewel-flower, and will open after a night; the new-comer's body becomes purple gold in colour, and he will also find under his feet a lotus-flower consisting of seven jewels. Buddha and the

Bodhisattvas at the same time will send forth brilliant rays to shine over the body of that person whose eyes will instantaneously be opened and become clear. According to his former usage (in the human world) he will hear all the voices that are there, preaching primary truths of the deepest significance.

‘ Then he will descend from that golden seat and worship Buddha with folded hands, praising and eulogising the World-Honoured One. After seven days, he will immediately attain to the state of the highest perfect knowledge (anuttarasamyaksambodhi) from which he will never fall away (avaivartya); next he will fly to all the ten regions and successively serve all the Buddhas therein ; he will practise many a Samâdhi in the presence of those Buddhas. After the lapse of a lesser kalpa he will attain a spirit of resignation to whatever consequences may hereafter arise, and he will also obtain a prophecy of his future destiny in the presence of Buddhas.

§ 24. ‘ Next are those who are to be born in the lowest form of the highest grade : this class of beings also believes in (the principle of) cause and effect, and without slandering the Mahâyâna doctrine, simply cherishes the thought of obtaining the highest Bodhi and by bringing this good quality to maturity seeks to be born in that Country of Highest Happiness. When a devotee of this class dies, Amitâyus, with Aval., Mahâs., and all the dependents, will offer him a golden lotus-flower ; he will also miraculously create five hundred Buddhas in order to send and meet him. These five hundred created Buddhas will, all at once, offer hands and praise him, saying : “O my son in the Law! thou art pure now ; as thou hast cherished the thought of obtaining the highest Bodhi, we come to

meet thee." When he has seen them, he will find himself seated on that golden lotus-flower. Soon the flower will close upon him ; following behind the World-Honoured One he will go to be born in the lake of seven jewels. After one day and one night the lotus-flower will unfold itself. Within seven days he may see Buddha's body, though his mind is not as yet clear enough to perceive all the signs and marks of the Buddha, which he will be able to see clearly after three weeks ; then he will hear many sounds and voices preaching the excellent Law, and he himself, travelling through all the ten quarters, will worship all the Buddhas, from whom he will learn the deepest significance of the Law. After three lesser kalpas he will gain entrance to the knowledge of a hundred (divisions of) nature (*satadharma-vidyâdvâra*) and become settled in the (first) joyful stage¹ (of *Bodhisattva*). The perception of these three classes of beings is called the meditation upon the superior class of beings, and is the Fourteenth Meditation.

§ 25. 'The beings who will be born in the highest form of the middle grade are those who observe the five prohibitive precepts, the eight prohibitive precepts and the fasting, and practise all the moral precepts ; who do not commit the five deadly sins², and who bring no blame or trouble upon any being ; and who by bringing these good qualities to maturity seek to be born in the World of Highest Happiness in the western quarter. On the eve of such a person's departure from this life, Amitâyus, surrounded by

¹ There are ten stages which a *Bodhisattva* goes through.

² Childers' Pâli Dictionary, s. v. *abhi/hânam*.

Bhikshus and dependents, will appear before him, flashing forth rays of golden colour, and will preach the Law of suffering, non-existence, impermanence, and non-self. He will also praise the virtue of homelessness that can liberate one from all sufferings. At the sight of Buddha, that believer will excessively rejoice in his heart; he will soon find himself seated on a lotus-flower. Kneeling down on the ground and stretching forth his folded hands he will pay homage to Buddha. Before he raises his head he will reach that Country of Highest Happiness and be born there. Soon the lotus-flower will unfold, when he will hear sounds and voices praising and glorifying the Four Noble Truths (of suffering). He will immediately attain to the fruition of Arhatship, gain the threefold knowledge and the six supernatural faculties, and complete the eightfold emancipation.

§ 26. 'The beings who will be born in the middle form of the middle grade are those who either observe the eight prohibitive precepts, and the fasting for one day and one night, or observe the prohibitive precept for *Sramanera* (a novice) for the same period, or observe the perfect moral precepts, not lowering their dignity nor neglecting any ceremonial observance for one day and one night, and by bringing their respective merits to maturity seek to be born in the Country of Highest Happiness. On the eve of departure from this life, such a believer who is possessed of this moral virtue, which he has made fragrant by cultivation during his life, will see Amitâyus, followed by all his retinue; flashing forth rays of golden colour, this Buddha will come before him and offer a lotus-flower of seven jewels.

‘He will hear a voice in the sky, praising him and saying: “O son of a noble family, thou art indeed an excellent man. Out of regard for thy obedience to the teachings of all the Buddhas of the three worlds I, now, come and meet thee.” Then the new-comer will see himself seated on that lotus-flower. Soon the lotus-flower will fold around him, and being in this he will be born in the jewel-lake of the World of Highest Happiness in the western quarter.

‘After seven days that flower will unfold again, when the believer will open his eyes, and praise the World-Honoured One, stretching forth his folded hands. Having heard the Law, he will rejoice and obtain the fruition of a Srota-âpanna¹ (the first grade to Nirvâna).

‘In the lapse of half a kalpa he will become an Arhat.

§ 27. ‘Next are the beings who will be born in the lowest form of the middle grade (to Buddhahood). If there be sons or daughters of a noble family who are filial to their parents and support them, besides exercising benevolence and compassion in the world, at their departure from this life, such persons will meet a good and learned teacher who will fully describe to them the state of happiness in that Buddha country of Amitâyus, and will also explain the forty-eight prayers of the Bhikshu Dharmâkara². As soon as any such person has heard these details, his life will come to an end. In a brief moment³ he

¹ Vide *Vaggrakkhedikâ*, § 9.

² Vide *Larger Sukhâvatî*, §§ 7, 8.

³ Lit. ‘In the time in which a strong man can bend his arm or stretch his bended arm.’

will be born in the World of Highest Happiness in the western quarter.

‘After seven days he will meet Aval. and Mahâs., from whom he will learn the Law and rejoice. After the lapse of a lesser kalpa he will attain to the fruition of an Arhat. The perception of these three sorts of beings is called the meditation of the middle class of beings, and is the Fifteenth Meditation.

§ 28. ‘Next are the beings who will be born in the highest form of the lowest grade. If there be any one who commits many evil deeds, provided that he does not speak evil of the Mahâvaipulya Sûtras, he, though himself a very stupid man, and neither ashamed nor sorry for all the evil actions that he has done, yet, while dying, may meet a good and learned teacher who will recite and laud the headings and titles of the twelve divisions of the Mahâyâna scriptures. Having thus heard the names of all the Sûtras, he will be freed from the greatest sins which would involve him in births and deaths during a thousand kalpas.

‘A wise man also will teach him to stretch forth his folded hands and to say, “Adoration to Buddha Amitâyus” (Namo-mitâbhâya Buddhâya, or, Namo-mitâyushe Buddhâya). Having uttered the name of the Buddha, he will be freed from the sins which would otherwise involve him in births and deaths for fifty millions of kalpas. Thereupon the Buddha will send a created Buddha, and the created Bodhisattvas Aval. and Mahâs., to approach that person with words of praise, saying: “O son of a noble family, as thou hast uttered the name of that Buddha, all thy sins have been destroyed and expiated, and therefore we now come to meet thee.” After this

speech the devotee will observe the rays of that created Buddha flooding his chamber with light, and while rejoicing at the sight he will depart this life. Seated on a lotus-flower he will follow that created Buddha and go to be born in the jewel-lake.

‘After the lapse of seven weeks, the lotus-flower will unfold, when the great compassionate Bodhisattvas Aval. and Mahâs. will stand before him, flashing forth magnificent rays, and will preach to him the deepest meaning of the twelve divisions of the scriptures. Having heard this, he will understand and believe it, and cherish the thought of attaining the highest Bodhi. In a period of ten lesser kalpas he will gain entrance to the knowledge of the hundred (divisions of) nature, and be able to enter upon the first (joyful) stage (of Bodhisattva). Those who have had an opportunity of hearing the name of Buddha, the name of the Law, and the name of the Church—the names of the Three Jewels—can also be born (in that country).’

§ 29. Buddha continued: ‘Next are the beings who will be born in the middle form of the lowest grade. If there be any one who transgresses the five and the eight prohibitive precepts, and also all the perfect moral precepts; he, being himself so stupid as to steal things that belong to the whole community¹, or things that belong to a particular Bhikshu, and not be ashamed nor sorry for his impure preaching of the Law (in case of preacher), but magnify and glorify himself with many wicked deeds :—such a

¹ The text has ‘saṅghika things,’ which is probably saṅghika lābha, i.e. ‘gains of the whole community’ opposed to gains of a single monk, Childers’ Pāli Dictionary, s. v. saṅghiko, p. 449.

sinful person deserves to fall into hell in consequence of those sins. At the time of his death, when the fires of hell approach him from all sides, he will meet a good and learned teacher who will, out of great compassion, preach the power and virtue of the ten faculties of Amitâyus and fully explain the supernatural powers and brilliant rays of that Buddha; and will further praise moral virtue, meditation, wisdom, emancipation, and the thorough knowledge that follows emancipation. After having heard this, he will be freed from his sins, which would involve him in births and deaths during eighty millions of kalpas; thereupon those violent fires of hell will transform themselves into a pure and cool wind blowing about heavenly flowers. On each of these flowers will stand a created Buddha or Bodhisattva to meet and receive that person. In a moment he will be born in a lotus-flower growing in the lake of seven jewels. After six kalpas the lotus-flower will open, when Avalokitesvara and Mahâsthâma will soothe and encourage him with their Brahma-voices, and preach to him the Mahâyâna Sûtras of the deepest significance.

‘Having heard this Law, he will instantaneously direct his thought toward the attainment of the highest Bodhi.

§ 30. ‘Lastly, the beings who will be born in the lowest form of the lowest grade. If there be any one who commits evil deeds, and even completes the ten wicked actions, the five deadly sins¹ and the like; that

¹ The five deadly sins, according to Mahâvyutpatti, § 118, are Mâtṛighâta, Pitṛighâta, Arhatghâta, Saṅghabheda, Tathâgatasyântike dushkaṭṭarudhiropâdana, which are unpardonable in the Larger Sukhâvatī; vide Nanjio’s note and Pravidhâna 19 (§ 8), the

man, being himself stupid and guilty of many crimes, deserves to fall into a miserable path of existence and suffer endless pains during many kalpas. On the eve of death he will meet a good and learned teacher who will, soothing and encouraging him in various ways, preach to him the excellent Law and teach him the remembrance of Buddha, but, being harassed by pains, he will have no time to think of Buddha. Some good friend will then say to him: "Even if thou canst not exercise the remembrance of Buddha, thou mayst, at least, utter the name, 'Buddha Amitâyus¹.'" Let him do so serenely with his voice uninterrupted; let him be (continually) thinking of Buddha until he has completed ten times the thought, repeating (the formula), "Adoration to Buddha Amitâyus" (Namo-mitâyushe Buddhâya). On the strength of (his merit of) uttering Buddha's name he will, during every repetition, expiate the sins which involve him in births and deaths during eighty millions of kalpas. He will, while dying, see a golden lotus-flower like the disk of the sun appearing before his eyes; in a moment he will be born in the World of Highest Happiness. After twelve greater kalpas the lotus-flower will unfold; thereupon the Bodhisattvas Aval. and Mahâs., raising their voices in great compassion, will preach to him in detail the real state of all the elements of nature and the law of the expiation of sins.

Ânantarya sins. Cf. the six crimes enumerated in Childers' Pâli Dictionary, p. 7 b, Abhi/hânam; vide supra, p. 192, § 25.

¹ The Corean text and the two other editions of the T'ang and Sung dynasties have 'Namo-mitâyushe Buddhâya' instead of 'Buddha Amitâyus,' which is the reading of the Japanese text and the edition of the Ming dynasty.

‘On hearing them he will rejoice and will immediately direct his thought toward the attainment of the Bodhi;—such are the beings who are to be born in the lowest form of the lowest grade (to Buddhahood). The perception of the above three is called the meditation of the inferior class of beings, and is the Sixteenth Meditation.’

PART IV.

§ 31. When Buddha had finished this speech, Vaidehī, together with her five hundred female attendants, could see, as guided by the Buddha’s words, the scene of the far-stretching World of the Highest Happiness, and could also see the body of Buddha and the bodies of the two Bodhisattvas. With her mind filled with joy she praised them, saying: ‘Never have I seen such a wonder!’ Instantaneously she became wholly and fully enlightened, and attained a spirit of resignation, prepared to endure whatever consequences might yet arise¹. Her five hundred female attendants too cherished the thought of obtaining the highest perfect knowledge, and sought to be born in that Buddha country.

§ 32. The World-Honoured One predicted that they would all be born in that Buddha country, and be able to obtain the Samādhi (the supernatural calm) of the presence of many Buddhas. All the innumerable Devas (gods) also directed their thought toward the attainment of the highest Bodhi.

Thereupon Ānanda rose from his seat, approached

¹ Vide supra, §§ 8, 22, 23.

Buddha, and spoke thus : ' O World-Honoured One, what should we call this Sûtra ? And how should we receive and remember it (in the future) ? '

Buddha said in his reply to Ânanda : ' O Ânanda, this Sûtra should be called the meditation on the Land of Sukhâvatî, on Buddha Amitâyus, Bodhisattva Avalokitesvara, Bodhisattva Mahâsthâma, or otherwise be called " (the Sûtra on) the entire removal of the obstacle of Karma ¹, (the means of) being born in the realm of the Buddhas." Thou shouldst take and hold it, not forgetting nor losing it. Those who practise the Samâdhi (the supernatural calm) in accordance with this Sûtra will be able to see, in the present life, Buddha Amitâyus and the two great Bodhisattvas.

' In case of a son or a daughter of a noble family, the mere hearing of the names of the Buddha and the two Bodhisattvas will expiate the sins which would involve them in births and deaths during innumerable kalpas. How much more will the remembrance (of Buddha and the Bodhisattvas) !

' Know that he who remembers that Buddha is the white lotus (*pundarikâ*) among men, it is he whom the Bodhisattvas Avalokitesvara and Mahâsthâma consider an excellent friend. He will, sitting in the Bodhi-*mandala* ², be born in the abode of Buddhas.'

¹ Sanskrit *karmâvarana-visuddhi*.

² Bodhi-*mandala* = Bodhi-*mandâ*, i.e. the Circle of Bodhi ; ' the round terrace of enlightenment,' see Kern, *Saddharmapundarikâ*, p. 155 note. This circle is the ground on which stood the Arvattha tree near which Sâkyamuni defeated the assaults of Mâra, and finally obtained Bodhi or enlightenment. The tree is called Bodhidruma, the ground round its stem the bodhi-*mandala*. In the *Saddharmapundarikâ* VII, 7, it is called Bodhi-*mandâvara*, which

Buddha further spoke to Ānanda : ‘ Thou shouldst carefully remember these words. To remember these words is to remember the name of Buddha Amitāyus.’

When Buddha concluded these words, the worthy disciples Mahāmaudgalyāyana, and Ānanda, Vaidehi, and the others were all enraptured with excessive joy.

§ 33. Thereupon the World-Honoured One came back, walking through the open sky, to the Mount *Grīdhra-kūṭa*. Ānanda soon after spoke before a great assembly of all the occurrences as stated above. On hearing this, all the innumerable Devas (gods), Nāgas (snakes), and Yakshas (demi-gods) were inspired with great joy; and having worshipped the Buddha they went their way.

Here ends the Sūtra of the Meditation on Buddha Amitāyus, spoken by Buddha (Sākyamuni).

Dr. Kern translates by the terrace of enlightenment, *vāra* meaning circuit. A different idea is expressed by *bodhimandapa* in the Buddha-*āraṇa* XIV, 90, which would mean a hall or pavilion, unless we ought to read here also *bodhimandala*.

INDEX OF NAMES AND SUBJECTS

IN THE AMITÂYUR-DHYÂNA-SÛTRA.

- Abhiśānam, page 192 note; 198 note.
- Agâtasatru, 161; 162; 164.
- Amitâbha (or Amitâyus), 166; 195.
- Amitâyus (or Amitâbha), 166; 167; 169; 176; 180; 189; 195; 198; 200; 201.
- Anâgâmin, 167.
- Ânanda, 164; 165; 168; 179, et passim.
- Ânantarya sins, p. 198 note.
- Anutpatikadharmakshânti, 169 note.
- Anuttarasamyaksambodhi, 191.
- Arhat, 178; 195.
- Arhatghâta, 197 note.
- Asaṅkha kalpas, 185.
- Avaivartya, 191.
- Avalokiteśvara, 176, et passim.
- Bhagavat, see World-Honoured One.
- Bhikṣus, 161; 175; 177; 189.
- Bimbisâra, 161; 167.
- Bodhi, 168; 191; 196; 197; 199; the circle of, 200 note.
- Bodhi-maṇḍala, 200.
- Bodhisattvas, 161, et passim.
- Brahma-maṇi, 176.
- Brahman (god), 165; 172.
- Brute creation, 165; 182 note; 184.
- Buddha, spiritual body of, 178; the height of Buddha Śākyamuni, 187; the charity of, 188.
- Chiliocosm, 173; 180.
- Depravities (five), 165 note.
- Devadatta, 161; 165.
- Dhârani, 190.
- Dharmadhātu-kāya, 178.
- Dharmākara, 177; 194.
- Enlightenment, the round terrace of, 200.
- Existence, the five paths of, 182; non-, 171; 174; 193.
- Five deadly sins, 192; 197 note.
- Gambudvîpa, 165.
- Gāmbûnada (gold), 173; 176; 178; 180; 182.
- Gaṅgâ, 180.
- Garlands, 162; 163, et passim.
- Gîva, famous physician, 163; 164.
- Grîdhrakrûra, 161; 162; 164; 201.
- Hardy (Spence), 187 note.
- Hells, 165; 182 note; 184.
- Hungry spirits (Pretas), 165; 182 note.
- Impermanence, 171; 174; 193.
- Indra, 165; 173.
- Kâlayas, a Sramana from India, 161.
- Kaṇḍâla, 164.
- Kandraprabha, minister of king Bimbisâra, 163.
- Karma, 183; 200.
- Karmâvarana-viuddhi, 200 note.
- K-kô (Chisha-daishi of Ten-dai), 161 note.
- Kimsuka, 176.
- Kintâmani, 174 note.
- Kshânti (Anutpatikadharma-), 169.

Kshatriyas (the kingly race), 163.
Kumārabhūta, 161 note.

Lapis lazuli, 169, et passim.
Law, prince of the, 161; remembrance of the, 174; eternal Law, 169 note.

Mahāmaudgalyāyana (mokuren), 162; 163; 164; 165; 201.

Mahāsthāma, 176; named Unlimited Light, 184, et passim.

Mahāvīyutpatti, 197 note.

Mahāyāna, 168; 188; 190; 191; 195; 197.

Maheśvara Deva, 166.

Mañjuśrī, 161.

Marks (minor), 174.

Mātrighāta, 197 note.

Meditation, 167, et passim.

Nāga, 201.

Nirvāna, 167; 169; 194.

Noble Truths (the four), 193.

Non-existence, 171; 174; 193.

Non-self, 171; 174; 193.

Padma (lotus), 184.

Parāmitā, 174.

Pitrighāta, 197 note.

Prayer, of Dharmākara, 177; mystic form of, 190; the forty-eight, 194.

Precepts, the eight prohibitive, 162; 192; the ten prohibitive, 167 note; the five prohibitive, 192.

Pretas, 165; 184.

Pundarika, 200.

Pūrṇa (Furuna), 162.

Rāgagriha, 161.

Remembrance (sixfold), 188; of the Buddha, 174, et passim.

Resignation (spirit of), 169; 181; 189; 191; 199.

Saddharmapundarika, 161; 200 note.

Sakra (Indra), 165; 173; 176.

Sakrābhilagnamāniratna, 173 note.

Sākyamuni, 165; 182; the height of, 187 note; 201.

Samādhi, 171; 181; 191; 199.

Saṅghabheda, 197 note.

Saṅghika lābha, 196.

Satadharmavidyādvāra, 192; 196 (where the Sanskrit is omitted).

Scriptures, the twelve divisions of, 186; 195.

Shān-tāo (Jen-do Daishi), 162; 163 note.

Signs of perfection, 174; 178.

Siva, 166.

Spells, 163.

Sramanas, 163.

Sramanera (a novice), 193.

Śrāvakas, 189.

Srota-āpanna, 194.

Sufferings, the five worldly, 169; 171; 174; 193.

Sukhāvatī, 166; 167; 168; 171; 175; 185; 200.

Sumeru, 166; 177; 180.

Tathāgata (Nyo-rai), 164; 178; 187.

Tathāgatasyāntike dushrakittaru-dhirotpādana, 197 note.

Three Jewels (Ratna-traya), 167; 188 note; 196.

Ushnīshajiraskatā, 182.

Vaidehī, consort of Bimbisāra, 161; 164, et passim.

Vaipulya Sūtra, 188; 190; 195.

Veda, 163.

World-Honoured One, 162; 164, et passim, being a translation of Bhagavat, the Blessed One.

Yaksha, 201.

Yama, 177; 180.

TRANSLITERATION OF ORIENTAL ALPHABETS ADOPTED FOR THE TRANSLATIONS
OF THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST.

CONSONANTS.	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.				Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pehlvi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	I Class.			III Class.							
	I Class.	II Class.	III Class.								
Gutturales.											
1 Tenuis	k				क	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	k
2 " aspirata	kh				ख	𐬖	𐬖	𐬖	𐬖	𐬖	kh
3 Media	g				ग	𐬗	𐬗	𐬗	𐬗	𐬗	
4 " aspirata	gh				घ	𐬘	𐬘	𐬘	𐬘	𐬘	
5 Gutturo-labialis	q					𐬙	𐬙	𐬙	𐬙	𐬙	
6 Nasalis	h (ng)				ङ	{ 𐬚 (ng) 𐬛 (n) }					
7 Spiritus asper	h				ह	𐬜 (h)	𐬜	𐬜	𐬜	𐬜	h, hs
8 " lenis	,										
9 " asper faucalis	ʔh										
10 " lenis faucalis	ʔh										
11 " asper fricatus		'h									
12 " lenis fricatus		'h									
Gutturales modificatae (palatales, &c.)											
13 Tenuis		k			𐬞	𐬞	𐬞	𐬞	𐬞	𐬞	k
14 " aspirata		kh			𐬟	𐬟	𐬟	𐬟	𐬟	𐬟	kh
15 Media		g			𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	
16 " aspirata		gh			𐬡	𐬡	𐬡	𐬡	𐬡	𐬡	
17 " Nasalis		ṅ			𐬢	𐬢	𐬢	𐬢	𐬢	𐬢	

CONSONANTS (continued).	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zand.	Pehlvi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	I Class.	II Class.	III Class.							
18 Semivocalis	y	...	...	ਯ	𐬶	𐬶	𐬶	𐬶	י	...
19 Spiritus asper		(y)	...	...	𐬶 init.	...	...	...	...	...
20 " lenis		(y)	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
21 " asper assibilatus		s	...	ਸ	𐬶	𐬶	𐬶	𐬶	...	...
22 " lenis assibilatus		s	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Dentales.										
23 Tenuis	t	...	...	ਤ	𐬶	𐬶	𐬶	𐬶	ת	...
24 " aspirata	th	...	...	ਥ	𐬶	𐬶	𐬶	𐬶	ת	th
25 " assibilata	d	...	TH	ਦ	...	...	...	...	...	...
26 Media	dh	...	...	ਧ	...	...	...	...	...	...
27 " aspirata		...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
28 " assibilata		...	DH	ਧ	...	...	...	...	...	...
29 Nasalis	n	...	...	ਨ	...	...	...	...	נ	n
30 Semivocalis	l	...	...	ਲ	...	...	...	...	ל	l
31 " mollis 1		l	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
32 " mollis 2		...	L	ਲ	...	...	...	...	...	...
33 Spiritus asper 1	s	...	...	ਸ	...	...	...	...	ש	s
34 " asper 2		...	s	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
35 " lenis	z	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	ז	z
36 " asperimus 1		...	z (g)	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
37 " asperimus 2		...	z (g)	...	...	...	...	...	...	...

Dentales modificatae
(linguals, &c.)

38	Tenuis	...	t	...	८	...	ط	...	ط	...	...
39	" aspirata	...	th	...	...	...	ط	...	ط	...	...
40	Media	...	d	...	...	...	ط	...	ط	...	...
41	" aspirata	...	dh	...	...	...	ط	...	ط	...	...
42	Nasalis	...	n	...	...	...	ط	...	ط	...	...
43	Semivocalis	...	r	...	...	...	ط	...	ط	...	...
44	" fricata	...	r	...	...	...	ط	...	ط	...	...
45	" diacritica	...	...	...	...	...	ط	...	ط	...	...
46	Spiritus asper	...	sh	...	...	...	ط	...	ط	...	...
47	" lenis	...	zh	...	...	...	ط	...	ط	...	...
Labiales.											
48	Tenuis	...	p	...	...	...	ط	...	ط	...	...
49	" aspirata	...	ph	...	...	...	ط	...	ط	...	...
50	Media	...	b	...	...	...	ط	...	ط	...	...
51	" aspirata	...	bh	...	...	...	ط	...	ط	...	...
52	Tenuissima.	...	p	...	...	...	ط	...	ط	...	...
53	Nasalis	...	m	...	...	...	ط	...	ط	...	...
54	Semivocalis	...	w	...	...	...	ط	...	ط	...	...
55	" aspirata	...	hw	...	...	...	ط	...	ط	...	...
56	Spiritus asper	...	f	...	...	...	ط	...	ط	...	...
57	" lenis	...	v	...	...	...	ط	...	ط	...	...
58	Anusvāra.	...	m	...	...	...	ط	...	ط	...	...
59	Visarga.	...	h	...	...	...	ط	...	ط	...	...

Labiales.

[illegible]

VOWELS.	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pehlvi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	I Class.		II Class.							
	I Class.	II Class.	III Class.							
1 Neutralis	0			...	...	...	...	...	...	ā
2 Laryngo-palatalis	ē			...	...	...	...	...	...	ā
3 " labialis	ō			...	...	...	...	...	...	ā
4 Gutturalis brevis	a			...	...	...	...	...	...	i
5 " longa	ā		(a)	...	...	...	...	...	...	ī
6 Palatalis brevis	i			...	...	...	...	...	...	
7 " longa	ī		(i)	...	...	...	...	...	...	
8 Dentalis brevis	h			...	...	...	...	...	...	
9 " longa	h			...	...	...	...	...	...	
10 Lingualis brevis	rī			...	...	...	...	...	...	
11 " longa	rī			...	...	...	...	...	...	
12 Labialis brevis	u			...	...	...	...	...	...	u
13 " longa	ū		(u)	...	...	...	...	...	...	ū
14 Gutturo-palatalis brevis	e			...	...	...	...	...	...	e
15 " longa	ē (ai)		(e)	...	...	...	...	...	...	āi
16 Diphthongus gutturo-palatalis	āi		(ai)	...	...	...	...	...	...	ei, ēi
17 " " " " " "	ei (ēi)			...	...	...	...	...	...	
18 " " " " " "	oi (ōu)			...	...	...	...	...	...	
19 Gutturo-labialis brevis	o			...	...	...	...	...	...	o
20 " longa	ō (au)		(o)	...	...	...	...	...	...	āu
21 Diphthongus gutturo-labialis	āu		(au)	...	...	...	...	...	...	
22 " " " " " "	eu (ēu)			...	...	...	...	...	...	
23 " " " " " "	ou (ōu)			...	...	...	...	...	...	
24 Gutturalis fracta	ä			...	...	...	...	...	...	
25 Palatalis fracta	ī			...	...	...	...	...	...	
26 Labialis fracta	ū			...	...	...	...	...	...	ü
27 Gutturo-labialis fracta	ö			...	...	...	...	...	...	

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